S/PV.5635 Security Council

In accordance with the understanding reached among Council members, I am pleased to invite the following participants under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council: Mr. Nobuaki Tanaka, Under-Secretary- General for Disarmament Affairs; Mr. Rogelio Pfirter, Director General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons; Mr. Gustavo Zlauvinen, Representative of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency to the United Nations; and Mr. Michael Schmitz, Director of Compliance and Facilitation of the World Customs Organization. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Security Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations. I should like to draw attention to document S/2007/84, which contains a letter dated 12 February 2007 from the Permanent Representative of Slovakia addressed to the Secretary-General, transmitting a concept paper on the item under consideration. Allow me to start the deliberations by making some introductory remarks. It is an honour and a privilege for me to open, for the second time this week, a Security Council debate convened by Slovakia — this time on the issue of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which is at least of the same importance as the debate on security sector reform that took place on Tuesday. Based on the experience we acquired in holding the chairmanship of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), our underlying motivation for organizing this open debate on the issue of cooperation between the Security Council and international organizations in the implementation of resolutions 1540 (2004) and 1673 (2006) was to create an opportunity for States Members of the United Nations and the relevant invited organizations to share experiences and lessons learned in the areas covered by resolutions 1540 (2004) and 1673 (2006). Establishing and enforcing sound and effective measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery is a challenge that requires the international community’s ongoing attention. Our intention is to concentrate on the most urgent issues which are discussed in particular at the meetings of the 1540 Committee. We expect that today’s meeting will be used to look at the possibility of providing assistance to those States which have not yet submitted their national reports. Given that some countries still have gaps in their national legislative systems controlling sensitive goods and technologies, we also anticipate a discussion about areas of cooperation with those invited organizations that are mentioned directly in resolution 1540 (2004) and regularly participate in the outreach activities of the 1540 Committee. It is therefore my pleasure to welcome among us Mr. Nobuaki Tanaka, Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs; Mr. Rogelio Pfirter, Director General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons; Mr. Gustavo Zlauvinen, Representative of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency to the United Nations; and Mr. Michael Schmitz, Director General of Compliance and Facilitation of the World Customs Organization. Finally, I should like to welcome all delegations that will be speaking today, and I look forward to a fruitful and productive discussion. In accordance with the understanding reached among Council members, I should like to remind all speakers to limit their statements to no more than five minutes in order to enable the Council to carry out its work expeditiously. Speakers with lengthy statements are kindly requested to circulate their texts in the Chamber and to deliver a condensed version when speaking. I shall now give the floor to the Under- Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Nobuaki Tanaka. Mr. Tanaka: I would like to thank you for convening this timely and important open debate. While the dangers arising from the global proliferation of terrorist acquisition of weapons of mass destruction are now widely recognized, much work remains to be done to reduce such threats. In this respect, the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) is continuing efforts to promote the full implementation of the resolution, including through enhanced outreach, dialogue, assistance and cooperation throughout the international community. I particularly welcome the participation of representatives from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the World Customs Organization (WCO). These three international organizations play crucial roles in the implementation of the process, especially through their practical experience and lessons learned in the areas covered by resolution 1540 (2004), and through their assistance programmes to facilitate the implementation of the resolution. The threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in fact represents a most urgent task. In the past year, I have seen to it that this issue is at the forefront of the work of the Department for Disarmament Affairs. Last year, the Department organized three regional outreach seminars on the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) involving more than 70 participating countries from the regions. Seminars were held in Beijing for the Asia-Pacific region, in Accra for the African region and in Lima for Latin America and the Caribbean region. I attended all of those seminars personally. I would like to thank all three organizations for participating in them. The presentations by experts greatly contributed to the success of these seminars. I also appreciate Ambassador Peter Burian’s able leadership in organizing them. After three seminars, I believe that we are now getting into the next phase of the implementation of the resolution. We need more tailored approaches to meet the requirements of the regions, sub-regions and even Member States. This cooperation among inter-governmental bodies is essential in implementing resolution 1540 (2004) and in building support for it throughout the international community. I believe this cooperation is an effective illustration of how sustained multilateral cooperation can work to advance the national security interests of all States and strengthen international peace and security.

I now call on the Director- General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Rogelio Pfirter. Mr. Pfirter: I would like to thank you for the kind invitation to attend this meeting. I am pleased to have this important opportunity to brief the Security Council on various aspects of the mandate and functioning of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and to highlight the important role it has to play in chemical disarmament and non-proliferation. The threat of chemical terrorism cannot be underestimated. Ease of access to dual-use chemicals and readily available knowledge of the technologies and processes required to manufacture chemical weapons make them a potential instrument of choice for terrorists. Only yesterday we learned that Iraq, a country whose people have in the past endured the terrible consequences of the use of chemical weapons, has suffered yet another series of cowardly attacks involving chlorine, which was used to kill and injure unprotected, innocent civilians. With your permission, Mr. President, I would like to read out a statement issued on my behalf at OPCW headquarters today and here in New York. “As Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, I condemn in the strongest possible terms the recent multiple use of chlorine gas by groups in Iraq to kill and injure innocent civilians. The international community has firmly rejected the use of toxic chemicals under any circumstances to inflict harm, as demonstrated by the overwhelming international support for the global ban on such weapons. The Chemical Weapons Convention has 181 States parties, and Member States of the United Nations have unanimously condemned the use of poison gas. I urge all Governments, particularly those in the Middle East region, whether or not they are parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, to join me in stating clearly that the use of poison gas is unacceptable.” The role of the OPCW in bringing about a comprehensive prohibition on chemical weapons is indispensable to the larger objectives of the United Nations in promoting international peace and security. Resolutions 1540 (2004) and 1673 (2006) recognize the need for multilateral cooperation in this area. Many of the measures in the operative paragraphs of resolution 1540 (2004) dealing with chemical weapons correspond to obligations that States parties have assumed under the Convention. Operative paragraph 1 of resolution 1540 (2004) stipulates that States should refrain from providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt in any way to develop or acquire weapons of mass destruction. This is fully in line with the general obligations set out in article I of the Convention and further developed in article VII. As you know, the OPCW is not an anti-terrorist organization. Nevertheless, by helping States parties to meet all requirements regarding national implementation, it helps ensure that dangerous chemicals are not misused in any manner, including for terrorism. In December 2001, two months after the terrible attacks against the United States of America, our Executive Council adopted a specific decision on the contributions of the OPCW to the anti-terrorism effort. These contributions include promoting universal adherence to the Convention and the full implementation of national obligations under the Convention. The objective of universal adherence to the Convention remains fundamental to the achievement of its object and purpose. This goal is also reaffirmed in resolution 1540 (2004). The failure of 14 United Nations Member States to join the Convention continues to be an issue of concern, including, in certain cases, as regards non- proliferation. This is particularly serious in the case of the Middle East and in the Korean Peninsula, where we hope that recent developments will bring into sharper focus the need to address accession to the Convention by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. I will now turn to the specific aspects I referred to earlier concerning the destruction of chemical weapons. According to the Convention, States parties must declare any chemical weapons stockpiles, including those which are old and abandoned. Operative paragraph 3 of resolution 1540 (2004) rightly addresses the need to develop appropriate measures to ensure accountability and physical protection of relevant materials. Under our Convention, six States parties, Albania, India, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, the Russian Federation, the United States of America and another State Party have between them declared approximately 71,000 metric tons of Category 1 and 2 chemical weapons. Overall, more than 16,600 metric tons of chemical weapons have already been destroyed under the verification regime of the OPCW. This figure represents nearly a quarter of the declared global total. The steps taken in this connection clearly contribute to global security, while reducing opportunities for non-State actors to gain access to existing stockpiles. We also carry out industry inspections. Since June 1997, when inspections began for the purpose of non-proliferation, the Secretariat has carried out over 2,700 inspections, including over 1,100 industrial inspections in 73 States parties. It is to the credit of the drafters of the Convention that a treaty that had its beginnings in the cold war era and was intended to address activities at the State level also allows us to respond to today’s threats. In view of the need to ensure full implementation of the Convention, our Conference of States Parties adopted a plan of action to assist States parties that have yet to meet their obligations, under the articles of the Convention, to enact implementing legislation and to establish a National Authority. Let me note that, in many cases, delays by Governments in the fulfilment of their Convention obligations are not the result of a lack of political will, but are due to a scarcity of specific legal expertise. The OPCW secretariat has actively focused on offering practical on-site assistance tailored to the needs of the States Parties that have requested it. Thus far, we have worked on 241 drafts of implementing legislation from 117 States parties. At least 25 States parties have also offered significant bilateral assistance. Of our 181 States parties, 172 — that is to say, 95 per cent — have established or designated a national authority. Sixty- three per cent of them have reported that they have adopted legislative or administrative measures to implement the Convention. One hundred States parties, or 56 per cent, have informed us of the measures they have in place to control transfers of scheduled chemicals. Fifty-six States parties, or 31 per cent, have indicated that they have reviewed their regulations on trade in chemicals and have confirmed that those regulations are consistent with the object and purpose of the Convention. Hundreds of thousands of tons of scheduled chemicals are traded internationally every year for purposes not prohibited under the Convention. In order to ensure that that is done only for peaceful purposes, we count on the invaluable support not only of Governments, but also of the chemical industry. The involvement and cooperation of that industry stems not only from its laudable support for the Convention in general, but also from the evident risk of possible attacks on chemical facilities — attacks by terrorists that would turn industrial sites into horrendous weapons. Under article X of the Convention, each State party is entitled to receive assistance and protection. Our activities in this area are central to our mission and are, again, fully consistent with the provisions of resolution 1540 (2004). The OPCW is also mandated to undertake investigations of any alleged use of chemical weapons and is equipped with the technical means and expertise to do so. Here, I would note that, in the case of alleged use of chemical weapons involving State non-parties, the OPCW is mandated to cooperate closely with the United Nations Secretary-General and that, if so requested, it will put its resources at the Secretary- General’s disposal. Since the Convention entered into force in 1997, we have trained more than 2,300 first responders within our States parties. For instance, in October 2005 we conducted a field exercise, Joint Assistance 2005, together with the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Ukraine. We also conducted an exercise organized by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the Finnish Ministry of the Interior. In all of these exercises, the hypothesis was an attack by terrorists either on a plant or on facilities within States members. In just a couple of months, the OPCW will be observing the tenth anniversary of its establishment and of the entry into force of the Convention on 27 April 1997. During that short time, we have made steady progress in carrying out our mandate. Indeed, we take a measure of pride in what has been accomplished in those 10 years. The Convention and its disarmament and non- proliferation agenda are being implemented effectively and in an exemplary manner. Our States parties have every reason to commemorate this important milestone in the history of disarmament. As members may know, I have extended a formal invitation on behalf of the OPCW to the Secretary-General to attend the commemoration ceremonies, which are to take place in The Hague on 9 May 2007. I believe that his presence and personal involvement in our commemoration would symbolize not only his own support, but that of the entire membership of the United Nations, for the work of the OPCW, an organization that confirms daily that even the most sensitive issues having to do with disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction can be dealt with multilaterally and by consensus. In closing, I wish to thank the members of the Council for this timely opportunity to address them on the work of the OPCW.

I now give the floor to Mr. Gustavo R. Zlauvinen, representative of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency to the United Nations. Mr. Zlauvinen: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), too, is pleased to participate in this relevant meeting of the Council. Many programmes and activities of the IAEA are relevant to resolution 1540 (2004). The IAEA General Conference has invited the Agency’s secretariat to provide assistance to member States, upon request and within the scope of the Agency’s statutory responsibilities, for the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). In particular, the Nuclear Security Plan for 2006- 2009 provides a compilation of activities and a plan for their implementation. Through these activities, the Agency assists States in preventing nuclear material and related technologies from falling into the hands of non-State actors and, accordingly, helps States fulfil their international obligations, including those required under resolution 1540 (2004). The relevant programmes and activities include, inter alia, the following: first, to provide legislative and regulatory assistance to enable member States to adopt the necessary legislation to implement instruments under the Agency’s purview, such as safeguards agreements, additional protocols and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material; secondly, to assist in strengthening member States’ systems for controlling nuclear material and related technology so as to enable Governments to implement legal instruments to which they subscribe and to tighten national controls; thirdly, to provide support to States for the implementation of high standards of physical protection of nuclear material, nuclear facilities and nuclear transports; and fourthly, to provide support for States’ efforts to upgrade border controls in order to enhance the capability to detect illicit trafficking in nuclear material and related technologies. In addition, the IAEA facilitates the development and publishing of a series of policy documents on nuclear-security guidance containing recommendations and proposing practical arrangements on how States can implement their international obligations that are relevant to strengthening nuclear security. Such guidance, on how to establish and maintain a system of accounting for and control of nuclear material, facilitates the implementation of States’ obligations pursuant to their respective safeguards agreements. In addition, guidance on the design and maintenance of a physical protection regime applicable to nuclear material and facilities is needed to support consistent implementation of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. To further assist States in their efforts to implement their international obligations, the Agency offers and carries out evaluation and assessment services to help States identify what needs to be improved in the area of nuclear security, including their national systems for the accounting and control of nuclear material and their regimes for the physical protection of nuclear material and facilities. Since 2003, more than 70 such peer-based review missions have been carried out by the Agency. Capacity-building continues to be a cornerstone of the Nuclear Security Plan for 2006-2009. As part of it, the Agency helps States to address key needs in human resource development. The Agency offers a comprehensive education and training programme with a wide variety of education and training events, including technical and scientific visits and on-the-job training in the fields of physical protection of nuclear material and facilities and illicit trafficking. Last year, a nuclear-security training course for lawyers was held by the Agency to create a pool of legal experts who would be available for participation in nuclear security missions. Since 2003, approximately 150 training events have been carried out, with more than 3,000 participants from more than 100 countries. The Agency has also responded to some States’ physical protection needs by providing upgrades and technical support for improved physical protection of nuclear material and facilities. Some nuclear facilities have also received technical support to strengthen their nuclear-material accounting systems. For capacity- building in the area of detection of nuclear materials in illicit trafficking, including at border-crossing points, more than 800 detection instruments have been provided to some 20 countries. The Agency’s programmes and activities in the area of nuclear security are funded mostly from extrabudgetary resources. The Nuclear Security Fund has been established to receive voluntary financial contributions for that purpose. In addition, significant in-kind contributions are received from member States. The cost of the activities carried out during 2006, for example, was $20 million. These support efforts will continue in 2007. An increased number of assessment and evaluation missions; legal and regulatory support activities; a strengthened programme for human resource development; and the provision of technical assistance, including the necessary technical equipment, will be carried out by the IAEA. Regional resource centres will be established, through which much of the required training can be offered. The Agency has also strengthened its international coordination efforts. Regular meetings are convened with member States and other international organizations. For example, the Agency develops, in consultation with individual member States, the integrated nuclear security support plans which bring together all of the work that is required to implement, inter alia, obligations under the legal instruments that are relevant in the nuclear area. Those plans provide comprehensive workplans for individual countries and can be used to help coordinate activities and generate the required resources. The plans improve the efficiency of existing resources and help to avoid caps. All activities are performed with due consideration to maintaining the confidentiality of sensitive information. Let me present some suggestions on how to strengthen cooperation between the 1540 Committee and my organization. We would like to suggest that the 1540 Committee actively inform Member States of all the programmes and activities carried out by the IAEA. The most practical way forward continues to be for the Committee to encourage those Member States requiring assistance in the nuclear field to work directly with the Agency and to report their progress in the fulfilment of their international obligations, as appropriate, to the relevant bodies, in particular to the 1540 Committee. Such implementation would be further encouraged if the Committee, in its summary reports, were to devote a dedicated chapter to the assistance provided by the IAEA for the fulfilment of obligations relevant to nuclear weapons and related materials. Information about IAEA activities in the nuclear field and security field can be found on the Agency’s web page. Finally, as a possible way for future interaction and cooperation, the Committee could share with the Agency information about those countries that have been identified by the 1540 Committee as needing further assistance.

I now give the floor to Mr. Michael Schmitz, Director of Compliance and Facilitation of the World Customs Organization. Mr. Schmitz: We appreciate this opportunity to explain how the World Customs Organization (WCO) might assist in the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). Customs administrations worldwide face the trade-security/trade-facilitation dilemma. On one hand, there is the continuing growth in legitimate international trade, while on the other hand there is the illicit cross-border movement of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), drugs, counterfeit merchandise, dual-use chemicals, small arms, undeclared merchandise, currency, cultural property, hazardous materials and individuals. In the light of the terrorist threat to the global economy, nations seek from their customs administrations economic and physical security, while international traders look for uniformity, predictability, transparency and efficiency in their dealings with customs agencies. The WCO finds itself in the business of globalizing and to the extent possible standardizing customs control efforts to improve both the security and the facilitation of the global supply chain. Our most visible effort to that end is the Framework of Standards — known as SAFE — a global supply chain security initiative developed at the WCO by the international trade community and WCO member customs administrations. In the 15 to 20 years prior to 11 September 2001, customs administrations, particularly in the developed world, began focusing more on trade facilitation rather than continuing to support unnecessary customs controls. At the WCO, that trade facilitation focus led to the negotiation of the revised Kyoto Convention on the simplification and harmonization of customs procedures in 1999. Today, 52 WCO members, including all of the world’s major trading nations, are signatories to the revised Kyoto Convention. However, 9/11 caused the world to refocus on customs control and to face a simple truth: that every nation has an absolute right to determine who and what will cross its national borders. The instrument of this exercise of sovereign control is customs. The joint industry customs task force that worked on the Framework built upon the work done on the revised Kyoto Convention and has produced guidelines on integrated border management, which is the single window through which to coordinate border agencies; integrated supply-chain management, which coordinates all links in the global supply chain; a revised data model that provides harmonized form and content of messages; and unique consignment reference policies, so that a shipment can be identified from origin to destination. Working together, customs and the private sector produced the SAFE Framework of Standards. It was unanimously adopted by the WCO Council in June 2005, and in June 2006 the WCO Council approved a document on authorized economic operators as part of the SAFE Framework. To date, 144 of our 171 members have signed letters of intent to implementation the SAFE Framework. The theory underlying the SAFE Framework is that appropriate, focused and layered trade security measures will actually facilitate the movement of legitimate trade across national boundaries and thereby protect the global economy. The SAFE Framework reflects the realization of the fact that security and facilitation are inextricably intertwined. The SAFE Framework has four core elements: advanced electronic manifest information; a consistent risk management approach; at the request of the importing nation, the outbound inspection of high-risk cargo at the point of export using non-intrusive detection equipment; and enhanced trade facilitation for legitimate trade that meets certain security standards. The SAFE Framework is built on two pillars: customs-to-customs network arrangements and customs-to-business partnerships. While not specifically set forth in the SAFE Framework, there is in reality a third pillar, namely customs cooperation with other national, regional and international Government organizations that have border control responsibilities. The WCO has engaged other regional and international organizations such as the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, the International Maritime Organization, the International Civil Aviation Organization, the International Organization for Standardization, the International Labour Organization, the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, the European Union and the African Union, to ensure that the SAFE Framework is compatible with other security and facilitation guidelines being developed by those organizations and does not unduly burden the private sector with conflicting security standards. We also work closely with the Security Council’s Counter-Terrorism Committee, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the Group of Eight, the World Health Organization, Interpol, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and other international organizations on security matters that can impact the global supply chain. We work with those organizations on training and capacity-building efforts. The SAFE Framework is a concept that moves customs focus from importation to exportation for security purposes. However, by focusing on the exportation of goods, customs will actually increase the facilitation of cargo upon importation. The concept is to identify high-risk shipments early in the global supply chain — at or before exportation — to allow for appropriate and timely control of high-risk cargo prior to its introduction into the global supply chain’s more vulnerable transportation network. The SAFE Framework foresees the rapid release of legitimate cargo upon its importation by identifying international traders that demonstrate an appropriate degree of security within their supply chain. That concept pushes security further back in the global supply chain by involving the private sector, which has increased security in its supply chains. How are we doing with this balancing act between security and facilitation? We are doing better than we were five years ago, but we are not yet where we want to be. Technology has been an enabler, but infrastructure and customs staffing are still real issues we have to face. Inevitably, trade volumes have continued to grow and security needs have increased. It has long been apparent to customs agencies that there are no physical security processes that can be successfully applied to match an ever-expanding threat potential while at the same time facilitating the rapid clearance of legitimate trade across national borders. Therefore, the sole means by which the safety of the global supply chain can be secured without imposing a crippling impact on the necessary free flow of legitimate trade, is through the consistent and effective application of well-reasoned risk management regimes along with the effective use of technology and customs best practices in security and facilitation. The WCO programme to control the exportation and importation of nuclear and radiological materials was developed nearly 15 years ago to further customs agencies’ efforts to protect the societies they serve. Ten years ago, working with IAEA, WCO developed recommendations covering customs actions against illegal cross-border movement of nuclear and hazardous materials. Those comprehensive recommendations urged our members’ administrations to recognize the need for the prevention, detection and repression of illicit movements of nuclear and hazardous substances. It called for appropriate legislation and powers to deal with all aspects of illegal trafficking in nuclear and hazardous material. It called for cooperation and the sharing of information on trafficking, and urged efforts to detect illicit cross- border movements. WCO and IAEA entered into a memorandum of understanding in 1998; we exchange illicit trafficking data, co-sponsor seminars and jointly develop technical and training materials. We also collaborate with IAEA in the production of technical documents on prevention, detection and response. We have participated with IAEA in customs radiation safety training courses and reviewed IAEA illicit trafficking handbooks and guidelines for monitoring radioactive material in the international mail. We have also developed a secure encrypted customs enforcement network, which permits customs services to exchange information and communications and includes databases on nuclear materials and hazardous substances. WCO has also, in the past two years, participated with the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee in seven missions to assess the measures employed by countries to bring themselves into compliance with Security Council resolution 1373 (2001), which in part requires enhanced border security to prevent acts of terrorism. At the end of the day, the one barrier that the actors in this play must cross is customs, and WCO and its member administrations stand ready to assist the United Nations and the members of this Council in their efforts.

At the outset, allow me to congratulate you, Sir, on Slovakia’s very successful presidency of the Security Council this month. We only regret the fact that this is a very short month, which represents a failure on the part of the calendar and not of your presidency. As the initiator and a sponsor of Security Council resolutions 1540 (2004) and 1673 (2006), the Russian Federation considers them to be key non-proliferation instruments in preventing weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and related materials from falling into the hands of non-State actors, particularly terrorists. We are convinced that ensuring the full implementation by all States of those resolutions is one of the principal means of counteracting the serious threat to international peace and security represented by the world-wide spread of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. The implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), which provides the basis for coordinated efforts to combat the black markets in weapons of mass destruction, will, given the scale and complexity of the targets it sets, be a labour-intensive and lengthy process. Assistance to countries in the implementation of the resolution should therefore be based on constructive dialogue without pressure or interference in the internal affairs of States and without harming legitimate international economic, scientific and technical cooperation. Effective non-proliferation work is not possible without a broad-based increase in cooperation between the United Nations and specialized international and regional organizations. We feel that, given the experience and knowledge that have been gained, a more active role in the implementation of the resolutions should be played by the export control regimes. Strengthening national export control systems is one of the key components of resolution 1540 (2004), and closer contacts between the Committee established pursuant to that resolution with export control regimes — including by involving the heads of those bodies in regional seminars — should be a priority of the Committee’s work. I wish to report on the efforts Russia is making to assist in the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). At Russia’s initiative, the issue of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is regularly discussed within the CIS Council of Foreign Ministers. We intend to relaunch the work of the CIS Joint Consultative Commission on Disarmament, the draft agenda of which includes items relating to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, enhancing national export control systems, and the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). An intensive dialogue is under way between foreign ministries of the CIS. A tradition has been established of convening consultations in Moscow with CIS States on export control and non-proliferation. There is active cooperation in strengthening the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons regime. In the context of implementing the trilateral initiative of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Russia and the United States of America, we continue to send CIS State missions to assist in providing security and safe storage of radioactive materials. Russia provides technical and methodological assistance to CIS partner States in the area of improving national legislation on the issues of reporting, control and the physical protection of nuclear and radioactive materials. In particular, within the framework of the Russian programme of support for IAEA safeguards, regional workshops are regularly held for CIS States on the use of physical protection systems and their inspection. We are actively working with the United States of America and IAEA on the removal from CIS States of highly enriched uranium from research reactors manufactured by Russia. To date, processed and unprocessed nuclear fuel has been removed from Uzbekistan. In order to assist in the implementation of the provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Russian Federation has offered assistance to a number of CIS States in drafting national implementation laws and an exchange of experience of the work of national bodies established pursuant to those instruments. Together with our CIS partners, we are striving to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention. We enjoy close cooperation in harmonizing export control systems, particularly within the framework of the Eurasian Economic Community (EURASEC). Together with our partners, we are developing mechanisms for EURASEC States members to implement the Agreement on a Common Order of Export Control, a Russian initiative signed in Moscow on 28 October 2003. We continue to assist CIS States in enhancing and improving their national export control systems on the transfer of dual-use technologies. We regularly inform our CIS partners on developments in international export control systems of which the Russian Federation is a member, but in which not all CIS States participate. That involves above all explaining changes that have taken place in export control lists and the importance of implementing them at the national level. In conclusion, I wish to note that the Russian Federation fully shares the views of the joint statement to be made this morning by the Permanent Representative of Belarus, Ambassador Dapkiunas, on behalf of the members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization.

I thank you, Sir, for holding this open thematic debate, the second such meeting convened by the Security Council under your presidency. It reflects your active and enthusiastic approach to leading the Council. I also wish to thank my colleague Ambassador Peter Burian, the Permanent Representative of Slovakia to the United Nations and Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), for his strenuous efforts at the head of the Committee. We also wish to convey our thanks to Mr. Tanaka, Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Pfirter, Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Mr. Zlauvinen , Representative of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and Mr. Schmitz, Director for Compliance and Facilitation of the World Customs Organization, for their participation in today’s meeting. The adoption of resolution 1540 (2004) was a historic landmark in the effort to limit the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which endanger human security, and to achieve the goal of preventing non-State actors from acquiring such weapons and using them in terrorist acts. The adoption of resolution 1540 (2004) was an additional step in the efforts made by the Security Council on this serious issue, especially since the adoption of resolution 1673 (2005). Two years after the adoption of resolution 1540 (2004), which was also the period of the mandate of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to that resolution, the Security Council extended the Committee’s mandate for an additional two years by adopting resolution 1673 (2006), thereby reaffirming that it continues to attach importance to the work of the Committee. The importance of implementing resolution 1540 (2004) is not in question. Nevertheless, three years after it was adopted, almost one third of the Member States of the United Nations have yet to submit to the Committee their reports under the resolution. That is the case despite the efforts of the Committee to promote technical cooperation between States with a view to achieving compliance with the resolution, including the information and outreach activities on which the Committee focuses. Given that the Committee cannot lend direct assistance to States in implementing the provisions of the resolution, as well as the fact that the submission of reports by States is the first step in achieving the aims of the resolution, we are duty-bound to identify ways and means to help to fulfil those goals and to arm ourselves with all available means to help States in that regard. That would serve to achieve the basic objectives of the resolution, namely, limiting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and preventing non-State actors from acquiring them. Undoubtedly, international organizations concerned with the objectives of resolution 1540 (2004), some representatives of which are participating in this meeting, have the resources to play an effective role in this connection. That is especially the case given that some of those organizations are actually carrying out activities in the areas intended to improve national implementation of the obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and conventions pertaining to nuclear safety and security. It is a well-known fact that resolution 1673 (2006) called upon the 1540 Committee to explore — together with States and international, regional and subregional organizations — ways of exchanging experiences and lessons learned in the areas covered by resolution 1540 (2004), as well as the availability of programmes to facilitate the implementation of the resolution. This open meeting therefore provides an opportunity for Member States, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the International Atomic Energy Agency and other relevant international organizations to exchange experiences and lessons learned and address possible ways to promote cooperation between international organizations and the Security Council as regards efforts aimed at the comprehensive implementation of the resolution. It is also an opportunity to encourage States to make use of assistance programmes provided by international organizations, including training and counselling for national governmental bodies concerned with the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) and assistance in the drafting of the necessary national legislation. In conclusion, we would like to express our support for the draft presidential statement on cooperation with international organizations in the implementation of resolutions 1540 (2004) and 1673 (2006), which the President’s delegation kindly prepared in the course of the consultations it held on the language of the statement. We look forward to its adoption at the conclusion of this meeting.

First of all, the Chinese delegation would like to thank you, Mr. President, for convening this open debate. The Chinese delegation believes that preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems is a real and pressing task facing the international community. Non- proliferation is conducive to maintaining international peace and security, in addition to being in the common interests of all countries. China is adamantly opposed to the proliferation of WMD. We support, and actively participate in, relevant international non-proliferation efforts. We welcome the fact that the United Nations is playing its proper role in this area. China believes that the proliferation of WMD has complex underlying causes that require an integrated approach to address both symptoms and causes. First, it requires the building of a global security environment of cooperation and mutual trust. Secondly, it requires efforts to deal with proliferation through political and diplomatic means. Thirdly, it requires the full participation of the United Nations in its central role, as well as that of other international organizations. Fourthly, it requires proper management of the relationship between non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In 2004, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1540 (2004) on non-proliferation, thereby establishing a Committee whose aim was to fill the gaps in existing international non-proliferation mechanisms in order to cope with illegal WMD proliferation activities by non-State actors. That was of great importance to the deepening of the international consensus on non-proliferation and to the promotion of the non-proliferation process. In April 2006, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 1673 (2006), which renewed the Committee’s mandate for another two years, thereby laying the groundwork for further comprehensive implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). In the past three years, with the assistance of experts, the Committee has done much work and made steady progress in collecting and reviewing national implementation reports and in carrying out outreach activities and facilitating international assistance and cooperation to promote the effective implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). China appreciates all those efforts. We have also been pleased to note that the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the World Customs Organization have also − utilizing their resources and expertise − made positive contributions to the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) in their respective areas of responsibility. It goes without saying that the implementation of resolutions 1540 (2004) and 1673 (2006) is a long-term task for all countries that cannot be accomplished overnight. The implementation of those resolutions depends largely on unflagging national efforts. At the same time, it is important for full and effective implementation of the resolutions that the 1540 Committee play a constructive role in enhancing outreach, promoting international assistance and maintaining the necessary exchanges and cooperation with the relevant international organizations. China attaches great importance to resolution 1540 (2004) and has always participated constructively and actively in the work of the 1540 Committee. As required by the resolution, China has submitted its national report and supplementary notes. In July 2006, we co-sponsored, with the United Nations and a number of other interested countries, a seminar on implementing Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) in Asia and the Pacific. That formed part of our contribution to promoting the implementation of the resolution in the Asia-Pacific region. China will, as always, continue to actively support and participate in the work of the Committee and will work with all other actors in a concerted effort to effectively implement resolutions 1540 (2004) and 1673 (2006). China supports the issuance today of a presidential statement on this item.

I join others in thanking Under-Secretary- General Tanaka, Director-General Pfirter, Mr. Zlauvinen and Mr. Schmitz for their briefings today. The activities of the international organizations they represent contribute greatly to States’ implementation of resolutions 1540 (2004) and 1673 (2006), and we hope that our discussion today strengthens the relationships among us and furthers our collective efforts. We appreciate the opportunity for the Council to focus on promoting implementation of resolutions 1540 (2004) and 1673 (2006) and to highlight its resolve to counter the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, their related materials and their means of delivery. The threat posed by weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) in the hands of terrorists or rogue States is one of the gravest dangers facing the planet, and in adopting resolution 1540 (2004) the Security Council sent a warning and an ultimatum to the broad range of facilitators of proliferation. Unfortunately, Iran has yet to heed that warning or make the strategic decision to cooperate with the international community and end its pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability. The report by the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) which the Council received yesterday makes clear that Iran has not complied with Security Council resolution 1737 (2006), thereby highlighting the Iranian regime’s continued defiance of the international community. This marks the second time that Iran has failed to comply with a resolution of the Security Council. The report also describes Iran’s failure to cooperate fully with the IAEA’s investigation and reiterates that, in addition to Iranian cooperation being long overdue, certain Iranian actions are hindering the IAEA’s ability to verify the purposes of Iran’s nuclear programmes. That is unacceptable. As resolution 1737 (2006) indicates, the Security Council should be prepared to take additional appropriate measures to communicate to the Iranian regime that its non-compliance is unacceptable and to persuade it to cooperate. States’ actions to implement fully resolution 1540 (2004) form an important part of international efforts to deny terrorists access to weapons of mass destruction and to ensure that States seeking to develop a nuclear or ballistic missile capability in violation of international obligations will not succeed. In that regard, we also recognize and support the efforts of the Security Council and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) to promote States’ full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) through the activities set forth in resolution 1673 (2006). We appreciate the chance to share the experience that the United States has gained in our own implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). For example, consistent with the resolution’s requirements concerning proliferation finance, President Bush, in June 2005, issued Executive Order 13382, which establishes a targeted financial sanctions programme that blocks the assets of designated WMD proliferators and their support networks. It also prohibits United States nationals and others within the jurisdiction of the United States from engaging in transactions with those to whom the United States has applied such sanctions. We have created a special 1540 coordinator in the State Department, who works with many relevant agencies on implementation. Last May we completed a national action plan for implementing resolution 1540 (2004). The United States would like to ensure that 2007 is the year of 1540 implementation. To do that, States must establish clear national priorities and develop national implementation plans, and begin to act upon them. We stand ready to work with other States to identify and share lessons learned and best practices concerning implementation. At last week’s 1540 implementation workshop of the Regional Forum of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which the United States co-sponsored along with Canada and Singapore, we were impressed to hear about the many developments that States in that region are pursuing to promote their own implementation. The United States is providing significant assistance to States working to implement resolution 1540 (2004) fully, and we welcome and are prepared to consider additional requests for such assistance. The 1540 Committee’s website lists the assistance that the United States is offering both bilaterally and multilaterally. For example, our export control and related border security programme has budgeted almost $132 million since 2004 for training, equipment and infrastructure development related to 1540 implementation. In 2007, that programme is sponsoring workshops on resolution 1540 (2004) with outreach partners in Oman, Kenya and Tanzania and in the Caribbean and Central and South America. As well as providing funding to the IAEA for its activities to support 1540 implementation, we provide joint training and assistance with the IAEA to IAEA member States. Similarly, the United States and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) have a long-term relationship in providing advice and assistance to enable States parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention to comply with their obligations under that treaty. Today’s debate also highlights the ways in which the Security Council can enhance its cooperation with organizations like the OPCW, the IAEA and the World Customs Organization in promoting 1540 implementation. We urge the Council to urge United Nations Member States which may need assistance with 1540 implementation to avail themselves of the assistance the IAEA and the OPCE provide to strengthen national legal, regulatory and institutional infrastructures related to non-proliferation, nuclear security and chemical weapons. The Council should encourage the 1540 Committee, the IAEA and the OPCW to consider how they might enhance their respective relationships, with a view to identifying activities that could enhance States’ fulfilment of their obligations under resolution 1540 (2004). For the IAEA, activities relating to the nuclear security programme might be particularly appropriate. And for OPCW, cooperation on activities such as technical assistance visits could be especially productive. I thank you again, Mr. President, for organizing today’s debate and for your leadership role on this important issue.

Congo welcomes your initiative, Mr. President, in organizing today’s debate on a very important and topical theme. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction continues to pose a threat to humankind, and the risk of their falling into the hands of terrorists remains real. Indeed, as recently as 16 February the General Assembly followed up on the implementation of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy; at that meeting Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon presented the first version of the Counter-Terrorism Online Handbook created by the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force. While noting that United Nations organs can play an important role in this area, he pointed out that the success of counter-terrorism activities depends first and foremost on the role played by Member States, which can be strengthened only through international cooperation. He also pointed out that collective and concerted action was necessary to prevent terrorism from threatening the very existence of humanity, because, in his view, a race is now on to overcome this destructive phenomenon, whose actors are fully prepared to use the most lethal means available. Those words give today’s debate particular importance, as they stress the ongoing nature and persistence of the phenomenon and therefore the need to strengthen and coordinate our actions, in particular to prevent weapons of mass destruction from falling into the hands of terrorists. In that context, my delegation fully appreciates the considerable amount of work that your delegation has been doing at the helm of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) since January 2006 with respect to Member States as well as to international, regional and subregional organizations. This is clear from the regional seminars held recently on the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) at Beijing, Accra and Lima, respectively; the Vienna workshop organized by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe; and, more recently, the workshop held by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum, from 12 to 15 February 2007, at San Francisco, to which the American delegation has just referred. Those meetings illustrate the Security Council’s will and determination to enhance its cooperation with international organizations. We welcome also the Council’s continued focus on civil society organizations through the 1540 Committee. In paragraph 8 of resolution 1540 (2004), the Security Council calls upon Member States “To promote the universal adoption and full implementation, and, where necessary, strengthening of multilateral treaties to which they are parties, whose aim is to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons”. Those States are also asked to renew and fulfil their commitment to multilateral cooperation, in particular within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, as important means of pursuing and achieving their common objectives in the area of non-proliferation and of promoting international cooperation for peaceful purposes. Along those same lines, the Security Council, in paragraph 5 of resolution 1673 (2006), calls upon the 1540 Committee to intensify its efforts to encourage States fully to implement resolution 1540 (2004) through a work programme which provides for, inter alia, outreach activities, dialogue, assistance and cooperation, particularly on aspects concerning border controls, law enforcement efforts and export and trans- shipment controls, including controls on providing funds and services such as financing to such export and trans-shipment. These are all areas for concrete action that will enable us to work in a coordinated manner and at all levels — national, regional and international — in order to prevent weapons of mass destruction from falling into the hands of terrorist groups. However, recent meetings held in Africa, Asia and in other areas of the world have shown that much remains to be done. Not only are reports not being submitted on time by Member States; when they finally are submitted, they do not always meet the requirements of the Committee. The obstacles we have noted in connection by cooperation by States include not only shortcomings linked to States’ performance, but also and, most importantly, the question of the priorities to be assigned in dealing with issues related to threats to international peace and security. While this may not be the most opportune moment to tackle the issue of small arms and light weapons, this meeting does provide an opportunity to recall this legitimate concern on the part of those whose very existence is daily threatened by such weapons. We agree that counter-terrorism is our common mission. However, let us not lose sight of the fact that small arms and light weapons are today the primary means used by terrorists to carry out their crimes. Let us be aware of that fact, despite the fact that, comparatively speaking, their potential for destruction is less than that of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons. Having said that, Congo fully supports the strengthening of the work of the 1540 Committee and hopes that the donor conference to be held in New York in March 2007 on the implementation of resolution 1540 will be successful. Once again, Mr. President, we wish you every success in conducting your sensitive mission, and we endorse the draft presidential statement crafted by your delegation.

Mr. Minister, we thank you once again for presiding over the work of the Council. We in South Africa hope that next month we will be able to achieve as much as your presidency has done. Let me also welcome the Under-Secretary- General for Disarmament Affairs; the Director General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons; the Representative of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency; and the Director General of Compliance and Facilitation of the World Customs Organization. We thank them for their briefings. South Africa welcomes this opportunity to discuss with other Member States issues related to resolution 1540 (2004). It is South Africa’s firm conviction that weapons of mass destruction do not guarantee security, but, rather, detract from it. As long as such weapons exist, the world will always live under the threat of a nuclear catastrophe. Today, we are discussing the fear we all share that such weapons could fall into the wrong hands. However, since weapons of mass destruction are illegitimate and their destructive impact is indiscriminate, South Africa fails to find assurances in a status quo that seems to hold that such weapons are safe in some hands but not in others. South Africa continues to believe that the objectives of disarmament and non-proliferation are mutually reinforcing processes that require continuous and irreversible progress on both fronts. We remain convinced that the only real guarantee against the use or threat of use of weapons of mass destruction is their complete elimination and the assurance that they will never again be produced. The overwhelming majority of States are as concerned about the vertical proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as they are about horizontal proliferation. With regard to horizontal proliferation, we note with grave concern a lack of even-handedness that further undermines efforts to deal effectively and credibly with proliferation issues. As it is, the existing arsenals of weapons of mass destruction are not only retained, but expanded and refined to make them more deployable in a conflict situation, especially when aimed at specific targets, with increased destructive power. When resolution 1540 (2004) was introduced, it was described by its sponsors as an emergency and temporary stopgap measure designed to close a missing link in the relevant international regimes addressing disarmament and non-proliferation. In other words, the fear was that non-State actors could potentially obtain weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. Since the adoption of resolution 1540 (2004), no credible efforts have been made to close the gap in the international regimes. Instead, the Security Council adopted resolution 1673 (2006), extending the mandate of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) until 27 April 2008. South Africa is of the view that challenges facing the international community in the area of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems can only be addressed in a balanced and comprehensive manner in the context of existing multilateral instruments. It is only through inclusive multilateralism and the reinvigoration of the relevant multilateral instruments and organizations that we can effectively deal with both old and new challenges in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation, including those covered by resolution 1540 (2004). These international regimes provide a clear recognition of the inextricable link between disarmament and non-proliferation and set out the obligations of nuclear weapons States, while upholding the right of all States to peaceful uses of relevant technologies. My delegation wishes to highlight the importance of technical assistance and cooperation between Member States and international, regional and sub- regional organizations. This assistance should be provided upon request of a State in a way that respects the sovereignty and national priorities of the State making the request. We should not lose sight of the fact that the objective of such cooperation is to assist States in meeting their obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions. Ensuring compliance with Security Council resolutions remains a national responsibility that cannot be transferred to international, regional or sub-regional organizations. International organizations and regimes are also not responsible for drawing up action plans and roadmaps for the implementation of Security Council resolutions by Member States. South Africa reiterates its conviction that in the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), structures such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which have already been established in accordance with international disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control agreements, should be utilized as the primary institutions in the international community’s endeavours to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including to non-State actors. South Africa would also be concerned if the Security Council were to assume legislative and treaty- making powers not envisaged by the Charter of the United Nations. South Africa will not accept externally imposed norms or standards, whatever their source, on matters within the jurisdiction of the South African parliament, including national legislation, regulations or arrangements that are not consistent with South Africa’s constitutional provisions and procedures, are contrary to South Africa’s national interests or infringe on its sovereignty. Regarding compliance with resolution 1540 (2004), the list of non-reporting and late reporting States consists primarily of developing nations. The Committee’s experts report that in addition to lack of capacity and reporting fatigue, one of the reasons offered by States finding themselves on the late or non-reporting list is that they do not have any proliferation-sensitive nuclear, biological or chemical capabilities and that reporting is therefore not considered a priority for them. Rather than assign international organizations the task of policing the implementation of the Security Council’s resolutions or taking over the reporting obligations of Member States, we should acknowledge that the resolution 1540 (2004) reporting requirements themselves are overly complicated and unsuitable for many developing States. The reporting obligations ought to be differentiated according to the capabilities of the State in question. Instead of chastising these States for their late or non-reporting status, it is important to acknowledge that none of these States are possessors of weapons of mass destruction. The 2005 World Summit called on the Security Council to consolidate its anti-terrorism activities and reporting requirements. The overlap between the functions and reporting regimes of the Counter- Terrorism Committee, the Al-Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee and the 1540 Committee needs to be addressed. To avoid duplication, the outreach activities and programmes of those Committees, including their expert support structures, should include joint visits to Member States that could benefit their work. Bearing this in mind, we welcome the objective of today’s discussion, which is to consider ways to harness the synergies that may exist between the work of the 1540 Committee and that of relevant international organizations. We believe this could assist non-reporting States in a manner that respects their sovereignty and also respects the mandates of the relevant international organizations. In conclusion, the vast majority of States still lend their primary support to cooperative approaches based on treaty-making combined with practical action within relevant international organizations. They see themselves as stakeholders in jointly managed systems of treaties and organizations for disarmament, arms control, verification and the building of security. Their principled renunciation of weapons of mass destruction should be reciprocated by an equal commitment to the disarmament of these weapons. Without honouring this most fundamental bargain that underpins all of our efforts, significant progress with respect to both disarmament and non-proliferation will continue to elude us.

France aligns itself with the statement that will be made later on behalf of the European Union by the Permanent Representative of Germany. I should also like to thank you for having taken the initiative to organize this open debate, the first the Council has dedicated to the implementation of that document since the adoption of resolution 1540 (2004) some three years ago. We believe that the approach that you have chosen for this debate, that is, cooperation between the Security Council and international organizations, is particularly appropriate. The Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), which has now reconstituted its group of experts, must step up its efforts to implement the workplan that it adopted some five months ago. Moreover, it has only 14 months left under resolution 1673 (2006) to report to the Security Council on States’ conformity with resolution 1540 (2004) in completing the implementation of the provisions of that resolution. That ambitious task cannot be carried out without enhanced cooperation with other international organizations. The purpose of my statement is to make a few specific suggestions to that end. First, the Security Council needs to develop its cooperation with international organizations in order to help States to report on the measures that they are undertaking. In that regard, the most useful cooperation concerns regional and subregional organizations. The States that find it difficult to report to the Committee are essentially developing countries in the Pacific, Africa and the Caribbean. The example provided by New Zealand, which has utilized regional and subregional frameworks that link it with Pacific States to help them report to the Committee, is exemplary. The Accra and Lima workshops showed the interest that that example has aroused in other regions. Such action can go hand in hand with cooperation between organizations: one regional organization can assist the action of another. The statement to be made shortly by the representative of Germany will attest to the experience of the European Union in this area. However, beyond providing information, the cooperation between the Security Council and international organizations is necessary, and now urgent, to ensure that States adopt appropriate measures. With regard to the implementation of physical protection measures for installations containing sensitive materials, as stipulated in paragraph 3 of resolution 1540 (2004), there are technical competences that we have not utilized to date within the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). We must not mix up competences: the IAEA will not make judgements on States’ conformity with the provisions of resolution 1540 (2004). On the other hand, it has elaborated principles and instruments that it can promote to members, such as the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. Indeed, these are mentioned in resolution 1540 (2004). In addition, the IAEA has cooperation programmes in the area of security and safety, which provide it with opportunities to raise States’ awareness as to whether the security measures they are taking meet the requirements of resolution 1540 (2004). Other organizations could play a similar awareness-raising role. That is the case with the World Customs Organization — whose participation I welcome in this debate — and the World Health Organization. What I said about the IAEA and the OPCW applies to those organizations. Finally, there are multilateral arrangements whose activities are relevant to non-proliferation, such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which has already had contacts with the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), or the Missile Technology Control Regime, which will soon meet with the Committee. There can only be advantages as a result of the involvement of such groups in information activities that reach beyond their membership and raise other States’ awareness of their activities as regards export controls. I recall that resolution 1540 (2004) establishes no norm regarding such controls and merely requests States to implement them. The Security Council is not in a position to promote the standards of these groups, but it can encourage them to provide States with ideas about how to implement their own national controls. In conclusion, I wish to say that cooperation with international organizations aimed at implementing resolution 1540 (2004) should be guided not only by a concern for pragmatism, but also by a certain sense of urgency. Pragmatism can only encourage the Security Council to welcome all the goodwill that is shown and to make use of all competences available. During the nearly three years since it was established, the 1540 Committee has not had substantial cooperation with the IAEA. It is clearly necessary to respect the mandates of the Council and the Agency, but not to the point of never asking for the opinions of those who are in the nuclear profession. Urgency demands that we accelerate our pace. I am not talking about the urgency resulting from the tight deadline that we have set ourselves for making judgements as to full implementation of the resolution. Rather, I am talking about the urgency of filling the gaps that traffickers and terrorists can still take advantage of in order to procure dangerous materials or contribute to proliferation. France supports the idea of cooperative action to implement resolution 1540 (2004). That must go hand in hand with the Security Council’s concern to shoulder its responsibility by effectively addressing the risk to international peace and security posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. Sir Emyr Jones Parry (United Kingdom): I should like to associate myself with the remarks to be made later by Ambassador Matussek on behalf of the European Union. The United Kingdom would like to place on record our gratitude to Slovakia, which currently holds the Council presidency, for organizing this event. Our position on the importance of resolutions 1540 (2004) and 1673 (2006) is well documented, as is our support for them. We consider them to be vital pieces of the international non-proliferation architecture. It is crucial that we, as States Members of the United Nations, put in place systems that reduce the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, in particular filling the gap posed by non-State actors. The Council has considered the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to be a threat to international peace and security since 1992. That underpins our continuing concern at developments in Iran and the failure of its Government to meet the obligations set out most recently in resolution 1737 (2006). The obligations under resolutions 1540 (2004) and 1673 (2006) are clear. But equally clear is the fact that putting in place all the legislation and systems necessary to protect ourselves against this threat will not happen overnight. To do so, we need to work at all levels: nationally, subregionally, regionally and internationally. We need a coalition of all those who are able to help. Many areas of the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) relate to the same goals as those of resolution 1540 (2004). They contribute to the global effort to put non-proliferation systems in place. Safeguards agreements and the ratification and implementation of additional protocols are all concrete steps that are necessary in their own right, but they also represent steps towards implementing resolution 1540 (2004). I would put the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material in the same category, and I would encourage all States to ratify the amendments to the Convention as a matter of priority. These areas of work are ones of great synergy with the work of the Security Council and its Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), not least because international organizations, such as those represented here today — whose briefings we very much welcome — know their members. They know their areas of technical expertise, and they are able, in many cases, to provide technical assistance in a way that the 1540 Committee cannot do. A fine example of that sort of approach is the successful work undertaken by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), in the form of its action plan on national implementation. In the view of the United Kingdom, that plan has been absolutely key in improving rates of implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Each element of the OPCW’s success in its field is a success for the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). I should like to take this opportunity to pay tribute to the contribution of the Director-General. The United Kingdom stands ready, as ever, to continue to support him. I should also like to mention the biological- weapons aspect of resolution 1540 (2004) and to state, for the record, how pleased the United Kingdom was with the outcome of the Sixth Review Conference of the Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, held last December. We welcome in particular the creation of an Implementation Support Unit in Geneva, which will help States parties to the Biological Weapons Convention to ensure that they implement their obligations under the Convention. We believe that this small team can become a focal point where States can exchange best practices on implementation. And — important in the context of today’s meeting — we think that team can function as a clearing house for States to offer and to request assistance, bringing requests and providers together, which is very important. I would also like to welcome the World Customs Organization (WCO) joining up the work of policymakers with the customs officers — who are engaged on the front line, often taking crucial decisions on whether to stop a shipment or whether to allow it. Invariably, it is those experts who know best how to detect and who are most successful at doing it. The United Kingdom wholly endorses the WCO Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade, known as the SAFE Framework. A secure supply chain is one from which goods will not and cannot be diverted to non-State-actor use. The United Kingdom has continued to support implementation of resolutions 1540 (2004) and 1673 (2006) through our own participation in international forums. Promoting discussion between States that can share experience and that have similar national situations can be a very powerful instrument. Such occasions, when set up with clear objectives and focused follow-up, are an important opportunity to map the way forward on implementation. The participation of international organizations and the opportunity to benefit from their expertise is also a real gain at such events. We found the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) workshop held in November last year useful for exactly the reasons I have tried to set out. As a result of that meeting, the OSCE and its members made a strong commitment to implementing the resolutions, among other things by developing national action plans for that implementation. Action plans can be a useful tool for States as they consider the top few priorities for their next steps on the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) and a useful tool enabling those in the international community that can provide assistance to see where priorities lie and where assistance needs are greatest. In conclusion, I would like to make clear that nothing in today’s debate is intended to divert or alter the mandates of the international organizations working in the non-proliferation field. The clear message of today’s meeting is that we share the goal of protecting the international community from the potentially catastrophic results of the proliferation of WMDs, specifically the ultimate nightmare of bringing together weapons of mass destruction and terrorists. That is why we should work together to reinforce that international effort and to make the best use of our respective resources. Not to cooperate would be wasteful and short-sighted. But to really put our hearts into productive cooperation: now, that could make a massive difference.

Allow me, Sir, to congratulate you and your delegation on having convened today’s meeting on an issue of great relevance and international interest: cooperation between the Security Council and international organizations in the implementation of resolutions 1540 (2004) and 1673 (2006). The adoption of resolution 1540 (2004) was a milestone in the area of non-proliferation. The national reports submitted to the Committee established pursuant to that resolution demonstrate the commitment of States to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and related materials and reflect their efforts to ensure that those weapons are kept out of the hands of non- State actors. In extending the mandate of the 1540 Committee, resolution 1673 (2006) showed that some States that submitted their reports still have gaps in their legislation and deficiencies in implementation. Renewed efforts are therefore required to achieve the full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). Here, I would like to commend Ambassador Peter Burian for his work as Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). My delegation is fully aware of the difficulties that many States face in the submitting of their reports or in the establishment of appropriate legislative and operational measures. The Committee should therefore maintain its full support towards the achievement of those objectives. Countries with more experience and capacity to provide assistance should also support that task. That situation gave rise to intensified promotion of the implementation of the resolution through the organization of a number of regional seminars. In November 2006, as an example of its commitment to the issue of weapons of mass destruction, Peru hosted one of the events for Latin American and Caribbean countries. The seminar was co-sponsored by the European Union and the Government of Spain and was supported by the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs through the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean, headquartered in Lima. Because of the results obtained in terms of shared experiences and assistance, we recommend such activities. The participation of subregional and regional organizations is highly appreciated. Allow me to note the progress made in cooperation between the 1540 Committee and international organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). My delegation welcomes the assistance that those and other organizations can provide in the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) within their respective mandates. Such support should, however, be provided on a case-by-case basis. We are confident that the work of the 1540 Committee and the cooperation of international, regional and subregional organizations will contribute to guide and motivate States in strengthening their non-proliferation processes. Finally, I would like to reiterate our conviction that non-proliferation initiatives, which are fully supported by my Government, should be associated with effective action on disarmament issues. Progress in both areas is required if we truly intend to build a safer world and to reduce the proliferation of conventional threats.

Belgium welcomes the organization of today’s open debate. We welcome, Mr. President, your country’s contribution to the efforts of the international community in that area. Belgium supports the statement to be made shortly by our colleague from Germany on behalf of the European Union. After the adoption of the fifth programme of work by the 1540 Committee, today’s debate will enable us to take stock of one of the principal elements of the fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction: the need to enhance cooperation and optimize coordination among the various international organizations that are active in this area. Indeed, the action of international organizations in this area is an extension of the obligation of each of our States to establish effective export control mechanisms to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Resolution 1540 (2004) was the first formal Security Council decision that described proliferation as a threat to international peace and security. While the resolution reaffirmed support for existing multilateral instruments, it also established new obligations addressing nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery and, in particular, covering non-State actors. While numerous States have submitted their national reports on the implementation of the resolution to the 1540 Committee, many others have not yet reached that point. Moreover, the submission of a report does not automatically mean that all obligations under the resolution have been fulfilled. The resolution has launched a process. Its implementation is a long-term task and will required sustained effort. Belgium is determined to provide its support to those countries facing difficulties in establishing the necessary administrative and legislative arsenals for the implementation of the resolution. Like many others, Belgium has worked with the various international organizations of which it is a member to ensure convergence among the actions of those organizations by drawing on the respective lessons learned, which would seem to be a clear necessity. Ensuring that optimal use is made of the specific skills of each organization remains a challenge that we must continuously and repeatedly seek to meet. The European Union’s strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction stresses the collective responsibility of States to combat proliferation. The European Union has taken numerous steps to encourage the submission of national reports, holds regional seminars on the implementation of the resolution, and supports the International Atomic Energy Agency’s assistance and cooperation programmes and various projects to implement the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions. Finally, Belgium also wishes to recall the utility of building bridges between the various export control regimes whose expertise, experience and know-how can be useful. While the autonomy of each instrument must be respected, mutual reinforcement among the various conventions and regimes could expedite progress towards establishing effective national legal systems. Nana Effah-Apenteng (Ghana): At the outset, let me congratulate you, Sir, for organizing this debate, considering the importance of the issue to the core mandate of the Security Council, namely, the maintenance of international peace and security. Let me also thank Under-Secretary-General Tanaka for his presentation and the representatives of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the World Customs Organization (WCO) for their briefings. Although the international community’s resolve to overcome the twin scourge of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has yielded some modest results, it has failed to assuage concerns over that foremost threat to global peace and security. The fear of terrorists’ acquiring and using weapons of mass destruction has become more serious given the current growing interest in civilian nuclear programmes. It is against that backdrop that my delegation considers resolution 1540 (2004) to be a landmark document that addresses a formidable challenge to global security in the twenty-first century. Although it is not a panacea for containing weapons of mass destruction proliferation, the resolution seeks to close a critical gap by preventing the acquisition of such weapons by non-State actors. The maximum gains that resolution 1540 (2004) seeks to achieve can be realized only through adherence to and implementation of its provisions. Three years since its inception, the Committee established pursuant to the resolution has made significant strides in the discharge of its onerous responsibility. Through its outreach programmes and participation in workshops and seminars, it has sensitized the international community, increased awareness of the importance of the resolution, and encouraged and assisted countries to fulfil their obligations. The Committee’s efforts have yielded positive dividends, with about 135 countries having submitted their first reports and 85 identified as providing additional information. While we welcome that positive development, we should be mindful of the fact that the resolution enjoys universal support and was adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter, which obliges all Member States to comply faithfully and fully with its provisions. Thus, nothing short of universal adherence is expected and acceptable. Having successfully endorsed an elaborate work programme, we hold the view that 2007 should be a year of implementation if we are to make substantial progress. Given the tremendous efforts still required, it is vital that the Committee adopt strategies that would enhance efforts towards fulfilling its mandate. As the Committee pursues efforts to ensure the submission of first reports by all Member States, it is our candid view that equal attention should be focused on implementation, since resolution 1540 (2004) is also suffering from an implementation deficit within and between countries. After all, the crux of the resolution is for States to ensure that adequate measures have been instituted to address the threat of non-State actors’ acquiring and using weapons of mass destruction. If we do not focus our attention on its implementation, the resolution may remain a mere declaration as States make minimal efforts at compliance, while achieving little improvements in global control over the proliferation of the world’s most heinous weapons. We will, however, be the first to admit that, given the gamut of control elements within resolution 1540 (2004) and the disparate resources among countries, even a satisfactory universal level of implementation will take years, if not decades, to accomplish. The ideal of international control over the spread of weapons of mass destruction to non-State actors requires a strategy that would counter the current challenges in order to remove the limitations to universality. The resolution recognized that reality and provided tools that should be used effectively for that purpose, such as the provision of assistance to less endowed States. It is my delegation’s strong view, however, that despite its tireless efforts, the 1540 Committee with its current mandate lacks the capacity to provide the requisite assistance needed to attain the long-term lofty goal of full implementation of all the provisions of the resolution by all States. It would need the support of relevant international and regional organizations that have the technical expertise in that sphere, such as IAEA, OPCW and WCO. The resolution recognized that crucial factor when it called, among other things, for the intensification of cooperation with international and regional organizations on the issue. We are therefore pleased to note that, in the Committee’s new work programme, priority has been placed on that relationship. The Committee’s role as a clearing house for assistance has grave limitations that should be addressed through active partnership with IAEA, since the latter also provides assistance to States on the prevention of nuclear materials and related technologies falling into the hands of non-State actors and offers legal and technical advice to States on adherence to and implementation of international instruments relevant to enhancing protection against nuclear terrorism. Again, not only has its safeguards regime provided a degree of security in itself, but its efforts to address safety and security — especially security measures put in place under the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material — have enhanced control over nuclear materials and facilities. Moreover, the Agency is considering offering legislative assistance to support States in their development of a comprehensive nuclear law governing a range of control measures, including nuclear safeguards and physical protection, a cardinal obligation under resolution 1540 (2004). It is also imperative that the current relationship with OPCW be strengthened within the realm of chemical weapons aspects under resolution 1540 (2004). The organization has a wealth of experience and expertise which could be of tremendous assistance to the Committee and the implementation of the resolution. IAEA and OPCW could also assist in ascertaining the implementation of obligations by States during field visits by its experts to countries. In the same vein, the 1540 Committee could also benefit from the useful information and expertise of the World Customs Organization regarding good customs practices, dual-use goods, labelling requirements, and how best to accomplish non-proliferation goals without disrupting global trade. My delegation also welcomes the recognition by the Committee of the need to forge close partnerships with regional organizations, such as the European Union, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the Caribbean Community, the Organization of American States, the League of Arab States and the African Union. Those institutions have the appropriate mechanisms for the pooling of resources for the implementation of such obligations under resolution 1540 (2004) as border controls and illicit financial networks within the regional context. Given their respective characteristics, they are able to develop more effective and contextually-driven means to fulfil the obligations of resolution 1540 (2004), rather than simply transplanting measures from States with different values and cultures. Moreover, such bodies can place the fulfilment of the resolution on the regional agenda and thereby promote its universal adherence by all States in the region. While we support the current engagement with some of those bodies, we call on the Committee to extend such partnerships to other regional groups. Finally, the coming months will be critical for the Committee, since its report to the Council at the end of its mandate will determine whether its efforts meet the general expectations of the international community. However, its success will also be a reflection of the commitment of Member States to abide by their obligations. We should work together collectively to keep the world’s most dangerous weapons from the hands of the most dangerous individuals and groups. That is a challenge we must strive to overcome if we are to save humankind from a catastrophe of unprecedented and unimaginable magnitude. Finally, we support the draft presidential statement that the President’s delegation has kindly prepared.

At the outset, on behalf of my delegation, I would like to extend our appreciation to you, Mr. President, for convening this open debate. My delegation also appreciates the presence of Mr. Tanaka, Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, as well as that of the high-level representatives of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the World Customs Organization. It is a fact the threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery is very real. That threat is magnified by the fact that WMD could fall into the hands of non-State actors, including terrorist groups. The continued existence of such weapons could contribute to the illicit acquisition of, and trafficking in, WMD. The adoption of resolution 1540 (2004) took place against the backdrop of the fact that previous WMD treaty regimes lacked universality and had been designed to deal only with State entities. They were therefore seen by some as ineffective in tackling the challenge posed by non-State actors. The mission of resolution 1540 (2004) was therefore to address that gap. As reflected its paragraphs 5 and 8, resolution 1540 (2004) was intended only to complement and reinforce, rather than replace or subvert, multilaterally negotiated treaties. We are reminded that, during the process of the adoption of resolution 1540 (2004), concerns were expressed that the Security Council had taken on a legislative role through which it dictated domestic law to Member States and enforced non-proliferation obligations outside the traditional multilateral negotiating process. We must therefore work towards establishing a multilaterally negotiated international legal instrument that will permanently address the gap being temporarily filled by the resolution. One of the key challenges before us pertains to the ability of Member States to fulfil the central provisions of the resolution, for which national legislation may need to be enacted and enforcement measures put in place. For the majority of States, a certain degree of technical and legal expertise is also required, as is capacity in general. With reference to that point, it must also be borne in mind that a State’s capacity to meet its obligations is not just a matter of overall State capability, but also one of national priority. For almost three years, the focus of the Committee has mainly been on encouraging the reporting requirement. While noting that reporting is indeed important, as it provides a baseline for analysis, it is not the objective of the resolution. The key point is the implementation of the provisions of the resolution. For developing countries with limited resources and many other equally pressing priorities, the increasing burden of reporting in its various forms can be overwhelming. It is therefore timely for the Committee to focus more on the implementation phase. Cooperation between the Council and its Committee with specialized international organizations should be framed within the context of assisting States to build their capacity to implement their obligations in a sustainable manner. The problems associated with implementation lie at the national level. In most cases, those problems derive from technical difficulties faced by Member States. The Committee should therefore focus on programmes that enhance the national capabilities of such countries, in collaboration with existing international organizations in the field of the prohibition of WMD. The full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) is a long-term objective and an ongoing process. It will require continuous efforts, patience, dialogue, cooperation and assistance. As a result, it is our belief that sustained international cooperation is essential to achieve the objectives and purposes of resolution 1540 (2004). The Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), which is tasked with ensuring the implementation of the resolution, is well placed to mobilize and coordinate an effective non-proliferation effort by garnering the support and assistance of various specialized international organizations in the execution of its mandate. While there are currently no substantive partnerships between those organizations and the Committee, this possibility could be explored in the future. In that regard, the Security Council and the Committee should optimize the comparative advantages of specialized international organizations. That partnership should strengthen practical cooperation, avoid duplication, promote cost effectiveness, strengthen synergy of efforts and increase the effective use of resources and expertise. In the areas of nuclear weapons, chemical weapons and their related materials, the Committee should continue its cooperation with the secretariats of the IAEA and the OPCW. Both organizations have, within their respective fields and mandates, programmes for State capacity-building that are directly relevant to resolution 1540 (2004). For instance, they maintain records of the status of the national implementation measures of States parties to their respective regimes. It is regrettable, however, that in the area of the control of dangerous biological agents we do not have similar organizations, since there is not yet agreement on a verification regime for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC). For our part, in implementing obligations under resolution 1540 (2004), Indonesia continues to strengthen its national implementation measures, including its national legislation and enhanced cooperation, both bilateral and multilateral. We are also working closely with international organizations such as the IAEA and the OPCW. Together with the OPCW, Indonesia last year held meetings of national authorities in Asia. Bilaterally, Indonesia and the OPCW have undertaken a series of training exercises on our emergency response system in the event of the intentional or accidental release of dangerous chemical agents. In addition, Indonesia continues to cooperate with the IAEA in the field of nuclear safety and security safeguards. In the absence of an international verification regime for the BWC, Indonesia and Australia have conducted annual regional workshops, with a view to strengthen regional cooperation and an exchange of best practices in implementing the provisions of BWC. Finally, as we pursue the non-proliferation initiative, we should not lose sight of the question of disarmament. It is our conviction that, in the end, the only guarantee for eliminating the fear caused by the possible use or threat of use of WMD is their total elimination, because that is the only sure way of preventing non-State actors from acquiring them. We therefore reiterate our call on all States to work towards that fundamental goal.

I would like to join those who have preceded me in congratulating you and your delegation, Mr. President, on Slovakia’s skilful leadership of the Security Council during the month of February. That skill is evident in today’s timely convocation of this open debate on the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). The delegation of Slovakia has led the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) with marked success. I am also grateful for the presence and participation of our invited guests. Last year the Security Council took a significant step towards meeting its commitment to maintain international peace and security by extending the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) for a further two years, thus acknowledging that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction poses a significant threat to peace and security. The Council thereby gave operational impetus to provisions relating to State implementation of non- proliferation obligations previously set out in an array of legal instruments on non-proliferation and at conferences on the matter, which additionally called for intensive cooperation among their respective States parties. Panama, whose economic development depends on the smooth flow of international trade, considers that, in the present international context of globalization, international peace and security is indivisible: an attack against one nation is an attack against all. Cooperation is therefore crucial for the success of resolution 1540 (2004). The implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) has given rise to a process of interaction between the Security Council and Member States, which are obliged to report to the Council on their compliance with the provisions of the resolution. From our viewpoint, there is one especially problematical area here: among the requirements of the resolution is the establishment of national export controls over dual-use materials, substances, equipment and technologies. That poses a challenge to State institutions not designed to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We take note of the efforts that must be made by small countries seeking to do their collective duty but lacking sufficient institutional, material or human resources to do so expeditiously. We therefore appreciate the assistance that the Committee provides to States indirectly, through its expert groups, in formulating and adopting national legislation to that end. In particular, we welcome the idea of convening outreach seminars on these and related issues, jointly with regional organizations. Such cooperation should continue and should be enhanced; it will create new synergy between the United Nations and other multilateral actors, which, each within its own area of responsibility, can contribute to this common undertaking. I cannot fail today to join other members in touching on another aspect of non-proliferation. In our era of globalization, it is artificial and dangerous to compartmentalize threats. Panama is among the vast majority of States that has never even considered the option of developing or acquiring weapons of mass destruction; that would have run counter to our priority of promoting national development in a context of peace, security and the rule of law. Indeed, Panama is a demilitarized State, having dismantled its army in conformity with a constitutional mandate. But all countries suffer from the scourge of the production, illicit trade and proliferation of small arms and light weapons. As former Secretary-General Kofi Annan said, while some view terrorism and weapons of mass destruction as the main threat to world peace, others consider that they face the immediate threat of small arms, used in internal conflicts. An effective multilateral response to the threat to peace posed by small arms and light weapons continues to be needed.

Allow me at the outset to express my deep appreciation for the timely opportunity that this open debate offers to discuss the role of international organizations in fostering the implementation of resolutions 1540 (2004) and 1673 (2006). The importance for international peace and security of preventing non-State actors from gaining access to weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their means of delivery and related materials has been so widely recognized that it needs no further explanation. In line with the 2003 European Union (EU) Strategy on WMD non-proliferation, Italy is on the forefront in combating the threat that terrorist organizations might acquire those deadly weapons, and it lends its convinced support to resolution 1540 (2004). It is worth recalling that in June 2006 the EU granted €195,000 to promote the implementation of the resolution in the Asia-Pacific region, in Africa and in Latin America and the Caribbean. The latter was again included among EU non-proliferation priorities for 2007 to 2009. I shall leave it to the European Union presidency, with whose remarks Italy fully aligns itself, to elaborate on cooperation between the Security Council and the European Union in this field. Three years after the adoption of resolution 1540 (2004), the danger of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has not yet been overcome, and several States face difficulties in putting in place the required legislative and technical provisions. Indeed, the response to the complex nature of proliferation challenges has to be comprehensive and must encompass, inter alia, safety and security of dual-use items, effective export and border controls and interdiction of illicit trafficking and brokering in these items. Against that background, we must make full use of the expertise of international organizations operating in the nuclear, chemical, biological and missile-related sectors. They can provide the assistance States may need. To that end, consistent with provisions of resolutions 1540 (2004) and 1673 (2006), a network of multilateral cooperation has to be envisaged. The Security Council and its Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) — which you, Mr. President, so effectively lead — can act as a catalyst. We believe that the present discussion should be institutionalized and made operational. The 1540 Committee should foresee, as it is starting to do, periodic meetings, in the form of thematic debates duly prepared in advance, with relevant international organizations in order to develop synergies, pool resources and facilitate the matching of assistance requests from States with cooperation programmes available in the portfolios of international institutions. While we welcome the presentations made earlier by the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the World Customs Organization, we deem it necessary to involve other international organizations active in areas within the scope of resolution 1540 (2004). In particular, attention should be paid to the physical protection and safe handling of biological pathogens, the strengthening of national mechanisms overseeing transfers of sensitive dual-use items and the enhancement of law-enforcement efforts to disrupt illicit networks used to finance proliferation. Questions of substance often come together with procedural issues. We therefore believe it might be useful for the 1540 Committee to agree on a calendar of meetings with relevant international organizations and to build with them a list of points of contact in charge of assistance programmes. In conclusion, let me once again stress that in the common endeavour to promote full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) the Security Council and the membership can rely on Italy’s firm commitment and steadfast support.

I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of Slovakia. Slovakia aligns itself with the statement to be made shortly by the Permanent Representative of Germany on behalf of the European Union. That is why I shall limit my statement to the following comments. My delegation is pleased to note that there is growing awareness of the importance of resolution 1540 (2004) for global and regional security and for the national security of United Nations Member States. Since the adoption of that resolution, significant progress has been achieved in the implementation of its provisions in various regions. At the same time, we recognize that there are still many challenges to be addressed in achieving the full implementation of all aspects of resolution 1540 (2004) worldwide. My delegation notes with satisfaction that through the support of individual Member States, donors, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and international and regional organizations, the Security Council has succeeded in creating a strong momentum in the implementation process, which must now be utilized for the strengthening of a global response, through further practical measures, to the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. Thus, while the year 2006 was dominated by efforts to increase awareness of the significance of resolution 1540 (2004), we strongly believe that this year the Security Council must concentrate on ensuring that further progress is made in the implementation of all aspects of resolution 1540 (2004) and resolution 1673 (2006) and in facilitating cooperation and the exchange of information on national experiences and best practices in addressing the requirements of resolution 1540 (2004), including with respect to further actions needed from States and on technical assistance needed and offered. My delegation is convinced that outreach activities must be sustained by a sound strategy on assistance that has to be developed and implemented in the long run. Technical assistance is one of the dominant issues in the context of the interaction of the Security Council Committee with States Members of the United Nations. Slovakia wishes to stress that broad-based cooperation with States and international and regional organizations in capacity-building and assistance is critical to effectively addressing this issue. Here we believe that the contribution of international, regional and subregional organizations and arrangements relevant to such efforts can make a real difference in advancing the implementation process. For those reasons, Slovakia is grateful to the Governments of Germany and of Norway for having organized, along with the Security Council, a donor States’ workshop on the assistance provided for the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), to be held in April this year in New York. My delegation fully appreciates the offers of assistance provided directly by several international organizations and arrangements and recognizes that other such bodies provide assistance of significant relevance to the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). Since this is the Security Council’s first opportunity to meet with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the World Customs Organization since it decided to extend the mandate of the 1540 Committee in April 2006, we wish to thank those bodies for the detailed updates on their activities in connection with the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). We would like to underline the fact that legislative measures to counter proliferation remain primarily the responsibility of the States Members of the United Nations, and that, ultimately, the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) is a national function and responsibility. Slovakia therefore considers that the importance of national ownership of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) might be best reflected in national action plans or road maps to achieve such full implementation. We are of the view that national plans of action would not only help to better prioritize the steps leading to the full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), but could also help to identify, for donor countries and countries providing technical assistance, those areas in which assistance is needed or requested. Before concluding, I wish to stress the importance that my country attaches to the need for a comprehensive and systematic approach to the implementation of all aspects and requirements of resolution 1540 (2004). We believe that such an approach can provide for an adequate system of protection and prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction at the national and global levels. Last but not least, I would like to take this opportunity to express my thanks to all members of the Security Council for their contributions and active participation in the preparation of the text of the presidential statement affirming our determination to promote increased multilateral cooperation towards the full implementation of resolutions 1540 (2004) and 1673 (2006). I now resume my functions as President of the Security Council. The next speaker is the representative of Germany, to whom I give the floor.

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union (EU). The candidate countries Turkey, Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the countries of the Stabilization and Association Process and potential candidates Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) country Iceland, member of the European Economic Area, as well as Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova, align themselves with this declaration. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, such as ballistic missiles, is a growing threat to international peace and security. While international treaty regimes and export-control arrangements have slowed the spread of such weapons and their delivery systems, a number of States have sought or are seeking to develop such weapons. The risk of terrorists’ acquiring chemical, biological, radiological or fissile materials and their means of delivery adds a critical new dimension to that threat. Meeting this challenge, therefore, is a central element of the EU’s external action. Our objective is to prevent, deter, halt and, where possible, eliminate proliferation programmes of concern worldwide. Non- proliferation, disarmament and arms control can make an essential contribution to the global fight against terrorism by reducing the risk of non-State actors gaining access to weapons of mass destruction, radioactive materials and means of delivery. It is against this backdrop in particular that the European Union fully acknowledges the relevance of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) as an important international instrument. It is the first to be adopted by the Council to deal with such weapons, their means of delivery and related materials in an integrated and comprehensive manner. The EU is determined to give full support to the Security Council and to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) in their endeavour to achieve the broadest possible implementation of the resolution’s requirements. The European Union fully recognizes the tireless efforts of the Committee established under this resolution to provide guidance to States on preparing and submitting national reports and fully implementing their obligations under resolutions 1540 (2004) and 1673 (2006). Let me indicate that the Committee, in doing so, should also bear in mind its particular responsibility to States in need of assistance. We are fully aware that the Committee’s capacities are not unlimited and that additional guidance and assistance is necessary. It can be provided by States but also by international organizations. The EU greatly appreciates the important work in support of national implementation that has been undertaken by a number of international organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. The EU also acknowledges the commitment of other international organizations to supporting the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) through appropriate activities within their respective areas of responsibility. Furthermore, the support and the useful contributions made by non- governmental organizations (NGOs) to the implementation of the resolution are appreciated. Nor does the European Union ignore the danger posed by weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and related materials. That is why, as early as December 2003, it endorsed the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. That non-proliferation strategy creates a comprehensive and cogent basis for joint action by the EU member States. It constitutes a central element of the EU’s external action. It is first and foremost within that framework and on the basis of that Strategy that the EU engages in the effective and comprehensive implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), which is one of the focal points of its non-proliferation policy. The EU Strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery rests on three pillars: rendering multilateralism and its instruments more effective; promoting a stable international and regional environment; and cooperating closely with key partners. The Strategy aims at strengthening identification, control and interception of illegal trafficking in weapons of mass destruction. It also suggests a programme of assistance to States in need of technical knowledge in the field of export control. Both are core issues addressed by resolution 1540 (2004). Every year the European Union adopts a list of priorities for the implementation of its non- proliferation Strategy. Support for the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) figures prominently among the EU’s policy priorities. That is why in 2005 the resolution was added to the list. But even before that time the EU had undertaken a number of activities, which it is still engaged in, aimed at strengthening national export control systems where assistance is required. The EU substantial legislative corpus in the area of export controls and the lessons learned and best practices identified during a peer review give the European Union a solid background that enables it to support third countries in the development of effective export controls. In 2006, the European Union and member States held numerous seminars and meetings providing export control training and assistance to States in need of technical knowledge, similar to the one recently held in San Francisco within the framework of the Regional Forum of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. In addition, cooperation and assistance programmes under the 2005 Pilot Project Programme of the European Commission, implemented by Germany’s export control agency with the assistance of national experts from EU member States, were advanced in several countries. All these measures, as well as many others I shall not mention here, contribute to assisting in the effective implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). Finally, in 2006, the EU co-sponsored and, together with United Nations Department of Disarmament Affairs, co-financed three regional seminars through a joint action by all European Union member States to support the regional implementation of the resolution. The seminars took place in regions where countries had the greatest difficulties implementing the resolution. The seminars were aimed at raising awareness of its requirements, in particular the obligation to submit national reports on implementation and to adopt relevant legislation and other measures. The seminars yielded very concrete and comprehensive recommendations with regard to follow-up and pinpointed the real need for assistance. We consider the seminars to have been of particular help in identifying further assistance needs, because the countries actually in need participated in the workshops. The recommendations are a result of their discussion and of their input. The European Union will listen to their voices. In assisting with the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) in third countries, the EU will continue to cooperate and coordinate closely with the stakeholder Governments involved. Their involvement and participation in identifying the assistance needed is an important precondition for the success and sustainability of any measure taken. But the European Union will also cooperate closely with the 1540 Committee. It is the focal point for the implementation of the resolution. Any action taken should, therefore, be closely coordinated with the Committee in order to avoid redundancies. Let me conclude by reiterating that the European Union remains committed to the full implementation of resolutions 1540 (2004) and 1673 (2006). However, our work on resolution 1540 (2004)is far from finished. We have a vision of how the world should look once that resolution is fully implemented. But that is still a long way off.

I now give the floor to the representative of Cuba.

Allow me to commend you, Sir, for your work as President of the Security Council during the month of February. I also take the opportunity to convey my delegation’s appreciation to the Under-Secretary- General for Disarmament Affairs, to the Director- General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and to the representatives of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the World Customs Organization for the valuable information that they have provided today. Cuba strongly supports general and complete disarmament under strict international control and in particular supports the complete elimination of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, recognizing the danger that their very existence poses for humanity. Cuba does not possess, nor has it any intention of possessing, weapons of mass destruction of any kind. In our country, all programmes related to the nuclear, chemical or biological spheres have always been exclusively peaceful in nature. They are under the permanent and strict control of our national authorities and are monitored by the relevant international agencies. We have an effective, predictable and reliable system in place for implementing our international obligations at the national level as a State party to the Biological Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. Cuba has repeatedly expressed concerns regarding the scope and implications of resolution 1540 (2004) and, hence, resolution 1673 (2006). Let us recall that due to the pressure exerted by certain members of the Security Council, resolution 1540 (2004) included some deliberately ambiguous provisions so that some States could claim that, through its adoption, the actions promoted within the framework of the so-called Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) had supposedly been rendered legitimate by the Council. Cuba considers that under the PSI, unilateral actions could be carried out that would clearly contravene key provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982, such as the right of innocent passage of ships and the legal regime governing the high seas contained in that Convention. We reiterate our rejection of any manipulation or arbitrary interpretation of resolution 1540 (2004) aimed at using it as a pre-authorization or justification for the unilateral use of force against certain non-State actors or even against States where the non-State actors may be located. This is particularly disturbing in the context of the accusations levelled by certain permanent members of the Security Council against some countries for supposedly developing weapons of mass destruction programmes. While noting the adoption of resolutions 1540 (2004) and 1673 (2006), the Non-Aligned Movement Summit held in Havana in September 2006 underlined the need to ensure that any action of the Security Council does not undermine the United Nations Charter and existing multilateral agreements on weapons of mass destruction and international organizations established in that regard, or the role of the General Assembly. Moreover, the heads of State or Government of the countries members of the Movement warned against the Security Council’s continued practice of using its authority to define the legislative requirements that Member States must meet in implementing its decisions, as is the case with resolution 1540 (2004). The Non-Aligned Movement has stressed that it is essential that the General Assembly address in an inclusive manner the issue of the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by non- State actors, taking into account the views of all Member States. Cuba believes that the Security Council is by no means the most appropriate organ to lead the fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in all its aspects. That is not only for the obvious reason that the five nuclear-weapon States recognized by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons have the veto power in that organ. Even more important, certain permanent Council members are adamantly opposed to moving forward with a multilateral negotiation process to attain the objective of nuclear disarmament. Cuba shares the concern about the risk of links between terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. We fully support all legitimate international efforts to prevent the acquisition by terrorists of such weapons and their means of delivery. Cuba unequivocally condemns all acts, methods and practices of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, wherever and by whomsoever committed and regardless of their motivations. Our country also condemns all acts or actions — regardless of who their instigators or perpetrators might be — aimed at encouraging, supporting, financing or concealing any terrorist act, method or practice. Having been a direct target of terrorism ever since the triumph of the revolution, the Cuban people have experienced firsthand the terrible consequences of terrorist acts. Nevertheless, the threat of the use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists cannot be addressed through a selective and discriminatory approach that is limited to combating horizontal proliferation and disregards vertical proliferation and disarmament. The prohibition and total elimination of weapons of mass destruction are the only guarantee that such weapons will not proliferate and will not, inter alia, fall into the hands of terrorists. If the Security Council really wants to contribute to effectively combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in all its aspects, it could adopt in the near future a resolution committing all its members — particularly its permanent members — to take immediate steps towards the achievement of nuclear disarmament under strict international control and within a given time frame. In conclusion, I should like to emphasize that our country — as it has done thus far, despite the concerns expressed — will continue to abide strictly by the provisions of resolutions 1540 (2004) and 1673 (2006). Indeed, Cuba has submitted to the Security Council, within the established time frame and in great detail, the reports required under resolution 1540 (2004). Our country reaffirms its willingness to contribute in every way possible to the achievement of genuine international cooperation, within the framework of the United Nations and the relevant international treaties, in order to address the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in all its aspects and to attain the objective of the prohibition and complete elimination of such weapons from the face of the Earth.

I now call on the representative of Belarus.

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the member States of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), namely, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. We thank the Slovak presidency for holding an open meeting of the Security Council on the implementation of resolutions 1540 (2004) and 1673 (2006). We are confident that this debate will help to improve the exchange of information among countries and international organizations and give a new impetus to cooperation aimed at facilitating the implementation of the Council’s resolutions. The Council’s openness and responsiveness to the opinions of Member States and international organizations will help to make the implementation of Council measures related to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction more effective and results-oriented. The success of collective efforts is directly linked to the effectiveness of action taken at the national level. Non-proliferation measures, such as those aimed at the physical protection of sensitive materials and at border controls, are regarded by States as important means to ensure their own security. We consider international export control regimes to be useful. The strategy of further improving national export control systems is elaborated within the framework of such regimes. It is clear that much remains to be done to make these mechanisms clear and transparent for the international community as a whole. Better understanding of how and why certain goods get onto control lists could help some countries address their concerns about the discriminatory trade barriers allegedly created by these regimes. Regional organizations that operate on the basis of common interests, trust and cooperation can play a positive role in eliminating concerns about the allegedly discriminatory nature of measures used by the international regimes. Regional organizations can offer practical assistance to States in elaborating effective national non-proliferation policies, including with regard to the implementation of Security Council resolutions. Such cooperation could take place in the form of information exchange; consulting; the elaboration of general principles for non-proliferation policies; and joint practical actions, from the elaboration of legal norms to the monitoring of their implementation. A significant number of regional events, including those held in collaboration with the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), attests to States’ interest in cooperation within regional organizations on non-proliferation issues. One such event, held recently in the CSTO area, was a regional workshop for the States of Central Asia and the Caucasus on the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). It was held by the Monterey Institute of International Studies and the Government of Kazakhstan in Almaty in October 2006. The member States of CSTO cooperate on non- proliferation issues in various formats: bilaterally, within economic integration unions and with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and other entities. Four Central Asian CSTO member States are parties to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia. The Treaty is an important practical contribution to the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. It also contributes to the implementation of the safeguards regime of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and to the control of nuclear materials. The membership of States in various regional and international organizations is an important element promoting effective coordination and a results-oriented approach in their non- proliferation efforts. Economic integration unions play an important role in the harmonization of export control legislation. Six out of seven CSTO members are engaged in such efforts within the framework of the Eurasian Economic Community. Standardized export control lists have already been drawn up, and the process of making national legislation uniform is currently under way. The CSTO defines its role in the non- proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the region taking into account the military and political nature of its activities. The principal areas of practical cooperation approved within the CSTO include the establishment of a mechanism for regular consultations, joint assessment of the degree of threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, assessing the vulnerability of sea, air and land shipments, and networking to ensure effective cooperation among the relevant agencies of CSTO member States. CSTO member States believe that new forms of cooperation to ensure the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction should complement and strengthen the methods of work already utilized by the international community within the framework of current non-proliferation regimes and international institutions. Those new forms of cooperation should not be an obstacle to international cooperation in the economic, trade, scientific and technical areas, conducted in accordance with the norms of international law. CSTO member States are principled and committed advocates of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and related materials. Countering new threats and challenges to national, regional and international security, including international terrorism, will continue to be a significant component of the work of the CSTO.

There are still a number of speakers remaining on my list for this meeting. I intend, with the concurrence of the members of the Council, to suspend the meeting until 3 p.m. sharp.