S/PV.555 Security Council

The representative of the United Killgdol1l bas requestecl to speak on a mat.ter raised by the rcprcsentative of Egypt at OLlr last meetmg on the issue which is now before us.

In his statement of 16 August [553rd l1wehng], the. re~resen­ tativc of Egypt stlg~estecl t.hat the n:atter WhlCh IS now before the Conncil IS techl1lcally il dIspute, and that the clelegations of France, the :t;retherlands, Turk~y, the Unitecl Kingclom and the Ul11ted States - and mdeed, 4. There is, of course, no motion on this subject before the Councï1. Neverthe1ess, the Egyptian representative raised a point which, if it were not answered, might give rise to misapprehension. Therefore, the five de1egations which he has specifically mentioned in his speech have consulted together and have agreed that, in arder not to take up too much of the Council's tüne, one of their number, namely myself, should act as spokesman for all of them in reply to this point which was raised by the representative of Egypt. 5. Two main points are at issue, as we see il. Firstly, there is the technical question whether this matter is a dispute within the meaning of the Charter and, if so, whether the five delegations mentioned are parties to it, and whether Article 27, paragraph 3, of the Charter consequently applies. Secondly, there is the broader question, which was also raised by the Egyptian representative, namely, whether the five delegations ought ta abstain on general principles, even if they are not strictly obliged to do so by Article 27, paragraph 3. l think l have put the point correctly. 6. As regards the technical question, the representative of Egypt first claimed that this matter was manifcstly a dispute. Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that it is technically a dispute. But what really matters is the question who the parties to the dispute are. On this point l think it can be clearly shown that the contention of the Egyptian representative is not correct. He referred to the two proposed definitions of a dispute, neither of which, incidentally, has ever been adopted by the Security Council itself. But even if one of them had been adopted, the effect would have been that, if a State came ta the Security Conncil with a complaint or accusation against another State, and if the State against which the complaint or accusation had been made rejected it, then there would he a dispute between them. It is of course possible that more than two States might be involved. The complaint or accusation might be brought ta the Council by a group of States, and might be brought against more than one State. In the present instance, however, only two States are concerned. The matter has been brought before the Council by the Government of Israel and the complaint is directed against the Government of Egypt. The dispute, if there is a dispute, is between Israel and Egypt, and between nobody else. 7. l should be quite prepared to admit that any one of the five delegations mentioned by the representative of Egypt might have asked the Security Councïl ta deal with the restrictions which the Egyptian Government has ill1posed on shipping using the Suez Canal. 8. Might l ask the President to request the public to be quiet?

Let us suspend for a moment. Let ~lS .ha~e an understanding. Our guests are here at our mvltatlOn, and are welcome indeeci. We w~nt them 13. To summarize, it can, l think, easily be shown that the Egyptian argument would proc1uce quite incongruous results. The effect of it would be to enable any State against which a complaint was made in the Security Council to ensure that the Council should be unable to take any action at aU. All that is necessary is that the State concerned should c10 sufficient damage to the interests of at least five members of the Council so that it could then claim that their interests were directly involved and that, therefore, they should not vote. The Security Council would then not be able ta take certain types of decisions as regards what might be a completely valid complaint by a Member of the United Nations. 14. We have, therefore, come to the conclusion that Article 27, paragraph 3, in no way debars us from voting on the draft resolution before the COl1ncil. On the contrary to read such an interpretation into the Article would b~, as we see it, to paralyse the Sewrity Cou~cil sa as to prevent it handling many controversies WhlCh, under the plan of the Charter, should come before it.

As the United Kingdom represcntative explained at the beginning of the statement which he has jl1st made to the Council, he was not speaking only on behalf of his own delegation, but also on behalf of the delegations of the United States, the Netherlands, Turkey and France. 16. l am speaking now, therefore, not simply to repeat • the ideas which Sir Gladwyn Jebb has just expressed - ideas which are sharec1 hy the French delegation - but because l wish to add another point of general concern to which my country attaches particl1lar importance, for historical reasons which will certainly be clear to aIl. 17. In raising the question of the right to vote of those States which have made diplomatic protests to Cairo in connexion with the case no\V before the Couneil, the representative of Egypt was doubtless thinking of the specific material interests affected by the restrictions imposed by his country on the passage of ships through the Suez Canal, which each of the States in question may invoke as the basis for an indiviclual complaint. Sir Gladwyn Jebb has replied for them on this point in a thorough and decisive fashion. 18. There is, however, another issue at stake in this affair. That issue, of concern to the whole world, is the principle that there shoulc1 at al! times he freeclom of transit through the Suez Canal for aU ships, whatever their nationality. Al! States are conccrned in the observance of this principle. They are al! entitled, if this principle is enclangered, to clemancl that it shoulcl he restored to its full force. And in sa doing, no State would be acting for itself alone; it wOl1ld also be acting on behalf of ail the others. 19. The part that France has played, from the very beginning, in the creation of this great international

l have no other speakers on my list. Unless somebody wishes ta speak, we shaH pass ta the vote. 2!. Mahmoud FAWZI Bey (Egypt): l have not asked for permission ta speak yet in order to avoid, if at aIl possible, having to speak several times. l should like to know, if possible, whether there will be other speakers later on. If so, l certainly reserve my right to answer whatever new points they may raise.

The President has no control over the wishes of the members of the Security Counci1. They have the right to ask for permission to speak at any time. It will probably be given to them if they ask for it. 23. Mahmoud FAWZI Bey (Egypt): On this understanding, l shall proceed to make my statement. 24. We seem to be near the end of our present debate, or at least this phase of it. l therefore wish ta express my sincere appreciation of every wise, cvery noble and every weU-intentioned ward l have heard since, on the 26th of last July [549th meeting], the Council began to consider the issues involved, which are so vital to the country l have the honour to represent. l am as sincerely grateful ta aU who, in an endeavour also ta understand the Egyptian viewpoint, have patiently or even impatiently listened ta my previous inadequate submissions, and l request their further indulgence in relation ta the few words l am about ta say. 25. Today and during the two meetings which the Council held on 16 August, l listened most carefully to the numerous statements made; and l have, since then, examined them with the same care. Most of the points brought up in those statements are dealt with in what l have previously submitted to the Council. l shall take up today, therefore, only the few points with which l have not already dealt. l shall, however, make one exception; it relates particularly to the repeatcd but evasive reference by the representative of the United Kingdom ;'0 the legal issues involved in the present dispute. 26. Thc representative of the United Kingdom has chasen ta reiterate [5521ld meetillg] that "these legal issues are no dOllbt debatable" but that hc still did "not considcr that it is necessary for the Sccurity Council ta go into thcm". He later added that "the view which 1 For the text of this agreement, see 0 fficiol Records of the Secllrity Couneil, FOllrth Yeor, Special Supplement No. 3. 27. The representative of the United States of America [552nd meeting], in his turn, tried to dodge the basic legal issues and to give the impression that Egypt is clinging ta a "technicality". l am certain that, were they dealing with a question of even the slightest concern to their countries, the representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States would not have spoken of these great and vital issues as "technicalities". 28. The representative of India, in his luminous statement before the Council on the same day, namely, 16 August [553rd meeting], told us that his delegation feels "that questions regarding the legal rights of the parties cannot he brushed aside as mere technicalities". At the same time, he pointed out the importance of the issues involved by !itating that "the question before 1IS is a complicated and intricate one, involving considerations of national rights and obligations and of international law". 29. In my last statement to the Council [553rd meeting], I mentioned that, with the exception of a brief casual reference by the representative of the Netherlands to the preamble and ta sorne articles of the Constantinople Convention of 1888 concerning the Suez Canal, we had not heard one single word ta show which act of the Egyptian Government violates which stipulations of this Convention. Later, in the course of the same meeting of the Council, we heard some comment in this connexion from ML Quevedo, the representative of Ecuador, which was, however, almost exc1usively derived from part of the history of the other de Lesseps canal, the Panama Canal. ML Quevedo recommended for the Suez Canal the same system of freedom of navigation anel commerce that is practised in the Panama Canal. In addition to what ML Quevedo told us, l would, mostly for the record, like ta give a samplin CT of the rich store of experience and precec1ent relating t~ this great waterway of the western hemisphere. 30. In a communication dated 2 October 1901, the Unitec1 States Ambassador in London, who had been , actively engaged in the negotiation of th~ Hay-Pauncefote Treaty referred to by the representatlve ot Ecuador, "'rote ta the United States Secretary of State that, by the provisions of the proposed treaty, t~e canal would be "ours to build as and when we hked, to own, control and govern... on the sole conditi.on of its being always neutral for the passage. of the ShlpS of aIl nations on equal tenl1s, except that If we get I11to war with any nation we can shut their ships out and take care of ourselves". 31. The views expressed by the United States Ambassador were reiterated in a letter of 12 Decembcr 1901 from the Secretary of State to Senator Cullom. There we read: "The obvious effect of these changes" - which had been introducec! into the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty during its negotiation - "is to reserve ta 32. A note from the British Embassy in Washington to the Department of State on 14 November 1912 clarified the matter further. This note said: "Now that the United States has become the practical sovereign of the Canal, His Majesty's Government does not question its title to exercise belligerent rights for its protection." 33. To this can be added the United States Proclamation of May 1917 and its legislation in two world wars, which \vere applied by the United States in the Panama Canal Zone and which resulted in the full exercise of belligerent rights in that zone whenever the United States was in a state of war. 34. The mention by the representative of the Netherlands of certain parts of the Constantinople Convention, casual as that mention was, together with the allegation of Israel that the Government of Egypt has contravened this Convention, and the brief references made by several representatives impel me to take up this point in more detail than l did previously. 35, Until the present stage of the Council's c1ebate, verv little of a concrete nature was said ta show which act' of the Government of Egypt contravened which stipulation of the Constantinople Convention. The few speakers who touched upon this point resorted mainly to comfortable generalities. Nevertheless, the allegation of Egyptian contravention of the Convention has been made; and it was followed by sorne comment tending to give an absolutely wrong idea of the rights of Egypt in this respect. All this requires an answer. 36. It is painful to be obliged, once and again, to bring forth the fact that the Suez Canal was never at anv time intended to cletract, even by one iota, from thé formai rights of Egypt, foremost among which is ils right to self-preservation, self-defence. Khedive Ismail of Egypt, maintaining the traditional policy of his country, stated, long before the actual opening of the Suez Canal, that the Canal must belong to Egypt, not Egypt to the Canal. \Vhat this meant and still means is that the sovereignty of Egypt, and its other rights, must remain entirt and intact, along with Egypt's loyalty to the freedom of navigation and commerce.. That this is so is dear from the terms of the Constantmople Convention, particularly those contained in articles X and XII; it is clearer still from the travaux préparatoires and the antecedents of the Convention. No amount of quibbling about word:; or speculating on the vagaries of lIninformed interpretation can overshadow or confuse the periect evidence of this faet. "Article Cl). The Suez Canal must be free for the passage of any ship in a11 circumstances. . "Article (2). In time of war, a time must be fixed for the ~tationing in th~ Canal of the ships belonging to a be1hgerent, and neIther troops nor \Var materials should be disembarked at the Canal. "Article (3). No act of hostility should take place in the Canal or in its annexes or in any part of the territorial waters of Egypt, even in the case that Turkey is a be1ligerent. . "Article (4). Neither of the two immediately preceding conditions shaH apply ta measures which may be necessary for the defence of Egypt." 38. This unambiguolls recognition by the United Kingdom that Egypt's right to self-defence in connexion with the Suez Canal is paramount, even as compared to the right of the Ottoman Empire, is only one of the many illustrations that can be given. More iight will be thrown to guide us at this point when we make a few comparisons. 39. In the regulations which the United Kingdom, while still occupying Egypt, forced the Egyptian Government to issue on 6 August 1914, it is stipulated, under pretext of conforming to article XIII of the Constantinople Convention of 1888, that the armed naval and military forces of His Britannic Majesty can exercise ail the rights of belligerency in the ports and in the territory of Egypt, and that the warships, mercharitmen and goods sequestered in Egyptian ports or on Egyptian territory can be brought before the British Prize Court. It may be observed that neither Suez nor Port Said was excluded from that stipulation. 40. In 1915, by means of a circular letter addressed to neutral Powers, Turkey declared itself forced extend hostilities to the zone of the Suez Canal, in view of the building by the United Kingdom of fortifications on the banks of the Suez Canal in contravention of the Constantinople Convention of 1888. The construction by the United Kingdom of fortifications of all kinds on the banks of the Suez Canal has, nevertheless, continued until today on an ever-increasing scale, with the result that, at the present time, we find British ~rmed forces which greatly exceed the 10,000 stlpulated I.n the at;nex ta article 8 of the 1936 Treaty - occupymg forttfied areas on the banks of the Canal, including such places as El Ballah Ismailia, Abu Sueir, Serapeum, Abu Sultan, Fayid: Geneifa an~ El Shalufa. l?uring the two world wars, British \varshlps ~lsed to revlctual and take in stores in the Canal and Its ports of access. Such action is a violation of article IV of the Constantinople Convention. 41. The United Kingdom also violated article V 2 For the text of this treaty, see Leaglle of N a/iolls, Trea/y Series, Vol. CLXXIII, 1936-1937, No. 4031. 42. ParaUe1 to this, history tells us that those responsible for British policy schemed and plotted ta ensure the control of the Canal on its completion, together with the control of Egypt and the Egyptian Sudan. r 43. As long as the United Kingdom was uncertain of playing a major role in the affairs of the projected canal, it maintained and, in various ways, gave expression to a poliey of obstruction. Stephenson was a particularly active member of the team of obstructionists whom the United Kingdom recruited for the carrying out of that policy. That determination of the United Kingdom. to play a major, or even and exclusive, part in the affairs of the Suez Canal reared its heacl 111any times over the years, and made itself felt by a11 those who \Vere concerned with the Canal as snch, or with the whole of Egypt. t 44. Some of the happenings at the Paris Conference of 1885 are very significant in this respect, particnlarly the opposition of the United Kingdol11 ta article lX of the draft submitted by France. That article proposed the setting up of an international commission charged with assuring the protection of the Canal, supervising the application of the prajected treaty and involdng, whenever necessary, the help of the Powers to carry out its tenus. The United Kingdom, obstinately and on purpose, opposed this scheme and succeeded in supersecling it with what later became article VIn of the Constantinople Convention; that article speaks not of an international commission, hut of the agents in Egypt of the signatory Powers. Thus, the permanent international organ envisaged under the French draft \Vas transformed into a system of no more than an occasional character. r 45. Even this was by no means enough to fulfil the aims of the United Kingdom's far-reaching scheme. In what is cynically caHed l'Entente cordiale of 1904 between France and the United Kingdom, the annual meeting of the agents of the Powers, which had been stipulated in the multilateral Convention of 1888, was arhitrarily suspended and superseded by occasional meetings of those agents only in case of danger or menace to the security of navigation in the Canal. Nor \Vas this enough, either, to sadsfy the insatiable British lust and thirst for power. I have already hinted at the [act that the United Kingd0111 wrate into the Treaty of 1936 provisions which cannot be recol1ciled with those established by the Constantinople Convention of 1888 and, worse still, which have been so exploited and sa abused by the United Kingdom as to constitute, in contravention of the 1888 Convention and of the 1936 Treaty itself, a continued and sustained series of violat1ons. A reading of this now decrepit and moribunr1 Trèaty, which was imposed on Egypt while British armed forces roamed aH over the country and arouncl it, will make this quite clear. 4-7. l hope it is clear by now that it is not Egypt that violates, dtller in letter or in spirit, the Constantinople Convention. 48. Could l hope, too, that, as The Tùnes of London suggested towarcl the end of 1871, the United Kingdom oHer some compensation for its previous errors in connexion with the Suez Canal? 49. In his statemellt on 16 August [552ndmceting], the representative of the United States talked of deepseatec1 disagreements in the Ncar East, of the ciesire to eliminate one source of agitation in that area, and of the availability of agents of confusion, He even assllmed the raie of an adviser to Egypt as to the ways and means of safeguarding its security. At the present moment, this reminds me somehow of the ec1itorial in which the New YorT;: Ti11-1-es told us, on 20 August, that "in these clays, when the United States has become the leading worlcl Power, it is imperative that we sit down now and then to think in terms of power politics". 50. l do not question the sincerity and the devbtion of our American colleague to his point of view. Nor do l doubt the fact that he is, nevertheless, standing entirely on the wrong foot. Does it ever OCClU" ta him that, by 1110st actively and abundantly backing Israel vandalism, his great country is the greatest protagonist of the main factor of disagreement in the Near East? Is the United States of America, in this and other ways, not helping the always available agents of confusion? And why does the distinguished representative of the United States consider the purely clefensive and preventive measures takcn by Egypt a source of agitation in the Near East? Does he really think that agitation would subside or be eliminated were Egypt instrumental in adding to Israel's aggressive power? Is he really convinced that the Security Cot1l1cil should supinely walk in the blood-dripping steps of Israel? Vlhy does he want the Council to run after an Israel mirage while the huge realities of Arab martyrdom and United Nations humiliation stare us in the face? Is it because Israel so desires? 51. As for the ac1vice of the United States representative relating to the security of Egypt, l must respectf~l1y say ~hat he might reconsicler his approach and dIrect to l11s own Government any advice on any matter he chooses. He might Even say that the United St~te§ 52. Another point raisecl during the Council's meeting on the morning of 16 August is, ta use the words of Sir Gladvvyn Jebb r552nd 1neeting] , that in spite of the fact that peace treaties have not been conc1udeel with the major enemy Powers, the Allies "did not attempt during the years after 1945 ta maintain in force all the restrictions which existed while hostilities were in progress", that "the tenclency has heen in the opposite clirection", and that "this criterion can be applied ta the present case". 53. l am sure that Israel and those who pamper it coulel not really want this criterion to be so applied. 1s Israel, like the major enemy countries, occupied by foreign armed forces? Is its foreign trade, like theirs, controlled? Are any of its factories dismantled? Is the remaining part of its inclustry regulated and supervised by the occupation authorities? Is it suffering from any other such imposed incapacities? 54. What are the almost invisible restrictions bv Egypt, in Egypt and for Egypt's own protection? What are thev in comparison with aB the restrictions which are still, ta this very hour, imposed upon the major enemy Powers? 55. Still another point raised is to the effect that Egypt has been given an ample opportunity to find an amicable solution ta the prohlem, but has not availed itseIf of that opportunity. The representative of Turkey r5531'd meetinp1 defl11ed snch a· solution as one "which would be satisfactory to all concerned" and which WOltld be reached "throl1p'"h negotiatioll, conciliation and mutual understanding". . 56. Our Turkish colleague either ignores the facts or misrepresents them. In spite of the sllstaine(l efforts of Egypt ta reach a solution which would increase the precious but often thankless flow of oil to all friendly countries and which would eliminate aB incoriveniences ta them, and in spite of the repeated offers of Egypt. Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Syria to extend every possible help for increasing the quantity of oil refined in their territories and for transporting the ail to third parties, the only answer we have heard to this friendly and co-operative stand has been an insistence 57. The restrictions in question have beeu lookecl at by the principal third parties who complain, ollly from their point of view and Israel's, not once from Egypt's point of view. Egypt has only been receiving representations and ultimata. Despite its readiness at any time to do sa, these third parties have not really sat clown with Egypt to examine together the elements, the difficulties and the possibilities of a solution. 'l'hose parties have not even accorded Egypt the treatment accorded a formel' or a present enemy who was or is killing their sons, but with whol11, nevertheless, they sit and talk and try to conciliate, understalld and, together, find a way out. 58. We are therefore entitled to ask if that attitude is friencl1y to Egypt. Is it just? Is it constrtlctive, or of a nature to foster goodwill in the Middle East? And is it - this l particularly say to the representative of the United Kingdom - in keeping with the so-called 1936 Treaty of Alliance between Egypt and the United Kingd01l1, which was concluclcd "with a view to consolidating their friendship, their cordial understanding and their good relations", and which stipulates ·that "each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes not to adopt in relation to foreign countries an attitude which is inconsistent with the alliance, nor to conclude political treaties inconsistent with the provisions of the present Treaty"? The answer is obvious. 59. The attitude of the United Kingdom and its associates evokes the memory of two evellts, one old and one recent. 60.. In 1857, Khedive Said Pasha of Egypt, during a V1Slt to London, called upon the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Palmerston, who differed with him in C?1111e:cion with the Sue~ Canal ~nd who, to quote one hlstonan, had the unthmkable 1I1solence to tell him: ''Your Egypt is but a tube of pottery which l shall smash from one end to the other whenever 1 want to". 61. The other event is contemporary - only four weeks old. On 30 July last, Mr. Churchill spoke to the H~u.se of COl1;m?ns of w~at he called the unprecedented BntIsh SUbl111SSlVeness 111 the Labour Government's dealings with the Egyptian blockacle of the Suez Canal. Asserting that British power and influence had declined throughout the Middle East, he said that the situation wOltld onl~ be retrieved by the joint co-operative action of the ~mted States and the United Kingdom and, in the Medlterranean, by France and Turkey. The answer of the British Prime Minister to Mr. Churchill'" remarks was, in part, that "the use of the biO' stick . E 0 agamst "gypt or other countries, as Mr. Churchill proposed, would have a bad effect on others in the area" and.that "it .was incompatible with the acceptance of the Umted NatIOns and the rule oflaw to think that 62. One e!oes not want ta mec1dle in the internai affairs of the United Kingdom; but, in view of same of the things that take place here in the Security Couneil, one almost wonders whether it is from ML Attlee and Mr. Morrison or from Mr. vVinston Churchill that the representative of the United Kingdom nowadays receives his instructions. Or are they all here, in fact, one and the same? 63. In speaking on 16 August of the Palestine question, of its still pending settlement and of its constituting the whole of which the present Suez Canal question is but a reflection, the representative of Brazil was much nearer the marle than some of our other colleagues who spolee on the same point. Allow me ta quote the t:elevant part of the statement of our Brazilian colleague [552nd meeting]: "The Suez question which the Council has before it is but a reflection of a much more important problem., one that has been the concern of the United N atÏons since the Organization undertoole to bring aboJ.1t a peaceful settlement of the Palestine question. l refer ta the problemof effecting an l111derstanding between Israel and its neighbouring Arab States. In spite of the General Armistice Agreements signed in 1949 and of the efforts of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, established by General Assembly resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, those countries are still far from attaining a definite solution of their controversies which could enable them to live together in peace and to co-operate towards the advancement of that important region. "Questions of great relevance, sltch as those of the I-Io1y Places and of the Arab refugees, and disputes of a territorial nature, remain unsolved and contribute to the creation of an atmosphere of bitterness and anim.osity between the Arab States and Israel. From time to time the Security Council, as well as other orgaas of the United Nations, has been calleel upon to discuss various controversial issues connected with Palestine - the after111ath of the military operations which were suspended by the armistice. We have, in several instances, dealt \Vith these symptoms, while no progress has been made regarc1ing the elimination of the causes of the existing antagonism between the States in question. "The work of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine has so far been hinderered by the impossibility of reaching a concensus of opinion which would enable the Commission to carry out its taslc. We dare say that, unless the United Nations succeeds in bringing about a conciliation between Israel and the Arab States by settling the main problems which are preventing the reconciliation bet,veen them and exacerbating the passions on both sides, all effort towards settling the peripheral disputes will be of liUle avail. 64. This important comment by the representative of Brazil inevitably evokes the query whether the course which the Security Council seems to be lal1nching upou is of a nature to pave the way for a settlement of any of the issues and questions involved, or whether it will, on the contrary, aelel to the almost insurmountable difficulties which beset our road ta that settlement. 65. l deeply regret to have to say, in this connexion, that some of the attitudes and the trends which have been revealed during and around our present c1ebate have fOl"ced upon me the conclusion that our common goal of settlement of the issues and questions involved cannot be attained by those attitudes and trends. This applies particl1larly to the draft resolution [5/2298/ Rev.l] before us which, incidentally, has been submitted by two olel hands at colonialis111 and a new-comer which is rapidly outgrowing all apprenticeship. The conclusion applies equally to the persistence of some members of the Council, including the sponsors of the c1raIt resolution, in c1aiming for themselves the double capacity of being, at the same time, judges and parties in the present dispute. 66. In my last submission l said [553rd meeting]; "This fundal1lental and Charterwise principlenamely, tint no State shall be judge and partyshould apply and command our respect in all cases, whether there are two or more parties to a question. Furthermore, the Counci1 cannot rightly subscribe to any attempt to defeat the raison d'être of this principle br c1aiming that it wouId at times impede the Council from discharging its duties. The duties of the Council are only and exclusively those which confonu with the principles of justice and the United Nations Charter. Any betrayal of thes~ principles could not form part of the Council's duties and does 110t form part of the Charter." 67. To this l add tbat the Security Council is not and never was meant to be almighty and omnipotent, <l;11~ t1~at it ?as s~lbmitted and will submit to many ll11llt.atlDns, m~lud1l1g the scores of vetoes alreaely apphed, accordmg to that same paragraph 3 of Article 68. The representative of the United Kingdom has attributed to me a statel11ent made at our preceding [553rd] meeting, that not only the sponsors of the draft resolution now before us, but also other l11embers of the Security Council as well, were interested parties. I take it, however, that he l11eant only the members to which l actually referred, namely, the three sponsors, the N etherlands and Turkey. His contention that we ean extend the description of "interested" to almost everyone in the world, to almost every State in the world is, to say the least, a very carefree contention. If we '.vere to apply his criterion, there would never be an application of paragraph 3, Article 27 of the Charter. vVe w0l11d never find any party to which we could apply the description or definition of an interested party. The question of what is an interested party is a matter to be investigated. I mentioned those five countries because they actually have material interests involved in the question and, furthennore, because each and every one of them has presented protests on many occasions to the Egyptian Government against the restrictions applied in the Suez Canal on the passage of son"'le war materials to Israel. How can we validly say that these countries are not parties? I do not see how there can be any doubt that they are. 69. The representative of the United Kingdom even went sa far as to imply - l hope I did 110t misunderstand him, or perhaps I should hope l did misu.nde:- stand hilll - that whether or not they are partIes IS a n'latter all110st entirely, if not entirely, left to their own appraisal or appreciation. 70. May I mention, in this connexion, the essential and very important difference between. the abo:,~­ lllentioned Article and rule 20 of the Secunty Council s rnles of procedure, according to which. the Presi~ent, if he happens to represent a country 111.terestec1 111 the question under consideration, may relinquish the J:-'residency to someone else. I have not mentlOned rule 20 of the rules of procedure before today ; I thought it would not be nice to mention it. But I am impelled j ust to mention it casually and without any. spe~ific atten'lpt to apply it to any present or recent sltuatton. l al'l'l irnpelled to mention it in connexion with the reference of the representative of the United Kingdom to Article 27 of the Charter. 71. Article 27 is a quite different story. Tt is. an essential part of the Constitution of the United Nattons knowl1. as the Charter. Tt stipulates essential rights for the Members of the United Nations. Tt stipulates the basic protection which has existed throughout the ages - even before the Uni~ed Nations or any such thing as the League of Nattons had ever been. heard of - that a party shall not be, at the same ttme, a judge. 72. l am very disappointed, l must confess, to note the persistent clesire of some of the members of the Security Council to indulge in the very doubtfulluxury of being, at the same time, judges and parties. I was "Considcring the debate in the Security Council on the restrictions imposed by Eg>'pt in relation ta the p"lssage through the Suez Canal of some war materials tü Israel, "ConJidering the daim by Egypt that, according to paragraph 3 of Article 27 of the Charter, France, the NetherIands, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the t1nited States of America must abstain from voting, "Considering that this claim by Egypt is contcsted by the members of the Securitv Council rnentioned in the preceding paragraph, . "Resolves to rcquest the International Court of J usti~e to give its advisory opinion on the fol1owing questIOn: " 'In the light of the Charter uf the United Nations, particularly paragraph 3 of Article 27, and in view of the debate in the Securitv Council, are France, the Netherlands, Turkey, thé United Kingdom and the United States of America obliged to abstain frorn voting on the question of the restrictions imposed by Egypt in relation to the passage through the Suez Canal of sorne war materîals to Israel?'" 73. It is many days since France, the United Kil1gdom and the United States brought forth their joint draft resolution. Yet the 1110re 1 look at that draft resolution, the more 1 scrutinize it, the less can 1 sel' any place for it arnong the high responsihilities assigned tu the Security Cnuncil by the United Natious. Under a sig- nificant title, namely, "Functions ami Powers" (of the Security Coul1cil), the Charter stipulates in Article 24 that: "1. In ordrr to ensure prompt and effective action b)' the United Nations, its :\lembers confer on the Security Council primary responsihility for the maintenance of international Iwace and security, and agrec that in carryillg out its duties unrler this responsihility the Security Council acts on their hehalf. "2. In discharging these duties the Security Coundl shaH act in accordancc with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. The specific powers granted to the Security Council for the discharge of these duties are laid down in Olapters VI, VII, VIII and XII." a Subsequently reproduced Ils a document under the symbol S1231J. 75. l have already enlarged upon this point in my last statement (553rd meeting], from which l do not need to quote smce it was given so recently and since it appears in the records of the Counci!. On the other hand, l think it appropriate that l should, at the present moment, cal1 attention to the following, which will help to show whether the Security Council would, if it overlooked the legal elements of the present question, be acting in conformity with the Charter and with the principles of justice and international law, and whether it has any authority or warrant from the United Nations to adjudicate such disputes as the present one in a way such as that proposed by the sponsors of the joint draft resolution which is now before us. 76. At the 552nd meeting of the Security Council, on 16 August, the representative of the United Kingdom said that the "legal issues" involved "are no doubt debatable" but he did "not consider that it is necessary for the Security Council to go into them". He tried to have the Council swallow this pil!. To this end, he adopted a casuistic approach by saying: "It is at least questionable whether the Security Council is really qualified to undertake the detailed legal study and analysis which would certainly be required if the Council were to attempt to make a legal finding", and that, for his part, he did not "fee!. .. that it would be profitable ta make such an attempt, since the view which the Council takes on this question should depend... on the actual situation as it exists rather than on any legal technicalities". In this devious way, the represen- tative of the United Kingdom aimed at persuading the Council to ignore the great legal issues involved which, very boldly, he wanted to portray as mere "legal technicalities". 77. The representatives of the United States and Turkey were quick to follow in the steps of the represen- tative of the United Kingdom. The representative of the United States obviously did not think the legal issues, huge as they are, to be worth his trouble. With a carefree wa\'e of the hand, he brushed themall aside and, like his British associate, tried to portray them as a technicality. 78. The approach adopted by the representative of Turkey seemed a little more elaborate, though it was in essence the same as that of the United Kingdom and United States representatives. He told us [553rd meeti1lg] of having "studied carefully the theses put forward by the interested parties" and that "they contained several controversial points on which decision was not easy". Yet his Government saw fit to precipitate matters by taking a stand on the present question contrary to the right of self-preservation which his country resolutely and successfully defended at Mon- treux in 1936. How grave and how dangerous are the 79. It was therefore heartenillg to listen to the timely comments of the representatives of. China and India duril1g our [553rd] meeting on 16 August. 80. Speaking of the draft resolution under èonsider- ation, the representative of China said: "The draft seems ta have assumed the validity of the daim that themeasures adopted by Egypt in the Suez Canal are in violation of general international law and the provisions of the Suez Canal Convention and the Armistice Agreements. In our opinion, that is a point yet ta be proved. Armistice is the first step to peace, but that does not mean the termination of a state of war." 81. The representative of China went on ta say, concerning the Suez Canal, that "it is unreasonable to suppose or assume" that its neutralization "cancels every right of the territorial Power". 82. At the same meeting of the Council, the represen- tative of India stated: "... the question before us is a complicated and intricate one, involving considerations of national rigbts and obligations and of international law. Egypt daims certain rights in the matter, but we are told that it is not necessary for tbe Council to pronounce upon them. .. The draft resolution before us seeks to avoid the legal issues involved. My delegation feels that. .. the legal rights of the parties cannot be brushed aside as mere technica1ities." 83. These and other warnings do not, however, seem to deter the sponsors of the joint draft resolution from continuing a course which would launch the Security Council upon the slippery and dangerous road of illegality and of chaos. Egypt will not be a party to such a scheme, but will steadfastly stand by the Charter and the rule of law in international relations.

l sball state the parliamentary situation. 85. The Council has before it a revised joint draft resolution on the Palestine question, presented by the delegations of France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. The joint draft resolution is contained in document S/2298/Rev.1, dated 15 August 1951. That is the only draft resolution beiore us which may be put to the vote. 86. Is there any further discussion of that draft resolution? 87. Mr. TSIANG (China): The President's statement seems to imply - or so l understand i~ - that the revised joint draft resolution contained lU document S/2298/Rev.1 is the only draft resolution formal1y before the Security Couneil. 89. On that technical ground, l think the Pre~ident is correct. 90.. If, however, the President's statement means that the Security Council should go forward to vote upon the joint draft resolution and treat the Egyptian proposai as non-existent, l would doubt the wisdom of such a course. The proposai of the Egyptian represcntative will, naturally, be interpreted by members of the Council in a variety of ways. l think that, in a matter of such importance and in connexion with such an important proposai, the Council should at least give the proposai reasonable consideration and the time for such consideration. l think that the time given to such consideration would only strengthen the position of the Security Couneil in the eyes of the peoples of the world. 91. l do not jump to the conclusion that the President intended to put the joint draft resolution to the vote and to treat the Egyptian proposai as non-existent. l only wish to suggest that, in view of the presentation of the proposai by the Egyptian representative, the voting nlight be postponed so that reasonable time might be given for its consideration.

The duty of the President of the Security Council is always to execute the will of the members of the Council. The rules of procedure, to which this President is trying to adhere, were adopted for the primary purpose of expediting the Security Council's work. 93. On reading the record of what l said, l am sure that no member of the Council can misunderstand my very carefully worded statement that, of the draft resolutions before us, the only one entitled to be put to the vote was the one to which l referred. That is the parliamentary situation. l am making a mcre statement of facto \Vhen the Council has finished its discussion and is ready to vote, that will be the draft resolution presented, that is, if the present parliamentary situation subsists. 94. There is no disposition at ail here on the part of the President to apply a steam-roller to this business in the Council.

l am sure we would a1l agree with the Presi.dent that the o~ly document before us at the moment IS the one to whlch he referred, namely the joint draft r~sol':ltion (Sj2298j Rev.l ). l do not think that fact IS dlsputed by the representativc of China, as far as l understand. That is the only document before us. 97. If aIl\' mcmber of the Council wishes ta make the draft resoilltion proposcd by Fa",zi Bey his own, l suggest that now is the time for him ta say that he Goes, Then we shall k1l0W where we stand. If any member does do that, then of course - and l imagine the President would a:;ree - we would then proceed to discuss that <lraft resolution, and evcntually ta vote on il. That vote \l'mzld naturally take place bcfore the vote on the only draft resolution which is before the Councîl at the moment. But ttntil we kllow whether any rnemher of the Council does wish to sponsor the draft resolution of the representative of Egypt, l, myself, do not sec that we are in order even in discl1ssing il. l kno,," that the representative of China wishes to have time to considcr il. Howcver, l do not think that the mere fact that he believes, in principle, that time should be given ta the consideration of this matter means tl1at we ought ta discuss it now, and far less that we ought to pastpone our vote on the substantive draft resolution unless, as l said hefore, he or anybody cIse wishes ta make the Egyptian proposai his own. After tho.t, of course, it could be discussed. 98. That is my personal point of view. 99. :\lr. l'SlANG (China): ln regard to the technical position of the proposaI which the representative of Egypt has just read ta us in the course of his speech, ntY opinion is the same as that of the President of the Council and of the rcpresentative of the United Kingdom. There is no difference of opinion in that regard. 100. In regard to the substance of that proposai, l have said nothing fur or agdinst it and 1 cannot have anything ta say for or agaim;t it because, even up to tl1is moment, 1 have not seen the text. l think it fair that the members of the COllncil should be givcn a chance to see and to read the text. Since the nature of that proposaI is, in a way, preliminary to the vote on the sllbstantial drait resolution, it wouId he prejudging the issue to vote on the suhstantial drait resolution without waiting for a consideration of the Egyptian proposaI. 101. Ali T wish ta say is that l think it wouid he wiser, politicaliy, for ns to postpone the voting on this joint draft resollltion for forty-eight hours, let us say. In that periml, we would see whether or not any member of the Council would sponsor the Egyptian proposaI, whether or Ilot al1\" mell1ber of the Council would wish to ha\'e a disCllssiOl~ on il. After forty-eight hours had elapsed, if no memher of the Council should sponsor that proposaI, we naturally could not have a formaI dehate on il. Then there wouId be no reason to postpone further the voting on the cirait resolution. l think that courtesv and fairness require the Council to adopt that course 'of action.

Accordin~ to the rules of procedurf', a motion ta postpone discussion of the question for forty-eight hours takes precedence o\'er the main issue that is before the Council. l assume

From whnt the President has said, l take it that, unless anybody abjects, the Council will adjourn for forty-eight hours. If that is sa - and l should hope it would he ttllc1erstood that unless any representative on the Council, within forty-eight hours sponsors or makes his own the ch-aft resolution proposed the representative of Egypt - the position will he that the only draIt resolulion before us will be the one before the Coundl now, and all that will remain to be done will be to vote on it.

That is one of the "if-y" qnestions on which the President does 110t wish to rule. 1 1 1 1,

l was mcre1y stating a point of view.

Does the representative of China wish to be heard before the Coundl replies lü the request for postponement?

l used the words "forty-eight hours", and l understand that the President is about to consult the COlmcil in this respect. l think, however, that those words may involve us in technical difflculties, and l therefore suggest that the discussion should he postponed until \lVeclnesday afternoon, 29 August.

l caH upon the Security CCl11l1cil to decide whether there is any objection to postponing consideration of this question until \Veclncsday afternoon, 29 August, at 3 o'clock. 109. Sir Benegal N. RAU (India): The representative of China has already anticipated the point which l wantec1 to take; that is to say, that the fortycight hours should 110t be interpreted too strictly bccause that would mean 5 o'dock on ,,yednesday. 1 r 1 r

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