S/PV.551 Security Council

ln c1eclaring open this meeting of the Securitv Cm111cil, 1 \\"Îsh tn make it clear that l alll overrulil~g my tlllnut1l1Celllent at the close of this lllorning's 111{~eting t!lat the SSOth mt'eting Imd been rccessed until 3.:30 p.lll. It is necessary to identify Illllrlling and afternoon lllcetings of the Security COllncil he1c! CIIl the Satlll~ day as separate meetings, and accnrdingly this meeting is the 551 st. SY8tmll of ÎntcrpNltation 2. The PRES1DENT: l wuulel snggest that we pursue the samc COllrse with reSpl~ct tu intcrpretations tItat wc elid this I11nrning at the 550th meeting. ft 7t'aS so cil.'cidcd. The Palestine qncstion (collUnued) (a) 1{E5TRICTIONS IMI'OSI,:'D li\' ECi\'l'l' ON THE PASSAGE 01' SIIIl'5 l'HROUGH T1I1t Stll·;Z CANAL (5/2241) At t!lcim'itation (If tire Pn~sid('ll/, Mahmolld Fawai Bl'Y, representative of B!J)'Pt,' Mr. J{/lCl/idy, representa/iv/' of iraq " aJld .lIr. Bban. repn~sl.'lIfativc of Israel, tU()/~ places at the Sccurity COlIHcil fable. 3. 11r. EBAN (Israel): \Vith 11fty pages of Egyptian argumentation hefore liS, we now have a clear picture of the views of the repl'escnlative of Egypt on an aspects of lnunan liic' and activity. Nuw and again in brief but me1l1orable moments he accidentally tOllched UpOI1 the subject nf the Council',s agenda, which is: "Restrictions Împnsed Ily Egypt on thc: passage of ships through the SI\(~Z Callal". l':,,('n here the contact with re1evance was never very constant or very close, for wc \Vere treated to a complete1y superfluous discussion of the general sense of armistice agreements as traditionally envisaged before the Charter was signed and without reference to any of the unique and ~pccific provisions which mark the Egyptian-lsracl C;eneral Armistice Agreement signe<l at Rhodes 011 24 .Fehruary 1949. 1 l therefore venture to repeat that there is no value at ail in any generalizatiom; about the traditional concept of an armistice in the face of a $pedfic agreement \Vhich 4. Not even the appearance of the formidable and, l must say, hitherto unknown figure of Professor Pfankuchen of the University of 'Visconsin has caused my delegation to change its fundamental approach ta this juridical theme. For the question is not the general incidence of armistice agreements but the particular provisions of this Agreement. The issue is not the traditional law which used to prevail under legal systems which existed before the Charter was signed: the issue is whether now, after the Charter has been signed and after the Egyptian-Israel Annistice Agreement has been in force for two and one-haH years, a Member State can ask the Security Council to respect its unilateral exercise of beHigerent rights, two and one-haH years after the signature of an agreement which was interpreted by this Council as marking the permanent end of aH hostile acts. 5. Doctor Pfankuchen, whom the representative of Egypt often quoted and less often acknowledged, cannot add to our wisdom on these points. Indeed, in the introduction to his text-book he specifically avoids making professions as ambitious as those which the Egyptian representative has made for hi111. He writes: "In this book l have made an effort to meet a teaching problem, rather than ta attempt to push forward the borders of knowledge in international law. [This textbook] is designed primarily for juniors and seniors in a four-year college or university." 6. Perhaps llothing more illttstrates the pre-Charter atmosphere in which the juridical argumentation of the representative of Egypt was conceived than some of the problems which the third and fourth year students are set, after a discussion of wars and armistices: "1. Read carefully the list of wars in paragraph 138... "(c) Suppose a 'general war' of States A, B, and C, against States X, Y, and Z. How many wars are there?" 7. But, sl1rely, the whole question before us relates excll1sively and specifical1y to the partlcl1lar instrument to which Egypt and Israel have set their hands. Nothing but the most direct interpretation of that instrument can have any bearing on the rights or the duties of the two signatory States. 8. 1 should have wished to confine my remarks to the acttial substance of the agenda whieh the Security Council has approved. Unfortunately, however, the representative of Egypt delivered himseH of a notably ill-hl1moured and self-righteotls attack on Israel, on its origins and \ts justifications, on its liberation 9. 1 can ol1ly assume that n senl-iC' of gl1i1t explains the vehemence of that attack. l t 1l1t1l-it rcst heavily upon the conl-icÎence of a Stat<: \\'hicl1 has launched into armecl intervcntion lJeyone! its frontiers when it surveys the grim conscquences of such intervention. It must be (1il1icult for Egypt to t('(1.1' up a resolution of the General .~sse.ll1bly, tn aUack it hy force, to trample npon it, to kIl! It stone c1cad and th('n to censure Israel for 110t l1d11g able tn resurreet it .tgain to IHe. 1 snggest, therefore, that, at no stage of any discussion on any prohk'm which remains as the relic of those hostilities, should this principle of initial res\lol1Sihility he forgotten. At the very least, an atmosphere of hU111ility, of a disposition to share in the responsihility for the settlc- 111('nt nf thesc questions should animate such speeches, instead of the censorintls ancl sclf-rightcous exhortations which have hcen udclrcsscd to us. 10. 1 do not concede that Israel is obliged to discuss \Vith Egypt any matter exccpt the restrictions on shiplling passing through the Suez Canal. A tenc1ency tu escape inlo totally extrancous issl1t"s can only be an index of (liscomfort anc1llltlst only serve tn confuse the Secnrity C0l1l1cii in its att<~mpt to COl1ccntrate its scrutiny on the single issne which now lies before il. Yet, if h;rael's honol\T is attacked, it must he defenc1ed, cven if the laws of strict rclevanee must be set aside. It is therefore not as a matter of choice or out of any bdicf that the Egyptian oll~ervations on extraneons matters \Vere in order, hut purely as a matter of equity and reciprocity, that 1 ndclress myself nOW to certain questiolls which do not lie on the agenda but which \Vere the suhject of exhnl1stive Egyptian comment this ll1orning. 11. First, it is my dutY ta make it dear that the Eg-yptian praetiee of visiting ane! searching ships passing with gonds boune! for Israel through the Snez Canal is the only breach in the Egyptian-Israel Armistice Agreement. Except for that vast and gaping hale, the structure of that Agreement would now be intact. Tt is necessary ta emphasize this point, beeause we were regaled this mornmg with a long list, l11Qstly of unilateral 12. One of the alleged violations of the Armistice Agreement to which the representative of Egypt made allusion was that of Bir Qattar. Bere again, he conspicuously failed either to present an accurate picture of that episode or to deduce from it its valuable and constructive lesson. 13. In the first place, there has never been any decision of the Mixed Armistice Commission for the evacuation by Israel of Bir Qattar, which is a place within the territory of Israel and therefore not subject to evacuation. However, under the provisions of the Egyptian-Israel General Armistice Agreement }'elating to the limitation and withdrawal of forces, there was a proposai for the withdrawa1 of Israel's military forces from Bir Qattar. 14. That evacuation was duly carried out. Indeedand here is a valuable :precedent - in deference to the Secnrity Council's opil1lon. and beiore a resolution on the question hac! been passed, Israel voluntarily acceded to the request of the Chief of Staff to cease the practice of maintaining its troops in Bir Qattar. So far from that evacuation heing a sham, there is in the documents of the Secl1rity COll11cil a report of the Chief of Staff recording that Israel forces were' duly absent from Bir Qattar and that the purposes of hisruling and of the Security Counci1's resollltions had been. carl'ied ont. 15. The situation is that Egypt is in a position to bringany complaint which it likes before the Security Council, and if any of the questions which the representative of Egypt has enul11erated had been a genuine source of grievance. a focus of tension in the Near East, a living issue in any sense, then it wou1d be his . c\.uty to do what we have done in the case of the Suez 16. For two years we have dragged this question of the Suez Canal blockade through the slow and leisurely processes of the Armistice Commission, suffering throughout that period al! the loss and prejudice of these blockade practices, and reaching a position where the Chief of Staff charged with the supervision of the Armistice warned the international com111unity that the continuation of this practice jeopardized the existence of the Egyptian-Israel Armistice Agreement. 17. Apart from the enumeration, then, of an in'e1evant and entirely settled list of armistice complaints and armistice issues, we were given a long story which attempted to link - by exactly what precise links of relevance l could not imagine - the question of the Suez Canal blockade with the tragic humanitarian question of Arab refugees. And here my delegation cannat fail ta protest against the fact that - not once, but twice - the representative of Egypt sOllght to give the impression that the Arab States were incurring a loss, or a burden or an expenditllre of one thousand million dollars as a result of the presence of Arab refugees in their midst. This fantastic statement was uttered not once but twice, Everyboc1y knows that not a tenth; not a fiftieth of that sum, of that loss or of that expenditure faIls upon the Arab States, individllally or collectively, as the result of the presence of Arab refugees in these neighbouring countries. Indeed, United Nations agencies charged with the supervision of this proble111 have reported ti111e and time again as ta the seale and nature of the burden which each govcrn111ent in the Near East incnrs as the result of this problem remaining unsettled. They point out that approximately the Arab States incur expenditure, or loss or burden ta the extent of five million dollarsall the Arab States together, annually - as the resuIt of the presence of Arab refugees in their 111idst, while Israel, as the result of the presence in Israel of those refugees who have been repatriatec\, incurs a far greater SUffi relatively and an almost equal sum absolutely. 18. The fact is that, amidst these great movements of population which have brought the Jewish com111unities of the Near East within Israel's gates and which have, <J,mong other results of the Arab war against Israel, led ta the creation of Arab refugees in Arab countries, the position isthat whereas, indigent and destitute'}ews of Iraq and Yemen are accommodated and integrated at the direct expense and to the heavy Qurden of Israel's economy, the Arab Governments have only recently begun to evince any similar response to the plight of their own kinsmen seeking refuge within their shores. Nor is it a fact, as any reader of the two Egyptian discourses might have been led ta believe, that there is in truth any major cleavage between international opinion and Israel opinion on the future course of action ta be taken for the solution of this prablem. The United Nations has entrusted its treatl'nent of the 19. The refugee prob1em in substance is not before the Security COlmcil and, therefore, l would content myself with these general remarks. We cannot, however, fail to point out to representatives of Egypt and of the Arab States who resurrect this problem that we do not uncIerstand the logic or the sentiment wherehy first they create this prob1em by their choice of armed force and then exploit for political purposes the misery which,. so far, they have done !ittle to alleviate. Behind the entire problem, and forming its general background, there lies the primeval and inescapable question of· original responsibility, and although no one daims that the burden for the solution of this problem can faH upon the shoulders of one State or one group of States alone, it is dear that, irrespective of the guilt for its creation, the responsibility for its solution is, in the immec1iate sense, a regional responsibility and, in the larger sense, an international task, for the dimensions of the problem go far heyond the scope or capacity of any State or group of States within the area. 20. In addition, then, ta these problems of settled armistice violations and the entirely extraneous though important question of Arab refugees, the representative of Egypt has brought to the attention of the Coundl, within the framework of these specific complaints, certain matters which are not Israel-Egyptian matters at all. Primary amongst them was the question of Jordan waters. l should be surprised to be1ieve that it is proper for Israel to discuss with Egypt any question which is a function of Israel-Jordan relations in so far as it has an international aspect at aIl. Therefore, l again deal with the substance of the question only with the explicit reservation that we recognize no Egyptian interest in the matter at aIl and no relevance whatever between it and the item which now lies on the agenda. 21. The facts are that if there is any increase of salinity in the lower Jordanand that, in itseIf, is a question which has yet to be proved - ·it can be more than explained by two '-circumstances which affect the River Jordan this year. The first is the Lmprecedented and cruel drought which hit Israel and Jordan with equal ferocity last year, whieh destroyed the. whole of Israe1's wheat crop and inflicted damage estlmated at twenty million dollars, and which, according to ~eports, has fallen with equally heavy impact on the agncu1tural economy of the Kingdol11 of Jordan. In every yearof sl11all ralnfaU - and especial1y in a yeat' of un~rec~~èntly meagre rainfall ~ there is a problem of matntalntng the non-saHnityof the river Jordan as it lee,yes Lake Calilee and also of maintaining its 1evel. throt~gh the lateness of rain. The Rutenberg Works and 1l1de~d aU the machinery of the Palestine Electric CorporatlOn have fallen into the hands of the forces of Jordan. The machines are not being maintained in proper condition, the dam is leaking and therefore its waters are not available to compensate for this unprecedented drought. Thus the coincidence of Jordan's neglect of that dam with the adverse fortunes of nature this year may weU have produced a seasonal problem at that part of the Jordan. 22. As regards the natural adversity, we can only join our prayers to those of Jordan for heavy and normal rain. As regards the part which human agencies play in this problem, we can only suggest that there should be a response to our repeated overtures to activate the dam of the Palestine Electric Corporation in the interests of the two countries and ta the benefit of the River Jordan, its freshness and its level. l need hardly say that if a well-known project for draining the Huleh marshes hac1 not been interrupted through events of which the Security Council is aware, then an additional 65 million cubic metres of fresh water would be Rowing into the upper Jordan and some of the effects of that heavier swell woulc1 he available to compensate for the effects bath of drought and of neglect of machinery. That then might be regarded as. a third or subsidiary aspect of this problem. 23. Above everything' else, since this is in the legal sense a matter of Israe1's domestic jurisdiction and in the moral sense an issue which affects the peoples of Israel and Jordan jointly and together, it. was natural for my Government through United Nations agencies to invite the Government of Jordan to a consultation ta see whether any factors other than those which I have described might have caused any abnormal salinity in the lower Jordan, and whether such additional causes, if they were found to exist, might respond to the joint co-operation of the two parties. There was merely a slight digression by the representative of Egypt away from this question affecting Israel and Jordan into the realm of questions affecting Israel and Syria. It should he realizecl that there is not one single Armistice Agreement to which we are aU jointly signatory. The Israe1- Egyptian Armistice Agreement is a separate instrument from the Israel-Tordanian Armistice Agreement and the Israel-Syrian Armistice Agreement. For that reason, we were especially baffied. to hear the; intr~lsion of ~he representative of Egypt 111to a relatl011shlP to WhlCh lw is 119 s~nse a partner\ 25. Apart then from extraneous Israel-Egyptian questions and other questions which exist between Israel and other Arab States, the representative of Egypt dwelt upon problems which affect Israel exc1usively and which are rcally not a fit subject for comment or jurisdiction by any Arab State or group of Arab States. He especially treated at some length and in detail the question of immigration to Israel. This is a question in which my Government's c10mestic jurisdiction is reserved completely. We are under no obligation whatever to bring immigration or population problems to be discussed internationally, least of all at the behest of countries which do not have a sympathetic attitudeand I refer here to Egypt - to the purposes of that immigration. There are countries aronnd this table which are denser in population than Israel can ever hope to become. There are many countries in the world which have to face a delicate adjustment between their resources and their populations. But so long as they are signatories of the Charter of the United Nations and bound together as are we by compacts of non-aggression, it is for them to make the adjustment within their alla.tted sphere or domain between their populations and thelr resources. 26. Ali the students of sociology in the Near East have agreed that the real population problem there is the crowding of 20 million people into the cultivated area of the Nile Valley in Egypt. Statisticians have . pondered in vain for an answer as to how that vast population concentration can exist and increase without ~reating some movement of expansion. That, however, IS for us an academic problem. It is not a matter in which Israel has or c1aims any jurisdiction. 27. In point of fact, there is nothing 1110re proud or significal1t in Israel's record than its success with limitec1 resources in absorbing this vast and unprecedented 28. \\Tith apologies tn the Council for having detained it on these extraneutlS fi11e:-itÎ0l1s, l tnrn to S0111e cOllsicleratiol1:-i which the n~presentative of E.gypt invoked in C!o:-ier relntiollship to the question nol\' before 11S. 1f J ttlH1ersto()(1 the clifferencc betwecn his adclress this mDrningl5511th l/lccti/lOI and the one he i deliverl'd last wl'l'k [519th IIlc{'lill!/], his chief cmphasis 1 this morning' was on 1.l1l' tlwme of self-preservation. Acl- 1 mitting that tltl' :-itoppagl', sl'arch and visit of ships to Israel throll~h the Suez Canal constit11tes in the legal ,i. und tl'c11llical sel1se tht~ {'xl'rcise of a right nf war, he , cJaimcd that tltis aet of war was l1l'Cl'SSary for Egypt's • self-prl'servatinlt. A cog-ellt rl'fntation of that thesis bas i already hl'en heanl in the l'l'marks of the rcpresentative of the United Kingllnm. [ wottlcl however add only one emphatic \,hsel'\'ation. Noilndy is sbooting at Egypt and llohody will shoot at Egypt. Nohlldy is interferin1{ \Vith Egypt's trarle or C(II1l111erCe, altltollgh Egypt is interfl'ring \Vith Israel's trade and C01l1merce. No State " (JI" grUllp of States is nrganizing an econo1l1ic lloyeott of Egypt in an l'1Tnrt tu strangll' the hreatlt of its Iife. 29. Ullder an arrangelltent approvcc1 1»)' the Secnrity C011ncil on Il Angllst 1949, Egypt, in the canse of its self-preservation, is now fl'ee to purchase, ta import , and to expnrt ar11ls fnr the purpnses of its defmce, l have alrearly [Jnillted nut that the renl'wl'c1 facility for Middle Eastern States tn 11l1rchas(' ar11ls frl'el}', arisil11{ from the Security C011l1cil n'snlution of Il August 1949, \Vas part nf the gel1eral assllmptiol1 wltidl prevailec1 in the Coundl at that tina' that war hacl becn Idt irreyocahly hehind, that ail wstiges of hdligercncy bad been a1Jan(loncd an(l that the Armistice \Vas an intermecliate staj:!;l' nf [Jeace, It was nnly on snch an aSSu11l1)tion that the SC'ClIrity COllllcil, and especially those l11el11hers of it which are engagl'c1 in the production and manufacture of arms, wottld' l'ver have <1r('am('(1 of allowing the emhargo ta he lift(~d and the facility of arms purchase for Ivfiddle Easte1'll States tn he renc\Vec1. 30. Bntb the records of the Secnrity Council and contemporar)' cxcllangcs of letters prave that these two tltings were contingent and reciprocal. Egypt \\'oulel h.Lve tn abandc111 ail the alleged rights of belligerency ancl in rdurn tlle worlel cn111n111nity would no longer (tet tnwanls Egypt as towarrls a belligerent. The worlc1 C0I11111tIl1it\, woule! c1eal with Egypt in this matter of its clefcnce; and the sal11C appliec1 to al! the other States, on the aS511111ption that therc \Vas no such thing as belligcrency amI that é1 normal statl' of aiIairs prevailcc1. \Vhat Egypt, I am afrn.id, has clone is ta pocket its advantage under that reciprocal agreement, tltat is tn say, tn assume for the pmposes of llurchasing anns that the Ncar East is normal and at pence, but when it cames tn applying tlte principle of normality ancl peace in the Suez Canal, the (loctril1e of a legal statc of war has heen inventer!. Thus, i'f it is a question of pllrchasing a1'111S, there i:-i no state of war; if it is a question of allowing free passage of goods, there is a state of war; if there is an invitation from the Palestine Conciliation Commission to agree in principle to sign 31. The selectivity of this argumentation, and its clear manufacture long after hostilities have ceased in an effort to rationalize this specific practice with an allegecl shield of legality, detract from that argument any validity which it might have had on its intrinsic merits. 32. At any rate, if Egypt regards itself as being in a state of war and be1ligerency, the Govermnent of Israel must reserve to itse1f the right and the intention to raise again with the Security Council and with those Governments from which ar111S are bought the question whether Egypt should not fulfil its share of the bargain, the abanclonment of all acts of war as the price of enjoying the effects of assumed normality in the purchase of arms. 33. Far from Egypt being left abandoned and naked to defend itself and to preserve itself, there are no inhibitions whatever upon Egypt's defence preparations. Nohoc1y at ail is restricting either Egypt's defensive preparec1ness Dt· the free development of its commercial and economic life. If Egypt is not sllffering something :fro111 Israel, then it cannat impose that thing upon Israel, for the agreement between us is conceived in the spirit of strict reciprocity, and it is impossible to justify on Egypt's behalf conduct which is not implicitly available ta Israel as weIl. You cannot say that Egypt is entitled to interfere with Israel's ail imports or arms imports or trade unless you acknowledge to Israel an equal right to establish helligerent and blockade practices for the pnrpose of interfering with Egypt's ar111S, Egypt's trade and Egypt's commerce. 34. Once this is realized we see the abyss into which bath countries and the Security Council would be wantonly flinging themselves if they were to give the slightest credence or support or the slightest degree of acquiescence to the sterile doctrine that the legal relations between Israel and Egypt are those of war. The idea that Egypt is fighting for its life in an effort of seH-preservation is not easy ta reconcile with its military budget.of 200 million dollars. 35. The position then on the question of selfprese~"Vation is that Egypt maintains unilaterally the doctrme of a state al war, refuses ta negotiate peace and then cdes out that its preservation is mcnaced. 36. YVith r~ference ta t~e )uddical aspect of this questIOn, l th111k that a conv1l1cmg refutation has already been heard. Article 51 of the Charter allows a nation ta undertake ~ction of self-defence only on two conditions, bath of WhlCh are absent here. One of them is that that country shall be the victil11 of arl11ed attack, and not even the Egyptian representative himse1f has illvoked any such prospect. The second is that the Security Council has. not ye~ assumed responsibility for the maintenance of lllt~rnatlOnal peace and security in that area. The Secunty Council has undertaken its responsibilities in that m'ea by un~erwriting the General Armistice Agreemen~s and calltng upon the parties to ensure their contl1lued fulfilment. 1 conciliation anc! mcdiation providecl for under the " armistice mltchit1l'ry. The attel11pts of the Chief of Staff ;;! of the Truel', Sl1pl'rvision Organization to secure the , cessation by Egypt of this practice has not borne fruit. ; Recug'nizing the deep peril for the armistice system inhcfl'nt in uny contiuuation of thi::; blockade., the Chief of Staff has stated that the matter cannot rest within the limÎted competence of the Mixed Armistice CCllll111issioll, Accordingly, 111)' Government has brought the mattl'r "dore the Security COllncil as a question alYectiug international peace and security. vVe have on record the vie\\'s nf the Unitl~d Nations representative who ncgotiated the Armistice to the effect that these practices are contrary to the \etter and spirit of the Armistice AgrCl'mcnts. \Ve have the fi.ncling of the United N<ltions otTicer charged \Vith sl1pervising the Armistice AgT('l~l11l'l1t tn the el'I'cct that these are aggrt'ssive allll hn~ti[e practices which jeoparclize the efl'el'tivt' funetinn nI' the Armistice Agreement. 38. In l'esllonse to this, and in addition to the juriclical digressions to whieh l have rderred and which have 110 specifie rclntiol1 tn the Agreement 1.Jefore us, the EgYjltian representative has sought to extenttate this practiee, if l understoo<\ him rightly, on the grouncl that its eH'ect might have heen grenter than it has been. He gave us statistics as to the nl1mhcr of ships which passed through the Canal ami the l1tlmber of those which \Vere interfered with, and he came to the conclusion that the interfercnce \Vas relatively smalt. 1, 39. Here wc have the statemcnt of the allthorized United Nations representative to the effect that l'very aet of interfercnce \\'ith cargo destined for Israel is a hostile and aggressiv<~ act and we have the reply of the rejlresentative of Egypt that his Government Ims committetl onl)' ailout 11fty hostile acts whereas it did have the physlcal 0Pl)Ortunity to perform some two thousand hostile aets. • ! 40. l wmtlcl sllggest tn the Council that we are faeed \\'ith a question of principle \Vhich is not in the slightest c1egrce affecter! Ily any quantitative considerations. 1t is no use saying that you passcd a hundrecl houses this 1110rning and that you only brokc into f1ftem, and that ohjective people shoulcl ecmte111plate the eighty-five into which you have not broken. l\i[oreover, the diminishing incidence of these interfercnces, far from heing a reassnring factor, is actllal\y a most diS1lllieting consideration. For the fact that there \Vere fl'wer and fewcr incidents of interference as the 1110nths \Vent by simply bears testimony to the deterrel1t effect of the hlockacle. It becamc known ta ships' captnins far and \Vide that any ship engaged on its innocent course \Vith commerce bound for Israel or on an itinerary which l'eqllired it to cali at an Israel port, would he suhject to snch molestatioll or interfer- 41. Moreover, this is an entirely unilateral Egypt in interfering with the trade and and the shipping of Israel, which imposes interference on Egypt at aU. l should there was a surprising event when the Egypt quoted the Royal Decree of February forms the legislative justification and the aets of blockacle about which a complaint submitted ta the Security Conncil. He articles 3 and 4 of that Decree lîsted liable to search and liable to other action, an kinds, their component parts and their l11ilitary aircraft of aU kincls, their component their accessories, whereas, when we stndy text of that Egyptian Decree, bath in its its Arabic versions, we find there is no reservation warships. It is ships of aU ldnds which these controls. It is not military aircraft, aU kinds which are subject to this process and seizure. l fail to nnderstand how document can be so tendentiously quoted, case, the issue is not the category of goods made the subject of this blockade. Israel Egypt has any right whatever to intercept of trade between Israel and another sovereign any State wishes to send any cargo ta for Egypt ta say whether Israel has much of the commoclity which that sends to its destination. 42. FinaUy, l shonld like to summarize lies before the Security Council as it delegation, which has borne the brunt over the period of two and a half years. the challenge have been squarely directed, rity Council must surely decide: either of war or there is not. The Conncil determine which it is, for sm'ely conformity between the legal rights and both parties. Should Egypt adjust itself Agreement as so far interpreted, to Mr. Bunche and of General Riley, ta the of both parties when they set their hands ment at Rhodes as an instrument exc1uding of residual war and as ruling out the performance hostile aet; or should we all have to to the negative, vengeful and sterile thesis of war, so that both parties, as it were, exhorted by acquiescence in this blockade the armistice as a state of war, under which hostile aets can be committed? 43. Surely all that has been laboriously in the negotiation and in the maintenance tice Agreement is in dire peril in this case. 44. Is that \\'hat we ol1ght to he doing? Surely the Armistice Agreements have a directly contrary sense. Surcly the 1\rl11i:,;tice Agreement is dead the moment therc is acquiescence in this sinister doctrine that a legal state of \Var, \Vith full belligerent and blockade rights, ma)' he legull)' invokecl hy any signatory ta it. No\\' tlmt the chal1cnge has heen macle, it surely must he clecidecl one way 01' the other. 45. The reprcsentativc of Egypt, as will have been noticc<l, has avoided the fact that tl1is al1egecl bel1igerency was ncver in\'okecl c1uring the hostilities or during or aIter the Armistice Agreement, but onLy recently \Vas Î1npl'()vis(~d as a jllstification for these acts. Above al1, wc are taken aback by the glib assumption tl1at Egypt c0l111nands the unilateral right to mailltain or terminale a state of \Var at its own will. Allyhody WOLlld thillk thnt Egypt, having been victol'ious in a righteol1s defensiv(~ \Var snnctioned by the United Nations, is now competent to dictate its tenus ta Israel, a clefeated foe \Vith no rights under the Charter. Surely tl1at is not a correct analogy tu this situation. Any analogy between Egypt ami Israel on the one hand and the Alliee! Forces in Germany on the otIler is likcly to he both in'elevant und fal1acions. nut if such analogies were relevant or valid, it coulc1not at all he assulllecl that Egypt's rights anù positiolls wOllld be thosc of the Alliecl Forces in that particular analogy, and certainly the unilateral capacity to clecide if a state of war cxists or is terminatec1 cannot rest with Egypt. On the nther hand, by requiring the i1ll11lcdiate cessation of thcsc acts, the Security Council \\'ould be vindicating the Armistice Agreement, the intentions and spirit vvhich animateel us at Rhodes would be fully restorecl, it wotlld become a matter of international record that no hostile acts are legitimate within the framcwork of the Armistice Agreement, and the armistice machinery, which must be paralysed sa long as there is no agreement betwcen the parties on their legalrelationship, coulcl begin ta function sl11oothly, whercas if the doctrine of a stnte of war \Vere to remaill, both IvIr. BUlIche and General H.iley would be repuclÜLted, the Rhoc\es Agreement in its original sense wonlel he set asidc, and two resolutions of the SecL1rity Ccn11lcîl determining the irrevocable end of 0.11 hostile nets WOLlid be superse<:1eL1. It is difficult to imagine that the Sccurity COlmcil has ever had a case berore it in which the only possible course of action shane sa clearly. 47. The issue before us is not part of the peace settlement; it is part of the armistice system. Until this defect and anomaly are repaired, the armistice does not effectively exist as the stepping-stone towards the final stage of peace. For that reason my delegation appeals to the Security COl1ncil to fix its eyes upon this single and specific issue, which my Government cannot envisage in association with other extraneous issues whatever they are and, by giving redress for this long-standing breach of the amlistice system, repair the foundation upon which we can proceed into the more constructive horizons of regional co-operation.

I am about to adjourn this meeting. I wish, of course, to consult the interests of the members of the Security Council. A preliminary investigation of the wishes of members of the Council indicates that several would find it inconvenient to meet again before Tuesday. It occurred ta me that perhaps the Council could meet Monday, but I find very reasonable grounds for not calling the next meeting on Monday. Daes any representative have an objection to adjourning until Tuesday morning at 11 a.m.? As there is no objection, the Coundl is adjourned until Tuesday at Il a.m. The meeting rose at 4.45 p.m. Printed in Canada Priee: 15 cents (or equivalent in other