S/PV.550 Security Council

l am always very happy ta take up the presidency of the Security Cotlllcil, succeec1ing the United Kingdom representative. In succeedlng hil11, however, 11.11 of 111Y resources are challcngecl, for l mllst attel11pt ta eqttal the ability, skill, judg111ent and poise which he shows and the c1earcut c1ecisions which he makes as President of the Security Council. This has always been true, The United Kingdo111 always sends brilliant and great statesmen to the United Nations. In sending Sir G]adwyn Jebb, they have sent S0111eone who not only performs his c1ltties with great ahility, but who appeals ta all the people of the world, and especial1y to the people of the United States of America, with whol11 he is very popular. Ado})tion of the agenda The agenda 'Zuas adopted. System of interpretation 2. The PRESIDENT: l would snggestthat we should follow the ltsual procedure as regards interpretation. Statcments by 111embers of the Secnrity Connei1 will receive bath simultaneotts and consecl1tive interpretation; statements by non-tllcmhers who are invited ta participate in the meeting wil! receive only si111ultaneous interpretation. . It ozvas sa decided. The'Palestine queslion (continueel) (a) RESTRICTIONS IMPOSE'D BY EGYPT ON THE PASSAGE OF SHIPS THROUGH THE SUEZ CANAL (S/2241)

.In the course of our last meeting the representative of Egypt said, among other things: "Some of the points have been brought up only today, and 1 therefore request that 1 be given the opportunity of dealing with them at another meeting of the Council." l regard the remark made by the ,then President of the Council as a commitment, and, therefore, calI upon the representative of Egypt. 4. Mahmoud FAWZI Bey (Egypt): In the preliminary statement 1 made at the Council's meeting of 26 July 1 indicated briefiy the views of my Government on the question the discussion of which we are resuming today. l now ask leave to deal with this question a little more fu1.1y, though not extensively yet, and, while doing so, to take up also some of the points which were raised and with which 1 have not dealt amply or not dealt at aIl. 5. From the beginning of this debate 1 have assured the Council that 1 will, on behalf of my delegation and of my Government, co-operate with it fully in, among other thiùgs, defining the nature and scope of the question which is now before us. In this respect 1 am usually at one with those who believe that a question well stated is half solved, although on the present occasion some scepticism migl,lt be forgiven in view of the artificiality which has constantly accompanied the halldling by some Powers of the question of Palestine, of which, to borrow the words of the Council's President for last month, Sir Gladwyn Jebb of the United Kingdom, the question we have now before us for discussion is another aspect. 6. In his letter dated 11 July 1951 ta the President of the Security Council [5/2241], the representative of Israel requested. that the ~ollowing item should be placed on the agenda of the Council: «Restrictions imposed by Egypt on the passage ·of ships through the Suez Canal." Tt is stated in the same letter that, "in contravention of international law, of the Suez Canal Convention (1888) and of the Egyptian-Israel General Armistice Agreement; the Government of Egypt continues ta detain, visit and search ships seeking to pass through the Suez Canal, on the grounds that their cargoes are destined for Israel". 7. The Council put the item on its agenda as requested. 8. I shall not recapitulate here what l stated at the Council's previous meeting regarding the adoption of the agenda by theCounciI. 1 wish, however, to refer to it. We can now have another look at the item included in the present agenda and try to make as 'accurate an appraisal as possible Qf the item itself and Qf its purport. , 11. That \Vas not th,· only saying or finding to which l referrecl in unler tu refnte the Israel contention in this regard, anc1 1 cau a11l1 will give many other facts and COn1111L'uts to slmw that Egypt cloes little more than delay only a fe,," ships for only a few minutes. This explains whr, 011 1~ October last, which was two years, live 1111lnths and three days after the begiuning of the restricti(Hls, Mr. Bevin stated that there were no c1e1ays hecanse of the new Egyptian regulations. Ta 1 1 J, pr()cC(~(1 from this tll tlw Israel contention that Egypt "detains ships seeking tn pass thrnllgh the Suez Canal" is, to say the least, a wild exaggcration. 12. .As for visitillg and inspecting ships, l recognize that Egypt cxercises this l'ight occasionally -lawfully and \Vith the utlllllst c1iscrdion. Paralle! ta this, it is only fair tu say that the l<:gyptian allthorities cio not inspect all the ships s(:eking to pass through the Suez Canal. ln my statement to the Cannetl at its last meeting l gave SOI1W illustrations of this fact, and l can and will in clue course give Home more. Nor do the Egyptian authOritiL'S apply the restrictions to all cargoes going ta Israel. The C(lnndl is already familinr with the very linljted list of materials affected, and knows that the re::;trictions appl)' tü only tt small 1ltlmber of war rnah'rials. } Î f 1.3. Tn say, tlten t tiUlt the Govel'11mcnt of Egypt contUIUCS tll "cletain, visit amI search ships seeking ta pass through the Snez Canal, 011 the grollnc!s that their cargoes are destincd for Israel" ig to make an assertion which, thollgh hrid. is, as l have ventured ta dernonstrate, nlore than packed \Vith distortion. 1 1 - 14. 'JVhile, tl1('re[ore, l neither hesitate nor feel em- !JarraHsed in st,lting that Egypt applies to some ships, ~n relatioll to S0111e war materials, a system of visit and Inspection, l sU!llnit that the first step which we should aIl take towarcls a prnper Ilnderstanding of the question now hefore ilS is to asccrtain and, as far as possible, agree upon ils basic facts. ~ ~. From the aclmitted fact that the Egyptian authorlbes visit and inspccl in connexion with some war n1aterials somc ships sç,eking ta pass through the Suez 10. '1'0 the unillitiated in Israel lare, the wording of this cUl11plaint might 5r('111 plain and uninvolved. Ta the rest of us this wonling 1S p:tckec1 \Vith calculated distortion. Egypt clocs nnt, in the abstraet sense, "detain" ships pnssing thrnl1gh tile Suez Canal. l have already refel"red in m}' previons statement to the debate clttring which, on W Octo!lcr last, Mr. Bevin told the House of C0111n1(111S that he \Vas "not aware of any cases in which the new Egyplian regnlations have in practice lcd to clc1ays." 11. That was not the onl)' saying or finding ta whieh l referred in ortler to rdute the Israel contention in tl1is n!ganl, and l can amI will give many other racts and cumml'nts to show that Egypt does little more tl1an ~lelay on1)' a fe\\' ships for only a few minutes. This CXplalllS why, 011 lB Octoher lust, which was two years, live montlls and three clays after the beginning of the restrictio1ls, Mr. Devin stated that there were no ddays hecatlse of the ne\\' Egyptian reg111ations. To procecd from thls tn the Israel contention that Egypt "detains ships secking to pass thl'ough the Suez Canal" is, to say the kast, a wild exaggeration. 12. As for visiting and inspecting ships, l recognize that Egypt exerciscs this right occaskmal1y - lawfl1lly and \Vith the utmost discretion. Pamllel ta this, it is only fair to say that the Egyptian anthorities do not inspect ail the ships seddng to pass through the Suez Cana\. ln Illy statC1l1cnt to the Conncil at its last meeting l gave ::iome illustrations of this fact, and l ea11 and will in due course give some more. Nor do the Egyptian :luthorities apply the restrictions to all cargoes going ln Israel. The (ollncil is alreudy familial' with the very limitecl list of materials affectec1, and knows tbat the restrictions apply to on1y a small number of war materials. 13. To say, then, that the Government of Egypt continues to "c1etain, visit and scm'ch ships seeking to pass through the Suez Canal, on the grounds that their cargoes are destined for Israel" is ta make an assertion whic:h, though brid, i5, as l have ventured ta de- Illull.,tralc, more thall packed with distortion. 14. "Vhile, therefore, l neither hesitate nor fcel e111- barrassed in slating that Egypt applies to sOllle ships, in relation to SOme war materials, a system of visit and inspection, l suiJmit that the first step which we shottld ail take tnwanls a prol)er undel'standing of the question llOW beforc us is to asccrtain and, as far as possible, agrce upon its basic facts. 15. From the acImittecl faet that the Egyptian authorities visit and inSl)ect in connexion with some war muterials some ships sc:;,eking to pnss through the Suez 16. With this in view, l shal1, ta begin with, comment mainly upon what is admittedly a fact. Later on l shall also take up whatever cise can be shawn ta be a fact. 17. Having said this l ask leave ta take up fi~st the admittcd fads, in arder ta see whether there IS any justification for the Israel daim that they constitute a contravention of international law, of the Suez Ganal Convention of 1888, and of the Egyptian-Israel General Armistice Agreement. 18. As for "internationallaw", whatever the representative of Israel means by it, there is not in the statement of Israel a single thing to show convincingly or even plausibly which acts of the Government of Egypt in tlus connexion contravene which law. It is very easy, especially for some, to throw a broad accusation based on a broad generalization as long as they are not required ta be specific and to he fair. 19. Like other armistices, the Egyptian-Israe1 General Armistice Agreement marked the termination of hostilities between the parties. There obviously could be no armistice if there were no hostilities, if there were no state of war. What an armistice puts an end to are the hostilities and not the state of war. l shall amply demonstrate in due course that the Egyptian-Israel General Armistice Agreement terminated only the hostilities and not the legal state of war. 20. We may, in this respect, usefully and re1evantly cast another glance at the traditions, the precedents, the jurisprudence and the doctrine until today concerning armistices general1y and, in particular, relating ta the rights and duties of States under an armistice. We will then be able to say whether the Egyptian-Israel General Armistice Agreement is a confirmation or a repudiation of ail that and of the Charter of the United Nations, and whether the Security Council was right, at its [413th] meeting of 3 March 1949, in approvingly taking note of that Agreement. 21. l shaH not recapitulate ail l said in this connexion at our [549th] meeting on 26 July when, referring to precedent and jurisprudence, l showed in chapter and verse that "armistices... are ail agreements between belligerent forces for a temporary cessation of hostilitics," that "they are in no wise to be compared with peace, and ought not to be called temporary peace, because the condition of war remains between the bel1igerents themselves, and between the belligerents and neutrals, on ail points beyond the mere cessation of hostilities," and, finally, that "In spite of such cessation (of hostilities) the right of visit and search over neutral merchantmen therefore remains intact. .. ". These are not my words but the words of jurists which l have quoted before and which l am quoting in part today. 22. H \';<lc. claimcd by the representative of Israel that thi:; ":,<l.nnot he sustained '!y t~1e United Nations and by the Charter. Such a claul1 IS completely rebutted, as 23. That there has becn a state of war in Palestine could not valiclly be clenied, nor could it be excluded by referenee to varions donbts, vagaries and attitudes as to the statns of Israel. Even before its birth - 1 am not speaking of legitimacy - Israel, as 1 sha11 amply demonstrate, was already kieking and \varring. Astate of war or a state of peace is not a few words put together or the eeho of a few wards. Tt is a rcality, a happening, a statc of things. 24.. In connexion with this point, Oppenheim tells us, in Lauterpacht's ec1ition of his International Law \ that "As international la\\' recognizes the status of war, ancl its effects as regards rights and duties between the belligerents on the one hand, and between the belligerent and neutral states on the other, the question arises what kind of States are legally qualified to malee war, and, therehy, ta become belligerents" aceording to the law of nations. The author adds that: "vVhcnever astate lacking the legal qualification to 1l1ake war nevertheless actually makes war, it is a belligerent, the contention is real war, and all the rules of international law respecting warfare apply to it." 25, With reference to Palestine, it can further be recallecl that, in his interim report to the General Asscmbly:! 011 16 Scptemher 1948, the United Nations Mediator repeatedly speaks of there being a war in Palestine. . 26. Furthel'"more, the existence of a state of war between Egypt, and Israel is pointed out by the Armistice Agreement, the very tel'"ms of which distinctIy and in a most specifie way show also the acts from which the parties are henceforth to refrain. 11 27. In the preamble to the Agreement, it is stated that the parties have decided to enter into negotiations under United Nations chairlllanship and "in order to facilitate the transition from the present truce to permanent peace in Palestine, ta negotiate an Armistice Agreement". 28. A reacling of some other parts of the Agreement will l1lake this clearer still. For example, we read in article IV, paragraph 3, that: "The provisions of this Agreement are dictated exclnsively by mÎlitary considerations and are valid 0111y for the period of the Armistice." l Oppcnhcim, Lassa Francis Lawrence, In/ernational Law, a Ircalüe, vol. II, (6th edition), editcd by Hersch Luuterpacht. London, Longmans, Green & Co., 1944. 30. That this annistice marks only a transitory stage short of permanent peace is llnmistakably shown by article l, paragraph 4, which stiplliates that: "The establishment of an armistice by the armed forces of the two parties is accepted as an indispensable step toward the liquidation of armed conf1iet and the restoration of peace in Palestine." 31. At the meeting of the Special Committee of the Egyptian-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission on 12 June 1951, Lieutenant General Riley stated that the armistice was considered "as the seQond step from the trl1ce". It was, he added, "the stepping point to a thircl phase which would be peace". 32. In a statement, on 30 July 1951, the day before yesterday, ta the House of Commons on Middle East Affairs, the British Foreign Secretary, Ml'. Herbert Morrison, considered the Arab States and Israel to be "still technically at war". .33. While this prevails, and, particularly in yiew of the continl1ance of the - shall l euphemistical1y say "indiscretion" of Israel, 01' shaH l frankly caH them by their name and say "violations and contraventions by Israel" - particularly in view of the continuance of these, Egypt has no lesser right, no lesser dutYand 110 other choice than to exercise its right of self-preservation and self-defence, which, as l submitted before, transcends al! other rights. 34. Oppenheim 4 tells us that "From the earliest time of the existence of the Law of Nations self-preservation was considered sufficient justification for many aets of aState which violate other States", and he proceeds ta give us some illustrations, among which are the following: "Amelia Island, at the mOl1th of St. Mary's River, and at that time in Spanish territory, was seized in 1817 by a bancl of buccaneers, under the direction of an aclventnrer namecl McGregor, who in the name of the insurgent colonies of Buènos Aires and Venezl1ela preyed indiscriminately on the commerce of Spain . ancl of the Unitecl States. The Spanish Government not being able or willing to drive them off, and the nuisance being one which required lmmediate action, President Monroe directed that a vessel of war should proceed to the islancl and expel the maral1ders, destroying their works and vessels." "In the course of the Second vVorld War the United States, while remaining l1eutral, adoptee! measures which, on the face of it, could not be regare!ee! as consistent with the law of neutrality as laie! down in the Hague Conventions. It has been submitted elsewhere that these measures, including the transfer of destroyers to Great Britain in 1940 and the Lend- Lease Act of 1941, were in accordance with the changed position of neutrality consequent upon the General Treaty for the Renunciation of War. In addition, the United States relied, solemnly and repeatedly, on the right of self-preservation as justi- . fying in law the unprecedented departure from the established rules of neutrality. That appeal to the plea of seU-preservation received a most persuasive addition of strength through the fact that, in the eyes of practically all the peoples of the world, the national cause of the United States, vitally menaced by the ostensible will for world domination on the part of Germany, became identified with the survival of the Law of Nations, as an effective code of international conduct." 36. Self-preservation and self-defence has, even in our days, impelled some Powers to restrict the importation of many war materials, or as they are more usually called, strategic war materials, to areas covering many countries with which there was and there is no state of war. The importation into those areas of those strategie materials is not allowed, or, in other words, the exportation of such materials ta those areas is not allowed. 37. These and many other comments and illustrations can be C]uoted to demonstrate both the existence and the extent as actually practised, of the right of self-preservation and self-defencc. "That there is one such right is incontestable", states Hall, in his International Law, and he continues by saying that "even ,vith individuals living in well-ordered c0111munities, the right of self-preservation is absolute in the last resort", and that "a fortiori it is so with States, which have in all cases to protect themselves". 38. Goodrich and Hambro 5 add: "... Article (51 of the Charter) safeguards the right of self-defence which is referred to as being 'inherent'. By so doing it follows a long line of precedents where in connexion with international agreements of this kind the right of self-defenœ has been tacitly or explicitly reserved. In connexion with the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, which contained no explicit reservation of the right of self-defence, the 5 Charter. of the United Nations, Comnlelltary and Documents (second and revised ec1ition); World Peace Foundation, Boston, USA, 1949. 39. It is even stated by the same authors that: "the provisions of Article 51 do not necessarily exclude th!s right of self-defence in situations not covered by tlllS Article," and that this right is on1y subject te? the undertaking by the Members of the United Nations ta "refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with· the Purposes of the United Nations". 40. Kelsen tells us in The Law of the United Nations that: "Although the right of self-defence is supposed ta be established by a rule of general international law which has the character of 'jus cogens' sa that it cannat be affected by any treaty, it has been considered not as superfluous ta stipulate this right expressly in the Charter. Neither the Covenant of the League of Nations nor the Pact of Paris contained an analogous provision." At another point, Kelsen says that: "The right of self-defence ... is the right of an individual, or astate, to defend his persan, 'property, or honour against a real or imminent attack. It is a right of the attacked or threatened individual or state, and of no other individual or state. Article 51 confers the right ta use forcenot only upon the attacked state but also upon other states which unite with the attacked state in arder ta assist it in its defence." 41. Having said this and borrowing from a statement of 27 June 1951, unanimously approved by the two United States Senate CCl111mittees which conducted the MacArthur investigation, l should like, in my tnm, ta state that we are unshaken in our c1etermination ta clefend ourselves and ta co-operate ta the limit of our capabilities with ail of those free nations, determined ta survive in freedom, and that nothing will deter our people and our Government from their re1entiess quest for our ultimate security. 42. The few remarks l have made relating ta the right of s<:lf-pre~ervation an~ sel.f-defence are inspired by the co~slderatlOll that thls nght is at the root of ail eXIstence, of ail survival, individual or national, that it is part an.d parcel of the Charter and the very concept of the Umted Nations, and that it is the main patrimony and the. highest priv~lege of every individual, eyery commumty, every nation and every group of natIOns, except the damned and the fools. ~3. This right, this sublimely primordial right, asserts Itself ail the more when it is seriously endangered. The faet that it is sa endangered in relation ta the l'ole which is. a~sumed in the Mi~dle East by world political 210111sm through Israel IS a nightù1arefor those who sleep and an ugly fact for those who areawake. 44. In my previous submission l referred ta some of the attitudes and actions of Israel whiçh are blocking 45. The Pre~ident of the C0l1lleil for the mOl1th of .ln1y statecl, aS l mentionec\ alreacly, that the qnestion with which we are dealing' i~ an aspect of the Palestinian question. 'Vby this (Illestion is never sohred, wh)' 50 man)' acnte prohlem~ ~te1l1 from it, why it is agonizingsa man)', frightening 50 many others anc! burning countless linger:> - a11 this is no secret to anyone. The 11ns",er is t1wre reacli1y to he seen bl' whoever cares to look. 46. If we w:ltch Israel in action against the law of natiuns, illduding the Charter, against the clecisions and rcsolntions of severnl organs of the United Nations inc1u<1ingthe St~curitv Council and the General As~ semilly, and in 1'l1thlcs~ contcmpt of hUl11an rights, then wc will .sœ a piclure the likc of wbich in clegradatio11 has never heen seen lJefore. 47. r shall 1illlit llIvsclf to <l 111ere outline of this pictul'c, nr rather the' jlart~ of it \vhich today caU for ~pecial attentio11. 4:-:. In 111)' statement al our previons meeting, l asked: Bas Israel respected the anni~tice? Has Israel carried out the resoll1tions of the tTllited Nations? Are the Palestinian Aral> rdugees had: in their homes al' COITIp~nsatt:d for ,their propcl'ty? H as Israel paie! the sltghtest attentIOn or sho\\'11 any respect whatsoever for the resolutions (Jf the United Natiolls in beludf of their hasic hUl11:11.1 rights? These are sOl11e - only S0111eof the ql1estllms 1 askt~d ; and the U11.swer to eaeh and to aIl of them is a glarillg ancl <1ellant "no". 49. l have with me a cletailed aCCOUl1t of the very many violations by Israel of the Egyptian-Israe1 General Armistice Agreement as investigated and l'eported by the Unitecl Nations olJservers in Palestine. To save time, l shall mention ol1lv a few of the cases sa reporkd: Ahasan El Sagl;ir, 7 October 1949, Israel shellee! nr<.'a Il)' 1llortar~- l am speaking in rather tl'1egmphic language tn save time - Beit Hanml11, 14 October 1Y4(), Israel ::;helled area by mortars and raic1ee! it with arl11onre(1 v('üic1~s; Ahasan El Kabir area, 16 :tITarch 19$0, Israelis crossed delineatiol1 lines and c011l1l1ittecl atmcities in the area, Incluc1ing the kidnapping and the killing of un Arab boy and two Arab girls; Buri ~ettlcmellt are(l, 16 June 1950, Israelis cro.ssccl the clemarcation linc intn the Egl'ptian side and committecl atrncities, inclucling the throwing of })etrol- ::;oake<\ material on Ara.h crops, sctting them Olt fire; Rafnh, 3D June 1950. Tsraelis crossec1 the demarcation line, killecl or injnred s(~vel'al Arabs and hurnec\ tents and corn; Gaza, 2 JlIly 1950, Rve armoured Israel boats entercd the territorial waters of Gaza und tcrrorized Arab fishenncn: Bir El lVlalagui, flve Israel armonrec1 cars and t\\'o jceps carrying" {rom fortY to fifty Israel soldier::; c\1:lsecl the Arahs in the area and prevented them hom rcaching the wells for water; El Qusaima, 50. In addition to these and similar violations by Israel of the Egyptian-Israe1 General Armistice Agreement, the Council will remember the cases of terrorism committed by Israel against the Arabs in various areas c1uring the last part of 1950 and resulting in the expulsion from Israel-controlled territory of wel1 over eight thousand Arabs who l1ntil today are, l1nder one pretext or another, not al10wed by Israel to return to their homes. 51. These are but a few exalllples of Israe1's violations of the Armistice Agreement. The attitude and intent which inspired these and many other violations also permeate Israel's action in severa1 other fields. 52. Israel has not even shown any respect for its own birth certificate, which is the political resolution of the United Nations General Assembly of 29 November 1947. In that resoll1tion [181 (II) ] the General Assembly ol1tlined the boundaries of what was to be Israel. Those boundaries are now on1y a matter of history and record. A great deal of trespassing by Israel has taken place and is still taking place, and a lot of what was to be the Arab State in Palestine was extorted and is until now forcibly controlled by Israel. In the same resolution the General Assembly stipulated the internationalizing of Jerusalem. Until today, however, and despite other resolutions of the United Nations with this in view, Israel continues to oppose the internationalization of J erusalem and to daim it all as its own. 53. In several resolutions the General Assembly stipu1ated that the Arabs expelled from Palestine shou1d be returned and that those who cou1d not or wou1d not return shou1d be compensated for their property. Yet these Arabs are still denied their country, their homes and their basic human rights; and that is not all. Far from it. The numbers of these refugees are swelling continuous1y by the arriva1 from Israel of still more Ara.b refugees. The Counci1 has been dealing unti1 recent1y with a samp1e of Israe1's action in this respect and consequently adopted its reso1ution of ~7 November 1ast [524th meeting] which, inciclentally but not strange1y any more, remains, unc1er one guise or ~nother, unimplemented by Israel, with the rest11t that, as I mentioned, well over eight thousand Pa1estinian Arabs driven by aeroplane, machine guns and otherwise into the c1emilitarized zone or across the frontiers into Egypt are not allowed to return and are addec1 to the nearly one million of their brethren who had previotlsly been expelled and forced ta flee from such barbarism as that of which Deir Yasin is symbolic. The story of 54. As a recent illustration of this, there is the qnestion of the Jordan '$ waters. ]\t[any of the expelled Palestinian Arahs tried ta settle in Arab areas near the Torc1an. They have hecn trying to eke ont a living, illeagre as it is, from these arid lands. Bnt Israel started to pU1llp away the Jordan's water hefore it reached them, and the salinity of the land of their llew abode inerl'ased. entailing the inevitahle re~;ult of seriously affecting its fertility and of doing away \Vith their new, even if Heanty, means of living. 55. This rl'cent Israel venture affects at the same time many other Arahs, as can c1early he seen from a reading of document 5/2236, dated 10 July 1951. This dOCltment consists of a lettcl" dated 6 July 1951 from the Minister of Jordan in \Vashington ta the Secretary- General of the United Nations, a cablegram c1ated 7 JUl1e From the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Jordan to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and a report of the J orclanian Lands and Surveys to the Jorclanian Minister of Finance and Economv. This report conduclec1 by saying' that: - "It is clear, therefore, that the recluction in the normal flow of the]ordan by c10sing the sluice gates controlled hy the Jews at Deganiya has increased the salil1ity of the river to sueh an extent as ta 111a1<e irrigation no longer feasible between Jisr Sheikh Husein and the Dead Sea. The consequences arislng from this almorma\ increase in the salillity of the Jordan can only be c1escribed as disastrous to the existing cultivators taking irrigation water by ptt111pS on both sicles of the river, but also it effectively and clecisively prec1uclcs ail schemes of refugee settlement in the Jordan Valley. ", 1 t "I am informecl hy the United Nations Relief and \Vork5 Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East that it has tlnder active consideration four schel11cs in this area, cach one c1ependent on pumping water from the river. Private enterprise is also engagecl in developing land in the Valley with the intention of pumping water from the same source. Therefore, unless inuncdiate action is taken by the Govern111ent to prevent the existing unwarranted inter- - Î fen~nce in the free !low of the river at Deganiya, the economy of Jordan will be serionsly affected and an further c1evclopmcnt c1epcnc1ing on irrigation from the River Jordan must cease." 57. yVhile making this rapid review of Israel's attitudes and contraventions it can relevantly be asked why, until today, more than t.wo years. and a hal.f.sit:ct it was tirst set up, the U11lted Nahons ConClhahon Commission for Palestine has made no progress whatsoever. A perusal of the record will show that this failure m11st be put entirely at the door of Israel. One example al110ng so many is the denunciation by Israel of the Protocol of Lausanne, which laid the basis for further discussions of the Palestine question, a dent1l1- ciation which took place one week - only one weekafter the signature of the Protocol by Israel. It is high time that the Conciliation Commission made it known to the United Nations and ta the whole world that the reason for its faihtre is Israel's obstruction and refusaI ta listen ta reason. 58. l shall not go on today recounting a11 the ghastly story of Israel's action against the Arab refugees. l shaH not go on ta describe the treatment meted out ta them until this hour, a fact which more than suffice~ ta shame the whole universe. 1 want, however, to inform the Council, and through it the whole world, that these refugees are human beings and to ask whert is fair play, where is justice, and where are human rights? 59. It is true that the United Nations has adopted resolutions in their behalf and has evel1 given them, and is continuing to give them, some relief. It is equally true that we should ail appreciate the efforts of the United Nations and its Members, particularly the United States of America, in this respect. Yet l trust that no one will accuse me of ingratitude or discourtesy if l mention that, on the other hand, these refugees have thousands of millions of dollars' worth of property in Palestine to whkh they are entitled, or if l recall what l said previously when 1 tried to assess, very conserva,tively and in utmost moderation, the weight and the impact of this Arab refugee problem on Arab economy and Arab life, and then found ominously staring at us sorne giant-sized troubles and the figure of a thousand million dollars a year ta burden further the already overburdened economy of Arab lands. These huge troubles and this added staggering burden seem, however, perfectly ta suit the shortsighted insidiousness of Israel's policy. 60. In fmther illustration of this point, may l, with permission, recall that Mr. Eytan, the Israel representative to the Conciliation Commission, at one time stated ta that Commission that it was not realistic to speak of the return of the refugees totheir homes and farms because, in many cases, those farms had been destroyed and the homes, if they had not been razed to the ground, were occupied by others. Of comse, the words "by others'I mean the Israelis. There was nobody else who couId possibly have occupied those homes after their occupants had been forcibly chased away from them. 1h. Eytan went on to say that Jaffa, which had beell almost entirely. Arab before, had taken a 61. The Israel representative stated further that he was more convinced than ever that any discussion of the repatriation of refugees would be academic and wuulel not l11'ing allDut any concrete results. He then saitl that during the past twenty years, on the other hand, it hall been fonnd desirable ail over the world that ail problel11s arising from l11inoriti'es should be diminated hecausc it had hcen found through bitter experience that the)' \Vere the canse, if not the main canse, of wurs and internaI tronbles. And Mr. Evtan Il"ent on to say that seriotls problel11s of minor[ties II'hich the State of Israel l11ight have been [aceel with; bad been so convel1iently rcsolved by the exodus of the , Aral> population and by the outbreak of hostilities. 62. Even this is not the end of the trai1. The process of deterioration continues, as it does with regard to other phases of the Palestinian question. Raids of aU kinds (·verywhere are constantly on Israel's agenda, and Israd is prnmptly and systel11aticaUy carrying them out. Th~ aerial action taken on 5 April 1951 against Syrian citizens h)' the forc~s of the Government of Israel was rleplon'd by the Security Council and was fOtlndto use the worcls of the Secliritv Council resolutiol1 of 18 l\lay 1951 lS.J.7th 'I1lcetiïl[J] -to "constÎtute a violation of the cease-fire provision providecl in the Security COllncil resolution of 15 luly 1948" and to be i'incollsistent with the terms of the Armistice Agreement and the ohligations assumec1 under the Charter". Thl'se and similar violations are merl' variations of the saJl1{~ pattern. They worry ail concernecl with Middle Eastern and world peace much more in view of the fact that the)' are the symptoms of a chronic disease and the exteriorization of an evil intent. (j.1. The mot of the trouble is the endlessness of the \\'ild amhitions of world politieal Zionism, of which Israel is the spearhead. Israel was actually not content \\'ith the territory ontlineel for it by the political resolutian of the United Nations General Assembly of 29 November 19-+7 j Israel is evidently 110t satisfied with the l1îuch "\vider territory it presently occupies, pending a final sett1ement; and Israel, even if it took the whole of Palestine, would not he satisfied; it wouId use that territory as a springboard for more adventure. 64. From the beginning, a pawn in this politieal Zionist game has 1>een the Arab people of Palestine, \l'ho \vere ta he expcllcel. The main tool has been the intense 1ewish immigration into Palestine. Of this immigration, the late United Nations Mediator, Count Folke Bernadotte, said in his interi111 report to the General Asscmbly, dated 16 Septel11ber 1948: "1t cannot he ignorecl that immigration affects not only the Jewish State and the Jewish people, but also the surrounding Arab worlel." 65. It is evident, however, that Israel does not pay the slightest attention to these considerations. Neither does 1 it, iil its ruthlessness and wild adventure, heed any counsc1 of wisdom and foresight. The Prime Minister 66. The reason can partly be secn both from the facts before us and from the reports of the United Nations observers in Palestine, which are replete with evidence that the whoJe programme of expropriating the property of and expelling the Arabs of Palestine is as reckless, ruthless and relentless as it is premeditated and carefully planned. The result is: out with the Palestinian Arabs. Just out -no rights, no freedoll1s. Never before in man's history has man been more despised, been treated with more contell1pt; never before has humanity been defiecl with more arrogance. 67. Hurewitz, in his book Thc Struggle for Palestine) which was published last year, says: "When the massacre on April 9th [1948] by Irgunists and Freedom Fighters of a hundred women and children in the Jerusalem Arab suburb of Deir Yasin was added to the military defeats and the lack of politieal leadership, there were causes enough for general Arab demoralization. By mid-May panic ovel'came all classes, and an estimated 200,000 Arabs had alreacly Hed their homes, many seeking sanctuary in neighbouring Arab countries. When the mandatory finally laid down its governll1ental authority, there were no Arab politieal institutions ta fill the void." 68. The author, who cannot be accused of failing in his entlmsiasm for political Zionism, tells us rather casually, of Deir Yasin, and of the massacre tilere on 9 April 1948 by Irgunists and the, queerly eno~gh, so-called Freedom Fighters, of a hundred Arab women and children. The picture as painted by the United Nations observers who reported that massacre is much more sordid. The significance and the cOllsequences of this and similar events are still worse. There has been a programme, carefully laid and as carefully carried out or ta be carried out. This programme has for some time b~en unfolding itself and, in quick succession, giving blrth to many a ho1'1'01' and to many an upheaval. There must have been a great deal of mutual congratulating then in political Zionist circ1es, and still more when the number of Palestinian Arabs frightened away from their homes was made to swell to a million. 70. Gone were the days when 2iollist leaders such as ]abotinsky, in his book The Jewish War Front, first pltblished in 1940, stated that "the transformation of Palestine" - meaning its 2ionization - "can be effected to the full without dislodging the Palestinian Arabs". The real programme of political 2ionis111 has, when unmasked, openly followed a system of supplanting the Arabs to make way for Jewish immigration. While keeping this in mind, the programme has shown indications of adhering c10sely to plans such as that of Max Nordau, who, in addition to his literary fame, was Herzl's col!aborator in founding political 2ionism, and who, about thirty-two years ago, long before fascism and nazism, came forward in 1919 with his plan which continues to retain its place among the basic statements of Zionist policy. In his plan Max Nordau speaks already, in 1919, with great emphasis of "the first million" Jewish immigrants to Palestine. To this he adds, "to absorb the Jewish exodus from other countries, Palestine must inevitably include Trans-Jordan." 71. If l compared the Max Nordau plan to some others - although l shaH spare the Council from having to listen to them today - it would seem very moderate indeec1. He wants only Trans-Jordan and Palestine: others of his people wanted much more. '. 72. These are but a few of the episodes which preceded the conclusion of the General Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel, or which accompanied 1 or followed upon it. l have hinted at these episodes so as to give an inkling of what Israel ancl world political Zionism are up to, and of what Egypt and the rest of the Arab world are up agaillst. 73. The representative of Israel eloquellt1y professed, on behalf of his Government, an eagerness for peace which that Government's attitude ancl actions thoroughly belie. Peace is facts and realities - palpable facts , and realities - not mere words. 74. l have given in brief outline some illustrations of what is actual!y taking place and of the sinister policy ancl intentions of world political 2ionism, particularly as carrieclout by Israel. 75. Is it not nnderstandable that we shoulcl look to our safety, to our clefence ancl to our self-preservation? Can anyone tell us candidly that he wonlcl accept for his own country, were it in Egypt's place, what Israel wants now - namely that Egypt, through her own domain and throngh her own territory, should allow the passage of war materials to Israel? Can anyone say canclidly that he would, under similar circmnstances, accept snch a thing for his country? The answer is obvious. And let all those who choose to support and stand behind the unrestrained hooliganism of Israel in 76. Let those who talk pence and aet war, who trample everything in sheer despite, know that they have lost their bea1"Îngs. This i5 not the road ,to peace. . 77. In its. complaint, Israel says that Egypt violated the Armistice. But, as l have submittee! to the Council before, the unequivocal terms of the Agreement leaves no doubt that, ,IS was twice decided by the Egyptian- Israel Mixed Armistice Agreement: "The Commission e!oes not have the right ta demane! from the Egyptian Government that it shol1le! not interfere with the passage of goods to Israel throngh the Suez Canal". These clecisions being final and Israel heing a signatory of the Armistice Agreement according ta which they were maùe, the matter sho1l1e! have resteù tl1ere. Nevertheless, Israel came forth with its complaint to the Council and here we <ire discussing it. 78. l have already spoken at S0111e length of the Egyptian-I5rae1 General Armistice Agreement and of as many relevant precepts of illternational law as l could properly mention in relation ta our present debate. l still fail ta sec what concrete act of the Government of Egypt violates either internationul law, illcluding the Charter of the United Nations, or the Egyptian-Israel General Armistice Agreement. Nor can l see any violation whatsoever by the Egyptian Government of the Constantinople Convention of 1888 concerning the Suez Canal, a scrntiny of which shows more dearly still that tlle Israel compl,tint has no leg to stand on. It cannot walk even on crutches. 79. In my statement ta the COtlncil at its [549t1l] meeting on 26 ] uly, l mcrely tOl1ched UpOI1 the Suez Canal Convention and relatee! treaties. Considering that nothing I11tlch has as yet bcen said by others in this regard, ] shaH confine myself today to a brief recapitnlation concernÎng this point and a few additional remarks and 1 shaH leave my other comment untU a later stage of our debate. 80. In my previous su1Jmission l statec1 that, notwithstanding the measmes taken by Egypt, the traffic through the Suez Canal had hecn very little affected and had even increasec1. l have Cjuoted some statistical reports to il1ustrate this faet and l have expressec1, what l express again toc1ny, my readiness to put at the disposaI of the Council nny further details required. 81. Nothing, however, in my juclgment, could serve the pllrpose of the Council better than the adc1ress delivered by the President of the Suez Canal Company at the meeting of the Company's General Assembly of Shareholders on 12 June 1951. Unless the Council wants me to l'l'ad the whole speech, l shall rcad only the following relevant parts. Let us hear what the President of the Suez Canal Company saie! on that day, the same day as that on which the Special Committee of the Egyptian-Israel lIIixed Armistice Commission made its decision in favour of Egypt: "At the last meeting of Ollr General Assembly a year aga, l had foreseen an increase of business in "The increase in profits has made it possible for us to make an equivalent and substantial increase in dividends. This increase corresponds to a proper evaluation of the various e1ements, among which is naturally inc1uded the possibility of maintaining it in the future, provided that the economic and political conditions remain tolerable. It seems to us, in fact, that this increase of the dividends is only proportionate with the legitimate hopes you may have entertained, after having been deprived of dividends during the war years. \1I,Te did everything possible not to frustrate this hope, and we rightly believe that you will be gratified to consider our recol11mendation to decide on a dividend substantially increased. It goes without saying that the distribution of a higher dividend has not in the least prevented us, as the accounts just submitted to you prove, from adding a very large amount ta the reserve fund. This precaution, which is not an innovation, the Company will continne to practise in the future, whenever possible, following, in so doing, the path of our predecessors in promoting a policy of investment and economy, which will provide for your future interests in the same way as the dividend is providing for your present interests. Capital is not alone to have benefited from the increase of the 1950 returns. The Canal tlsers are in the same position. Your Board of Directors has decic1ed to grant the maritime navigation the benefit of a reduction of the transit toU. For two years the shipowners in general, and those of Great Britain and the United States in particular, have been requesting it. Their requests became more insistent the moment the financial results of 1950 became lmown. In fact, the intention and constant practice of the company has always been in favour of making shipowners benefit by the increase of its returns whenever this is possible and justified. The Company would not deviate from this sound policy which has earned for it a favourable opinion in maritime circ1es. This favourable opinion together with the invaluable support of Egypt and the Egyptian Government are the two greatest moral forces of the Company. It is due, l repeat, to the fact that the Company has always hacl at heart the interests of the shipowners either by reducing the transit tolls whenever possible, or by putting at their disposaI the most perfect facilities and the best possible conditions for transit. The Company's positive interest lies in the pursuance of this policy, and the continuity of its results. It is to keep in line with this policy that we have ttndertaken on the Canal great projects which are being presently executed and in some points terminated; that we have abolished last year the passengers' transit toU; that we are reducing this year the transit toll on ships. The report submitted by the Board of Directors has provided a complete analysis of the elements of the traffic which has reached the intensity you lmow. Nothing in the facts 82. From this 1110St authoritative speech just quoted, the fol1owing, among other pires: (1) that dming 1950 and the fol1owing it, the Company's business was even more than in the previous eorresponding (2) that revenues increased; (3) that the added ta; (4) that owing ta extra profits, were macle to the shippers who dealt Company; (5) that new projeets were carried there are others which are still to be earried that the relations and co-operation with Government are at theil' best; and (7) fessed sorrow for the fate of the Company Canal is entirely uncal1ed for and 111uch less than crocodile tears. 83. In the whale speech there is not a l'ven a hint, aI any violation whatsoever Canal Convention; not a word about any the traffie in the Canal and not a whispel' infringement lIpon the freedom of navigation Canal. 84. The time has not yet come for me to comparisons and relevant comment. When come for that, I shaH not merely ask who to whom. l might have rather more to say.

permission of the President I should like very short preliplinary statement on behalf United Kingdo1l1 ·delegation. l do not wish to enter into aH the details of this very complex but l think it might be llseful if l were to general approaeh. 86. The history, as we kllOW the history has been extensive!y covered in the statements we have already hearcl, and l therefore shaH al1 the old grouud. l would just l'ecaIl ta the statement which l made last Novemher meeting] when this suhject, together affecting Palestine, was being cOllsidered. l gave three main reasons for the importance Government attached ta securing an early factory sett\ement. 87. In the first place, l referl'ed to the international shipping and commerce, which 88. Secondly, l drew attention last November ta the practical importance of these restrictions. Tt is for the delegation of Israel, if it will, to say how far the restrictions affect it. l understand that their effect is considerable. Sa far as the United Kingdom Government is concerned, the ban on the passage of oil tankers throngh ~he Canal to the refinery at Haifa has caused us great inconvenience and considerable financial loss. In addi- (ion ta the prejudice which we have suffered, the virtual jnactivity of the great refinery at Haifa affects almost ;1.11 the countries of \Vestern Europe. Ineidentally, what the representative of Egypt had ta say today regarding the generally flourishing state of the Suez Canal Company seems to us, at least, to have no relevance to the grave loss suffered by His Majesty's Government ilS a result of the restrictions which the Egyptian Gov- ~rnment has imposed. 89. The third point to which l referred in my state- ~ent last November was the politieal importance of the continuance of these restrictions, and this is in a way perhaps the most important. What l then said was: f'Whatever may be the rights of the Egyptian Government in this matter - and as ta that l would prefer ta make no comment now - it must surely be a malter of regret to us aIl that the politieal situation in the Middle East should remain unsettled, and that the contÎnuance in force of these restrictions for sa long after the Armistice Agreement was signed should contribute, as it does, to the state of tension and uneasiness in the Middle East." 90. Neither the arguments presented in the Council at its last meeting and at this, nor the. events whieh have bccurred since last November, in our opinion in any way affect the validity oi what l then said. In attempting to justify the restrictions on the freedom of international commerce which uses the Suez Canal, the representative of Egypt has raised legal issues connected with the interpretation of the Suez Canal Convention of 1888 and belligerent rights. These issues are no doubt debatable, although 1 must sayat once that we, for our part, cannot accept the point of, view expressed by him, but it is unnecessary for the Security Council to become entangled in the maze of legal arguments. For practical purposes, l suggest that the Egyptian conduct in this respect ought to be guided by the Armistice Agreement concluded in Februat;y 1949., Before the' Security Coundr adopted tbis Armistice, Agreement, Ml'. Bunche, and there can be no greater authority, said [433rd meeting]: février compétente "There can be little doubt that both sides desire to be freed from the many burdensome restrictions and interferences which were imposed under" the truce. The entire heritage of restrictions which developed out of the undec1ared war should be done away with. ' There should be normal access,' restrictions on im-' portation and immigration should be eliminated, " ... the Armistice Agreements constitute portant step toward the establishment of peace in Palestine and [the CouncilJ considers these Agreements supersede the truce provided in the resolutions of the Security Council [310th meeting]" and 15 July 1948 meeting]". 92. The Council also noted that the "several Agreements include firm pledges against any acts of hostility between the Parties". Faced these, we think they provide obvions proof present restrictions are prec1uded by the Cauncil. 93. The Egyptian case, as presented by onr Mahmoncl Fawzi Bey, not unnaturally tends the so-called right of self-preservation. This any rate ta my delegation, seems ta be a conception. Obviously States have a right themselves, if by that is meant to defend themse1ves the face of unprovoked aggression. This right acknowleclged in Article 51 of the Charter, dentally lays down that it can only be exercised the Security Council has taken the measures to maintain international peace and security. we differ from the representative of Egypt asserts, if in fact he does, the right of his apply considerations of self-defence in the present If Egypt were involved in actual hostilities, no doubt be justified in taking measures for defence. This is not, however, the situation present time. 94. Hostilities are not in progress and have in progress for two and a haH years. It cannot maintained· that Egypt is under any imminent of attack from Israel. We must therefore conclude the daim to exercise belligerent rights for of Egypt cannot now be sustained and must sidered as an abuse of belligerent rights as these are recognized in international law. 95. l would now. draw attention to the fact Special Committee established under the ~greement has ~ompleted its considerati<;J11 of the ban appeal as lt was reqnested to do 111 the Council resolution of 17 Novel11ber 1950. be.fore us the text. of the statement macle Rl.ley o.n 12 June 111 document S(~194. l might thlS pomt that l cannot agree wlth the suggestion the Egyptian representative that the force Riley's remarks can be dismissed by suggesting was speaking as a seH-appointed. jurist and man-at-large. General Rileyis both Chief 96. General Riley's judgment has made it quite clear that, whether or not these restrictions are technically a breach of the Armistice Agreement, they are directly contrary to the spirit of that Agreement and constitute, as he put it, an aggressive and hostile act. It surely cannot be denied that the maintenance of these restrictions, which have now been in force as 1 said before for a period of nearly two and a haH years after the Armistice Agreement was signed, prejudice the stability of the area and the prospects of achieving a final settlement. The situation is the more regrettable in view of the many statements made by Egyptian representatives emphasizing their sincere desire to act in a spirit of co-operation and conciliation and to work for the restoration of general peace in Palestine. 97. In these circumstances 1 consider that the political importance of bringing about the early removal of the restrictions has ·considerably increased since the matter was discussed in the Council last year. The practical importance of obtaining a satisfactory settlement is certainly no less now than it was then. The failure to employ all the resources at the Haifa refinery continues to cause loss and prejudice not only to the United Kingdom but also to many other countries in no way connected themselves with the Palestine conflict, and 1 need scm-cely remind the Council that owing to other events in the Near East the need for utilizing to the full any available refining capacity at Haifa and e1sewhere may well become even more pressing if the supply of petroleum products is to be maintained for great areas of the world, including Western Europe and many countries of Asia. 98. This completes the general preliminary statement of our attitue!e which 1 wish to put before the Council. It is necessarily critical of the position adopted by Egypt. But 1 cannot believe that this will come as any surprise to the representative of Egypt in view of the statement 1 made last November and of the very many approaches which have been made by us to the Egyptian Government through the diplomatic channel. 1 am, however, encouraged to think that the Egyptian Government may itself be prepared to consider a modification of its present attitude. l have noted that, at the Council's [549th] meeting of 26 July, the representative of Egypt saie! that he would fully co-operate with the Council to find a just and real solution and that his approach to the problem would be fair and constructive. l am sure that 1 would be expressing the views of many members around the Council table when l say that we sincerely hope that the Egyptian Government will feel able now to lift these restrictions. Such a step would remove the injustice and anomaly which must, in our view, continue so long as the restrictions are maintained. Tt would be in accordance with the opinions expressed by the highest United Nations authorities, such as ML Bunche and General Riley, and it would prove an invaluable contribution towards the lessening 99. In SUlD, our submission is that the maintenance by the ~gyptian Government of restrictions on traffic proceed1.n~ throug~ tl~e Sue~ Canal is quite unjustified, that 11 lS b~commg 1l1creasmgly abusive and that, unless the Egypüan Government can itself find ways and means of relnedying the situation, the Couneil should exercise its undoubted authority.

The Security Council will meet again at 3.30 this afternoon, when the first speaker will be the representative of Israel. The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.