S/PV.549 Security Council

l would suggest that for members of the Security Council, there should be both simultaneous and consecutiveinterpretation and that, if non-members of the Council are invited to participate, their statements should be interpretedsimultaneousily but not consecutively. If there is no objection, we sha11 so proceed.

In dealing with the Palestine question, it has been the practice of the Security Council to invite those representatives of States in the area, who wish to do so, to participate without vote in the discussions of the Council, if they are not already members of the Council. The aspect of the Palestine question with which we are about to deal concerns a complaint by Israel against Egypt. Therefore, it follows that the representatives of Israel and of Egypt should be present when this matter is under discussion. 3. The representative of Iraq has also asked, in a letter [S/2262] which l received yesterday, to be allowed to participate. Although Iraq is, if l may say so, less directly concerned with the present complaint, l thinkit would be in accordanc,e with the past practice of the Se'curity Council, to which l have already referred, to grant this request. too/~ places at the Security CouncU table. S. Ml'. EBAN (Israel): The Government of Israel 110W cames before the Security Couneil to seek the cessation of an aggressive and hostile practice which violates the purposes of the United Nations Charter, the specifie provisions of the Egyptian-Israel General Armistice Agreement \ and the prineiples of international law. Egyptian interference with the passage of goods through the Suez Canal is specifically directed against Israel. It is therefore natural for my Government, as the victim of a deliberate act of war, to bring the question before the Security Couneil. However, this is not a complaint of limited topographical scope, similar to others which have arisen on various occasions within the context of the armistice system. This is a central international question. The freedom of the seas; fidelity to international conventions; the legal integrity and moral and practical worth of the Egyptian-Israel General Armistice Agreement; the allthority of the Ur~ited Nations officers under that Agreement; the free deve10pment of economic co-operation in the Middle East; the future of Egyptian-Israel relations, for peace or for war - aIl these grave issues come within the wide perspectives of this discussion. The importance ,of the question is weIl illustrated by the impressive volume of condemnation which the Egyptian practice of blockade has already evoked both from United Nations' representatives charged with the negotiation and supervision of the Armistice, and from individual Powers whose interests have been prejudiced by these acts. Moreover, General Riley's statement that the effective functioning of the Armistice Agreement is jeopardized by the continuation of these practices must be regarded as a serious danger signal to the Security Council, in the light of its own responsibility for the impartial implementation of the Armistice Agreement. 6. The Security Council will recall that when the Mandate for Palestine ended on 14 May 1948, the Arab States openly tmdertook armed intervention against the State of Israel. In the course of this armed intervention, undertaken in defiance of Security Council resolutions, Egypt sought to establish a general blockade against Israel and began to visit and search ships of aU nationalities passing through the Suez Canal, thus violating the freedolll of the seas and contravening the Suez Canal Convention, under which Egypt is bound to keep the Suez Canal "always... free and open in time of war as in time of peace" 2 to all ships, without distinction of nationality. The object of this practice of 7, On 24 February 1949, a General Armistice Agreement was signed at Rhodes between Israel and Egypt, in the presence of the United Nations Acting Mediator, Mr. Ralph Bunche, and the United Nations Chief of Staff, General Riley. General Riley has now stated, in document S/2194, that "it was certainly never contemplated at Rhodes that what is, in effect, an act of blockade. .. would be continued by one of the parties to the General Armistice Agreement more than two years after it had been signed". 8. On 29 June 1949, after the protests of certain Pmvers, the Egyptian Government modified some of its restrictive regulations. Even then, however, a long and specific list of items inc1uding ships, important categories of goods, and in particular petroleum, remained subject to seizure as contraband if found destined for Israel. Ships transporting or suspected of transporting such goods have been detained for visit and search, and goods of such categories, if found, are removed and are liable to condemnation in a prize court. This threat of forcible interference acts as a deterrent ta the normal trade which would otherwise have passed through the Suez Canal to or from Israel. Thus the Egyptian practice,both in its declared "legal" motive and in its effects, c1early constitutes an act of war, and operates as though there existed an internationally recognized state of war which all other Powers were bound to respect. 9. Today, two and a haH years after the signature of the General Armistice Agreement, the passage of cargo through the Suez Canal continues ta be severely restricted. In fact, new and increasingly burdensome restrictions were introduced by the Egyptian Government in September 1950, such as the requirement of a guarantee by ships' captains, and in particular by captains of oil tankers, that their. ships would not ultimate1y discharge their cargo at an Israel port. Another regulation caUs for the submission of logbooks by tankers intending to proceed southward through the Suez Canal. Vessels found to have called at any port in Israel are placed on a black list and denied stores, fuel and repair facilities in' Egyptian ports. There have recently been signs of an Egyptian intention tQ extend these illicit blockade practices to other waters, in which Israel possesses and intends to use its full maritime rights. 10. The records of the Security Coundl itself throw a c1ear light both on the illegitimacy of the Egyptian blockade ,and on the contradiction between this practice and the Armistice Agreement. This Agreement was conc1uded pursuant to the Security Coundl's resolution of 16 November 1948 [381st meeting], and is described in its own text as a l11easure to facilitate the "transition from the present truce to permanent peace". The text of the Armistice Agreement contains repeated indica- "The Armistice Agreements are not the final peace settlement, but the only possible interpretation of their very specific provisions is that they signal the end of the military phase of the Palestine situation. The objective now clearly should be to restore normal conditions of peace to the fuUest possible extent... The entire heritage of restrictions which developed out of the undeclared war should now be done away with. " There should be. free movement for legitimate shipping and no vestiges of the war-time blockade should be allowed to remain, as they are inconsistent with both the letter and the spirit of the Armistice Agreements." 11. It was against the background of this ~uthor­ itative statement; which even the representative of Egypt did not venture to chal1enge, that the Security Council adopted its resolution [5/1376] on 11 August 1949 [437tl1 meeting], requesting the signatory governments to observe the Armistice Agreements, and reminding them that - and l quote the resolutionthese agreements "include fim1 pledges against any further acts of hostility between the parties". It is quite _evident, therefore, that the Security Council did not expect that acts of war would now continue, or that two and a haH years after the conclusion of these agreements a signatory government wou1d actually claim belligerent statns which it had not even ventured ta assert when it launched and maintained these hostilities. Indeed, the Security Council resolution. of 11 August 1949 was considered by its authors and sponsors to mark the end both of restrictions on the sale and purchase of arms, and of restrictions on the free movement of shipping. The records of the Security Council and contemporary exchanges of 1etters malce it clear that these two relaxations were contingent on each other, and that both were based on the same principle, namely that the end of any state of hostilities had now been reached. The general viewpoint expressed by members of the Security Council was summed up by the represel1tative of the United States, Mr. Austin, in the foUowing words: "I submit that these pledges of non-aggressiol1 are a really solid basis for a permanent and lasting peace in Palestine... These restraints [on the sale of anns to .the Middle Eastem States] ... are no longer appropnate or necessary now that we have firm commitments from the parties in the Armistice Agreements to refrain from aU hostile activity and to acljust their differences, if any, peaceably." 12. That quotation is from the official records of the 434th meeting of the Security Council. 13. The Security Council's very decision ta restore ireedom of sale and purchase of armaments to aU gov- : 14. Basing itself on these authoritative interpretations of the General Armistice Agreement, the Government / of Israel had immediate recourse to the Mixed Armistice Commission which, having discussed a complaint of Egyptian interference with Israel-bound shipping . through the Canal, made the following decision on 29 August 1949 [S/2047] : mixte "The Mixed Armistice Commission thinks it has the right to clemand that the Egyptian Government shall not interfere with the passage of goods to Israel through the Suez Canal." Egypt continued to refuse compliance and appealed ta the Special Committee. 15. vVhen another fourteen months had passed without sans maritimes au cours né arabes encore". , the inclividual protests of the maritime Powers having ~ any effect, my Government again clrew the attention of the Security Council to this question in October 1950. After a brief discussion, during which several representatives condemned the Egyptian practice in vigorous terms, the Security Council referred the question back to the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization for a final attempt to resolve it within the framework of the local armistice machinery. On that occasion, too, the Security Council, so far from giving any sanction to the Egyptian theory that under the Armistice Agreement a state of legal war persists, recalled in its resolution of 17 November 1950 [524th meeting] that the Armistice Agreements between Israel and the Arab States "include firm pledges againstany further act of hostility between the parties". The Council went on to remind "Egypt and Israel as Member nations of the United Nations of their obligations under the Charter to settle their outstanding differences". f \, général vations ·finales, 16. Tl1ese were the èircuinstances in which the issue arDse for discussion in the Israel-Egyptian Special Committee on 16 January and 12 June 1951 uncler the chairmanship of General Riley. The Committee then had on its agenda the' appea1 by the Egyptian Government against the decision of the Mixed Armistice Commission of: 29 August 1949. On 12 June 1951 General Riley made his final observations, .which have been circulated as docuulent S/2194. de mixte 17. They deal in the first place with a jurisdictional point, and in the second place with the question of substance which now lies before the Security Council. On the jurisdictional point the Committee upheld ·the Egyptian contention that the Mixed Armistice Commis. sion laeked competence to deal with the matter because of its restricted terms of reference. On the substance, however, General Riley denounced the Egyptian 1 practice in the strongest terms. He said: "It is quite clear to me that action taken by Egyptiall authorities in interfering with passage of ï!:ocids ,destined for Israel through the Sue2; Canal "In my opinion, this interference is an aggressive and hostile action... " 18. General Riley stated further: " ... l must also say that the action of the Egyptian authorities in this instance is, in my view, entirely contrary to the spirit of the General Armistice Agreement and does, in fact, jeopardize its effective functioning. It wascertainly never contemplated at Rhodes that what is, in eiIect, an act of blockade, or at least an act undertaken in the spirit of blockade and having the partial effect of one, would be continued by one of the parties to the General Armistice Agreement more than two years after it had been signed." 19. General Riley's report goes on to make it clear that there are no obstacles of jurisdiction in the way of the Security Council. He said: "... it certainly is [clear] to me that the question cannot rest here. Either the Egyptian Government must, in the spirit of the General Armistice Agreement, relax the practice of interference with the passage of goods destined for Israel through the Suez Canal, or the question must be referred to some higher competent authority stlch as the Security COlmcil or the International Court of Tustice... the General Armistice Agreement was nevër intended ta provide a c10ak for the commission of acts by either party which in their intent and effects are indeed qostile," 20. General Riley conc1uded with what he called a "strong request" to Egypt to "desist from the present practice of interfering with goods destined for Israel through the Suez Canal, sinee such acts can only be construed as inconsistent with the spirit of the Armistice Agreement". 21. In the whole record of the armistice system there is no other instance of an aggressive and hostile practice being continued in the face of such urgent condemnation by the authorized United Nations representatives. Never yet has the Security Council failed to endorse and confirm reasonable requests of the Chief of Staff in any case where the effective functioning of the Armistice was jeopardized. Surely there can be no precedent of acquiescence in favour of an action accurately c1escribed as "hostile and aggressive", and justified even by its authors only on the guilty pretext that Egypt unilaterally presumes to maintain a state of war against a Member of the United Nations. 22. The statements which l have quoted from General Riley's report make it unneeessary to prove the hostile nature of the acts against which my Government has brou~ht this c9mplaint. It has been establishedby the SpeCIal COImmttee that these are "aggressive actions" and. "hostile Cl:cts". It is true that the Speci.al Committee declded that lt could act only on aggreS31ve or hostile 23. No serious weight can be attached to an interpretation to the ef'fect that hostile acts may not be committed by armed forces bnt that hostile acts are in order if committed by non-military means. It is as though we were to say that our armed forces may not attack each other but that it is perfect1y correct for our coast-guards to strang1e each other's trade, for our chemists to devise means of destroying each other's crops', for our radio stations to intervene for the purpose of mis1eading and endallgering each other's aircraft. All these hostile acts are committed because they are not performed directly by armed forces. 24. Israel solemn1y invites the Security Council to join with it in utter1y repudiating such a pernicions view of the Armistice Agreement, and asks the Council to maintain a stern and equal objection to any hostile act of whatever category or motive. A 25. In fact, however, we are not faced by any divergence between the letter and spirit of the Armistice Agreement. This is not on1y in fact a hostile and aggressive act and therefore forbidden by the Charter and by the Security Counci1's resolutions of Il August 1949 a~ld 17 N ov~mber 1950. It is also a hostile and aggres- SlVe act restl11g squarely on the threat of force, and thus standing in clear violation of article II, paragraph 2 of the General Armistice Agreement. At the meeting of the Special Committee of the Mixed Armistice Commission on 12 June 1951,the following significant exchange took place: Colone! Dayan (Israel): "1 wou1d like to ask one ~uestion. If one of the ships does not obey the order Issued, be it by customs authorities or by coast-guard authorities, wou1d armed force be used against that ship ?" Colonel Sherine (Egypt): "1 do not want to answer that question." 26. But· despite Colonel Sherine's refusaI, the reply ran be found in the Egyptian legis1ation which governs the b10ckade practice. l have in my hand the original Arabic text of the Egyptian Royal Decree dated 6 Fe?ruary and promu1gated 3 April 1950. The relevant articles read as follows: "Preamble: On the proposaI of the Minister of War and Marine, and of the Minister of Finance and after ap'p~ova1 bythe Cduncil of Ministers." "Article 17: Our Ministers [this is the royal plural] are charged, each in his own sphere, with the implementation of the present Decree." 27. No woncler that Colonel Sherine wouId not answer Colonel Dayan's question. The hostile act rests clearly upon the sanction of force, and the Armistice Agreement in article l makes no distinction between hostile acts supported by the use of force, and hostile acts supportecl by the threat of force. Both are equally violations of the Agreement in spirit and in letter. 28. Here then is an action describecl by Unitecl Nations representatives as "inconsistent with the letter and spirit of the Armistice Agreement", as "hostile" ancl "aggressive", continuing two and a haH years after the conclusion of an Agreement whose plU'pose was to be "a transition to permanent peace". The practice is maintained in spite of two resolutions of the Security Council affirming that the Armistice Agreement requires the cessation of aU acts of hostility between the parties. It is implemented by legislation in which the threat of armed force is clearly definecl as its ultimate sanction. Could the Security Council conceivably fail to demand the cessation of such a cumulative attack on the armistice structure without incurring the mournful result that this Armistice, once applauded as a major achievement of the United Nations, shall instead - in General Riley's words - become a cloak for the commission of hostile acts and thus lose every ounce of its legal worth and moral compulsion? 29. The case becomes stronger and clearer when we now turn to the astonishing motives whereby Egypt seeks to justify this practice. The Security Council may find this difficult to believe, but the words which l shall now quote are taken from the statement of the Egyptian representative in the meeting of the Special Committee of the Mixed Armistice Commission on 12 June 1951: "We are exercising a right of war. We are still legally at war with Israel. An armistice does not put an encl to a state of war..It does not prohibit a country from ex:ercising certain rights of war." 30. A landmark is now reached in international history. A Member of the United Nations asks the Security Council to honour, protect and sanction hs desire to exercise a unilateral state of war. 31. Having recorcled this Egyptian admission that the acts under discussion would be illegitimate except on the a~sumption of astate ?f war, le~ us proceed to ex:a1111l1e whether the SecurIty C0U11Cll can allow the case to rest upon this precarious ground. There is no value whatever - no value whatever - in the Egyptian contention that "an armistice does not put an encl to a state of war". For we are not concerned here with 1( 32. To this question there is only one answer. This Armistice Agreement is not a mere suspension of hostilities, leaving belligerent rights intact. This Agreement, as its own text constantly reiterates, is a permanent and irrevocable renunciation of all hostile acts. Mr. Bunche's official interpretation in July 1949 [S/1357] that this Armistice Agreement provides for Ha definitive end of the fighting" and "incorporates what amounts to a non-aggr<~ssion pact between the parties", has been re-echoed again and again by other United Nations representatives, by individual members of the Security Council, and by the Security Council itself in its reso1utions of 11 August 1949 [S/1376] and 17 November 1950 [S/1907 and Corr.1]. It is vain for Egypt to hark back to a previous era in which The Hague regulations of 1907 defined an armistice as a mere suspension of hostilities under which "the belligerent parties may reSUl11e operations at any time, provicled always that the enemy is warned within the time agreed upon, in accordance with the tenns of the armistice".3 What is the relevance of this traditional concept of armistice to a specific Armistice Agreement whose text recognizes neither war nor belligerency and declares instead tl1at: "This Agreement. .. shall remain in force until a peaceful settlement between the parties is achieved ... "? . ~ , 33. How can the Egyptian picture of armistice agreements as a mere subtraction from the rights of war stand up against Security Council resolutions which interpret this particular Agreement as inc1ucling "firtn pledges against any further acts of hostility between the parties?" It is not surprising that the Egyptian contention of a state of war was sternly repudiated in the Special Committee of the Mixed Armistice Commission. Replying to Colonel Sherine on the passage which l have quoted, General Riley said on 12 June 1951 : "Certainly there was no dec1aration of war; it was a question of acceptance or non-acceptance of the Security Council resolution of 1948... certainly in their spirit and letter the Armistice Agreements had no thought of a resumption of hostilities. .. You may quote all the international authorities in the world on armistice agreements, but when you check your own Armistice Agreement you will find that it is almost unique in history. The parties themselves have evolved in this Armistice Agreement certain principIes on which international jurists have yet to write books, and certainly this Armistice Agreement does not in any way, shape or fortn justify either party talkiiIg about the resumption of war." . 3 Aime.'!: to the COllve1ltion, Regulations respectillg the law and customs of 1C1ar 011 land, section II, chapter V, article 36. 35. But the claim of belligerent rights is not only invalid. It is, l suggest, also insincere, in the sense th~t Egypt has not been consistent in its ?-dherence to lt. This whole theory of a state of war 1S very recently manufactured for the sole purpose of creating a "legal" pretext for the Suez blockacle. 36. Thus, when Egypt announced its military intervention to the Security Council on 15 May 1948 [292nd meeting] in document S/743, it was most careful to exclude any idea that war was being declared or that a legal state of war existed; for by confessing itse1f ta be at war outside its frontiers without having been attacked, Egypt would have been confessing aggression. Thus, as Egyptian bombers raided Tel Aviv and Egyptian forces swept up the coast, the Egyptian spokesman in the Security Coundl cast about desperately to find other definitions. This was a police action. This was an act of rescue. It was a disinterested attempt to put out a fire in a neighbouring house. Similar1y, during the armistice discussions at Rhodes, Egyptian representatives uttered not one single word about the existence of a state of war. Again, the text of the Armistice Agreement has no reference to belligerent rights. 37. In August 1949, when the Security Counci1 met to survey the political and legal situation created by the Armistice Agreements, every member of the Security Council took part in the discussion. Not a single representative alluded to the existence of any rights of war; nearly aIl spoke in the spirit of the United States representative whom l have quoted, asserting that hostilities had been brought to a permanent and irrevocable end. The representative of Egypt at that time was so concerned to prove that the Near .East was an area in which the normal export and import of arms could be renewecl, that he overshadowed every other speaker in his forceful assertions that all relics or prospects of war had been left behind forever. Bere are the words of Mahmoud Fawzi Bey [434th 111,eeting] ; "The conclusion of the Armistice Agreements marks the end of an important stage in our dealing with th.e Palest~ne ques~ion. Th.e present report of the Untted NatIons Act111g Medmtor makes it clear that the fighting in Palestine has ended. We further read ~n t~e repor~ that the Agreements. have proved effective m practlce and that the Actl11g Mediator sees no ~eason why they should not continue to do sa. Ta th1s may be added, among other thingscertain expressions which we heard today from seve/al quar- "1 am purpasely making these quotations, or rather transliterations, of what 1 understood the Acting Mediator and the spokesman of Israel to have said today. "As to the question of Palestine, the Armistice Agreements concerning it abound in unequivocal assurances and com1l1itments not to resort ta force or even plan or threaten to resort to force in its settlement." 38. H,ow strangely this states1l1anlike utterance reads when set against Egypt's recent discovery that astate of war still exists, that rights of war must be respected, that some categories of hostile acts may be performed. Was the existence or survival of a legal state of war such a trivial CirCt1l11stance in their minds that Egyptian representatives omitted ta mention it at any stage of the hostilities or when they came ta discuss and summarize their conception of the force of the Armistice Agreement? Butperhaps there could not be a more grotesque example of the manner in which this "state of war" is alternatively claimed and repudiated, to meet changing circumstances and needs, than the following message from Lausanne, dispatched by the news ageneies on 1 August 1949 in connexion with the proposaI of the Palestine Conciliation Commission that Israel and the Arab States should agree in principle ta negotiate peace treaties. The message, the gist' of whieh was subsequently transmitted ta Israel by the Conciliation Commission, reads: 38. dignes qui guerre être Les tence constance d'en même conception Il l'existence et qu'une sanne sition tine principe dont nication conçue: "Arab representatives have informed the Palestine Conciliation Commission that as there had never been a formaI state of war with Israel, no formaI peace treaty with Israel can be signed." 39. 1 hardly tbink that the Security Council will ser!ously wish to follow the en'atic course of Egyptian jurists as they tUr1l the tap of war on and off ta suit the argument of the day. Hostilities had long been ter- 1l1inated, the Armistice long signed and endorsec1 by the Security Counci1, before the first Egyptian revelation late in 1949 that a state of war had been there an the time, with nobody noticing it. 39. vraiment engagés mentent lems lités par la de sonne 40. pas insoutenable l'Organisation système tionales, de belligérance 40. Quite apart from being false in history and untenable in law, it is clear that the claim ta belligerency cannat be sustained by the United Nations. The Charter has created a new worId of international relations within whieh the traditional "rights of war" cannot be enthroned. It is no accident that belligerent rights have never been" recognized or mentioned either by the Charter or by any organ of the United Nations. Mem- 41. My Government instructs me to declare that Israel is in no state of war with Egypt and denies that Egypt has the least right to be at war with Israel. We believe it urgent that the Security Council should pronounce its view on this decisive question. There is no prospect that an armistice agreement can function between two parties, one of which regards that agreement as an intermediate stage of peace, while the other regards it as a state of war, giving shelter and authority to aIl acts of hostility other than those specificaIly defined. The very assertion of Egypt's intention to maintain a state of war is in itself an offence hardly less grave than the performance of the hostile acts which flow from that assertion. 42. The right of ships to traverse the high seas and international highways of the world is a cornerstone of the laws of nations. In modern history any violation of this principle has always'led to the creation or extension of international conflicts. In this connexion 1 wish to state that the specific complaint which my Government has brought before the Security Council does not presume to imply any limitation of Egyptian sovereignty and should not be confused with any other issues which have arisen, or might arise, hetvveen Egypt and other Members of the United Nations. The fact that Egypt has established its sovereignty in territory situated on both sides of the already existing Suez waterway does not affect the issue bcfore us. This was made c1ear at the 175th meeting of the Security Council on 5 August 1947 by the late Prime Minister of Egypt, Nokrashy Pasha, who, while emphasizing the absoluteness of Egyptian sovereignty over every inch of Egyptian soil, went on to describe the Canal as "an international artery open to all nations in time of peace and in time of war". He added that the attributes of the Canal were "tmivcrsality, equality and neutrality". In a learned juridical", analysis, Fa;is El-~houri. Bey, of Syria, stated.: rh~ C~nal bemg an 1l1ternatlOnai naval highway, Its navIgatIOn should he free to aU nations in time of peace and war." 43. .~hus, the more we asse~t and recognize Egypt's sovele~gnt1,~he .more e~nphatIc becomes Egypt's dutY to m~1l1tall1 lis InternatIOnal obligations, which are a ~unctlOn of that complete sovereignty. These obligations 1I1c1ude the. ~nited Nations Charter and the Egyptian- Israel Art:l11stlce Agreement, and they therefore exclude any doctnne of freedom to commit hostile acts. When 44. des la toires du pays goriquement au liberté neries 44. The Security Couneil is well aware of the damage inflicted by this practice on the economic life of the region and of other territories lying beyond the Near East. The fact that Israel is not exc1usively affected by this loss has been noted in previous meetings of the Security Council. Yet we must deny that Egypt has the remotest right to impose this kincl of interference on the lawful and peaceful commerce of the region, on its trading freeclom and on its oil-refinil1g facilities. } 4S. The Government of Israel looks with confidence 45. du faire constitue la indispensables l'acquiescement blocus. suprême tionale décrite Nations traire du de ment qui taires Pour sécurité "droit" tilité lequel de antérieures Convention ments totalement Unies tiel coopération Orient tivité défendre toute de to the Security Council for action to bring about the cessa!ion hof thifs mohst fgrievoufs lsituati?n wit~l i:: increas111g t reat or t e uture 0 tle entlre reglOn.li The need for such action can well he estimated by envisaging the consequences which would arise from any acquiescence by the Security Council in the continuation of this blockade. In that il1credible event, the highest organ of international security would have given: its effective sanction to a practice described by United Nations representatives as "hostile", "aggressive" and "contrary to the Armistice Agreement". The functioning of the armistice system would be jeopardized and the operations of the Mixed Armistice Commission reduced to complete paralysis by the confirmation of the doctrine. that the relationship between the two signatory members is now that of a state of war. For the first time in its history the Secu:rity Council would have agreed to respect the alleged "rights" of a Member State to perfom hostile acts opel1ly defined as arising from the existence of an alleged state of war against a fellow Member of the United Nations. The previous rulings of the Security Council that the Armistice Agreement "inc1udes finn pledges against any further acts of hostility" woulc1 be utterly repudiated. The United Nations woulcl have refused to support so vital a prineiple as the freedom of the seas. The cause of economic co-operation between the States of the Middle East would suffer a blow at the hands of the very international c0111munity which should have a vital interest in the assertion of that cause. A fatal qoubt would spread throughout the region concerning the impartial maintenance of the Armistice Agreement in its letter .and in itsspirit. In such an atmosphere of impunity for hostile and aggressive acts, and of dis- 46. Converse1y, the Security Council, by reqi.tiring the permanent and unconditional cessation of these aets, would vindicate the spirit and letter of the Armistice Agreements, endorse and confirm the authority of its representatives, assert the high principle that Israel and Egypt are bound together not by the rights of war but by the duties of peace, uphold international interest in the maintenance of the freedom of the seas and the norn1al progress and development of economic life in our region, vindicate the equity of the armistice system as a system imposing equal obligations upon all signatory States and requiring from each of themand not from Israel alone - a due subordination of national policy to international duty. In calling for the cessation of these practices which the Egyptian Government has so far maintained in the face of wide international condemnation, and with no advantage to itself, my Government talœs the opportunity of evoking the high hopes which inspired us at Rhodes when we set our hands to the Egyptian-Israel General Armistice Agreement and thus paved the way to the establishment of the general armistice settlement throughout the Middle East. Conscious that ail vestiges of war would now be abandoned, we saw the Egyptian-Israel Agreement as a potential stepping-stone to a wider regional accord. 47. Today the abandonment of this warlike act which disfigures our relationship would restore the vitality of the General Armistice Agreement, facilitate its smooth functioning, and open up a road along which Egypt and Israel might advance together tciwards wider cooperation. It is through free movement and not through sterile blockade, it is by an advance towards peace and not by retreat into so-called "legal" war, that the peoples of Israel and Egypt, representing in their modern revival two venerable civilizations of the Mediterranean world" may contribute each within the bounds of its capacity to the creative welfare and stability of the Middle East. Yet, to realize that vision, or even to ~naÎ1:tain the Armistic~ as a basis of non-hostility, it IS vItal that the Secunty Council should condemn and require the cessation of a hostile action which can have no sanction in the heart of any peace-loving man. 48. Mahmoud FAWZI Bey (Egypt): l am grateful for the opportuuity afforded me to participate in the present discussion in accordance with Article 32 of the Charter. l hardly need to add that, on behalf of my d~legation and I?y Government, l shall fully co-operate wlih the Council, whether for defining the nature and scope of the question which is now before us or in the endeavour to find a just and real solution. To the best of my modest ability, l shall be fair and constrnctive in 111y approach to the problem or problems involved. 49. ' l trust that this is the attitude of the Council and l have reason to believe that, while we discuss this question which has been, described by the Pres.ident aS 50. l also Eeel confident that the Council will bear with me if on occasion l speak at some length in my earnest desire ta contribute to bringing forth, in as clear an outline as possible, the issues involved and the views of my Government concerning them. J 51. l have been listening ta the statement made taday by the representative of Israel. l shall take up in due course lts various points and topics, including those which have already been raised. Some of the points have been brought up only today, and l therefore request that l be given the opportunity of dealing with them at another meeting of the Council. 52. In adoptlng its agenda for today's meeting, the Security Council gave expression ta one of its unquestionable prerogatives, as the Council is always master of its own procedure. Of course, like certain tactical attitudes taken here and some other matters of which we are all aware, the adoption of the agenda, being a mere proceduralmatter, does not in the least prejudice any of the questions involved, nor does it preclude the eventuaHty that the Security Council might find that the question it has been considering does not lie within J its competence and, therefore, should not be dealt with by the Council. 53. Aside from the question of the agenda, we read in document S/2194 of a final decision made on 12 June last that " ... the Mixed Armistice Commission does not have the right ta demand from the Egyptian Government that it should not interfere with the passage of goods ta israe1 through the Suez Canal". 54. This is the second such decision on the subject. The first was made on 8 June 1950. The contradiction is glaring between the fact that these decisions were final, in accordance with the Egyptian-Israel General Armistice Agreement and the other fact that it is apparent1y at the instance of one of the parties ta that Agreement, namely Israel, that the item on today's agenda has been brought befor'e the Security Council. 55. In this connexion, it will be recalled that article X, paragraph 4, of the Egyptian-Israel General Armistice Agreement stipulates that: "On questions of principle, appeal shall lie to a Special Committee, composed of the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization and one member each of the Egyptian and Israeli Delegations ta the Armistice Conference at Rhodes or some other senior officer, whose decisions on all sl"tch questions shaH be final. If no appeal against a decisionof the Commission is filed within one week 56. Paragraph 8 of the same article stipulates: "Where interpretation of the mcaning of a particular provision of this Agreement is at issue, the Commission's interpretation shall prevail, subject ta the right of appeal as provided in paragraph 4." 57. It will he clear to the Council from reading these paragraphs of article X of the Egyptian-Israel General Armistice Agreemeùt that bath on the question of interpretation and on questions of principle, there is a system stipulated by the Agreement itself, and that it is considered mast unequivocal1y that decisions on these two matters, interpretation and questions of principle related ta the Armistice Agreement, are ta be final. Ta this the parties agreed. 58. However, in a tao obvious attempt ta get around these clear and most unequivocal stipulations, Israel has, both in the letter addressed ta the President of the Security Council by its representative and in the statement we have heard today, claimed that Egypt has violated not only the Armistice Agreement, but also international law and the Convention of Constantinople of 1888, concerning the Suez Canal. To this and ta sorne other points, l sha11 return later. 59. It will further be recalled that article l, paragraph 2, of the Egyptian-Israel General Armistice Agreement stipttlates that: "No aggressive action by the armed forces -land, sea, or air - of either Party shal1 be undertaken, planned, or threatened against the people or the armed forces of the other; it being understood that the use of the term 'planned' in this context has no bearing on normal staff planning as general1y practiced in military organizations." 60. It willfurther he recalled that article II, paragraph 2, of the Agreement stipulates that: "No element of the land, sea or air military or para-military forces of either Party, including n011- regular forces, sha11 commit any warlike or hostile act against the military or para-militaty forces of the other Party or against civilians in territory undel' the control of that Party; or shall advance beyond or pass over for any purpose whatsoever the Armistice Demarcation Une set forth in Article VI of this Agreement except as provided in Article III of this Agreement; and elsewhere shaH not violate the international frontier; or enter into or pass through the air space of the other Party or through the·waters within three miles of the coastline of the other Party." 61. None of these stipulations is an innovation in international law or practice. They are but a consecration of precedents and of generally accepted doctrine in this regard. 63. Coming to the cable from Major General Riley, to which l referred, l think l am justifiec1 in saying that the matters c1ealt with by Major General Riley in that cable could, in fairness and in the light of the c1ecisions of the Security Council, be divided into two categories: first, a part relating to his activities in his capacity as Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization, and, seconc1ly, a part relating exclusively to his activities as a self-appointed j urist and as a gentleman-at-large. The last part does not properly be10ng in our records, the records of the Security Council, or in our present discussion. The only capacity which links Major General Riley with the work of the United Nations is that of Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision organizatiOll. A clear defillition of his duties is given in the Armistice Agreement and in the Security Council resolution of 11 August 1949 [437th meeting], in which the Council requests the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization to ttndertake the observance of the cease-fire in Palestine. 64. It was ln the discharge of these duties that the Special Committee, under his Presidency, made its decision of 12 June last. l have already referred to, though not commented upon, the fact that the stipulations of the Egyptian-Israel General Armistice Agreement on which this decision was based are not innovations in international law, usage or agreements, but are a consecration of precedent and of generally accepted doctrine regarding armistices. In his 1944 edition of International Law, Oppenheim says: "Armistices or truces, in the wider sense of the term, are all agreements between belligerent forces for a temporary cessation of hostilities. They are in no wise to be compared with peace, and ought not to be called temporary peace, because the conc1ition of war remains between the belligerents thel11selves, and between the belligerents and the neutrals, on aU points beyond the mere cessation of hostilities. In spite of such cessation the right of visit and search over neutral merchantmen therefore remains intact..." "The distinction between hostilities and a legal state of war is ... important in detennining when a war begins and ends. Hostilities cluring a legal state of war may be terminated by an armistice, but the legal state of war may not end until the entry into force of a treaty of peace. This was the case at the end of the [First] World War." 66. The distinction between peace and an armistice has been u11lnistakably made throughout the debates in the Security Council, particularly during the meeting of 3 March 1949 [413th], at which the Council took note of the Egyptian-Israel General Armistice Agreement. 67. More recently, in its resolution of 17 November 1950 [524th mee6ng] , the Security Council stated that the Armistice Agreements contemplate the return of permanent peace in Palestine. l could go on almost indefinitely quoting from precedent and from jurisprudence and doctrine to show, as Oppenheim puts it, that an armistice is a mere cessation of hostilities and to show further that the right of visit and search over neutral merchantmen therefore remains intact. l could equa1ly demonstrate that the right of visit and search over merchantmen which Egypt exercises is but a fraction of the rights allowed to the parties to an armistice agreement. Indeed, we further read in Oppenheim and other jurists, and we know from precedent, that among the rights of the parties to an armistice agreement there are also such rights as the right of blockade and the right to capture, even on the high seas, lleutral vessels attempting' to break the blockade and the right ta seize contraband of war. 68. Egypt, as can readily be seen, is not at·a1l fully exercising its rights under the armistice. lt is even reducing to a bare minimum the exercise of its right of visit and search, as well as the list of the contraband of war of which the passage through Suez and Port Said is not pennitted. 69. For the sake of further clarity and to refresh our memory in this connexion, l ask the forbearance of the Security Council while l quote from some important documents such as the German declaration of 19 September 1939, which was inspired by the British Government's proclamation of 13 September 1939 and the Declaration of London of 26 February 1909; the Egyptian Military Proclamation NU1l1ber 5 of 15 May 1948; the Egyptian Military Proclamation Number 13 of 6 June 1948; the Egyptian Military Proclamation Number 38 of 8 July 1948; the Egyptian Military Proclamation of 4 November 1949; the Egyptian Royal Decree of 9 February 1950, and resolution 500 (V) of the United Nations General Assembly of 15 May 1951. 70. Article 1 of the first of these declarations reads: "The following articles and materials will he regarded as contraband (absolute contraband) if they "Two. Ammunition and parts thereof, bombs, torpedoes, mines and other types of projectiles; appliances to be used for the shooting or dropping of these projectiles; powder and explosives including detonators and igniting materials. "Three. Warships of aU kinds, their component parts and their accessories. "Four. Military aircraft of aU kinds, their component parts and their accessories; airplane engines. "Five. Tanks, armoured cars and armoured trains; armour plate of aU kinds. "Sù:. Chemical substances for military purposes; appliances and machines used for shooting or spreading them. "Seven. Articles of military clothing and equipment. "Eight. Means of communication, signaling and military illumination and their component parts. "Nine. Means of transportation and their component parts. "Ten. Fuels and heating substances of aU kinds, lubricating oil. "Eleven. Gold, silver, means of payment, evidences of indebtedness. "Twelve. Apparatus, taols, machines, and materials for the manufacture or for the utilization of the articles and products named in numbers one to eleven." 71. The Egyptian Military Proclamation of 3 September 1939 establishes a system of inspection of merchantmen in Port Said and in Suez, which are the two ports of access to the Suez Canal. This system waS applied from 1939 until 1945 without any objection being raised on behalf of the freedom of navigation through the Canal by any of the Powers, least of aU by the United Kingdom which, on the contrary, had asked for the establishment of this system and was the first to benefit by it. 72. The Egyptian Royal Decree of 9 February 1950 applies to the foUowing contraband of war bound for Israel: "1. Arms, ammunition, explosives, their component parts and their accessories. "2. Chemical substances for military purposes, appliances and machines used for chemical warfare. "3. Fuels. "4. Warships and military aircraft, their component parts and their accessories, aeroplane engines. "5. Tanks, armoured cars and armoured trains which are made for military purposes and not for civilian purposes. 73. Resolution 500 (V) of the General Assembly of 18 May 1951 recommends that every State: "Apply an embargo on the shipment to areas under the control of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and of the North Korean authorities of arms, ammunition and implements of war, atomic energy materials, petroleum, transportation materials of strategic value, and items useful in the production of arms, ammunition and implements of war". 74. From a comparison of the documents l have just quoted, it transpires that the one among them which, as a whole, covers the narrowest area and imposes the fewest restrictions is the Egyptian Royal Decree of 9 February 1950 which applies to the contraband of war bouncl for Israel. This clecree is a culmination, so far, of a continuous process of relaxing the measures imposed by Egypt on the passage of war contrabancl in Suez and Port Said. One can easily be convincecl of this fact by examining, among other things, the successive instructions issuecl by the Military Governor on 10 ]anuary, 21 ]uly and 14 September 1949. When to this we add that in acmal fact, as l shall proceed forthwith to demonstrate, the traffic through the Suez Canal has not only been very little affected, but often has even increased, it should be realized that the broad accusations levelled at Egypt and the huge clamour made against it in this connexion are, by a far cry, out of proportion with the inevitable and less than minimum restrictions imposed, and are entirely unjustified by either international law or international practice. 75. It was, therefore, not in the least astoni'shing to hear Mr. Bevin tell the House of Commons on 18 October last that he was "not aware of any cases in which the new Egyptian regulations have in practice led to delays". The fact that this statement was made two years, five months and three days after the start of those measures is very significant, though by no means astonishing. Indeed, if we cast a glance at the statistics of the traffic through the Suez Canal, we find, for example, that during the period of almost nine months from 15 May 1948 to 24 February 1949, out of the 8,009 merchantmen which arrived at Port Said, 548 ships were visited and only 71 were unloaded of contraband of war. During the same period, 282 ships reached Suez, and only two ships were visited and none was even partly unloaded. In the following three months, 2,139 ships arrived at Port Said, 195 of them were visited andon1y 25 were partly unloaded. During the same period, 1,043 ships reached Suez, nine of them were visited and none at all unloaded. It can further be clearly seen that during 1950 traffic had increased in the latter part of the year compared to the first part of the year, in spite of the restrictions which Egypt fe1t impelled to impose. It must therefore be as clear as day that Egypt is not working against the freedom of 76. actif occasions, droit absurde 77. canal disposition sible, égard nant, de Israël tume l'Organisme fait Commission ger le dans 78. droits, existence? sur sellement autres trouvent conscience ou ou en partie. 79. Puissances ment, d'inspection. plaignent. .survivre. 76. In actual fact, the traffic through the Canal is as active as ever. If every now and then on very rare occasions Egypt feels impelled to exercise its right of visit and inspection, l think it is only preposterous to deny Egypt this right. 77. l have given some illustrations concerning the traffic ,through the Suez Canal, and l am, of course, willing to put at the disposaI of the Council, as much as l can, any further details required on this as on other relevant points. It must, however, be abundantly clear by now that the stipulations of the Egyptian-Israel Armistice Agreement did but confirm international jurisprudence and international practice, and that the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization did but confirm all that when he agreed that the Mixed "Armistice Commission did not have the right to demand from the Egyptian Government that it should not interfere with the passage tl1rough the Suez Canal of ships to Israel. . 7S. Could Egypt do less than exercise its rights, among which is the right of self-preservation? This right, of which l have not spoken so far and of which l shall have a great deal to say, is universally recognized and known to transcend all other rights. l am quite certain that no one sitting around this table would take it upon himself and upon his conscience to abandon this right on behalf of his country or recognize that it should in all or any part be abandoned by his country. 79. l admit that some maritime Powers are, to our regret, affected, although slightly, by the exercise by Egypt of its right of visit and inspection. It is natural for them to want to complain; it is natural for us to want to survive. sa. l come now to the part of a statement by Mr. Bunche which was referred to by the representative of Israel who, as he did in connexion with the cablegram of General Riley, saw fit to isolate from its context the part he quoted from Mr. Bunche's statement. That ,statement was made before the Security Council on 4 August 1949 by Mr. Bunche in his capacity as Acting Mediator, who, inline with his duties and together with many others, said that with the armistices concluded, the next objective "should be ta restore normal conditions of peace to the fullest possible extent". He could not have meant that the parties were to be exempted from their normal duties or deprived of their normal rights under an armistice. Nor could he have meant that the Armistice Agreements with Israel were to be interpreted other than according to their , unequivocal intent and their carefully worded and clearly formulated stipulations. Nor could Mr. Bunche have meant - without any warrant from the partiesto either detract from or add to these stipulations. As Mr. Bunche himself stated at the same meeting of the Council, the Armistice Agreements "are the product of voh1l1tary negotiations between the disputing parties". ,They can therefore be changed only through the consent of the parties. Meanwhile, their scope remains the same, SO. de l'isolant du Médiateur déclaration séance tions, orateurs: vant des tainement parties leurs que devraient les texte presses. sans soit l'a ventions tions elles 81. l stated further, at the same meeting, that "1 should like to c1ispel any possible misconception which might occur in some minds regarding the recent Armistice Agreement conduded at Rhodes", and l reminc1ed the Council that this armistice agreement, "as its own terms clearly state, is of a purely military nature and contemplates no prejudice in any way to the rights, daims and positions of either party". 82. l had, at the same meeting, assured the Council that "Egypt is very glad to have been able to give yet another proof of its desire for peace, its respect for the Security Council and its unfailing compliance with the Council's r~solutions". 83. This brings me to the point, also referred to previously, of why, until now, Egypt has not concluded a peace treaty with Israel. This has been repeatedly stated by some who seem to deprecate what they seem to consider the reluctance of Egypt to condude a treaty of peace with Israel. It is, however, well known to ail those who are familiar with the realities and the precedents of international life that a peace treaty is often not conduded immediately or shortly after the actual cessation of hostilities or their termination by an armistice. l shaH not recapitulate what l mentioned before concerning the distinction between hostilities and a legal state of war and its importance in determining when a war begins and when a war ends. l shall not weary the Coul1cil by referring either to ail or even to 1110st of the cases on record to illustrate this fact, but shaH limit myself to a reference to only a few illustrations. 84. In the war between Spain and its American colonies, for instance, active hostilities were gradually dropped, and came practically to an end about 1825, though peaceful relations were not formally restored - at any rate, with some of the colonies involveduntil 1840. l call the particular attention of the Council to this fact: in the war between Spain and its American colonies, active hostilities were gradually dropped and came to an end in about 1825, but peaceful relations were not formaHy restored until 1840. 85. In the First World War, the hostilities ceased with the armistice of Il November 1918, but the Treaty of Versailles clid not enter into force, legally tenninating war with Germany, unti110 January 1920. Furthermore, since the United States clid not ratify this Treaty, for it the legal state of war continued to a later date. On 2 Ju~y 1921, th~ President of the United States approved a JOInt resolutlOn of Congress declaring the war at an end. On 25 August 1921, the representatives of the United States and Germany signed the Treaty of Berlin and ratifications were exchanged on Il November 1921. 86. Pfankuchen, to whom l referred earlier} also said that "Courts do not ordinarily regard the cessation of hostilities as in itself terminating a war, and it is certain that a considerable time must elapse before a war would be regarded as ending through a mere cessation of hostilities without conquest, surrender, or formaI treaty. A United States District Court in 1919 did not regard the armistice of November Il, 1918, as terminating the war between the United States and Germany. 'An annistice effects nothing but a suspension of hostilities; the war still continues.' " 87. In the Second World War, hostilities with Japan endecl on 15 August 1945} and those with Germany ended on 7 May 1945. Yet until today, no less than about si~ years later, no peace treaties have been concluded either with Japan or with Germany; and the best that can be said concerning Japan is an expression of hope that most of the Powers which are present1y in a legal state of war with it will, towards the beginning of next September, conclude with it theaties of peace. The hope that ail such Powers will soon conc1uc1e peace treaties with Japan seems presently to be very faint. As for Germany, the wh01e of Germany, the prospect is much dimmer. 88. The comments of jnrists and the precedents l have just referred to are only a part of the abundant store of jurisprudence and actual practice whieh can be quoted ta show that more often than not a considerable lapse of time is required between, on one hand, the cessation of hostilities or the conclusion of a truce or an armistice, and, on the other hand, the terminatioll of the legal state of war or the conclusion of a peace treaty. " 89. From the reference l made ta precedents, it c1early transpires that as many as six or even fifteen years are sometimes needed for that purpose. Such lapse of time is necessary sa that matters will graduaIly improve, passions will graduaIly subside and disputes willgraduaIly be reso1ved. 90. It is, therefore, bath important and relevant ta our present debate that we look into this very essential element of time and try ta find out whether its contents, with reference ta Israel, are conclucive ta the termination of the legal state of war and ta the consequent possibility of doing away with the measures which are the subject of the present dispute and which Egypt is bath impelled and, legaI1y and politicaIly and from the point of view of survival, justified ta take. 91. Bas Israel respected the armistice? Bas it carried out the resolutions of the United Nations? Are the Palestinian Arab refllgees back in their homes or compensated for their property? The answer to these and 1l1any other distressing questions is definitely "no". 93. To this must be added the discussions of the Council which lasted for seven meetings, starting on 16 October 1950, and temporarîly ending with the Council's resolution of 17 November 1950. 94. From these discussions and resolutions, as well as from the relevant reports of the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization, the following facts are set out most c1early: one, that Israel armed forces illegally occupied Bir Qattar; two, that Israel had intimidated by aeroplane raids and otherwise, and thus expelled thousands of Palestinian Arabs from Israelcontrollecl territory into the demilitarized zone between Egypt and Israel and across the frontiers into Egyptian territory. The Council [524th meeting] therefore took note of "the statement of the Government of Israel that Israel armed forces will evacuate Bir Qattar pursuant to the 20 March 1950 decision of the Special Committee", and re"iluested "the Israel-Egyptian Mixed Armistice Commission to give urgent attention to the Egyptian complaint of expulsion of thousands of Palestine Arabs" [5/1907 and Corr. 1]. 95. After this resolution by the Council, Israel merely gave a semblance of evacl1ating Bir Qattar, a so-called evacuation which is no more than a sham. 96. As for the Palestinian Arabs who, pursuant to the Council's resollttion of 17 November last, were ordered back, they are not bacl<. They are, under one guise or another, still frightened away and not allowed by Israel to return to their homes. Nor are these the only Palestinian Arabs to he ruthlessly expelled in recent months from Israe1-controlled territory - as if the savage expulsion of well nigh a million of thei:!;" brethren were not enough to embarrass and humiliate the United Nations and blacken the face of our generation. 97. The Council will recall, in this connexion, that Even when on 29 November 1947 the General Assembly adopted a resolution [181 (JI)] aiming at a political solution of the problel11 of Palestine, it stipulated the full protection of the Palestinian Arabs. 98. This was later reaffirmed also in the General Assembly's resolution [186 (5-2)] of 14 May 1948. Furthermore, on 11 December 1948 the General Assembly enc10rsed [resolution 194 (III)] once more the prineiple that "the refugees" from Palestine, "wishing ta return ta their homes and live at peace with their neighbours shonld be perl11itted to do so at the earliest practicable date,· and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return..." 99. Has the voice of the United Nations in behalf of the Arabs expelled from Palestine been heeded by Israel? Has Israel paid the slightest attention to it or shown any respect whatsoever for the resolutions of the 100. Having, to our regret, had to look' for a while at the appalling picture of and about these - to borrow the words of the New Y ol'k Times a few days agathese hopeless, helpless, miserable Arab refugees from Palestine, and having noted its direct bearing on the relations with the neighbonring countries, is it surprising that the New Yorla Times, in the same article l referred ta, joins others in considering this to be the core of the whole problem, and is it surprising that we find it conspicuously among the stl11ubling blacks on the road ta peace? 101. Another aspect of this most disturbing and disruptive condition of the expelled Palestinian Arabs is that, while they own in their own land thonsancls of millions of dollars ofJ)roperty, U1ey are thrown on the mercy and the alrea y overburdened economy· of the other Arab countries. 102. If we translate this into hard facts, and into figures, the picture will be seen more c1early still and more distressingly. 103. There were, not long aga, another some million refugees somewhere else in Asia who used ta cost one Power represented here around one thollsand million dollars yearly. l have lived for years both in Palestine and in the other Asiatic country to which l alluded, and l know that the usual cost of living is much higher among the Palestinian Arabs. l shaH, however, for the sake of argument, consider that the maintenance of the million or so Palestinian Arab refugees will cast no more, either, than a thousand million dollars a year, ,vhich would mean less than eighty-five dollars a month per individual, to cover all expenses, inc1uding housing, food, medicine, sanitation, transportation, administration and some other miscel1aneous expenses. 1 1 1 104. Now, l might be entitled to ask how can the Arab countries possibly afford this extra expenditure of thousand million dollars a year? 105. To all this, as if it were not by itself sufficient, should be added the politieal effect on Egypt and the other Arab countries of the prolonged existence of such a huge number of refugees. . 106. All this and re1ated consequences of the attitude and the action of worlel political ZionislTI, of which Israel is but the spearhead, is a source of great discouragement to aU those who have at heart the' peace and security of the Middle East and of the whole worlel. It furthermore inevitably evokes the thought of how lUuch and how long the Arab world' has been always the greatest haven for the Jews aIl over the world, whenever and wherever they were persecuted. Some might, however, feel the same way as a famous cynical statesman of the Middle Ages, to whom the saying is attributed that, "Believe me, it is easier ta forgive the offences your enemy does you than the benefits your friends confer npon you". 107.. Alot of talk wasmade by the repiesentative of Israel, ". who daimed that Egypt had violated the 108. In my present preliminary submission l sha11 not enlarge on this question unless it is so desired by the Counei1. l sha11 not, among other things, ask that we all accompany the hîstory of the Canal, step by step, since such tîme as that of the ancient Egyptian King who, near]y 2,650 years ago, had started to dig a similar canal from the Red Sea across Lake Timsah to the Mediterrancan, but who, after half finishing that project, abandonec1 it because an oracle had indicated that he would be working for the Persians. Any sîmilarity between this episode and certain happenings and correlations of today is a mere coincidence, though not devoid of sîgnificance. 109. Today, l shall also refrain from going into certain other matters - relevant as they are - and from making certain comparisons, although if so desired, l could proceed forthwith to do so. l couId, for example, deal with a famous related, intrusive and most offensive treaty which was discussed here in 1947, and which is a much battered and worse than decrepit vestige of the age of colonîalism. l could simi1arly deal with a no less famous treaty which - in a sense - is a blood relation of the Suez Canal Convention, waving to it across the oceans. 110. But my intention has been, for today, to briefly, yet as c1early as l could, show the position of Egypt in connexion with our present debate, assert its sovereignty, remind those who are prone to forget of its title and of its right to self-preservation, outline the basic elements of the question now before us, and on behalf of my delegation and my Government, fu11y co-operate with the Council in the endeavour to find a lawful, just and real solution.

l have no further speakers on my list, and l therefore assume that no member of the Council wishes to speak at this partÎcular stage. We have heard two important and powerful statements from the representatives of Egypt and Israel respectively, and l feel sure. that sha11 a11 want to reflect .on those statements and perhaps, as the representatIve of Egypt has saîd, consult our oracles. 112. That bei?g so, l imagîne that it will be my col1eagues' deslre ta acljourn until some time next week. l have made certain inquiries and it seems to me that probably ne:xt Wednesday afternoon wouId be

l should be only too delighted if l thought that we could in fact finally dispose of this item at our meeting on Wednesday next. But l l"nust say that l rather venture to doubt whether that will be the case. l think the representative of Egypt has reserved his right to make another speech, giving a further elaboration of his attitude, and no doubt various members of the Council will be prepared at our next meeting ta give perhaps provisional statements of their governments' views. Whether they will aU be prepared to give final statements of their governl11ents' views l do not know, but at the moment l should be inc1ined to doubt it. However, if it is thought better ta have a meeting in the morning as well as in the afternoon, l should be the last to oppose that for myself, but, in my Presidential capacity, l think l shaH have to put that to the Council. 115. The suggestion has in fact been made by the representative of the United States that we should meet next 'YVednesday 1110rning - at 11 o'dock, say. Is that agreeable to the Council? In the absence of any objection, l take it that that is the Council's decision. We therefore stand adjourned l1ntil next Wednesday at 11 a.m. The meeting rose at 4.45 p.m. FIN LAND - FINLANDE Ak~teemlnen Kir}akauppa, katu, Helsinki. FRANCE Editions A. Pedone, Paris V. GREECE - GRECE "Elettheroudakls," nale, Place de la GUATEMALA Go~baud & Cla. ltda. num. 2a, 2 do Piso, HAIT1 Max Bouchereau, velle!' Boite "ostale Prince. HONDURAS llbrerla Panamericana, Fuente, Tegucigalpa. ICELAND -ISLANDE Bokavorzlun Slgfusar Austurstrell 18, ReykJavik. INDIA"':'INDE Oxford Book & Statlonery House, New Delhi. INDONESIA - INDONESIE Jajasan Pembangunan, 84, Djakarta. IRAQ-IRAK Mackenzle's Books Statloners, Ilaghdad. IRAN Ketab-Khaneh Danesh, Avenue, Teheran. IRELAND -IRLANDE Hlbernian General cial Buildings, Dame ISRAEL leo Blumstein, P.O.B. 35 Allenby Road, ITALY - ITALIE Colibri S.A., Via Chlossetto LEBANON - LIBAN librairie universelle, llBERIA J. Momolu Kamara, Streets, Monrovia. LUXEMBOURG Librairie J. Sctwmmer, Luxembourg. MEXICO - MEXIQUE Editorial Hermes, cal 41, Mexico, O. NETlIERLANDS - N.V. Martinus Nl)holf. 9, 's·Gravenhage. NEW ZEALAND- NOUVELLE.ZELANDE United Nations Assoclallon land, G.P.O. 10n, NICARAGUA Dr. Ramiro Ramlrez Publlcaclones, Managua, ARGENTINA - ARGEf>jTINE Editorial Sudamerlcana S.A., Calle Alslna 500, Buenos Aires. AUSTRALIA - AUSTRALIE H. A. Goddard (Pty.>, Ltd., 255a George Street, Sydney, N.S.W. BELGlUM - BELGIQUE Agence et Messageries de la Press. S.A.. 14·22 rue du Persil, Bruxelles. W. H. Smith & Son 71-75 Boulevard Adolphe·Max, Bru.elles. SOLIVIA - BOLIVIE Llbrer!a Clent!fica y L1te1arla, Avenlda 16 de Julio 216, Cosllla 972, La Paz BRAZIL - BRESIL . l1vra11a Agir, Rua Mexico 98·B, Calxa Postal 3291, Rio de Janeiro. CANADA - CANADA The RyersoD Press, 299 QueeD Street West, Toronto. CEYLON - CEYLAN. . The Assoclated N~wspapers of Cey!on, ltd., Lake House, Colombo. CHllE - CHILI . lIbrer!a Ivens, Cali. Moneda 822, Santiago. CHINA - CHINE The Commercial Press, ltd., 211 HonaD Road, Shanghai. COLOMBIA - COLOMBIE llbrer!a Latina ltda., Apartado .Aéreo 4011, BogoU. COSTA RICA - COSTA.RICA Trejos Hermanos, Apa1tado 1313, San José. CUBA la Casa 8elga, Ren~ de Smedt, O'Reilly 455, La Habana. CZECHOSLOVAKIA - TCHECOSLOVAQUIE CeskoslovonskY Splsovatel Nârodnl TFrda 9, Praha 1. . DENMARK - DANEMARK Einar Munksgaard, N~1regade 6, K~benhavn. OOMINICAN REPU8LIC- REPUBLIQUE DOMINICAINE llbmfa Oomlnlcana, Calle Mercedes No. 49, Apartado 656, Ciudad Trujillo. ECUADOR ,.... EQUATEUR Munoz Hermanos 'il Cla., Plaza deI Teatro, Quito. EGYP':- EGYPTE· librairie "La Renaissance d'Egypte," 9 SH. Adly Pasha, Cairo. EL SALVADOR-SALVADOR Manuel Navas y Ciao "La Casa dei libre Barato" la Avenida sur num. 37, SaD Salvador. ETHIOPIA - ETHIOPIE Agence Ethiopienne de Publicité, Box 8, Addis-Abeba. United Nallons "ubl/cotlons Clm furlher lie oblolned 'rom Ihe followlng booksellen: GERMANY - ALLEMAGNE AUSTRIA - AUTRICHE Buchhandlung Elwert & Meurer, Haupt.· B. Wüllerstorff, Waagplatz, strasse, 101, Berlln-SchBneberg. Salzburg. W. E•. Saarbach, Frankenst1asse, 14, Koln·Junkmdorf. JAPAN - JAPON Alexander Horn, Splegelgasse, 9, Maruzen Co.!.. Ltd., Wiesbaden. Nlhonbashi, lokyo Orders and Inquiries lrom counlrl., where .ales agents ha.ve not yet beeD apl'ointed may be .ent to: Sales aDd Circulation Section, United Nations, New York, U.S.A.; or Sai•• Section, United Nations Office, Palais des Nations, Genova, SwiherlaDd. Printed in Canada Priee: 25 (or equivalent i?-