S/PV.560 Security Council

The vital point is that the Security Council has not and cannot have competence to deal with this matter. 29. The reason is simple. The oil resources of Iran, like its soil, its rivers and mountains, are the property of the people of Iran. They alone have the authority to decide what sha11 be clone with it, by whom and how. They have never agreec1 to share that authority with anybody else or to c1ivide their ownership of a11 or part of that property or what it proc1uces with anyone. They have not submitted anc1 will not submit. their authority in that regard, or the exercise of it, to review or juc1gment by any persons or body outsic1e Iran. That ownership anc1 that authority are inalienable. They are part of the foundations on which stand our national sovereignty and our admitted equality among the other sovereign States of the cOl11munity of nations and of the body in which it is organized, the United Nations. 30. It may be useful to break in at this point to state succinctly what decisions the people of Iran, acting through their elected representatives, have taken respecting the oil resources of the country. On 20 March 1951, the Iraniau legislature unanimously enacted into law the principle that the exploitation of the national oil resources should be nationalized. On 30 April, the legislature, again with a unanimous voice, passec1 a law to give practical application to the previous enactment. 31. These laws were general in their tenns and applied to the entire territory of Iran. They provided, in accordance with the most enlightened principles and the most advanced standards prevailing anywhere in the world, for indemnification and the payment of just compensation to those whose operations would be affected. . 32. It was provided that 2S per cent of the earnings of the National Oil Company, established pursuant to the law of 30 April, should be set aside as security for the compensation payable to the former Company. Subsequently, in the COllfse of the negotiations with the representatives of the fOffiler Company, the Government of Iran expressed willingness to take the value of the Company's shares prior to nationalization as the ba~;is for deter~llining the amonnt of compensation to be pald. Alternatlvely, we stated our readiness to use the ~ame I~lethod that. had b~en employed by other countries, I11cludl11g the Umtecl K1l1gdom, in connexion with their schemes of nationalization. The choice between these alternatives we were willing to leave to the former Company. As a final alternative, we offered to determine th.e amount of indeu1l1ification by l11utual agreement wlt.h the f~rme~ Company after taking into account the claIms agall1st It of the Iranian Govern.ment. ~t1ggestion that the action of Iran has been confiscatory 18 a baseless accusation desigl1ed only to turn world public opinion against us. 34. The legislature also exhibitecl a solicitous care for the illterests of the foreign consumers of Iranian oil. The law of 30 April provicled that Cltstomers of the forl11er Çompal13;' should. have the right to purchase at current mternatlOnal pnces the same quantities of oil that they had im'ported .frC?m .Iran previously. They wel:e also ta ~~ glVen pn~rtty 111 t~le purchase of any avallable adclltlOnal suppltes of 011. As an effective means of realizing this aim, my Government stated that it Was reacly to enter inta a long-term contract for the sale of oil to the United Kingdom. 3? As a ftlrther means of ensuring the availability of 011 ta former consumers through the efficient operation of the oil industry within Iran itself, my Government dedared its readiness to take the British technicians ernployecl by the former Company into the employ of the National Qil Company and to give them the necessary authority to carry on in the exercise of their technical tasks. 36. From al! this, it is clear that any suggestion that Iran's exercise of its sovereign rights was hasty, arbitrary or illjurious to others can have nofoundation in facto The action of Iran was not motivated by blind elnotion or by hatrecl or enmity to any government or nation. On the contrary, the legislation we have adopted, and the steps we have taken in giving effect to it, afford abunclant evidence of our clisposition ta co-operate and maintain friendly relations with the l'est of the worlcl. l t is not we who have sought to commit economic suicide or ta kil! the goose that laid the golden eggs. 37. l have digressed for a moment to show how tcnlperate has been our exercise of 9ur sovereign rîghts. Again l must stress, however, that the matter of excrcise of such rights is for the people of Iran to determine in thcir sovereign discretion. As for the rights themselves, it is a settlecl principle of international law that in matters of domest1c concern, to which this question eminently relates, their exercise can' neither be abridgecl nor interfered with by any foreign sovereio'n or international body. That prillciple of internationallaw is also the law of the United Nations by vil-tue of Article 1, paragraph 2 of the Charter whicb enshrines the principle of equal rights and. selfdetermination of peoples, and by virtne of Arttcle 2, paragraph 7 of the same instrument which torbid~ tI;e United Nations ta intervene in matters essenttally wlthll1 the clomestic jurisc1iction of any State and exempts the JVlembers trom anyrequirement to submit such matters ta settlement ullc1er the Charter. 39. Iran possesses the same unfettered right in that regard as every other country. We have concluded no agreements of any kind, whether by treaty, contract or otherwise, with other States, abridging that right. 40. The United Kingdom Government has trespassed on this sovereign right of Iran. In clear violation of law and withol1t any legal justification whatever, it has sought to take advantage of the late iniquitous concession agreement of 1933 with the forn1er Company to interfere with the execution of our laws. The instrument is a private agreement between the Government of Iran and the former Company. It confers no rights, standing or competence on the United Kingdom Government in the matters to which it relates. The Government of Iran is thus not a party to any contract with the United Kingdom Government about ail. 41. A private agreement, even one enl1ring ta the benefit of foreigners, cannot bar a nation from the exercise of its sovereign rights; nor did the so-called agreement of 1933 purport to do that. It can confer no right on a foreign government to claim to be consulted in matters of domestic legislation. 42. The former oil Company is comn10nly spoken of in Iran as the "Colonial Exploitation Company". This sobriquet has excited particl1lar indignation in· official quarters and in certain parts of the Press in the United Kingcl011l. If the popular tag did not fit and if the predatory policy and power of the United Kingdom Government were not intimate1y involved in the operations of the former Company, that Government would have takcn the only possible just, sound and reasonable view, namely, that the matter was essentially the concern of Iran and that the sole interest of the United Kingdom Government in it, if there were any, should be to observe whether adeql1ate compensation was being proposed for the legitimate claims of the former Company. 43. The United Kingdom Government, however, has chosen to act in violation of international law and, seeking. to l1surp our sovereign rights in matters of domesttc concern, has interfered in the internai affairs of Iran. Its unlawful intervention has taken various forms. It has sought ta incite internai dissension and ql~estlO11 t~ that Court; and three, by invoking tnbunal whlch was known to it to be without competence ta hear such a complaint against us without first having our express consent given in that particular case. 44. :rhis ~busive use of p~oce?s was aimed at bringing Iran 111to dlsrepute by makmg It appear that we did not respect international law and the pronouncements of high international tribunal. The victory was a cheap one. The United Kingdom Government foresaw c1early that we wouicl not appear and that it \Vould therefore obtain an indication from the Court by default. The Court WolS, of course, quite without competence and its indication [S/2239J was equally invalid. 45. By way of an aside, l must say that the indication was also entirely without warrant in the facts of the situation. The Court allowed itself to be misled, without undertaldng an indepenclent inquiry into them, by the misrepresentations offered by the United Kingdom. Having been th11s beguiled, the Court issued its astonishing indication proposing that we should place our oil industry under British and international surveillance. 46. My respect for the great position assigned the International Court of Justice in the United Nations system and my reverence for the principles of equal justice which it is supposecl to serve compel me to moderate the expression of my views on its action in this case. It passes comprehension that a high international tribunal shoulcl have taken action touching the. most sensitive domain of national sovereignty without having sought in any way to satisfy itself that it was C0111petel1t to entertain the request for an indication, without inquiring into the jl1dicability of the suLJject-matter of the application, without more than an e.t:parte statement as to the facts, and by default. This is an example of mIe by judicial fiat which 111USt have astonished more governments than our own. 47. It was regard for the principles of international law and justice which dictated our note of 9 July 1951 to the Secretary-General of the United Nations informing him that, in our view, the indication of the Court was invalid for all the reasons which 1 have given above and becal.lse it was clearly outside the tenns of the Iranian declaration of 2 October 1930 recognizing the c0111pulsory jurisdiction of the Court. We informed him further that we were withclrawing our declaration of 2 October 1930 recognizing the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. 1 United Natiolls Registry number 46/04 (8). 49. Il'an, throughout its history, has shown the most devoted respect for international law and has sought scrupuloltsly to carry out its duties as a Member of this anc! other international organizations. We have ~bs~rv~d, and will contin~le to o~serve, every legal 1umtatlon lIpon Oltr soveretgnty whlCh flows from our participation and co-operation in the affairs of the family of nations. vVe are prepared to collaborate sincerely with ail nations and governments in the C01111110n work of bringing nearer the realization of the unive"rsal ic1eals and aspirations of mankind. 50. In our conduct and in our approach to the problems of international relations, we are animated by the hape thnt international law and international organization. may gradually be perfected and by the hope tbat they will eventually succeed in extending protection to the rights of ail nations, the litt1e as weil as the big, and will 50 acquire that power and authority which they require to be truly the guardians of peace and instruments of co-operation between nation and nation. 51. Unhappily, tbis is still a vision of the future. International 1aw is presently weak and deficient. The great and powerful still lord it over the world, and even in the illtemational organizations of the family of nations. In this condition of affairs, the protection of the fundamental rights of the weak requires them to be most jealous of their independence and sovereig-n rights ancl to insist on the most scrupulous respect for them from others. The limitations on sovereignty imposed' by international 1aw ancl international agreements are not obscure and are recognized by all governmellts. Outside that narrow domain, however, tbe sovereignty of States is l1llimpaired. At the heart of it is the absolute right ta manage one's internai affairs 'without any other limitations than those containecl in the principles and laws established in the country itself. 52. It fallows tbat the competence of the International Court of Justice, as its Statute shows, can extend only to the narrow domain governed by international law and treaty and can in no wise impinge upon the internai affairs reserved absolutely to national sovereignty. Ivloreover, even in the narrow sphere which is proper1y its own, the Cour1's freeclom is restrictecl by the limitations specified in its Statute and by the individual reservations macle by governments in their several declarations of aclherence. l have a1ready pointed out that, in their dealings with the strong, the governments of wcak countries must he jealous of the sovereign rights which they enjoy under international 1aw. If the Court is to do equal justice between the strong and the weak, it must show the most scrupulous regard for the reCJ.uirements of the 1aw in that respect. If the Court 53. By trampling On the principles of international law to which prinmrily the weak must look for protection of their rights, the United KingdoID Govenunent has o1Jtained an invalid indication from the Court. lv1isrepresenting that indication as a binding judgment, it seeks ta begui1e the Secnrity Council into approving the invalid results of its la\Vless efforts. 5"L The devious. arguments anel the legal subterfuges employed bl' the United Kingc10m cannot conceal the lack of competence of the Security Cottncil to aet on the United ]{ingdol11 eoltlplaint. The reasons are the same 'which markecl the United Kingdol11 Government's conduct in this matter as an tlnlawful interference in our internai affairs, and which renclered the International Court of Justice incompctent and its indication provisional measures on 5 July 1951 invalid. 55. The nationalization of a country's basic industries is tll1duubtedly its sovereign right. In nationalizing the oil inclustr)' of Iran, we macle use of that recognized right. No agreement or treaty exists with the United Kingdolll Governmcnt limiting tl1at right. 56. The so-callcd concession agreement of 1933 has no bearing on the case at aIl. Not only is the United GO\'crnmcnt uot a party to it, but it gives that Government no rights whatever. Moreover, as an agreement ",itb a private company, it has no bearing on the high prerogatives of national sovereignty. 57. The faet that the imposed agreement of 1933 was malle \Vith a foreign national does not alter the case. No evidence l'an be aclcluced to show that international law puts aliens in a favoured position over the nationals of a cDuntry, wbich nationals are t1l1qnestionably subject tn its general legislation. If governments have sovereignty in internaI affairs only in respect of their own nationals but not in respect of foreigners who have the support of powerful goverl1ments, the latter wou enjo)' special rights and privileges incompatible with the equality of rights. Snch a doctrine woulc1 s.llbvert the la\\' and could onl)' ensue in a modern revlval of the system of capitulatory privileges. No indepel1de~lt state would willingly subject itself to snch degradatlOll and slavery. 58. For the reasons 1 have indicated, the Security Cauneil would oe incompetent t~ lend its auth?rity, as the United Kingclom representatlve has asked lt to do, ta the provisional measures indicated by the Court. Apart from the bar to the Cotlncil's jurisdiction inte~­ posed by Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter, there 59. What are the provisional measures which the United Kingdom delegation would have the Security Council call upon Iran to obey? They are not a final judgment; in fact, they are not a judgment of any kinc1. Before a party to a case before the International Court of Justice, to say nothing of a Member of the United Nations that is not a party to the case, is obligated ta comply with a decision of the International Court of Justice, that decision must be both final and binding. That is the cleaJr meaning of Article 94 of the Charter. 60. If we look to Article 41 of the Statute of the Court, which confers on the latter power to indicate provisiollal measures, it appears that these cannot be final sinee Article 41 states that they are to be suggested "pending the final decision". It is only to the final judgment, however, that the Statute (Article 59) attributes binding force. It is only the final judgment which is a binding decision, and it is only with respect to such hinding decisions that Members of the United Nations have, by Article 94 of the Charter, given undertakings of compliance - and then only in cases to which they are lJarties. 61. The United Kingdom representative [559th meeting], indeed, argues that there would be no point in maldng a final decision bincling if one of the parties could frustrate that decision in advance and so render the final judgment nugatory. This is an argument de lege ferenda rather than one declaratory of existing law. Indeed, the language of Article 41 itself negatives the inference which the United Kingdom representative would have the Security Coundl draw. That language is exhortative and not obligatory. The provisional measures indicated by the Court would have bincling force only if the parties were bound by an arbitration treaty expressly obligating them to respect such measures. 62. The United Kingclom representative also attempts to derive the Secl.1rity Council's authority from the provision in paragraph 2 of Article 41 of the Statute that the Court shall. notify the Council of interim meaSl1res indicated by it. The inference is far-fetched and enCOl1nters the insuperable objection that an international instrument which concerns exclusively the rights and duties of the International Court cannat be ~ons!ru~d to confer po:wers on the Security Council by 1l11phcatlOn. The mea111ng of the requirement of notice ~o th~ Security Council would appear to be obvious. It IS deslgned to further that co-operation which is required of ail organs of the United Nations. Situations may well be conceived in which lt may be of interest or importance to the Security Council in the exercise of its own authority under the Charter - for it has none under the Statute ~ ta he informed of provisional measures indicated by the Court. 63. ~ wish ne~t to dispose 'of the suggestion that the Secunty CounCl1 must. h:we jurisdiction,in any case, 64. It hardly seems necessary to refute the United Kingc!om's assertion that international peace and security require that the oil inelustry in Iran should continue to function under British management. If the implication of that statement is that it is the nationalization of our oil industry which has endangered peace, it is not dear why the United Kingdom Govenunent, which has nationalized so many industries itself, should not he halecl before the Security Council for having sappecl the foundations of the pillars of peace. It that is not its implication, in what way does Iran threaten worIel peace? 65. Ours is a country with a population of 18 million people, many of whom live in extreme poverty. Its buclget is a tiny one of about $250 million. It has no potential for war, for it lacks heavy industry. Its army and air force are sufficient only for the needs of the maintenance of internaI arder, while its naval forces are sufficient only to patrol its coasts. It argues a deficient sense of humour to suggest that a nation as weak and small as Iran can enclanger world peace. The assertion is strikingly reminiscent of the fable of the world and the lamb. 66. Whatever danger to peace there may be lies in the actions of the United Kingdom Government. By overt display of force, it has sought to keep us from exercising om sovereign authority over our natural resources. It has made ominous gestures such as the dispatch of paratroops to nearby places and of vessels of war to the vicinity of our coastal waters. The irresponsible threats to land forces in Iran might have had the most c!isastrous consequences by lighting the Hames of another world war. For those consequences, the United Kingdol11 Government would alone he responsible. Iran has stationed no gunboats in the Thames. 67. If, however, as had been,publicly declared, these tactics have been abandonecl, there is no longer any likelihood of a menace to international peace and security, and it is not clear how the United Kingdom Government could have the hardihood to press its complaint in the Secmity Council on that ground. 68. 1 have referrecl to the weakness of Iran. It must be the first endeavour of any truly national and patriotic government of Iran to overcome that weakness. Let me explain why. 69. Destiny had placed Iran between two powerful. empires. On the one sicle lay imperial Russia,. which in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was in the stage of growth and expansion. On the other sicle lay the British Empire, which had brought the greater part of southern Asia and aIl of India ullder its rule. The positions of these two empires came ever closer until finally only the plateau of Iran remained as a natural barder between·them, 71. In the year 1907, when the great Powers were already wel1 on the road to the First '~or1d War, the United Kingdom conclucled an Agreement with tsarist Russia for the division of Iran into two spheres of influence. The diplomatie knife eut Iran like a cake into a northern zone of tsarist influence and a southern and eastern zone of British influence. The latter zone, which includeel the concessionary areas ta which l will come in a moment, was the lion's share of this division of the spoils. 72. Fortunately for Iran, the tsarist reg!me elid not survive the First vVorlel '~ar. The great Russian Revolution toole place. Ta the joy of the people of Iran, the Soviet Union, in accordance with the policy annonnced at its birth, concluc1ed a treaty with the Iranian Government in 1921 nullifying a11 the tsarist agreements with Iran, surrendering' a11 concessions, abolishing the capitulations, and renouncing tsarist rights uncler the 1907 Agreement with the United Kingdom. 73. The United King'dom was not equally generous. Having occupiecl Iran during the First 'Vorld War, it took aclvantage of the disappearance of its former rival from the field ta seek in 1919 ta impose a virtual protectorate upon the people of Iran by treaty with a subservicnt Government. Article l statec1 piously enough that the object of the Agreement was to guarantee the indepelldence and integrity of Iran; the other articles, however, placed the Iranian Treasury and Army ullder the control of British advisers. This Agreement failed to becol11e effective because of the c1etermined opposition of the national movement in Iran and also because of the support which some of the Iiberal nations of the world, notably the United States of America, gave ta the people of Iran. 74. It is appropriate ta quote at this point from the declaration made at the time by United States Secretary of State Robert Lansing. This declaration was publishecl in Teheran on 9 September 1919 by the American Embassy and reads: "The United States Government instructs you ta please deny ta Persian ofiicials and to any other Persians or persans who may be interested that the United States has refused ta aid Persia. America has unifonnly shown her interest in the welfare of Persia in many ways. "The American members of the Peace Commission at Paris often tried ta obtain a hearing for Persian delegates before the peace' Conference and. the American Commission was surprisec1 that it did not "It also appears that the Persian Government at Teheran lent no strong support to efforts of its delegates sent to Paris. The American Government is surprised to learn of the recent Anglo-Persian Treaty which would seem ta indicate that Persia does ~10t w.ish America's aid or support hèreafter, and this 111 splte of the well-known fact the Persian Peace Commission at Paris openl)' and urgently sought American aid and assistance." 75. Although its effort to establish a protectorate was frustrated by the resistance of the Iranian people, the United Kingdol11 Government did not desist from interference in our political affairs. In 1921, a military coup d'état took place with British connivance. The result of this was the establishment of a dictatorial régime which the British fostered for twenty years. For two long decades, no constitutional régime existed in Iran. Freedom of speech and of the Press, freedom of worship and free elections vanished totally. It was the dictatorship so established which made possible the iniquitolls agreement imposed on the Iranian people in 1933. 76. The fact that during the Second vVorld War Iran was allied with the victors and that, as the economic and military link between the Western Allies and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Iran won the title of "Bridge of Victory", made no difference to British policy. Not only was national life disorganized by foreign armies on our soil, but we were macle to bear the financial burdens of the British by the imposition of an onerous monetary and financial exchange agreement. That agreement set the priee of sterling at a high and fictitiotls level far above its real value. This brought about a great inflation in our currency, such as we had never experiencec1 before, which was accompanicd by a tenfold increase in commodity priees. In this way, nine of every ten cents of our money were taxed away for the purpose of achieving the so-called higher aims of British diplomacy. This tax paid the costs of British occupation. In return, we obtained a testimonial to our co-operative and self-sacrificing spirit in one of the paragraphs of the Teheran Declaration. 77. A more exact representation of the true spirit of British diplomacy than is contained in the Teheran Declaration is available in a speech broadcast by the British Broaclcasting Corporation on 6 November 1941 concerning the occupation of Iran in that year; the British Embassy in Teheran published the speech on the same date. A translation of the text, which was in Persian, follows: "British c1iplomacy, as a rule, is based on friendship. British diplomacy in Iran is aIsa based on friendship, but there are two types of friendship, a disinterested ldnc1 and one based on interests. Disinterested friendship with Iran is because of its being a great historical nation which has made great contributions ta science, philosophy, art and literature and has left its mark on many thitlgs in the world's civilization. But the Britishfriendship with Iran,. or "In the year 1919, when we wanted to conclude a treaty with Iran, 1l1any of you thought that we intended to make Iran a protectorate, while our reasons for the conclusion of that Treaty were based on our c1isappointment with the Iranian situation and our dismay at the fact that Iran could not continue its life as an independent country." 78. l must content myself with thisshort aecount of the political relations of the United Kingdom and Iran. The representative of the United Kingdom does not relish our calling his Government's .poliey imperialistic. We, too, would have preferred to keep silent on this subject if he had not opened it. 79. The reflections induced by examinations of the oil archives are melancholic. For that reason, if for no other, it would have been better to allow them to remain closec1. As the representative of the United Kingdom has said, we shou1d instead have faith in the new world, a worlel in whieh, through the will of God Ahllighty and the generosity of liberal and benevolent men, great nations will no longer be able to menace smaller and weaker ones. l cannot, however, close the book of British imperialism without going into some detail coneerning the economic poliey of the Unitec1 Kingd0111 in Iran. 80. l shan pass quicldy over the initial steps in the attempt ta rec1uee us to economic servitude ta the United Kingdom. Fil"st came the concession of 25 ]u.ly 18.72 to Ba~on ~ulius Reuter, a British subject, grant1l1g h1111 excluSlVe nghts, for seventy years, to build roads and railways, to exact toUs, establish banks, issue ~urreney, and exploit such mineraI resources as coal, lron, leac1 and petroleum. Despite the eventual cancellation of that concession, it had an enduring result 81. Nothing came of the Reuter concession for the exploitation of mineraI resources in Iran because of opposition abroad ?-nd at home. On 28 May 1901, however, a concessIon l'las granted to another British subject, William Knox D'Arcy, giving him the sole right ta extract and exploit ail in al! of Iran, except the five northern provinces, for sixty years. The concessionnaire l'las to pay the Iranian Government a royalty of 16 pel' cent of the net profits. At the expiration of the concession in 1961, al! the buildings and installations owned by the concessionnaire l'lere to revert to the Iranian Government. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company, which later replaced D'Arcy as the concessionnaire, usee! varions pretexts to pay no royaltiès until 1920 when, aItel' long negotiations and discussions, it made a lump SUll1 payment of ;f1 million in full settlement of all past clue royalties. From 1920 to 1932, the Company paid less than ;f10 million. 82. In the year 1930, an incOllle-tax law l'las instituted for the first time in Iran. The Company, although not exempt from income tax, withheld payment of the tax for two years. By curtailing production and by presenting fictitio11s balance-sheets, it showed an ostensible reclnction of its earnings ta one-fourth of those of the previons year and tlms goaded the Iranian Government to annul the D'Arcy concession. 83. There is abundant evidence that plans for the ll.nl1ulment of the D'Arcy concession had been laid long in advance by the Company in order ta prepare the way for a new and marc favourable agreement and, particularly, for an extension of the life of the concession. The people of Iran at this time l'lere ruled by a dictatorship which had been established following the c:oup d'état instigated and assisted by the British. Consequently, individual Iranians had no voice in cleterminillg the fate of their country. The deputies in the parliament l'lere elected from lists drawn up by the Government. 84. The British Government; as now, brought the matter of the annulment of the D'Arcy concession before the League of Nations and, by threats of rupture of relations and the dispatch of war ships ta the Persian Gulf, hrought pressure ta bear upon Iran. In this l'lay, by terror and intimie!ation amid threats of bayonets and naval guns, the 1933 agreement l'las made to replace the D'Arcy concession. The concessio~, which would have expired in 1961, l'las extended by thlrty-two years, ta 1993. "They brO\.~ght up the question of the extension and. pressed It. ~eyeml of us, though deprived of Ch01ce, were ul1wl111l1!1 and extremely depressed but there w.ns ua alternatIve. 'V/hen l say there was no alternatIVe, l do Dot mean that it was as individuals fearing for ol1rselves; rather it was fear for the c:Dnntry and the consequences llnder those cÎrcl1mstances ..." 86. Notwithstanding the fact that Iran was coerced into conc1uc1ing the 1933 agreement, which according to lUlîversally establishecl legal princîples would be null and void, yet, in order to avoid futile debate and prevent any confusion, 1 must state that the Iranian Government daes not wis11 to entcr into any discussioil regarding the l1u11ity of the agreement imposed on us. Even if it he supposec1 that the concession possessed validity, the main point to bear in mind is that the legislative Rouses of Iran - the Majlis and the Senate - acting in Rccordance with the authority vested in them, have hy law of gel1cral application and non-c1iscriminatory application, nationalized the ail lndnstry throughout the country. A11 private rights, even if embodied in concessions ancl agreements, must yield ta the exercise of sovercignty in the intcrests of the genera1 welfare. 87. Even cursery stndy of the 1933 agreement reveals the glaring disadvantages which its terms involvecl for Iran. The following are a few examples: (i) lI/come-ta.v: According to the balance-sheets of the former Anglo-Iranian Oil Company for 1948 which the Iranian Government has been unable to certify, the total revenues of the Company in that year amountec1 to :f. 62 million. Of that total, .f 28 million were paid ta the British Exchequer in profit taxes. On the other hand, the income-tax received b)' Iran from the former Company was only il:: 1,4 million; that is to say, less than 5 per cent of the sum puic1 to the British Treasl1ry in taxes. To put it another way, only 2 per cent of the en~ire income of the Company \Vas paid over to the lra111an Government as income-tax, while about 45 pel' cent went to the British in taxes. Had the D'Arcy concession still been in force, the 1ranial1 Government wonl<1 have received r.E21 million in income-taxes since that concession granted the Company no tax exemption. (ii) Priee of oil and ifs related. products in ~he intei'iol' of Iran: As an oil-produc111g country wIth low production costs, Iran l11ight reasonably have expected tlmt its ail and oil products. should have solel nt a priee within the reach of l~S. people to enable thel11 to raise their standard of hvmg and to facilitate the cxecution of development projects in industry and agriculture. The. agr~el~lent, howev:er, based the priee of oil for general publIc consumptlOl1 (iii) CustOHts duties: The 1933 agreement cxempted the former Company from the payment of cnstoms dues and duties. The loss to the Iranian Government on that account has been so large that if, in place of royalties paid to the Iranian Government, the former Company had paid tariff rates on its imports and exports, the revenues of the Iranian Government wotlld have far exceeded its royalty receipts from the oil concession. (iv) The extension of the duration of the Agreement: The m05t important disadvantage to Iran from the agreement 'Nas the extension of the concession for thirty-two years. This involved the l)ostponement for the 5ame period of the transfer to Iran of the Company's establishments and installations. 88. également pu iraniens. restrictive, de 88. That i5 not all, however. The former Company aIsa failed to carry out those provisions which might have favoured the Iranian Government and people. Through faIse and restrictive interpretations, it has clec1ined to give them effect. l shall cite a few examples : (a) The 1933 agreement increased the royalties 1 payable ta the Iranian Government ta 20 per cent of the profits of the former Company from all its snbsic1iary and associated companies. As; however, sneh companies pay only a part of the profits in dividcnds to the parent company, Iran's share of the proflts of the subsicliary companies has been eorrespondingly rec1uced. (b) The Company, by unfair misinterpretation of the agreement, has prevented any control or auditing by the Iranian Government of the accounts of the Company itself and of its subsidiary and associated companies. (c) Notwithstanding the indisputable right of Iran ta verify the amount of oil exported, the Company, by various means, has been able to prevent <Lnv snch action. There is good reason to believe that thé statcmellts of the Company concerning the qnuntities of oil exported were not trllstworthy. (d) Instead of adopting an effective plan ta reduce the number of foreign employees and experts and to replace thcm by Iranian natiollals, the Company has not only avoided reducing the number of foreign employees but has increased them hom 1,800 in 1933 to 4,200 in 1948. No technical Iranian staff has been trained; eighteen years after the date of the concession the directors of the former Company look with satisfaction at the results of their policy of sabotage of the principle of Iranian technical development. f) Although the Company was explicitly bound to assure health services and housing for the labourers employed on its operations, more than 80 per cent of the Iranian workers in the oil regions are without housing. They take refuge in hovels made of old tents, mattings, and discarded tin Cans which are quite weIl kl10wn by this time to aIl those who have visited that region. The houses built in Abadan and the other oil centres are - or rather were - inhabited mostly by the British staff. 89. l have described at length the policy of political interference and economic oppression practised by the United Kingdoll1 Government in Iran. l have set out the record of more and more unequal and disadvantageous agreements with the former Company imposed on us by them. l have recounted the tale of the many material breaches of agreement committed by the former Company. My object in doing this has been to make clear the reasons for the mounting resentment felt in my country over the sheer disparity between the revenues derived from the exploitation of our resources and the benefits which accrued to our people therefrom. 90. The record of British economic exploitation of Iran has been a sorry one. No one should he surprised that its consequence has been the nationalization of our oil industry. 91. The first unmistakable indication of the attitude of the people to foreign exploitation of our resources came with the enactment in 1944, by the Iranian parliament, of legislation which prohibited the granting of future oil concessions. In 1947, the Majlis rejected a proposaI by the then Prime Minister, Ghavam-us- Saltaneh, to approve an arrangement with the USSR Government for the formation of a joint company to exploit the oil resources of the Northem Provinces of Iran on the basis of a fifty-fifty division of the profits. In rejecting the proposaI, the Majlis adopted the following rider: "The Government is charged to conduct the :1ecessary negotiations and take the requisite measures 111 all cases where Iran's rights ta its natural resources, whether subterranean or otherwise, especially in the case of the ail resources of the southern part of the country, have been impaired; and to see that aU national rights should be restored. The Government (ii) Factor of internaI policy: It goes withol1t saying that, so long as an imperia1istic company such as the former Anglo-Iranian Oil Company has a monopoly of this great source of wea1th, it will be impossible for the Iranian Government and people to enj Dy politieal independence. Notwithstanding the .commercial garb worn by the former Company, it must be considered as a latter-day paralle1 of the former East India Company, which brought the great sub-continent of India t1l1der its sway in a short period of time. The former Anglo-Iranian Oil Company had an annual budget larger than the budget of the Iranian Government and possessed a much larger import-export turn-over. It intervened in the internaI politics of Iran; it had a hand in the Majlis elections and the formation of cabinets. All of this was done for the sake of securing for itself the highest possible income from the resources which it controlled. By the expansion of its organization in the il1terior of the country, by the encouragement whieh it gave ta administrative corruption in government departments and by the unlawful support which it extended to certain journalists or political groups, it had in reality created an imperium Ï11 impe1'io which gradually undermined the independence of the Iranian nation. The people of Iran had no choice, if they were to safegnard their future happiness and to secure their politica1 integrity, but to put an end to the usurpations of the former Company. 97. Upon the passage of the laws for the nationalization of the oil industry by the Majlis, the Iranian Government and the mixed parliamentary oil board, composed of representatives of the Senate and the Majlis who were charged with the enforcement of the laws, made every effort to carry out the provisions of the 1aw respecting the "talceover" of the installations of the former Company, the sett1ement of its accounts, the arrangement of compensation payments and the sett1ement of the question of the sale of oil ta former customers, of which the United Kingdom was the most important. The attempt was made to solve these problems in a friendly manner which would be satisfactory to the former Anglo-lranian Oi1 Company. When the former Company expressed a desire for negotiations, the Iranian Government comp1ied with the request whole-heartedly. However, the de1egation which represented the former Company, after several preliminary meetings, submitted a proposaI which showed how far it was from being willing to negotiate in good faith. Its proposaI was the following: all the establishments and assets of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in Iran should be transferred to the National Iranian Oil Company, which shou1d transfer the said installations and assets to a third company, whieh would be fonned by the 98. The American Ambassador in Iran, on 9 J uly 1951, hanc\ed the Government a note from the President of the United States of America in which the Presic\ent expressecl his interest in the peaceful settlement of the question in dispute. He offerec\ to senel Mr. VV. Averell I-Iarriman to Iran as a special envoy to discuss the question with the Prime Minister and his Government. The Iranian Government, out of deep appreciation of the good will shown by the President of the United States of America, informec1 him in reply of its reac1iness to start negotiations at once for the peaceful settlement of the controversy, provided that the national rights of Iran were fully respected in accordance with the oil nationalization laws. It also dec1ared its reac1iness to extend a cordial welcome to Mr. I-Iarriman. 99. Mr. Harriman arrived in Teheran on 15 July 1951. He recoml1lencled that negotiations be begun in Teheran with the British Government delegation which was to come there for that purpose. After several meetings with Ml'. Harriman, it was agreed that the fol1owing formula shoulel be forwarded through Mr. Harriman, on behalf of the Iranian Government, to the United Kingdom Government, as a new basis for negotiations: (i) In case the United Kingdom Government acting on behalE of the former Anglo-Iranian Oil Company formally recognizes the principle of the nationalization of the oil industry in Iran, the Iranian Government is prepared to start negotiations with the representatives of the United Kingdom Government who woulel act on behalf of the former Company. (ii) The United Kingdom Government, prior to the departure of its delegation to Iran, shall formally recognize the nationalization of the oil industry in Iran. (iii) By the principle of nationalization of the oil industry is meant the proposaI approvecl by the special parliamentary Oil C0111mittee which had been ratified in the Oïl N ationalization Law, the original text of which is given below: "In the name of the happiness and prosperity of the people of Iran, and in order ta help the furtherance of world peace, we, the signatories, propose that the oil industry be nationalized in aU the regions of the country without any exception; that is to say, al! the activities relative to the discovery, extraction and exploitation'of oil be in the hands of the Governn1ent." Meanwhile a copy of the memorandu111 submittecl by the clelegates of the former Anglo-Iranian Oil C0111l)any relative to their compliance with. the principle of oil nationalization in Iran which has not been (iv) The Iranian Government dec1ares its readiness to enter into negotiations with the United Kingdom Government regarding the manner of the enforcement of the Oil Nationalization Law in so far as it concerns the United Kingdom interests. 100. Following the submission of that formula .by Ml'. Harriman and its acceptance, and after the rece1pt by the Iranian Government of a mernorandum from the United Kingdom Government which forma~l~ rec-. ognized the principle of nationalization of the 011 mdustry in Iran, a Government delegation headed by the Right Honourable R. R. Stokes, the Lord Privy Seal, came to Teheran, on 4 August 1951. In the negotiations between the two dc1egations, MI. Stokes submitted an eight-point proposaI, the main points of which are as follows: (i) To provide for compensation to the former Company in the administrative budget of the National Iranian Oil Company j (ii) To create a purchasing organization on behalf of the former Anglo-Iranian Oil Company which would give practieal monopoly of the purchases of oil ta that organization through the conclusion of a long-tenn contract, say for twenty-five years, with that organization; (iii) To divide the profits eCJ.ually, one-haH going ta the National Iranian Oil Conipany and the other half going to the purchasing organization; (iv) To create an operating agency to act on behalf of the :National Iranian Oil Company composed of the British staff with an Iranian representative 011 the board. 101. These proposaIs were rejected, because they were contrary to the Oil Nationalization Law and also did not comply with the "fonr-point" formula submitted through Mr. Harriman to the United Kingdol11 Government and accepted by the latter. The Iranian Government, after some discussion and exchange of notes, submitted counter-proposals to the United Kingdom Government, a summary of which is given below: (i) "Vith reference to the sale of oil, the Iranian Government is prepared to sell to the British Gove1'11ment the same amount of oil which it has been purchasing in previous years, say in the neighbourhood of la millions tons pel' year, and ta conclude a contract for a definite period of time which would be satisfactory ta both parties. (ii) The priee of ail shaH be based on the prevailing international rates on the basis of the Lo.b. value at any Iranian port; but the Iranian Government is not ready to divide into halves the oil receipts accruing ta it from its sales of oil, and is also not ready to accept any kincl of partnership which is contrary ta the ordinary commercial usage. . (~ii) In order to manage and exploit the national ol! mclustryof Iran on an efficient basis, the Iranian (iv) With reference to the claims of the former Anglo-Iranian Oil Company regareling compensation payments, the Iranian Government is prepared ta settle that question in any of the three following ways: (a) on the basis of the quoted value of the shares of the Company prior to the passage of the Oil N ationalization Law; (b) on the basis of the procedures followec1 by other countries where industries have been nationalized; (c) on any basis which would be 111utually satisfactory to bath parties, having due regard to the counter-claims of the Iranian Government. (v) With reference to the question of oil transport, the Iranian Govern111ent is also prepared to deliver any amount of oil bought by the United Kingdom. Goverll111ent to any company which produces a recelpt from the latter Government; other customers, if they c1esire, can make arrangements for the transportation of oil to the desired destination through that or any other establishment, provided they give the necessary order to that particular freight agency. 102. The United Kingdom showeel no disposition to consider our proposaIs. The results of further efforts of the Iranian Government were negative. Mr. Stokes and his colleagues left Teheran on 22 August and ML Harriman left on the following day. It was unnouneed that the negotiations had only been suspended. 103. After these departures, the Iranian Government awaited the receipt of new proposais; but sinee the continuation of this stage of unccrtainty was not feasible, a memorandu111 was sent to the United Kingdom Government on 12 Septemher through Mr. Harriman. The United Kingdom Government was, of course, acting on behalf of the former Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. 104. In the communication from my Government, the points at issue were reviewed. It was emphasîzed that, if the negotiatiol1s were to he indefinitely suspended, it woulel not be possible for the lranian Government and people to clc1ay indefinitely the practical implementation of the law. It was pointed out that a great number of British technicians were residing in Abadan and were being kept by the former Company from aecepting employment from the Irai1îan Government. The Iranian Government, out of good will and in hopes of a suceesfuI conclusion of the negbtîations, hadtaken no steps ta employ other technicians to carry on the work i~l ~he ail regions. On the other hand, so long as the eXlstmg differences were not settled, it was evident that certain members of the British staff might intrigue and cause new agitation; fear was e~pres~ecl that th~reby they might create misunclerstandll1gs m the relations of the two Governments. Furthermore, as long as the agents of the former Company remained in Iran, it was quite 105. Mr. Harriman, for reasons to transmit the above-mentioned United Kingdom Government. 106. This made it necessary ment to take direct steps for situation. To that end, a new pared in which the main principles were restated and additional offers and the transport of ail were 107. This infonllal letter was Kingdom Ambassador in Teheran; upon instructions from his Goverl1111ent, veyed its refusai of onr proposais. 108. The Iranian Government, no choice but ta give formai notification technical staff members in Abadan ta enter into the employment Oil Company, and whose presence become withont object, to prepare from Iran within a week from fication. Their departure took serenity. They were treated untoward incident of importance of their departure from Iran. It to fifty years of unhappy and the exploitation of our resources foreigners. 109. We cherish a sincere further expand our friendly relations ment and the people of the United aware that British friendship us. We regret the fact that, Kingdom Government has not ta Olir national aspiration. Had have been created an atmosphere sincere mutual confidence and the interests of l)oth countries. between us of late has been the 9i1 C.01~p~ny, which gave British ~mper~al~st~c tone. Ta defend llnpert~hst1c tendency and ta make of a fnendly atmosphere, we had 110. We also desire ta preserve and to expnnd our friendly relations with our great neighbour ta the nol'th, the USSR. We want to bring about its belief in our friendship. We were obliged ta reject the proposai made by that Government for the formation of a mixed Irano-Rllssian ail company. Our Majlis passed a law forbidding the granting of any concessions in the future. Even the discussion of such grants was banned by that law, so great was our desire to keep our freedom of action in this great industry, which is of such vital importance in our national life. Ill. The former Anglo-Iranian Oil Company was a great barrier to the realization of this national aspiration. Moreover, it was a disturbing element in the policy of political equilibrium which is sa essential to the political integrity of our country. With the disappearance of the Company from the politieal scene in Iran, there will remain no room for new demands on us or pretexts for interference. 112. These are the factors which led us ta take the path of nationalization of the oil industry throughout Iran. They have been put forth before you in an truthfulness and sincerity. 113. l fear that the statement I have just made may have taxed your patience. Before coming to a conclusion, however, I wisb to recapitulate and ta make some general observations whieh may assist the Security CouHcil ta a better appreciation of our point of view. 114. I have demonstrated, I be1ieve, that the United Kingdom case i5 deficient in every aspect of law and morals. l t begins with a flagrant1y unlawful interference in our internaI affairs. Tt is followed by an abusive application ta the International Court of Justice for relief, which the latter is inc0111petent to give. H<wing 5ucceeded in obtaining by default an invalid indication of provisional measures prejudicial to Iran, the United Kingdom moves ta further quicksand and invites the Secmity Coundl to follow it through misinterpretation after misinterpretation of the Charter, and ta exercise authority which the Council does not possess. 115. Another branch of the case rests on the most evident misrepresentation of recent happenings in Iran as constituting, somehow, a potential danger ta international peace. The world knows that it is not our Government which has threatened ta employ force, but the United Kingdom Government. Tt has, therefore, no possible ground for invoking the jurisdiction of the Security Council because of our action, since it is not to be supposed that the United Kingdom Government can induce the Security Council to act on its behalf by offerillg to stop its own 111isconduct. 116. l be1ieve our legal position to be unassailable. We might have rested our case on it but we als'o have regard 117. This brings me ta my final ward. We have made it c1ear from the outset that we regard the Security Council as without authority to deal with this matter. The Council will not have failed to note the cogency of our arguments on the law. This is not a legal body, but primarily a political body chargecl with the highest political responsibilities. It will readily understand me, therefore, when 1 say that the political and economic independence of Iran is of the highest importance to the maintenance of international peace and secllrity. The part of the world in which we live is one of the sensitive areas of international life. It is a meeting-place of great Powers. If it is wealc, the dangers to international peace and security increase in almost geometrical proportion to the increase in our dependence on others. 118. The task which wisdom enjoined on our neighbours, long before the creation of the United Nations, and wh:ich, unhappily, they never carried out, has now fallen ta the United Nations to discharge. That task is to ensure respect for our independence, and for our right of self-determination, and, in appropriate ways, to help us to maintain friendly relations of eqllality with the rest of the world. 119. Given the conception we hold of our dutY and of the dutY of others towards us, it must be plain why we will not be coerced, whether by foreign governments or by ülternational authorities. Under pressure, we will not taJce action and we will 110t engage in negotiations affecting our internai affairs. Ta do so would not only constitute an admission that we are not a sovereign and equal nation, but would eventually be fatal to our independence. 120, Mr. MOSSADEGH (Iran) (translated from French): We have replied ta the first United Kingdom draIt resolution [S/2358]. With the President's permission, we will reply later to the second [S/2358/ Rev.l] . 121. Sir Gladwyn JEBB (United Kingdom).: l do not quitc Imow,what the position is. Does the rcpresentative of Iran reserve his right to make another statement now, or after 1 have spoken? . 122. The PRESIDENT: l understood the Prime Minister to say that he wants to speak later. 123. Sir Gladwyn ]EBB (United Kingdom): In that case, l will certainly make a few observations about the . statement he has j ust made. 125. Further, as far as l tl11derstood it his statement suggests that His Majesty's Gover11l;1ent has not accepted the principle of nationalization, whereas, on the contrary, as we all know, it has accepted the princi~le. of nationali~ation. Once again, the Iranian Prime M1111ster seems 111 some way to accuse us of having used some kind of force whereas, again as we all know, we have not used force. 126. Finally, the representative of Iran made a number of accusations against the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. Some of these are false, others are very H1l1cb exaggerated. NaturaIly, 1 reset;ve my right to reply to tbem in detail at our next meeting. 127. In the meantime, l need only say this. The l ral1ian Government maintains generally that the Persian people have been impoverishecl oWlng to the activities üf the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. That is what l certainly understood. This is demonstrably untrue. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, by its skill and foresight and goocl management, succeeded in developing the oil of Iran. Oil in the grollnd is, after aIl, only a potential source of wealth, and since the Iranian Government coulel not itse1f develop that oil, it was essential, rightly or wrongly, for the Iranian Governinent to arrange for its development by foreigners. That is a facto The terms on whicb the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company offered its services were always at least as favourable ta Iran as any obtaining at any given time in the Middle East. In other words, without the Anglol ranian Oil Company the Iranian people would be not richer but inca1culably poorer today than they are and woulel not possess an industrial potential which, in agreement with those who built it, can and should form tbe basis of the future prosperity of the Iranian nation.

Does the representative of Iran wish ta speak now?

No.

1 do not have any other speakers on my list. l shall interpret tbis as meaning that the members of the Security Council, after having 11eard the statements by the representatives of the United Kingdom and Iran, wish ta have a recess in our discussion in arder ta resume it tomorrow. If that is 50, 1 shall acljourn the meeting now until tomorrow at 3 o'dock. The meeting rose at 5.20 p.m. FINLAND - FINLANDE Akateemlnen Klrjakauppa, katu, Helsinki. FRANCE Editions A. Pedona. Paris v. GREECE - GRECE "Eleftheroudakls," librairie nale, Place de la Constitution, GUATEMALA GO,ubaud & Ciao ltda. num. 26, 2 do Plso, Guatemala HAITI Max Bouchereau, lIbra.!ri. velle." BoÎt. postale Prince. HONDURAS Librerfa Panamerlcana, Fuente, Tegucigalpa. ICELAND - ISLANDE Bokaverz1un Slgfusar Austurstreti 18, ReykJavik. IN DIA ...:. INDE OXford Book & Stationery Hous., New Delhi. INDONESIA- INDONESIE Jajasan Pembangunan, 84, Djakarta. IIlAQ- IRAK Mackenzie's Bookshop, Statloners, Baghdad. IIlAN Ketab-Khaneh Danesh, AU'enue, Teheran. IIlELAND - IIlLANDE Hlb.rnlan General Agency cial Buildings, Dame ISRAEL Leo Blumsteln, P.O.B. 35 Allenby Iload, Tel-Aviv. ITALV-ITALIE Colibri S.A., Via Chioss.tto LEBANON - LIBAN Librairie universelle, LIBERIA J. Momolu Kamara, Streets, Monrovia. LUXEMBOURG Librairie J. Schummer, Luxembourg. MEXICO - MEXIQUE Editorial Hermes, S.A., ca/ 41, Mexico, D. NETHEnLANDS - N.V. Martlnus NIJhoff. ARGENTrNA - ARGENTINE Editorial Sudamcrlcana S.,~., C,lle Alsina 500, 611enos Aires. AUSTRALIA - AUSTRALIE H. A. Goddard (Pty.J, Ltd., 255a George Street, Sydney, N.S.W. 8ELGIUM -'- BELGIQUE Agence et Messageries de !a Presse S.A., 14-22 rue du Pers Il, Bruxell's. W. H. Smith & Son 71-75 Boulevard Adolphe·Max, Bruxelles. BOLIVIA - BOLIVIE L1brerla Cient/fica y Literaria, Ayenlda 16 de Julio 216, Casilla 972, La Paz BRAZIL - BRESIL lIvrarla Agir, Rua Mex/ço ~B.6, Calxa Postal 3291, Rio de Janejro. CANADA - CANADA The Ryerson Press, 2g~ Que,n Streét West, Toronto. CEYLON - CEYLAN The Associated New,papers of Cey'!on, ltd., Lake House, Colombo. CHILE- CHILI lIbreria Ivens, Calle Moneda 622, Santiago. CHINA - CHINE The Commercial Piess, Ud., 211 Honan Read, Shanghai. COi.OMBIA - COLOMBIE Llbrerfa Latina Ltda., Apartado .Mreo ~Oll, Bogotâ. COSTA RICA - COSTA·RICA Tra/os Hermanos, Aparlado 1313, San José. ' CUBA La Casa Belga, René de Sm.dt, O'Rellly 455, La Habana. CZECHOSLOVAKIA - ~ TCHECOSLOVAQUIE Ceskoslov.nskY spisovatel Narodnf 1'Frda ~, Praha 1. DENMAllK- DANEMARk Einar Munksgaard, N~rregade 6, K_benhavn. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC- REPUBLIQUE DOMINICAINE Librerla Dominic.n., Calle Mercedes No. ~9, Apartado 656, Ciudad trujillo. ECUADOR:- EQUATEUR Mu"oz Hermanos y Cia., Plau dei Teatro, Quito. EGYPT - EGYPTE· libraIrie "La Ranaissance d'Egypte," ~ SH. Adly Pasha, C.iro. EL SALVADOR - SALVADOR M.nu.1 N.vas y CI•. "La Casa dei Libro Barato" la Avenida sur num. 37, San Salvador. ETHIOPIA- ETHIOPIE Agence Ethlopl.nne de Publlclté, Box B, Addis-Abeba. ~, 's-Gravenhag•• NEW ZEALAND- NOUVELLE·ZELANDE United Nations AssocIation land, G.P.0. 1011, NICARAGUA Dr. Ramiro Ramlrez Publlcaciones, Managua, AUSTRrA - AUTRICHE a. Wüllerstorff, Waagplatz, Salzburg. United N"I/ons pub/lctltrons ctln further be ôbltllned Irom Ihe lollow/ng boohellers: GERMANY - ALLEMAGNE Buchhandlung Elwert & Meut'er, Haupt.· strasse, 101, Berlin·Schoneberg. W. E. Saarbach, Frankenstrasse, 14, Këln-Junkersdorf. JAPAN - JAPON Alexander Hon., Splegelgasse, 9, Maruzen Co" Ud., Wiesbaden. Nlhonbashl, Tokyo Order. and inquirles 'from r.ounlries whero sa'es agents ha,ve nal vot bel!n apporn-lm! rn"y bo sonl to: Sales and Circulation Section, United ~Iatl<lns, Now York, U.S.A.; or Sales Section, United Nation. OHice, Palais des Nallons, Genova, Switzerland. Printed in Canada Priee: 30 cents (or equivalettt in