S/PV.562 Security Council

Session 6, Meeting 562 — UN Document ↗ OCR ✓ 2 unattributed speechs 2 duplicate speechs
This meeting at a glance
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Resolutions
Topics
General statements and positions General debate rhetoric International criminal justice War and military aggression

SIXIEME ANNEE
SIXIEME ANNEE
PLUSI-IING MEADOW), NEW
PLUSI-IING MEADOW), NEW
A/l United Nations combined with fignres. Nations doc'Ul1tent.
A/l United Nations combined with fignres. Nations doc'Ul1tent.
Les doc'uments lettres majuscules lignifie qu'il s'agit
Les doc'uments lettres majuscules lignifie qu'il s'agit
The agenda was adopted.
The agenda was adopted.
Unless l am mistaken, this is the that the Security Council has cleait with essentially arising out of a dispute between government and a foreign company. Consequently, decision which we take will constitute. an precedent for future decisions· of the Secürity
Unless l am mistaken, this is the that the Security Council has cleait with essentially arising out of a dispute between government and a foreign company. Consequently, decision which we take will constitute. an precedent for future decisions· of the Secürity 13. Ecuaclor has not thus far maintained diplomatic or economic relations with Iran, maintain cordial, friendly and lasting relations the Unitecl Kingelom, a Power which helpecl gain our inclependence and later initiatecl our progress with its technique and capital. Nevertheless, on problems like the one we are considering Government must inevitably base its opinion international instruments ta which the Repuhlics, including Ecuador, are parties. these agreements, together with other principles, the basis for a just equilibrium and fair between the inclustrialized ancl non-industrialized countries, between a sovereign State and foreign and undertakings. l shal1 go on to cite al1110st 'literally, some of the rules ancl prineiples forth in these inter-American international - l have the aeinal texts with me - which are related to a case such as this, 13. Ecuaclor has not thus far maintained diplomatic or economic relations with Iran, maintain cordial, friendly and lasting relations the Unitecl Kingelom, a Power which helpecl gain our inclependence and later initiatecl our progress with its technique and capital. Nevertheless, on problems like the one we are considering Government must inevitably base its opinion international instruments ta which the Repuhlics, including Ecuador, are parties. these agreements, together with other principles, the basis for a just equilibrium and fair between the inclustrialized ancl non-industrialized countries, between a sovereign State and foreign and undertakings. l shal1 go on to cite al1110st 'literally, some of the rules ancl prineiples forth in these inter-American international - l have the aeinal texts with me - which are related to a case such as this, minait L," IIIS ~\\'alt ',le:. :;:<.:., minait L," IIIS ~\\'alt ',le:. :;:<.:., .pollr tX;\". ", ":":r~.' r~ l;ari, :"--'~~\', .. ) .pollr tX;\". ", ":":r~.' r~ l;ari, :"--'~~\', .. ) l dtm:\!i:' ':.:; . . r:illln" n :; '.:," l dtm:\!i:' ':.:; . . r:illln" n :; '.:," ~ptéc U(:'l~··::t\ "1 ." -,' lUI a~i:l:'-'l, ~ptéc U(:'l~··::t\ "1 ." -,' lUI a~i:l:'-'l, 1 ProlH',~it; '-L'. S llIt'mi:,·· ~·':1 lui c;.ti::,: .' 1 ProlH',~it; '-L'. S llIt'mi:,·· ~·':1 lui c;.ti::,: .' 14. One of the rights of aState is to enact ta manage -its interests and ta administer AState has jurisdiction within its national over ail its inhabitants, whether nationals They are ail equally under the protection ta the jurisdiction of thenational8.uthorities; may not claimother or greatel' rights thannationals. 14. One of the rights of aState is to enact ta manage -its interests and ta administer AState has jurisdiction within its national over ail its inhabitants, whether nationals They are ail equally under the protection ta the jurisdiction of thenational8.uthorities; may not claimother or greatel' rights thannationals. 1111 Co:::.' ' , Illtinll ,ë,: .• :' 1111 Co:::.' ' , Illtinll ,ë,: .• :' '1l1l•.~ti!,;: ': ':"; l, Ct'rlaiH',.' '. '1l1l•.~ti!,;: ': ':"; l, Ct'rlaiH',.' '. iull dt b ; "j' Il"t:"t l't· ;',:. iull dt b ; "j' Il"t:"t l't· ;',:. Eq~1ality with nationais is the maxin~u:n whlch aliens may demand under the positive of States. No State or group of States may for any reason, either directly or inclirectly, internai or external affairs of another State. is the use of armed force forbic1den but also form of intervention or any action designed a State or its political, .economic Or cultural . State may use or insttgate the. use of .econQmic pressure ta force another State ta Eq~1ality with nationais is the maxin~u:n whlch aliens may demand under the positive of States. No State or group of States may for any reason, either directly or inclirectly, internai or external affairs of another State. is the use of armed force forbic1den but also form of intervention or any action designed a State or its political, .economic Or cultural . State may use or insttgate the. use of .econQmic pressure ta force another State ta 1 11011 p.::: ;. : 1 11011 p.::: ;. : ~,nl ur\{~~' "'~ ~,nl ur\{~~' ".~ l Ù i'jll'~ t ~ -~'~", l Ù i'jll'~ t ~ -~'~", :ulti:t'r ,.':' mont :Hi\ 1:;:',," "allt 1\\\' " ".' (. C. 'l1~t:: ',,:,:' IX pari.Î:"'~ =-;,"::" :ulti:t'r ,.':' mont :Hi\ 1:;:',," "allt 1\\\' " ".' (. C. 'l1~t:: ',,:,:' IX pari.Î:"'~ =-;,"::" t11lt'1l1 '';' t11lt'1l1 '';' 15. The American States have agre~d. pcacdul measures for the solution of thelr differcllces, lJllt have c1ecided tl;at such ~lleasures he applicd to allY matter. wl:l1c1:, ~)y. ItS falls within the clomesttc ]urlschctlOn Nevertbe1ess, they have also c1ecided parties c1iffer on whethcr the subject falls c1ol11estic jurisc1iction, this preliminary he stlhmitted for seulement ta the InternatIOnal of Justice at the request of either party. Hi. A few of these States have mac1e the elfect that the matters which fall domestic jurisdiction of a country must be country itself. The parties must not make representations to protect their nationals, dispute to the International Court of Justice purpose, while the natio11als can take their domestic courts of the State concernec1. proceedings must not be resortec1 to until exhatlstec1 aIl the measures provic1ec1 for of the country in \vhich the action is initiatec1. 17. With respect to Article 36, paragraph Statllt.e of .,the I.11ternational Court of All~encall h.epubhcs have agreec1 that, whlcl~ they recog11ize the compulsory tl~e Court, as well as in a case in which d!ffer Slll ,,:hether or not the Court has Court Itselt sball settle the question of competence. of these Sta~es. h~ve. made reservations compulsary JUr1sdlctton of the Court in rt'scrvat!ons th~y each mac1e when c1ec1aratlOn provlc1ed for under Article 18. On. the other hanc1, none of the American has de.nled the rule, recognized by international t~at ~hens m;1st exhaust the available local J'orCIgll capital and investments Inust trcatmel~t. !he American States have t;~ke ~11l]usttfied, unreasonable or discriminatory atf~cttng the legal1y acquired rights or the nathmals of o~l~er cOtl11tries, on any grounds to .allY crJ!lelttlOns otller than· those natwnal expropriation in the constitution eacl.l conntry. They have also agreed tllat 't 1> ' mus le accon~pal11ed by prompt, adeqnate payment of fatr compensation. 19. In subscribing to this convention of the A . S ' affect th~11~r~ca~ 1 ta~es exp~essly stated la~ of th~ \:~dc~ld ~h~~ fo~~gn caPdital is ,WI regar to the standa~c1s ",:hich are already ; part of international law. lwen If not universally accepted, they have at least been accepted by a large number of States in an important geographical sector of the world. standa~c1s ",:hich are already ; part of international law. lwen If not universal1y accepted, they have at least been accepted by a large number of States in an important geographical sector of the world. 21. In deciding whether or not a dispute falls within the domestic jurisdiction of aState, it seems clear that the 11rst question to consider is the nature of the dispute. 21. In deciding whether or not a dispute falls within the domestic jurisdiction of aState, it seems clear that the 11rst question to consider is the nature of the dispute. 22. Even in the case of disputes on economic questions - and what l am saying now is not contained in the international treaties or other documents to which l have referred - even in the case of disputes which are basically economic and arise out of the activity of an alien indiviclual or company in the territory of aState, there is an American convention which provides that, shoulcl there he disagreement as to whether or not the case falls within the domestic j urisdiction, this very point should be suhmitted to the International Court of Justice. Bnt, in our view, the solution of the question of jurisdiction is much dearer in the case of a direct dispute between two States. l am referring, for example, ta disputes involving territorial daims, or ta cases where two States believe or daim that they are entitled to the same territory, or cases involving the houndaries between two States or a difference in the actllal demarcation of their frontiers. In such cases, the question is clearly not one which comes within the domestic jllrisdiction of a single State, and one State cannot decide unilaterally that the matter cames within its domestic jurisdiction. Because of the very nature of the dispute, the jurisdiction in such cases must be international. In the view of my Govermnent, all that aState can hope for in snch cases when it claims that a matter is within its domestic jurisdiction, in arder to prevent the application of an international measure far peaceful settlement, is that the International Court of Justice may be called upon ta decide whether the dispute is purely one of domestic jurisdiction or cames under international law. 22. Even in the case of disputes on economic questions - and what l am saying now is not contained in the international treaties or other documents to which l have referred - even in the case of disputes which are basically economic and arise out of the activity of an alien indiviclual or company in the territory of aState, there is an American convention which provides that, shoulcl there he disagreement as to whether or not the case falls within the domestic j urisdiction, this very point should be suhmitted to the International Court of Justice. Bnt, in our view, the solution of the question of jurisdiction is much dearer in the case of a direct dispute between two States. l am referring, for example, ta disputes involving territorial daims, or ta cases where two States believe or daim that they are entitled to the same territory, or cases involving the houndaries between two States or a difference in the actllal demarcation of their frontiers. In such cases, the question is clearly not one which comes within the domestic jllrisdiction of a single State, and one State cannot decide unilaterally that the matter cames within its domestic jurisdiction. Because of the very nature of the dispute, the jurisdiction in such cases must be international. In the view of my Govermnent, all that aState can hope for in snch cases when it claims that a matter is within its domestic jurisdiction, in arder to prevent the application of an international measure far peaceful settlement, is that the International Court of Justice may be called upon ta decide whether the dispute is purely one of domestic jurisdiction or cames under international law. ', ', 23. With regard to the sùbject we are diseussing today _ and l should like the members of the COllncil to reflect on this point - the question of domestic or international jurisdiction, of whether or not the dispute falls exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of Iran, is to be decided by the International Court of Justice. If the Court declares itself competent in the matter, it will thereby deny that the case i~ one for domesti.c jurisdiction and will give a final Juclgment. Then, If either Iran or the United Kingdom refuses to comply with the judgment, the oth~r State :vi.ll clearly be entitled to appeal to the Seeunty Conncll 111 accordance with Article 94, paragraph 2, of the Charter. If, on the other hand the Court decicles that it is not competent beeause th~ case faIls within the domestic jurisdiction, the Security Cottncil should not then intervene in a 23. With regard to the sùbject we are diseussing today _ and l should like the members of the COllncil to reflect on this point - the question of domestic or international jurisdiction, of whether or not the dispute falls exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of Iran, is to be decided by the International Court of Justice. If the Court declares itself competent in the matter, it will thereby deny that the case i~ one for domesti.c jurisdiction and will give a final Juclgment. Then, If either Iran or the United Kingdom refuses to comply with the judgment, the oth~r State :vi.ll clearly be entitled to appeal to the Seeunty Conncll 111 accordance with Article 94, paragraph 2, of the Charter. If, on the other hand the Court decicles that it is not competent because th~ case faIls within the domestic jurisdiction, the Security Cottncil should not then intervene in a 25. COllsequently, it would in our view he - l repeat the word inac1visable - for the Council to mIe on this point collectively, as an organ United Nations, whatever the illdividual opinion one of us may be. 25. COllsequently, it would in our view he - l repeat the word inac1visable - for the Council to mIe on this point collectively, as an organ United Nations, whatever the illdividual opinion one of us may be. 26. As far as my Government is concerned, coufine myself to stating that, in its nationalization of the oil industry in Iran is Inatter - and legally. unassailable provic1ed whose lawful rights are affected by it are compensation - and cannot of itself afford a complaint to the Security Counci1. The nationalization is based on the right of every sovereign State legislation, a right recognized by Article 1, and Article 2, paragraph 7, of the United Charter. 26. As far as my Government is concerned, coufine myself to stating that, in its nationalization of the oil industry in Iran is Inatter - and legally. unassailable provic1ed whose lawful rights are affected by it are compensation - and cannot of itself afford a complaint to the Security Counci1. The nationalization is based on the right of every sovereign State legislation, a right recognized by Article 1, and Article 2, paragraph 7, of the United Charter. 27. On the other hand, my delegation considers if . justice is not done to the plaintiff after exhausted a11 the available means within jurisc1iction, there has then been a denial of believe that a denial of justice should be before any diplomatic action, apart from exercise of good offices, is taken by a attempting to protect the rights of its nationals. 27. On the other hand, my delegation considers if . justice is not done to the plaintiff after exhausted a11 the available means within jurisc1iction, there has then been a denial of believe that a denial of justice should be before any diplomatic action, apart from exercise of good offices, is taken by a attempting to protect the rights of its nationals. 28. From the facts which have so far arisen discussion in the Council, my delegation consider that there has yet been a denial any rate a clear-cut one, in the dispute lranian Government and the Anglo-Iranian Company, though there may be one later does there seem to have been a denial of we bear iù mind that the complaint is basec1 causee! to a foreign company having rights contract, notby any arbitrary action of one the Iranian Government but by a general measure providing for nationalization, 28. From the facts which have so far arisen discussion in the Council, my delegation consider that there has yet been a denial any rate a clear-cut one, in the dispute lranian Government and the Anglo-Iranian Company, though there may be one later does there seem to have been a denial of we bear iù mind that the complaint is basec1 causee! to a foreign company having rights contract, notby any arbitrary action of one the Iranian Government but by a general measure providing for nationalization, 29. Furthermore, l personally do not consic1er there can be a violation of international law contract conduded l:iy a sovereign State individual or a company is broken or voided consequence of, a general statute. The law be unjnst, for the law respect acquired every State knows what is vital to it and what and, mOl'eover, some process of law must the plaintiff by which he may daim any which he is entitled. 29. Furthermore, l personally do not consic1er there can be a violation of international law contract conduded l:iy a sovereign State individual or a company is broken or voided consequence of, a general statute. The law be unjnst, for the law respect acquired every State knows what is vital to it and what and, mOl'eover, some process of law must the plaintiff by which he may daim any which he is entitled. 30. We have also considered whether Government has refused to pay compensation. study. of the Iranian statute on the nationalization 30. We have also considered whether Government has refused to pay compensation. study. of the Iranian statute on the nationalization 31. So far, my delegation has heard no evidence in this discussion that the lt'anian Government has violated any treaty with the United Kingdom. 31. So far, my delegation has heard no evidence in this discussion that the lt'anian Government has violated any treaty with the United Kingdom. 32. \Ve must aiso consider whether the oil nationalizatioll statute is of general application. From the wording of the statute, the answer to this question appears to be in the affirmative even though it, in fact, only affects a single forcign company. 33. In our view, before the Security COl1ncil could be competent to deal with this case under Chapter VI of the Charter, there would have ta be an international dispute or situation between two States or nations, whether or not a nation concerned had organized itself as a State or whether or not the State had been recognized. l should like to refer to the example given by the President of the Counci1. There is a snbstantiai difference between the Indonesian case, which concernecl a dispute betwecn two nations one of which had not yet been constitllted as a sovereign State or recognized as such by the international comn1tlnity, and the present case, in which the dispute originated in a difference between a sovereign State and a foreign company. 32. \Ve must aiso consider whether the oil nationalizatioll statute is of general application. From the wording of the statute, the answer to this question appears to be in the affirmative even though it, in fact, only affects a single forcign company. 33. In our view, before the Security COl1ncil could be competent to deal with this case under Chapter VI of the Charter, there would have ta be an international dispute or situation between two States or nations, whether or not a nation concerned had organized itself as a State or whether or not the State had been recognized. l should like to refer to the example given by the President of the Counci1. There is a snbstantiai difference between the Indonesian case, which concernecl a dispute betwecn two nations one of which had not yet been constitllted as a sovereign State or recognized as such by the international comn1tlnity, and the present case, in which the dispute originated in a difference between a sovereign State and a foreign company. 34. A further requirement is that the dispute or situation shall constitute a threat to the maintenance of international peace and security. It is questionable whether the Council is empowered under Article 24, paragraph 1, or Article 25 of the Charter to make recoml11endations in cases where there is no dispute between two States, or where the dispute or situation does not constitute a threat to the peace. 35. Divergent views on the first question have been expressed in the British and the Iranian statements before the Counci1. It is true that there have been ncgotiations in Teheran between the Iranian Government and a delegation from the United Kingdom Government representing the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, with the personal representative of the Head of a third State exercising gooe! offices. However, we must now ask a further question: If a government claims the so-calleel right of diplomatic protection and there naturally follows ,a diplomatie discussion with the other government - for that must naturally follow if the relations between the two countries concerned remain normalcan the mere exercise of diplomatic protection transform a dispute between one of these States and a foreign company inta a dispt~te betwe~n the two States? If the answer to that questlOn were 111 the affirmative, then any case of diplomatie intervention, whether justified or unjustified, would alter the nature of the dispute and make it an international one. Consequently, in my view the question is highly debatable. 34. A further requirement is that the dispute or situation shall constitute a threat to the maintenance of international peace and security. It is questionable whether the Council is empowered under Article 24, paragraph 1, or Article 25 of the Charter to make recoml11endations in cases where there is no dispute between two States, or where the dispute or situation does not constitute a threat to the peace. 35. Divergent views on the first question have been expressed in the British and the Iranian statements before the Counci1. It is true that there have been ncgotiations in Teheran between the Iranian Government and a delegation from the United Kingdom Government representing the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, with the personal representative of the Head of a third State exercising gooe! offices. However, we must now ask a further question: If a government claims the so-calleel right of diplomatic protection and there naturally follows ,a diplomatie discussion with the other government - for that must naturally follow if the relations between the two countries concerned remain normalcan the mere exercise of diplomatic protection transform a dispute between one of these States and a foreign company inta a dispt~te betwe~n the two States? If the answer to that questlOn were 111 the affirmative, then any case of diplomatie intervention, whether justified or unjustified, would alter the nature of the dispute and make it an international one. Consequently, in my view the question is highly debatable. f 1 f 1 1r 1r l, l, ~. ~. ~. l ~. l I~il."""'" ; fîJi :; 1 I~il."""'" ; fîJi :; 1 37. Only if it did so would the Council oe competent to deal with the case and to make recommendations under Article 36 of the Charter. If the situation involve a threat to the maintenance of peace between two countries, even if only at one point, in one we should have to reacl1 a different conclusion peace being one and indivisible, the existence of totl1e peace does not depend upon the material the danger or upon the geographical area affected. 37. Only if it did so would the Council oe competent to deal with the case and to make recommendations under Article 36 of the Charter. If the situation involve a threat to the maintenance of peace between two countries, even if only at one point, in one we should have to reacl1 a different conclusion peace being one and indivisible, the existence of totl1e peace does not depend upon the material the danger or upon the geographical area affected. 38. In regard to the power of the Council Article 94, paragraph 2, of the Cbarter recoml11enc1ations or decide upou measures to to give eHect to a judgment rendered by the seems to me that the wording of Article 94 implies the power of the Cou\1cil comes into being only the International Court of Justice gives a final and not when it merely indicates provisional evell though, according to the Court, these are ta ellsure that effect sha11 be given to a later j udgment. 38. In regard to the power of the Council Article 94, paragraph 2, of the Cbarter recoml11enc1ations or decide upou measures to to give eHect to a judgment rendered by the seems to me that the wording of Article 94 implies the power of the Cou\1cil comes into being only the International Court of Justice gives a final and not when it merely indicates provisional evell though, according to the Court, these are ta ellsure that effect sha11 be given to a later j udgment. 39. Consequently, the failure of aState to provisional measures indicated by the Court el11power the Security Couucïl to make recommendations under Article 94, paragraph 2, of the Charter. and l want to make this very clear, because consistent with the attitude which my country adopted in other organs of the United Nations, ularly in the Interim Coml11ittee of the Assembly in 1948 - my Government would be to vote in iavour of a dedsion by the Council this question to the Court itself; that is to question whether the Coundl muy make recommendatians tmder Article 94, paragraph 2, of the Charter one of the parties has failed to comply with provisional measures. 39. Consequently, the failure of aState to provisional measures indicated by the Court el11power the Security Couucïl to make recommendations under Article 94, paragraph 2, of the Charter. and l want to make this very clear, because consistent with the attitude which my country adopted in other organs of the United Nations, ularly in the Interim Coml11ittee of the Assembly in 1948 - my Government would be to vote in iavour of a dedsion by the Council this question to the Court itself; that is to question whether the Coundl muy make recommendatians tmder Article 94, paragraph 2, of the Charter one of the parties has failed to comply with provisional measures. 41. My delegation also considers, however, that the Council shoulcl not rule at the present time, because the legal question - that is, the question whether the dis12ute is ~ithin th~ d?111~Stic jurisd.iction ~.or is subject to 1l1ternatlOnal adJudlcatlOnawalts a Judgment or ruling of the Intemational Court of Justice, as the represelltative of India reminded us yesterday [561 st meeting]. 41. My delegation also considers, however, that the Council shoulcl not rule at the present time, because the legal question - that is, the question whether the dis12ute is ~ithin th~ d?111~Stic jurisd.iction ~.or is subject to 1l1ternatlOnal adJudlcatlOnawalts a Judgment or ruling of the Intemational Court of Justice, as the represelltative of India reminded us yesterday [561 st meeting]. i i 1 <-" 1 <-" 42. Yet, neither do we think that the Couneil should refrain from any action in this case. On the contrary, we think that it ought to endeavonr to fadlitate agreement betweel1 the parties, without taking any action which woulcl imply that it regarded itself as competent, assuming that the Comt is to decide, in rulîng upon its 42. Yet, neither do we think that the Couneil should refrain from any action in this case. On the contrary, we think that it ought ta endeavonr to fadlitate agreement betweel1 the parties, without taking any action which woulcl imply that it regarded itself as competent, assuming that the Comt is to decide, in rulîng upon its o,~!n .competence, :",h~th~r .th~ dispute falls completely wItlun the clomestIc JunsdlctIon of Iran. The Coundl even if it does not have competence and expressly reserves the question of its competence, can exert its moral influence upon the parties to seek a fair solution of the problem. o,~!n .competence, :",h~th~r .th~ dispute falls completely wItlun the clomestIc JunsdlctIon of Iran. The Coundl even if it does not have competence and expressly reserves the question of its competence, can exert its moral influence upon the parties to seek a fair solution of the problem. 43. For aIl these reasons, obviously, my delegation must regret that it cannot vote for the United Kingdom draft resollltion, nor for the amendments moved by the de1egations of India and Yugoslavia since in our view, in the paragraphs of the preamble unaffected by the y ugoslav-Indian amendments, as weIl as in all the other paragraphs of the preamble to the draft resollltion, the competence of the Coundl is recognized from the very fact that these clauses admit that the situation const!tutes a threat to the maintenance of peace and secunty. 43. For aIl these reasons, obviously, my delegation must regret that it cannot vote for the United Kingdom draft resollltion, nor for the amendments moved by the de1egations of India and Yugoslavia since in our view, in the paragraphs of the preamble unaffected by the y ugoslav-Indian amendments, as weIl as in all the other paragraphs of the preamble to the draft resollltion, the competence of the Coundl is recognized from the very fact that these clauses admit that the situation const!tutes a threat to the maintenance of peace and secunty. r r 44. Moreover, the United Kingdom draft resolution appears to, admit by implication that the Coundl, notwithstanding the fact that the International Court of Justice has merely orclered provisional measures, has power to make a recommendation undel' Article 94, paragraph 2. Again, in paragraph 1 of the operative part of the United Kingdom draft resolution [S/2358/Rev.1], whatever interpretation is sought to be placed on the principles unclerlying the provisional measures of the Court, the competence of the CounciJ is again alleged and in a certain sense terms of settlement, albeit provisional, are recommended. Nor are we able to vote for paragraph 2 of the operative part, for the reasons so cogently expounded yesterday [561 st nteeting] by the Chinese representative. 44. Moreover, the United Kingdom draft resolution appears to, admit by implication that the Coundl, notwithstanding the fact that the International Court of Justice has merely orclered provisional measures, has power to make a recommendation undel' Article 94, paragraph 2. Again, in paragraph 1 of the operative part of the United Kingdom draft resolution [S/2358/Rev.1], whatever interpretation is sought to be placed on the principles unclerlying the provisional measures of the Court, the competence of the CounciJ is again alleged and in a certain sense terms of settlement, albeit provisional, are recommended. Nor are we able to vote for paragraph 2 of the operative part, for the reasons so cogently expounded yesterday [561 st nteeting] by the Chinese representative. 45. Lastly, the texts of the United Kingdom drafts contain the words "calls upon" or "calls for", which are retained lmc1er the amendments in document S/2379. Since these words are used in several Articles of the Charter, the suggestion is thereby conveyed that the Couneil has competence. 45. Lastly, the texts of the United Kingdom drafts contain the words "calls upon" or "calls for", which are retained lmc1er the amendments in document S/2379. Since these words are used in several Articles of the Charter, the suggestion is thereby conveyed that the Couneil has competence. 46. My delegation could vote in favour of the draft resolution if the amendments proposed the deletion of the paragraphs of the preamble implying compe.tence or recognition of a threat to the peace; and also If the 46. My delegation could vote in favour of the draft resolution if the amendments proposed the deletion of the paragraphs of the preamble implying compe.tence or recognition of a threat to the peace; and also If the 47. The likelihood of a solution or a peaceful between the parties will .11ot increase climinish if the Council c1ecides today that and enjoins on the parties a specific method and friendly settlement. Direct seulement likely if the Council, without declaring con1petent or that it is not competent, influence ta help the parties ta reach such 47. The likelihood of a solution or a peaceful between the parties will .11ot increase climinish if the Council c1ecides today that and enjoins on the parties a specific method and friendly settlement. Direct seulement likely if the Council, without declaring con1petent or that it is not competent, influence ta help the parties ta reach such 48. l shoulc1 like ta propose the resolution, in which my delegation has refer ta the dispute objectively without the hope that in this· text the Council acceptable elements. l may say that l should ta the deletion of the second paragraph referrirlg ta the International Court of majorityof the members of the Council paragraph undesirable. l inserted that paragraph ta the International Court of Justice the legal reason why we should not competence here and now. The text of tian follows [S/2380].: 48. l shoulc1 like ta propose the resolution, in which my delegation has refer ta the dispute objectively without the hope that in this· text the Council acceptable elements. l may say that l should ta the deletion of the second paragraph referrirlg ta the International Court of majorityof the members of the Council paragraph undesirable. l inserted that paragraph ta the International Court of Justice the legal reason why we should not competence here and now. The text of tian follows [S/2380].: "Considering the request submitted statemènts made by the United ernment, and the statements macle ernment of Iran, in connexion with the in Iran, and the background of the facts relating thereto, "Considering the request submitted statemènts made by the United ernment, and the statements macle ernment of Iran, in connexion with the in Iran, and the background of the facts relating thereto, "Considering that thé International Justice is ta express its opinion on whether the dispute falls exclusively domestic jurisdiction of Iran, "Considering that thé International Justice is ta express its opinion on whether the dispute falls exclusively domestic jurisdiction of Iran, "Without deciding on the question competence, "Without deciding on the question competence, "Advises the parties concerned ta tians as saon as possible with a view fresh attempt to seUle their differences with the Purposes and Principles Nations Charter." "Advises the parties concerned ta tians as saon as possible with a view fresh attempt to seUle their differences with the Purposes and Principles Nations Charter."
'.'The Security Council,
'.'The Security Council,
The President unattributed #166856
There are still on the Est for this afternoon. If there are we shaH adjour11 now and meet at afternoon.
The President unattributed duplicate #166857
There are still on the Est for this afternoon. If there are we shaH adjour11 now and meet at afternoon. Printed in Canada Printed in Canada
The meeting rose at 12.50
The meeting rose at 12.50
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UN Project. “S/PV.562.” UN Project, https://un-project.org/meeting/S-PV-562/. Accessed .