S/PV.561 Security Council

It was with a feeling of great cOllsternation that wc heard this morning the shocking news of the assassination of the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaqat Ali Khan.

It was with a feeling of great cOllsternation that wc heard this morning the shocking news of the assassination of the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaqat Ali Khan. 2. Ail who met the Prime Minister during his visit to the United States in 1950 were i11lpressed by. his hreac1th of visioh and his steadfast will to work for the bettennent of his people. He was deeply intent upon cniarging the political and economic freed011l of his nalioll. He hall a clear vision of the necessity of bringing abont unden;tandillg and collaboration between Asia 2. Ail who met the Prime Minister during his visit to the United States in 1950 were i11lpressed by. his hreac1th of visioh and his steadfast will to work for the bettennent of his people. He was deeply intent upon cniarging the political and economic freed011l of his nalioll. He hall a clear vision of the necessity of bringing abont unden;tandillg and collaboration between Asia ;L11c1 the vVestern countries as one great factor for peace anel progress in our time. ;L11c1 the vVestern countries as one great factor for peace anel progress in our time. 3. IIi:; unti11le1y death when he was in the midst of his grcat task gives Ils a cIeep sense of loss. 1~1terpretin~ the sentiments of the mem1Jers of the Secnnty Counctl and of the United Natiol1s, l ask a minute's silence as 3. IIi:; unti11le1y death when he was in the midst of his grcat task gives Ils a cIeep sense of loss. 1~1terpretin~ the sentiments of the mem1Jers of the Secnnty Counctl and of the United Natiol1s, l ask a minute's silence as ;L trilmte to the deceasecl Prime Minister. ;L trilmte to the deceasecl Prime Minister. 4. Sir Gladwyn .IEBB (United ~(ingdom): ~n asso- ciating myself with what th~ Presl~~nt has saId ~bout the tragic cleath of the Pnme MU1lSter of Palo.stan, Liaqat Ali Khan, 1 should like, if 1 may, to paya tnbute to his memory. 4. Sir Gladwyn .IEBB (United ~(ingdom): ~n asso- ciating myself with what th~ Presl~~nt has saId ~bout the tragic cleath of the Pnme MU1lSter of Palo.stan, Liaqat Ali Khan, 1 should like, if 1 may, to paya tnbute to his memory. l l 6. )3ut his loss will be fe1t more widely and peoi)1e outsiJe !lis own country. I inevitahly think of the gap ,vhich his death Ims left in the C011l1ciis the British Commonwealth, where his juclgment knmvleclge of affairs were always greatly valued fellow Prime Ministers. 6. )3ut his loss will be fe1t more widely and peoi)1e outsiJe !lis own country. I inevitahly think of the gap ,vhich his death Ims left in the C011l1ciis the British Commonwealth, where his juclgment knmvleclge of affairs were always greatly valued fellow Prime Ministers. 7. It is a sadc1ening and dispiriting fact that, last year, the assassin's bullet has deprived the \Vorlel of no less than three gifted leaders. Let our actions here try to ensnre that conditions prevail in which such outrages are not repeatec\. 7. It is a sadc1ening and dispiriting fact that, last year, the assassin's bullet has deprived the \Vorlel of no less than three gifted leaders. Let our actions here try to ensnre that conditions prevail in which such outrages are not repeatec\. 8. Ml'. AUSTIN (Ull.ited States of America): United States delegation ta the United Nations deeply moved and saddened by the tragic death Liaqat Ali Khan, Prime Minister of Pakistan. 8. Ml'. AUSTIN (Ull.ited States of America): United States delegation ta the United Nations deeply moved and saddened by the tragic death Liaqat Ali Khan, Prime Minister of Pakistan. deleg~tion observecl his service in the United \Vith gratitude for his patience and far-sighted towarc1 pacifie settlement of the disturbance in Pakistan and Inclia were clirectly affected. tcnible hour, wc are not only sad on acconnt injury Vie feel bas necessarily been causecl to the Nations, but also on accollnt of his Begum whole nation of Paldstan. "re \vish ta send them warm-heartecl sympathy in this public manner. already tried ta do this privately, because lVIrs. and ] [elt that we Were very warm friends of the Minister and his Begum. deleg~tion observecl his service in the United \Vith gratitude for his patience and far-sighted towarc1 pacifie settlement of the disturbance in Pakistan and Inclia were clirectly affected. tcnible hour, wc are not only sad on acconnt injury Vie feel bas necessarily been causecl to the Nations, but also on accollnt of his Begum whole nation of Paldstan. "re \vish ta send them warm-heartecl sympathy in this public manner. already tried ta do this privately, because lVIrs. and ] [elt that we Were very warm friends of the Minister and his Begum. 9. TIH~ Prime Minister worked indefatigably for thmllgh the Unitfd Nations, in particlllar in the for pacific seUlement of the dispute over the Jammu and Kashmir. His death cames as expected blow to the structure of peaceful negotiations which Liaqat Ali Khan had powerflllly reinforced his enc1eayours hcre. 9. TIH~ Prime Minister worked indefatigably for thmllgh the Unitfd Nations, in particlllar in the for pacific seUlement of the dispute over the Jammu and Kashmir. His death cames as expected blow to the structure of peaceful negotiations which Liaqat Ali Khan had powerflllly reinforced his enc1eayours hcre. 10. Sir Benegal N. RAU (India): l take opportunity of joining in the tributes of regret have been expressecl at the tragic news of the ation of Liaqat Ali Khan, the Prime lVIinister stan. 1 knew him weil in the old days belore 1947, he was an important member of the Indian Cabinet. \Vas a great parliamentarian, ancl was held in the respect in a11 circ1es. His loss at this juncture create a great void in Pakistan and will he mourned, 1 am sure, throllghont India. 10. Sir Benegal N. RAU (India): l take opportunity of joining in the tributes of regret have been expressecl at the tragic news of the ation of Liaqat Ali Khan, the Prime lVIinister stan. 1 knew him weil in the old days belore 1947, he was an important member of the Indian Cabinet. \Vas a great parliamentarian, ancl was held in the respect in a11 circ1es. His loss at this juncture create a great void in Pakistan and will he mourned, 1 am sure, throllghont India.

The usual rules of protocol wouId require t11at l shoule! keep a respectful silence on an occasion of this kincl. l fee! that this is not a matter of protocol. Therefore, l should, first of all, wish tn tltank the President for leacling the Council in payiug trilmte ta the Prime Minister of Pakistan. H.is loss is a shock ta a11 of us. His 105s is not confinee! tn the people of Pakistan. l feel that the tasks of the U nitcc1 Nations in promoting peace and tlniversal prusperity have snffer'ir! through the tragic death of the Prime Minister. 14. Ml'. QUEVEDO (Ecuador) (tralls1ated fr0111, .)~!,a/lish): l should like to associate myself with the tributes paid here ta the memory of the Prime Minister of Pakistan, and tn his perseverance in seeking a peacefui seU1l'nwnt of the international c1ifferences in which his country is involvec1. 15, l sha11 only ac1d tlmt the Prime Minister of Pakistan showec1 his confidence in the United Nations as the proper organ for the solution of disputes between nations. l shoulc1 like to express my Government's s}'mpathy tn the Government of PaJdstan and to that country's de1egalioll tn the United Nations. 16. l'dr. SARPER (Turkey): l wish to associate my dcle"'ation \Vith tbe worcls expressed by my colleagues who"have preceded me anc1 to express our deep regret at the tragic loss of the Prime Minister of Pakistan.

On behalf of the Netherlands and its delegation to the United Nations, r. wish ta associatc myself whole-heartec11y with the well-dcservcd trilmtes paid to the memory of the late Prime' Minister of Pakistan. One of the most disting'lIishec1 statesmen, not only of the continent of .Asia Imt <tlso of the \\'orl<1 al> a whole, has traglcally succumbccl. 18. V/hile offering mir cIeeply felt sympathy and. conclolenccs to the Government ancI IJeople of Pakistan, l muy perhaps express tl~e hope that the high pri~lCiples which guidecI Liaqat Ah Khan when. deal11l~ wlth the many comp!cx and grave. problems \VIth WhlCh .he was confronted may survive bIS death and yet preval!.

l sh.oulcI like to associate my delegatioll wIth the expresslOns of sym- Adoption of the agenda Adoption of the agenda Complaint of failure hy the Iraniall to comply with provisionsl lllcasures ])y the International Court of Justice Anglo-Il'anian Oil Company case ( continuetl) •A t the in'vitation of the President, Mr, Mossadegh, representative of han, tool~ SeOl1'ity Cou11cil table, Complaint of failure hy the Iraniall to comply with provisionsl lllcasures ])y the International Court of Justice Anglo-Il'anian Oil Company case ( continuetl) •A t the in'vitation of the President, Mr, Mossadegh, representative of han, tool~ SeOl1'ity Cou11cil table,

Before starting my speech l behalf of the Government and people of Iran, ta the Government and people of Pakistan felt sympathy in this sad and terrible sufferec1. Pakistan is one of the nations which ern11lent and people of Iran hoId in the ancl for whiclt we have the deepest respect.

Before starting my speech l behalf of the Government and people of Iran, ta the Government and people of Pakistan felt sympathy in this sad and terrible sufferec1. Pakistan is one of the nations which ern11lent and people of Iran hoId in the ancl for whiclt we have the deepest respect. 21. D1.lring my opening statement [560th l saicl that l should have some remar1cs on the revised clraft resolution [S/2358/ l11itted by the United Kingd0111 delegation. brief. There is one basic point which must before the Security Couneil can ta1ce the it is asked to take in bath the first [S/2358] [S/2358/Rev.l] texts of the United Kingd0111 resolution. This point is whether or not Council is competent ta deal with this complaint. already explained the reasons why, in Council is not competent. In this respect, resolution is no better than the old one. were a British court, the United Kingc10m would have ta be struc1c out for the simple it is vague and contradictory and discloses action. 21. D1.lring my opening statement [560th l saicl that l should have some remar1cs on the revised clraft resolution [S/2358/ l11itted by the United Kingd0111 delegation. brief. There is one basic point which must before the Security Couneil can ta1ce the it is asked to take in bath the first [S/2358] [S/2358/Rev.l] texts of the United Kingd0111 resolution. This point is whether or not Council is competent ta deal with this complaint. already explained the reasons why, in Council is not competent. In this respect, resolution is no better than the old one. were a British court, the United Kingc10m would have ta be struc1c out for the simple it is vague and contradictory and discloses action. 22. In explaining the reasons for its initial [S/2357], the United Kingdom statec1 extremely urgent to prevent the enforcement of the issued by my Government for the cleparture British technicians from Abadan - a measure to put it bluntly, the United Kingd0111 r559th 111eeting] is wrang in interpreting After first trying ta drive us iota a corner British nationals to agree ta work for us and to withclraw the technicians, the United co111plainecl ta the Secnrity CouDeil because it at its word and decided not ta keep agaiost their will. As the United Kingcl0111 tative has talc! the Council [560th meeting], tion has dropped this c01l1plaint of expulsion revised ciraft resolution. 22. In explaining the reasons for its initial [S/2357], the United Kingdom statec1 extremely urgent to prevent the enforcement of the issued by my Government for the cleparture British technicians from Abadan - a measure to put it bluntly, the United Kingd0111 r559th 111eeting] is wrang in interpreting After first trying ta drive us iota a corner British nationals to agree ta work for us and to withclraw the technicians, the United co111plainecl ta the Secnrity CouDeil because it at its word and decided not ta keep agaiost their will. As the United Kingcl0111 tative has talc! the Council [560th meeting], tion has dropped this c01l1plaint of expulsion revised ciraft resolution. r r 'ii! 'ii! 24.. The _?nly dispute between my country anc1 the Umted K111gdom relates ta the United Kingdom's attempt ta interfere, in violation of established principles of international law, in am internaI affairs. It has nothing ta do with oil installations. If there ever was a threat ta the peace, it lay not in any difficultY connectecl with ail installations but in the threat of the U nitec1 Kingd01l1 Government ta resort ta force in orc1er ta stop us from cOllclucting our own affairs. 24.. The _?nly dispute between my country anc1 the Umted K111gdom relates ta the United Kingdom's attempt ta interfere, in violation of established principles of international law, in am internaI affairs. It has nothing ta do with oil installations. If there ever was a threat ta the peace, it lay not in any difficultY connectecl with ail installations but in the threat of the U nitec1 Kingd01l1 Government ta resort ta force in orc1er ta stop us from cOllclucting our own affairs. \' \' ,., " ,., " 25. The United Kingdom delegation is obviously in ql1anclary. For l'easons of its own, it has to keep this question on the Council's agenda. As it has been unable ta persuade worlel public opinion that the lamb has eaten up the wolf, it now hopes to Ieeep its cOluplaint from bcing struck off the Security Coullcil's agenda by invcnting a series of unfounded allegations to justify interferencc in our affairs. This attempt will not bear serious scrutiny. A glance at the preamble will show that the lllcasures suggested to the Security Council do not fall within its proper jurisdiction. 25. The United Kingdom delegation is obviously in ql1anclary. For l'easons of its own, it has to keep this question on the Council's agenda. As it has been unable to persuade worlel public opinion that the lamb has eaten up the wolf, it now hopes to Ieeep its cOluplaint from bcing struck off the Security Coullcil's agenda by invcnting a series of unfounded allegations to justify interferencc in our affairs. This attempt will not bear serious scrutiny. A glance at the preamble will show that the lllcasures suggested to the Security Council do not fall within its proper jurisdiction. 26. The new c1raft resolution, unlike the preceding one, does not ask the Security COllncil ta call upon my Government to comply with the invalid provisional 111casures indicated by the Court, which the Council !las no <luthority to do. Consequently, the reference the preamble to the provisional measures indicated on 5 .July 1951 [S/2239] and to the importance of upholding the aut1l0rity of the International Court Jllstice is sa 111uch surplusage and in no way helps the United Kingdom to solve the question of jurisdiction. 26. The new c1raft resolution, unlike the preceding one, does not ask the Security COllncil ta call upon my Government to comply with the invalid provisional 111casures indicated by the Court, which the Council !las no <luthority to do. Consequently, the reference the preamble to the provisional measures indicated on 5 .July 1951 [S/2239] and to the importance of upholding the aut1l0rity of the International Court Jllstice is sa 111uch surplusage and in no way helps the United Kingdoll1 to solve the question of jurisdiction. r tr ~. r tr ~. 27. The provisional measures.cannat cO~1stitute a 1eg~1 1Jasis for action by the Secunty Counctl. All that lcft is the unfounded allegation that there is a dispute rcgarcling the oil installations. As l have already said, thcre is no such dispute. 27. The provisional measures.cannat cO~1stitute a 1eg~1 1Jasis for action by the Secunty Counctl. All that lcft is the unfounded allegation that there is a dispute rcgarcling the oil installations. As l have already said, thcre is no such dispute. 28. The only question to be settled with regard ~o the ail installations is the amount of the compensatIOn be paid to the former Company. This is a ques~ion betwccn the Company and ourselv~s;. and the Ul11ted Kino.clom Govermnent has no part 111 It. vVe have not 28. The only question to be settled with regard ~o the ail installations is the amount of the compensatIOn be paid to the former Company. This is a ques~ion betwccn the Company and ourselv~s;. and the Ul11ted Kino.clom Govermnent has no part 111 It. vVe have not refu~ed to pay compensation.; on the contrary, we have impressed on the representattves of the former .Company ancl on the United Kingdon~ Gove.rt1ment how llnport~t it is, in arder ta keep the 011 flow1l1g, ta co-operat.e wtth us in c1etennining properly the amount ta be pmd and refu~ed to pay compensation.; on the contrary, we have impressed on the representattves of the former .Company ancl on the United Kingdon~ Gove.rt1ment how llnport~t it is, in arder ta keep the 011 flow1l1g, ta co-operat.e wtth us in c1etennining properly the amount to be pmd and 29. The only reason why the United Kingdom ernment does not openly attack this right it knows this right ta be beyond challenge to conceal its insincerity in the negotiations, acceptance of that principle, which it has with 11S. 29. The only reason why the United Kingdom ernment does not openly attack this right it knows this right ta be beyond challenge to conceal its insincerity in the negotiations, acceptance of that principle, which it has with 11S. 30. Since the adoption of the nationalization conduct of the United Kingdom Government revealed that hitherto it has not been concerned negotiation but merely with using any illegitimate of economic, psychological and military pressure it could lay its hands on to break our professed to accept the principle of nationalization; the negotiations of la5t Jdy show that the was a mere formality. Neverthe1ess, having mission to l'eheran, the United Kingdom can now maintain that it was willing Having led the International Court of Justice a decision both iJl-advised and contrary to Statute, it now styles itself a defender Having first concentrated its war-ships in waters and paratroopers in nearby places, threatened ta land on our shores, it malces parade of its love for peace. l t now seeks new pressure on us by means of the hypocritical resolntions it has sl1bmitted to the Council. 30. Since the adoption of the nationalization conduct of the United Kingdom Government revealed that hitherto it has not been concerned negotiation but merely with using any illegitimate of economic, psychological and military pressure it could lay its hands on to break our professed to accept the principle of nationalization; the negotiations of la5t Jdy show that the was a mere formality. Neverthe1ess, having mission to l'eheran, the United Kingdom can now maintain that it was willing Having led the International Court of Justice a decision both iJl-advised and contrary to Statute, it now styles itself a defender Having first concentrated its war-ships in waters and paratroopers in nearby places, threatened ta land on our shores, it malces parade of its love for peace. l t now seeks new pressure on us by means of the hypocritical resolntions it has sl1bmitted to the Council. 31. The United Killgdolll representative Council [559111, meetù~g] that his Govern111ent an agreement based on the mIe of law rather the rule of force. vVe are jl1st as anxions as Kingdom Governl11ent ta achieve such a we have always asked it to join us in negotiating agreement on that basis. Application of the of law would eliminate all the attempts that made to prevent us from exercising Otlr sovereign to decide how our oil industry should be would also eliminate any diplomatic pressure, appeals to legal or political organs jurisdiction, the sabotage of our efforts to services of qnalifiec1 technicians, and a11 the of economic pressure and boycott which us"ed against us ta make our economy collapse break our will. The use of force, on which Kingdom Government has relied, cannot lead or provisional plan for restoring ail production. 31. The United Killgdolll representative Council [559111, meetù~g] that his Govern111ent an agreement based on the mIe of law rather the rule of force. vVe are jl1st as anxions as Kingdom Governl11ent ta achieve such a we have always asked it to join us in negotiating agreement on that basis. Application of the of law would eliminate all the attempts that made to prevent us from exercising Otlr sovereign to decide how our oil industry should be would also eliminate any diplomatic pressure, appeals to legal or political organs jurisdiction, the sabotage of our efforts to services of qnalifiec1 technicians, and a11 the of economic pressure and boycott which us"ed against us ta make our economy collapse break our will. The use of force, on which Kingdom Government has relied, cannot lead or provisional plan for restoring ail production. 1i 1 1! 1! 1i 1 1! 1! 1 1i ,,1 Il 1 1i ,,1 Il 32. vVe are not to bhulle for the stoppage production, '~Te have made constructive compensate the former Company, and we to sel1 oil ta our former customers. We 32. vVe are not to bhulle for the stoppage production, '~Te have made constructive compensate the former Company, and we to sel1 oil ta our former customers. We ~\ ~\ 33. 'VVe see no evidence in the new draIt resolntion any sincere desire to negotiate. On the contrary, find a great cleal of eviclence in it that the United c1?l11 is not yet willing to recognize and nghts or to deal with us on an equal footing ance with the principles of law. The United still wishes to impose upon us the unjustified measures recOl11mended hy the International Justice. l t still wishes to nnc1ermine the which we are heId as a peace-loving Member United Nations. As it cannot, either clireetly clirectly, challenge our sovereign rights, it undennine thel11 by leading the Security subject the cxercise of our rights to the prior of the United Kingdom. We are led to conc1ude the purpose of this new draft resolution is not negotiations, but to transform this domestic illtO an international one hy requiring the to be condueted under the authority of the Council and within the framework and by the of the invalid provisional measures indicated Court. 33. 'VVe see no evidence in the new draIt resolntion any sincere desire to negotiate. On the contrary, find a great cleal of eviclence in it that the United c1?l11 is not yet willing to recognize and nghts or to deal with us on an equal footing ance with the principles of law. The United still wishes to impose upon us the unjustified measures recOl11mended by the International Justice. l t still wishes to nnc1ermine the which we are heId as a peace-loving Member United Nations. As it cannot, either clireetly clirectly, challenge our sovereign rights, it undennine thel11 by leading the Security subject the cxercise of our rights to the prior of the United Kingdom. We are led to conc1ude the purpose of this new draft resolution is not negotiations, but to transform this domestic illtO an international one by requiring the to be condueted under the authority of the Council and within the framework and by the of the invalid provisional measures indicated Court. 34. We have come thousands of miles ta answer in the interval between the submission of Kingclom complaint [559th meeting] and 'lncc in this chamher [560th m.eetingJ, proved false alanl1. Instead of allowing everyone aiter the first episode, the United Kingdom here by submitting a new and vague complaint cerning a subject on which there is no differencc tween us and of which we never hem'd arrivaI. Others around this table must have why they l'lere here. It is disagreeable to have for the United Kingdom delegation ta tell us what grievances it has and why it thillks the Council should look into them. We are not to remain here indefinitely in arder ta witness performance of the kincl staged by the United mission in Teheran last summer. The two aets seen have not been particularly good. The Council is better able than we are ta decide can allow the performance to go on and still dignity. 34. We have come thousands of miles ta answer in the interval between the submission of Kingclom complaint [559th meeting] and 'lncc in this chamber [560th m.eetingJ, proved false alanl1. Instead of allowing everyone aiter the first episode, the United Kingdom here by submitting a new and vague complaint cerning a subject on which there is no differencc tween us and of which we never hem'd arrivaI. Others around this table must have why they l'lere here. It is disagreeable to have for the United Kingdom delegation ta tell us what grievances it has and why it thillks the Council should look into them. We are not to remain here indefinitely in arder ta witness performance of the kincl staged by the United mission in Teheran last summer. The two aets seen have not been particularly good. The Council is better able than we are ta decide can allow the performance to go on and still dignity. ," :" ~ "" '~pI ~::ù:r .'. ';' .. :\ :J ~;;;c:l ," :" ~ "" '~pI ~::ù:r .'. ';' .. :\ :J ~;;;c:l "~ :".,::::;~~l; "~ :".,::::;~~l; 35. We have shawn by word and deed our eagerness to negotiate. It was not necessary the Security Council in order to induce us at the same table with the United Kingdom. United Kingdom, not Iran, whi~h ~ud.denly conference table and refused ail ll1VltatlOns to it. Since our arrivaI, we have sought in vain other evidence than mere l'lords that the United dom is ready ta negotiate. Th~re has been repetition .of the same old.tachcs of p.r~ssure. passing.. If our offer to dlSCUSS a legttlmate 35. We have shawn by word and deed our eagerness to negotiate. It was not necessary the Security Council in order to induce us at the same table with the United Kingdom. United Kingdom, not Iran, whi~h ~ud.denly conference table and refused ail ll1VltatlOns to it. Since our arrivaI, we have sought in vain other evidence than mere l'lords that the United dom is ready ta negotiate. Th~re has been repetition .of the same old.tachcs of p.r~ssure. passing.. If our offer to dlSCUSS a legttlmate ":~ ~,. ,:'~;rri'i~!j57, : -.' '. ":~ ~,. ,:'~;rri'i~!j57, : -.' '. 37. It is, of course, simply a [lat statement that the Security Council nor, indeed, His ernment has anything ta do with the expropriating a billion [thousand cern known as the Anglo-Iranian Oil this action shoulcl have any unfavourable chance outside Iran that is just too the world; and that if His Majesty's not imll1ediately agree not only to priation but also ta carrY,ing it out whatever loss ta the Uilited Kingdom world, then it is guilty of sabotage in lranian internaI affairs. 37. It is, of course, simply a [lat statement that the Security Council nor, indeed, His ernment has anything ta do with the expropriating a billion [thousand cern known as the Anglo-Iranian Oil this action shoulcl have any unfavourable chance outside Iran that is just too the world; and that if His Majesty's not imll1ediately agree not only to priation but also ta carrY,ing it out whatever loss ta the Uilited Kingdom world, then it is guilty of sabotage in lranian internaI affairs. 38. Having delivered himself of Prime Minister now proposes, as go back to Iran, presumably to distressing situation which has arisen ta his own folly and that of his enthusiastic, supporters. 38. Having delivered himself of Prime Minister now proposes, as go back to Iran, presumably to distressing situation which has arisen ta his own folly and that of his enthusiastic, supporters. 39. It will not have escaped the Council that many of the allegations of thePrime Minister of Iran are manifestly not ta say wilfully distortecl. lt profitless for me ta rdute point by point inaccuracies, just às it would be wrong over the more flagrant of them in repJying in detail, 1 mList make some the question of the competence of the which the representative of Iran has . in question. 1 dealt with this matter 1 October 1951 [559th meeting], revert to it now. 39. It will not have escaped the Council that many of the allegations of thePrime Minister of Iran are manifestly not ta say wilfully distortecl. lt profitless for me ta rdute point by point inaccuracies, just às it would be wrong over the more flagrant of them in repJying in detail, 1 mList make some the question of the competence of the which the representative of Iran has . in question. 1 dealt with this matter 1 October 1951 [559th meeting], revert to it now. i i '40.. The issue involved in the Iranian that 0[ the expropriation of foreign on the alleged grouncls of public interest. capable of objective proof that this is governec1 by' clefinite rules of '40.. The issue involved in the Iranian that 0[ the expropriation of foreign on the alleged grouncls of public interest. capable of objective proof that this is governec1 by' clefinite rules of 1 1 1 1 ~ li ~ li ~ftltt ~ftltt '71.. ~h~re is the further fallacy unclerlying the domestic '71.. ~h~re is the further falIacy unclerlying the domestic érj~é tions \core ptl1 358/ liant. érj~é tions \core ptl1 358/ liant. JU~I~chctlOn argt1l11e~lt as advanced by the Ml111ster, that anythmg done by a Government JU~I~chctlOn argt1l11e~lt as advanced by the Ml111ster, that anythmg done by a Government ?W~l territory in relation to private persons or companies IS 'iPSO facto a matter of domestic j urisdietion. were the .case, the admitted rules of international governing the treatment of foreigners would, instance, be futile. l t is indeed not really too much say that almost all bilateral treaties between relate to matters which, hut for their regulation treaty, would be pnrely domestic matters. ?W~l territory in relation to private persons or companies IS 'iPSO facto a matter of domestic j urisdietion. were the .case, the admitted rules of international governing the treatment of foreigners would, instance, be futile. l t is indeed not realIy too much say that almost alI bilateral treaties between relate to matters which, hut for their regulation treaty, would be pnrely domestic matters. llpleni te dans ;c de 10i1 , de,;; iait peut :tptl.' l'ria- : \lar ,unellpleni te dans ;c de 10i1 , de,;; iait peut :tptl.' l'ria- : \lar ,une- 42. In this connexion, it is not irrelevant to note the present Prime Minister of Iran himseH, in a on 19 December 1944 in the Majlis, as a private member in opposition, defencled his action in refusing to a bill for the cancellation of the Anglo-Iranian Company's concession by arguing that "existing agreements could not be cancelled by unilaferal or there would next be a Bill for the cancellation hano-Soviet Treaty of 1921". In other Ml'. Mossadegh implicitly recognized that the now in dispute was one properly falling within sphere of international law, and equally very properly he drew attention ta the dangers. of one-sided abrogation. May l j ust sayat this point that, on 29 October he also said, in referring to the part played by President Benes in secnring the 1933 agreement of which we hearcl 50 much: 42. In this connexion, it is not irrelevant to note the present Prime Minister of Iran himseH, in a on 19 December 1944 in the Majlis, as a private member in opposition, defencled his action in refusing to a bill for the cancellation of the Anglo-Iranian Company's concession by arguing that "existing agreements could not be canceIled by unilaferal or there would next be a Bill for the cancellation lrano-Soviet Treaty of 1921". In other Ml'. Mossadegh implicitly recognized that the now in dispute was one properly falling within sphere of international law, and equally very properly he drew attention ta the dangers. of one-sided abrogation. May l j ust sayat this point that, on 29 October he 30150 said, in referring to the part played by President Benes in secnring the 1933 agreement of which we hearcl 50 much: (hl (hl Pre- Pre- 1 d, ith :t ùe 'Irt';. 1 d, ith :t ùe 'Irt';. 1'~Ur mier r Ile 1est 'u::.es , Illl :utre mier 'rraijuerai mon i" je 1'~Ur mier r Ile 1est 'u::.es , Illl :utre mier 'rraijuerai mon i" je "Finally both the Persiati Government and Company came away from the League of contented and victorious. The Company victorious because they had secured an extension thil·ty-two years ta the concession and the Government were victoriousbecause they annulled the D'Arcy Concession". 43. Let me now turn to the impeachment of the Iranian Oil Company which the Iranian Prime Minister macle in his opening remarks to the Security yesterday [5601h 11'leeting]. He alleged then that petroleum industry "bas contributed,practi~all:i:' ta the prosperity of the people.. ThIS IS irresponsible. The Anglo-Iranian 011 Company man)' years providecl four-fifths of the forei&n exchan~e which the Iranian Government needs for Its essentlal imports. Itwas on the basis of the substantial revenues "Finally both the Persiati Government and Company came away from the League of contented and victorious. The Company victorious because they had secured an extension thil·ty-two years ta the concession and the Government were victoriousbecause they annulled the D'Arcy Concession". 43. Let me now turn to the impeachment of the Iranian Oil Company which the Iranian Prime Minister macle in his opening remarks to the Security yesterday [5601h 11'leeting]. He alleged then that petroleum industry "bas contributed,practi~all:i:' ta the prosperity of the people.. ThIS 15 irresponsible. The Anglo-Iranian 011 Company man)' years providecl four-fifths of the forei&n exchan~e which the Iranian Government needs for Its essentlal imports. Itwas on the basis of the substantial revenues 1r 1r e,,! t de Ori l'ulle ltere,,! t de Ori l'ulle lter- 44. Nor can l pass over specifie inaccl1racies. Iranian representative at one point misql10ted from my speech of 1 October and made the fignres relating to the sums paid l ranian Oil Company ta the Iranian referrecl to anl1ual payments whereas l had it clear - or l thol1ght· l had made it record will show - that l was speaking years 1943-1950. 44. Nor can l pass over specifie inaccl1racies. Iranian representative at one point misql10ted from my speech of 1 October and made the fignres relating to the sums paid l ranian Oil Company ta the Iranian referrecl to anl1ual payments whereas l had it clear - or l thol1ght· l had made it record will show - that l was speaking years 1943-1950. 45. Let me therefore once more importance of the great contributions which Iranian Oil Company has made ta the revenues Iranian Government. l shall take as an single year 1949. In that year, the Iranian received .:E 13.5 million in royalties 1933 agreement; .:E9.1 million in customs other paymcnts; and approximate1y .:E7 result of the special foreign exchange on the Company, makil1g a total of .E29.6 the supplemental agreement been ratified, woulel have been increased to about .:E 39 sums compare with the moclest .:E 7.1 million to the shareholders of the Anglo-Iranian in the same year in respect of their interest alone, incidentally, but also in many other In other words, the various revenues elerived Anglo-Iranian Oil Company alone would to cover 110t only the ordinary buelgetary such long-tenu economic development within the capacity of the country to undertake. 45. Let me therefore once more importance of the great contributions which Iranian Oil Company has made ta the revenues Iranian Government. l shall take as an single year 1949. In that year, the Iranian received .:E 13.5 million in royalties 1933 agreement; .:E9.1 million in customs other paymcnts; and approximate1y .:E7 result of the special foreign exchange on the Company, makil1g a total of .E29.6 the supplemental agreement been ratified, woulel have been increased to about .:E 39 sums compare with the moclest .:E 7.1 million to the shareholders of the Anglo-Iranian in the same year in respect of their interest alone, incidentally, but also in many other In other words, the various revenues elerived Anglo-Iranian Oil Company alone would to cover 110t only the ordinary buelgetary such long-tenu economic development within the capacity of the country to undertake. 46. The representative of Iran also made allegations about the failure of the Company proper social conditions in the oil-field Abadan. He said, "The population... is conditions of absolute misery withollt even necessities of life"; and in another passage, than 80 per cent of the Iranian workers... housing. They take refuge in hovels made mattings, and discarded tin cans which known... to all those who have visited that 46. The representative of Iran also made allegations about the failure of the Company proper social conditions in the oil-field Abadan. He said, "The population... is conditions of absolute misery withollt even necessities of life"; and in another passage, than 80 per cent of the Iranian workers... housing. They take refuge in hovels made mattings, and discarded tin cans which known... to all those who have visited that 47. 50 far as l am aware, the Iranian Prime has hil11se] [ never visitee! Abadan or the he seen the conditi9ns there with his would not, l am convl11ced, have made such statem:cnts as those l have qnoted, because 47. 50 far as l am aware, the Iranian Prime has hil11se] [ never visitee! Abadan or the he seen the conditi9ns there with his would not, l am convl11ced, have made such statem:cnts as those l have qnoted, because l1l1~el11ahle tact that social and housing wh1ch the Company has provided are infinitely l1l1~el11ahle tact that social and housing wh1ch the Company has provided are infinitely 49. In one passage of his statement, the representative of Iran stated - 1 can only think disingenuollsly - that the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, instead of redl1cing the number of foreign employees and experts and replacing them, as it should have done, by Iranian nationals, had actually increased the number of foreigners from 1,800 in 1933 ta 4,200 in 1948. This statement taken, of course, without reference to the developments in the industry, might impress uninformed people. But in those same years, though the Iranian representative did not choose to mention it, the number of Iranian employees rose from approximately 14,000 to approximately 70,000. Simultaneously, the production of oil rose from 7 million to nearly 27 million tons a11nually. In other words, the presence of an increased number of foreign technicians brought vastly increased productivity which in turn provided employment for ever-increasing l1umbers of Iranians and greater wealth for Iran. 49. In one passage of his statement, the representative of Iran stated - 1 can only think disingenuollsly - that the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, instead of redl1cing the number of foreign employees and experts and replacing them, as it should have done, by Iranian nationals, had actually increased the number of foreigners from 1,800 in 1933 ta 4,200 in 1948. This statement taken, of course, without reference to the developments in the industry, might impress uninformed people. But in those same years, though the Iranian representative did not choose to mention it, the number of Iranian employees rose from approximately 14,000 to approximately 70,000. Simultaneously, the production of oil rose from 7 million to nearly 27 million tons a11nually. In other words, the presence of an increased number of foreign technicians brought vastly increased productivity which in turn provided employment for ever-increasing l1umbers of Iranians and greater wealth for Iran. 50. In this connexion 1 should like to quote the remark of the Iranian Prime Minister that the Iranian employee "plays the part of a mere manual worlcer" - those were his words - in the oil-fields. Once again the evidence is against him. As of :March 1951, of the Company's 9,100 salaried staff occupying the highest positions among its 75,000 employees in Iran, 5,500 were Iranians and 3,600 non-Iranians. Of the 119 most senior employees, thirty were Iranians, most of them, of course, in positions of authority over British as well as Iranian staff. 1 really do not know the motives of the Iranian representative in glossing over these figures. 50. In this connexion 1 should like to quote the remark of the Iranian Prime Minister that the Iranian employee "plays the part of a mere manual worlcer" - those were his words - in the oil-fields. Once again the evidence is against him. As of :March 1951, of the Company's 9,100 salaried staff occupying the highest positions among its 75,000 employees in Iran, 5,500 were Iranians and 3,600 non-Iranians. Of the 119 most senior employees, thirty were Iranians, most of them, of course, in positions of authority over British as well as Iranian staff. 1 really do not know the motives of the Iranian representative in glossing over these figures. 51. It has been said by the Iranian representative that the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company has extorted vast profits from the exploitation of oil in his country without making a corresponding return to the Iranian nation. This accusation is also a total distortion of the true facts. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, throughout its association \vith the Iranian nation, has consistently offered the l110st generous and advantageous terms 51. It has been said by the Iranian representative that the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company has extorted vast profits from the exploitation of oil in his country without making a corresponding return to the Iranian nation. This accusation is also a total distortion of the true facts. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, throughout its association \vith the Iranian nation, has consistently offered the l110st generous and advantageous terms 53. l repeat: The Anglo-Iranian Oil time and again demonstrated its willingness the tenns of its contract. Its financial policy has been prudent and far-sighted. willing to fOl'ego quick profits in favour investments. In a sense the Anglo-Iranian has had to act as trustee for the Iranian its installations become the property of people at the end of the concessionary period. have been a breach of that trust to have, appointed unqualified Iranians to highly technical jobs, thereby impairing the operations from which the Iranians themselves such great benefits. 53. l repeat: The Anglo-Iranian Oil time and again demonstrated its willingness the tenns of its contract. Its financial policy has been prudent and far-sighted. willing to fOl'ego quick profits in favour investments. In a sense the Anglo-Iranian has had to act as trustee for the Iranian its installations become the property of people at the end of the concessionary period. have been a breach of that trust to have, appointed unqualified Iranians to highly technical jobs, thereby impairing the operations from which the Iranians themselves such great benefits. 54. If the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company to Iran and developed the oil resources of the people of the world would have been lack of the oil and the people of Iran would not have been richer - as the Iranian somehow wishes to l1nply - but would have than they are today and with tremendous leeway up in comparison with their neighbours East. It can be argued that some other have taken the place of the Anglo-Iranian That does not in any way alter my argument. Anglo-Iranian Oil Company having always most favourable tenns, the situation of would not have been materially different inc1eecl have been much less favourable prudent management of its great inclustry. 54. If the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company to Iran and developed the oil resources of the people of the world would have been lack of the oil and the people of Iran would not have been richer - as the Iranian somehow wishes to l1nply - but would have than they are today and with tremendous leeway up in comparison with their neighbours East. It can be argued that some other have taken the place of the Anglo-Iranian That does not in any way alter my argument. Anglo-Iranian Oil Company having always most favourable tenns, the situation of would not have been materially different inc1eecl have been much less favourable prudent management of its great inclustry. 55. At this point, l must make some reference astonishing allegations about the alleged of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in politics of Iran. 55. At this point, l must make some reference astonishing allegations about the alleged of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in politics of Iran. 56. Iran, as is known, is a large country, Prime Minister has saicl, larger indeed Great Britain and Italy combined. It has past a great l'ole in history and has made <;ontributions, as we all Imow, to the human 56. Iran, as is known, is a large country, Prime Minister has saicl, larger indeed Great Britain and Italy combined. It has past a great l'ole in history and has made <;ontributions, as we all Imow, to the human 111 art, architecture and literature. lt is an with a settledand anc.ïent civi1i~a,tion 8,ncl boulld together 111 art, architecture and literature. lt is an with a settledand anc.ïent civi1i~a,tion 8,ncl boulld together 58. On the political side, the very presence of the Company in Iran has almost certainly been a factor in preventing that country from fal1ing under far more sinister influences. The al1egations of interference by the Company in Iranian internaI affairs are demonstrably false. Indeec1, it is clear that, if the Company had possessed anything like the power or influence which the Iranians now contenc1, the present situation would never have arisen, and it would not have been possible for any Iranian Govemment to nationalize it or to get very far with the process. The very ease with whieh the whole thing has been carried out is the best testimony ta the fact that the Company has adhered ta its industrial task and has had little or no power or influence outside il. 58. On the political side, the very presence of the Company in Iran has almost certainly been a factor in preventing that country from fal1ing uncler far more sinister influences. The al1egations of interference by the Company in Iranian internaI affairs are demonstrably false. Indeec1, it is clear that, if the Company had possessed anything like the power or influence which the Iranians now contenc1, the present situation woulcl never have arisen, and it would not have been possible for any Iranian Govemment to nationalize it or to get very far with the process. The very ease with whieh the whole thing has been carried out is the best testimony ta the fact that the Company has adhered ta its industrial task and has had little or no power or influence outside il. , , :' •.•,',,'.• 1 :' •.•,',,'.• 1 It t It t 59. May l fina11y say in this connexion that, in an attempt ta a11eviate the suspicions of an imaginary imperùt11$ in i111perio ML Stokes, the Lord Privy Seal, at the time of his mission to Teheran offered ta provide inter-governmental safeguarc1s against the possibility of interference in the internaI affairs of Iran by anyone engaged in the oil business. 59. May l fina11y say in this connexion that, in an attempt ta a11eviate the suspicions of an imaginary imperùt11$ in i111perio ML Stokes, the Lord Privy Seal, at the time of his mission to Teheran offerecl ta provide inter-governmental safeguarc1s against the possibility of interference in the internaI affairs of Iran by anyone engaged in the oil business. r r ~{ ~{ 60. Btlt l do 110t wish to harp on the unforgiving past ancl, personal1y, l prefer to look to the futnre. The Iranian Prime Minister has said that the Iranian nation i5 detennined to use its vitalresources of oil to raise its standard of living and thus ta promote the cause of peace. His Majesty's Government natma11y would warmly enclorse this sentiment. It is, therefore, a11 the greater tragedy that Iran has, by its own actions, c1eprived itself of the prosperity which it could derive from its oil inclustry. !ts persistent refusaI ta recognize the sanctity of contracts led first to the complete stoppage of oil-tanker sailings, then to the closing down of the oil industry and then, finally, to the departnre of those British technicians on whom Iran must depend for the efficient operation of the industry. 60. Btlt l do 110t wish to harp on the unforgiving past anc!, personal1y, l prefer to look to the futnre. The Iranian Prime Minister has said that the Iranian nation i5 detenninecl to use its vitalresources of oil to raise its standard of living and thus ta promote the cause of peace. His Majesty's Government natma11y would warmly enc!orse this sentiment. It is, therefore, a11 the greater tragedy that Iran has, by its own actions, c1eprived itself of the prosperity which it could derive from its oil inc!ustry. !ts persistent refusaI ta recognize the sanctity of contracts led first to the complete stoppage of oil-tanker sailings, then to the closing down of the oil industry and then, finally, to the clepartnre of those British technicians on whom Iran must depend for the efficient operation of the industry. 61. While l do n'ot doubt the Iranian Prime Minister's sincerity in championing the r~ational a~pirations .of t~e Irunian people, the fact remams that If he perslsts 111 his present policy ane! refuses to neg~ti~te on r~asonable tenus, he will conden1n the vast maJonty of hls people 61. While l do n'ot doubt the Iranian Prime Minister's sincerity in championing the r~ational a~pirations .of t~e Iranian people, the fact remams that If he perslsts 111 his present policy ane! refuses to neg~ti~te on r~asonable tenus, he will conden1n the vast maJonty of hls people 62. So, once again, l appeal to the Iranian Minister to face the practical facts of the situation. 1ranian Government has inc1ulged too long in speculations unrelatec1 to the hard facts of an oil industry. His Majesty's Government repeatedly declared its willingness to recognize principle of nationalization in Iran and to settlement on that basis which would take acconnt interests of a11 parties. l am quite satisfied goocl will on both sides, it is possible ta reach settlement which would be compatible with llationalization of the oil indnstry, and which the same time, enable Iran to benefit from the of foreign experts and foreign facilities on industry depencls. 62. So, once again, l appeal to the Iranian Minister to face the practical facts of the situation. 1ranian Government has inc1ulged too long in speculations unrelatec1 to the hard facts of an oil industry. His Majesty's Government repeatedly declared its willingness to recognize principle of nationalization in Iran and to settlement on that basis which would take acconnt interests of a11 parties. l am quite satisfied goocl will on both sides, it is possible ta reach settlement which would be compatible with llationalization of the oil indnstry, and which the same time, enable Iran to benefit from the of foreign experts and foreign facilities on industry depends. 63. l am further cOllvincecl that no settlement possible eX'Cept on a basis of co-operation and ship between the Iranian Government, as of the oil, and those who contribute their enterprise to its production and distribution the world. It would be a tragedy if the Iranian ernment, by reiusing to recognize the necessity such co-operation, should prevent the 1ranian from enjoying the economic benefits which accrue to Iran as a result of the exploitation greatest industry. 63. l am further cOllvincecl that no settlement possible eX'Cept on a basis of co-operation and ship between the Iranian Government, as of the oil, and those who contribute their enterprise to its production and distribution the world. It would be a tragedy if the Iranian ernment, by reiusing to recognize the necessity such co-operation, should prevent the 1ranian from enjoying the economic benefits which accrue to Iran as a result of the exploitation greatest industry. 64. In conclusion, let me emphasize that the lem is part of a larger problem. 'vVe lllust whole broad question of the free world's needs for raw materials and the inter-depenclence - dependence, not the independence - of a11 free l appeal with all the earnestness at 1l1y èommand the Prime Minister of Iran to look beyond bOllnds of nationalisl11 to the wider common the world c01111l1unity. \~Te are united in purpose: to l'aise the standard of living throughout the world, in the less advanced the more advanced countries. If civilization survive, we must find the means of working tO\,vards commOI1 encls. There is no place selfishness any more than there is any reality 64. In conclusion, let me emphasize that the lem is part of a larger problem. 'vVe lllust whole broad question of the free world's needs for raw materials and the inter-depenclence - dependence, not the independence - of a11 free l appeal with all the earnestness at 1l1y èommand the Prime Minister of Iran to look beyond bOllnds of nationalisl11 to the wider common the world c01111l1unity. \~Te are united in purpose: to l'aise the standard of living throughout the world, in the less advanced the more advanced countries. If civilization survive, we must find the means of working tO\,vards commOI1 encls. There is no place selfishness any more than there is any reality 1, 1, 1 1l il il 1 1l il il ~ ~ ~ 1lI ~ 1lI self-s~lfficie.ncy, Those \~ho ar~ the leaders both m~h~:r.own count~'les andl~ the world, responslbl1Jtles. There IS a Perstan lxoverb "'rh h e s eep are not to be used for the shepherd, self-s~lfficie.ncy, Those \~ho ar~ the leaders both m~h~:r.own count~'les andl~ the world, responslbl1Jtles. There IS a Perstan lxoverb "'rh h e s eep are not to be used for the shepherd, sheph~rd must serve the sheep". In modern l1;late:lal, :esonrces canno~ be used .selfishly. hke mdlvlduals, have dutles and ob1Jgations sheph~rd must serve the sheep". In modern l1;late:lal, :esonrces canno~ be used .selfishly. hke mdlvlduals, have dutles and ob1Jgations l'1 l'1 :~ ~: :~ ~: 65. Sir Benegal N. RAU (India): This is a difficult case, and for no country except perhaps the parties thel1lselves is it more difficlllt than for lndia, which has friendly relations with both. vVe have hem"cl at considerable length the comp1aint of the United Kngclom on the matter uncler discussion, ancl that of the Government of Iran so eloquently presentee! to the Council hy its distinguishecl Prime Minister. My Government strongly believes that the clifferences between the parties regardillg the future of the ail industry in Iran shoule! be settlecl by peaceful negotiations, with due regard to equity and the legitil11ate interests of bath parties. 65. Sir Benegal N. RAU (India): This is a difficult case, and for no country except perhaps the parties thel1lselves is it more difficlllt than for lndia, which has friendly relations with both. vVe have hem"cl at considerable length the comp1aint of the United Kngclom on the matter uncler discussion, ancl that of the Government of Iran so eloquently presentee! to the Council hy its distinguishecl Prime Minister. My Government strongly believes that the clifferences between the parties regardillg the future of the ail industry in Iran shoule! be settlecl by peaceful negotiations, with due regard to equity and the legitil11ate interests of bath parties. 65. glais): sauf plus tions exposer, puis présentée de vaincu sujet être à des 65. glais): sauf plus tions exposer, puis présentée de vaincu sujet être à des 66. répugné Il d'une nalisation Gouvernement ment cipe 66. répugné Il d'une nalisation Gouvernement ment cipe 66. 'vVe are glad that both parties huve disavowed the use of force for the settlement of their difficulties. Tt appears to 11S that the area of disagreement has been appreciably narrowed clown as the principle of nationalization of the oil inclustry has been acceptecl by the Unitec1 Kingd011l Government; while the Iranian Government has, for its part, always accepted the principle of the payment of clue compensation. 66. 'vVe are glad that both parties huve disavowed the use of force for the settlement of their difficulties. Tt appears to 11S that the area of disagreement has been appreciably narrowed clown as the principle of nationalization of the oil inclustry has been acceptecl by the Unitec1 Kingd011l Government; while the Iranian Government has, for its part, always accepted the principle of the payment of clue compensation. 67. des ont à et peut de façon une lièrement 67. des ont à et peut de façon une lièrement 67. Questions involving the future working of the installations and ancillary matters which are of a complex ane! technical nature have still to be resolved and must fOrln the subject of protractec1 discussion and negotiation. If the Security Council can exercise its gooc1 offtces towards promoting the commencement of t'lIb between the parties, it will have made a valnable contribution towards reclllcing the friction in what has frequently been c1escribed as a particularly sensitive part of the globe. 67. Questions involving the future working of the installations and ancillary matters which are of a complex ane! technical nature have still to be resolved and must fOrln the subject of protractec1 discussion and negotiation. If the Security Council can exercise its gooc1 offtces towards promoting the commencement of t'lIb between the parties, it will have made a valnable contribution towards reclllcing the friction in what has frequently been c1escribed as a particularly sensitive part of the globe. 68. tructions de amendements Royaume-Uni Rev.l]. tions cause négociations posons 68. tructions de amendements Royaume-Uni Rev.l]. tions cause négociations posons 68. 1t is in this spirit that, under my Government's instructions, my delegation, together with that of Yl1goslavia, proposes certain amendments to the United Kingdom revised draft resolution now before us [S/2358/Rev.1]. Our aim is to propose a basis for negotiation which will safegl1ard the legitimate position of each party and will offer a real possibility for the resumption of negotiations in a favollrable at1110sphere. VVe accorc1ingly propose the followîng amenclments [5/2379] : 68. 1t is in this spirit that, under my Government's instructions, my delegation, together with that of Yl1goslavia, proposes certain amendments to the United Kingdom revised draft resolution now before us [S/2358/Rev.1]. Our aim is to propose a basis for negotiation which will safegl1ard the legitimate position of each party and will offer a real possibility for the resumption of negotiations in a favollrable at1110sphere. VVe accorc1ingly propose the followîng amenclments [5/2379] : First, in the preamb1e, c1e1ete the paragraphs heginning with the words "Noting the action" and "conscious of the importance". First, in the preamb1e, c1e1ete the paragraphs heginning with the words "Noting the action" and "conscious of the importance". Secondly, in paragraph 1 of the operative part, c1elete the words, "the principles of the provisional measures indicatecl by the International Court of ] ustice unless mutually agreeable arrangements are macle consistent \Vith", so that the amendee! paragraph will read: Secondly, in paragraph 1 of the operative part, c1elete the words, "the principles of the provisional measures indicatecl by the International Court of ] ustice unless mutually agreeable arrangements are macle consistent \Vith", so that the amendee! paragraph will read: "Calls for: "1. The resumption of negotiations at the earliest practicable moment in. order to malee further efforts "Calls for: "1. The resumption of negotiations at the earliest practicable moment in. order to malee further efforts "2. The avoidance of any action which the effect of further aggravating the prejuc1icing the positions of the parties "2. The avoidance of any action which the effect of further aggravating the prejuc1icing the positions of the parties 69. Let me say a few words in explanation amendments. J am sure that ail of liS desire resumption of negotiations by the parties possible. As we ail Imow, negotiations were for several weeks and we were an c1isappointed they were suspended or broken off. Since the of negotiations.is what we are aiming at, to 1l1ake the resolution, so far as we can, both parties. From this point of view, it delegation that the references to the provisionalmeasnres indicated by the International Conrt of weil he deleted. Of the five measures which inclicatecl [S/2239], Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are, events that have happenecl since, no longer heing easily imple1l1ented. 69. Let me say a few words in explanation amendments. J am sure that ail of liS desire resumption of negotiations by the parties possible. As we ail Imow, negotiations were for several weeks and we were an c1isappointed they were suspended or broken off. Since the of negotiations.is what we are aiming at, to 1l1ake the resolution, so far as we can, both parties. From this point of view, it delegation that the references to the provisionalmeasnres indicated by the International Conrt of weil he deleted. Of the five measures which inclicatecl [S/2239], Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are, events that have happenecl since, no longer heing easily imple1l1ented. 70. No. 3 reads: 70. No. 3 reads: "That the Iranian Government and Kingdol11 Government should each ensure measure of any kincl should be taken hinder the carrying on of the industrial commercial operations of the Anglo-Iranian . Company, Limited, as they were carried May lst 1951". "That the Iranian Government and Kingdol11 Government should each ensure measure of any kincl should be taken hinder the carrying on of the industrial commercial operations of the Anglo-Iranian . Company, Limited, as they were carried May lst 1951". Since ail the technicians have· departed, longer possible. Since ail the technicians have· departed, longer possible. 71. No.4 reads: 71. No.4 reads: "That the Company's operations in continne l1l1der the direction of its management was constitutec1 prior to May 1st 1951, such modifications as 1l1ay be brought about ment with the Board of Supervision paragraph 5". "That the Company's operations in continne l1l1der the direction of its management was constitutec1 prior to May 1st 1951, such modifications as 1l1ay be brought about ment with the Board of Supervision paragraph 5". For the same reason, this measure also capable of implementation. For the same reason, this measure also capable of implementation. 72. No. 5 is based on Nos. 3 and 4 and incapable. in present circul11stances, of mented, so that what remains of these measures is only Nos. 1 and 2. These two ta .ensure that no action that might situation or prejudice rights woulc1 be Council will notice that the substance - measures is already containec1 in paragraph operative part of the clraft resolution. There no need for any reference to the provisional paragraph 1. 72. No. 5 is based on Nos. 3 and 4 and incapable. in present circul11stances, of mented, so that what remains of these measures is only Nos. 1 and 2. These two ta .ensure that no action that might situation or prejudice rights woulc1 be Council will notice that the substance - measures is already containec1 in paragraph operative part of the clraft resolution. There no need for any reference to the provisional paragraph 1. 73. l may refer at this point to the question Council's competence and make a observations, reserving my final views 73. l may refer at this point to the question Council's competence and make a observations, reserving my final views î 01 der, the Court, wlllie rndlcatmg provlslOnalmeasures ,ait de nature . ~xpressly stated .that the indicatiol? of these î 01 der, the Court, wlllie rndlcatmg provlslOnalmeasures ,ait de nature . ~xpressly stated .that the indicatiol? of these uger la jlOii- ,.'.•.•. l,n .no. ~ay preJudgeel the questIOn of the ! Jun sc1tctton and left unaffectecl the right of uger la jlOii- ,.'.•.•. l,n .no. ~ay preJudgeel the questIOn of the ! Jun sc1tctton and left unaffectecl the right of 1 . lsubmit arguments against such jurisdiction. s a ralSOI1 de', désirons tous : s le plus lot :. négociation; ~,74. The same position was maintained in aines elllOlli r: Cou ~·t oreler of. the ~ame elat~ which calleel llspcnduel c.~ ".' par.tles to .sl1bn11t thelr memonal and counter-memonal ns cst ce q'lt . by ~l certa!n date. In response to the second ndre la solu. U 111tec1 K111gdom Government submitted its 1 . lsubmit arguments against such jurisdiction. s a ralSOI1 de', désirons tous : s le plus lot :. négociation; ~,74. The same position was maintained in aines elllOlli r: Cou ~·t oreler of. the ~ame elat~ which calleel llspcnduel c.~ ".' par.tles to .sl1bn11t thelr memonal and counter-memonal ns cst ce q'lt . by ~l certa!n date. In response to the second ndre la solu. U 111tec1 K111gdom Government submitted its c~ptable po~r on 10 October 1.951, just. about a week ago. a ma déléga. . to that. memonal conta1l1s nearly twe~ty c~ptable po~r on 10 October 1.951, just. about a week ago. a ma déléga. . to that. memonal conta1l1s nearly twe~ty ~at()ires indj. fr observatIOns ~f the Governmen! o~ th.e 1!n:ted :tee peut tort ~. on the. ques~lOn of.the Court s Jttrlsdlctt~n. ; que la C~Ll " becn glven t1me untll 3 December to submlt 3, 4 et 5 r,t mcmoria1. Whether or not Iran avails itself qui sont SIlr- ?Pl~or~ur~ity, it seems dear that the .question ~at()ires indj. fr observatIOns ~f the Governmen! o~ th.e 1!n:ted :tee peut tort ~. on the. ques~lOn of.the Court s Jttrlsdlctt~n. ; que la C~Ll " becn glven t1me untll 3 December to submlt 3, 4 et 5 r,t mcmoria1. Whether or not Iran avails itself qui sont SIlr- ?Pl~or~ur~ity, it seems dear that the .question ~es. JUrJschctlOn has not yet been finally declded Conrt and is, in fact, sub judiC!! at the present .s les tenne5 ~es. JUrJschctlOn has not yet been finally declded Conrt and is, in fact, sub judiC!! at the present .s les tenne5 75. It may not therefore be wise or proper ta prononnce on this question while substantially same question is sub judice before the International Court of Justice. Jnst as the International Jllstice indicated provisional measures withont juc1gi ng the question of' jurisdiction, it possible for this Council also ta ask for the of negotiations between the parties without that question in any way. 76. The Council will observe that, besides amencl the operative part of the draft resolntion, clelegation aIsa proposes ta delete the paragraphs of the preamble. Since we propose out all references ta the provisional measures International Conrt of Jnstice from the operative there is no point in retaining in the preamble paragraph explaining the need for upholding Besicles, as l have already pointed out, the has maele it clear that it has not yet fmally question of its juriscliction. In these circumstances, pas non p1m l. thillk it advisable ta omit the last two paragraphs the preamble. 75. It may not therefore be wise or proper ta prononnce on this question while substantially same question is sub judice before the International Court of Justice. Jnst as the International Jllstice indicated provisional measures withont juc1gi ng the question of' jurisdiction, it possible for this Council also ta ask for the of negotiations between the parties without that question in any way. 76. The Council will observe that, besides amencl the operative part of the draft resolntion, clelegation aIsa proposes ta delete the paragraphs of the preamble. Since we propose out all references ta the provisional measures International Conrt of Jnstice from the operative there is no point in retaining in the preamble paragraph explaining the need for upholding Besicles, as l have already pointed out, the has maele it clear that it has not yet fmally question of its juriscliction. In these circumstances, pas non p1m l. thillk it advisable ta omit the last two paragraphs the preamble. l~ Gou\'erne·V a ce que ne· l~ Gou\'erne·V a ce que ne· kelqIle nature 1" Lyer la contil : .cO!l1l\l{'r~iale .!.,.' -III/lied. telle 1 " .. :i ehlliril'Il, sm! J kelqIle nature 1" Lyer la contil : .cO!l1l\l{'r~iale .!.,.' -III/lied. telle 1 " .. :i ehlliril'Il, sm! J 15 les tem:e,l 15 les tem:e,l n Iran ~e ",n- \ 1directeur tel .., n Iran ~e ",n- \ 1directeur tel .., US réserre ·.le 1 rtées cl'awlrd ' isée au para- US réserre ·.le 1 rtées cl'awlrd ' isée au paraes Nos 3 et -1t 77. l hope that, whatever may be the nltimate ation dans les 'Ir these amenclments, bath parties will understan ne re~te dt, friendly spirit which has animated them. es Nos 3 et -1t 77. l hope that, whatever may be the nltimate ation dans les 'Ir these amenclments, bath parties will understan ne re~te dt, friendly spirit which has animated them. .N05 1 et 1,' 78. Mr. BEBLER (Yugoslavia): l sho~tld ut a~gra\'er h ~ explain briefiy the views of my. delega~lOn :onsed remar· revised draft resolution of the U11lted Kmgdom. 'es fi~ure ~éJir de l'l~soh1l1ol'· 79. As the members of the Conncil will recall, mesures co,,· very outset of our discussion relatit;g ta c0111plaint against Iran [;559th me.ettng] , l the opinion that the Secun~y Councii w~s not .N05 1 et 1,' 78. Mr. BEBLER (Yugoslavia): l sho~tld ut a~gra\'er h ~ explain briefiy the views of my. delega~lOn :onsed remar· revised draft resolution of the U11lted Kmgdom. 'es fi~ure ~éJir de l'l~soh1l1ol'· 79. As the members of the Conncil will recall, mesures co,,· very outset of our discussion relatit;g ta c0111plaint against Iran [;559th me.ettng] , l the opinion that the Secun~y Councii w~s not 5 lI1ot5 de L )' ta deal with matters of thls order, Wd~ll~h wef formuler fille! ~. essentially within the domestic juris IctlOn 5 lI1ot5 de L )' ta deal with matters of thls order, Wd~ll~h wef formuler fille! ~. essentially within the domestic juris IctlOn 11101\ opinion' concerned - in this case, Iran. 11101\ opinion' concerned - in this case, Iran. if! if! 81. It appears, however, that some members of Council have a clifferent feeling on this question competence. Shollld their views prevaiI anel the of the Council he that it coüld make a useful contribution to an early satisfactory settlement of this matter the parties themselves, we wOllld naturally be anxiolls have it take a course which might, as we see it at help to achieve such a settlement. 82. In this regard, the general approach of the United Kingdom revised draft resolution, which caUs for resumption of negotiations at the earliest practicable moment in order to make fllrther efforts to resolve differences between the parties" [S/2358/ Rev.1], in the opinion of my de1egation, fundamentally a one. We have always considered that direct negotiations constitute the best method for dealing with differences of this kind; and, in this particnlar case, we feel strongly that sllch negotiations should be resumed. also feel, however, that they should be resumed conditions which would give them the greatest possible chance of success and, conversely, that anything might impair that chance of success should scrupulously avoided. We must, above alI, carefuily avoid even giving the impression that we attempting to impose a basis for the negotiations one of the parties might constrne as restricting its in the sphere of its domestic jurisdiction. 83. l feel, in this connexion, that certain changes the United Kingdom revised draft resolution better adapt it to the purpose we are seeking to achieve. V/bat l have in mine! are. the paragraphs which contain a direct reference to the provisional measures indicated by the International Court of Justice, and particulariy, the second and third paragraphs of one might cali the second part of the preamble starting with the words, "The Security Council". l would, fore, suggest the deletion of these two paragraphs. ,; '. 84. The same would apply to the language of "<~~''''., paragraphs of the aperative part. In paragraph 1 '-.:.i, operative part, l thi.nk it would be aelvisable to dispense ~~th the wards: "in accordance with the principles '~~J dt '~~J dt 85. For similar reasons, it would suffice in paragraph 2 of .the op.erative part to ask the parties ta avoid any 85. For similar reasons, it would suffice in paragraph 2 of .the op.erative part to ask the parties ta avoid any act101~ wlllch would have the effect of further aggravating the situation or which would prejudice their positions, withol1t entering the highly contentious field of rival rights and daims. These considerations have prompted my delegation to submit, jointly with the delegation of lndia, the amendments contained in document S/2379 which are now before the Council. act101~ wlllch would have the effect of further aggravating the situation or which would prejudice their positions, withol1t entering the highly contentious field of rival rights and daims. These considerations have prompted my delegation to submit, jointly with the delegation of lndia, the amendments contained in document S/2379 which are now before the Council. 86. In concluding, l would urge both the United Kingdom delegation and the Council, if it does feel empowered to take some such action as proposee! in the United Kingdom's revised draft resolution, to accept the changes proposed in these al11endl11ents. e!o feel that these changes would increase very considerably the Council's chances of attaining the goal which a11 me1l1bers of the Council, regardless of their differences on the legal aspect of the case, have in mind, that of helping the parties to come to an early and 1l1utua11y satisfactory settlement. 86. In concluding, l would urge both the United Kingdom delegation and the Council, if it does feel empowered to take some such action as proposee! in the United Kingdom's revised draft resolution, to accept the changes proposed in these al11endl11ents. e!o feel that these changes would increase very considerably the Council's chances of attaining the goal which a11 me1l1bers of the Council, regardless of their differences on the legal aspect of the case, have in mind, that of helping the parties to come to an early and 1l1utua11y satisfactory settlement. Cc.:: NI! Cc.:: NI!

The two proposaIs before the Council are very reminiscent of the Agreement which the British Government imposee! upon Iran. In article l of that Agreement, 1ran's independence was completely guaranteed; but in the other articles its anl1Y and revenue were placed under the supervision of the United Kingdol11.

The two proposaIs before the Council are very reminiscent of the Agreement which the British Government imposee! upon Iran. In article l of that Agreement, 1ran's independence was completely guaranteed; but in the other articles its anl1Y and revenue were placed under the supervision of the United Kingdol11. 88. Before speaking here for the last time and taking my leave of the Security Council, l should like to be able to reply to the speech made hy the United Kingdom representative. l wouId therefore request the Council to givc Ille time to read the speech, so that l may reply tomorrow afternoon. 89. vVhile l am speaking, l should just like to make my Government's position quite c1ear. For the reasons l have alrcady explained in my previous statements, the Security Council is not competent to deal with this question. Consequently, we shall oppose any chatt l'esolutian, however amendecl. 88. Before speaking here for the last time and taking my leave of the Security Council, l should like to be able to reply to the speech made hy the United Kingdom representative. l wouId therefore request the Council to givc Ille time to read the speech, so that l may reply tomorrow afternoon. 89. vVhile l am speaking, l should just like to make my Government's position quite c1ear. For the reasons l have alrcady explained in my previous statements, the Security Council is not competent to deal with this question. Consequently, we shall oppose any chatt l'esolutian, however amendecl. ,';,,\ 90. Ml'. TSIANG (China): What l have to sayat this moment is of a preliminary nature. It is intended ta help the Council to proceed in an orderly manner, which ,vOttld economize the time of the Council and avoid confusion. 91. The amendments moved by the delegations of India ane! Yllgoslavia [S/2379] are worthy of our study. Those amendments are based on the text submitted ta us by the United Kingdom delegation [S/2358/Rev.1]. In my preliminary statement, l shall therefore also use the United Kingdom document as the basic text. l should like the members of the Council, ,';"\ 90. Ml'. TSIANG (China): What l have to sayat this moment is of a preliminary nature. It is intended ta help the Council to proceed in an orderly manner, which ,vOttld economize the time of the Council and avoid confusion. 91. The amendments moved by the delegations of India ane! Yllgoslavia [S/2379] are worthy of our study. Those amendments are based on the text submitted ta us by the United Kingdom delegation [S/2358/Rev.1]. In my preliminary statement, l shall therefore also use the United Kingdom document as the basic text. l should like the members of the Council, '! .2. .• ~ '! .2. .• ~ 92. The first paragraph of the United Kingdol11 states, in one part, a fact; that is, the fact of a dispute, that a dispute exists. The second part goes characterize that dispute. At the very beginning discussion, l expressed my idea that that characterization was not appropriate, namely, that this dispute Clis likely ta threaten the maintenance of international peace and security". 93. l do not think this dispute is of that character. you put that phraseology in the draft resolution, will ask: who threatens peace and security? Furthermore this dispute belongs ta a special category. tainly does not belong in the domain of power politics. order ta help the two parties to find a solution, it humbly submit, the part of wisdol11 not to dramatize dispute, not ta attribute to it characteristics that should not have and does not have at this moment. 94. Therefore, l should like to see the second part the first paragraph entirely dropped. The paragraph states a fact, and l have nothing to regard to that. The third paragraph also mentions fact, but that fact wonld have some meaning if we went on to say what the United Kingdol11 says in the next two pal"agraphs. Since the movers the amendl11ents urge us to drop the next two graphs, the mere mention of the fact that the United Kingdom "requested the International Court Justice" seems to have no l11eaning. Theref.are, l suggest that, if we are going to drop the last paragraphs of the preamble, we might as weIl the third paragraph. 95. Then we come to the part which reads: "Conce1'ned at the dangers inherent in the dispute regarding the oil installations in Iran..." That, of course, is obvious. No matter what the of the dispute, we realize that it is an important dispute. It is a dispute which affects a vital interest of country and an important interest of another country. have no objection to that. But again, we have phrase, "the threat to international peace and security which may thereby be involved". l say that that is inappropriate and not helpful for the purpose this draft resolution has in mind, namely, to promote solution. Therefore, l wonder whether the movers the .amendment would not consider the dropping phrase "the t1ueat to international peace and security which may thereby be involved". 96. Tl/next two paragraphs, if l understand correctly, have been dropped by the movers of the amendments. ....... 97. Then we come to the phrase "CaUs for". l am ~ clear about the legal implications of that phrase. \ "'- representative of India said that the question , ~competency should, .for the time being, be left ~' that the Council might well proceed to bypass ~rurité inter- something, the Council implies that it has authority over this dispute. l wonder whether other phrase may not be better, in the sense " ;vould not. prej udice that questiop of competency. r .· ThereJore, 11lstead of the words "CaUs for", ~rurité inter- something, the Council implies that it has authority over this dispute. l wonder whether other phrase may not be better, in the sense " ;vould not. prej udice that questiop of competency. r .· ThereJore, 11lstead of the words "CaUs for", t d'une tel1e '.;;i(·. ~e~lain; :'4'wnte. Dt ,:,pèciale. n rlm- de foret l' :'llluliul1, il .. dram::lli,rr 'ftctàisliqltti 'lln- actuel!r. t d'une tel1e '.;;i(·. ~e~lain; :'4'wnte. Dt ,:,pèciale. n rlm- de foret l' :'llluliul1, il .. dram::lli,rr 'ftctàisliqltti 'lln- actuel!r. ", suggest the word "Advises". ", suggest the word "Advises". 98. T~le s~lbstantial amendment llloved by de1egatlOns 111 regard to paragraph 1 see11lS to 98. T~le s~lbstantial amendment llloved by de1egatlOns 111 regard to paragraph 1 see11lS to f f Cl great improvement. Cl great improvement. 99. .Par~g~"aph. 2 of the operative part certa111 d1111Cttltles. Of course, we do not lvlember State to aggravate the situation, already tense. So far as that is concerned, thel"e no obJection to that paragraph. But the paragraph certain consequences whlch we should foresee now. The oil industry is the principal industry Hs importance to Iran, l should assume, ouly to the importance of the land of Iran; land i cûmes first a11l0ng the natural resources of . thcn oil. That measures the importance of tbis 99. .Par~g~"aph. 2 of the operative part certa111 d1111Cttltles. Of course, we do not lvlember State to aggravate the situation, already tense. So far as that is concerned, thel"e no obJection to that paragraph. But the paragraph certain consequences whlch we should foresee now. The oil industry is the principal industry Hs importance to Iran, l should assume, ouly to the importance of the land of Iran; land i cûmes first a11l0ng the natural resources of . thcn oil. That measures the importance of tbis f,': l;l ileuxiin:" , Ipprimèe. If. rÎtli il dire!> f,': l;l ileuxiin:" , Ipprimèe. If. rÎtli il dire!> i(' t·gal:ll:ent 1''1''11r ~111\'lüm l'ni dans ~e~ • :mlt'lIfs des lkax alinéa.; i(' t·gal:ll:ent 1''1''11r ~111\'lüm l'ni dans ~e~ • :mlt'lIfs des lkax alinéa.; ~unt~ ...-L"'ni lia ~unt~ ...-L"'ni lia :t" .1ïmliql1er 'jlt, ilt:pour\'ll :t" .1ïmliql1er 'jlt, ilt:pour\'ll " . to Iran. That oil is also important to the Kingdom and, in faet, ta the whole free should like to see that oil iiow as it has in Re1ativcly, however, its importance to the Kingdom is 111uch less than its importmlce ta 41 100. If the phrase "avoidance of any " . to Iran. That oil is also important to the Kingdom and, in faet, ta the whole free should like to see that oil iiow as it has in Re1ativcly, however, its importance to the Kingdom is 111uch less than its importmlce ta 41 100. If the phrase "avoidance of any '~Ul' ~i notl3 niu,;; atinéa> 'llppnmer ~ '~Ul' ~i notl3 niu,;; atinéa> 'llppnmer ~ (.•. (.•. ' should mean total inaction during the peri negotiations, the consequences would be seriolls. inaction would have a bad effect on the economy ' should mean total inaction during the peri negotiations, the consequences would be seriolls. inaction would have a bad effect on the economy ( ( il:nt rè,!II!e; il:nt rè,!II!e; the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom would to reSl1l11e operations soon; l understand that. 4 consequences to Iran of a long periad of inaction r be fatal. the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom would to reSl1l11e operations soon; l understand that. 4 consequences to Iran of a long periad of inaction r be fatal. ;~ ~ r1-,ti~-rll~ tTI ;~ ~ r1-,ti~-rll~ tTI -. -·ü L.i nature :!. j~;~:t d\.n -. -·ü L.i nature :!. j~;~:t d\.n ' ' 101. Does this paragraph imply total inaction 101. Does this paragraph imply total inaction a~ ;Î!h..~h: t~:t a~ ;Î!h..~h: t~:t ',rl:~l1L; [oD;t! the period of negotiations? What would happen nJ,l, ~!1l1;, negotiations dragged on for a half-year of for mNiaü' qt:r ,1 'IA/oulcl this paragraph oblige the Iranian Government ... l:t 1J û(\:' remain inactive and to allow that incll1stry 1",,:,; ne :;{lnt t'· paralysed? l should like to have some explanation , ,. rlttelndre ~ that point. ,',,.i" il 5<lrüir 102. These are my preliminary reactions Hllh' <Inne 5: amendmcnts and to the United Kingdom ciraft :.ii'nt [".5 Il tion. l put the11l on the record no"y sin~ply ~o ',rl:~l1L; [oD;t! the period of negotiations? What would happen nJ,l, ~!1l1;, negotiations dragged on for a half-year of for mNiaü' qt:r ,1 'IA/oulcl this paragraph oblige the Iranian Government ... l:t 1J û(\:' remain inactive and to allow that incll1stry 1",,:,; ne :;{lnt t'· paralysed? l should like to have some explanation , ,. rlttelndre ~ that point. ,',,.i" il 5<lrüir 102. These are my preliminary reactions Hllh' <Inne 5: amendmcnts and to the United Kingdom ciraft :.ii'nt [".5 Il tion. l put the11l on the record no"y sin~ply ~o r r ~m'naœ que,' colleag'ues may keep these suggestlons 111 mmd ~ et la seell- b f ....: the period oI adjoUfllment eor~ we ne~t f those suggestions are ~ot taken .111to conslderatlOn, woulel have difficulty lU supportmg the amendments, and far greater difficulty in supporting the Kingc10m draIt. 103. Ml'. TSARAPKIN (Union ?f Soviet Republics) (tra-nslated fram .Rl~ssj.an): The c1e1egation has objected to the.11'lc1usl?n 111 the Couneil's agenda of the Umted Kl11gdom ~m'naœ que,' colleag'ues may keep these suggestlons 111 mmd ~ et la seell- b f ....: the period oI adjoUfllment eor~ we ne~t f those suggestions are ~ot taken .111to conslderatlOn, woulel have difficulty lU supportmg the amendments, and far greater difficulty in supporting the Kingc10m draIt. 103. Ml'. TSARAPKIN (Union ?f Soviet Republics) (tra-nslated fram .Rl~ssj.an): The c1e1egation has objected to the.11'lc1usl?n 111 the Couneil's agenda of the Umted Kl11gdom lt,~ amende- lt,~ amende- ,';&S 5ui,'anl,. ,';&S 5ui,'anl,. ,.". .leue me ,.". .leue me :<cnsi'luenœs :t' mill. Le ndr<1\t. polir 'i)mpétence, :<cnsi'luenœs :t' mill. Le ndr<1\t. polir 'i)mpétence, 105. The pnrpose of both draft resolutions to induce the Security Council to c10mcstic affairs. There is very little them. Both draft resolutions pursue intervention in the domestie affairs of Iran. 105. The pnrpose of both draft resolutions to induce the Security Council to c10mcstic affairs. There is very little them. Both draft resolutions pursue intervention in the domestie affairs of Iran. 106. The USSR de1egation has already sueh intervention in Iran's domestie entirely contrary to one of the most important of the Charter, set forth in Article 2, is, that nothing eontained in the Charter the United Nations to intervene in essentia1ly within the domestic jurisdiction The USSR delegation consic1ers sueh Iran's clomestic affairs inadmissible, a flagrant violation of the sovereignty people. 106. The USSR de1egation has already sueh intervention in Iran's domestie entirely contrary to one of the most important of the Charter, set forth in Article 2, is, that nothing eontained in the Charter the United Nations to intervene in essentia1ly within the domestic jurisdiction The USSR delegation consic1ers sueh Iran's clolllestic affairs inadmissible, a flagrant violation of the sovereignty people. 107. For these reasons, the USSR opposed ta both the first and the second 107. For these reasons, the USSR opposed ta both the first and the second 108. The amendments which have particular the Indian-Yugoslav and have no effect on the question we Theil' aim is ta make a question which the domestic jurisdiction of aState international negotiations, which is tantamount vention in Iran's domestic affairs. smcike-screen, whatever verbal camouflage these amendments and proposaIs, the remains the same: under one pretext in a more or less stringent form, to force negotiations and to make a question exclusively within its domestic jurisdiction international discussions. Once again us a flagrant violation of Article 2, paragraph Charter. 108. The amendments which have particular the Indian-Yugoslav and have no effect on the question we Theil' aim is ta make a question which the domestic jurisdiction of aState international negotiations, which is tantamount vention in Iran's domestic affairs. smcike-screen, whatever verbal camouflage these amendments and proposaIs, the remains the same: under one pretext in a more or less stringent form, to force negotiations and to make a question exclusively within its domestic jurisdiction international discussions. Once again us a flagrant violation of Article 2, paragraph Charter. 109. The USSR de1egation is opposed to the amendments to the Kingdom ch-aft resolution. The amenc1ments drait resolution pursue the samc end the c10mestic affairs of Iran and violation sovereignty, an end which is in direct the Charter. 109. The USSR de1egation is opposed to the amendments to the Kingdom ch-aft resolution. The amenc1ments drait resolution pursue the same end the c10mestic affairs of Iran and violation sovereignty, an end which is in direct the Charter. 110. These are the reasons why the is opposed to both the first and second cIraft resolutions and to a1l the amendments them. 110. These are the l'casons why the is opposed to both the first and second cIraft resolutions and to a1l the amendments them. '," .•,' the Ul1~tedNatlOnscould induIge in any such sentiment. '," .•,' the Ul1~tedNatlOnscould induIge in any such sentiment. _0 112. So far as we are concerned, of course l may _0 112. So far as we are concerned, of course l may ~; sa.y at. once that, as the representative of a party ta, ~; sa.y at. once that, as the representative of a party ta, ,~' thls dispute, l shall abstain when we come to the ,~' thls dispute, l shall abstain when we come to the ~. t voting. But in spite of that, the Council may wish ta ~. t voting. But in spite of that, the Council may wish ta '0 1 hear SO!l1e prel~111inary views of mine in regard ta the su.ggestlOns whlch have lately been macle, and notably \VIth regard ta the proposais of the representatives of '. l llc1ia ~nd Yugoslavia an~ the amendments which they '0 1 hear SO!l1e prel~111inary views of mine in regard ta the su.ggestlOns whlch have lately been macle, and notably \VIth regard ta the proposais of the representatives of '. l llc1ia ~nd Yugoslavia an~ the amendments which they :'1 have Clrculated and expla111ed. :'1 have Clrculated and expla111ed. '; 113. It is evident, of course, that these amendments ;:: ,~l: c1iminish verYd considerably the force and, sa far as we '; 113. It is evident, of course, that these amendments ;:: ,~l: c1iminish verYd considerably the force and, sa far as we ~;: al"C concerne , l am afraid, the utility of the already very waterecl-down ch"aft resolution which we had ~;: al"C concerne , l am afraid, the utility of the already very waterecl-down ch"aft resolution which we had .~.. vcntured. ta St1b~11it, 1110re especially, perhaps, if they .~.. vcntured. ta St1b~11it, 1110re especially, perhaps, if they '~~' are conslc1ered 111 the light of the doubts regarding h. compe~cnce which were voiced by the representative of Indla. As regards that last point, l may say that we firmly maintain, though l recognize that the doctrine is not l1niversally shared, that the proper way for a "n member to register his view on competence is by the t vote wltich he casts on the ch-ait resolution itself. l '~~' are conslc1ered 111 the light of the doubts regarding h. compe~cnce which were voiced by the representative of Indla. As regards that last point, l may say that we firmly maintain, though l recognize that the doctrine is not l1niversally shared, that the proper way for a "n member to register his view on competence is by the t vote wltich he casts on the ch-ait resolution itself. l shuulc1 hope, therefore, that, whatever the theory of ent' thc thing may be, that in practice is what it will amou11t shuulc1 hope, therefore, that, whatever the theory of ent' thc thing may be, that in practice is what it will amou11t \'Je: ta in the present case. 'it;' 114. As regards the amendments submitted by the \'Je: ta in the present case. 'it;' 114. As regards the amendments submitted by the il; l l'epresentative of China, l am afraid that they 'Nould il; l l'epresentative of China, l am afraid that they 'Nould ;Iiè 1 reclure the draft resolution to a practical zero. If those '" amcndl11ents were adopted, it would be, sa far as l am :- concernec1, like having a' resolution which saic1 that the ;Iiè 1 reclure the draft resolution to a practical zero. If those '" amcndl11ents were adopted, it would be, sa far as l am :- concernec1, like having a' resolution which saic1 that the Or; Security Council recognizes the existence of sin and r; advises hoth the parties to be good. That is just about ':. what it 'Nouic! amount to. Any faults it may have or, \'i lndced, any utility, woulc! be entirely extracted by this 1;1 process. It is perfectly obvious and that, no doubt, is ':: J the intention. \Vith great regret therefore, l must d'I' fir1111v oppose and urge the members ta oppose the -j . -. ' d [ 1 . f Cl . ' ~~'d l11gCl1lotlS amen ments 0' t1e representattve 0 mm. Or; Security Council recognizes the existence of sin and r; advises hoth the parties to be good. That is just about ':. what it 'Nouic! amount to. Any faults it may have or, \'i lndced, any utility, woulc! be entirely extracted by this 1;1 process. It is perfectly obvious and that, no doubt, is ':: J the intention. \Vith great regret therefore, l must d'I' fir1111v oppose and urge the members ta oppose the -j . -. ' d [ 1 . f Cl . ' ~~'d l11gCl1lotlS amen ments 0' t1e representattve 0 mm. '\f 115. As regards the powerful intervention of the '\f 115. As regards the powerful intervention of the ~. representative of the Soviet Union, of course one i rccognizes his motives in rushing so powerfully ta the ':.;'1, assistance of the neighbour on his right. l can only wonder what his attitude would be if, for instance, i/:.; the free and indepenc1ent Government of Romania Ii ,; rcpuc1iated the existing contractllal obligations whereby urt; the USSR exploits Romanian oil. vVe can only wonder ~. representative of the Soviet Union, of course one i rccognizes his motives in rushing so powerfully ta the ':.;'1, assistance of the neighbour on his right. l can only wonder what his attitude would be if, for instance, i/:.; the free and indepenc1ent Government of Romania Ii ,; rcpuc1iated the existing contractllal obligations whereby urt; the USSR exploits Romanian oil. vVe can only wonder . :_,.·_~_~:.r",' ..."hat his attitude would be as regards domestic jurisdiction in that regrettable event. f 116. Having said that, l think l should like a litt1e S ~j time _ pel'haps until tomorrow ~orning, if. the . :_,.·_~_~:.r",' ..."hat his attitude would be as regards domestic jurisdiction in that regrettable event. f 116. Having said that, l think l should like a litt1e S ~j time _ pel'haps until tomorrow ~orning, if. the 1~'" President would like to have a meet1l1g then - s1l11ply 1~'" President would like to have a meet1l1g then - s1l11ply l~"l to reflect on the Yugoslav and Indian amendments, the :t't b~a~~~~, f~t~h~~~~~;l, ...~~ d~U~~t fil:~llihe~;~~ci;~~~t~~em~ li l~"l to reflect on the Yugoslav and Indian amendments, the :t't b~a~~~~, f~t~h~~~~~;l, ...~~ d~U~~t fil:~llihe~;~~ci;~~~t~~em~ li

Tomarro", l shaH prove that there concession COlltract between the Government and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. \Vhen Govemment founel that ta continue to Jeal Company was not in the nation's interests, it llationalized the ail wells. \'Vhen l'Iilr. HarrÎman cume we drafted a formula whereby the United Governl11ent woulel agree, bath in its own acting for the Company, ta recognize the nationalization of our ail industry under that very formula.

Tomarro", l shaH prove that there concession COlltract between the Government and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. \Vhen Govemment founel that ta continue to Jeal Company was not in the nation's interests, it llationalized the ail wells. \'Vhen l'IŒr. HarrÎman cume we drafted a formula whereby the United Governl11ent woulel agree, bath in its own acting for the Company, ta recognize the nationalization of our ail industry under that very formula. 118. The Government of Iran mnst be contraI of the prospecting, extraction and of the ai!. The United Kingd011l Govermnellt recognizecl this requircm.cnt specifically withdraw; l should now like ta ask why it this ctuestion bcfme the Council, thus causing Conncil to intcrvene in a question not competence. 118. The Government of Iran mnst be contraI of the prospecting, extraction and of the ai!. The United Kingd011l Govermnellt recognizecl this requircm.cnt specifically withdraw; l should now like ta ask why it this ctuestion bcfme the Council, thus causing Conncil to intcrvene in a question not competence. 119. The Iranian Guvernmcnt has nationalized oil wells. The lranian Governmcnt wishes exploitation of the oil industry in its own lranian Government has always been prepared compensate the Company for any damages it and to settle its accounts with the Company - to wind up the matter in a reasonable way. The Government has always been prepared to ta aIl the States which have been purchasing past tIuee years. 119. The Iranian Guvernmcnt has nationalized oil wells. The lranian Governmcnt wishes exploitation of the oil industry in its own lranian Government has always been prepared compensate the Company for any damages it and to settle its accounts with the Company - to wind up the matter in a reasonable way. The Government has always been prepared to ta aIl the States which have been purchasing past tIuee years. 120. Conseqncntly, 1 cannot imagine any which Cüuld possibly make acceptable the amendments snblllitted by varions mernbers of the Couneil. 120. Conseqncntly, 1 cannot imagine any which Cüuld possibly make acceptable the amendments snblllitted by varions mernbers of the Couneil. 121. l appeal to yon to talce pitYon the Iraniall in their ntter povcrty, misery and destitution. he extre11lely dangero\1s if present conditions r caU upon the President and members of and l say: Beware of taking a decision cndanger international peace. 121. l appeal to yon to talce pitYon the Iraniall in their ntter povcrty, misery and destitution. he extre11lely dangero\1s if present conditions r caU upon the President and members of and l say: Beware of taking a decision cndanger international peace. 122. TOl11orrow afternooll l shaH further this point and prave that there is no contract the l ranian Government and the Company, that Great Britain wants is to be able to intervene in the matter. This is a habit Great Britain has now a whole century; the present is not a time it. 123. The PRESIDENT: In view of the the hour, l suggestcd that we adjourl1 110W again tomorro.v at 10.45 a.m. 124. Ml'. QUEVEDO (Ecuador): In view nature of the debate that we have had this and the importance of the amendments submitted representatives of India and Yugoslavia, l 11111ch like to have the Counci1 meet tomorrow if t11at is possible, rather thall in the lUorning. necessary to have sufficient time to consider carefl.ll1y. 122. TOl11orrow afternooll l shaH further this point and prave that there is no contract the l ranian Government and the Company, that Great Britain wants is to be able to intervene in the matter. This is a habit Great Britain has now a whole century; the present is not a time it. 123. The PRESIDENT: In view of the the hour, l suggestcd that we adjourl1 110W again tomorro.v at 10.45 a.m. 124. Ml'. QUEVEDO (Ecuador): In view nature of the debate that we have had this and the importance of the amendments submitted representatives of India and Yugoslavia, l 11111ch like to have the Counci1 meet tomorrow if t11at is possible, rather thall in the lUorning. necessary to have sufficient time to consider carefl.ll1y.

l intcnded to cali two meetings for tomorrow, one in the l1lorning and one in the afternonn. In vie\\" of the fact that alrcady there are two spl~akers for the morning meeting, r think it woulc\ Ile aclvisallle to I1wet in the morning, unless the

l intcnded to cali two meetings for tomorrow, one in the l1lorning and one in the afternonn. In vie\\" of the fact that alrcady there are two spl~akers for the morning meeting, r think it woulc\ Ile aclvisallle to I1wet in the morning, unless the ~. '-'1 " ". 1/ ~. '-'1 " ". 1/ ~ .. '·1 ,:'::"- ~ .. '·1 ,:'::"- represl~ntative of Ecuador has strong ohjections to this procedure. represl~ntative of Ecuador has strong ohjections to this procedure.

1 had intenc\ed to intervcnc for the purpose of suggesting what the President has nlready annonnced, namely, his intention of calling a meeting in the morning und, if nCCl'ssary, tn have one in the afternoon. However, having askcd to s[K>ak {or that pmpose, l should like ta make tl very brief comment.

1 had intenc\ed to intervcnc for the purpose of suggesting what the President has nlready annonnced, namely, his intention of calling a meeting in the morning und, if nCCl'ssary, tn have one in the afternoon. However, having askcd to s[K>ak {or that pmpose, l should like ta make tl very brief comment. "",J "",J ,"." 'i ", ,"." 'i ", .~ ~ -c, .~ ~ -c,

1 think that the consensus of " opinion of the members of the Coul1cil favoms our having two meetings tomorrow.

1 think that the consensus of " opinion of the members of the Coul1cil favoms our having two meetings tomorrow. The mcctitlg rose at 6.25 p,m. The mcctitlg rose at 6.25 p,m.

Tomorrow l shaH prove that there concession contra.ct betwecn the Government and the Anglo-Iranian ail Company, \Vhen the Government f(Juuel that to continue ta deal Company \Vas not in the nation's interests, it nationalized the oil wells. "Vl1c11 Ml'. Harriman came to we drafted <L fonnula. whereby the United Governmcnt would agree, both in its own acting for the Company, to recognize the nationalization of our oil inclustry unc1er that very formula.

Tomorrow l shaH prove that there concession contra.ct betwecn the Government and the Anglo-Iranian ail Company, \Vhen the Government f(Juuel that to continue ta deal Company \Vas not in the nation's interests, it nationalized the oil wells. "Vl1c11 Ml'. Harriman came to we drafted <L fonnula. whereby the United Governmcnt would agree, both in its own acting for the Company, to recognize the nationalization of our oil inclustry unc1er that very formula. 118. The Govemment of Iran must be in control of the prospecting, extraction and exploitation of the oil. The Unitec1 Kingdom Governmel1t recognizec1 this requirement specifically and withdraw; l should now like ta ask why it has this question hcfore the Council, thus cal1sing Council to intervene in a question not competence. 118. The Govemment of Iran must be in control of the prospecting, extraction and exploitation of the oil. The Unitec1 Kingdom Governmel1t recognizec1 this requirement specifically and withdraw; l should now like ta ask why it has this question hcfore the Council, thus cal1sing Council to intervene in a question not competence. 119. The lranian Govermuent has nationalized oil wells. The lnlllian Governmeut wishes ta exploitation of the oil industry in its own hands. lranian Government has always been prepared campensnte the Company for any damag"es it and ta settle its acconnts with the Company ta \Vinci up the ma.tter in ft reasonable way. The Government has always been prepared ta sell ta ail the States which have been purchasing past tilt'ee years. 119. The lranian Govermuent has nationalized oil wells. The lnlllian Governmeut wishes ta exploitation of the oil industry in its own hands. lranian Government has always been prepared campensate the Company for any damag"es it and ta settle its acconnts with the Company ta \Vinci up the ma.tter in ft reasonable way. The Government has always been prepared ta sell ta ail the States which have been purchasing past tilt'ee years. 120. Cansequently, l cannat imagine any which could possibly make acceptable the a11lendments suh11litted by various members of the Council. 120. Cansequently, l cannat imagine any which could possibly make acceptable the a11lendments suh11litted by various members of the Council. 121. l appeal ta you ta take pitY on the Iranian in their utl:er poverty, misery und destitution. be extrcmely dangerolls if present conditions l caH upon the fi resident and members of the and l say: Beware of taking a decision which endanger international peace. 121. l appeal ta you ta take pitY on the Iranian in their utl:er poverty, misery und destitution. be extrcmely dangerolls if present conditions l ca1l upon the fi resident and members of the and l say: Beware of taking a decision which endanger international peace. 122. T01l101TOW afternoon l shall fmther this point and proye that there is no contract the lranian Govem11lent and the Company, and that Great Britain Wallis is to be able ta intervene matter. This is Cl habit Great Britain has now a whole century; the present is not a time ta it. 123. The PRESIDENT: In view of the the honr, l suggested that we adjourll now agaiu. tomorrow at 10.45 a.m. 124. Ml'. QUEVEDO (Ecuador): In view nature of the debate that we have had this and the importance of the a11lend11lents submitted representatives of India aud Yugoslavia, l ShOLÜd 11luch like to have the Councilmeet tomorrow if that is possible, rather than in the morning. nccessary to have suffieient time to consider the carefully. 122. T01l101TOW afternoon l shall fmther this point and proye that there is no contract the lranian Govem11lent and the Company, and that Great Britain Wallis is to be able ta intervene matter. This is Cl habit Great Britain has now a whole century; the present is not a time ta it. 123. The PRESIDENT: In view of the the honr, l suggested that we adjourll now agaiu. tomorrow at 10.45 a.m. 124. Ml'. QUEVEDO (Ecuador): In view nature of the debate that we have had this and the importance of the a11lend11lents submitted representatives of India aud Yugoslavia, l ShOLÜd 11luch like to have the Councilmeet tomorrow if that is possible, rather than in the morning. nccessary to have suffieient time to consider the carefully. lü11lfnt ' avons' 126. The PRESIDENT: l intended to cali ent du meetings for tomorrow, one in the morning and one Ille! ttt the afternoon. In view of the fact that already recon· i are two speakers for the morning meeting, l think :rolière, would be advisable to l11eet in the morning, unless representative of Ecuador has strong objections to procedure. lü11lfnt ' avons' 126. The PRESIDENT: l intended to cali ent du meetings for tomorrow, one in the morning and one Ille! ttt the afternoon. In view of the fact that already recon· i are two speakers for the morning meeting, l think :rolière, would be advisable to l11eet in the morning, unless representative of Ecuador has strong objections to procedure. m dEi tyerne· Dni ra tir. Jel' m dEi tyerne· Dni ra tir. Jel' ~27. Mr. G:J3.0SS (United States of America): 1l1tended to mtervene for the plU'pose of suggesting what the President has already annoullced, namely, intention of calling a meeting in the 1110rning and, necessary, to have one in the afternoon. However, having asked to speak for that purpose, l should like to a very brief comment. ~27. Mr. G:J3.0SS (United States of America): 1l1tended to mtervene for the plU'pose of suggesting what the President has already annoullced, namely, intention of calling a meeting in the 1110rning and, necessary, to have one in the afternoon. However, having asked to speak for that purpose, l should like to a very brief comment. :'ll~ d~ :'ll~ d~ ~ell. Ct altaire ~ell. Ct altaire t-à.direl'. ,ce GOll' i Ire son' :urs du: t-à.direl'. ,ce GOll' i Ire son' :urs du: 's puits le l'ex· mains : 's puits le l'ex· mains : 128. In view of the fact that amendments have suhmitted .today by the Governments of India y ugoslavia, l should simply like to say that my ernment would like the opportunity to consider amendments most carefully. l want to reserve now, l may, the right of my delegation to state more at a subsequent meeting, presnmably tomorrow, our position will be. 129. Having said that l11uch, l think it might also appropriate to say that the favourable attitude of United States Government toward the pending resolution is grounded upon the unalterable friendship of the United States for hoth the people of Iran and people of the United Kingdom, and is motivated by the desire to see the parties to this dispute reach just and constructive solution as soon as possible. 128. In view of the fact that amendments have suhmitted .today by the Governments of India y ugoslavia, l should simply like to say that my ernment would like the opportunity to consider amendments most carefully. l want to reserve now, l may, the right of my delegation to state more at a subsequent meeting, presnmably tomorrow, our position will be. 129. Having said that l11uch, l think it might also appropriate to say that the favourable attitude of United States Government toward the pending resolution is grounded upon the unalterable friendship of the United States for hoth the people of Iran and people of the United Kingdom, and is motivated by the desire to see the parties to this dispute reach just and constructive solution as soon as possible. à CoJlJJ' gnu Cft à CoJlJJ' gnu Cft ~S, , ~S, , '011 qui:. 'sts par 1 '011 qui:. 'sts par 1 ,1;, f' l' , ._.- .... ! ~i h ,1;, f' l' , ._.- .... ! ~i h "F,n~: , (',\rd"Ji ' Ir: uney lale. ~~ "F,n~: , (',\rd"Ji ' Ir: uney lale. ~~ 130. l shaH reserve my comments regarding amel1dments until our llext meeting. 131. ML QUEVEDO (Ecuador): If the majority the Security Council feels that it is necessary ta two meetings tomorrow, I shall have nothing more say. 130. l shaH reserve my comments regarding amel1dments until our llext meeting. 131. ML QUEVEDO (Ecuador): If the majority the Security Council feels that it is necessary ta two meetings tomorrow, I shall have nothing more say. ;; êXPli-!' : altC\\I"l ill'.lgnie' le, ù~tt le klO;"." t lŒ lit l'i s): Vu! de li':':!;: ;; êXPli-!' : altC\\I"l ill'.lgnie' le, ù~tt le klO;"." t lŒ lit l'i s): Vu! de li':':!;:

I think that the consénsus opinion of the members of the Council favours having two meetings tomorrow.

I think that the consénsus opinion of the members of the Council favours having two meetings tomorrow. The meeûng rose at 6.25 p.m. The meeûng rose at 6.25 p.m. j io' 1';;;-' is.aw:;f j io' 1';;;-' is.aw:;f IltS. p:,'" Youç ,)f)ssit:' i, plut; !Us ù'· roblèn IltS. p:,'" Youç ,)f)ssit:' i, plut; !Us ù'· roblèn United Nation. publication. can furthe, ',em the fo/Jo'lfl.'l boohelle..: GERMANY - ALLEMAGNE AU Buchh.ndlung Elwert & Meul'er, Haupl.' B. slrasse, 101, Berlln·Schoncberg. Salzburg. W. E•. Saarbach, Frankenslrasse, 14, Këln-Junkersdorf. JAPAN Alexander Hom, Splegelgasse, 'l, Maru,en WIesbaden. Nlhonbashl, Orders and inquiries From countr!es wh.,e ha.ve nDt ret bun appointed may he .ont Clrcùlatlon Sedlcln, Unitod ~lations, Now of S.les Section, United Nalions Office, Nation•• Gene"., Switterland. United Nation. publication. can furthe, ',em the '0/10'1(1.'1 boohelle..: GERMANY - ALLEMAGNE AU Buchh.ndlung Elwert & Meul'er, Haupl.' B. slrasse, 101, Berfln-Schëincberg. Salzburg. W. E•. Saarbach, Frankenslra55e, 14, Këln-Junkersdorf. JAPAN Alexander Hom, Splegelgasse, 'l, Maru,"n Wiesbaden. Nlhonbashl, Orders and inquiries From countries wh.,e ha.ye nDt yet bun appointed may he ,ont Clrcùlatlon Sedlcln, Unitod ~lations, New of S.les Section, United NaHons Office, Nation•• Gen."., Switterland. Priuted in Canada (or equivalellt Priuted in Canada (or equivalellt