S/PV.563 Security Council

We are proceeding under those provisions of the Charter by which the Security Council explores the possibilities of settling disputes between nations by pacifie means. Toclay and at previous meetings of the Council on this question - even, in faet, during the debate on the adoption of the agenda [559th meeting] - considerable attention has been paid to the competence of the Security Council. Some members of the Council have expressed c1011bts on this score, and other representatives who have spoken here, inc1uding the Prime Minister of Iran, have positively denied the competence of the Council to deal with the question. My Government feels that there can no question about the competence of the Council in this case, because there clearly exists a dispute between the United Kingdom and Iran the continuance of which likely to endanger international peace and security. i' 2. l intend to refer to the nature of the dispute, unelertaking to P?int out that it is of. t~Iat ~at\lre. ,,:hich mentioneel 111 the Charter as glV111g jurtsellctlon for 3. The Prime Minister told us on Monclay, 1951 [560th meeting], that the parliament enacted legislation to nationalize the oil industry country. He then told us of the steps Government of Iran to put that legislation tion. He informed us that the Anglo-I.ranian Company had objected to the measures proposed taleen by the Government of Iran. The Prime recountec1 this history as follows: "Upon the passage of the laws for ization of the oil industry by the Maj lis, Government and the mixed parliamentary compàsecl of representatives of the Senate Majlis who were charged with the enforcement laws, macle every effort to carry out the the law respecting the 'talceover' of the of the former Company, the settlement of the arrangement of compensation payments settlement of the question of the sale of customers, of which the United Kingdom most important. The attempt was made to problems in. a friendly manner which would factory to the former Anglo-Iranian Oil vVhen the former Company expressed negotiations, the Iranian Government complied the request whole-heartedly. However, tion which represented the former Company, several preliminary meetings, submitted which showed how fal" it was from being negotiate in good faith. Hs proposaI following: aIl the establishments and assets Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in Iran should ferred to the National Iranian Oil Company, should transfer the said installations and third company, whichwould be formed by Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. This proposaI only contrary to the oil nationalization volved a revival of the former Company guise. For that reason, the lranian Government the view that a continuation of negotiations absolutcly fmitless, and they were broken 4. Was that a dispute? The Gover11lnent ceeded, fol1owing these events, with the implementation of the nationalization legislation. At the same Government of Iran conducted negotiations Government of the United Kingdom concerning problem. The Iranian Prime Minister referred ~s déclara. ~s lorsqu'il 15 octobre t.', ..'.'· Iran avait Il "1 wish once again ta declare emphatically Governl11ent is quite willing ta reopen tiations on the two points just mentioned, the United Kingdom Government shows and intention to reach a settlement." ~;1i~E: ~ :~/~~;t , ". JI ,-", , 5. Are we talking about States? Later, Millister of Iran made this statemcnt [560th loi Slir la ::;ouverllelire mixte lIat et de de l'appli- .it en lellr ions (le la "The American Ambassador in Iran, 1951, handed the Governmellt a note President of the United States of America the President expressec\ his interest in settlement of the question in dispute. He send Mr. VV. Averell I-Iarrim:ln to Iran envoy to cliscuss the question with the Prime ancl his Governmcnt. The Iranian Government, of deep appreciation of the goodwill shown Presiclent of the United States of America, him in reply of its readiness to start negotiations once for the peaccful settlement of the provic\ed that the national rights of Iran respected in accorc\ance with the oil nationa1ization laws. Tt also dec1ared its readiness to extencl welcome to Mr. Harriman. l'ancienne JI:,".'., ,ux arralles indem· vente du ('.:,'••., allllle-Uni .' : résoudre e satisfai· '. Lorsqu~ JIIvrir de; -ès vololl- :epcl1dant, Jélégatioil :scnté tillE it loin dE ',> "ML Harriman arrivec\ in Teheran 1951. He recommenc\ed that negotiations Tehran \Vith the British Government which \Vas ta come there for that pmpose. several meetings with Ml'. Harriman, it that the fol1owing forll1ula should be through Mr. I-Iarriman, on behalf of Gove,:nl11ent, tothe United Kingdol11 Government, a new basis for negotiations: gnie pro· l'" ll~~oë~l~~ 1 ~ dernièrë 1 rs al' \I[nf t.~' ~x-/ tlg o· r Ion seule- ;C' lalisation, . Ille Comi : Couver- 1 ,iOll selon r inutile et f r t; !f, " (i) In case the United Kingdom acting on bchalf of the former Anglo-Iranian Company forl11ally recognizes the principle nationalization of the oil inclustry in Iran, Gover11l11ent is prepared to start negotiations the representatives of the United King'dom ment who would act on behalf of Company. te de Cl'3 ntinué la ives à la Cl1Jcnt de ;ot\verne- " (ii) The United Kingdom Government, the cleparture of its clelegation ta Iran, shall recognize the nationa1ization of the oi1 Iran." Il pétrok i' \ .' 7. The rule of law in this particular it does not :Lny the less represent two puting over this matter because one a great industry of its country. It obligations of sovereignty to protect honour, the property, the rights and country's citizens wherever they may Although this reservation is made, the purpose of undertaking ta say dispute between two governments but ernment and a private corporation, have the fact that it is a dispute between ments relating to the property of the those governments and the daim of within the other country which are c1aimed the cause for the nationalization of the in this same statement, the Prime Minister a subsequent exchange between the Iran and the United Kingdom. The Prime Minister of Iran thus gave Council of the facts leading up to our the matter here give clear illustration principles and procedures of international one government takes measures which the interests of the nationals of another, foreign national is unable to obtain national's own government may espouse endeavour to settle it in negotiations ment of the first country. 8. That is exactly what happened ment of Iran adopted measures bearing directly on the business of Oil Company. After discussion between and the Government of Iran, in whicb was reached, the Government of the entered into negotiations with the Governmcnt on this matter. 9. As we have seen from the staü!ments Minister of Iran, the negotiations countries have so far not prodttced referring to the dispute between the Prime Minister, on Monday, 15 follows [560th meeting]: "The United Kingdol1l Government, chosen to act in violation of international see1cing ta USl1rp our sovereign rights domestic concern, has interfered in of Iran." - Nothing could be plainer disptlte between governments.- "Its yention ha~ taker: variol1s fon~s: It 1I1t~rnal dIssenSIOn and .se~lt:on stnkes. It bas sought to mtl1TI1date war-ships just beyond our coastal 10. When the Government of Iran announced was withdrawing in the immediate future the permits of the British staff at Abadan, the Governrnent of the United Kingdom brought the matter Security Council. In view of ail these circumstances, my Governll1ent believes the conclusion is inescapable that a dispute e:x;ists between two governments, of the Ul11ted Kl11gdom and Iran, the continuance s'agit bien l, n dépit du ; \Ill~ grande1 igations de ' l' défendre ,. whic1~ is likely to endanger international peace secunty. ;",.~G.r.lissants Ij, .•.•..•· , qu'ils St ' \'idell1ment , 'wl1d eltl1t " 'Ili.'lllenl t: : in ~ en fail ~.' fl!fCml qui f' Il' (e.~ güu· t: .t1ll:S iajus· Ir 'aitllt pro· "\ 1 • ". 11. At this point, l wish to l'efer again to sorne ments on this question of the nature of this dispute being of the nature spoken of in Article 33 Charter. Paragraph 1 of Article 33 states: "The parties to any dispute, the continuance which is likely to endanger the maintenance national peace and security, shaH, first of ail, solution by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, ciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, regional agencies or arrangements, or other means of their own choice." ~I .~~:~~ J'; rt' le Gou· ; Hm,mme· . Irai,.afait,\ " ,q~' """ r CI3lTCltlent .. And sa these l)arties did. They acted in accordance the principle of that provision of the Charter United Nations. " t'Il droit ~ m'lll! de> Il:, 12. How was this dispute characterizec1? nature was this dispute as conceived in the statement facts by the Prime Minister of Iran? l have quotations l should like to get into the record directly and probatively on that question. l read the first of these quotations [560th meeting] "J'rt;-"·" :.:. •~ .~".,u\l , :tilts élran-I'; ,\e rIlCll.lf'.nl .: ":m (lm~;e t'.~ë Il~ir \ ~" ..e (;~!U\'~!. !uiti;~;;~E· lc' i'Ar.fL· "The movement which is manifesting itself is supportec1 by a people fully conscious of The lranian nation is determined ta use resource, which is part of its national patrimony, raise its standard of living and thus ta promote cause of peace. ~,~ui ü~l tl .te l'ITi.::, H·t':l~n:< ra .::e ;'ljd , "In arder ta reach this goal, Iran expects and SU1)port of the United Nations and of the loving nations which are its Members. The of the United Nations and the high principles tained in it require Member States to helping hand ta Iran today. That is the true of international co-operation for the promotion social advancement, which is the very basis Charter." !aNé,16 1 ~'5 i1égü(i~. t. ,rc pernl!; , parbill ~u Je' : Prtnt;~r l' .•1. 'Lj .. ré agir ~ r ~~l~~~ton~ 1 de l'kiil'; : :',-- Rienl' n: gou\'er· , 13. Of course, this argument lS followed quently accompanied by the c1aim that the Council docs not have competence and that help the cause of p~ace by disl11issi~g t~is matter from its consideratIOn and by leav1l1g It alone, nothing after the parties have thus far failed party, the United Kingdom! over th~ protest has brought it ta the Securlty Councii for help. rë\'t:111 dl·t : dis{ûrde~ ~, ;t a essaye ~'! l3.tl'auX de f,\ What was hovering in the mind of Iran whenhe made that statement? he not refcrring to peace? Did he the situation, if continued, might give that might challenge the peace of 15. Let us consider the following meeting] : "Whatever danger to peace the actions of the United Kingdom "Vas there danger, in his estimation? - display of force, it has sought to cising our sovereign aut~lOrity resollrces. It has made oml11OUS c1ispatch of paratroops ta nearby of war to the vicinity of our irresponsible threats ta land forces have had the most clisastrous consequences .the flames of another world war. quences, the UllÎted Kingdom alone be responsible. Iran has boats in the Thames. "If, however, as had been publicly tacties have been abandoned, there likelihood of a menace to international security, and it is notclear how Government could have the hardihood complaint in the Security COllncil 16. There is the question - right who determines, whether there is a \iVho has been charged with the sibility of making an inquiry and or not there is a threat to the peace? 17. 1s this challenge to the competence Council free from doubt, or do we question here, provoked by tl1e statement by the Prime Minister of Iran? Let statement made here by the Prime and this extract, like the others, relates the dispute, to its being a dispute of in the Charter. The statement 111eeti11g] : "The world knows that it is which has threatenecl to employ Kingdom Government. It has, ground for invoking the jurisdiction Council because of 'our action, supposee! that the United Kingclom "The only dispute between my country and United Kingdom relates to the United Kingdom's attempt to interfere, in violation of established ciples of international law, with our internaI It has nothing to do with oil installations. If ever was a threat to the peace, it lay not difficulty connected with oil installations but menace of the United Kingc10m Govermnent to to force in order to stop us from condueting our affairs." Minis!!! $uit-il œ lation, s• ~rcnd de :ide dam Uni."- • That is pretty emphatic, is it not, as to the nature this dispute? ~l~I~~t l~' nos res· maç~~t" .• x YOlSllll . e de 11", ' 19. At the same meeting [561st], the following ment was made: "Since the adoption of the nationalization laws, conduct of the United Kingdom Government c1early revealed that hitherto it has not been cerned with negotiation but l11ere1y with using illegitimate means of econol11ic, psychological military pressure thnt it could lay its hands break our wil1." ~s contre l..• amir le, 1 'aient pli : Le Gou· \ .11 la m· ; wl1uière; : 20. Does that sound pacifie? Does it sound just commercial transaction, a dispute relating to .property only? 21. l quote again from the statement of the representative of Iran [561st meeting] : "The United Kingdom representative has told Council that his Government wants an agreement based on the mIe of law rather than on the force. We are just as anxious as the United dom Government to achieve such a solution, have always asked it to join us in negotiating agreement on that basis." :. déclaré, ( ble plul t : tt a ~ c (,\mrnent t ..rDir ta t llcréln~ te! 'lu6tlon, 1 l'n~.;{me 'l t~ chargé 1 • (:oq1\1\1 n:aint:t~ 1 22. l quote again from that same statement meeting] : "We are not to blame for the stoppage of production. We have made constructive proposaIs compensate the former Company, and we have to sell oil to our former custOl11ers, We have concession after concession, to the extent that legislation wouldpermit. As these offers were accepted, we asked for counter-proposals. We waited five months for the United Kingdom ta proposaIs based on principles of law but, instead, have been subjected ta a steady application rule of force." sl:cllnle;f ous tro~' r "(l\l1er~ ; .~. nm·:l·.·. la Md.· 11l1111~ 16î:.' 15 IIU311f' sima-il',. 1.'",,011it.•.. a mena4 {(1\"anm~ : ;ibÎe d" lans Ilot supposer "Consequently, 1 cannot imagine which could possibly make acceptable ments submitted by various members "1 appeal to you to take pitY on in their utter poverty, misery will he extremely dangerous continue. 1 cali upon the President the Council and 1 say: Beware which mây endanger international 25. Does the Security Council evidence than that? Ought not to accept these statements at their 26. To be sure, the daim accompanies way to preserve peace is to dismiss Security Council for peace, for a pacific daim is made that that is the way by dismissing the appeal, Iran may with but will go on in its own way, and give as much consideration great ,question which involves all And, for that matter, this question world. 27. Clearly, the Security Council, has a right and a dutY to inquire to do what it can to promote the achievement fuI settlement of the dispute. 28. .There is nowbefore the Gouncil tion submitted by the representative Kingd01:n. Certain amendments [S resolution have been accepted in a in a conciliatory speech delivered [562nd 11l.eeting]. Those amendments by the representatives of India and United States supports the draft resolution [S/2358/Rev.2]. It is designed, Government, to perform this great United Nations, that of endeavouring parties to a dispute closer and doser dispute itself can be resolved in agreement. 29. It is the high function of the assist in achievil1g pacific solutions national problems, the continued might . endanger peace. The Council duty, l believe, to stand aside in play no role. The proposaI before designed to help bring the parties should be no doubt of the authority ado.pt this draft. resolution, or of the tak111g stlch actIon. 30. My Government earnestly hopes pers of the Council will resolve any ~st quessécurité uver une stion, le séa1lce] ;

During the discussions between Kingdol11 and the lranian delegations which has witnessed before the Council sinee 1 October, eerning the dispute which has arisen between governments over the oil installations in two points have struck my delegation as deserving special mention. ison q~1l proposes J . le la dé- ,,~ " ,el Si la 32. One is the conciliatory attitude displayed United Kingdom Government in this case, dantly confirmed by the radical changes recently by its delegation in the draft resolution s\..lbmitted the Coundl early this 111:0nth. 1 :s grand. 1 Conseil 1 ldre une / .tionale." 1 oignages déclara- 33. A comparison of the two texts shows United Kingdom Government has not merely its attitude to the very rapid changes in the which wouId quite obviously have in any case sitated some changes in the original draft. My tion be1ieves that a remarkable effort to understalld anxieties of the other side is evideneed by spirit of the new draft before us. In a dispute such important interests 011 both sides and such a degree of intensity, it is rare ta see parties, despite most pressing considerations and prestige, display sa much restraillt, or efforts to understand the opposite point of show such a broad outlook, transcending the attitudes of the two sides and embracing a view of their common interests and, indeed, common weal of mankind. lOyen de ~., ::lnseil de 1 èglement en reje- ~; a l'Iran. ira selon a à celte n-Orient .~ ~ Conseil lUr cette Ion d'un de réso- )résenté. ~ [562ème ! accepté 1 de ré.>o- 1 34. This leads me ta the second point delegation believes to deserve thorough consideration by the Council. \iVhen he submitted his resoluti(;H1 the.clay before ye~terd~y [560th the Umted Kmgdol11 representatlve told us principal aim was to reach a provisional which, without prejudging the final solution negotiated by the parties concerned, wouId free flow of oil to be restored. ~s repré- \. ~Î~~5~; I( que ce li lin diffé- I! solu par 1\ utes des '/ r :r T i de sécu- 'oblèmes pourrait 35. We believe that the Council's views on should be governed by the following main eration: Iran holds a treasure worth more material riches, for it is a treasure of energy ductive foree which has already made a great tion to tl1e prosperity of the conntries importing black liquid gold, this life-blood of So many industries. Oil hidden below ground is, as sentative of the United Kingdom pointed out, dormant and sterile wealth. For Iran itse1f, this in its sail would mean nothing unless it were ~il faillidérohait nt nous s parties de sécu- IItion et ~. r ! Ille tout !bres du 37. Accordingly, I feel sure that al1 the Council \Vere glad, as was the French to hear some of the words which were before yesterday from the representatives parties ta the dispute. I have already representative of the United Kingdom. 38. We were no less pleased to hear the Prime Minister and representative us that he was fully aware that a settlement urgent necessity for the vital national which he is responsible, and ta hear same time,·. with all the authority of Head of the Goverl11nent, that the l~a4ership is fully prepared to reopen üatlOns. 39. I think that we need have no hesitation the clraft resolution before us in the proposed by our colleaglles from India at the same time as we pay tribute ta of national dutY and international responsibility the British and Iranian statesmen and set themselves. 40. l should like to state in advance ~elegation that, in voting in favour of t~or~, we m.ost earnestly hope that üaüons, whlch we are confident will sh~rtly, will lead rapidl~ ta a constructive satlsfact?ry ta. both parties. IVe hope ment wIll satlsfy the Government promot~ the economic prosperity of the soclal progress and welfare of its also hope that the agreement will satisfy who have been partners in this great return will be ensured for the vast amount intelligence, technical science, organizing and services of ail leinds which they order to extract from the depths of the great natural wealth, which has already ta Iran and ta all the members of 011r the past and which promises ta be source of profit in the future. 41. Mr. MOSSADEGH (Iran) Fren.cft) : As I am very tired, I should President would allow ML Saleh to hav.e prep~red ta the speech of the representative Ulllted Kmgdom. When the reply 43. l said in my first statement [560tl1 we were not disposed to discuss the question validity of the so-called contract of 1933. Kingdom representative has apparently concession on our part that the agreement one. He is mistakcn.· The agreement from us by force and fraud and was ab i1ûtio. 44. The United Kingdom representative meeting] has sought to quote me against has failed to observe that the remark made ironically, in October 1944, in the speech concerning the dictatorship which imposed on my country with British connivance. Company had incleed won a victory at Nations by obtaining a longer lease of life, the shackles of the D'Arcy concession, of as having been annulled, were merely firmly. But l leave it to the United Kingdom sentative to get such comfort as he speech. 45. l also leave it to the United Kingdom tative to explain what principles of international and equity render valid an agreement obtained the emplo)'ment of methoc\s such as those just describec\. 46. But it must not be supposed that, victory in this way, the Company reformed to become a moclel for other foreign investors way ta maintain n1lltually beneficial relations people of an exploitecl country. The which had been employed in the inducement callecl contract continued to be employed . prevent onr striking off the fetters which l have saic\ that the Company constituted in ùnpel'io. Dl1ring the perioc1 of the cendancy, the Government of Iran looked House in London, where the principal Company were locatecl, for guidance country. , : l ~ ,-. -'l'~ ~: ,.'. \, .... 1~ '. • 'l~ ", ··n: . . 1"" ;.! l'~, -;,!'. -.-, 47. But despite ail this, the United Kingdom sentative [561st meeting] takes exception ca1ls my "impeachment" of the former Company, he describes as "rea1ly irrespol1sible". 48. l have not made an actual count of worcls used by Sir Gladwyn Jebb in his ments but as you leaf the pages of famatory ~ord after defamatory word 49. Contrast this with the fresh and in which Sir Gladwyn Jebb paints his United Kingdom represents intelligent against the blind and unintelligent reaction by Iran. The United Kingdom offers The United Kingdom has shown extended support for our programme The United Kingdom is to be admired contribution to Iran. The activities Company are a model to be copied world in like endeavours. The former madeevery effort to improve our standard increase our opportunities for education; us hospitals, dispensaries, schools, housing and employment. It has earnings into Iranian production. 50. As l read the words and listen tone of the representative of the United conclusion is forced upon me that l former Company was an eleemosynary we were indeed ungrateful to reject blessings which it poured on us. 51. l do not ask of the Security unbounded admiration for the people that the representative of the United for his compatriots. But no one acquainted conditions of life in my country results of the activities of the former quite the same wide-eyed wonder as And, as the vision of Utopia which he away into the never-never land which a11 fantasies and fables, the harsh facts spirited away abide with us. 52. We are indeed an ancient people by the technical accomplishments of has been slow. If indeed we are, as the represel1tative states [559th meeting] rush, it is because the more advanced made our continued leisurely journey impossible and intolerable. His standards presumably what. he had in mind when present action as a mad rush: The history however, does not bear him out. 'vVe fifty years in taking action, although 53. There is, if l am not mistaken hidden in the intricacies of the United Kingdom' representative's statement of 1 Gctober [559th meeting] a hint of repentance. He says that 'lit is quite true that the Iranians have not hitherto played a very great part in what should in principle be a joint undertaking". 54. N early fifty years after the exploitation of Iran began comes the acknowledgment that the undertaking shoulc1 have been joint. His repentance unhappily does not go far enough for us to accept it. What we might have accepted at the beginning, when British venture capital hac1 to be risked to initiate the enterprise, what we l11ight have accepted had it been freely offered even after that, is no longer enough nor, in view of the settlec1 national policy of Iran, possible after the initial British investment has been recovered many times over, unhearc1-of profits have been obtained and the moc1ernization anc1 expansion of plants fil;anced by Iranian revenues, which were unlawfully withheld from Iran and misappropriated to uses in which we had no voice. We have bought and paid many times over for the share in the enterprise which is now offered to us. 55. The representative of the United Kingdom has presented some figures to the Counci1. He has cited [559th meeting] the figure of :fl14 million in royalties paid to Iran. The figure is large. But it becomes pitiful when divided by fifty, which is the number of years in which the royalties have mounted to the sum mentioned by hil11. He neglected to say that this represented first 16 per cent anc1, after 1933, 20 per cent of those profits of the former Company which it chose to disclose to us. He neglected to mention the equally important fact that these sums were our share of what was left after taxes paid to the Unitec1 Kingc1om, so that Iran, in effect, has all these years been a taxpayer to the British Treasury. He neglected to offer any figures on the returns obtainec1 by the United Kingdom Government from Iranian oil exclusive of its taxes on the oil revenues. \"le have the word of a man who should know that an approximate estimate, as of a date before 1923 - that is, nearly thirty years ago - was no less than i 40 million. My authority for this estimate is Mr. Winston Churchill, who was one of the prime l110vers in the United Kingdom Government's acquisition of a majority interest in the former Company. Data concerning the return to the United Kingdom Governmcnt since the date of Mr. Churchill's estimate are not available to us, but it far exceeds the total royalties paid to the Government of Iran. 57. To the United Kingdom receipts, of course, must he added the diviclends paid it 011 its shares, the savings to the British N avy from the ac1vantageous and cril11inatory priee at which they purchased oil from former Company, thttsfurther reducing the revenues in which 'l'e were entitled to share. l may mention passing that the former Company enjoyed an exemption from custOI11S cluties which amounted to more th i 28 million on exports, in the years 1947 through 1949, ane! f 6 million on imports. 58. It was surpnS1l1g ta hear the United Kingdom representative [561st 1tleeting) inclnde among the contributions of the former Company f 9.1 million as customs duties, taxation and other payments. The picture is totally different when that figure is broken into cOll1ponent parts. It incll1des excise taxes on sales petroleul1l products ultimately paid by the Iranian consumers; custOIl1S dulies on goods imported for consl.llnption by Company workers, which were passed to the latter; and income tax upon employees' income in the petroleum inclustry. None of these items was true charge on the Company itself, and it suffered onancial los8 becal1se of them. 59. Again it is misleading to say that Iran bas receivec1 another benefit of about "i 7 million as a result of special foreign excbange rate imposed on the Company". Iran is a member of the International Monetary Fund and its foreign exchange rates are officially recogllized and accepted by this institution; Iran has never bought a single pound trom the former Company at less than official rates. 60. The United Kingdom representative mentioned that, in 1949, only a moc1est sum of 1. 7.1 million was distributed to the shareholders of the former Company. He forgot to saythat this represented a 30 p"r cent dividend, which in turn was the maximum amount 61. vVhat is important to Iran is to see its wealth is going abroad in the fonn l mentioned in the [S60th] meeting of 15 were not allowed by the former Company its books. But the following figures supplied former Company show the magnitude derived from Iran in 1950. LU lieu de 1I1ées ulle .nt à près ériocle de li a perçu ?2. The profits enjoyec1 by the former Company, ln and year out, have been 50 large that able to self-finance a host of other profitable which provided it with all the services n1arket our oil. No accounting has ever ta us of the revenues of these companies, never received any share in their profits. ~tte entrer de tontes Ires, { recettes été versés la marine , .x avantak ole auprès ol1core les une part. 63. If l have hac1 to present fragmentary show the enom10US c1isparity between the eamings and the returns to the United Kingd0111 ernment as against the sums derived by is not ullwillingness to present those figures. simply not available to us, and we have of obtaining them. The position i5 a curioLls although the former Company was enabled by virtue of a grant of privileges from Iran, ernment is unable to present an authoritative based on the Company's books, of the financial of the matter. Instead, itmust rely on estimates. snch estimates can only be approximate, theless reflect accurately the order of magnituc1e financial relations with the former Company. ~ que l'auration de de 1947 à 1 de livres les impor- 1! entant du , dans les me cie 9,1 1 e douane, ne la réa- ~rents élé· , Ir la venle yse par le le sur les 64. In 1950 alone, the former Company profit of between $500 million anc1 $550 between i 180 million and i 200 million, enterprises in Iran, at international market this huge amount, Iran received only $45 about i 16 million as royalties, share of taxes. 65. The profits of the Company in the year after c1eclucting the share paid to Iran, 1nore than the entire sum of i 114 million representative of the United Kingdom as paid to Iran in royalties in the course of century. n des em- é reportee ~s revenus un de ces l véritable . de pertes r 01 bénéficié t ~s sterling 66. Let me put it another way. Petroleul11 resource. Iran has been singularly favourecl in this resource. Accorc1ing to recent estimates, discovered petroleum reserves amDunt to million barrels; that is, a little under 2,000 Up to the present time, Iran has produced tons of crude oil and other petrolenm products; nearly 20 per cent of ils total reserves been extractec1. The rate of extraction has, increasec1 from year to year. In 1950 it amounted lnillion tons from about eighty wells. derived by Iran in fifty years from the this nearly 20 per cent of its reserves amounted .' \ la COI11- aire inter- • .aie et les et acceptéi seule livre )indre que l1alé qu'en ses action- JI,; ; de livres lme repré- :-à-dire le 67. l do not contend that this figure is mately exact. The United Kingdom representative perhaps be willing to enlighten us. It state of affairs in Iran; that it is the United Govermnent which has access to the Anglo-Iranian Oi1 Company, while my ment l11ust rely on methods of calculation employed ta couvey some idea of the order of the Company's gains from the exploitation natural resources. Wc will doubtless be absolute total is wildly wrong. Anticipating ever, l may rejoin that the smaller absolute the years before the First ",Vorld 'TVar between that and the Seconc1 World larger purchasing power than the present 68. Unfortunate1y, it is not possible pittance rèecived by Iran by the same the total would be, since the percentage up to 1933 was even smaller than the subsequent It is impossible ta escape the fact that, the Middle East has representec1 a gigantic wealth in the past and offers an even greater sonrec of revenue in the future, only the tion of this has accrued to the countries the reserves from which this wealth flows. staked Western ail industry to the blue game, anc1 it has pyramided these fortunes. 69. In the Review of Econ.omic Conditions Middle East, published by the United tariat as a snpplement to the /iVorId Economie 1949-50, appears the following passage which speaks volumes despite its dispassionate "The terms of their concessions foreign companies a freeclom of action stantially insulates them from the Middle Eastern count1-ies. Output is considerations of world, rather than local' Moreover, it is the companies which own the means of transport, whether tankers, ta carry Middle Eastern oil and. it is they who secure these markets, western Europe and in other parts of foreign exchange .derived hom sales to the petroleum companies, and is in retained by them. ~ntant du l'ci montre st le Gou- >;:. livres de IOn propre ëthodcs de lue idée de l' :p'1g'llie tire II! . On n0\15 Il,': 71. The contribution of the former ail Company the national income in the form of expenc1itures the country by direct payments, employment, and sa on constituted only 10 per cent. The which the Company took out of the country, ta its own figures, amounted to about 30 our national incame. ~lIr alm!lue . jt' pourrai lié pour le.> 1 IOlldiale et 1 mière et la III (lolll"Oir calculé en 72. The representative of the United Kingdom been quick ta seize on the fact that, in February the Majlis enacted a law ta devote the country's revenues to the seven-year development programme, claim credit for the former Company as having this idea possible. The fact was that, before had elapsed, it was clear that Iran could not development programme on the basis of the allowed it. The result was that, precise1y the former ail Company, the execution of the virtually to a stop. !,,, '. d'appliquer rc,ue par i1htiendrall, 1!J33 était m.'ltlenl. JI il que, si Je iiùUrCè Je tt', cn plIi;. imp(mante tt'lI! les ri· f·, f, 1 rr 73. The United Nations publication which quoted previously C0111ments: "There is, therefore, striking contrast between the huge potential .represented by the oil reserves of the Middle the current benefits so far derived by the countries which the reserves belong," 1 '. ·74. The United Kingdom representative has with pride ta the report of the Int.ernational Organi.sation ail labour conditions. in the ail in han as. supporting his ~ .assertions .concerning social bencfits which the former Company' has.conferred upon us. A reading of that report, unfortunately, not bear him out. ;~Ii!é ~!u'urrt x a 1mda;· a tiré dt; iIf ;lfY'ii!' 1';" tmf~ t:! iliai,\ M9· , IIUÎ en dit l~ aux (Dm- ~ III les plate . "je ÙOl1l}- Il. En outre,f' ,l:>~edent 1t; 75.. The h01\sing of which he boasts has i:ndeed l)rovided, .. but pr~Î1cipally f~r. the s~laried sistirig alrnost ei'ltlrely of BntIsh natlOnals. states: "At the end of 1949 about 90 per sala:ried staff had been given accommodations Col11pany houses. On the other hand, out of ~1,875 eal'11ers only 5 298 or 16.6 per cent, were 111 , , houses." Elsewhere, the report observes: majority of the ai! workers, however, live in ~1~ICliOll fi! ~ :xl~lant 5ur Il r"îier~, f..l1! '1 ôlcheminiJ; 'ücurcnt cr~ ,;',;, Il' dans lfi • mgères pro- Cümp.a,,"l11ti Iscr\'ées par _ 1 See Rcvic1v of Economie Conditiom ill the (ST./E.CA/9!Add.2), p. 30.. "Final!y, another group of workers !ives honses or huts made of al! sorts of l11ate~tals, 360 tents which the Company put up lU emergcncy measure ta accommodate homeless ers." ~ That was the situation at Abadan. 76 In the oil-fields the situation was somewhat 62:5 per cent of the predol11inat~ly British. accommodated in Company housmg as agamst over 36 per cent of the lranian wage-earners. 77. Distressing as these conditions are, comparably better than that of the contract employed within the Company's areas who from al! the schemes which the Company the henefit of its own workers. This exclusion ticularly serious in the field of.health and f?o? Contract workers are not entltled ta admIssIon ouly hospital in Abadan, the Company hospital, treated there, they must pay. 78. l need not develop this point further; little pcrspicacity to perceive in the understatement the report of the International Labour the contradiction of the daims made here. 79. l shaH not in tllrn, as l might, asie what tion of the social benefits presently enjoyed British Isles are paid for by the revenues from Nor do l donbt that the British people ~o~kit1g. B~t l must reject any suggestion 011 mdustr;: tn Iran r~presents, as the United rep;esentattve has. s~ld. a vast labour and thelr part. The 011 mdustry in my country up b~ the sweat an? .labour of our people, exertlOns of the Bntlsh. The fact is that advanc~d country in the world in which a ~nterpnse would .hav~ taken sa much and httle. It was pOSSIble m Iran because of our backwardness and weakness. Our hopes that the Con~pany we would l.earn We~tern ways pro~ress l;ave been bItterlydlsappointed, Ull1t~c1 Kll1gdom representative's assertion mectmg] that "when more really comp t 1 ..; e en tee 1I1lCI~ns. are tra~ned, so will more be ref a.l1y slgmfies the mdefinite postponemel1t o llnprovement. . 2 ILO, Labour COllditions • tA O'{ ,Sil/dies aIId Re.Ports Ne S' ~11 Nie 1 bldustry , w, l'rIeS, o. 24,. pp. 33, ètcOlenl .'"',•' scms de ' ltt-rinux, Inpagnie ~ ~~at~Ut "'",:,',!' était Iln , ogemeli\ unique" t,:, ,Ilien". r ~1ucated stock-brokers. The argument that oppression 15 the very pattern of progress" and should c?ndemnecl out of hand because thereby "knowledge dlffused and technological improvements follow" remjnis~ent of some of the cruder nineteenth theologlcal and philosophical projections of logical doctrine of the survival of the ,ttest. Ile::; SŒ: r ; l~lT<:rttl t' 'êe dani a<'lte fil : 82. It may be appropriate for Sir Gladwyn Jebb, after al1, speaks as the representative of the ?tockholder of the Company, to address a board ln ten11S of prudent financial policy and wil1ingness fOI'ego quick profits for long-term returns; suggestion that the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company trustee for the Iranian people is not only a gratuitous offence to am national pride, but is instinct smug superiority which has always marked the of t.he former Company and of its principal stockholder ,toward us. l may say, for Sir Gladwyn J ebb's that the only trustee for the Iranian people legislature which the people of Iran have elected the Government which has the confidence of that lature. If we had to regard the former Company trustee rather than as a commercial concern with us at arm's length, we might have to ugly "vorcls as embezzlement and theft to clescribe .financial dealings with us. ~, que Il 1 , tra\'ail· ~ ~\'e dam falimen· premur; ;; le seill lÎe: Ilot;· ~r" 83. The United KingC10m representative, however, not füund it possible to sustain the high note philanthropy. .He is aware that there' are companies and boasts thaf the Anglo-Iranian Company had always given the 1110St favourable He even suggests that, had it not been for the pany's competitive spirit which induced it to offer better terms ta us, we might be far indeed behind oil-producing neighbours in the Middle East. 84. The fact is that we are vastly behincl although oil production began .in Ira~1 fully !orty before it was undertaken III nelghbounng .Tremendous investments have had ta be made Middle Eastern countries in the Iast decade to oil production; yet their. proportio!1ate share returns has improved, whIle ours elther sto?d dwinclled and now far exceed ours. Saudl agreeme~t of 20 February 1949 with the Pacifie .. titrdl il \1\", :oc ~(dJ.;, i i} f: 85. Even when Sir Gladwyn Jebb came in his statement in which he forsook the long look into the future, he persisted the oid theme that it was our refnsal to sal1ctity of contracts which had brought their present pass. If the future which to sh~re with him holds nothing but the tract with the former Company, l am shalI have ta part company. He has expressed for the prospective c1eterioration of "Iran", he says, "cannot have it both ways. have the help of foreign experts, foreign foreign enterprise." l recognize that the pany and its principal stockholders will make every effort, so long as their present continues, to maintain their present blockade nical know-how. But this is a temporary and it would be short-sighted of them ta trained personnel can be 1cept out of Iran by British threats. 86. l respond readily to the United Kingdom sentative's appeal to face the practical facts ation, and l am certainly not behind him to negotiate. Wherever the former Company operate in the future, however, it will operate in Iran. Neither by trusteeship nor will we turn over to foreigners the right Di1 resources. vVe are willing to sell oil f10wing in established channels. vVe are eager practical assurances on which our customers reasonable expectations that their requirements supplied. We are willing to pay for the qualified tec1mical personnel. We shall not ownership or control of our oil industry. are wide awake ta the practical as well as of the situation. We are not, however, finance other peoples' dreams of empire resources. Looking, with the United Kingdom sentative, beyond the narrow bounds of the wider interests of the international l see no place for the former Company achieve common purposes of raising the living of l,eople all over the world. 1 should to plead guilty to a charge of national although l do not pretend that my people virttlous tha~ any other in that regard. l meet the pomt by observing that, in the ~::I~~În~ ;;,~: .:.•.•.•.•.•. être pire si r:,:.:rt' 87. Mr. MOSSADEGH (Iran) French): If the elementary principles respected in the Security Council, l will be respected in any assembly. ,r~~u'a~~~~~s r~j.~:;:: ') ~troliè~es .n~ i~"::( de seCUnl\.". t<·~; " 88. The first requirement for a contract parties is that they shall be competent, is that they shaH he free, :~l~vi~~1 R()~·a;;ë:'e·;! laratioll où, Cf'~5J:: ~. lllguemcnt r",{,:;, ~~! répéter qu~~ ,s k lii 111 elles Sf'l\~, s',:~' 'l: mitre ['in\'i.,";;'/.:~ le i invite à r·;\:t;.::" r e prétendu ,:.;r;,: ' lins fort m;{· r ' . Il a eXllr[""" i:~: • llent qu'ulb,t L~: 1 89. After the British Government over the 1919 Agreement, whieh effect, a c1ictatorship was established the part which the 1919 Agreement to play. l must emphasize that, under therI.' was no freec10m of assembly, Press and no freedol11 of elections. police sul)ervision for fifteen years, in a prison near the Afghanistan frontier. 'ne peut i, l' léficier du CT;':'; .' 90. The situation in Iran was as l il. The Government enginecred the Majlis, that is to say the Chamber the Chamber of Deputies in its turn ment into power. It was a vicious the situation in Iran until 1320 [1940-41] . 1.'esprit (l\,j•..•.•.~.'~'.:-'.'''.....•'.•.. l'ment Cl'!l1:"~ <,~ • on plus gr,,: ;~(-. : titude al·l,,,;~,~~, ,l, ;, us les 11'-." ,-".;. " •., ~, ~I ':<'~ ~ "~1 des Cfl1\r'..:,.· .,;..:,:t' , ,III a\'a.nt~;.:".; .:. , de l>er:-p:"'<'~' '.:l que$ pOUfr·, ," .::":1 me! qtlal~fif ~'" ,.:': 91. One of the tasks assigl1ed to the ernment was to extend the D'Arcy Company itself recogl1ized that the longer valid. )\'tnll11C-L n', .>:'·:'.;;i;i 't;.lIes SOtH, ., ","~ ~ 92. The case was brought before League of Nations, which gave this parties: try to reach an agreement. ever, that an agreement between strong is an agreement betwcen sheep a\l1(~ll1enl ~,',~ ;. ,: 1 ~\ que Silit :.~ " , des expk::.>i:.' . j~ullai:; l)h~,~ /:', >':; , lmr C(lnlr;,~, ",\ . i mit d'l'X;': :' ,. 4 mes lmU l,; .,;,>'. : ~'. d·e 1.·(;.••."'.1"'" '. '.' '. r'" , -,".,.,':,. ','.", ,,'" . 93. In 1933 the Parliament agreed should be prolonged; not one of the really represented the nation. 94. These statements are now going tiated by the authentic documents will read out ta the Council. LIS 50fl1ntî' , '" .' ks gr5.c(~ ~.. ; :ncnt :s'~~t'i;~''.."i, :. . Xml:'; s.:""-"; Ils qllalii;~" "e' .,. la pr.'r·rC-':"c j ('lroll' F··'·: ~"}

This is the Ministry of the Interior to the Governor dated in Persian, Mehr 30, 1311 [October t~ de i'as"l'~"": rl:," 't.ahle th, t;; ,::'Ci: S\IS Ù ii\t~'.~~<·~,~ .:'~~': ~ 'JIW r1·"I,I~~" "No. 1428 "Gazvin, Government of the Province "Candidates for election from Shahroc1i and Kouros. The order of the Supervisory Cou.ncil should so that it sho111d be stlltable for l~ rc.~~"'f~ur-i>H lali:-'IIW l!~"'" du R,;.....' •.:'·· ", :' Î\'iti:' ilil(~':"':.,~'T.{;' ". rrait j\lm'r . ~~,:t:;'!i; ieClif CQm~;t!:, :,':'1 This 1S signed by the Minister of the 97, This is a telegram from Rezaeyeh to of the Interior, Persian date 11/10/12: "Following No. 129, referring ta 2024. Pasha Khan has been recommencled this 'Imperial Special Bureau'. 11/10/11 - (Signed) Sa-ed." "No. 2078 "No. 133 - Since Hamdollah Khan remain in the Par1iament, then the e1ection brother who is also from MaKou is no able. Therefore, after the situation \Vas was decic1ecl to l11ake a decision upon Parsa's In this case acquire aisa the acceptance of mandant and inform us of the matter necessary arder be issued." 98. A cipher telegram from Gazvin ta the the Interior in code, datec1, Persian date 11/8/2, as follows: "Ministry of the Interior No. 1428 "Shahroc1i has a nt1ll1ber of opponents meantime, might create trouble. But the Kouros will not encounter any c1ifficulty since in Gazvin likes or c1islikes him. l just wantec1 ta be informecl beforehand, and give necessary orc1ers to prevent the voices of which might be raised against Shahrodi. meantime, 1 hope that with the Grace of orclers of the Government will be carriecl out "12 Aban, No. 3784, Montazam." 99. Here is telegram No. 485: ~'With the information that you have imp1ementation of Government's decisions, think it will be required that any special issued. The Governor's dutY is ta prevent, way that he deel11s necessnry, irregular activities carrying out the arder." 100. Anot~er teleg~am is acldressed ta the of the l ntenor and slgned by the Governor ~". "Ministry of the Interior, Infor111 us of nàrne__,of Kouros - 2 Aban, No. 3814, Montazam, Governb1:._of Gazvin. ~""'-'" 102. There is a note below the telegram: '·'Mr. Mirze Said Khan: "Tell ML Kouros personally to go to Gazvin possible." 103. Here is another te1egram from the Ministry the Interior to the Government of the Province, Gazvin: "No. 4158 "It has been discl1ssed with Mr. Kouros; he had been in Gazvin two weeks ago and has met sorne notables. It is expected that he will go again to Gazvin on Friday." 104. Telegram No. 1482, signed "Hossein Sami-i" to the Ministry of the Interior: "A report has been received stating that Modjiroddaleh and Amir Amjad are secretly making collusion against the Government election candidate favour of their own candidacy in Mian-do-Ab. iml11ediate1y wired the Government of Mian-do-Ab to serve them notice to leave for Maragheh during the election period; otherwise they will he exilecl." 105. Telegral11 to the Ministry of the Interior from the Governor of Rasht: "Ministry of the Interior: "As has been perceived in the last few days, the l11embers of the Election Board and others do not show any enthusiasm for the electian of Chaychi. It is necessary for him to come here to Rasht for a few days before the beginning of e1ection so that some popularity be created in order to facilitate the matter." The te1egram is signed by the Governor, Divan Beighi. 106. Instruction by the Ministry ta the Department concerned: "Act as is requested." 107. Code telegram to the Government of the Province of Damghan, from the Ministry of the Interior: "The conclitionis-not as you have reported. Moreover, nobody is able to exert influence against the order of the Government. The Government of the Province should only show ability for carrying out the orders, and put into effect the order in its full 108. ML MOSSADEGH (Iran) (translated French): l shaH hand these documents in rity Council so that it may verify that they tic. As Y011 have seen, these telegrams show Parliament which prolonged the 1901 concession composee! of deputies none of whom represented nation. The Ministers 'Nho signed the Bill free. If they had refused to carry out the the dictator, they would have been imprisoned, dered or exiled. A concession granted in stances is not valid. 109. l shallnow show how the Company the affairs of our country.

This is a note by Gass, one of the high officiais of the former in London, and sent to Northcroft, anotber in Tehran, regarcling the meeting held in 28 April, 1951 between Shahrukh, the General of Propaganda in Teheran, and Chisholl1l.

These are documents which we information office of the Company after ization of the ail installations.

The note reads "Shahrukh started the conversation, fluent and idiomatic English. He confirmed outset that t11i5 was an entirely 'off the in 50 far as any publication ta the Press cerl1ed. Dm-ing the course of a long he made the following points: "''''le must face the fact that the .Agreement· was ttnpopular. The Company suffered foryears from a campaign agalnst itself. No Persian of any consequence ever darecl' to 'clefend the Company or Agreement in .public or in Majlis debates that he WOltld be accused of being in the British ... "Persia was now in a perilous condition, (Shahrukh) realized that the important not ta sqneeze a little more out· of the ta get more 1l10ney soon and to spend it "Shahrukh was very critical of Sa'ed handling of the Agreement more thal1 once, that bis and Gulshayan's presentation 15th Majlis had been quite deplorable. was that it was now useless to submit il ", 0: " " " .. ~ " :1 t 1~ "', Z, :.;.. :'~ "When l spoke, l dealt first with the question propaganda and told Shahrukh that it was welcome news to hear him say that it was a government responsibility to bring home to public opinion advantages of the Agreenl.ent. We had always most strongly that it was the Government, and the Company, who should undertake this task. Our Representative in Tehran was fully posted with details of the Agreement and of an relevant matter and was authorized to give any information that was required of him and that he considered desirable, to the appropriate government al1thority... "As regards the question Shahrukh had raised to the possibility of an improvement in the terms the Agreement, l made it quite clear that there could be no revision l1pwards of the tenns. l sketched very briefly for Shahrukh's information the course. negotiations, saying that whateve~ other .reputatlûn l and others might have, l was qmte certam that had 110t the reputation of being bargainers. explained that 1 made an offer on behalf of Company at the very ~ta~t, from which 1.hac1 ultimate1y budged, behevmg that ~he subJect was altogether tao' important to lend Itse1f to carpetbargaining methods... "1 said that the Agreement was now signed, .repeated that there could be n~ question: of improvement in the tenns. 1 explall1ed that ID saymg 113. Another passage states: "Shahrukh inquired whether there was any that the British Government might bring pressure to bear on the Company to revise the payments upwards if it came to a complete impasse before Agreement was submitted ta or after it had been rejected by the Majlis. He remarked that it would be disastrolls for the present Government's prestige if a subsequent Government got something better, l replied that the British Government had taken part whatever in the negotiations from the start, holding that it was entirely a Company affair, as was j and that l did not think for a moment that they would be likely to bring any pressure to bear on Company to increase the amounts of the payments." 114, Ml'. MOSSADEGH (Iran) (tmnslated fro111 French): This doclllnent is signed by the head of information office. 115. Ml'. SALEH (Iran): A telegram to A. H. Chisholm irom. P. Stockil reads as follows: "On 27th and 28th June the Information Department Offices which were sealed by police 21st June were enterec1 by Dr. Bagai and other members of the N ationaI Front who took many photographs of documents. A few have been reproduced in TehraH-i-Mussavar and Shahed apparently in attempt ta prave Department's subversive activities, but tlley should not reflect adversely on Company's attitude in unprejudiced eyes. Owing ta close watch kept for weeks past National Front on Infonnation Department Offices mass destruction or removal of documents was possible as beginning of sueh operation wouId have been quickly reported ta National Front and would certainly have provoked raid calculated ta close Department at ti1l1e when services specially nceded and to demonstrate our so-called guilt by our attempt to destroy or re1l10ve evidence. Some aI the more confidential files were however removed to safety and others destroyed including a number personally handed over ta Stoekil by Keating before the latter returned to United Kingdom." 116. This is a confidential note prepared by the former Company's officiaIs in Tehran about the meeting "Parker has recently returned from Cairo where the D.S. Petroleum Attaché there, Mr. A. Lager, had handed him several documents relating to various ail operations in Venezuela and the Middle East. Parker felt that it might be advantageous to show those relating to Venezuela to the Concessions Department of the Ministry of Finance, but wished to have our views and agreement first. The docun1et1ts in qüestion consisted of a number of statistical breakdowns of oil company earnings and goverl1ment revenues from the oil industry in Venezuela, a review of the oil industiy in the same country produced by the Priee, Waterhouse organization in Caracas, and a brochure on the same subject published by Joseph Pogue of the Chase National Bank. These were all left behind for perusaI. 1f "Those documents relating to Middle East operations consisted of a comparative table of M.E. concessions which the Petroleum Attaché was compiling. Details were provided of the Aran1Co and Kuwait Neutral Zone operations... "Parker produced two confidential telegrams, recently received by the U.S. Embassy in Tehrall from the U.S. Embassy in London, giving details of negotiations in London between representatives of the Iraq Government· and the LP.C. The first of these messages, dated 2 August, indicated that the Iraqis were pressing for a royalty of shillings 17.2 per ton ta be revised to shillings 18.7 per ton in 1954, and a goId clause to be based on the price of gold in Baghdad. The Company were said to be prepared ta accept 17.2. It was .stated that the LP.C. and the Foreign Office were resisting, to the point of going to court, the suggestion that the free Baghdad rather than the official London price of goId should be admitted... "The second telegram, dated 4 August, revealed that agreement had been r<:ached between th~ .two parties on a fiat royalty eqmvalent to about shtlltngs 18 per ton. The Iraqis had ev!dently dropped the .point concerning the Baghdad pnce of gold. It would appear that the above discussions related to the LP.C. "Parker mentioned that the AIOC the Gulf Platt rates to Abadan products subsidizing new refinery construction aU its markets, thereby acce1erating Abadan Refinery would faU by the 117. Mr. MOSSADEGH (Iran) French): l do not wish ta weary the Council. l shaH leave these documents President, and ask him ta order their 118. We have shown that the Company aU Iran's affairs - political, commercial, others; The Company had a de facto, concession. We have always respected ernment and we did not wish to break the Company. We have made our final will read it ta the Council.

l wish ta is an informaI paperewhich was neither 11:or did it bear any address. It was notice of Ris Imperial Majesty, and Court was askecl to submit it informaUy Ambassador. The text of the paper is "In view of the fact that the Iranian endeavours that an arrangement within the law, in such a way that the of the oil industry in Iran does not nation and Government and that which have arisen from the nationalization oil industry be resolved justly and possible, a concise explanation of its this issue. is given hereunder. "Fundamental problems under discussion " (1) Examination of the daims [Anglo-Iranian] Oil Company as weB of the Iranian Government. "The Iranian Government is prepared to settle the just daims of the former Oil Company in one of the following ways, having regard to the daims of the Iranian Government: "(a) On the basis of the shares of the former Oil Company (priees prevailing before the nationalization of oil industry law) . "(b) According to the laws for the nationalization of industries enforced in any country whieh the former Company considers more to its advantage. "(c) Any other way acceptable to both parties. (((2) Sale of oil to the British Government: "The Iranian Governl11ent is prepared, in future, to sen annually to the British Government I.o.b. Iranian ports, the same al110unt of oil which the British nation and Government bought formerly, at prevailing world priees t1l1der long-term agreement. "The British Governl11ent can take half of the priee of the oil bought to redeem the claims stated in paragraph (1) of this letter. ·'~(3) Conclusion of contracts 'luith foreign techmcwns: "The National Iranian Oil Company will retain the required l1tuuber of foreign technicians with all the rights and benefits they enjoyed under the former Oil Company and will sign individual contracts with them. 1 1 Jr ·"And in order that there may be no change in the structure of the former Company and that the great industry may not be disruptcd, it (NIOC) will maintain all the previous administrative and technical rcgulations (save those which are in conflict with the nationalization of oil industry) and win manage the administrative and technieal branches in the same. manner as in the past and will plaee these branches at the disposaI of technical experts, be they Iranians or foreigners, and will give enough powers to the heads of the branches in their routine daily jobs so that they may have freedom of action for the progress of their work. i, r Jl 1 ··.·.· "Moreover, the exploitatioi1 and refining organizations will be headed by a foreign tec1mical manager, whose nationality will be later determined by the Iranian Government. The technical manager who will be at the service of Iran and aet as liaison be- "The National lranian Oil Company to one or more agencies appointed by customers. "The Iranian Government, as it has stated, is prepared to solve the above-mentioned problems by negotiation and expects that to resume the talks on the basis of this will state your views as soon as possible negotiations are started within one submission of this letter." 120, The Court Minister, Mr. Ala, as instructed, the unofficialletter to the British Embassy. 121. The reply received by Mr. Ala from follows: "At the audience which His Imperial Shah was good enough to grant 17th September, His Majesty informed Prime Minister was anxious to reopen on the oil question. Although the suggestions the Prime Minister which His Majesty to me did not appear to me to hold hope of a reasonable basis for negotiations in deference ta His Majesty that if the ernment woulcl put their proposaIs would forward them to my Government. "Your Excellency left with me on the the 19th September a communication point out, is not drawn up on official neither dated nor signed. This paper constitute any advance on, but rather a from, the previous attitude of the ernment; nor does it appear to take into views expressecl by Mr. Han"iman. It does the points which His Majesty gave me Dr. Mussaddiq [Mossadegh] was forward, and indeed the main lines of this alreacly been answerecl in the letter Mr. Harriman to Dr. Mussaddiq, with r'vlajesty's Government are in full agreement. "1 regret therefore to have to inform Majesty's Govermnent cannot regard an official document nor can they regard as constituting a basis on which they j ustified in resuming negotiations. (Signed) "F. M.

'\!lfe have seen that the bad behaviour Company ancl Iran's buclgetary deficit have cause of the nationalization of the oil Acting for the Company, the United Kingdom lent )ffi. 124. The United Kingdom representative claims that Iran has violated certain treaties between our two countries; but he does not specify which treaties or how they were violated. mse 125. As regards the general rules of international 1aw, l must point out that expropriation of the property of aliens is governed by one condition only: compensation. There is no denial of justice unless compensation refused; and in the case before us, the Iranian legislature has provided for this compensation. Tt specifically enacted in our nationalization statute, and in order to put it into effect we have repeatedly asked the representatives of the former Company to negotiate with us in order to settle our accounts. We have said that we are prepared to consider the Company's claims provided that the legitimate counter-claims of the Irallian Government are also considered. Vve have made, during the negotiations, several proposaIs for settlement in order to achieve some result, but we have received no reply. ~Ii~ Ipitr ~t ni lm ;00. lenir 126. The strongest evidence of our sincerity is the proposai which we made on 19 September last to the United Kingdom representative at Tehran and which has just been read to the Council. vVe have no dispute with the United Kingdom Government. Even if there was a valid and fair contract, it concerned only the Iranian Government and the Company. There was no contractual relationship between the United Kingdol11 Government and the Iranian Government concerning which the United Kingdol11 Government could laya complaint before the Security Council. n.ll leg~ anœ aux qu~ dont nti~ 127. We ask the Security Council not to attempt the difficult task of intervening in the affairs of Iran. We beg it to leave the Iranian Government a free hand and the Iranian people the possibility of self-determination. 128. We have a budgetary deficit of 300 to 400 million rials. This deficit must be made up out of the revenue from the southern oil. If the Security Council advised us to negotiate, that negotiation would be protracted and would tie our hands. We must be free to make 130. l have work to do in Iran now, and leave of the members of the Security Council. so, l appeal to their sense of justice. l am sure are moved by the kindest feelings towards oppressed nations. The people of Iran are the Security Council will take no action on Kingdom complaint and will set no barrier fulfi.lment of their national aspirations. the Council that the Iranian people keep They demand justice and will not themselves of injustice.

In explain the attitude of my Government, to make a brief statement. Firstly, there minds, no doubt about the Council's competence with the question under discussion. In saying me make it quite clear that l do not competence of this body to deal with the the dispute between the United Kingdom but, as appears from the very wording of item on our agenda, to the situation which out of the failure by the Iranian Government with provisional measures indicated [S/2239] -;'\nglo-Iranian Oil C;ompany .case by the l11stance of the Umted NatlOns and, indeed, whole worId - the International Court of 132. At the beginning of our deliberations, why my delegation was in favour of agenda. It is in keeping with the same line that my Government is firmly convinced that rity Council is competent to pronounce question as it is laid before us. 133. In this respect, l need not remind how great is the importance whieh the Gove:nment attaches, and has always attached, quest1Ol.1 of competence. No long memories to substantiate this contention. 134. The provisions of the Charter, as general rules of international law determine delimit. the scope of the Council's cO;llpetence. been Justly observed by several repcesentativesamong them the Prime Minister of Iran the Security Council is not a court of justice oft~n ?wayecl ~y political rather than legal ThiS Is unavOldable, and it was doubtless natural tendency in mind that the authors of wisely made, in Chapter XIV, specific provisions allo.w. the International Court of Justice deClslve part whel1ever a legal qnestion was is our firm conviction that the Court neeets 135. Let us bear in mind that the sma11er and weaker States, especiaIly, have the greatest interest in upholding the authority and the influence of the Court. If the motives and professional integrity of the judges were a110wed ta be questioned here, then a fatal blow would he dealt not only to the authority of this august body but also to the very structure of the United Nations. To my knowledge, for the first time in the history of the Council a case is brought before it with the backing of a previous, be it intermediate, ruling or, if you like, indication of the Court. 136. \iVhile, as l emphasized before, not wishing to pronounce myself on the fundamentals of the casein the same manner as the Court itself has hitherto refrained From cloing - l think that it wouId, to say the least, be somewhat bold to substitute our legal arguments and our legal thoughts for those of the Court. The President will understand from my remarks why the N etherlands Government would have preferred the first revised draft resolution [S/2358/ Rev.l] to the one as amended by the delegations of India and Yugoslavia. 'vVe regret, in fact, that in the now amended clraft resolution [S/2358/ Rcv.2], the references ta the Court's ruling have been waterecl down, and are now confined exclusive1y to the third to fifth paragraphs. However, the draft resolution still contains some reference to the action of the Court and, as the amendments [S/2379] have proved to be acceptable ta the United Kingclom Government, my delegation will support the second revised draft resolution. By supporting this draft resolution, we are also prompted by the clesire that the Security Council, competent as we consider it to take cognizance of the dispute, should also c1early show its concern with the dangers inherent in the circumstances and should use the weight of its prestige in trying to bring the parties concerned to a resumption of negotiations and to restrain them from any action which would tend further to aggravate an already tense situation. This appears ta have been achieved by this draft resolution and, if it has not acquired the form we consider best, we have accepted it as the next best. 137. It will also be clear From what l have said that we cannat vote for the draft resolution [S/2380] which was circulated this morning [562nd meeting] by the representative of Ecnador. In the second paragraph of that draft resolution, the provisional measures which were indicated by the International Court are entire1y disregarded; and in the first paragr~~h of the operati,:e part the question of t~e Coun.ct! s competenc~ IS explicitly left c01;lple~ely. 111 the mr. l have expla11led thatour conceptlOn IS dlfferent. Vve do not want to 138. As to the proposals or, l might suggestions made by the representative [561st meeting], we share be feeling by other members of the Council that the draft resolution to a somewhat formula. 139. l may conclude by expressing COl1cern lest the second revised draft acquired the assenting votes of members of the Council, be rejected the Government of Iran. The ultimate a rejection may well do incalculable least to Iran and to the Iraniau people, hope that the words of the Prime which we listened yesterday and retrospect, prove to have been spoken standable emotion of the moment followed by a complete rejection tions. 140. As l pointed out at the statement and as the distinguished India has also stated [561st meeting], question of the nature of the dispute not been decided and may, in a way, to be sub judice. And the Council's in a way intermediate. If, as we parties, whatever their feelings competence, will see the contents the clear indication of the sentiments of the members of the Security Council the dispute, will respect them and will with, thetn, our present deliberations have been in vain. Hl. Ml'. TSIANG (China): We the second revised draft resolution Kingdom [5/2358/Rev.2]. This course, embodies the substance [5/2379] placed bcfore us by the and Yugoslavia. l acknowledge that is, in my opinion, an improvement upon as l think that the first revision was upon the original draft. Nevertheless, cannot vote in favour of this second reasons for my not supporting this me in my statement yesterday think l do not need to repeat what 142. In the second place, we have resolution [5/2380] placed before tative of Ecuador. It is not exactly in mind. However, it is the closest ,Therefore, l shaH vote for the Ecuadorean lution. In my humble opinion, it'is the as well as the most helpful proposal can pass at this time. 144-. For one thing, does not that absoltitist doctrine, that absolutist assertion of complete sovereignty over this matter and of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Security Council, impair the usefulness of the United Nations? 145. In a conflict between the assertion of national sovereignty and the jurisdiction of the United Nations, it appears ta me that all progressive people must give the benent of the doubt ta the United Nations. 146. In the second place, an absolutist assertion of national sovereignty and exclusion of the Security Council would render useless the recognized right of diplomatie protection. If a government is ta exercise that right, it can resort ta negotiations. In the old days, it could also resort ta the use of anned force. Now, the Charter bars the use of armed force; a government can resort only ta negotiations. Is it in the interest of the international community ta deny another channel for diplomatic protection - thOlt is, the channel of an appeal ta some organ of the United Nations? 147. Therefore, while l feel that the matter of nationalization is entirely within the domestic jurisdiction of Iran, l cannot accept the doctrine that a11 the complications which may arise from that act of nationalization are entirely beyond the jurisdiction of the Security Council. 148. This question of competence is extrel11ely complicated. l sometimes think we make a mistake by 100king at it from too simple or too absolutist or too monistic a point of view. We seem to think that the Security Council, if it is competent to handle a matter, is competent ta do anything at all with it; and that, if the Council is not competent, then it is entirely incompetent. l feel that we had better be more realistic in our study of this problem. l think we should ask another question: What is the degree of our competence? l think that that question deserves our analysis as much as the other and absolutist question: Are we competent or are we not competent? 150. In the course of this debate, l, for gained some encouragement. The representative the United Kingdom has assmed us that ernment accepts the principle of nationalization. of the criticisms which the Prime Minister made in regard to the speeches of Sir Gladwyn 1 must confess that l have been nlllch touchecl mocleratiol1 and by the evident goodwill which towarcl the Government and the people of Iran. attitude represents that of the Govermnent United Kingdom - as we must assume that 1 feel that resttmption of negotiations could satisfactory solution. The principle of nationalization accepted. The only worry l have is whether acceptance is an acceptance both in principle facto l should not like to see any snspicion acceptance in principle, with the reverse of practice coming in through the back door, let since any snch suspicion would obstruct the negotiations. 151. 1 think that the day has passed when the of the Iranian oil industry can be shared with companies of foreign governments. Technical operation, managerial assistance probably we1comed and woulcl be accepted. Such arrangements on the technical, managerial level, would be entirely with the efficiency of the industry in with a view to a division in controi. 152. This debate has also made it clear that ernment of Iran has no idea of confiscating property of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. Prime Minister has repeatedly stated that ernment stands for fair compensation. He has a number of alternative bases for negotiation. not ready to say whether his offers are fair but 1 certainly have gained the impression that is wide open for negotiation on that point. 153. l have also heard the Prime Minister [560tl1 meeting] that his Government would British technicians. Technical assistance and co-operation in an industry such as oil require conditions for efficient operation. V'ihen the Minister says that the lranian Government ta employ foreign and British technicians, 1 assume his Government is ready to afford those technicians those conditions under which, and under which efficient operation couId be conducted. 154. 1 myself feel that the members of the at least understand the matter better after this l, for one, had hoped that the resumption of negotiations would lead to results. 156. crois de que pays, niqnes D'anciens d'obtenir sées, déçus cours plus ment et nous l'un étaient 156. l do not need to go through aU that, but l think we can learn a little bit from the Far Eastern aspect of this whole problem and from om experience in this matter. In my country, there was a great wave of anti-British 1110vements in the 1920's. l watched that. That wave of movements began with old grievances. We tried to obtain revision, and revision was refused or delayed. Our sense of grief was sharpened and, furthermore, as time went on the natural progress of the world made us feel that those grievances were more and more burdensol11e. Then came a point where propa- gandists, evil-doers and self-seekers climbed on to this movement and we faced certain propaganda slogans; one was that aU the troubles of China could be laid to British iniquities. 157. l'histoire avant Chine, et riqne de propagande: intentionnellement maintenir lati011 ce accepter. fort Chine guère vo.ulaient ils riches 157. l am supposed to know something about Chinese history. So far as l can remember, .before the first Englishman ever came to China we hac! famines, floods, and other troubles; so it woulc! be an historical untruth to load aU our troubles on the shoulders of Britain. Thcre were other propagandistic slogans; for example, that the British intentionally and systematically tried to keep China weak and the Chinese people poor. That also is a thing that the more clear-mindecl people in China could Ilot accept. Those who know the British know that most of them went to China to l11ake 1110ney, They c1id not care whether we were rich or poor. They wanted to make money. If they had had a choice in the matter, they would rathel' have hac1 the Chinese l'ich than poor. Many of them, after living some time in the country and becol11ing interested in it, dic! take a genuine interest in the we1fare of the community. To say that the British actions in China had the e[fect of hurting China is unmistakable; but to say that the British intentionally and systematical1y tried to keep China weak and the Chinese poor was, of course, pure propaganda. e~x, s intérêt quenc~, en n'a ont mamtel11l' Chinois la 159. Then there was a l110vement on the tao. They started their campaign with the proposition: "We have the treaties and the vVe have the bonds in our hands. You talk sion. 1t is not time yet. Do you mean to you are going ta throw away contracts? believe in the sanctity of treaties and agreements?" 160. Then trouble began to brew. After British, like the Chinese also divided. Some said, "No, we have to teach the Chinese a must lceep thel11 in place. If you make a concession time, they wil! come back with màre requests cessions. V/here will we be?" 161. The more liberal British stated, "The arc gone.. "'IVe can negotiate new arrangements the basis of the new arrangements, British in China can expand and prosper. There ta stick ta those old arrangements." 162. In the case of China, it is fortunate the British there were those who t1l1derstood. case, at that time, Sir Austen Chamberlain \Vith a statement of British policy meeting part of the way; and the British Government wisclol11 to send us Sir Miles Lampson, espccially capahle. Under these circumstances, finished our anti-British campaign by achieving interest, on one side, and continued British afterwards. 163, What 1 have said here is my fundamental regard ta anti-British movements of this to introduce that philosophy in the course on Indonesia [187th meeting], and 1 shouldlike 11 mouvement l'autres buts.r Llvement dans :1 e exJgeait que '. la Chine Ile i oiques h,~ ,..• assez raison· avions b.esoin fi' e canse, 1.1 n'y '): 165. 1 have asked permission to speak for two The first is just to say that the Iranian Prime has made some play with c10cuments which stand it, were extractec1 from the office of Iranian Oil Company in Tehran. esures dlsm· "1' s. Nous étion,;:' lpte que nou, l . iens étranger; . ;i! prendre de, liciens britan· 'r e mouvement J 166. l have not had time to examine these in detail, although, of course, l shall read great attention; but l must say that, at first after having heard the extracts, they seem show two things and, l think, two things only; first place, that His Imperial Majesty Reza Pahlevi was a dictator, a fact which 1 am sure al! admit without further ado or without further and, in the second place, that the Anglo-Iranian company endeavoured to press with Mr. who, 1 understand, was a Cabinet Minister its view that the Supplemental Agreement one and should be passed. l cannot see why thought. improper for the Anglo-Iranian Oil ta do thls. In any case, sa far as l can gather, seem ut least ta have been quite open and normal. lm ensuite du : leur campa- est nous qui rous détenons ; nons parlez '\'étendez-yolIS l? Ne crorez- e' ~~~fj,;!:: 1(. hinDis. NOlis r 5 cédons ctHe ., exigeront de .r., )l'S ?" 167. The second thing :r want ta say is simply There has been a complaint by the Prime Iran of hard words on my part. Of conrse, first time that he has come to the Security Council, 1 can assure him that, in the short experience 1 have had, there has been no lack of hard this table, and that people tend - at any their interests are affected - ta cali a spade 1 am sure he will forgive me if 1 continue and l have no doubt that he will continue himself. lues en Chine .1.·.. aucune raison l'ds.'' , tr lient: "Fi des t' de nOIl\'CaIlX 168. However, l must also say that any hard 1 used were in reply, 1 believe, to what 1 thought rather hard words on his side. But, having 1 may now say, to quote an English proverb - already quoted a Persian one - that hard words no parsnips. And 1 am sure we would both advised not to go on exchanging hard words, clown, if we can, to practical negotiations - say, negotiations on a really practical basis, rnaintain has not been providec1 before. heureU5ement clairvoyant>. berlain, qui a ~s conciliante ~ment britan· :r Sir Jfile5 rticulièrcmclIl 111S un terme sauvegardant nons avom Britanniquei. ~ ~. lte mon opio f'ements anli· d'introduire sâallcc1 que 169. In conclusion, l should like to say that accusation of the representative of Iran wounded me, if 1 may say sa - 1 may even say

l shall now speak as the representative of BRAZIL. 171. The Security Conncil is entrusted with very broad powers, l1nder Chapter VI of the Charter, to investigate any displ1te or uny situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, and ta recommenc1 the appropriate procedures on matters of adjustment to cope with thern.. It was under snch provisions embodied, in particular, in Articles 34 and 36 of the Charter that the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company case was brought before us. 172. Considering the complex and intricate legal issues involved in the question and the important political interests related thereto, my delegation believes that the efforts of the Couneil to achieve a sett1ement of the c1ifferences between the United Kingdom and Iran could hardly have succeeded if we had chosen to look into the merits of the question. If we realizec1 that we woulc1 be confronted with the difficult problem of defining the concept of domestic j urisdiction and the question of deciding on the binding force of the measures indicated by the Court in its arder of 5 July last [S/2239], we cannot but feel relieved that the conciliatory step was talcen by the United Kingdom c1elegation of withdrawing its former cIraft resolution and presenting another one basec1 on the hope of attaining a solution for the controversy through negotiations between the parties. The Security Council is, above aU, a political organ; and its primary task of assuring international peace and security can better be accomplished through the constructive worIe of conciliation than through the role of an intemutional tribunal ruling on complex legal issues. 173. For the reasons l have just stated, the BraziEan delegation will cast Ïts vote in favour of the second revised United Kingc10111 cIraft resolution incorporating the amendments of the Inc1ian and Yugoslav delegations. In doing sa, the Brazilian delegation wishes to make cIear that its attitude in no way prejudges the merits of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company case, nor shonld it be interpreted as a condemnation of the position taken by the Iranian Government in this matter. Since the beginning of our procedure, it was the hope of my delegation that some sort of solution would be possible which \Vould give the parties to the controversy a renewecl chance to reach a peaceful settlement of their differences. This new road was opened by the withdrawal of the frrst United Kingc10m draIt resolution and the presentation of the new text. 174. The Brazilian delegation was very much impressed by the brilliant arguments set forth by the representative of Ecuador [S62nd meeting] on the various and highly complex juridical issues involved. 176. In giving its support ta the secondrevised United K!ngclom draft r~solution, the Brazilian de1egation wlshes to express tts hope that the two parties to the llegotiations calleel for will therehy succeed in adjusting all their c!iffcrences, th11S avoiding the continuance of a situation that has developecl in the past month between the two countries and that couIc! hardly contribute to the maintenance of peace in the world, already so distllrbed by the grov,'ing international tension.

In view of the lateness of the hour, l suggest that we adjoum now anc! meet tomorrow at 10.45 a.m.

1 think that it wonlel be better to postpone our next meeting for another clay, rather than to meet tomorrow morning. 1 think that the situation is rather difficult. We have heard very many new arguments. We are confrontec! with a new draft resolution. l thinl< that many of us shoulcl have more time for reHection; and perhaps some of us will need new instructions from our governments. This, at least, is m)' situation. Therefore, 1 suggest that we postpone our next meeting for, let us say, fortyeight hours, or at least tllltil Friday morning if you prefer a morning to an afternoon session. t

1 confess that, for our part, we should greatly have preferred ta have a meeting tomorrow moming and, as the saying goes, "Let us he shot of the thing". We have been discussing it now for a very long time; l think that mal1.Y of us have exhausted our arguments one way or another. Speaking for myself, l certainly should have preferred getting to the vote. Of course, if the represcntative of Yugoslavia, or any other representative, insists on having more time to consult his Government, it is not for me to object. However, l would sugi?"est, if it is agreeable ta him, that we shollid meet on FncIay morning, and 1 shoulcl hope that on Friday morning there would he no further oratory. '-Ale could then procced to the vote and everybody would vote in accorclance with his conscience. f ,~ t 1 •,

We have a meeting schedulec1 for tomorrow afternoon to deal with the Kashmir problem. We could hoIci that meeting in the m?rning and cleal with thisquestion in the afternoon, lf that would be satisfactory to the representative of Yugoslavia. 181. Ml'. BEBLER (Yugoslavia): 1 understand that the United Kingdom representative agrees to postpone this debate until Friday morning. It means that we can 1,>,(2 Tht' }'IU':SIDENT: We shaH nwel tlllllflrrow aftcrl100n on the Kashmir ~h2lJl Illl'l't Frirlay lllorning at 10.30 f.r~lIIiall qut'stion. The meeting rose al 7.25 F;ri;;;d~-C-;;Mda'----------~=~P~r~.