S/PV.546 Security Council

l wish to cali the attention of the rnembers of the Security Coul1cil to the drait resolution presented jointly by the delegations of France, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. This has been circulated as document S/2l52/Rev.l. l shall now caU upon the sponsors of this draft resolution to introduce their proposaI ta the Security Council. 2. Ml'. AUSTIN (United States of America): l wish first to read the joint draft resolution contained in document S/2152/Rev.l. "R.ecaUing its past resolutions of 15 July 1948 [5/902], 11 August 1949 [5/1376], 17 November 1950 [5/1907, 5/1907/Corr.1] , and 8 May 1951 [5/2130] relating to the armistice agreements be- tween Israel and the neighouring Arab States and ta the provisions contained therein concerning methods for maintaining the armistice and resolving disputes through the mixed armistice C0111111i,ssions partici- pated in by the parties ta the Armistice Agreement, "Noting the complaints of Syria and Israel ta the Security Council, statements in theCouncil of the representatives of Syria and Israel, the reports to the Secretary-General of the United Nations by the Chief of Staff and the Acting Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization for Palestine, and statements before the Council by the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Super- vision Organization for Palestine, "Noting further that article V of the General Armistice Agreement gives to the Chairman the responsibîlity for the general supervision of the demilitarized zone, "Endorses the requests of the Chief of Staff and the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission on this matter and caUs upon the Government of Israel to comply with them; "Declares that in order to promote the return of permanent peace in Palestine, it is essential that the Governments of Israel and Syria observe faithfuUy the General Armistice Agreement of 20 July 1949; "Notes that under article VII, paragraph 8, of the Armistice Agreement, where interpretation of the meaning of a particu1ar provision of the agreement, other than the preamhle aild articles r anel II, is at issue, the Mixed Armistice Commission's inter- pretation shall 1)revail; "CaUs ~tpon the Governments of Israel and Svria to bring befote the Mixec1 Armistice Commissi01~ or its Chairman, whichever has the pertinent respon- sibility under the Armistice Agreement, their C0111- plaints and to abide by the decisions resl1lting there- from; "considers that it is inconsistent with the ob- jectives and intent of the Armistice Agreement to refuse to participate in meetings of the Mixed Armis- tice Commission or ta fail to respect requests of the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission as they relate to his obligations tinder article V, and ca1ls upon the parties to he representeel at aU meetings ca11eel by the Chaît-man of the Commission and to respect such reql1ests; "CaUs ~lpon the parties to give effect ta the fo1lowing excerpt cited by the Chief of Staff of the Tntce Supervision Organization at the 542nc1 meeting of the Security Council on 25 April 1951, as being from the summary record of the Syria-Israel Armistice Conference of 3 July 1949, which was agreed to by the parties as an al1thoritative comment on article V of the Syrian-Israel Armistice Agree- ment: 'The question of civil administration in villages and settlements in the demilitariz:eet zone is proYiclect 'Where Israel civilians return to or remain in an Israel village or settlement, the civil administration and policing of the village or settlement will be by Israelis. Similarly, where Arab civilians return to or remain in an Arab village, a local Arab admin- istration and police unit will be authorized. 'As civilian life is gradually restored, administra- tion will take shape on a local basis under the general supervision of the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission.' 'The Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commis- sion, in consultation and co-operation with the local communities, will be in a position to authorize all necessary arrangements for the restoration and pro- tection of civilian life. He will not assume respon- sibility for direct administration of the zone.' ; "Recalls to the Governments of Syria and Israel their obligations under Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations and their commit- ments t11lder the Armistice Agreement not to resort to military force and finds that: "(a) Aerial action taken by the forces of the Gov- ernment of Israel on 5 April 195land "(b) Any aggressive military action by either of the parties in or aroune! the e!emilitarized zone, which further investigation by the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization into the reports and complaints recently submittee! to the Council may establish, "constitute a violation of the cease-fire provision provided in the Security Couneil resolution of 15 July 1948 and are inconsistent with the tenns of the Armistice Agreement and the obligations asst11ned under the Charter; "Noting the complaint with regard to the evacua- tion of Arab residents from the demilitarized zone: " (a) Decides that Arab civilians who have been removed from the demilitarized zone by the Govern- ment of Israel should be permitted to ;eturn forth- with to their homes and that the Mixee! Armistice Commission should supervise their return and re- habilitation in a manner to be c1etermined by the Commission; and " (b) Holds that no action involving the transfer of persons across international frontiers, armistice lines or within the demi1itarized zone should he un- dertaken without prior deeision of the Chairman of the. Mixed Armistice Commission; liNoting with concern the refusaI on a number of occasions to permit observers and officiaIs of the Truce Supervision Organization to enter localities and g)."~!!i? Whiçh w~r~ subjects of complaints in oreler to "Reminds the parties of their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations to settle their inter- national disputes by peaceful means in such manner that international peace and security are not en- dangered, and expresses its concern at the failure of the Governments of Israel and Syria ta achieve pro- gress pursuant to their commitments under the Armistice Agreement ta promote the return ta per- manent peace in Palestine; "D1:rects the Chief of Staff of the Tntce Snper- vision Organization ta take the necessary steps ta give effect to this resolution for the purpose of re- storing peace in the area, and authorizes him to take such measures ta restore peace in the area and ta make such representations to the Governments of Israel and Syria as he may deem necessary; "CaUs upon the Chief of Staff of the Tntce Super- vision Organization to report ta the Security Council on compliance given to this resolution; "Requests the Secretary-General ta furnish snch additional personnel and assistance as the Chief of Staff of the Trnce Supervision Organization may request in carrying out this resalution and the Conn- cil's resolution of 8 May 1951 and 17 November 1950." 3. Last week, while participating in sponsoring this c1raH resolution which calls f'or a cease-fire in the pres- ent unfortunate dispute between Israel and Syria, l urged the necessity of prompt consideration of the com- plaints which we have now had on our agenda for the last few weeks under the Palestine question. Fortu- nately, with the passage of the intervening days between onr last [545th] meeting and this one, we have received reassnring indications that the fighting in and around the demilitariied zone has ceased as ordered. Today, therefore, l believe we may consider these complaints more dispassionately and with a dearer understanding of the facts and of the necessity for prompt Secnrity Council action. l think that the urgency of Council action can be readily appreciatecl by al! of us, for delay in acting here delays the realization of peace in Palestine. 3. en déplorable demandait nécessité plusieurs la citons séance les de Nous avec exacte sécurité Je cus mesures, l'établissement 4. l'Organisme le retourné devons parties volonté réglé 4. Furthermore, although the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization, General Riley, shoulcl have had a much longer periocl of convalescence, he has returnec1 to his post in Palestine and we should see to it that he and the parties under dispute have material evidence of our determination that this present dispute shall be resolved promptly and that future disputes shall he preventec1. 6. The United States strongly supports General H.iley's position. In view of the critieal nature of the present situation in Palestine, my Government deems li desirable for the Council ta consider "lith care the complaints before it in order to see what may be done to strengthen the existing negotiating machinel'y. In sl1pporting General Riley's view that the Mixed Armis- tice Commission can and should hancHe nearly aU the complaints before us, the United States believes that a number of these complaints should be returned to the Mixed Armistice Commission for prompt decision and eql1ally prompt implementation of the decisions taken. 7. In returning these complaints to the Mixed Armis- tice Commission, the Council will do well, in my Gov- ernment's view, to avoid passing judgment on such of those complaints as the Commission is capable of hand- ling. Not only would such action by the Council du- plicate and possibly prej udge decisions of the Commis- sion, but it would lessen the inclination of the parties to exhaust the remedies to which they have agreed before coming ta this Council. A new problem might lollow in a possible conflict of judgment. 8. Tt should he obvious, l believe, that lasting peace in Palestine will more readily come from decisive nego- tiation between the parties, particularly where avenues of negotiation already exist, than from decisions demanded from the Security Council by parties un- willing to negotiate. The United States believes that the Mixed Armistice Commission should act on the complaints referred to il. In taking this position, my Govert1ment also believes that the Council can render assistance to the parties and to the negotiating machinery by ent\l1ciating general considerations which it believes shoulcl guide the settlement in the present difficulties. The COl1ncil should be prepared to pass judgment on those matters which, in its opinion, have implications beyond the Commission's jurisdiction. 9. Tt would appear essential that the parties be in- structed to settle their disputes through the Commis- sion and that the Council should consider ways and means for facilitating the negotiations. The Council now has before it a nllmber of complaints from the Governments of Syria and Israel. It is regrettably apparent from the statements of Israel and Syria that ] 0, In signing the various armistice agreements, Israel on the one hand, and Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Egypt on the other, agreed that the United Nations would assist the parties in the supervision of the application and observance of the terms of those agree- ments. The Trnce Supervision Organization has played an important raie in carrying out the provisions of the armistice agreements. The United States believes .that the Council should give great weight to the account of the recent events given by this United Nations body of impartial observers chosen from the armed forces of Belgium, France and the United States. 10. d'armistice, Royaume part, Unies mise L'Organisme joué tions Etats-Unis grande événements est forces Unis. Il. la l'opposition les mixte risée. il qui elle-même. 11. In the view of the United States, the basic cause for the present situation in the demilitarized zone has been the conflict of views over the rights and respon- sibilities of the United Nations Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission in the demilitarized zone. In examining what these responsibilities are, we must look therefore at the record of the negotiations which precedecl the armistice as weIl as at the Agreement itself. 12. aux Bunche, exprimé démilitarisée. 12. On 26 June 1949 Mr. Ralph Bunche, the Acting Mediator for Palestine, expressed himself in a letter to the Syrian and Israel Governments on the manner in which the demilitarized zone would operate. Mr. Bunche stated in this letter, in part, as follows: "The provision for the demilitarized zone in the light of all circul11stances is the most than can reason- ably be expected in an armistice agreement by either party. Questions of permanent boundaries, territorial sovereignty, customs, trade relations and the like must be dealt with in the ultimate peace settlement and not in the armistice agreement. "1 would point out again that previons arrange- ments for demilitarized zones involving United Nations responsibility as at El Auja, Government House and Mount Scopus, have worked satisfactorily and have served to protect fully the interests and c1aims of rival parties pending final settlement. The proposed demi1itarized zone in the agreement now l1nder negotiation will work equally weil. The United Nations will insure this, sinee its honorand effective- ness will be involved. "In this regard l would point out that in view of the relatively small area involved and the limited ntllnber of settlements or villages in it, the admin- istration and policing problem is .not at aIl a severe or greatly complicated one and can be readily solved. "1 would also point out that in the projected mixed armistice commission, both parties will have an opportunity to discuss and agree upon details affecting this or any other aspect of the Armistice Agreement and that the United Nations will fmd fully satisfactory any subsequent arrangements based on mutual agreement of the two parties. The sole function of the United Nations is to assist the parties in reaching a mutnally satisfactory agreement and in giving them such he1p as they may mutually reqnest in implementing and supervising the terms of the agreement." 13. Of even greater significance in considering this dispute are the definitive comments which were inserted in the records of the Armistice Conference between Israel and Syria on 3 July 1949 which both parties agreed constituted an authoritative statemcnt on article V of the Armistice Agreement. This statement, in our view, sets forth a definitive interpretation of the rights of the Chaimlan of the Mixed Armistice Commission in the demilitarized zone. These comments were quoted by General Riley in his statement before the Council on 25 April. 14. vVith regard to the actual supervision of the demilitarized zone itself l should like ta refer to article V of the Israel-Syrian General Armistice Agreement which provic1es for its establishment. This zone may be seen on the map attached to the Armistice Agreement and 15 divided iuto a llorthern, a southern and a central sector. Article V, paragraph 2, of the Armistice Agree- ment states: "In pursllance of the spirit of the Security Cot1l1cil resolution of 16 November 1948, the armistice de- marcation line and the demilitarized zone have been defined with a view toward separating the armed forces of the two parties in such manner as to minimize the p05sibility of friction and incident ,,,hile providing for the graduaI re!>toration of normaÎ civi1ian life in the area of the demilitarized zone without prejudice to the ü1timate settlement." , 15. Sub-paragraph 5 Cc) of the same article states: "The Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commis- sio~ establis~ed in article VII of this Agreement and U11lted NatlOns observers attached to the Commis- sion shallbe responsible for ensurinr.r the full im- plementation of this article." <:> 21. In conclusion l would like to reiterate my Gov- ernmel1t's conviction that, if peace is ta come in the Palestine area, the major responsibility for such peace rests llpon the parties in the area. They have the means for l11aintaining the armistice that now exists, if they will use them in good faith. This means full co-operation with the Chairl11an of the Mixed Armistice Commis- sion, the rel1dering of aU necessary facilities ta the United Natiol1s observers in the performance of their duties, and a will ta abide by decisions reached by the Commission or by its Chairman, whichever has juris- diction in the case. The role of this Council should rcmain that of strengthening the existing armistice machinery when it is necessary, of considering COI11- plaints of the parties only when aH their other remedies have been exhausted, and of constant1y reminding the parties of their overriding obligations to establish a lasting peace among themselves. 22.. Sir Gladwyn JEEB (United Kingdom): Mem- bers of the Council will, l know, share my own satis- faction at the recent anl1ouncel11ent conveyed to us in the United Nations press release of 14 May of the cease-fire agreement between the Governments of Syria and Israel, ancl at what appears to have been a complete cessation of fighting in the demilitarized area and the adj oining areas since the adoption by the Council of its resolution of 8 May [S12130]. 23. It is indeed encouraging that wise counsels should have prevailed and that what had become a tense and threatenil1g situation should now be dealt with by nego- tiations between representatives of the Governments of Syria and Israel and the Acting Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization. l should like to ex- press 111Y delegation's appreciation of the services of the Acting Chief of Staff and the other members of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization who have helped to bring about this détente. 2~k l understand that General Riley left for the Middle East last Snnday, 13 May. It is indeed fortunate that his health should have recovered sl1fficiently to enable hi111 to resume his work there. We ail have great faith in General Riley's ability and impartiality, and we believe that the confidence which he has inspired in both parties will enable him to resolve their differences. 25. If General Riley is to be able to negotiate a settle- ment of the various matters in dispute, it is clearly necessary that the Council should place on record its views 011 a number of the broad issues. And this should be donc, if possible, qllickly, since whilst these issues are under consideration here in New York, the Chief of Staff will l1ndoubteclly fincl difficnlty in gaining the full attention of the parties on the spot. 26. His Majesty's Government in the United King- dom consequent1y hopes that the Council will feel able to support the drait resolution presented by my United States, French and Turkish colleagues and by myself, and that in debating the medts of its various provisions 17. From the foregoing it seems clear that the Armis- tice Agreement provides for the graduaI restoration of normal civilian life in the zone and that this graduai restoration is without prejudice to the u1timaté settle- ment. The agreement also provides that the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission, who is the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Or- ganization or an offlcer c1esignated by him, is respon- sible for ensuring the full implementation of article V anc1 is also empowered to authorize the return of civilial1s to villages and settlements in the zone and the employment of limited nU111bers of locally recruited civilian police for internai security purposes. 18, It is my Government's view that article V of the Armistice Agreement formally establishes that the United Nations Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission, and not Israel or Syria, is the responsible party for general supervision of the administration of the demilitarizec1 zone. This authority has been ac- quiesced in by both parties. It is believed that this situation obtains until Israel anc1 Syria reach an agree- ment to the contrary, or a modification of the Armistice Agreement is made. In the individual villages and settlements in the demilitarized zone, it seems clear that the local authority lies with the local officiaIs, either Arabs or Israelis, but outsicle of their immecliate jl1ris- diction it would not appear from the agreement that they coulc1undertake activities in the demilitarized zone contrary to the requests or recom111el1dations of the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission, 19. In the present instance, we have an example of one of the parties claiming to interpret correctly article V of the Armistice Agreement in deciding what con- stitutes normal civilian life in the zone. l should like to caU attention to the fact that the Armistice Agree- , ment provic1es appropriate means whereby an inter- pretation of article V may be made. In this connexion, l c1raw attention to article VII, paragraph 8, which states: "\Alhere interpretation of the meaning of a par- ticular provision of this Agreement, other than the preamble anc1 articles l and II, is at issue, the Com- mission's interpretation shall prevail ... " 20. The Council now has before it a draft resolution which has been introduced by the United Kingdom, France, Turkev and the United States. It is the view of my Governrilent that the adoption of this clraft reso- lution by the Council will clarify and strengthen the respol1sibilities and duties of the Chairman of the Israel- Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission. My Government is glac1 to note that fighting in the area .in question has ceased. It is the hope of 111Y Government that the adop- tion of the draft (esolution which the Ço~mçjl nQW has 27. In the view of His Majesty's Government, the fllndamental consideration which we shollld have in mind is that of strengthening the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission and the Truce Supervision 01'- ganization. 'YVe think, therefore, that the Couneil should not pronounce on the matters of detail which have been put before us by the representatives of the two parties but should confine itself to the broad issues. It will then be for the Chief of Staff to work out a solution through the machincry provided by the General Armis- tice Agreement, or in negotiations with the represen- tatives of the two Governments. 28. As 1 said in my remarks in support of the cease- fire resolution on 8 May [545th 11'l,eetil1g] , we are fully aware that the fonn of administration in the demili- tarized zone provided for in the Armistice Agreement must inevitably give rise to difficu1ties in practice. We have always regarded, for our part, this fonn of admin- istration as a purely temporary expedient until a per- manent settlement can be negotiated between the two Governments. We have never failed to malee dear our view that Israel and Syria should proceed with the negotiation of a final peace settlement. The fourteenth paragraph of the resolution now before the Council reminds the parties of their obligations to promote the return of permanelltpeace ta Palestine, and we hope that members of the Council, by giving their emphatic approval to this, will show the two Governments how earnestly the United Nations hopes that progress can now be made towards the completion of final peace treaties between Israel and the neighbouring Arab States. 29. But untU a final peace treaty between Syria and Israel has been made, His Maj esty's Government in the United Kingdom regards the question of sovereign- ty in the demilitarized zone as being perfectly dear. The General Armistice Agreement, together with Ml'. Bunche's interpretive note of 26 June 1949, which was formal1y accepted by both Governments as an authoritative cOl11mentary on the Agreement, must be interpreted as meaning that, so long as the armistice continues in force, neither Government exercises sove- reignty in the demilitarized zone. The tenth paragraph of the draft resolution which my United States col1eague has just introduced would place on record the Council's approval of the principles set forth in Ml'. Bunche's note, and would call·upon the parties to give effect to them. Members of the Security Council will observe that this paragraph does no more than re- state what the two Governments have already accepted in the interpretive note, but in view of the doubts which have been expressed during the conrse of our recent debates, we thought it right that the Security Council should set its seal, so to speale, on theessential -Eeatures of the interpretive note by incorporating them in tbis resolution. ·111 the view of my Government, therefore, bath the ÇTgyernments Qf Israel and Syria have a dutY 30. If l may illustrate this by a case in point, may l say that if the Government of Israel considers that the Agreement is defective in sa far as it enables the land- owners of the area near Banat Yakub to hold up in- definitely the Palestine Land Development Company's Lake Ruleh c1rainage project, its right course should he to put forwarc1 whatever amendments to the Agree- ment it consic1ers necessary ta a conference convoked hy the Secretary-General under the provisions of this article, and if necessary to bring its proposaIs ta the Security Council. If instead the Palestine Land Devel- apment Company proceeds with its operations and expropriates the land, having no authority to do so, the Company and the Israel authorities who control its operations must inevitably place themselves in the wrong in this matter. \iVhilst, therefore, my Govern- ment fully recognizes the general benefit that would result from the completion of the Lake Ruleh drainage scheme, it is firmly of the view that it should not be proceeded with in violation of the provisions of the General Armistice Agreement. 31. I hope that other mel1lbers of the Council will agree with our view on this matter and that they will feel able to support the provisions in the draft resolu- tion which l have mentioned. I should wish ta add only a brief reference to the various acts of violence which have unfortunate1y been committed in the demilitarized zone and on lis borders during recent months. Para- graph Il of the draft resolution declares that the use of aerial bombardment by the Israel forces on 5 April 1951 constituted a breach of the Armistice Agreement and of Israel's obligations as a Member of the Unitec1 Nations. The Cüuncil has heard allegations of <ll!gressive military action in other parts of the cease-fire z"'one, and there have been suggestions that the Government of ~yria. has us~d its forces in this way. These are ques- tIOns on whlch we have at present no precise in- formation and, in the view of my delegation, we must await more detailed and considered reports from the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervisory Organization 32. There is one further matter which l wish to men- tion, and that is the question of the Arab villagers who have been transferred to areas outside the demilitarizec1'. zone. There have been suggestions that these transfers have been made llnder chtress and, indeed, the inability of the United Nations observers ta trace their present whereabouts and ta assure the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervisory Organization that their movement was indeed of their own volition and that their present welfare is in aU respects satisfactory, must cause mem- bers of the Council considerable anxiety. My Govern- ment hopes that the Israel authorities will realize the importance of giving General Riley's Trnce Super- vision Organization full facilities to trace any Arab residents who may have been transferred from the demilitarized zone and to return them to the demi1i- tat'izcd zone, should this prove ta be what they desire. 33. If l muy sl1lnmarÎze my Government's attitude, therefore, l would say that it is greatly encouraged by the recent improved situation on the Israel-Syrian border and hopes that wise statesmanship on the part of the two Governments will lead ta an early s~ttlement of the variotls points of dispute which gave rise to the fighting. It hopes that it wil1 be possible to replace the General Armistice Agreement with a final peace settle- ment at an early date anc! that in the meantime b,oth parties, by strict observance of the provisions of the Armistice Agreement and by lenc!ing their fullest sup- port to the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commis- sion, will ensme the continnance of peaceful conditions and orderly administration in the demi1itarized zone. It feels that it is not too mnch to hope that a final settle- ment between the Governments of Israel and Syria might leac1 to similar settlements between Israel and the other Arab States and that the political, economic and strategic co-operation which woulc! then become possible would convert the Middle East into a region of strength and stability instead of a region weakened hy internai dissension. May the Govemments of Syria and Israel, in resolving their present differences, show the way towards such a happy Ol1tcome. 34. Mr. French) : incidents, LACOSTE (France) (translated fram For more than two \11onths now a series of many of them bloody, several involving 35. It is not only our concern for the people directly affected by these disorders - the two States involved and their neighbours, whose tranqui1lity is thus dis- turbed- but our essential responsibility in this Coun- cil, whose name gives such an exact definitiol1 of its basic task of preventing the cause of peace from being threatened at any point in the world, which impels us to direct our 1110st vigilant attention ta the situation now reigning in this tense area stretching north and south of Lake Huleh. 36. It wouId, I think, be of little value to enumerate ail the incidents, the list of which we hope is now at last completed, which have for sa long occurred spo- radically in the demilitarized zone and on occasion even outside its boundaries, in spite of the counse1, advice and representations which the Goverl1l11ents of several States which are l11embers of this Council, inc1ucling mine, have repeatedly offered in the friendliest and most urgent tenns ta the two parties to the dispute. Nor, I feel, would it be of value to give an account of any of the incidents. We have long since learned from experience that the detailed facts, and the interpretation to be placed upon them, are always subject to challenge and to dispute on one side or the other, even when the observers of the Truce Supervision Organizatioll have given a decision. The simple list of the complaints laid before the Council by Syria and by Israel provide, if one may say so, objective confirmation of the truth of this remark. 37. Two basic faets nevertheless caU for our attention: fi.rst, the existence of an unhealthy and dangerous situa- tion on the eastern borders of Palestine; secondly, the occurrence of certain outstanding events, which ,are not open to doubt and the substance of which is unchal- lenged, the most serious certainly being the bombing of El Hamma from the air on 5 April. These events, which are in themselves deeply ta be regretted, reveal astate of mind which causes legitimate and serious anxiety. 38. The first question which we must ask and which I believe, cornes naturally to mind is this: How dicl snch a situation occur? How did it become possible after the encouraging beginning made with the conclusion of the Armistice Agreement of 20 July 1949? 39. The reply to this question is, I fear, onlv too simple: An armistice is, by defi.niüon, a provisiomil and transitory arrangement: an arrangement at once too rigid and too vague, in which it is difficult to live. No one who is familial' with Palestine affairs will, I think, dispute the fact that this provisional arrangement has already lasted too long. This, undoubtedly, is the root C'ause of the evil, and ail States sinccrely interested in 40. This, however, is not the only cause of the disturbances with which we are today concerned. Pending such a final settlement as l have just men- tionec1, nations must live, and must live in peace. When in 1949 the United Nations lent its good offices to the conflicting parties, it did not confine itself to helping them to come to an agreement on a cessation of hostili- ties. The intention was also to help them, in the spirit of the Charter, to organize and to put into effect a system which would make possible, as far as eircum- stances permitted, that peaceful and even harmonious co-existence and those good-neighbourly relations be- tween States which represent the true ideal which in- spires the efforts of the United Nations and cements the co-operation of its Members - when they do co-operate. possible, ~ 41. The Mixed Armistice Commission, the Truce Supervision Organization, aU the machinery in which the former belligerents are called upon to co-operate, with the assistance of personnel appointed by the United Nations, offer the States concerned means of passing through this waiting period with as little difficulty as possible and in any event peacefully, and- it is to be hopecl- of passing through this period of adaptation which separates them Trom the normal relation of neigh- bouring States at peace with one another, in the legal and in the actua1 meaning of that worel. nerie les tout faut 42. The unhappy events of the last two months have t!l1fortunatrly shown us that the complaining parties who are today tcfore us have occasionally overlooked the obligations they had assumed by signing the 1949 Armistice Agreement. In the first place - and this is the most seriOns matter - they have resorted to force in certain cases in an attempt to secure what they regarded as justice for themselves, and, secondly, they have refused, in practice, to observe the definite rules laid down for them by the Agreement in order to permit the very operation of the armistice machinery. plaignantes par 43. In these circul11stances, what should be, what 1S to be, the attitude of the Security Council? 44. In the first place, it was the dutY of the Security COlmcil to caU upon the parties to cease hostilities, as it dicl. That was the object of the draft resolution l snbmitted on behalf of my Government on 8 May, jointly with the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and Turkey [5/2130], and which was adopted by the Council on the same day by ten votes, with no opposition [545th meeting]. 45. The Council- and this is the object of the draft resolution which the representatives of the countries mentioned and myself are submitting today on behalf of our Governments - must still recall to the parties, in more precise and detailed terms than were I)Ossible in the urgent resolution adopted last week, the respect due to their obligations and conunitments under the General Armistice Agreement. 46. Above aU the draft resolution just placed before the members of the Couneil reminds the Governments fait 47. The draft resolution further decides that the groups bf civilian Arabs who were removed from the demilitarized zone by the Govemment of Israel must be authorized to retum immediately to their homes and . that the Mixed Armistice Commission must see to it that they do retum and are rehabilitated. Finally, it declares that there must be no action implying the transIer of persans across international frontiers, armistice lines or within the demilitarized zone without a previous decision by the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission. 48. l think that General Riley's replies on 8 May [545th meeting] ta the questions l had asked him at the previous [544thJ meeting - l shall quote the replies - make it quite clear that there is a need for a provision of that kind in the draft resolution before the Council. 49. General Riley said: "1 have a record of two villages in the central sector which were destroyed. Baqqara was completely razed to the grounc1 and the village of Ghannama was destroyed. The Arabs from the villages of El Hamma, Baqqara and Khouri Fann were taken to Sha'ab, near Acre, in Israel territory. VI/omen and children from Ein Gev 11ave 1110ved to the mountains near the Syrian border. In the caSe of Samra, there is no definite information at present as to the where- abouts of the population." 50. That is what General Riley told us himself on 8 May. 51. Those provisions of the draft resolution to which l have just referred concern the pasto It is quite obvious that they also relate to the future and 1 am certain that 1 am interpreting the thought of us aU when 1 express the urgent hope that no more violence, whether it take the form of acts of war or of the eviction of civilian population, will arise in the area with which we are concerned. 52. For the future, there are two sets of provisions to ensure that the Truce Supervision Organization and the armistice régime rtm as smoothly as possible. One concerns the work started by the Palestine Land Development Company in the demilitarized zone. The third, fourth and fifth paragraphs of the draft resolu- tion specify that this work must only be'resurned after the Chairrnan of the Mixed Anllistice Commission has arranged an agreement which permits the work to start again. 54. However, as General Riley has so rightly pointed out, the Palestine Land Development Company has not the right to expropriate land in the demilitarized zone and there must be an agreement between the Palestine Land Deve10pment Company and the land- owncrs before the work is resumed. It hus been said too often that it was only a question of a few acres of land. It is also and ubove aIl a question of a principle and, when aIl is said and done, of the whole status of the demilitarized zone. No wonder, then, that the villagers who owned these lands defended their property, even with rifles in their hands. No wonder tbat the question should have come before the Mixed Anllistice Commis- sion. 55. The second series of provisions contained in the clraft text to which l have referred may be read in the eighth, 11inth, tenth and thirteenth paragraphs. Theil' purpose is simply to remind the parties of the essential rules, which have on a number of occasions been ignored or violated, but which must without fail be observed if the machinery which is ta make it possi- ble for the local populations and the two conflicting States to live in peac~ is to function. It is unnecessary, l believe, to comment on them one by. one. They are all self-explanatory, and their timeliness, not to say their necessity, is obvious. 56. My delegation expresses the French Government's very sincere and. very deeply fe]t hope that this draft resolution will be adopted promptly and, if complete unanimity cannot be achieved, by as full a majority as was the resolution of 8 May. 57. The French Government's profound concern for the we1fare of the populations involved and of the two States, with each of which it i5 intimately linked by bonds of friendship, is reflected in its efforts, in collabor- ation with the United States, United Kingdom and Turkish Governments, to find the basis for an immediate solution of the present difficulties. 58. In conclusion, it is in full consciousness of its joint responsibility with the above countries and with ail the members of the Security Council, and animated by the desire to serve the general cause of peace, that the French Government urges the adoption of these provisions.

As Olle of the sponsors of the draft resolution before the Council, l wish to make the following statement in my capacity of representative of TURKEY. 60. We have listened to the statements of both parties on this phase of the Palestine question. We have studied and consiclered the letters received from the represen- 61. The recent developments in the Israel-Syrian armistice area have caused us deep concern because, as has already been pointed out to the Council by my delegation [545th meeting], we regard these developments as a new manifestation of the generally unsettled situation in the whole of Palestine. The Middle East being -our own region, our earnest hope is naturally to see normal conditions, stability and lasting peace return to that region. We are certain that this can be and will be achieved. It is with this conviction in our hearts that Turkey has been working as a member the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine the past two years. But, until general peacecan be restored, tension will unfortunately continue in Palestine. We are doing all we can, and the United Nations is cloing all it can, to reduce that tension to a minimum and to confine it as much as possible to incidents on local scale, if it cannot be eliminated altogether. That is the purpose of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, of the Mixed Arn1istice Commission, and, partly, of the Conciliation Commission itself. 62. The situation that developed araund the Banat Yakub Bridge was indeed serious. It grew out of the controversy over the question of the drainage of the Huleh marshes and resulted in exchanges of fire and loss of life. l do not intend to go into the details and merits of the case. Although the incident was intrinsically seriaus, it was a local frontier incident which could have been expected under the prevailing circumstances. In fact such incidents were foreseen in the Armistice Agreement which was signecl by Israel and Syria. Article VII, paragraph 7, provides that: "Claims or complaints presented by either party relating to the application of this Agreement sha11 be referred immecliately to the Mixecl Armistice Commission through its Chairman. The Commission shall take such action on all such claims or camplaints by mean~ of its observation and investigation machinery as 1t may deem appropriate, with a view to equitable and mutually satisfactory seulement." 63. Paragraph 8 of the same article further provides that: 64. Bath of the parties have accepted these provisions in signing the Armistice Agyeement. Since the controversy was over the application of the Agreement within the demilitarized zone, the normal and final authority to which both the controversy·and the ensuing incidents should be referred is the Mixed Armistice Commission. 65. Other incidents followed those of the Banat Yakub bridge. As tension grew ail along the armistice area it spread southward and caused the incidents of the El Hamma district. There was firing there, too, and seven Israel policemen were killed. This was perhaps a more serious incident than those up north, but again l shall not go into the merits of the case. It is clear from the report of the Acting Chief of Staff that the Mixed Armistice Commission, which attempted to investigate that incident and whose work was stopped short, was unable to collect sufficient evidence to reach a definite conclusion as to where the responsibility lay. Several questions have remained unanswered. One point, however, was sufficiently clear: this also was a local incident. 66. But we cannot adopt the same attitude towards the bombing that followed this incident. Aerial bombing is not a local incident; it is a very grave step which cannot be justified under the CÎrcumstances and which should not be passed over in silence in this Council. 67. Another point that has caused us concern is that ail through these deve\opments in the Israel-Syrian armistice area, United Nations authority and the orders of United Nations observers seem to have been disregarded repeatedly. Several instances of such defiance can be found in the reports of Colonel De Ridder, Acting Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization. 68. Thereafter, incident followed incident and the situation deteriorated until the adoption by the Security Council of its cease-fire resolution of 8 May. In this connexion we must note with satisfaction that the armistice area has become quiet again after that resolution was adopted and that, according the reports, a cease-fire agreement has already been reached between the parties. . 69. After preliminary remarks, let us tum to the points at issue between the two parties. 70. The first among these is the highly controversial and still more complex problem of sovereignty over the demilitarized zone. The demilitarized zone, consisting of three separate sectors, was created under the Israel-Syrian General Armistice Agreement. If we leave aside resolutions, recol11l11endations, and policies with regard to this zone and look at the question from a strictly legal point of view, the chief legal instrument which might help us in our consideration of the 71. The Armistice Agreement does Dot he1p us if try to determine the problem of sovereignty over demilitarized zone. It contains no reference to sovereignty. In faet, when it was being drawn up, the question of sovereignty over the demilitarized zone was intentionally and expressly avoided. 72. Article V, sub-paragraph 5 (a) of the Agreement dearly states that a demilitarized zone shaH be establishecl "pending final territorial settlement between the parties". Final territorial settlement obviously means the final de1imitation of territorial boundaries. Further, paragraph 1 of the same article expressly provides that the arrangements for the demilitarized zone "are not to be interpreted as having any relation whatsoever to ultima:te territorial arrangements affecting the two parties to this Agreement". 73. This point, in fact, was explained here by General Riley in his statement of 25 April, when he quoted several documents and notes whichmake it clear that the parties had agreed, before the Armistice Agreement took its final form, that a number of questions, including that of territorial sovereignty, must he c1ealt with the ultimate peace settlement ancl not in the Armistice Agreement. This idea, in our view, was actually incorporated in the Armistice Agreement in the form of phrase which l have just quotecl, that is: "pencling final territorial settlement betwccn the parties". 74. It must also he pointed out that just because there exists no clear reference to sovereignty in the Armistice Agreement, just because the question of sovereignty was not dealt with in that Agreement, it does not follow that either party has accepted the claims of the other to sovereignty over the demilitarized zone. This point appears to be so obvious that it need not be elaborated further. In fact, article II, paragraph 2 of the Armistice Agreement itself c1early states that: "It is also recognized that no provision of this Agreement sha11 in any way prejudice the rights, claims and positions of either party hereto in the ultimate settlement of the Palestine question ... " Actua11y, both of the parties have their claims with regard to the demilitarized zone. 75. In his statement in this Council on 17 April [541st meeting] the representative of Syria said: "The territory comprising the dell1ilitarized zone had been for the most part under Syrian ocCtlpation, as l have already stated. When a final peace agreement has been concluded, Syria will certainly insist that this territory should be returned to its contro1." 76. On the other hand, the representative of Israel, in his statement of 25 April, dealt at length with the question of sovereignty over the demilitarized zone, insisting that the demilitarized zone, excepting a small 1. 77. Under these conditions, and without passing jlldgment in any way on the merits of the claims of either side, l sllbmit that there is no legal ground to determine with finality the question of sovereignty over the demilitarized zone and, as it has been done in the Armistice Agreement, it must still be left open until a final territorial settlement can be reached between Syria and Israel. 78. Meanwhile, we agree with the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization that the demilitarized zone has a special status ttnder the Armistice Agreement. It was suggested by Mr. Bunche, as quoted in General Riley's statement [542nd meeting] that the purpose of the demilitarized zone was to create a "buffer zone" between the armed forces of the two parties, in arder to eliminate as fully as possible friction and troublesome incident between them. l suggest that this was not the only anc1 the whole purpose. As a matter of fact, at the time of the cease-fire in 1948, Israel was claiming, unc1er the original partition plan, the territories which now constitute the demilitarized zone, while Syria had large portions of these territories under. its military occupation. Thus these territories \Vere disputed and c1aimed by both sic1es, and the only way to make the parties agree to an armistice was to cstablish a demilitarizec1 zone in these territories, without prejudice to the claims of either party, and to leave the question of ultimate possession to the final peace settlement. Obviously, each of the parties agreed to this arrangement, with the intention of insisting on its own claims later. 79. Thus the demilitarized zone was established and there is, in our opinion, no doubt that it was placed unc1er a special status. First of aU, it is sufficiently clear in article V of the Armistice Agreement, as it was pointed out by General Rilev in his statement to the Council last week,that military activity is totally excluded from the demi1itarized zone. Civilian activity also, in our unc1erstanding of article V of the Armistice Agreement, is not unrestricted in the demilitarized zone. It is true that paragraph 2 of article V provides for "the graduaI rcstoration of normal civilian life in the area of the dell1ilitarized zone". But sub-paragraph 5 (c) of the same article clearly states that "the Chairman of the Mixed Commission... and United Nations observers attachec1 ta tl~e Commission shaH be responsible for ensuring the full implementation of this article". Thus it is their responsibility to see to it that normal eivilian life is gradually restored in the zone. 80. These provIsions have been freely and fully accepted by the parties and are binding upon them. Keeping them inmind, let us look at the question of the drainage work of the Huleh marshes. Without going into a discussion of whether the draining of these ll1arshes would or would not have military implications, 81. It was unfortunate that the situation developed, as it did, before the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission was in a position to give his views on the matter. We still believe, however, that this question falls within the competence of the Commission on the spot' and that it will not be necssary for the Security Council to intervene further in the matter. 82. l t is with these considerations and convictions that we have sl1bmitted jointly with the delegations of France, the United Kingdom and the United States the drait resolution which is now before the Council. \7Ve believe that a resolution of this Council along the Enes proposed in this draft would greatly help the efforts to reach an equitable and mutually satisfactory settleluent on all these matters, and would be useful for the eventual restoration of stability and lasting peace in the Middle East.

l wish to speak on a point of order. The hour is growing late, and l l1nderstand that there are several more speakers on the list. Many of the representatives received the joint draft resolution only this morning and they wouId, perhaps, Eh to have a little more time to study it, particularly in view of the statements made this afternoon by the sponsors. For that reason l respectfulIy suggest that it might be better to adjourn the meeting now until a later date.

The representative of the N etherlancls has proposed adjourmnent. Are there any objections?

l have not asked to speak in order to present an objection ta the proposaI for adjournment. l should like to address an inquiry to the President if l may. 86. My delegation considers it to be of extreme importance, as l believe Mr. Austin has pointed outand, l believe, also the United Kingdom representative - that this matter should be handled with a sense of l1rgency..More specifically, it seems appropriate to raise the questlOn of whether it would be possible to terminate the Council's proceedings on this clraft resolution before the end of this week. Therefore, the question which l should like to address to the President of the Council is whether, in theevent that the meeting is adjourned now, as has been suggested - and to which suggestion l am not interposing any objection - the COlmcil might be prepared to meet on Friday, 18 May, and, if necessary, to continue into the evening of that day in an effort to complete consideration of the draft resolution.

Representatives on the Council are aware that the First Committee will meet

1 should 110t like ta admit that the First Committee necessarily !las priority when any conflict arises between its meetings and ours. Our work might even be more urgent than the work of the First Committee in certain circumstances. What was suggested by the representative of the United States, however, was that we should meet on Fric1ay - and the President suggested that it should be at 4 p.m. - and be prepared, if necessary, ta carry on our work into the night, sa as 'ta arrive at a decision of SOllle kind on Friday. Is that the intention of the President? 89. Ml'. ESIA (China): We aU realize the urgency of this matter and the necessity of trying to bring it to an early conclusion. 1 have no objection ta meeting on Friday, but 1 do not understand why we should meet at 4 p.m. vVhat objection would there be ta meeting in the morning? 1 raise this point because unfortunately it happens that both Ml'. Tsiang and 1 have engagements for Fric1ay evening, and we should not like to be absent from the meeting if it is at aU possible for us to be there. Would it not be possible ta meet Friday morning, so that we might fi,nish by evening?

My intention in suggesting that we meet at 4 p.m. on Friday was to fix a time that would be convenient for the Council and at the sallle time would not involve any overlapping of the meetings of the First Committee. The First C0111111ittee is to llleet tomorrow morning, and it will prohably continue to meet in the afternoon and on Friclay morning. 1 regret that the time that has been suggested is not convenient for the representative of China, but it seems ta be the sense of the Council that we should meet on Friday' afternoon, as has been proposed by the representative of the United States. In that case, 1 think that we should continue our meeting Friday evening, as has also been suggested by the representative of the United States, in arder ta finish our consideration of this itetn. 91. Ml'. GROSS (United States of America): 1 should lil-ce ta support the suggestion made by the representative of China that the Councilmeet on Friday at 3 o'dock in the afternoon, instead of at 4 p.m.

1 have no personal objection to a meeting at 3 o'clock. 93. Ml'. ESlA (China): 1 shaH not persist if that is the lllajority view of the Security Council. However, the assumptionis that the First Committee will complete

1 think that for practical reasons we may disregard the meetings of the First Committee with respect to fixing the time of meeting of the Security Council, because the First Committee may continue with its work into ncxt week. We will try to find an arrangement that will suit both the Security Council and the First Committee. 95. The representative of the United States proposed a meeting of the Secttrity Council at 3 p.m. Friday. The representative of China has proposed that the Council should meet on Friday morning. 1 woulel Iike to have the sense of the Council as to which of times woulel be more convenient ta the l11ajority.

think it is quite a simple matter. In prindple we will arrange to meet at 3 p.m. on Friday, but if by chance - which ta me, at any rate, appears to be remote - the First Committee canc1udes its work on Thursc1ay, we can then meet on Friday morning at 10.30.

Are there any objections to the proposaI of the representative of the United Kingdom? As there are no objections, it is decided provisionally ta meet at 3 p.m. on Friday, 18 May, with the understanding that if the First Committee should finish its work Thursday evening, we shall then meet on Friday, 18 May, at 10.30 a.m. SALES AGENTS FOR UNITED DEPOSITAIRES DES PUBLICATIONS FINLAND - FINLANDE Akateeminen Klrjakauppa, katu, Helsinki. FRANCE EdlUons A. Pedone. Paris V. GREECE - GRECE "Eleflheroudakls" nale, Place de 1; Constitution, GUATEMALA Goubaud & Ciao num. 28, 2 do Piso, HAITI Max Bouchereau, velle." Boi~e postale Prince. HONDURAS llbreria Panamericana, Fuente, Tegucigalpa. ICELAND -ISLANDE Bokaverzlun Slgfusar Austurstretl lB, Reykjavik. INDIA":'INDE OIcford Book & Statlonery House, New Delhi. INDONESIA -INDONESIE Jajasal'l Pembangunan, 84, Djakarta. IllAQ:- IRAK Mackenzle's Bookshop, Statloners, Baghdad. IRAN Ketab-Khaneh Danesh, Menue, Teheran. IRElAND - IRLANDE Hlbernlan General cial Buildings, Dame ISRAEL leo Blumstein, P.O.B. 35 Allenby Raad, ITALy - ITALIE Colibri S.A., Via LEBANON - LIBAN librairie universelle, LIBERIA J. Momolu Kamara, Streets, Monrovia. LUXEMBOURG librairie J. Schummer, Luxembourg. MEXICO - MEXIQUE Editorial Hermes, cal 41, Mexko, NETHERLANDS - N.V. Martlnus Nljhoff. 9, 's-Gravenhage. NEW ZEALAND- NOUVELLE.ZELANDE United Nations Assodatlon land, G.P.O. 10ll, NICARAGUA Dr. Ramiro Ramlrez Publicaclones, Managua, ARGENTINA - ARGEf'!TINE Editorial Sudamericana S.A., Calle Alslna 500, Buenos Aires. AUSTRALIA - AUSTRALI E H. A. Goddard (Pty.), Lld., 255a George Street, Sydney, N.S.W. BELGIUM -'- BELGIQUE Agence et Messageries de la Presse S.A., 14·22 rue du Persil, Bruxelles. ' W. H. Smith & Son ' 71-75 Boulevard Adolphe·MalC. Bruxelles. BOLIVIA -IlOLlVIE libreria ClenUilca y literaria, Avenlda 16 de Julio 216, Caslila 972, la paz BRAZIL - BRESIL livrarla Agir, Rua Mexico 98-B, Caixa Postal 3291, Rio de Janeiro. CANADA - CANADA . The Ryerson Press, 299 Queen Stroet West, Toronto. CEYLON - CEYLAN The Associated Newspapers of Ceyl,on, Lld., Lake House, Colombo. CHILE - CHILI , lIbrerla Ivens, Calle Moneda B22, Santiago. CHINA - CHINE The Commercial Press, lld., 211 Honan Raad, Shanghai. COl.OMBIA - COLOMBIE lIbrerfa Latina Uda., Apartado, JJreo 4011, Bogotol. COSTA RICA - COSTA·RICA TreJos Hermanos, Apartado 1313, San José. CUBA la Casa Belga, Ren6 de Smedt, D'Reilly 455, La Habana. CZECHOSLOVAK(A - TCHECOSLOVAQUIE Ceskoslovensky Splsovatel Nolrodnll'Flda 9, Praha 1. DENMARK - DANEMARK Einar Munksgaard, N,rregade 6, I<_benhavn; DOMINICAN REPUBLlC- REPUBLIQUE DOMINICAINE Librerla Domlnlcana, C.lle Mercedes No. 49, Apartado 656, Ciudad Trujillo. ECUADOR,... EQUATEUR Muiloz Hermanos y Cia., Piaza deI Teatro, Quito. EGYPT- EGYPTE· Librairie "La Renaissance d'Egypte," 9 SH. Adly Pasha, Calro. EL SALVADOR - SALVADOR Manuel Navas y Cla. "La Casa dellibro Barato" la Avenlda sur num. 37, Sal'l Salvador. ETHIOPIA - ETHIOPIE Agence Ethiopienne de Publlclt6, Box B, Addis-Abeba. AUSTRIA - AUTRICHE B. Wüllerstorlf, Salzburg. United Notion< publications con lorther be obtolned Irom the 101l00/Ing boobellers: GERMANY - ALLEMAGNE Buchhandlung Elwert & Meurer, Haupt.· strasse, 101, Berlln·SchOneberg. W. E., Saarbach, Frankenstra.se, 14, Kiiln-Junkersdorf. JAPAN - JAPON Alexander Horn, Spiegelgasse, 9, Maruzen Co., lld., Wiesbaden. . Nlhonbashl, Tokyo Orders and inqulrio. ~rom countries ...horo salos agonts havo not yet beon appolnted may be sont to: Salos and Crrculalion Section, United Nations, No... York, U.S.A.: or Salos Soclion, United Nations Office, Palais dos Nalions, Gonova, S...iturland.