S/PV.552 Security Council

l would suggest that we shoulcl follow our usual practice as regards interpretatiounamely, that statements of non-members of the Council should receive simultaneous interpretation on]y and that statcments of members should receive sil11u1tancous and consecutive intcrpretation. rt 'was so decided. Adoption of the Agenda The ar/cllda was adopted. The PalcsLÎnc qUCSLÎOll (continued) (a) RESTRICTIONS IMPOSEm BY EGYPT ON THE PASSAGE OF SIII!'S TIIROUGH THE SUEZ CANAL (S/2241) A t the invitation of the President, Mahmoud Fœwzi Be}', representa/ive of BUy/'t; MI'. J(hali~y, represenlative of Iraq.; and MI'. Eban, representatwe of Israel, t()ol~ places at the Securit'j' Council table. Z. The PRESIDENT; The first name on the list of speakers is th:1t of t\1e represen.tative of the Uni~ed Kingciom. Berme ca~lll1g upon h1l11~ however, l thu;k it is only fair to indlcate that the l~st .of speakers WIll probably he very long and ~hat lt IS. therefore my intention ta adj oum this meet1l1g at about 1 p.m. ~nd ta reconvenc the Security Couneil for a second meet1l1g at 3 p.l11. 3. Sir Gladwyn JEBB (United ~ingdom): l explained the general attitude of the U mted Kingdom l 4. In the [,r5t place, the cIraft resolutjon at~etl1pts to l1lake the sort of approach ta the problem wllIch we feel is 11105t appropriate. vVe have heard a gooe! many m'guments about the legal position from the representatives bath of Israel ancl of Egypt. Ii has been snggested on the one sicle - ancl denied on the other - that Euypt is authorized ta impose these restrictions unc1cr th~ terms of the Suez Canal COl1vention of 1888. The Egyptian representative has daimed that a state of 'l'al' exists between EgYllt and Israel and that the restrictions are justified as the natural ancl normal exercise of belligerent rights. The reprcsent<~tive .of Israel, on the other hand, h,ts argued that the Secul'lty COllnci1 must finc1 that thcl-e is 110 state of war. 5. As l saiel on 1 Angust, these lega1 issues are no doubt clebatable, but l still do not cOllsider that it is necessary for the Security Cotll1cil to go into then~. It is at least questionable whethcr the Security COUllCtl is really qualified to undertnke the detai1ed legal study and analysis which "'oulel certainly !Je reqnirec1 if the Counci1 were to attel1lpt tu 11l1lke a legal t1nding. N or do we feel, for our part, that it would he proJ1table to l11ake such an attempt, sillce the view which the COtlllcil takes on this question sholl1c1 clepend, in our opinion, on the actnal sitnation as it exists rather than on any 1ega1 technicalities. 6. In case it shoulcl be suggestecl that we are thus, so to speak, shil'king ;11l esscntial iss\le, l shall give an exal11ple in support of l11y general argument. The Egyptian representative has himse1f poi nted out that in many \Vars there is a considerable intcrval betwcen the cessation of hostilities and the concll1sion of a final peace treaty. This is, of cotm:e, perFectly truc, But it does not fCllla\\' tbat dllring this interval the full rigour of belligerent rights can reasonably he excrcisecl. That does no-t follow at aIl. The situatioll at the close of the last war natnrally cumes to onr mind. Even 110W, pence treaties bave not been conclucIed \Vith the major cnemy Powers, and even in the case of ItaJy and the minar Powers a considerable periocl elapsed aher the enel of hostilities before the peace treaties \Vere actnally signed. Yet, in spite of this, the Allies dic\11ot attempt dnring the years after 1945 ta maintain in force all the restrictions which existed while hostilities were in progress. Incleed, the tendency has been in the opposite direction and, at least for am part, it has been our c1eliberate policy to relax the I-estrictions and ta \Vork as rapiclly as possible towarcls the restoratio11 of normal peace-time conditions. Technically, no c1oubt, the Allies wOllld have heen able to daim the exercise of full belligerent rights at any time, but l suggest that it wOlllc1 have been t1llthinkable that the clock shou1cl have been In1t back in this \Vay 7, l t sel'nls tn 111l' that this criterion l'an he applied ta the II1'l'Sr'llteaSl', f':gypt daims tlmt tlwre is ;t state of \Var amI that it is tl1l'I'l'fure l'ntitkcl to exercise belligereut rights, Il is nnt Ill'l'l'ssary, ill uur vie\V, for the Council tu pnl1lotlnCl~ UJI this, EYCll if it \\'ere self-l'vident that a sbte oi \Var l'xisted -- which is hv 110 means the case, IIi Cllttrse "",·,-tllis \\'uultl in itself atfnrd no justificatioll for the 1l1ailltl'llanCl' IIf the restrictions at the presellt tinll' and in the light of the present situation, What nlattl'l'S is Ilnt \\'ht'lher there is soml' technical hasis 10r thl' n'stril'tiolls 1111t whether it is reasllllahle, jl1st al1<1 e![llitaIJ1t' that thl'}' shoull! he 11laintaince1. This is tIlt' princ'ipll' on wllich the drait resollltioll before thr' l'1JI111cil has ken 1'0lï1nl1ated, ancl it is 011 this issue that we con,.;ider tbat tl](,' Councîl shollld pronouncc, R If tite prohlenl is apprllachecl iu this way, l cio not l1I\"sdi think that there l'an hl' l1luch c!ouht about the d(:cisiou \Vhidl the CU1UKil shoul!l t,tke. The clraft r"~olul.illu nofl'rs II) tilt' attitmle which the C011ncil h:ts arlo[ltl'd il1 tlH' past al1d tn the pnJu01ll1cemt'nts of ll llilt'(1 Natilills authl/ritil's such as 11'1r. Bunche anc! Gl'Ih'ral Ril(')'. 1 de;L1t \\'ith tlwse points at smlle length iu illY statl'l11C'nt (If 1 :\I1g"l1st, al1d l \l'()ulc1 only say now that tllC' col1clusion Sl'l'I1lS tu Ille, at leasl, tn he illescapallie. l), 'l'hl' Armistice Agrel'ment \\"as meant not to hring ahnut luerl'1y a tl'll1Jlllrary panse il1 the figltting, Imt to pnt a delil1itin' end ln hostilities aild to g11ard against t!leir n~IlI'\l'al. \\,11('11 the AgTcl'I1H'llt \l'as ('ndnrsed by the Cl/tll1eil 1S/ 1371) 1 il \l'as Ilnr delll1ite lInc!erstancIing thal it wo1l1r1 mark tll(' end of tlte restrictions which ltad "ecu i1l1posl'd nn !loth sidl's, The restrictions on shiJl\lil1g' in lhe' ~ LIez ('all;11 shoLlld therefore have been liited II'IH'II tIn' Artllistice Agn.'enK'lll 'l'as signed, and tlll'\' have 1'l'cu11Ie 11\111'(, 11llreasonablc and more anacltr~lItistic \Vith eadl 1111l1lth (ltat has passed since then, 10, Paragraphs 5, (l, 7 alld S of the clraft l'l'solution deal, as repn's('l1tativl's will st'e, \Vith the queRtion of heliig<'rt'llt rights. 1"11I" the reaSCH1R which Thave already stated, tlll~ dra ft l'l'snlutiol1 dnc's not attel11pt to say \\'ltetlter or not Eg')'pt l'ail tec11l1ically daim to be l'l1titled tn 1Jvl1igl'l'l'nt rights. \Vhat the c!raft l'l'solution <Ines sav is that, in the light nf the Armistice Agreement and u( \l'hat has takell place since it IVas signccl, the 1I1ailltenanC(' (If t11l' pn'~il'nt restrictif)]]s is ul1j ustil1ed and 11111'easllnable and 111usl lit, lleld tu constitltte an ahuse nI' any rigitls \l'ltielt E,lD'pt ma)' daim to possess, If it l'Oltld hl' Shm\'ll tltat tlwse nlcasnn~S are esseutial for the dl'Îcl1cl' tif 1':gYJlt, wc lIli~';ht \Vcll he prepared to take a c1ifll't'C'nt vie\\'. But 1~:gY[lt is not heing attackcd and is nnt undt'r an\' illlllliltl'nt threat of attack, and we therefnre call11('lt ;H"ree that thl'sC I11casures are necessary fnt' the self-ddt'ne;' m self-preservation of Egypt, 11. \Ve therdore fecl jltstifœd in asking the Coltncil ln approve lite npl'mtivc pamgraph of the clraft l'l'solution, which calls upnn Eg'ypt to tennil1ate the restrictions nn shippillg' in th(' Sucz Canal. V'll'are lIot asking the Egyptian C;overl1lncnt to give up any of the rights which it l'an legitimatcly daim ta exercise in 12. Finally, l should like, with the President's permission, to emphasize that in calling upon Egypt to terminate these restrictions, we do not feel that we are in any sense penalizing Egypt or seeking to impose on it measures which are in any way inequitable or unreasonable. The Armistice Agreement was meant ta terminate ail hostile acts, and it was so understood both by the parties and by the Security COt1l1cil itself. l would again quote Mr. Bunche's words in the Security Council in 1949 [433rd meetingJ. He then said: "The entire heritage of restrictions which developed out of the undeclared war should be done awav with... There should be free movement for legitimate shipping, and no vestiges of the wartime blockade should he allowed to remain...". The restrictions which applied to Egypt were terminated by the Security Council resolution [5/1376J of August 1949, and there can be no justification for the attempt by Egypt to maintain against Israel restrictions similar to those from which Egypt itself was released two years ago. Nor can it be said that the Security Council is acting too hastily. Egypt has been given the most ample time and opportunity for lifting these restrictions. During the past two years a number of maritime countries have made almost continuai representations to the Egyptian Govern111ent through the diplomatie channel, but ail these have been of no avail. 13. The complaint by the Government of Israel with which the Council is now dealing was submitted as long ago as 11 July, and the COl1ncil can certainly not be acCttsed of having dealt with it in any hasty or precipitate manner. In fact, as is known, action by the Council has frequent1y been postponed in order that further efforts might be made to achieve a satisfactory settlement which would obviate the need for any COllncil action. Every endeavour has therefore been made, but we have received no indication that the Egyptian Government is prepared to put forward any proposais which could be considered as satisfactory. In these çircumstances it seems to my delegation that we must go forward with the draft resolution which has been tabled and that, as l saiel on 1 August and now repeat, the Council should exercise its undoubted authority. cOl1lplain~ which we are now considering, 1 had the ?Pl?ortuplty to st~te ~n behalf of my Government that, III ItS Vlew, the sltuatton created by the Egyptian Government's restrictions on the free passage of ships and goods through the Suez Canal should come to an end as soon as possible. 1 also expressed the hope that, as a .re.sult of the approaches made by the diplomatic ~11lSSI0~lS of the principal countries concerned in Cairo, Illcludmg that of my country, the Egyptian Government could see its way to revoking its restrictions forthwith. 15. At the same time 1 expressed the view, which was shared by al! the members of the Council, that we shonld suspend our consideration of the question until the ~hai~man of the Speciar.Committee was able to submlt 111S report on the actIOn to be taken on the complaint lodged at that time by the Government of Israel. 16. Since then, the oft-renewed approaches of the diplomatie missions of the States concerned have unfortunately failed to secme the hoped-for decisions on the part of the Egyptian Government. We have also received the report from General Riley which we were awaiting [5/2194]. Mr. Eban has again given us a full acconnt of the complaint made by the Government of Israel against the Egyptian Government regarding these restrictions on the freedo111 of movement through the Suez Canal. Lastly, the representative of Egypt has outlinecl his Government's reply to the accusations made against it by the Government of Israel. Consequently, the COllnCi! is now in possession of al! the facts of the case. . 17. 1 may add that it took great care not to hasten unduly the consideration of the case and to al!ow the Egyptian Government, once the complaint had been loclged and the case heard, al! the necessary time to Cllnsider the methods for removing the cause of the dispute. 18. After much waiting and a careful examination of ail the legal and factual data set before us during the discussion, the time has 110W come for the COl1ncil to take its decision. 19. According ta the French Government, there are tbree main aspects to this case: the first, which is fundamental, concerns the general principles of international law and, within their framework, the international status of the Suez Canal; another concerns the implementation of the General Armistice Agreement entered into by Egypt and Israel at Rhodes on 24 February 1949; a third concerns the effects of the restrictions imposed by the Egyptian Govermnent at Suez: that is to say, the general effects, and in particular the economic effects, upon other Powers. 20. YVhichever of these main aspects of the question the Conncil considers, it is obvious that a solution is absollltely essentiaI. The great principles of international law must be respectec1; the Convention of Constantinople must be implementecl; the Armistice Agreement between Israel and Egypt, which is one of the cornerstones of the maintenance of peace and secu- 21. It has heen questioned whether Egypt were actually in a state of war according ta law at the time when their forces were fighting Negeb. Futhermore, since the fighting has and an armistice of a specifical1y permanent has been concludecl, the French Government that there is no legal basis upon which parties may exercise .in respect of the traditional rights of belligerents - rights belligerents are entitled - involving visit, seizure. 22. It should he emphasized that sl1ch exception in international law, the principle freedom of the seas and of international A correct interpretation should allow exceptions as possible so as ta leave intact. 23. Besides, in the case uncler discussion, rule is in keeping with the general purposes United Nations. 24. That is the spirit in which the French examined the complaint bronght before by the Israel Government on 12 July is. also the spirit in which, having completed it is now submitting jointly \Vith the United and United Kingdom delegations the draft which has jltst beell circulated to the members Council [5/2298]. 25. That draft resolutioll begins by earlier resolutions so as to show the exact reached in the examillation of the case by to show the continuity of the Council's emphasize that the solution now proposee! Council is but the logical continuation outcome of those resolutions. 26. Indeed, the resolution of 11 August 1949 endorsed the conclusion of Armistice Agreements tween ~srael and the neighbouring Arah emphasu::ed the pledges in these agreements "further acts of hostility between the parties". 27. The resolution [5/1907 and Carro vember 1950 also emphasized the aims of agree!l1ents and urged the States "ta talce as will lead to the settlement of the issues them". 28. The question of restrictions on the passage through the Suez Canal now Council, illustrates the clifficulties e;periencec1 Eastern Stat~s in ad.apting themselves to should remam the tdeal and the real effort~, both in their OWll interest and in secunty. Unfortunately, this is not an isolated the COllncil has alreacly examined snch have to examine others in the future. 29. Paragraphs.3 and 4 of the draft resolutioll to the conclusions which have been reached 30. Paragraph 5 outlines the legal foundation for the operative part of the draft resolution, The reasoning is slInple: the armistice régime which has been in existence betweer~ Egypt and Israel for nearly two and a haH years chffers from the cIassical type of armistice in sa far as it is of an expressly permanent character and can~o.t. ther.efore be annuIlec1 by a resumption of hostrht!es; 1t can ?l1ly reach its consummation by en~lors111g' the peace It has aJready brought about. Since nelther State lS actively a belligerent, there can be no ju;stification for exercislng the right of visit, search and selzure. 31. Paragraph 5 is fol1owed by three statements of fact which are the logical continuation of the preamble: first, that the maintenance of the restrictions imposed by Egypt on free passage through the Suez Canal is incollsistent with the objectives of a peaceful settlement betweell the parties and the establishment of permanent peace in Palestine set forth in the Armistice Agreement~; secondly, that such practice is an abuse of the exerclse of the right of visit, search ane! seizure; and thirclly, that the practice cannot be justified on the grolll1c1s that it is necessary for legitimate self-defence. 32. Havingstated these facts, the Council must now take a decision. The basis for that decision is ont1ined by a further preamhle in paragraph 9. The paragraph Ilotes that the restrictions are unjustified in law because they .are inconsistent with Egypt's pledges uncler the Armistice Agreements, because they are an abuse of the rights of he1li~erents and also because they represent unjustified interference with the rights of nations to navigate the seas and to trade freely; futhermore these nractices are prejudicial to the interests of a1l nations, including a large number which have at no time been connected \Vith the conflict in Palestine, either directly or indirectly. 33, The conclusion is therefore obvious. Tt appears in paragraph 10, in which the Council "caUs upon Egypt ta terminate the restrictions on the passal!e of international commercial shipping and goods throug-h the Suez Canal wherever bounc1 and to cease aIl interference with snch shipping beyond that essential ta the safety of shipping in the Canal itself and to the observance of the international conventions in force". 34. 1 neecl hard1v tell the representative of Ee;ypt that the French Government has not reachec1 these conclusions lightlv. l do 110t wish, by proclaiming the merits of the decision now proposed to the Council by the clelegations of the United States, the United Kinl!dom-and France, ta make myself ridiculous or even hateful in his eyes by trying to point out to hi111 that his Government can only benefit from the repeal of measures which it has been enforcing for two and a haH years, despite the representations made al1110st unceasingly throughout that long period by ail States concerned in the international maritime trade. 36. Respect [or the Armistice Agreements which encled the hostilities in Palestine, a respect \\'hich the Canneil means to require in equal mensure from a11 the States signatory ta those Agreements, should represent a direct contribution to the peace and prosperity of the Middle East, in which Egypt is one of the esscntial clements. 37. Since 50 much is at stake, 1\1c111bers will, l mn sure, considcr that it is thc Council's right atICl dutY ta reqllest the Egyptian Government tn make what it no doubt regards as a sacrifice, and that the Egyptian Government will frec1y recognize that it is \,"orth eonsenting to sncll a sacrifice precisel)' bemnse sn 1l1uch is at stake,

Speaking as the represcntative of the UNITED STATES OF Ai'I'1ERICA, 1 wish to state that I11Y Govcrnment joins the United Kingdol11 and FTémce in sponsoring tll(~ clraft resolntion which has been submitted toc1ay ta the Conl1cil. 39. The matter in hand has very broacl ramifications. 'vVe arc not dealing here simply \Vith restrictions which one State is practising against ~lI1other, nor with the snpi)ly of ail neec1ecl. by the eCn!10111:Y of one Stntc, n01' \vIth the com111erce nf maritime nations. This is but one manifestation of a situation affecting the ",hole N l'al' East, a situation where, unhappily, deep-seatccl disagreements play a strong and self-pl'rpetnating roll'. At a. time \\'hen agents of confusion arc always availablt, to exploit differencc5 between nations or within the society of incliviclual States and when aggT('ssiml is on the 1l1arch in various parts of the world, the who1e free worlel, not just the arca il11l11ediatc1y affected. looks with apprehcnsion at the fanning of the fires of distrust and dispute in any quarter. 40. In taking its position as represented in the clraft resolution hefore the Cotlncil, the United States is g'uic1ec1 by the clesire to see one sonrce of agitation in the Ncar East eliminatec1. Also we are convincecl that the armistice agreement system which stoppecl hostilitics between Israel and Egypt nearly two ,lI1d é\ half J'cars aga must be upheld and strengthencc\ ulltil su{'h 11111e as a permanent pence is rcached. \\Te fed that in c1ropping the restrictions, Egypt could 111ake a l)ositive contri bution tn the relief of tcnsion in the Nl'ar East. Such a contribution would In-ing one step 11earer the attainl11el1t of peace, which at long last would C'nahle the na.tions of the Ncar East to de\;otc thcmselvcs fully ta thetr separate developl11ent ancl tn that of the whole area. To us, Egypt's security would seem bettcr safegllarded by the establishment of conditions uncler which ..j.I. In co-sponsoring this draft rcsolution, my Government has had Vl'ry n1llch in mincl the provisions of article 1 of the Egyptian-lsrae1 General Armistice Agreement, which starts with thcse words: "\i'lith a view tn promoting the rctu1'l1 nf permanent peace in Pakstinc.. ," 1 Thesc are the agrecd "'ords of Egypt anr! Israel, amI the)' fonn the ohjcctive of the Armistice Agreement alltl of tbis Conncil's basic concern in the enforcement of the Armistice. 42. The clllnplaint lJefnn~ us is: "lx.estrictions imposed !ly Egypt 011 the passage of ships through the Suez Callal". \Vl' have heard the pusitions of E.gypt and Israel. \Ve also have beiore us the finding made by Gellel'al Riley at the meeting of the Egyptian-Israel Special CUllllnittee on 12 June, At that time General Riley stated that hl' could not hnlc1 that the Egyptian restrictions \\'L~re a violation of the letter of the Armistice Agreen1t'llt illasl1Iuch as hl' couic! Ilot establish that the restrictions were enfnrcec! by military or paramilitary forces nf Egypt. On the other hand, he macle quite c1ear that he bdieved that the actions of Egypt in this matter \Vere cnlltrary tn the spirit of the Agreement. 43. Ceneral Hilev, as Chief of Staff of the Truce Sllp(~rvisi()n Orgailizatioll, is the chief agent of this C0l111cii ill the Cil forccmellt of the armistice system. I-Ie \l'as at the eOl1lerellCe at .Rhodcs when the Armistice AgrCl'n1L'l11 \)('t\\'een Egypt and Israel was ncgotiated and sigllcr!. fie is certain]y in a position to know.what \l'as the illtellt ur the parties at the time they slgneC! the i\gTeeml~nt. .He has indicated that in signing this Agree;nel11 [':gypt and rsrae1 had as their main intention the discollti111lallCe or hostile actions such as these restrietinns and thnt thev regarder! the Agreement as an indispensable stcp .towarcls the restoration of llC'r111anent peace in the area pursuant to the Security Council's l'l'solutions of 4 and 16 November 1948 [S/1070, S/1080.1. 44. The United States is firmly of the opl\1l0n that the restrictions which Egypt is exercising over ships passing tlirough the Suez Canal are inconsistent with the spirit and intcnt of the Armistice Agreement. My Government bdieves that the imposition of these 1 For the text of this agreement see Official RCC01'ds of the Scc/lrit;y COll/lcil, FOllrth l'car, Spccial Su/,plemellt No. 3. 45. I now turn to General Riley's finding on 12 June that the restrictions are not technically a violation of the Armistice Agreement. My Government believes this may be technically correct, but it is difficult ta consider the Egyptian actions as thereby justified merely because the officiaIs who enforce the restrictions cannat be c1assified as military or paramilitary forces of Egypt. This is .a technicality which cannot be allowed to stand in the way of the fundamental consideration before us, namely, the scrupulous adherence to the letter and spirit of the Armistice Agreements. If Egypt, through the technicality, threatens the underlying intent of its Armistice Agreement with Israel, this Council must appreciate the e[fect that snch action would have, not only on the observance of the Egyptian-Israel Agreement, but on the integrity of other Armistice Agreements. One evasion of these Agreements invites others. We cannot permit a challenge of this kind to serve as a precedent for jeopardizing the present stability of the Palestine area and progress toward peace for the area. 46. While the case before us involves a violation of the spirit and intent of the Egyptian-Israel Armistice Agreement, l. feel bound also ta calI attention to the adverse and damaging effect which the Egyptian restrictions have had on the legitimate interests of various maritime nations, inc1uding the United States. 47. ~y G?,:,ernment alway~ ~egrets that any compla111ts ans1l1g out of the applIcatIOn of the Armistice Agreements should have to come to this Council. The United States especially regrets this complaint, since it ~1ad hoped that from the friendly representations which 1t .and other Gover,nments had repeatedly made Egypt ml&"ht become conv1l1ced of the wisdom and great credit w~l~h woule! be. hers in voluntarily lifting the restnchons. UnhappJ1y these representations have been to no avait We now have no choice but to adopt the draft resoluti01: ~efore us, which will calI upon Egypt to lift the restnchons. 48. l said th.a~ my G.ove:nment reg~etted the necessity of the C?~ncl1 ~ consldenng compla1l1ts arising out of the adml111stra~lOn of the Armistice Agreement. My Government Vlews these complaints as symptoms of ~tall1hty aIlfl ~l !astIIlg-. peace III tlte are'a. Unfortunate1y, ;' thes(' CllI1ll'lalllts \\"111cl1 kœp enl11ing' to the Coul1cil imlÏL'atc that the pa rtil's in the nrea are uot pursl1ing the course cakulated tn ka<l tn tlte goal of tlte practice oi tnlcrance, r('.~pcct fnr the nbligatill11s arising from international agn'cIlH'I1ts ami the establishment of conditions ftll" living' togdher in peace witlt one another a~ gnnd lleigltllOuJ"S. 49, question que l'Organisation entrepris qucstion la voisillS. signées conciliation en générale encore qui autres importante 41). l\lr. l\lUNIZ (Brazi1): The Suez question which the ClJllJ1cil has Iil'fure it is but a rel1cction of a much 1110re important prnhll'Ill, olle that Itas heen the concern IIi the Ullitl'd Nations since the Orgallization 1uHlertook tu hring' ahout a !l('acC'fnl settleJJJent of the Palestine IIlH~st~un. r rekr to the prolilcm nf clTccting an llnder- ~tandlng' I/(,t\l'e('n [srac'l and its lleighbouring Arah States. In spitc' ni the General Annisticc Agreements sig-nl'd iu 11)·VI and ni tl1l' dturts of the United Nations Conciliatilill (\Ilnlnission for Palestine, establishcd by (;('ncral Assl'lIIblr rcsolutinn 194 (Il 1) of 11 Deccmber l').J.H, thnsc countril'S ~lre still far from attaining a ddinih: snllltinn ni tlwir cOlltn.l\'crsies which could l'nahlc them tn live tngethcl' in peace and ta co-operate towanls the advancement of that important region. 50. Lieux des et l'animosité il des litiges opérations nOllS symptômes, mêmes question. 50. Qnestions uf grcat re1evance, slich as those of the !luly l'laces amI of the Aral; refugees, and disputes Ill' a tl'1'ritorial nature, rcnmin lI11solvcd and contribute tn thc cn:atiun nf an atmosphere of hitterness and allÏtnositv het \\'l'l'n the Arab States and Israel. From time tn'timc the Sccuritv Call1lcil, as weil as other Ilrg'aus nf the United Nations, has been callet! upon to discllss varinus cnntroVl~rsial issues connccted \Vith ['nlestine --- thc aftennath of the military operations which \1'('\'1.' sUslwlHled by the armistice. Vie have, in f ~e\'('l'al instances, <kalI \Vith thcse sYl11ptOIl1S, while no jll'llgJ"l'SS has lweu made regarding the e1imination of the causes I)f tlH' existing <Lntagollisl11 betwcen the States in Illiestion. . .'i 1. l'hl.' \l'ork uf the 'United Nations Conciliation Conl1nission for Palestinl.' has 50 far heen bindered by 51. Nations jusqu'à chement de pour guère, pas résolvant lenr et r thl~ i11lpllSsihility of reachillg a consensus of opinion which \\"ould l'nable the Commission to carry out its task. Vve darI.' sa\' that, 1I1Ilc~ss the United Nations succeeds in ilrillging alHlllt a conciliation between Israel and the Arab States IIY settling' the main prohlcms which are preventing lhe recuncil ialion ilctween them and exacerbating the Jla~siuns on 1JnLh sides, aIl efforts towarc!s sett\ing the lJ('l"iplwral disputes will he of little avaiL 52. durable pas sm constantes pl'oblème sement 52. "iithout a solution of the problem of rcfugees, for instance, no atlelllpt at pacilication will yield enduring l'l'sults. 'l'Ill' rcfugee problel11, by its dimensions, by its fal'-reachillg repercussions on the lire of the Arab States, ily the cuntinued ecollomic pressure that it places upon the AraIJ populations, is the main obstacle in the way of a Hnal paci/ieatioll between ISl'ael and the Arab States. 54, The representative of Egypt, clealing with the specific question submitted to the Security COlincil, has contended that the armistice being a 11Iere temporary suspension of hostilities, the state of war continues to exist and therefore Egypt is entitled ta impns<' restrictions affecting Israel trade. \Vithou t any disregarcl for the reasons set forth by the representative of Egypt and for the allthorities he citecl in favo!1f of his point of view, l must say that the COllnci1 sholllc! not allow the thesis of the existence of a state of war betwccn Israel and the other signatories of the General Armistice Agreements of 1949 to j lIstify the rl'sort to hostile ncts by any of the parties. According tu the tt'rms of article II, paragraph 2, of the Agn~ement between Israel and Egypt of 24 February 1949, hath parties pledged themselves to abstain from "any warlike or hostile act" against each other, 55, Futhennore, the purpose of the Agreement lS explained in article l as follO\vs: "\Vith a vie\\" to promoting the return to permanent peaee in Palestine", Article XII, paragraph 2 of the Agreement defines very clearly the eharacter and c1uration of the Agreement: • "This Agreel11 ent, havi ng' been negotiatecl aud eoncludecl in pursuance of the resolution of the Security Couneil of 16 Novemher 1948 calling for the establishment of un armistice in orcier to eliminate the tlueat to the peace in Palestine and to faeilitate the transition from the present trllce ta permanent peace in Palestine, shall remain in force l1ntil a peaceful settlement between the Parties is achicved, except as provided in paragraph 3 of this Article." 56. Therefore, during the intermecliar)' phase betwcen the cessation of hostilities and the definite peaceful settlement, the parties are bound tn refrain from acts likely ta enclanger the aehievel11ent of the nltimate pnrpose of the Armistice. The representatives of bath Israel and the United Kingclom have ctuoted state1l1cnts by General Riley and Mr. Bunche ta the effect that the measl1r.es ~dopted by th.,e EgYl?tian Government relating to. t;avlgatlOn on ~h~ Suez Canal are contrary to the Sptrlt of t~le Arl11~stlce Agreement. Shoulcl wc accept the Egypttan thesls, vye would he uound to recognize any measnres of repnsal adoptecl by the Israel Government. It is obviol1s that in the exchange of hostile acts that WC;lllld follow, w~ could hardly expect to lay the f?11I1datlons of a defimte solution to the Palestine questlOn. 58. On the other ha11(I, wc are Ilot collvinced that the restrictions enfnrced Il)' Egypt cnnlr! he consideree! as an exercise of the rigltt of self-preservation on the part of Egypt. Tlw tenns (If Article 51 of the Charter dtlillc dearly the cirCllll1stances in which a country is allthnrizl'd tll invoke the right of sdf-preservation. NOlle of I:hese circl1l11stances are indicatecl in the case ]wfore us. N (1 imll1illent dang't:r tn the existence of Egypt arises from the passage nf certain categories of gonds destinerl for Israel tltrouglt the Cana\. '1'here is no evillence that the IHae1 Guver111nt'llt is preparing an arl1lcr! attack against either Eg)'jlt or any other Ileig-lthouring Aral> countries. 5~). In vie\\' of the reasons l have statc:rI and having in lllinr1 thl: m:œssity of sjlaring 110 effurt in orcier to avoid furtltl'r rll'lerioratioll ill the l'dations bctween Israel and the AraiJ States, the Brazili:m delegation will vote to support the liraft resolutioll presented to the Sl'curity C(lundl Il)' France, the Ullited Kingdom and the Ullited States, callillg Upllll Egypt to tenllinate the n'strictiolls un the passage of illternational cOllnnercial shipping alld gunds through the Suez Canal. III votillg for that proposaI the Brazilian delegation illlplies no rel1eetioll (Ill tlle Egyptiiln C;overnmcnt. Vic l'atl1l'r interpret the rirait resolution suhmitted to the Security Cnullcil as an admonition tn Egypt not to entcrtain an uuaclvisec1 action which, if continuecl, might 1c'ad tn the resulllptioll of 110stilities between Israel and the AraiJ States, creating a situation pregnant with the gravcst dangers tn international peace. The Braziliall dl'1egatioll hclieves that an attitude of se1frcstraint on tlle part of Egypt would be an important contrihution to the re-establishment of peace between Israel and the Arab States, wlrich is being pttrsued by f r thl~ lJnited Natious. GO. As l :mid in the heginning, the specific question hefme us is llnly a f1arc-tlp nf the existing antagonisl11 hetwcen Israel amI the Aral1 States, resulting from the llllsnlvcc1 dÜiputes betwecn thC111. No l'cal i111provement iu this situation can he expected white the main problems dividing Israel and the Arab States l'l'main unsettled. It is the fil"ll1 helief of the Brazilian c1elegation that the United Nations shoulc1 11Iake an energetic attempt tn eradicate the sources of friction which are preventing fmal pacifIcation in that region, an attempt comparable

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