S/PV.542 Security Council

The Council will remember that at our preceding [541st] meeting on 17 April 1951, the representative of the United Kingdom stressed the opinion that in the grave matters brought to our attention by Israel and Syria, we should do our very best to establish the facts. He then suggèsted that for that purpose and none other we wou1cl be well advised to hear evidence from the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, General Riley, wh{), unc1er the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Syria of 20 July 19491, is also designatec1 Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission, established under article VII of that Agreement, with authority, in his turn, ta designate for that functian a senior {)fficer from the observer personnel of the Truce Supervision Organization. On 17 April the Council agreed that the President would invite General Riley ta appear before the Council in orcier to give clarifications or ta answer questions which some of the participants in the discussion {)n the problem before us might wish t{) put to hi111. l am happy ta say that General Riley, although still in the stage of convalescence from a medical {)peration, has placed himself fully and entirely at the disp{)sal {)f the Cot111cii. 2. l am certain that l interpret the feelings of the members {)f the Council in expressing our appreciatian fDr the readiness with which General Riley has met our request to be here today, notwithstanding the physical handicap from which he is still suffering. l take pleasure in once again introducinv General Riley, wh{) als{) took part in the discussions relating ta the Palestine question last October, t{) the members of the Council.

After hearing the first speaker on my list, the representative of Israel, l sha11 give General Riley an opportunity ta make a statement, and l sha11 also give the opportunity to anyone around this tahle who desires to put questions ta the General.

The territories affected by our present discussion forlu two demilitarized zones on the Israel-Syrian border. The first, whieh l shaH calI the Huleh sector, extends from the eastern and southern banks of Lake Huleh into a narrow strip of territory lying between the River Jordan and the Syrian frontier. The second, which l shall caU the Ein Gev sector, covers an area between the Syrian frontier and the southeast bank of Lake Tiberias. Although the Huleh sector was the scene of the original dispute fomented by Syria during February and March 1951, in an effort ta impede the drainage of the swamps, the main centre of tension has since Iain in the Ein Gev sector, where Syrian forces have established a military outpost at El Hamma in the clemilitarized zone. Both sectors lie c1early ancl ul1cleniably beyoncl the Syrian frontier to the west. Thev have been so situated in relation to that frontier ever' since Syria became a separate political entity, first as a manclated territory and then as an independent State. 5. Incleecl, the Palestine-Syrian frantier, beginning at the Mediterranean and extending eastward towards the Jordan, was made ta turn sharply at a. right angle ta the north in order to keep the territory containing the lake and swamps of Ht1leh within Palestine. This frontier clemarcation was not inadvertent. It was deliberate and prudent, for to the nnrth of Lake Huleh a number of small streams and rivulets come together to [orm the sources of the River Tordan. It is here that our only river gathers up its strèngth, pours itself into the Huleh basin and continues on its southward descent toward thc Sea of Galilee and the Deacl Sea.. It is true of Israel, as it was of Palestine, that failure to possess those sources would preclude any water policy thl'Ollghout the country adequate to extend cultivation by diverting surplus water into the aricl zones. To hole! these water sources is to clutch Israel at its throat and to command its pmspect of development and growth. For Israel to possess them has no such effect on Syria, whose abundant rivers dwarf Israel's meagre water resources and throw a poignant light on the rapacious expansionist daim to these territories which the Syrian representative asserted at this very table here last week [541st meeting], 7. Another weighty consideration affected the Ht11eh swamps themselves. The valley surrounding this lake was once one of the most fertile and thickly populated regions of the country. The neglect of ancient drainage and irrigation systems has, in the course of generations, bred a pernieious swamp, stagnant with slime and buzzing with disease. The germs of malaria lurk everywhere, the Chief of the United States Soil Conservation Service rcported, in surveying this area a few years ago. This dread epidemic has long sapped aIl life and energy on the banks of the lake and in its vicinity. It is the 1110St l1nsanitary district remaining in a country from which the patient toil and effort of decades has all but banished this fearfu! scot!rge. 8. The original demarcation of this international frontier was influenced, even at that time, by the expectation of a development and drainage effort to be unc1ertaken in the course of the establishment of the Jewish national home. Thus, the bounc1ary agreement between France and the United Kingclom included the following provision: "The Government of Palestine or persons authorizec1 by the saic1 government shall have the right to ]milc1 a dam to raise the level of the waters of lakes Hnleh and Tiberias above their normal level on condition that they pay fair compensation ta the owners and occupiers of the land which will thus be iloodecl." 9. In 1934 .Tewish development bodies, organized in the Palestine Land Development Company, acquired the concession at the price of $1 million from the original concessionaires, who hac1 thel11selves purchased it· for $25,000 before the First Wodd War, and held it without undertaking any drainage while malaria reigned until such time as good fortune might reward their passivity. Under the new concession some 14,500 acres 'Nould be ac1ded to cultivation, and malaria eliminated from an area of 25,000 acres. la.. 0;1 24 March 1938 the Huleh Concession Botrndaries Ordinance was ehact~d by the· High Commissioner and Council, and became part of Palestine law. This ordinance demarcated a reserved. and unreserved area and provided that: ."The coi1cessionnaires shaH, subject to the terms . of the c011cession or any concession replacing the \\ \ 11. With respect to the reserved area, the ordinance provided: "Nothing in this ordinance contained shall affect the rights and privileges of the concessionaires under the concession or any concession replacing the same of access to or egress from the reserved area and of exercising and carryingout and maintaining therein and thereon all or any drainage, rec1amation and other works contémplated or prescribed by the concession, or any concession replacing the same suhject to and in accordance with the terms of such concession." 12. It is dear, then, that on the expiration of the Mandate, the Huleh concession possessed by the Palestine Land Development Company constitutec1 a duly acquired vrivate right which any new sovereign, whatever its identity, would be obliged by internati0l1al law to honour and uphold. .. 13. On 14 May 1948 the State of Israel proc1aimed its indepenc1ence within an area which included both the Huleh and the Ein Gev sectors. Inc1eed, throughout the entire partition discussion, it had never occurred to any responsible person to suggest a c1emarcation of the State of Israel which would not commanc1 the water somces indispensable to its growth or which would not include the swamps which Israel had an exclusive right and c1esire to drain. 14. On 18 May 1948 [294th. meeting] the representa.tive of Egypt chal1enged the representative of the United States in the Security Council to define the area in which the Provisional Government of the State of Israel had rightful jurisdicüon. The representative of. the United States indicated an area which included both the sectors now· under discussion. 15. On 14 May 1948 theStateCouncil of Israel enacted as Israellaw within thai area al! the legislation of the· Mandate not specifically revokecl. Major provisions of the H uleh Ordinance have also been explicitly re-enacted. It is tme, however, that the Armistice Agreement prevails. over ail previous conceptions of jurisdiction. Thus, if the Israel-Syrian General Arl~1istice Agreement contained any provision cancellIng previous legislation in the demilitarized zone, exclllding Israel's civil jurisdiction from it, suspending c1ul,yacquired private rights, or according Syria or any Ul?lted Nations representative a capacityhitherto noneXlstent to determine the continuation or cessation of the Huleh drainage work, then that provision would now govern the lega:l situation.' But no such provision exists. No single word to that effect can be found in the Armistice Agreement. vVe could search every nook and cranny of this document, we could shakeit .until it rattled, and we should still find nothing in it which 16. In exall1ining the background of this central question, it is necessary to refer 110t only to the text of the Armistice Agreement itse1f, but also ta th~ letter of Mr. Bunche dated 26 June 1949, which was formally acceptecl by both governments as an authoritative commentary on the proposai which formed the basis of t'he Agreement. It is. also relevant to recall the circumstances of the negotiations which led to the conclusion of that Agreement. The Security Council will reca1l that several months before the tem1ination of the Palestine Mandate on 15 Mav 1948, Syrian regular . forces commenced military activities on the Palestine side of the river in an attempt to overthrow by force resolution 181 (TI) of the General Assembly recom· mendingthe establishment of the State of Israel. Upon the termination of the Mandate, Syrian aggression took the form of a full-seale invasion whereby a salient was formeo on the we~tern sicle of the Tordan between L;].ke Hllleh and the Sea of Galilee, while the Israel villag-e of Mishmar hay Yarclen was occupied by Syrian forces. Thus the invacling- Syrian armies occupied a part, thoug-h not ail, of what is now the Huleh seetor of the c1emilitarized zone and a verv small part indeed of the Ein Gev' sector of the c1emilitarized zone. 17. After the second tnlce in July 1948, no further military activity took place on this front.· When the armistice negotiations began in the sUl11mer of 1949, the Government of Israel proposecl that Syrian forces abandon Israel territory into which their entry had, 18. soit entre saillant victorieuse, invasion qualifier '.•, of the Israel-Syrian international frontier, with the aclded incentive that here the salient had been formed not by a sllccessful counter-attack in response to an invasion, but by a Syrian invasion which even its own authors had not ventured to claim as a process of Syrian clefence. , 19. It became dear, however, that Syria was in no mood ta accept the equitable principles which had governed Israel in negotiating its agreement with Lebanon. Israel, for its part, was determined not to sign any agreement which left a single Syrian soldier or any vestige of Syrian civil authoritv at any point "yest of the international frontier, This clash of positions produced a· deadlock in the armistice negotiations at Mahanayim on the Israel-Syrian frontier, and the scene shifted to Lake Success where it was my privilege to co-operate with the Acting Mediator, Mr. Ralph J. Bunche, in the examination of a compromise proposaI. Mr. Bunche did not dispute the contention that the Syrians could legitimately be required to meetthe Israel demand for complete with- 19. Syrie tables de décidé soldat syrienne conflit négociations syra-israélienne; Success, M. d'une contesté mement d'Israël territoire pallier occupées zones devinssent forces serait retour avaient un position, de acte de ~Irawal from Palestine territory, but he proposed that 1I1 order ta mitigate the effects of this withdrawal, the areas occupiecl by Syrian forces together with certain areas which had never beenoccupied by them should become a demilitarized zone into which Israel forces wOl1ld not ac!vance and in which civilian life would be restored, including a return to villages and settlements which had been abàncloned in the area. NIr, Bùnche dic! not for a moment seek to deny that the acceptance of 'this proposai iù place of a dear-cut plan. for Syrian withdrawal and Israel entry might reqt1lre an act of compromise on Israel's part. In its zeal to secure an armistice agreement with Syria and thus to complete the armistice system as a whole, my government decided to' clarify this possibility further 20. It was explairied, therefore, ta Mr. Bunche that we envisageel this area as a scene of swift and progressive development. We proposed ta enlarge our network of ag-ricultural vil1ages which were restoring to Upper Galilee its pristine fertility and beanty. We intended to develop the Huleh marshes and wastelands in accordance with the terms of the concession heM by the Palestine Lanel Development Company. Accordingly we requesteel the Acting Meeljator to define the precise effect of the tenn "demilitarization" and to indicate what limitations Israel woulel be assuming if it signed a treaty recognizing this area as a elemilitarizeel zone. These assurances were given ta us time and ag-ain until they reverberated in our ears. The demilitarization of an area, we were told, meant the exclusion of armed forces from that area; it meant nothing less, but it meant nothing more. The Armistice Agreement in general and the demilitarizatian clause in particular WOtlld be describecl as a purely military measure raising no question of sovereignty either positively or negatively. We were told that it would be improper to quote the Armistice Agreement as so1l1ethingwhich cauld either create or annul, confinn or suspend, sovereignty. In Mr. Bunche's words, later committed ta writing, "no question of sovereignty shmtld be raisecl at ail". A demilitarizeel zone would be defined in the Agreement itself purely as a zone "from which the anned forces of both parties shal1 be totaHy excluded and in which no activities by military Or para-military forces shaH bepermitted". 21. Our anxiety lest consent to demi1itarization should be interpreted as acquiescence in the limitation of our civil jurisdiction was now set at rest on the abstract level. It was stillnecessary, however, to ensure that the demilitarized character of the zone should not be invoked ag-ainst the specific projects which we contemplated. Accordingly we informed Mr. Bunche that it was Dur intention not merely to restore existing settlements and· villages but to establish new ones throughout the zone. He confirmed that under his proposaI the del11ilitarizedcharacter of the zone would not impair that intention in any way. Vve further p~inted ou~ that ot11: 10cal1y-recruited police, based on El11 Gev 111 the Em Gevsector and Mishmar hay Yal'den in the Huleh sector, would in fact be units of the Israel police force, entirely subservient to its central control and owing their allegiance to the Government of Israel. He confirmec1 this unclerstanding as well, together with the provision that the police in the Arab villages within the sanie zone would not have a 22. The Security Council should observe that in his subsequent letter of clarification, Mr. Bunche did in fact refer to our police as "Israeli" police in national tenns, while he did not refer to the police for the Arab villages as "Syrian police" but as "Arab police locally recruited". 23. It was further discussed and agreed between us that these police forces would not be static but would have mobility in accordance with the concept of normal police activity. It was clear to us that the presence of Israeli police and the absence of any police force subservient to any other government or authority would remove any fears that our civilian position was being prejudiced under the guise of demilitarîzation. 24. On 24 June 1949, a meeting took place at Lake Success between Mr. Bunche and Mr. Reedman rep.resenting the United Nations, and Mr. Shiloah, Mr. Rafael and myse1f, representing Israel. On the basis of this conference l cabled that night to my govemment the assurances received from the Mediator, which could be summarized as follows: agreement to demilitarization imposed no limitation upon Israel except the provision that. its armed forces could not enter the zone; demilitarization, like other provisions of the Am1istice Agreement, had no effect upon sovereignty.one way or the other; so far from development and settlement activity being i11lpeded, there would be a positive injunction to facilitate it, and the situation envisaged would be analogous to that established in the areas which passed under Israel's control LInder articles V and VI of the Israel-Jordan General Armistice Agreement 8. This comparîson was of the most crucial and decisive importance ta my government, for in those areas covered by the Israel-Jordan Agreement the provision that Israel forces may not enter certain areas has gone hancl in hand at all times with the fullest and most unqualified exercise by Israel of its civil jurisdiction in all other respects. 25. In these circu111stances Mr. Bunche addressed his letter to the Israel Minister for Foreign Mfairs on 26 June 194-9. This letter confinned that the establish- ~lent of the demilitarized zone had no effeet on questlOl;S of sovereignty, which neither the parties nor the Ol11ted Nations representatives were entitled ta raise. It expressed the analogy with the Israel-Jordan Agreement under which Israel's civil jurisdiction has never been questioned. It stated that normal civilian life ~U1der normal civilian administration will be operative 111 the zone. It confirmed that the Agreement would ~eet Israel's unqualified - note the word "unqualified" 26. The Security Council may be interested in this unusual reference to the idea that the area would not be a wasteland. This ieference was a specific and positive allusion ta Israel's intention - made clear at that stage ta ail parties - ta proceed with the urgent and vital worle of draining the Huleh swamps. There was no question of making this right conditional upon the good graces of Syria or of subjecting it to the veto of the Chairman of the lVIixec! Armistice Commission. 1 solemnly affinn to the Council, as a matter of intimate personal knowledge, that the Government of Israel "woulc! never have set its hand to an armistice agreement which would have conferred power upon any external autbority to forbid the execution of the Huleh concession or any other works preparatory to the establishment of new villages and settlements in the demilitarized zone. Those who would now seek ta impose these reservations, for which they can finc! no trace of support in the text of the Armistice Agreement, are acting' beyond the Agreement and, therefore, in violation of it and in most regrettable abuse of the spirit· of conciliation which moved my government to accept the demilitarizatiori of the zone. 27. It is with this background clearly in mind and memory that 1 now address myself to sub-paragraphs A (c) .and (d) of the memorandum of the Chief of Staff dated 7 March 1951 [5/2049, part IV) para. 3] which concerns itself with the legal situation of the demilitarized zone. In discussing these sections 1 comment simttltaneously and automatically on the political and legal aspects of the address made by the representative of Syria on this same point last week. In discussing tbis document of the Chief of Staff 1 need hardly assure him, after so many years and months, of the spirit of sympathy and high personal regard in which 1 turn to that analysis. 28.· Let it first be remembered that the Armistice Agreement, including the provision for the demilitarized zone, is a document of purely military significance and effect. Article II states: " ... the provisions of this Agreement [are] dictated exclusively by military, and not by political, considerations". The United Nations Chief of Staff and the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission derive their authority and functions in the Agreement from the signatures of the two contracting States. If the signatory States had not written certain functions for the Chief of Staff and his colleagues into the Armistice Agreement, they wouId have no specific functions under that Agreement. Because of the exclusively military nature of the Agreement, it is signed and operated by military officers. Since these agreements are military in character, the Unitec! Nations representatives invited by the parties 29. Until 7 March 1951 these limitations had been faithfully observed. United Nations representatives, in the tradition of Mr. Bunche, had abstained from giving prejudicial rulings on political or juridical matters and had referred to such matters only in order to stress their irrelevance ta the Armistice Agreement. The Chief of Staff's memorandum of 7 March marks, perhaps, the first deviation from this practîce, for l must regretfully make it clear that my government does not only take issue with the substance of these political and legal observations, but also questions the propriety of these very subjects being subjects of official pronouncements by United Nations representatives concerned with the armistice. 30. The origin of this mcmorandum is that the Chief of Staff was asked whether wor1e on the Huleh concession coulcl be deemed to alter the balance of military advantage in such a way as to constitute a violation of the Armistice Agreement. Incleed, the only grounds on which the Huleh concession could properly become a subject of discussion under the Armistice Agreement wonld be if it were related ta the question of a military threat to one of the parties. Once this question is answered negatively it follows that the Huleh concession ceases to have relevance to the Armistice Agreement at aIl. The Chief of Staff inevitably gave a neg-ative answer to the question whether work on the Huleh concession constitutes a contravention of article II - military aclvantage - of the General Armistice Agreement. He conclucled, within his terms of reference, that in draining Lake Ruleh the Israe1is will not enjoy any military advantage not equally applicable to the Syrians, and he went on to assert the non-military character of the project as a whole, with the consequence that the Syrians - and these are his w9rds - "cannot on any grotmds ofter objections to thIS type of work" [S/2049, part IV, para. 3, sect. A]. 31. The memorandum, however, fails to perceive that the civilian nature of the work excludes not only any Syrian right of objection but also any theory that this wor.k, in its political and legal aspects, is the proper subJ~ct for negative observatiollsby those chargec1 with the unplementation of a pureI)' military agreement. From this starting point the memoralldum embarks upon a series of discussions on profound and complex ma~ter~ of law and political theory, the effect of demilitanzatIon on sovereignty, the legal force of the Huleh Con.cession Ordinance of 1938, and the alleged right of Syna to veto the exercise of that concession at will. 33. The fil'st, as l have said, is that an expression of opinion on the political and legal matters dealt with in this section of the memorandum is beyond the powers of the United Nations representatives as defined in the Armistice Agreement. These representatives, lilee the signatory States themselves, have no more and no less powers in the demilitarized zone than are expressly confided to them under the terms of the Agreement. Once they act beyond these powers they are no longer operating within the Agreement. The functions of the Chief of Staff and of the Chainnan of the Mixed Armistice Commission, as defined in the Armistice Ag-reement, do not include a capacity to rule on questions of sovereignty, on the validity of legislation, on the annulment or suspension of concessions, on the conferment or annulment of laws of expropriation, or on any others amongst the legal and political matters dealt with in this section of the memorandum. There is only an express r~servation and assurance by the Mediator that questions of sovereig-nty may Hot be raised at allan injunction which can have little meaning for the parties if it is not considered as binding uron United Nations representatives concerned with the armistice as weil. 34. Secondly, not one of the far-reaching political and leg-al doctrines enumerated in this section of the memorandul11 finds any support in the text of the Armistice Agreement. It is, in fact, one of the 1110st remarkable features of this section of the memorandum that it lays clown an imp0sing series of categ-orical and arbitrary political and legal pronouncements without any attempt to quote articles of the Armistice Agreement in their support. But the omission is inevitable: sections of the Armistice Agreement are not quoted in support of these contentions because there do not exist any articles of the Armistice Agreement which can be quoted in their support. The Government of Israel must continue to hold that no more can be read into the Armistice Agreement and its provisions about the demilitarized zone than is actually expressed in the text or its accompanying documents. 35. As a typical text in international law confirming that the sig-natory of an agreement cannot be bouncl by any limitation not expressed in that agreement, l wouId cite the Reports of Infenlational Arb'itral Awards 4, laying down general prineioles on the basis of a specific arbitration between Sweden and the United States. On that occasion, the authoritative arbitrator statecl: 4 United Nations Publications, Sales No.: i949.V.I., vol. II, p. 1254. 36. l regret the necessity of having had to labour with leg-al texts what should he the truism that Israel in signing the Armistice Agreement cannot be deemed to have committed itself to any limitation which is not specifical1y defined in the text of the Agreement itself. 37. Thirdly, the basic assumptions that Syrian and Israel sovereignty are equally inapplicable in the demiHtarized zone, and thnt the aet of signing the Armistice Agreement rendered nu11 and void or in abeyance whatever legislation may have been valid up to that date, are in direct conflict with the assurances containecl in Ml'. Bunche's letter of 26 Janttary 1949, on the strength of which the parties gave their assent to the Armistice Agreement. That letter expressly stated that general questions of sovereignty may not oe raisecl. If questions of general sovereignty were thus exc1uded from the armistice conference itself, they cannat now be properly raised on the subordil1ate leve1 of the Mixed Armistice Commission or its Chairman. 38. My gavernment is under no doubt that within t~1is area, which has been part of the State of Israel ~1l1ce the proclal11ation of its independence, the author- Ity and jurisdiction of the Israel Governl11ent are l~mited orily by the specific reservations of the Armistice .Agreement. l state this view for purposes of clarificatIOn! not because l believe that its validity can be detennmed here. Nothil1g in the Charter requires or el11powers the Secul'ity Council, in addition to its other onerous responsibilities, ta confer or withhold, to suspend or confirm sovereignty in any part of the warld. M:y point is simply that the specific assurance th~t qt1esh~ns of sovereigntywonld net be affecte"d by thlS exc1uslvely military agreement is violated by any e:t ca~hedra pronouncements against the c1aims of sOverelgnty upheld, believed in, or exercised by any party in the area concerned, ~9.. Fourthly, the doctrine that the Huleh concession ;5 elther null and void or in abeyance complete1y overooks a basic principle of international la.w: name1y, 40. Fifthly, in so far as the theory advanced both by the representative of Syria and in the memorand\l1? of the Chief of Staff assumes that the process of demlhtarization in itself removes an area from the scope of its normal jurisilliction and controlthis assum~tion is in direct conflidt with the principles and practIces of international law. Nothing either in the text of the Armistice Agreement itself or in Mr. Bunche's explanatory letter purports to read more into the expression "demilitarized zone" than those words actual1y mean in the context of the Armistice Agreement - that is to say, a zone from which the armed forces of both parties shall be totally excluded and in which no actiyities by military or para-military forces shaH be permItted. The creation of a demilitarized zone is not a particularly unusual phenomenon in international practice and never, never means that the area is taken out of its normal jurisdiction or any jurisdiction to which it might formerly have been deemed to belong. Demilitarization has never, never yet been considered as investing the area concerned with any peculiar orparticular legal status in international law. This, indeed, is one of the things which distinguish demilitarization from neutralization or the establishment of a no man's land, which may in certain eÎrcumstances involve a new and special status for the neutralized. zone. In arder to create a special legal status in a case of mere demilitarization, the agreement establishing the demi1itarized zone would have to be explicit and specifie in this respect. Tt certainly could not proceed by infcrence. 41. If anyone wishes ta advance the view that the process of demilitarization in itself creates a special political status for the demilitarized zone, he will, in my submission, be unable to prove his point by reference to any other process of demilitarization in the history of international relations. For example, it was üever suggested by any j urist that the demilitarization of the Rhineland under the Treaty of Versailles between the two world wars affected the sovereignty of that area or conferred upon it any special political status. 42. The truth of this in our case is demonstrated in an interesting. ~nd striking way in the Israel-Syrian General An11lstIce Agreement. The concluding sentence of sub-paragraph 5 Ca) of article V states: "This provision" - that is, the provision for the establishment of the derüilitarized zone - "applies to the Ein Gev and Dardara sectors which shaH form part of the demilitarized zone." This sentence gave rise to a considerable debate.at the tim~ of the armistice negotiations, partic" u.larl);' 1~ the draftll1g sub-committee. The Syrian delegaplOn 111slsted that the demilitarÎ:l:ed zone, including the 43. The fact that parts of the demilitarized zone may at one time have come under Syrian military occupation is of course quite irrelevant, for military occupation itself does not give rise to legal sovereignty. Still less can the memory of an aggressive military occupation confer any legal standing after its own lapse and liquidation. 44. 1 should add that there is a small demilitarized .area within the Syrian frontier on the Syrian sicle. !srael does not assume that it has any rights or I11te~e.sts .in that small area, providecl that it is kept ?elmbtçlflzed. vVe do not assume that Syrian laws are ll1 ~beyance there. If anything occurred in that zone, ~yna wouId have full responsibility for dealing with It. It ;.vould be interesting to know whether Syria agrees that.l.t n? longer has sovereignty in that part of the demI1ltanzed zone which has been part of Syria always. 45. It shol1ld be pointed out that the Armistice Agreement establishes not only demilitarized zones from whieh all armed forces lUust be excludcd, but also much ~arg:er defensive zones in which armed forces may he ma111tal11ed only in li1l1ited numbers. These defensive l?nes ~over wide. ar~as both of Isr~el anc! of Syria. .I:er~ IS no genenc dlfference, therè IS no dlffèrence of pnnc.lp!e, either in abstract logic or in tenus of the AnmstIce Agreement, between a demilitarized zone and a defensive zone. The distinction is purely one of degree. t6i It would be far-fetched to suggest that the estab- .IS 1.m~nt of defensive zones in any way affects civil Jllnsc!Iction within the area thus establishecl but an are' 1. , c . a 111 ~ l1C~ few troops can be maintained is not ctlfferent ln kmd from an area in which no troops can 47. Sixthly, the doctrine that all laws previously in operation became defunct with the signature of the armistice runs counter to the established practice of the Armistice Agreement throughout the past two years, for within that period Israel civil authority has operated in the zone subject only to the ban on the movement or armed forces and the powers spècifical1y ascribed ta the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission in article V. Taxes have been levied and residents of the zone have been subject to the proceedings of Israel courts. Israel health and public services have been extended to the zone, and. Israel police have, in accordance with the terms of Mr. Bunche's letter, exercised normal police functio11s in the area. It would be difficult, l suggest, for the Chief of Staff to contend that Ein Gev and Mislunar hay Yarden have been obeying laws which are in reality 11ull and void or in abeyance in that zone. 48. Moreover, the practice of the past two years has fully supported our contention that Israel's right ta proceed with land development in the demilitarized zone is not affected at ail by the provisions of the Armistice Agreement. Thus, on 28 November 1949, the Mixed Armistice Con?mission discussed the Syrian complaint that the establlshment of new Israel settlements in the demilitarized zone were acts to which Syria couId object, since they were carried out under Israel authority within the demilitarized zone and wouId result in an increase of Israeli population to the military disadvantage of Syria. The Mixed Armistice Commission formally rejected this complaint. It determined that ~sraelJs right to establish those villages in the demilitarlzed zone we~e unaffected by the Armistice Agreement and that the 111crease of Israeli population in that area had no bearing on the Agreement. 49. This. dè~i~iye test case, affirming Israel's right to 1?ursne ltS clvlltan development activities in the demilitanzed z~me, !S of the greatest importance in our pr~se~1t discussIOn, for again there is no difference in pnnclple betwe.en .the establishment of new agricultnral settlem~n.ts, brl11g1l1g ne:v land· under cu1tivation, and the dra111l11g of ?- swamp 111 preparation for theestablishme!1t . of ne'," Villages and the cultivation of new land. It lS lmpos~lble. t? maintain that the former is legal and the lél;tter Il1eg1.tll11ate, that Syrian agreement is not essentJal ta the former while it is indispensable to the latter. The record and activities of the Mixed Armistice Comm!ssion alsovindicate our. assumption that the authonty of. ~sr~el police legitimately applies throughout the demlhtanzedzone. Thus1 on 5 September 1949; . • • 50. Surely, this agreement cannot be reconciled with the view that Israel police do not possess rights under the Armistice Agreement ta act under the due processes of law against residel1ts of the de1l1ilitarized zone, whether Arab or Jewish. 50. compatible termes lienne mesures qu'ils 51. In all the complaints, submitted by my govemment with respect to the demilitarized zone, we have described the places concerned as being within the demilitarized zone of Israel territory. Objections to this nomenclature have never been raised on the part of the Chainnan of the Mixec1 Armistice Commission. Moreover, work on· the Huleh concession itself was resumed in October 1950, with the full knowledge both of the Syrian Government and of the Chair1l1an of the Mixed Armistice Commission. In January 1951 this work extended to the elemilitarized zone again without chàllenge or complaint. 51. nement nous comme toire part D'autre Houlé faitement Président janvier démilitarisée provoqué 52. Correspondence passed between the Israel representative and the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission based on a clearly unc1erstood pre1l1ise that Israel cOl11manded the right to continue or resume this work at times fixed by itself and notified to other parties. As we shall see, the view that this right is 52. d'Israël mistice poursuivre il aux que a presse tice du su~ject to the explicit authority of the Chairman of the Mlxed Armistice Commission or, as General Riley puts it, is dependent upon the agreement of the Syrian Govemment, is a thought which has been formulated as one of recent and belated origin. 53. To sum up this point,' the 'theOl'y that Israel's laws, civil jurisdiction or freedom of development in the demilitarized zone are in abeyance and may legiti- 53. laquelle sa trouvent son contraire tion contraire ~l1ately be challenged under the Armistiçe Agreement I.S contra~y to the establishec1 practice of the Agreement, Just as lt is without foundation in the text of the Agreement itself. 54. lation tarisée 54. Seventhly, the contention that previous laws in the del;Jili~arized zone are in abeyance conflicts with the objective of the Agreement looking towards the 55. The police operating in that area were not tied down ta settlements or villages but could patrol, in normal police fashion. Bath the Hl11eh and the Ein Gev sectors were administratively an integral part of Eastern Galilee and entirely remote from any Syrian jurisdiction. If we restore normal civilian life in Eastern Galilee, then those are the conditions ta be restored. A situation in which no laws operate in the area, in which the Huleh concession is in abeyance and in which Syrian agreement is necessary for the pursuit of drainage worIe in the marshes does not constitute a restorationof normal civilian life. Il would represent the creation of an entirely new abnormality. 56. Finally, the Chief of Staffs legal theories would in their application lead the practical life of the area into a reductio ad absurd7im, for if there is no Syrian or Israel sovereignty in the area, and since Ml'. Bunche's authoritative letter excluded any theory that the United Nations has administrative powers, the conclusion is that the demilitarizecl zone is a vaCUU111, a kind of no man's land, a vacuum which is precisely what Ml'. Bunche's letter saic1 it must not be. It would follow that the residents of that area have no civic obligations to any government, cannot be brought before any court in the event of crime, and constitute an island of anarchy within the area. This confIîcts with the basic legal principle that legislation must retain its force until superseded by the legislation of a new sovereign in the area. 57. A further coroUary would be that measures whereby law and arder have been 111aintainecl and governmental services extendec1 throughout the zone for the past year and a half vvould 110W be declared re~rospectively illegal. The taxpayers of Ein Gev and Mlshmar hay Yarden should have their money returned and the mosquitoes should be brought back ta the drained. sections of the Ruleh swamp. 58.. My government fully accepts those limitations ta tts freedom of 1l10vement and action which are expl!citly l~id down in the Armistice Agreement. In part1cul~r. tt. acknowledges its dutY to help preserve the dem1htanzed character of the zone and to assist the Chainnan of.the Mix~d Armistice Commission to carry out the precise functlOns ascribed ta him in article V par~g.raph 5, of the Agreement. Hs own action il~ dra1l1111g the Huleh swamps, bath within and outside the demilitarized zone, is well-founded in international law, offers no viol.at~on of the "military advantage" clause of the Anmstlce Agreement, is not forbiclden by any ?ther provision of that Agreement, does not de~end. 111 any .degree upon the agreement of Syria, whlch 1$ a fore1gn and extraneous govern111ent in aU 59. cher Commission de verraient leurs terrain 80, travaux d'une nement ration d'armistice. 59. My government has constant1y sought and accepted the good offices of the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission with regard to the assessment of compensation for Arab landowners who would inevitably be displaced by the pursuit of the drainage operation. The land thus affected covers precise1y seven acres, and it is c1ear that the development of the project as a whole cannot be impeded pending settlement of sa small a complication, to the solution of which, however, my government will lend its best efforts in co-operation with the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission. fi What is to us particularly disquieting is the .suggestion in this memorandum that the Palestine Land Development Company should be instructed to suspend its legitimate work in the demilitarized zone until Syrian agreement - l repeat: until Syrian agreement - is received for its resumption. Is not this suggestion tantamount to the permanent liquidation of the scheme, sinee the Syrian representative has told us c1early that his government will never agree to the Huleh drainage project ? 60. suggestion laquelle devrait qu'elle risée bien: n'équivaut-il puisque déclaré consentement 61. ont souverains aucunement clusions, décision et antérieure, la autorité gouvernement vitale veto aucun part, dans 61. The effect of the Chief of Staff's findings in this respect is thus to confer sovereignty upon Syria in a matter of completely non-Syrian concern, for under this formula the Syrian Government can decide if and when the project shall ever be resumed. Neither in previous legislation nor under the Armistice Agreement does Syria possess an ounce or particle of legitimate right to control this matter. My government cannat be asked to subject this vital Israel project to !he approval or veto of the Syrian Government, which IS no~ a party with a legitimate stake in the concession ?r wlth any right to determine this matter in whole or lU part. 62. civil de tice; partie le l'exercice ces 62,. That this is an Israel project arid is a civilian proJect - and thus immune both from Syrian interests a~d ~herefore from that of the Mixed Armistice Coml1!lsslOn~ is actually asserted and implied in a pre- VI0~S sectIOn of this very memorantlum, in which the all~f of Staff later proceeds ta establish a virtual Synan veto over the resumption of this worle 63, Agait;st the b~ckground of this central political and legal Issue, whlch is of the most vital concern to the security an? integrity of Israel, l wish to con1ment dn the actual dlsturbances which have caused the breakown of security both in the northern and the southern sectors of the demilitarized zone. My government has no doubt at all that it is faced with a detennined 63. d'ordre tance d~Israël, produits dans démilitarisée. s'agit créer ~ttet;tpt ~y Syria to create and maintain a state of euslOn lU both sectors in an effort to undermine 64. On 27 March an Israel tractor driver was killed, and a policeman going to his aid in a police tender, flying a white f!ag, was shot and wounded. On 27 March United Nations observers evacuated the women and children from Ghanname to Baqqara ta remove them from the line of fire. Israel police evacuated the rest of the villagers from Ghanname ta Baqqara when that village was hit repeatedly by Syrian fire. On 30 March fire was opened again on Israel tractors in the de.mi.1itarized zone ancl spread wildly and indis~ crun1l1ately. The Israel Government received both an oral and written appeal from the eIders of Baqqara to be removed from the scene of tragic conflict ta an area furth~r into. the interior of Israel away from the grow1l1g tensIOn. 65. On. 31 Mar~h the Israel representative informed the United Nations observer that the villagers of Baqqara had b~en move~l. cleeper into Israel territory where . t~ey ~nJoy .c?nd.ltlons of security no longer present lU thls dell1lhtanzed zone. In this connexion the fran.J< and sensational stat~ment of the Syrian rep~ resentatlve !ast week, that hls government aspires to !he annexatlOn of the Ruleh sector, is bound to make It..a scene of tension in which my government's vIgIlance must be maintained. 66.. This interference with this legitimate drainage p~oJect, first by pol!tic~1 and then by violent means wltl~ ~atal results, slgmfies an assault on the entire an11lstIc.e system. There is no sÏilcere or t t' t' f' cons ruc Ive n~o Ive or sl1ch 1l1terference. My government is convll1ce.c1.t~at, faced by a situation in which fire is opened on clvlhan workers ridding this area of l'tS d . pest tl b· . en emlC s, le 0 Jectlves of the United NatI'on b ser d b l' l' scan e . ve y ore enng t le cessatIOn of fire, not the cessatlOt; of work. The C~arter requires that men lay down theIr anus, not thelf ploughs. The faet that this · 67: sa rapport l'Etat d'asséchement, "action d'armistice dans il ces de ces culier l'accord mistice. 67. In this connexion 1 note that it is suggested in : Colonel Bossavy's letter, referred to in Colonel De 1Ridder's report," dated 27 March 1951 [5/2067, para. 32] J that Israel undertook what is called "unilateral action" in resuming the drainage work on 24 March. Since the Armistice Agreement does not ascribe any powers or interests to Syria in the question of the Huleh drainage, there should be nothing invidiolls in this worie being unilaterally undertaken by the only party whom it actually concerns. In point of fact, however, the entire progress of the work sinee October 1950, and in partieular its resumption on 24 March, were undertaken both with the knowledge and the acquieseence of the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission. 68. This is proved by the following exehange of correspondence between Major Shoham, the Israel representative, and Colonel Bossavy, Chairman of tlte Mixed Armistice Commission [5/2067, para. 10]: 68. qu'ont d'Israël, mission "According to your request to stop the work of the Huleh drainage scheme, 1 will see to it that necessary orders will be given to stop the work trom Friday, 16 March 1951, changing by this procedure the date agreed upon in the letter of the officer-incharge of the Israel delegations ta the Mixed'Armistice Commissions dated 14 March. 1 understand that it is agreed by this that the work of the Huleh drainage scheme will be resumed on 23 March 1951." 69. Shoham 69. The reply from Colonel Bossavy to Major Shoham is as follows [5/2067, para. 10]: "1 have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated 15 March. l have noted the change of date regarding the stoppage of the Huleh drainage works. l think that considering today's events, this is a proper approach towards reaching a mutually acceptable solution." 70. The second letter which 1 have quoted in full c1early conveys Colonel Bossavy's full acquiescence in the resllmption of work on the appointed day. My government cannat therefore accept Colonel Bossavy's later interpretation in which he asserts in his own wards that the Chairman reported that no agreement . bad been reached on the resumption of the work and tltat he had merely taken riote of the letter [5/2067, para. 16] .. In the first place, this is not a legitimate . IUterpretatlon of Colonel Bossavy's reply, in which he had dearly accepted the full implications of Major Shoham's letter dealing both with a temporary stoppage and the r~sttmption of the \York. In the second place, the followmg extracts from the verbatim record of the 70. gral entièrement repris nement colonel mé, dent pour prendre d'abord, colonel accepté Shoham leur Bossavy reprise se compte mission !neet~ng of the Mixed Armistice Commission clearly Itwahclate Colonel Bossavy's suggestion that he had flot a pproyed the resttmption of the worle on the crucial date, 23 March: 71. After further comment by the Syrian representative, the Chainnan said: "The work will be provisionally stopped until approximately 24 March, at which poin~ l shal! tak~ other measures and issue the necessary ll1structlOns. 72. At this stage, l am forced to comn~ent also on Colonel Bossavy's statement referred to 111 the same report to the effect that the Israel delegat~on ~ad agreed that the question of the Huleh conces~lOn 111 general fell within his competence under artIcle V of. t~e Armistice Agreement [5/2067, para. 18J. ThIS IS precisely the contrary of what ~o~k place, f?r. at both relevant meetings of the AnmstIce CommIssIOn, ~he Israel delegation reiterated its view that the qu~~tlOn of the Huleh work, being of a civilian and non-mIlttary character fell outside the scope of the competence of the Mix~d Armistice Commission and its Chairman. l ts only agreement was that the Chairman coul.d use his good offices to clear up and settle the questlOn oi the compensation for the owners of the flooded lands. 73. The southern part of the demilitarized zone consists chiefly of the Ein Gev sector, which had never been occupied by Syrian forces nor out of Israel control, but which nevertheless was demilitarized in accordance with the strictly military provisions and intentions of the Armistice Agreement. l have said that the very fact that Israel consented to the demilitarization of this sector proves the absence of connexion between demilitarization and any suspension or annulment of sovereignty or jurisdiction. This area has been the scene of constant and violent Syrian encroachment ever since the Armistice was signed. On 27 February 1950 and again on 12 April 1950, Israel lodged complaints with the Mixed Armistice Commission against the presence of Syrian soldiers at El Hamma. The latter complaint was withdrawn after the retirement of ail Syrian gendarmerie at El Hamma. 74. On 20 July 1950, the Mixed Armistice Commission confirmed and ruled that Syria had committed a violation of the Armistice Agreement by opening fire from the shore near Kursey against an Israel booth on the lake, kill!ng one Israeli and w011l1ding another. In March of .thls year, as part of the determined attempt to lay daim and challenge to the demilitarized zone Syria decided to undermine security in the Ein Ge~ sector simultaneously with its attempts to create an atmosphere of crisis and peril in the H uleh sector in t?e north..a? 3 April 1951! the Israel-Syrian ArmistIce CommISSion met to conslder a drait agenda headed by seven Israel complaints of Syrian firing on civilian workers in the Huleh sector. In the very Course of tha~ meeting, !srael submitted a further and equally senous complamt that on 2 April 1951 Syrian forces had entered the demilitarized zone near El Hamma ·75, There can be no doubt whatever that the occnpation by Syrian forces of El Hamma constituted ân invasion of the zone and that henceforth Israel cauld expect a rain of fire from Syrian forces in both of the allegedly demi1itarized sectors. A great gust of passion swept our country. Israel is tÎl"ed of having ItS people killed. The act of aggression which the Arah States, with Syria in the lead, launched against it but a few years ago has left thousands of casualties whose graves are still fresh. 75. par zone s'attendre riennes tarisés. pays. ses duits a les 76. The Charter of the United Nations does not require Israel to sit passively by while its people are thus kiHed. The dictates of self-defence required swift action against this military post i11ega11y established in the demilitarized zone. Such was the nature of the aeria1 action which Israel forces toole whi1e we simultaneausly seizec1 a11 measures ta secme the limitation of this local tension and to ease the United Nations, under the tenns of the Armistice Agreement, of its duty to remove aH armed forces from the demilitarized zone. The Government of Israel was moved to tbis decision nat only by the wanton murders of the previous days. It also noted that no ward of apology or regret was heard from Damascus and that the Syrian Government hacl ample opportnnity to disavow this deed or subsequently to disassociate itself from it by promising at least .ta discover and punish the men responsib1e. Up ta thlS date, Damascus has still lacleed the decency to express any regret for these casualties. Nevertheless l an~ now specifica11y instructed by ml' government to say 111 aH frankness and candor that it, for its part, regrets that it fe1t constrained to take action which may nat be compatible with the tenus of the Armistic'e 76. Israël est fense diates la sailles prenions cette tions tice, armées à vernement qu'aucun et désavouer responsabilité de pas morts reçu franchise regrette ne Convention rité l'assurance suite mait posaient. ~greement. It asks the Security Council to accept the ~mcere expression of its regret and its assurance that It was on1y the extreme provocation and the feeling that there was need for enerlTetic self-defence that lUaved it originally to that deci~ion. 77, In the meantime, unhappily, the provocation has gane on and has indeed assumen more systematic and scarce1y less murderons form. My governmel1t was not wrong. in its belief that a serions and concentrated u}tel11Pt is being made by Syria against the il11munity f the southern and northern demilitarizec1 zones as 77. depuis matique ment bérément méridionale événements vernement mission cincl ;~as been proved by recent events. On la April 1951, l ~oyernment added ta the agenda of the Mixec1 th:l111Stlc~ ~oml11ission complaints of five violations of An11lstJce Agreement by the flight of Syrian fighter 78. We have also added to th.e agen9a of the Mixecl Armistice Commission complamts wlth referen~~ ta an armed Syrian formation which took up Posl.tlOns in the Ein Gev sector, north of N<;gev, on 8.AP:l1 for the purpose of firing on Israeli pollce, operatmg 111 the Negev sector, with tragically fatal results. 79. The new document submitted today by the representative of Syria [5/2103] conceals another sucl~ aggressionthe murder in cold blood of an Israell individl1al on the Lake of Tiberias through fire from Nukiba. One would gather from these docul1;ents that Israelis are running around Sout.her.n. Gahlee committing suicide. In each caSe the mflictlOn of a f~tal casualty by Syrian arms is follow~d by the prese~ltatlOn ta this Council of one of these fnvolous complamts. l would add that after the first shootil1g from Nukiba, United Nations observers failed ta obtain a guarantee from the Syrian delegation that no fire woulc1 be opened from the Arab. siae upon then~ if they went into the area. The Em Gev sector, hke the Huleh sector, is ta this day and up to this very moment a scene of frequent military action by Syrian armed forces and by para-military forces unc1er Syrian commando 80. Observers of Middle Eastern politics may have their own views on the internai reasons which have animated the Syrian Government, in March 1951, ta assume a militant clemeanour both in the Huleh sector and in the Ein Gev sector, and to proc1aim an ambition last week ta annex both areas to Syrian sovereignty. There is nothing new or in any sense illegitimate either in the operation of the Huleh project or in the exercise by Israel of its jurisdiction in the Ein Gev sector, which forms an integral part of the State and in which the only limitations upon Israel are those specified in the Armistice Agreement itself. 81. In its conversations with Colonel De Ridder, while reserving its position on ail past complaints, my gover~men~ was the first to discuss a formula whereby p~ace 111 tlus area ~ay now be restorec1. It agreed with h1l11 on the followmg four points [S/2084, para. 40]: (1) that ail milit.ary and para-military forces of both sICles should be wlthdrawn from the demilitarized zone' (2) that no further fighting within the zone or acros~ dem.arcation lines should he permittecl; (3) that United Nat1~ns observ~rs be afforded every facility for carryu;g ont the.lr.cluty; (4). t~at the :esponsibility of the Mlxe~ Armlsbce Commission Chalf111an to implement article V of the Armistice Agreement on the resumption of normal civilian life in the zone be reaffirmed. We now tmderstand that agreement on this formula has s~nce been .secured from the Syrian side. The fourth pomt, referrmg to the responsibility of the 82. l conc1l1de with a brief reflection on the general political history involved in tbis discussion. It had not been the intention of my delegation ta go beyond the discussion of the Armistice Agreement and ta deal with the general subject of territorial c1aims. The territorial discussion is not before the Security Council, and no progress bas been made with it since the SUl11mer of 1949 when, at Lausanne, the State of Israel declared that it had no c1aim on the territory of any Arab State or on any territory controlled by any Arab State. The Arab States in their reply laid daim to Eastern Ga1ilee, \;Vestern Calilee, the Northern Negev, the Central N egev, the Southern Negev and the entire Jerusalem area between the capital and the coast - in fact, to the whole of Israel with the exception of 10 per cent of its area which was generously omitted from these demands. In the light of this position l appreciate the delicate humour which inspired the representative of Syria, in a broadcast the other night, to declare that it is Israel which has expansionist daims at the expense of the Arab States. He may have spoiled his forensie effect by adding, in the same breath, that Syria proposed to take over the Huleh and the Ein Gev sectors. l should have thought that if Syria intends to help itself ta Huleh it would find it convenient for the swamps to be drained in the meantime. 83. This announcement by Syria of an unfounded daim to the areas concerned, coupled with the memorandu111 of the Chief of Staff declaring that Israel law and jurisdiction did not apply in that area, force my goverllment to make the preservation of this area its dosest andmost intense concern. We rejeet the Svrian claim. We shall sig'n no peace involvingthe cession of these areas. There ean be no Israel without the Huleh and the Ein Gev sectors, without tbe precious sources of the Jordan and the swamps and marshes of Lake Huleh, To defend its rights and claims in that area Israel will reveal a tenacity no less pronounced than that which warded off similar grave politica[ and military threats to the southern area of Israel but a few years aga. l t is a most unfortunate reflection on the spirit of our times that this tiny State of Israel so meagerly endowed with land and water, shoulcl find itself at various times sa hard pressed to defend the 84. The southern extremity of Israel is a barren desert where no human habitation has thrived for centuries pasto The northern extremity of Israel is stagnant and malarial swamp. Neighbauring States, rich in their deserts and abundant in their undrained swamps, have coveted Israel's southern desert and Israel's northern swamp. As we strove ta maintain our desert sa we shall strive ta the utmost limit to preserve our swamp. Iil the course of a little till1e the desert has already hegul1 ta f!ourish and will soon be a desert no more. So, too, the swamp will become a gracious habitation, healthy, proucl and free. Surely no one who helps, however unwittingly, to deprive us of full freedom of our desert or of our swamp is incurring any cause for future pride or credit. 85. We are convinced that the Security Council, whose responsibilities in this matter are confined to the preservation and restoration of peace and security, will pursue that aim as an absolute obj ective and not be drawn into any measure which would encourage the hopes of those in Syria who would extend their dominion into Israel's patrimony beyond the Iimits which international law had generously established to Syria for the past tluee decades. And finally, we would do well to ref!ect that in all these discussions of armistice violations there is a trend to overlook the most chronic and fundamental violation of all. The armistice agreements were signed as provisiona1 measures marking a transition to permanent peace. Thus, their very purpose is set aside and their very spirit is defeated by uny party which does not make a constant effort to advance beyond the armistice system into the realm of final peace. A constant refusaI even to seek such a settlement by negotiation is a direct repudiation of the armistice agreements. 86. If civilized relations, which should prevail between all Members of the United Nations, were allowed ta exist here, then frontier disputes would not come within the realm of militarv discussion and an armistice agreement: they would Ge the normal materia1 for frienc11y, diplomatic intercourse and cou1d be settled without recourse to. military judgment or discretions. The world community cannot blame any State which fails ta find a formula for a peace settlement. It should really censure those States which will not even attempt ta reach a settlement by processes of contact and negotiation. But not only do Ollr neighbouring States condemn us to the precarious ambiguities of an armistice system designed as a provisional measure for a passing day; they also seek to utilize advantages under the armistice system in an attempt ta bring paralysis and strangulation to crucial areas of Israel's daily life. '88. Having by these violations and interventions, lltterly iIlegitimate under the armistice agreements, prejuc1iced Israel's interests at such central points as its maritime communications, its ail industry, its intellectual and medical life, the Arab States now seek ta i1l1pede us in another sphere in which Israel has a tradition of successful progress: in land reclamation, malarial control and agricultural settlement. These violations and interventions represent in their total · aggregate a most ominous and purposeful attempt to impede the tranquil routines of Israel's daily life at 88. d'Israël communications maintenant '. every central point. We are fully alive to the master , strategy of these acts, which aim at using the armistice system as a weapon for the siege and strangulation of , Israel. •89. Thus, while accepting all the specifie injunctions · which the armistice agreements lay down and pledging ourselves to worle for the restoration of those pro- 1 visions wherever they lùay have been impaired, Israel "must maintain its rights under the agreements and refuse to contribute ta its own paralysis. We have no course but to stand guard with increasing zeal, both in defence of the specifie provisions of the armistice and against any attempt to impose upon our beleaguered and encircled State deprivations which the agreements do not specify. Above all, we reaffirm our readiness at any time ta develop the armistice agreements into a more stable system of inter-State relations in the Middle East.,

The Council has now heard, in today's meeting and the preceding meeting, statements .itom both parties ta this dispute. It is my intention now ta call upon General Riley, who desires to Inake a statement. ,If there is some time left after that, 1 intend ta give an opportunity to members, who would Iike ta put questions ,to General Riley, ta do so. 91. Major General RILEY (Chief of Staff, United Nations Truce Supervision Organization): As Chief of Staff and as one who participated in the negotiations of the Israel-Syrian General Armistice Agreement, 1 must express my regret that a situation has arisen which has made ii: necessary for the Security Council ta intervene, especially in the absence of a prior clecision of the Mixec1 Armistice Comrnission. The incidents of fighting which occurred, the threat of more serions fighting, the interruption of the orderly operations of the Mixed Armistice Commission, and the formal notification by one party that it would not meet with the 92. The parties - Israel and Syria - have agreed ~o an armi~tice, and in that agreement ~h~y set up c.er~a1l1 1l1achinery, including a Mixed. An111stlce C01111111sslOn, to deal \vith clifferences and c!lsputes over that agreement, its interpretation and applicat~on. Unfortunate.ly, in the present case the remedies pr.ovlded for the parties by the Armistice Agreement pnor to appeal. to the Security Council have not been exh~t1sted, SI~1ce no clecisions on the issues laid before thls Councll have been talœn in the Mixecl Armistice Commission. Since the matter is llO\V before the Security Council, however, and in view of certain positions taken by the parties, it would be extre!l1~ly helpful. t? th~ futu~e work of the Mixed Arnl1stlce Com1111sslOn If clanfication and guidance on such issues could be obtainecl through discussion in the Council. 93. The underlying issue in this dispute concerns the extent to which either party is or is not free to unclertake civilian activities in the demilitarized zone. This implicitIy involves the question of the raIe and responsibility of the United Nations in ensuring that the demilitarized zone shal1 be respected in accordance \Vith the letter and spirit of the provisions of the Armistice Agreement. . 94. The demilitarized zone \Vas the indispensable basis for agreement on this particulaI' armistice. The disposition of the military forces of the two conflicting parties was such in this area that it was imperative that a bufier zone should be created from which al1 military forces of both sides would be withdrawn and ta which they would be denied access so long as the agreement endured. There has been no question - and 1 believe there is none - with regard to the fact that lleither party can undertake any military activity in this zone without serious and dangerous violation of the Armistice Agreement. 95. The question of civilian activity has, however, been raised, and in such a way as to create a dispute over interpretation of the Agreement ami friction between the parties so severe as to lead ta a series of violent local episocles. 96. ~n this regard, 'Yh~t must be mad~ e111phatically clear IS that the Armistice Agreement c!ld not in any way cleal \;ith the question of territorial sovereignty and that tIus question, general1y and particularly in so far as the clel!1Îlitarized zone is concerned, must l'est in abeyance wlule the Armistice Agreement is in effect t111less there is a l11utual agreement of the parties to the contrary. 97. l haye taken advantage of my presence here to cOllsl1l~ Wlth :rv~r. Bunche, formerly Acting Mediator on tllIS question of the demilitarized zone, sinc~ "1 do not, of course, assume for myself any right to malee an authoritative interpretation of the Israel- Syrian G~neral f\nnist~ce Ag:eemen.t or any provision of It. 1t IS mal11festly llnposslble for me or for any other individual to do so. The Agreement itself. in article VII, paragraph 8, states: 'YVhere interpretation of the meaJling of a particular provision of this Agreement, other than the preamble and articles l and II, is at issue, tIre Commission's interpretation shall prevai!. ~he Commission,. in its discretion and as the need anses, may from tIme to time recommend to the parties modifications in the provisions of this Agreement.' "Therefore, the Agreement itself, in article VII, paragraph 8, envisages the means by which authoritative interpretations of its provisions may be obtained whenever differences of interpretation arise. Once signed, the Agreement be10ngs to the parties, who must be held bound by all of its provisions. "1 may, however, provide you, as United Nations Chief of Staff and as one who, with Mr. Vigier, deputized for me on the spot in the negotiation of the Israel-Syrian Agreement, my personal view of the general purpose and nature of the demilitarized zone. "The purpose of the demilitarized zone in the Israel-Syrian Armistice Agreement, as set forth in article V, paragraph 2, of that Agreement, was to sej)<1.rate and to keep separatec1 for theduration of the armistice the armed forces of the two parties, in order to eliminate as fully as possible friction aJld troublesome incidents between them. This was to be, in effect, a sort of 'buffer zone', pending final peaceful seUlement of the dispute. "At the same time, it was recognized that every reasonable effort should be exerted to avoid that hardship for the civilian inhabitants of the area inc1udecl in the zone which would be the case if the area were to become a vacuum or wasteland. The restoration of normal civilian life was the goal, but it was realized that, in view of the tension whichhac1 been created by ~he fighting, this restoration must be graduaI (article V, paragraph 2). It was recognized also that the graduaI restoration of normal civilian life in the demilitarized zone could neither be automatic nor left" to the discretion of the conflicting parties. It .was provided, therefore, that the Chairman of the 1I:11xed Armistice Coml11issionshould be the responsible agent for guiding this process (article V, subparagraphs 5 (c), 5 (d) and 5 (e» although he was no~ called upon directly to administer the area, this bemg left to local devices. "In an of the discussions andnegotiatiol1s on this Agreement, in aU communications concerning it, inc1uding my letters as Acting Mediator of 24 May to the Foreign Ministers of Israel and Syria, and the notes and letters delivered to the two governments in my name on 26 J tille in response to questions raised on 21 June, it was always kept upper- 1110st in mind that it was an armistice agreement and .not a peace treaty or other final settlement that was being negotiated. The question of territorial sovereignty, therefore, was scrupulously avoided. "In paragraph 2 of my cable from New York of 25 June 1949 ta ML Vigier in Damascus, which was transmitted by him to the Foreign Offices in Damascus and Tel Aviv on 26 June, l stated: 'The prOVIsIOn for the demilitarized zone in the light of an circu111stances is the most that can be reasonably expected in an armistice agreement by either party. Questions of permanent boundaries, territorial sovereignty, customs, trade relations and the li1ce must be dealt with in the ultimate peace sett1ement and not' - l repeat not - 'in the armistice agreement.' "The prOVISIOns of the Armistice Agreement and my communications to the governments in connexion therewith, do not establish, affirm, confirm or deny the rights, daims or position of either party with regard to the question of territorial sovereignty either in the demilitarized zone or e1sewhere. The Armistice Agreement was entered into without prejudice to any and a11 such rights, claims or position (article II, paragraph 2; article V, paragraph 1) in the ultimate settlement." 98. In addition, l bring to t1'le attention of the Security Council the following note which Ml'. Bunche prepared in reply to certain questions raised by both de1egations during the discussion on his suggested compromise draft proposaI which, with some changes, now appears as article V of the General Armistice Agreement. This discussion took place in the meeting of the Israel-Syrian Armistice Conference, on 21 June 1949, and which reply. at the request of both parties, was made a part of the Summary Record of the meeting of 3 July 1949. It reads as follows: "Where Israeli civilians return to or remain in an Israeli village or settlement, the civil administration and policing of that village or settlement will be by Israelis. Similarly, where Arab civilians return to or remain in an Arab village, a local Arab administration and police unit will be authorized. "As civilian life is gradually restored, administration will take shape on a local basis ltnder the general supervision of the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission. "The Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission, in consultation and co-operation with the local comml1nities, will be in a position to authorize an necessary arrangements for the restoration and protection of civilian life. He will not assume responsibility for direct administration of the zone." 99. In this instance both delegations agreed to consicler Mr. Bunche's explanatory note of 26 June, once recorded in the minutes of that meeting, as an authoritative comment, should any difficulty in the interpretation of the article arise. l personally have used this note, therefore, as the basis for my interpretation of the meaning of this particular article. 100. Because of the agreement of the parties with regard to the special significance of this explanatory note of 26 June in the interpretation of the provision for the demilitarized zone, this note, clearly, is to be c1ifferentiated from other communications in connexion with the negotiations. In the course of the negotiations, Mr. Bunche and Mr. Vigier necessarily sent many unilateral appeals, suggestions, proposaIs and explanations. In my view, and Mr. Bunche assures me that he shares this view, none of these communications other than the explanatory note of 26 June can be said ta have any official standing as a basis for interpreting article V of the Agreement, since it was this note alone which the parties themse1ves accepted for this purpose. 101. The troublesome question of administrative authority in the demilitarizec1 zone is one that, if considered and clarified by the Council, can be very useful ta the future work of the Mixed Armistice Commission. Certainly, if this were done, it would clarify the position with regard to that portion of the Huleh concession project which involves the straightening of the River Jordan within the demilitarized zone which, in 102. It is not necessary, of course - and indeecl it would not be desirable - for the Counci1 ta ad as a substitute for the Mixed Armistice Commission and undertake to reach decisions on all of the subsidiary questions involved in this dispute, such a~ the evact~­ ation of the Arab refugees, the destructIOn of the1r property and compensation therefor, the shooting of the Israel police, the retaliatory bombing of El Hamma, etc. It might be pointed out, however, that in so far as compensation'for property destroyed is concerned, l have always maintained that the Mixed Armistice Commission has no authority to act except by mutual agreement of the parties. This is to avoid a majority vote in which the Chairman must cast the vote to one side or the other. 103. This entire affair is most unfortunate and, in my view, could have been avoided had there been more patience and restraint and less determination to undertake unilateral decisions with regard to the exercise of administrative authority and ta civilian activity in the demilitarized zone. The area involved in the particular civilian activity here concerned was not great and the machinery provided by the Armistice Agreement was entire1y adequate to deal with the matter had it been properly used. 104. l am confident that the Armistice Agreement can be made ta worle lndeed, for almost two years it has worked well. It is certainly in the interests of both parties that they should make it worle. It is their Armistice Agreement, not anyone else's. All that is needed is a reasonable al110unt of co-operation and goodwill. The United Nations is there for one reason and one reason only: to help the parties preserve the peace of the area. This cannot be accol11plished, however, unless the parties themselves act in good faith in attel11pting to find ways and means to carry out or to implement the Armistice Agreement.

l am very· grateful to General Riley for his c1arifying statement. l believe that members of the Council will require some time to study it. in order to be well prepared ta formulate eventual questions they might want to put ta General Riley. In that connexion, l would suggest to the Council that We should now adjourn. l am advised that as far as the remainder of this week is concerned, any day between now and next week would present certain inconveniei1ces ta some of our members. As a result of that l would suggest to the Council that we should meet again on this issue next Tuesday morning, 1 May, subject of course to the approval of my successor to the Presidency who "vil! take office as from 1 May. 106. The Coùncil is aware that, on Monday, 30 April, we may have anothèr meeting in arder to finish other business which is still before us. Thus, the first occasion available to continue our work on the Palestine question wouId be Tuesday morning, 1 May, since Tuesday after- 107. The representative of Syria has asked to speak. Does it have to do with the ti1l1e of the next meeting? 108. Faris EL-KHOURI Bey (Syria): My remarks would not bear exactly on the date of the next meeting but rather on the present status of the question. l wish to ask the President's permission to make a short stutement which l feel would be convenient to make at this meeting. That statement might then he taken into consideration during the period which the President bas just suggested shol1ld elapse. My state1l1ent applies to the problem to be considered and it wouId only take about fifteen minutes.

It was not my original intention to reopen the general debate now. As l explained at the beginning of this meeting and at the end of the last meeting, the purpose of this meeting would be essentially to hear the statement of General Riley in order ta put questions to him afterwards. If we now hear another statement from one of the l)arties, that may again invite a rep!y from the other party, and in that case we wouId never arrive at a moment where we could put the questions to General Riley. Might l respectfully suggest that the reprcsentative of Syria might postpone his statemcnt until after we have heard the questions to be put to General Riley dttring our next meeting on this question. 110. Faris EL-KHOURI Bey (Syria): If it is not desired to hear my statement today, may l ask the President that it should be distributed aS a document sa that the members of the Security Council can read it before the next meeting?

l agree to that. 112. Faris EL-KI-IOURI Bey (Syria): In that case l shal1 submit my state1l1ent in that form. 1.13.. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated fr01n Russian): If it were not to present any insuperable difficulty for the parties at whose request the question has been included on the agenda of the Security Cot111cil, l would submit the request that the Council's next meeting shou!d he held not on .1 May but on 2 May at any time that might he convement to the Council. 1~4. The ~R~SIDENT: Personal1y, l have not the : sligh!est objectIon to that, but since the calling of a mais, ~eetl11g for 2 May will no longer be in 111Y hallds but 1~ the hands of the next President, l must leave it to ll1m to decide on that matter. liS. Ml'. SARPER (Turkey): If Wednesday, 2 Uay, as. proposed by the representativc of the Soviet mon, 1S convenient to the rest of my colleagues, l

In that case, may l take it that there is no objection on the part of the members of the COl1ncil to having our next meeting on this particular question on 2 May, that is, next Wednesday afternoon? 117. A~ there is no objection, it is sa decided.