S/PV.535 Security Council

When the Council adjourned yesterday afternoon [534th 1neeting], 1 was about ta proceed ta deal with the suggestion made by the representative of India [533rd 1neeting] that, in agreement with a similar suggestion made by Sir Owen Dixon in his report l, the 5ecurity Council might agree that the initiative in this matter should now pass to the parties themselves, and that the parties should be left ta settle this dispute by direct negotiations. 2. The Council is awarc that, ever since this dispute arose, repeated effo.rts have been made by the Govern- 2. différend cinqltième documents 3. l maintain that that was the fairest possible solution of the situation which had arisen and the fairest sett1ement of the dispute over accession. Nobody can suggest that it wouId have given any kind of advantage to Pakistan or, indeed, to India, and that is the reason why 1 maintain that it was a very fair solution, 4. The trouble which had arisen was still in its initial stages, That solution did nat commend itse1f to the Governmen~ of .India, and the principal reason it adyanced agamst It was that, for constitutional reasons It was not willing to invest ils Governor-General with the needed authority ta act on its behalf, Pakistan on the other.hand, \Vas ready ta invest its Gover;lOr- General Wlt~ the needed authority. It was in reply ta that suggestton that the Prime Minister of India made the offer, part of which l read out from his telegram of 8 ,November yesterday afternoon, when l drew attentIOn ta paragraphs 10 and Il of that telegram. 5.. That was our first attempt ta come ta a sett1ement IVI,th the Ç10vernment of India of the problem that had :nsC'n, Smce then, over the course of the years 1948 (V49, 1950 and even 1951, efforts have been made t~ rr.tch alsettlement by uegotiation if possible but those e orts lave been unavai1i~g. l need not dilate li on them nor. draw t~e Councl1's attention to them, the conversatIons,whlch have taken place and the corre: spondence WhlCh has gone on have not led t th' concrete. l therefore submit that 't . h Il 0 any l.u~g to suggest th t th' 1 IS W a y unrea IStlC matter by negaotia~iPartbles ought ta be left to settle this on etween themselves. 6, As l set out bef tl C ' 1100n an internatioore le ounCl1 yesterday after~ Indi~ and Pakistan whhl igreement exists between pute, The whole diffi lt re. erence ta t~e Kashmir discu y IS ta get Indla ta implement 7. In this connexion, ",hen maki"g tmB suggestion the representative of India a.lled t11e attention of the Security Council ta Il Press report. acoording to him dated 20 February from Karachi, te) the effect. that Sarclar Mahamnlc"ld Ibrahim Khan, former head of the Asad Kashmir Govemmcnt. had expre:s...oo the view that aU Indo-Pa.kistan disputell, induding the dispute relating to Kashmir, c(llIld be settled by Indla and Pakistan between themselvC"s by .mutual di~ls~ion. Even if that were SO, cvcn if Sarclar 7\!ahnmmad Ibrahim Khan had said this, that would he the opinicJn or the hope (If oneindividuaJ who might weil mal<e a mistake in assessillg the possibilitic!I of a seulement bv mutual negotiation. Il is not u if Sardar Mahammad Ibrahim Khan were speaking on Il qUl'"Stion of facto Il 50 happens, howcver, that Sardar Mahamnuad Ibrahim Khan did not say that sorne PreS!! agf:llC)' bas attributed tu him. 8. Apparently, on noticing in the Press wltat. wu attributed to hil11, Sa.rclar Mahammad Ibrahim Khan. dispatched a telegram to the President of the Settlrity Coundl whicl1 rends as foUows: "My statement as reported br the Press Trust of India and quoted by the Indlatl reprc.sentative is whoUy incorrect. The correct text of the statement made by mc, repre~ti.ng my viewli and publis.herl in the Pakisla" Tittt"'s o{2J February 1951. il> L'i f0110W5 ••• " It will be reœUed. that the drait reKllut:ion now before the Security Coundl (SIZ017] wu pre!lented tothe Council on 21 February in the aJtemoon, when it Wl.!li already 22 February in the Indian flub-continent. Thili statement of Sardar Mnhammad Ibrahim Klum 'Na1i published on 23 Februa.ry. He hu quotec1 hi.!! sta.tementi whic:h is as follo1oVtl: uThe dra.ft resolution as presente<! 10 the Security Council by the AnglO*American deleptions is a definite deviation From the stand taken by the Coundl in ils earlier resolution and amcmnts ta a.ppe:uement of intt1Ulsigence of Iodla. "1t i5 comforting tc, note that the propoMI made by Sir Owen Dixon in bis report to leave the parties concemed to settle the dispute anmng themselves ha.s been rejected. 1 Sll~est that the Secunty Cou.oeil ShOllld be asked to Il.sue an injunction order to the Govemment of India and the Dogra Crlwemment, restraining them .from holding electi<)Os .to the proposed State 'constituent assembly' as nothing short of an over-al1 plebiscite will Mtisry the I<a.shmiris. "The State of Jammu and Kashmir should remain one single unit, and no govenunent or party should be allowed to functioll during the plebiscite. "The Security Council should ensure that the Muslim population of the Indian-occupied part of the State is not hounded out, either through starvation or terrorization." 9. It will thus be appreciated by the Security Coundl that the version of this statement to which Sir Benegal Rau referred in his. speech on 1 March could not possibly have emanated from Sardar Mahammad Ibrahim Khan. It is inconceivable that any Press agency could have made a mistake on the point, unless it invented the statement itse1f, inasmuch as the statement that l have quoted does refer to this point and says exactly the opposite of what it is alleged Sardar Mahammad Ibrahim Khan said. He said: "It is comforting to note that the proposaI made by Sir Owen Dixon in his report ta leave the parties concerned to settle the dispute among themselves has been rejected." 10. Therefore, as l have submitted, even if Sardar Mahammad Ibrahim Khan had said what was attributed to him, that really would have no relevance to the issue. It would he the opinion or the appraisal of one individual. But actual1y he has not said that to which the representative of India drew the Security Council's attention. 11. What would be the reslllt if any such counsel were to be followed? It would enable India to consolidate its hold on Ka;;~mir and ta continue systematically to alter the compOSitIOn of the population by forcing or driving out more and more Muslims as refugees into Pakistan and settling non-Muslims in their place. ' 12. The repres~ntative of India said the other day, in the course of hls speech, that conditions in Kashmir were now settling down and that it would be a pity to c, di~tl\rb them - presumably through further efforts to brmg about a peaceful s~ttlement of the dispute. One of ~he aspects. of the setthng down of conditions that is takmg place 1.S ~ consta~t stream of Muslim refugees out of Kashmlr lUto Pakistan. And our· information _ of course, ~t is not based on the personal knowledge of ~l.l1y of u~, masmuch as we have no access to the Vallev ltself-.IS that a good deal of the substitution of th~ populatIOn has gone on and is still going on' that is that. refugees from India.- refugees who had'to go t~ Ind~a as such, non-,Musltms - are being settled in the terntory of Kashmlr. 14. lation droÎts liberté, la Pakistan. part son 14, There can be no setùing down oC conditions until the people of Kasnmir are given the fullegt right le> dC"> termine) absolutely and rn.-ely, wiLhout any kind of hindmnce or inf1UetlL"e or (lteSSure, the queltion of accession oC the State to 1ndla or ta Pakistan, On ~ hal{ of India, any suggestion that India ml0uld relax ils hold over Kashmir is resented, 15. tendant mire. demandent. de ne fcr protester et 15, Indiaresents any suggestion that it should relax its hald on Kashmir, Uecause the Government and people oC Pakistan demand this, they appear to Indian eyes as disturbers of peace and as indter! tu war. India desires to he left alone to complete Lhe strangulation of Kashmir, and every voice rnlllcd in protest agaîrtllt its broken pledges and ilS tyrarmy in Kashmir jars on its ear!!. One can appredate that kind of sel1shiveness, though of course one cannat bc expected to !wmpathite with it. • aremf;.~. évidemment provoque 16. la porter cherche non-violence, Il llne probleme situntion pa.raiSMit des mais une œrtains y res nlidt>r President l!Ultion indienne t>npa.llW1t muion a lion condse que 16. Again, Sir Benegal Rau ho nmde Il reference to propagancla in Pakistan tbreatening ""ar Clver K.u.shmir. 1 suppose the insinuation is that India stands onl)' for peace and non-violence ""hile Pakistan Îs a wamlOnger. rrue, in Pakistan there has beeft, there still is, .Il great denl of agitation in the minds of the people overthill problem of Kuhmir. It would he futile tu deny that the situation hu often boilecl up la bursting point. Thal sh?ws the degree of intensity of reeling in Pakistan cwer thl5 que.stion, but that war or warlike polides are threatened from the Indian side cannat he denie<!. Apart f:om certain mmtalJl movernentli that took pInce 8IOme ttme Qg? in. India to~vards the tl(:Jr(1ers of Pakistan, the only o,b)cctlve of whlC:h c()uld he ta overnwe Pakistan, there 15 the statement of Mr. Khare, !:he President of the. Hindu Mal.1Uabha, an imp(lrtant politieal body to w}llch the Preludent of the Indian Onlon retently lient !us good wishes. Incidentally, the Hindu Maluumhha IS n purely communal Hindu organization. This stAte~ ment appeared in the Press on 22 Februar,' 1951. Mr. Khare's solution 110 short and sharp. Refcrring to Kashmir, he said the solution wu "to attack and attach it", 17. Il. would he unprofi~nl~le to go on mu1t.iplying references to that WhlCh, If It proves nnything at aIl, yr0,:,es that ce.rtainly in P.aki~tan, possibly ail throllghout 17. prouvent Pakistan, quc ndl~, th,ere III great agItatIon and disturbance of the pubhc mmd ~ver the continuation of this dispute. Tlw only conclUSion that can be drawn therefrom ill that speedy, vigorous and effettive action is needed to bring St' tirt'r. est 18 Sir Benegal Rau also drew the attention of the Se~urity Council to the fact that India had alread~ reduced its forces in Kashmir by 29 to 25 p~r cen without waiting for any corrèSpOndll;g. r.eductlOn by Pakistan. That, again, is a matte~ on whl~h, m the nature of things, we have n? direct mfonnatlOn. l hav~ ?~ reason to question thls statement made by my dlstm ished friend. l accept it as correct, but, ?n the o~her ~nd, our information is that, even after thlS reductl?n, India maintains at the present. 111?ment s~methl11g like four divisions in Kashmir. TlllS IS many tn;nes the strength of Pakistan forces in the Asad Kashmlr area. The total strength of the Indian armed for.ce~, we have been informed, in Indian-occupied Kashl11lr IS roug~ly 65,000 men. This, again rO\I~hly, mea~l~ one Indlan soldier for every forty Kashmms. In addItIOn, there are the State anned forces, inc1uding the State army and militia, totaling twenty-one battalio~s. and· a cavalry regiment. That is we believe - and It IS based on such information as is ~vailable to us - a fair estimate of the armed forces maintained in the Indian-occupied portion of Kashmir. 19. armées l'Etat, Cachemire, fie-t-il? lation moment, giques tère timides, timidité, Ils tyrannie condition extrêmement payent Pakistan, leur cette tage ceux s'établir réussissent positions vie Si au lants tout 19. l have said that the proportion of the Indian armed forces alone, leaving out the State army and the State militia, is one ta forty Kashmiris, men, women and children. What is the significance of that? As has been observed by Sir Owen Dixon, the people of the Valley, of whom we are talking at the moment, are not a high-spirited and independent people. They are cxtremely tlmid. They have been rendered timid, and some of the stories of their timidity, if related, would raise both laughter and pity. They have been rendered timid by a hundred years of the most grinding tyranny under the Dogra rulers. They are a highly artistic peo~le, even in their present state. Specimens of their artlstic work fetch high priees and are highly appreciated in Pakistan, India and elsewhere. Given the chance, they are also an cxtremely cultured people, although that kind of chance comes to a very small percentage of the people of the Valley of Kashmir, and only when they have left the Valley. Those who have gone outside Kashmir and settled down in Pakistan and India not only have given an extremely good account of themselves, but they have always risen to the highest positions, both in public life and in the field of letters and culture, in much larger numbers in proportion. to their size in Pakistan and. India than any other section of the population. 20.. The late Sir Mohamad Iqbal, the great poet and 20., phJloso~her, with whom originated the very concept of Pakistan and who first gave expression to itphIlo~op~e, et t~ough the name. ,crone into existence later - was hlmse1f. a Kashmlr1:. He, has w,ritten and sung of Kashnm and Kashmms wlth especlal pathos in poignant n'~st natre Cachenme , 21. He praye<! for something that might inspire the lowly_ people of Kashmir with a spark of dignity. Here is a Kashmiri of the present generation - Sir Mohamad Iqbal died only a few yean aga - describing the degradation, the misery, the wretchedness of his own people. In another verse, he said: "The Kashmiri, the bondsman who himself goes about inrags, while hi:'! master adorns l1imself in the heautiful silks woven bv his slaves". This i5 an almost Iiteml description of the conditions in Kashmir. 22. That \Vas Sir Mohamad lqbal. The prcsem Govcrnor-General of Pakistan is li. Ka....hmin. The Minister of the Interior in the Pakistan Central GOYernment is a K.uhmiri. The Gtlvernor of Sind. one (lf the provinces of Pakistan, is a Kashmiri. The Prime Mimster of the Northwest Frontier Province is a Kashmiri, and a hast of others, as 1 h.'\ve sa.id, oct'upy very honourable positions in the cl.llturalliic of Pakistan and, indeecl, even of India. That is the ki.nd of people who have been reduced to the conditions 1 Mve d~ scribed in the words of Sir Mohanlad Iqbal and which has been described in very moderatc language by Sir Owen Dixon. There is one armerl lndian soldier to fort)' Kashmiris. As a matter of faet, one 5(lldier armed \Vith no more than a bayonet couIc! drive 4,000 Kash· miris today in whatever direction he dellired, 23. The Security Council call judge ta what extent the presence of any troops among people of that kind, who have suffered ta that degree and ta tbat extent, would Interfere \Vith the freedom and impartiaHty of the plebiscite., As a matter of Caer, it would not he u Question of interfere,'nce. The Mere sight of oomebodv whom the Kc"lshmiris Ilupp0sed wa..'!l J:IOste:d there b). Shcik Abdul/a's Govel11ment and who esirec!. the actes~ sion of Kashmir to India \\-'Ould penmade 99 Kashmiris out of 100 to vote for the areession, although e...erv one of ~hose 99, telt ta himself, would vote for aœeuion to Pakistan. In those clrcumstanccs, India's oonlinueO oc~p~tjo~ of Kashmir hy. force and il.'S insistence l,pon retallllng ltS armecl forces ln Kashmir. is a most flagrant aet of aggression and a mast potent threat ta the maintenance of international peaœ. 24. It. is an aggress:ion not only against the people of Kashn11r, but al50 against Pakistan, It ill a threat to the very existence of Pakistan, sinœ India aimll thereby nat a~ly ta enc:ircle P~istan strategically, but allia tn h.ave Its 7conomy at Ils mercy b)' control of ail the rlvers WhlCh are the lif~blood of \Vest Pakistan, Thal the referen~ to strategie endrclement is not a figure of speech 15 borne out by Sheik Abdulla himself. A Press report of a statement which he ga\'(! in Delhi on 21 October 1947 rends, in part, as follows: "Due to the strategie position that the State he1d, if this State joins the Indian Dominion, he thought, Pakistan would be completely encircled." 25. Owing to India's persistent refusai to withdraw its forces and permit a fair and impartial plebiscite to be he1d, Kashmir is today an explosive spot and is a cause of the most acute anxiety to the whole world, but more particularly to Pakistan and to our neighbours both in the Middle East and in the Far East. It may be within the knowledge of the Security Councilinasmuch as same of these communications have been addressed to the Secretary-General and may have beell passed on to the Coundlthat the Iranian Parliament, a nU111ber of Syrian Deputies and a number of Iraqi Deputies have expressed their anxiety over the continuation of this dispute and have requested that, having regard ta the peace of that region of the earth and l1ltimately tointernational peaee, this dispute should be quickly and fairly and justly resolved throl1gh peacefui methods. 26. More recently, expression has been given to similar sentiments on behalf of the non-official representatives of the whole of that region in the sessions of the M otamar, or the Conference of Islamic Countries, which took place in Karachi. 27. It would be enough to quote in this connexion the view of one who took part in the discussions on Kashmir in the recent Prime Ministers' Conference in London. I refer to Mr. Menzies, the Prime Minister of Australia, one of our Far Eastern neighbours. I take this quotation from The Ti1nes of London of 16 January 1951: "1 want ta say to my friend, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, as 1 would say to the Prime Minister of Inclia if he were hcre tOllight, that there is nothing we are not prepared to do to get rid of a matter which, so long as it continues, is not only a threat to the peace and good government of the Indian suL-conti. nent, but is a grave threat to the security of the entire free world." 28. The problem beiore the Security Coundi can . be very briefly stated. It is to insist upon India's carrying out the obligations that it has unclertaken. The disparity between India's professions, both in connexion with Kashl11ir andin connexion with other problems, and its action, is so wide that the world stands puzzled by it. Most people imagine that a great country, as India undoubtedly is, claiming to be a peacefui Member of the United Nations and professing to base its concluct on the loftiest moral principlesand, in fact, preaching to the world from a high moral pedestal - could hardly be so inconsistent where its OWll obligations are concerned. Yet, no fact in recent history is so indisputab1y established as this: that India has, .over a long period, through various excuses, l)ersistently refused.to carry out what it had undertaken to do. 30. India re,aLizes t!lat no impartial penlOn wouM regard its excuses or interpretations as vaUd, and there· fore it reEuses to face arbitration. Il tumerl down the proposai for arhitrution put forward by.the û)~l!Tlis' sion. Throughout the yeu 1950, the Pnme lIhmster of Pakistan, in personal discussÎon and in corresfJon· dence \vith the Prime :Minister of India, tried his utmm,t ta get the Prime Min.ister oE India to aœept arbitration for settling ail outstanding disputes between India and Pakistan if negotiations and mediation shonlcl fail. The Prime Minister of India would not agree. 31. 1 venture to submit that no pa.rty to a dispute, let alone a great country Iike India, which knnwslts stand in a dispute to be just, wauld refuse impa,rtial arbitration. rnclia's refusai is a denr indicatIOn of 1ndia's own estimation of where it stands. It knows il is wrong, and therefore it has tumed dc)wn t'\'Cf)f suggestion that some impartial authority should detemline those points with regard to which the two parties are at variance, relatin.g to the international agreement embodied in the resalutions of the CmlllllÎssion of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 [S/1100, S/ll96j. 32. But even where the stand of a party is deemed not to he fair or JUSl, at leut by the oppostng partv, in the ulomate resort what ili the method of rcsol..-iilg a deadlock of that description? There is an agreement affirmed by both, accepted by bath - still affinned and accepted bl' both: c1ifferences arise with regard to iu interpretatlOn or method of implementation; one sicle insists thl1t ils Interpretation of the agreement shlmld be acceptecl and given effeet to; the otherparty does not accept that intelJlretation as valid. How in the worlel can you decide Il dtspute oC that kiud e.xcept through arbitration, if mediation or conciliation or othcr attempts at adjustment shouJd fail, as they have all faiJed in this case? 33. Let us assume for one moment that the fault ill wholly Pakistan'lI. ACter aH, that ia the utnulst that my learned friend could contenc1. Let us D$SUme that, in respect of every matter that is holding up the progres~ of a settlement, Pakistan is to bla.l11e and is in the wron~. Weil, Pakistan says: "Let an impartial authorit)' loo~ lnto the matter and tell bath lildes what their obhgations are. Let bath sides say, '\>\le here and IlOW agree that, when wc are told wbat our obligations art'. we shaU carry them out fully'," ~4, What more is required of us, assuming we are 10 the wrong? Arter ail, India can on1)' contend that 35. On numerous occasions, Pakistan has expressed its willingness to have its pending disputes with India settled through arbitratiOll. l shall draw attention to only one statement of the Prime Minister of Pakistan, made in the course of what has now come ta be known as the "No "Var Declaration" corresponc1ence. l be1ieve the correspondence has been made public. In paragraph 3 of his letter dated 21 November 1950, to the Prime Minister of Inciia, the Prime Minister of Pakistan 'wrote: "It seems to me that, if we are to move forward, we must face squarely what it is that has prevented India from acceptil1g my No War Declaration. Reviewing our correspondence, it becomes quite clear that the crux of the difficulty is the re1uctance of your Government ta substitute, on any issue, impartial arbitration for threaienecl and actual use of force. India has been ttnwilling to accept the decision of an impartial arbiter on any issne now outstanding. Pakistan is and has been willing io accept the decision of an impartial arbiter on every issue outstanding between us." 36. Can Pakistan be called upon or expected ta make alny g1reater contribution toward the settlement of international disputes through peaceful methods? As l have already said, let us assume for one moment that every charge that my learned and distinguished friend from India makes against Pakistan has substance. \Vell, then, we will go to arbitration and we will be turned clown. We are prepared to take that risk. Why does not India eagerly embrace this fair opportunity offered to it of having every one of these matters in which it considers itself in the right decided in its favour? 37. This, then, is the situation which the Security Council has ta resolve: that India, while professing to adhere io the international agreement contained in those two resolutions, and repeating its acceptance and affirmation of it, refuses in actual fact to carry it out. 38. The rej ection by the representative of India of the United Klt1gdom-United States draft resolution which is now before ihe Securlty Council is the latest instance of this intransigence. The main ground that he has put forward for rej ecting the resolution is that it endorses Sir Owen Dixon's proposaIs for demi1itar~ izatioll, which, according to the representative of India go beyond the terms of the reso1tüions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949. 39. As l tried ta explain ta the Security Couneil earlier, the resolutions divided the demilitarization process int? two stages, the truce stage.and the plebiscite stage. l wlll not repeat that; l submltted it as late as yesterday to the Council. India took objection with rega.rd to s?mething that was ta be attempted and carned out 111 the second stage on the ground that it should be carried out in the first stage. Being impressed 40. Then Sir Owen Dixon t(»ok up the same idea and attacked the whole demilîtariz<'ltion pmblem together. NaturallYI whell l'OU depart {rom the method of impiementation laid down in ail in.'ltïllment. sorne dUU1ges do creep in, but the objective remainJl the saille, namely the demilitarizatioll of the State to the extent which will enable a fair and impartial plebiscite to be held. He put forward his scheme, but objt'C:tion Vlas taken to that on the groulld that it depa.rted {rom the two resolutions. India witl not do ""hat the t""O resolutions say: it says they mean something e15e. India will flot agree ta have the point in dispute arbitratt~ upon, it will not do wllat it has already agreed to do. taking inta account the disbandillfI and dlsarming of the A:lfld Kashmir forces, and Il will not do what Sir Owen Dixon suggests. 41. If at this stage ail that is attempted ill Mother mediation, the whole history of the dispute ShO\"'ll that it will meet with the Mme result a.'1 previous mediation efforts. Those who are waiting in agon)' and impatience upon the action to he taken by the Security umndl to resolve this most explosive problem will be C'ompe.lled to come ta the conclUSion tltal the Securil)' Council is not prepared to deal with it, as I.·ts dUl.it'.S as the principal organ of the United Nations make il imperative that it should. 42. What is it that we suggest might help to rnove matters forwn.rd? vVe submit tl1a1 the Sec:urlty Coundl should depute an outstanding pers<mality 01 high repute a;nd stau?ing to bring about the implementation ?f the mtenlatlClnal agreement and to carr)' out ils l~lplementation. and should ~ve him full powers Cor the chscharge ?~ hi~ r~sponsibihty, i~c1uding the power to ~e.ct demJ11tarlutlOn ~yrernovmg or disbanding tht' m111tary forces of aU rnterested parties - to use the words used ~y Sir Gladwyn Jebb on 21 February [532nd tneellng1- to exercise effective supervision over the fUfictions of govemment in the Statt! and to declde finally any points of difference whkh might arise ?etwe~n the ~arties in t.he carrying out of thase duti(~s, l~cludmg the mterpretatlOn of any clauses o( the internatIonal ~g~eement. embodied in the two resolutions o( the C0t?mlsslon w~lch \Vere accepted Il)" the parties and which bath parties contrnue to accept. At the same time, 43. In view of the information now before the Security Coundl relating to the proposaI ta call a State constituent assembly in Kashmir, India should be asked not to proceed with the convocation of the constituent assembly in Kashmir and not to make any attempt to determine unilaterally the future of the State. By taking this action the Security Council would be putting ta a final and conclusive test the professions of the Government of India that it is ready ta honour its obligations under the resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949. 44. The draft resolution now before the Councll should therefore be modified in the sense that l have indicated. There are some clauses in that draft resolution whieh should be omitted and there are others which need to be amended. For example, sub-paragraph 4 (iii) relates to the possibility of boundary adjustments, which in fact wouId mean a partial partition of the State. This subparagraph is ~n c~ntravention of the international agreements embodled III the resolutions of August 1948 and January 1949, and should he omitted. This is something which has not been asked for either by India or by Pakistan, neither has either of the two main politieal parties in Kashmir, the National Conference and the Muslim Conference, asked .for anything of thekind in fact, aH parties are opposed to this suggestion. Her~ is the latest pronouncement of Sheik Abdulla on this point, reported from New Delhi on 24 February. l am 9uoting from the Pakistan Times of 25 February, and ln the course of his statement on the resolution Sheikh Abdulla is reported as having stated: ' "The latest resolution has again insinuated the suggestion for the partition of the State in itsfinal disposition, so as to secure parts of it for bath the States of India and Pakistan. This holds out dangerous possibilities of the dissolution of the State of Jammu and Kashmir as an organic unit and is hound to result in the people being deprived of their nation's existence and identity." 45.· l need not at this stage go into further details on the draft resolution, but l shall do so if the necessity should arise. At the present moment we are as l conceive, occupied with the main question of pr[nciple which is that the two .resolutions of August' 1948 and ]anuary 1949 have been accepted al:d reaffinned by both sldes and the effort of the Secunty Council must be directedtowards the implementation of those two resolutions. The whole object of those two resolutions is to move forward towards, and ta organize and hold, a free and impartial plebiscite, and it is that abject whic~ must be kept in view al! the time. Every step that 15 necessary must be taken towards the achievement of that objective, and no step must in the slightest degree take awa~ from the freedom and impartiality of the plebiscite. \ .. 46. The representative of India referred ta the interests of.the people of Kashmir, and this is what the interests of the people of Kashmir demand. He said: 48. The vast majority of these people have, as 1 have said, suffered for over a century under the most despotîc tyranny. They are today living under constant threat and dread of bayonets. Undoubtedly their future must be decided in their own interests and in accordance with their own desires, but it is only the people of Kashmir, voting in a free plebiscite, who can decide their own future in accordance with their own interests and desires. We do not ask for more, but we shall not be content with less. . '. 49. The representative of India has talked of concessions to Pakistan, and has said that India can make no more concessions. We ask for no concessions. Is it a concession that this problem should be decided through a free and impartial plebiscite? And if it is a concession, to whom is it a concession? The representative of India painted a very attractive picture the other day of conditions in India and conditions in Kashmir. If a free and impartial plebiscite is held, and that picture represents the actl1al state of affairs, everyone in Kashmir will vote .for accession to India. India should he eager to push for- "ward to that consummation. 50. 1 have stated on previous occasions before the Security Council and 1 repeat that if any proposaI made by me will, in the opinion of the Council, have the effect of swaying the vote of even a single voter against his free wishes, in respect of this matter, that proposaI should be rejected. But the same criterion must be applied to every Indian proposaI. SI. Am. 1. asking for concessions? Am 1 seeking to ~pply a ngld formula? The duty of the Security Council IS clear. 1 am asking for no more. It is only thus that we can seclUe for the people of Kashmir the right of self-determination. It is in this spirit that Sir Gladwyn Jebb made the following remarks in his speech of 21 February [532nd meeting]: . "Whate-:er ~ifficulties may have been felt by either of the partIes 111 the past, 1 hope that there will now be a· ready acceptance of the principle that the best guarantee of a fair expression of the wishes of the people of Kashmir is the removal or disbandment of the military forces of all interested parties and their replacem~nt by United Nations forces which can have no. interest to sway the vote either way. As a principle thlS seems to us at least to be so axiomatic that we can hardly believe that it will not be accepted by 52. l, on behalf of Pakistan, readily accept the principIe laid down by Sir Gladwyn Jebb. l trust that my learned and distingui~hed friend representing India will also do the same;' 'But whether he does or does not, the dutY of the Security Council is clear. It is ta take prompt and vigorous action to hold a free and impartial plebiscite in Kashmir. Withoutthis, there is the greatest danger ta the peace of Asia - indeed, it can easily be to the peace of the whole of the world. . Events are moving fast. There is no time to lose. 53. The Prime Minîster of Pakistan, in a letter dated 14 February 1950, urging the Prime Minister of India ta accept arbitration about standing disputes between India and Pakistan, said the fol1owing: "In aU disputes there is a danger that the party which is in possession of and wishes ta withhold the rightful due of the other may sa conduct itself as either to prevent a fair settlement or to cause such delay in settlement as to produce the same result. Either cause engenders a sense of injustice, frustration and despair of securing a remedy by peaceful means, which is one of the most frequent causes of conflict," 54. On the question of Kashmir, which is both the key to and the barometer of India-Pakistan relations, the sense of frustration and despair has already mounted to a dangerous pitch. The task before the Security Council is of the utmost importance and urgency. l solemnly appeal to the Council to approach that task in that sense of urgency. 55. It has been said, on behalf of India, that India is a secular State, that it is democratic, that it is progressive, and that it is non-violent. It is not my purpose ta question India's greatness on the basis of these daims or, indeed, of many others which readily suggest themselves. It has been either aUeged or insinuated that Pakistan has been guilty of aggression, that Pakistan is retrogressive, that Pakistan is a theocratic State. l do not know what that might mean, but somehow it is employed as a term of derogation. 56. It is not my purpose, especially at this late stage, to enter into a discussion of the relative merits of India and Pakistan. Those who made these charges against Pakistan are well aware that the interim Constitution of Pakistan today is the same as the interim Constitution of India was before hs new Constitution came into force. They are also aware that the proposed Constitution of Pakistan whieh is being framed, ta the extent to which the reports of the Committees have been received, guarantees the same or similar rights, privileges, and safeguards to minorities and groups. It safeguards the same freedoms as the Indian Constitution does. l have no desire to enter into a coinparison on that basis. Let us assume for the moment, for the sake of argument, 57. Pandit Nehru has recently said: "Kashmir, if it goes ta Pakistan, will be ruined." Pakistan itself is for the moment, whatever the wishes in certain quarters,' by the sheer grace of Gad, far from being ruined. And it is the grace of Gad alone that can enable an individual or a people or a State ta survive or ta progress towards prosperity. But even if the apprehension of the illustrious Prime Minister of India were ta any extent well founded, it may be that Kashmir might prefer ta be ruined with Pakistan, as a land of free men, rather than ta live in luxury in the bandage of India. There are human values which often rise above these considerations. There has been a persistent denial of those values during the last three and a half years. How long will the denial continue without danger of consequences that may be sa grave that no reversaI may be possible? 58. This is what l had ta submit at this stage, and l shall wait ta hear what the Security Council will say is the choice offered Pakistan and the people of Kashmir. What should they do ta bring about a peaceful settlement of this problem, consistent with their honour and dignity and the principles of fairness and justice? 59. l am grateful ta the President and ta the Security Council for the indulgence that they extended ta me yesterday and today. l have spoken with emphasis, under the pressure of the agony of Kashmir and the apprehension of the tragic horrors that may overtake that P8:rt of the world if this dispute is not speedily, justly, fatrly and peacefully settled. It has been difficult, on some aspects of this problem, ta speak with due restraint. . l have tried.to exercise t~at restraint but l may have fatled on occaSlOn. ExpreSSIOns may have escaped me that might have jarred the sensitivity of members of the Council, and particularly those of my distinguished ~nd learned friend, Sir Benegal Rau, for whom, as he 1S well aware, l have always entertained and continue to entertain the highest esteem. If that should have happened, l would beg him and the members of the Council to extend their indulgence further so as to overlook anything of that kind. ' 60. The PRESIDENT: For the moment l have no s~eakers on .my list. If n? one wants to speak now, l :"lsh ta adv1se the Secunty Council that l have been mformed that the representative of India would like ta ~eply to the statement of the representative of Pakistan at an early date, but he would like ta have sorne time for preparation. Under the circumstances l would propose ta adjourn the meeting now until Friday afternoon, 9 March at 3 o'clock. 61. As there is no objection, it is sa decided. SALES AGENTS FEaSRpUU~:~~'ONS DEPOSITAIRES D FINLAND - FINLANDE Akateemlnen KlrJakauppa, katu, Helsinki. FRANCE . "d Edition. A. ..e on~, Pari. V. GREECE - GRECE "Eleftheroudakls," nale, Place de la ComtltutlOll, GUATEMALA. Ltd Goubaud & Cla. num 2B Zdo Piso, .Guatemala • , ARGENTINA - ARG ENTlrJl! 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