S/PV.565 Security Council

If there are no objections, we sha11 keep the same system of interpretation we have been using sa far. There will be bath sinlllitaneous and consecutive interpretation of statements by members of the Security Council, and only simultaneous interpretation of statements of representatives of States not ll1embers of the C0l1l1cil. Adoption of the agenda The agenda ~vas adopted. COluplaint of failure by the Iranian Government to comply with provisiollal measures indicated by the International Court of Justice in the Allglo-Il'allian on Company case (S/2357) ( concluded)

In accordance with the decision ac10pted by the Security Council at a previous [559th] meeting, l invite the representative of Iran to take a place at the Security Council ta.ble. 3. The parliamentary situation is as fotlows. The Secu1"Îty Council has before it two draft resolutions, the second revised draft resolution submitted by the UnitecI KingcIom delegation [S/2358/Rev.2], and the cIraft resolution submitted by the representative of EcuacIor [S/2380]. 4. Ml'. BEBLER (Yugoslavia): When l asked on \Veclnesday, 16 October [563rd meeting] for an extra day's adj ournment, l dic1 so because l felt that the 6. On the other hand, there seems ta be doubt, and evell a substantial divergence cerning the Council's competence in this competence has been flatly ancl emphatically one of the two governlllents most directly Similar feelings have been cxpressed by bers of the Council, while others have or 1ess serious doubts regarding the question petence. ; ; ; 7. As l made clear in my previous statement meeting], my delegatioll shares bath the that talks shoulcl be resumed and the widespread regarding the Council's competence ta take in this matter. Indeec!, we were prepared - hesitatingly, l must aclmit - ta support the Council ta the parties concerned if the bers hac! provided an overwhelmingly positive to this question of competence which has us. This, obviously, has not been the case. not think that this fundamentallegal aspect lem can be either evac!ec! or brushed aside, passed on ta some other United Nations wc can simply say that we do not really wc have the right ta do anything about that we shall do something none the less. wc are particular1y sensitive ta the general before which the Council now finds itself. 8. We consider, therefore, that the situation new suggestions, which l am prepared ta an open mind.

During our discussions of the and also of this morning several melllbers, 01~ the draIt resohl~ion relating to the Od Company submlttec! on 12 October King?om representative, who has accepted meetmg] amenclments [5/2379] moved sentatives of Inclia and Yugoslavia, have selves in some clifficulty because the International of Justice, before whom certain aspects have been brought, has not yet ruled competence ta deal with them. 10. Accordingly, it seems ta me that COllncil had better adjourn its debate resolution 110W before it - which appears 12. Mr. LACOSTE (France) French): l did not say l'sille die". International Court of Justice has competence... ". (translated from l said: "until the ruled on its own

My view was that the postponement would be indefillite because no date has been fixecl \Vith respect to when the International Court will pronounce itself. 14. l\lr. LACOSTE (France) (translated from Frellch): Actually, it is not inc1efinite, but without a fixecl date. As the President pointed out, we do not kno\V when the Court will rule.

l t would be the same because that motion would come under rule 33, paragraph 5, of the Council's provisional mies of procedure, which reads: "to postpone discussion of the question ta a certain day or indefinite1y... JO.

On this particular point, l really do not qllite see why the President does not put ta the Council the actual proposal which has been made by the representative of France and which he wants the President ta put to the Conncil in his way. As ta whether it is a certain day or indefinitely, one can argue either way. It is a certain day oecause it is the day which he has indicated. That is quite different from putting it off indefinitely. In any case, l c10 not see why the proposai by the representative of France cannot be put to the Council as such. 17. l wish to state my general attitude towards the point raised by the representative of France. The question of competence has, of course, troubled this body since the initiation of the c1ebate [559th meeting]. In spite of what the representative of Yugoslavia has said, my impression is that there is a majority in this body generally in favour of the thesis, which we have consistently maintained, that this Council is competent to take cognizauce of this matter. It is true that this majority is, unfortunately, not sufficient to constitute the normal majority of seven. However, there is also a minority of members who have doubts - partly on legal and partly, no doubt, on political groullds - of the validity of this particular thesis; and this minority - there is no disguising of the fact - is sufficient in size ta prevent the adoption by the Council of the greatly watered-down draft resolution which we have submittec1 and which now lies before the Council in its final fonl1, incorporating the amendments obligingly supplied by the representatives of Yugoslavia and India, and for which the Yugoslav representative is now, he says, unable to vote. ClISS it presumably with the full consent cerneet.' There would be no doubt about since we cannot get the consent of the the greatly diminishec1 draft resolution submitted, so far as we are concerned agree - and l hope that the whole Council to the intelligent suggestion just made by tative of France. 19. l should think that the President motion to the Couneil in the words of the of France and ask the Council whether that motion generally. l cannot see why should disagree. If the Council does agree, ullanimolls and that wOllld be gooet; if object, l am ·afraic1 we shall have to vote.

Of course submit the motion presentecl by the representative France in its proper terms, as formulated no intention at all of a1tering the tenns motion \Vas presented. 1 only tried to situate under mIe 33, paragraph 5, of our mies under which it comes. The motion presented representative of France is therefore put el'ation of the Council. 21. . Mr.. AUSTIN (United States lwish to have the record show that, at U I~ited States supports the motion macle sentativc of France and seconc1ecl by the of the United Kingdom. Of course, we coming, in effect, under that paragraph of is held by the President to he the correct prececlence. on a procedural motion. l President was eminently right in determining arder of precedence this motion holds bècause it is a procec1ural motion and arder established by mIes. l agree that that under mIe 33, paragraph 5. 22. l shaH therefore vote for this proposai stated by the mover of the motion - that ment of the c1ebate until a particular event which of course means the same thing as 23. Thé PRESIDENT: The motion :presented representative of France is before the Security

of the USSR objected to the inclusion t~le agenda of the Security Couneil. The tlon c~ecla~ed at that time [559th meeting] Secnnty Council could not take cognizance 111 .favour of the proposai submitted by the representatlve of France. In our opinion, it is covered by rule 33, paragraph 5, of the Council's mies of procedure. 27. However, 1 should like to cal! the attention of the Counc!l ta this fact: The competence of the Security Counc!l and the competence of the International Court of Jl1stice are not identical. Shoulc1 the Court decide that it is not competent to render judgment on this question, that would not automatically mean that the S~curity ç:ouncil is also not competent ta deal with tlus questIOn. On the other hand, should the Court decide that it is competent to l'ender judgment on this question, that also would not automatically mean that the Security Council is competent. 28. 1'0 my de1egation, the French proposai real1y means two things. First, that for the sake of a settlemet?t. a postponementis desirable; secondly, that the declslOn of the Court and the reasons on which it will be b~sed might throw some light on our problem here, that ts, the problem of competence. That is all that the French proposai means. It is in that light that my delegation will vote in favour of the French motion.

vVhatever our individual opinions may be, the Issue of competence has been raised in the Council. l do not k110W whether the majority considers the ~ol1ncil to be competent; but, in anycase, l shal! vote 111 favour of the French proposai for reasons similar to those given by the representative of China. l consider that, if the Court were to declare itself competent and pronounce a judgment, and if the judgment were carried out by the otiter party,. then there would be no need for the Council to intervene in the matter. However, if the Court shOlild declare itself competent and pronounce a juèlgment, and if that judgment werenot accepted by bath parties, then the party which was prepared ta accept the Court's verdict wouid be elltitled to ask the Council ta deal with the matter in accordance \Vith Article 94, paragraph 2 of the United Nations Charter. 30. In the circumstances, 1 thillk that the French pro" posai is extreme1y wise. By a simple procedural proposaI, 1 hope we shall be able to secure the agreement of practically all the members of the Council. . 31. For my part, when 1 submitted the proposaI [512380] which is before the Council, l was not thinking 'of any concrete problem similar ta the one that we are discussing now. Ecuador has in the past main., tained, and continues to maintain, good relations with 32. We did not wish by our draft draw any powers from the Council powers. We were simply trying to reinforce ity of the lntentational Court of Justice our own respoîlsibilities. From another many doubts have been expressed regarding cil's competence, a sma11 country like cerned ahout the precedents which this create, and which might open new avenues intervention in the domestic affairs countries, to which all the countries have long since declared their opposition. "," . ; . , 33. l am not spealdng here on behalf Latin America but only on behalf of ment; but this has been the constant Latin-American countries. 34. For all these reasons, my country pleasure in voting in favour of the proposai by the representative of France, which to overcome aIl our difficulties.

assumption that nobody else particularly on the lmmediate motion for adjournment ancl as, l should hope, there are no he made on the question of competence, before we adjourn - as we presumably a long period - to make certain general on the attitude of His Majesty's Government. 36. It will not, l think, have escaped members of the Security Council that in my opinion Olt any rate, considerable throughout these proceedings. l have motiyated !hrou~hollt. by. the sincere nothmg whlch l111ght lmpa1r the resolve to lel}d i~s ·weight and its authority to of thlS dispute. But l must confess to restless, and sometimes even rather listening to the speeches of one or two l .hav~ detected - on the part, l nllnonty - a clear imputation that was p~rhaps Olt .fault in bringing this Secunty çouncl1 at all, and certainly, the CounClI to uphold the provisional by the International Court of Justice. beer: suggestions that, even if we were commg to the Security Council at all, rate, come here prematurely. 37. . The rep~es~ntative of Ecuador for .mstance, .1l1~hcated that international be ~nvolv~d ~f It were evident that dental of Justice but that, in his view, :'. 38. His Majesty's Govemment has throughout this dispute, l thillk it will be acknowledged, taken the greatest care to aet as a loyal Member of the United Nations and to follow scrupulously the procedures enjoined 111 the Charter for settling international disputes. 39. What cloes the Charter sayon this point? As we al! should know, Article 33 provides as follows: "1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shaH, first of all, seek solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice. "2. The Security Connci1 shall, when it deems nccessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means." 40. As l have alreac1y saiel, the Company, when seeking arbitration, was rebuffed by the Iranian Government, and its own attempt to negotiate a settlement was fruitless because of the completely llegative attitude of that government. The United Kingdol11 then, accorc1ance with the Charter, had recourse to the International Court of Justice. But this rel11ec1y was equally without avail since, as l have pointed out many times, Iran has frustrated any judgment that the Court may give by flouting its interim indications. Despite this, my Government itseH attemptec1 to reach a settlement by dispatching a Cabinet mission to Iran with full powers ta negotiate, and hy taking ac1vantage of the generons action of the President of the United States in sending Mr. J-Iarriman to Iran to act as a conciliator between the two parties. 41. In these circumstances, there can sUl'ely be no cloubt whatever on two points: first, that there has already been a denial of justice; and secondly, that His Majesty's Government has attempted ta apply all the relevant procedures prescribed in the Charter. vVhat other reconrse had we but to lay this dispute before the Counci1 itse1f and to seek its support and authority in bringing about a just settlement? 42. The Security Counci1, however, has now declined to act, or to act effectively in this question. l cannot help thinkinO' that this may well create a most serious precedent fo~' the futnre. The tendency 'will surely to diminish the prestige of the Secnrity Council,the International Court of Justice and the United Nations 43. As regards the future, l can only say this. our draft resolution been voted c1own, anc1 receivec1 seven votes at the time Even if it had vetoed, we should have been under some moral obligation to resul11e negotiations. In spite of that, l may provided the Iranian Government has some change heart and does not insist on procceding solely lines followed up to now, we will still not discuss matters with them. The trouble is that, of all our positive efforts, the representative of the Council has had only too good an opportunity observing, has met these efforts not by genuine proposaIs or by willingness to negotiate but mechanical repetition of ultimata. Mr. Mossadegh described the ultimata as offers to negotiate, but he is only prepared to discuss the questions pensation and sale of oil to the United Kingdom. ever he may say to the contrary, his views on ject woulc1 not be acceptable to any government company in a similar situation, or to His Majesty's Government and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. 44. As l saic1 in a previous statement [561st meeting], this negative attitude ignores the facts of the situation. Leaving aside for a moment the juridical aspects dispute, how can the Iranian Government conceivably pay adequate, prompt or effective compensation, cliscuss such questions as the sale of oil, if neither the revenues with which to pay compensation nor the oil to sell because it is unable to operate industry effectively? l hope l have already complete1y clear that, in all its otIers, His Majesty's Government has accepted the principle of full and plete llationalization of the oil industry in Iran phrase is understood in the vVestern world; that say, the ownership by the Iranian Government oil industry of its country. Unfortunate1y, we far failed to convince the Iranian Government where an owner of any inc1ustry is not himself of managing that inc1ustry with full efficiency, it usual to employ an agent or contractor to manage operate it for him, and that, in a large and business like the international oil industry, he be able to get an agent or a contractor who is , \ i \ ~\ ..,.1 \ 45.. l 111ust again repeat that there is nothing in the vanous ~ffers we have made and are still willing ta make "vhlch can he regarded as in any way inconsistent with full and complete nationalization - at any rate as it is understood in my country. ' ~6. ~n the light of ~hese final r~l11arks, may l say that, 111 splte of everyth1l1g, l contl11ue ta hope tha.t the Iranian Prime Minister who, regrettably enough, does not seem ta display any marked interest in the affairs of the Council today, will accept the genuine goodwill of His Majesty's Government and its determination ta reach a settlement which in no way impairs the declared will of the Iranian people ta nationalize their ail inc!ustry. If he woulc! now refrain from brooding on the past and be reac!y ta examine practical difficu1ties with which the Iranian Government, by its recent actions, is now faced, a settlement of this dispute would qllickly oe achieved with great benefit ta the Iranian people anc! the whole of the free world.

My delegation will vote in favour of the proposaI submitted by the represcntative of France while regretting that, in our opinion, the course of events in the Security Council during these last weeks does not seem, ta say the least, to have contributed ta increasing the prestige, the standing and the efficiency of the United Nations and its supreme organ, the Security Council. 48. Sir Benegal N. RAU (India): In supporting the proposaI which has jllst been made by the representative of France, l should like to sayat the outset a very few words on the question of competence. The Iranian Government relies, as wc ail know, on Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter, which has been read out a gaoe! m'any times. 1 should like, however, to read it out once again in order to remind the members of the exact provisions of this paragraph. It reads as follows: "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations ta intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the l)resent Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII." 49. Vve are not concerned at present with the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter, so the exc~ption with respect to that Chapter does not apply. It lS ~he main provision which concerns us now. The openl11g wonls are, "Nothing contained in the present Charter. ..". Articles 33 and 94 are parts of the Charter. 50. The basic question whether the matter tially domestic in character is now sub !inder adjuc1ication in the International Court and its j uc1gment may, as the representative has pointed ont, throw usefullight on our It is on this grounc1 that l support the has been made by the representative of 51. l should like ta express the hope ponement of the consideration of this Conncil will afford an opportunity to the cerned to resnme negotiations on their The parties are not sa wide apart from each may at first sight suppose. l have tried to on which they are in agreement, and which agreement has still to be attained. 52. 1'0 start with the matters on which agreement. On 15 March 1951 the Majlis March, the Senate, ratified the Oil Nationalization the text of. which ,vas as follows: "In the name of the happiness and the people of Iran, and in order to help ance of worlc1 peace, we, the signatories, the ail industry he nationalized in all the country without any exception; that the activities relative to the discovery, exploitation of oil be in the hands ment." 53. The principle of the nationalization indnstry in Iran, as embodied in the been accepted by His Majesty's Government United Kingdom. Thus, there is agreement on the principle of nationalization but also and meaning. 54. This brings us to the subject of compensation. aet to enforce the nationalization law Mareh \Vas. passed on 28.April 1951 by on 30 Apnl by the Iral11an Senate. This board of twelve members to reg111ate the the nationalization law. Articles 2 and 3 mental act l'an thus:· "Article 3. Under the supervision of the Mixed Board, the government is charged ta investigate the lawful and rightful daims of the goverlUnent as well as those of the Company, ta report its views thereon to the two Bouses of Parliament and npon ratification ta give effect thereto." 55. Thus, article 3 of the supplemental law contemplated the investigation of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's claims ta compensation, and article 2 empO\verecl the Government ta dcposit up to 25 per eent of the currcnt net incame into an agreed banle against these daims. From the very beginning, therefore, Iran intenclecl ta pay compensation. As to the total amount of compensation, the Iranian Government is prepared to settle that question in any of the three following ways, and l sha11 now quote from the Prime Minister's statement to this Cauncil on 15 October [560th mectiH{fJ : "\i'vith reference to the claims of the former Anglo- Iranian Oil Company regarding compensation paymcnts, the Iranian Government is prepared to settle that question in any of the three fo11owing ways: (a) on the hasis of the quoted value of the shares of the Company prior to the passage a{ the Oil Nationalization Law; (b) on the basis of the procedures followec1 by other countries where industries have been nationalizcc1; (c) on any basis ·which wouId be nmtually satisfactory to bath parties, having due regard to the counter-daims of the Iranian Governnlcllt." 56. l be1ieve, therdore, that on this point - that is, on the total amount of compensation to be paid as distinct from the mocle of payment, to which l shan come presently - therc is, if not agreement, at least evcry prospect of agreement. 57. l next come ta the mode of paymcnt. On this question l think there has not yet been agreement between the parties. As {al' as l can discover, Iran has offered two alternatives: the first, that 25 per cent of the oil revenues of Iran is to be deposited in an agreed bank to meet the compensation c1aims; the second, that the Iranian Government is prepared ta se11 to the United Kingdom Goven~mel~t the s~me amoullt o{ ?il that it has been purchasll1g m preVlOl1S years, tl;at IS, about 10 million tons pel' year for an agreed penod at prevailing worId priees, and the United Kingdoln Government may take 50 per cent o{ the priee of the oil to redeem the compensation claims. "Thcre must be more than a willingness compensation. There must be ability to do effective form. l believe, however, that if ments for the sale of oil are made with the interests, the compensation problem could be out satisfactorily." 59. The Prime Minister of Iran told us in this on 15 October [560th 1n~eting]: "1 wish once again to declare emphatically Government is (1uite willing to reopen direct tiations on the two points just mentioned" - to say, regarding the methods of fixing compensation and the sale of oil to the United Kingdom. ~ . 1 60. On 17 October [563rd meeting] he went further and describec1 what he would and what 110t negotiate on. He said: "1 am certainly not behind him" - that is behind the United Kingdom representative - eagerness to negotiate. .. lAie are willing to and to keep it fiowing in established channels. are eager to provicle practical assurances on om customers can found reasonable expectations that their reqllirements will be supplied. willing to pay for the services of qualified personnel. We shall not discuss the ownership control of our oil industry." 61. l do not wish to go into further details. But l have said enough ta show that the matters remain for settlement should be capable of adj ustment by negotiatioti. l hope that the time available now and the uncertain or certain clate to which pose to defer the consideration of this subject utilizecl by both parties in the resumption of tiations; and l wish to express the hope that negotiations will result in this subject not coming before us at al! again.

l shaH put to the vote motion presented by the representative of France. . In favour: Brazil, China, Ecuador, France Netherlands, Turkey, United States of Americ~. Against: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Abstaiwing: United Kingdom of Great Britain N orthern Ireland, Yugoslavia. The :motion was adopted by 8 votes to one, abstentions.

The Security Council has devoted six meetings to the consideration of the item relating ta the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company case. Althaugh no clecisian was reached, the discussion of tl;e. que~tion having been postponed, the Security Councl! IS sttll seized of the matter. The proceedings of the Security COllncil in the period from 1 October to 18 Odober [559th to 563rd meetings] have been far from fruitless and sterile, inasmuch as they provided us with the opportunity to hear the contentions of both parties, as expressed by the representatives of Iran and the United Kingdom. The series of statements delivered by Prime Minister Mossadegh and Sir Gladwyn Jebb at the different stages of our preceedings did not exclude, even in the heat of debate, the possibility of common effort towards some mutnally agreeable settlement consistent with the principles and purposes of the United Nations. The matter has been carefully analysed under its manifold aspects by the members of the Security Council, and it would be unrealistic to deny that aH the statements advanced by the various delegatians represented in the Counci1 refiect a C0111mon denominator of goodwill and friendliness in helping the two parties to a reconciliation of their outstanding differences. 65. l think l faithfully interpret the sentiments of the Security Cauncil when l express the earnest hope that Iran and the United Kingdom will find a common gTOt111cl for settlement compatible with the peaceful traditions of both Member States and with the fidelity which they have always shown towards the ideals embodied in the Charter of the United Nations. Arrangements for future meetings of the Security Council 66. The PRESIDENT: Eefore we adjourn, l wish ta clraw the attention of the members of the Security Council ta the following point. It will be recalled that, nt onr 557th meeting held on 31 August 1951, the Council agreed that Monday, 22 Odober, would be the last day on which the Council would be in a position meet in New York, and that Tuesday, 23 October, would be the first day on which the Council would be a position to meet in Paris. 67. A numher of delegations have approached me and mentionec1 the difficulties they would have in attending uny meeting during the week fol1owing 23 October. As a matter of fact, when we establishec1 the tÎme-limit for our meetings in New York, we reached the agreement that, in view of the many difficulties involved, we should do our utmost to avoid holding a meeting during the perioc1 extending from 23 October to the end of the month. 68. The President cannot, of course, entirely rule out the possibility of an emergency meetin~ ~aking place c1uring this period. Nor can the Councl1 Itself, under the tenns of the Charter, mIe out in advance the possibility of any such meeting. However, it tnight 69. l should like to hear the views of the the Security Council on the point l have 70. Ml'. AUSTIN (United States of America): believe there are some matters of expediency would make it wiser for the Council ta 1 November. l wouId suggest 29 October 1 November. The Kashmir question is in as l unclerstand it, that it might be wiser for a meeting before 31 October. For tbis reason, 29 October as the clate.

,\iVould possible, however, to set a more precise Conncil's meeting in Paris? The President theCouneil neecl not meet until the end of but he does not guarantee that it willnot meet. he said that urgent questions may arise neeessitating earlier meeting of the Couneil. 72. The United States representative is posing that the Couneil should meet on However, the President's statement that urgent tions may arise lleeessitating an earlier meeting Council still stands. Consequently, l should whether we ean regard 29 Oetober as the on which the Cotl11cil willmeet in Paris. 73. l should like some clarification on because l believe it is essentia1 for al! members Security Council to decide on their means portation to Paris. Shoulcl the Council 29 October, they will have to go by air to for the meeting; on the other hand, if no to be callecl before 29 October, they will have travel by sea. 74. Consequently, l should like to ask the to state precisely the earliest date on which will be conveuecl in Paris.

We can reach standing that the Secnrîty Couneil will 110t ul1til 1 November or, as suggested by the representative of the United States, 11ntil 29 October, This, woulcl be subject to any emergency. As l stated, the President cannot entirely mIe possibility of an emergency meeting taking that period. Rule 2 of the Council's provisional of procedure states: "The President shall call a meeting of CouDcil at the request of any member of Counci1." .

l do not think wc are really in an acute dile111l11a. What we are going to do, if necessary, is to meet in New York up to 22 Octoller, and ta meet in Paris on and after 23 OctobeL In practice l shonld hope that we wonld 110t meet, at any rate, nntil perhaps 29 October, nnless indeed the Kashmir matter shonld become acnte and one of the parties should wish ta have a meeting before thell. Othenvise, we shonld meet at the end of the Illonth or, perhaps, on 1 November. But if by any chance an urgent Cjuestion arises and the President has ta sn1111110n a mceting either in New York or Paris, 1 snppose that if any one of Ils conld not be l)resent we should have tn he represented by a snbstitute or, if nccessary, by our a111bassadors in Paris. There arc amhassadors in Paris who conld each represent his particular conntry, l shonld have thonght. That would !Je the way to do it if there shonlet be an urgent meeting. 79. ML TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Repuhlics) (trallslatcd fr01n RlIssian): It \Vould appear therdore that the position is as follows. The Council Illay still 111('('t in New York on 22 October, and in Paris as saon as 23 October. In these circnl11stances, 1 shol1lc1 like ta reqnest that no meeting be convened in Ncw York on 22 October, so as tn enable 11S ta leave New York hy air and be in Paris on 23 October. It is, of COl1fse, physically impossible to meet in New York on 22 Octo1Jer and in Paris on 23 October. That is wh)' l am seeking some clarification on the point. Perhaps we conld forego a mecting on 22 October; that would enable me to leave by air for Paris on 22 October. r am not in the same position as other members of the Security COl1ncii; for example, the USSR Ambassador in Paris i5 now on leave in the Soviet Union, sa that l shall have ta go to Paris. .s0. The PRESIDENT: l do not see any probability of Cl meeting on 22 October. l myself have arranged transportation f(Jr tomorrow. Of course, my alternate will he here and in case of emergency he will be able to preside over the Security Conncil. But as l have just said, l do not see any probability of a meeting on 22 October. 81. At any rate, wc coulcl adjourn today with the nnderstanding that we will do our best not ta have any meeting nntil 29 October in Paris. 82. ML BEBLER (Yugoslavia): l asked ta speak before the Presiclent uttered the last sentence. Barring unforeseen and nrgent matters for wl,1ich we are bou.nd to I11cet undcr the Charter at any tnne, l should hke ta know the first probable date for the discussion of the Kashmir question. l think it would also be useful for other members of the Council. Not anyone can

If there are no we might agree on the date of 29 October.

do not like to interpose an objection. l should, like to malee a suggestion. It is that, in the things, the Security Council cannot wisely arbitrarily for taking up any particular question. have founcl out enough about the Kashmir-Jammu tion, l thillk, to cause us to avoid fixing a rigid time. l sl1ggest that it would be much we are obliged to answer a question such pouncled by the representative of Yugoslavia, stlggest that at any time between, say, 26 1 November, one ought to be prepared to question, because it is a real live question. 85. For my part, therefore, l am not stating tion that is illtended to bar a decision here; the Coul1cil to consider whether we ought rigicl and fixed rule with respect to the first which we will take up that question.

Although we cannot precise date on account of the varied functions Security COlmci! and its obligations under we can, more or less, establish an understanding us that we will do our best not to meet on bdore a certain date. The understallding would he that the Kashmir question will before the Security Council prior to 26 October barring any emergency of course. l am speaking genera! consensus without any precision, be violated by any emergency situation. Shall on that?

If no one strong feelings, why could we not fix the October 1951 as the earliest date for the discussion the question of Kashmir? Is there any possibility such an agreement by Member States who concerned?

as l am concerned, l shou1d think 29 October would really be a very suitable date. The question probably get better consideration then than were fixed for 26 October or fOl' 27 October, l believe is a Saturday anyway. l-Iowever, the parties concerned should very much insist earlier than 29 October 1951, l imagine we have to take' that into consideration; we ignore the fact that that desire existed. things being equa1, l hope that there will agreement on 29 October 1951. ~~Ir~ "ëa~~~E HotIse, INDONESIA Jajasan 84, Djakarta. IRAQ - Mack.n:zle's Stal/oners, IRAN Ketab-Khaneh Avenue, IRELAND HIMrnlan cial Buildings. ISRAEL, LlO Blumsleln, 35 AII.nby ITALY_ Colibri lEBANON libralrl. LIBERIA J. Momolu Streeu, LUXEMBOURG Librairie Luxembourg. MEXICO Editorial cal 41, NETHERLANDS N.V. Martlnus 9, 's·Grav.nhage. NEW NOUVELLE·ZELANDE United land, NICARAGUA Dr. Ramiro Publlc:aciones Tr~los Hermanos, Aparu,do 1313, SU José. CUBA La Casa Belga, ReM de Smodt, O'ReUl, 455, la Habana. CZECHOSLOVAICIA - TCH ECOSLOVAQUIE ~skoslovenskY Splsovat.1 Nirodnl1'F!dll 9, Praha 1. ' DENMARK - DANEMARK EInar Munksgaard, N,rregade 6w K,benhavn. DOMINICAN REPUBltC- REPUBLIQUE DOMINiCAINE L1brerfa Domlnicana, Calle Mercedes Ho. ~9, Apartado 656, Ciudad Trujillo. ECUADOR :- EQUATEUR Munol Hermanos y Cla., Plua dei Teatro, Quito. EGYP! - EGYPTE· librairie "L. Renaissance d'Egypte,H 9 SH. Adly Pasha, Calro. El SALVADOR - SALVADOR Manuel Navas y Ciao "La Casa dellibro Barato" la Avenlda sur num. 37, SaD Salvador. ETHIOPIA- ETHIOPIE Agence Ethiopienne d. Publicité, Box B. Addis-Abeba. AUSTRIA B. Wiiller$torff, Salzburg. Un/f.d Na/ion. publicallon. can lurlAe, he Irom fh< follow/ng books.II.r;: GERMANY - ALLEMAGNE Buchhandlung Elwert & Meurer, Haupt.' strasse, 101, Berlln-Schoneberg. W. E. Saarbach, Frank.nstrasse, 14, Koln-Junkersdorf. JAPAN Alexander Horn. Splegclgasse, 9, Maruzen WI.sbaden. NlhonbashJ, Orders and inClutries '(rom countries where sales '~ave not yet been appointed may be s.nt to: Circulation Section. UnIted Nations, New York, or Sales Section, United Nations Office, Nation., Geneva, Swiherland. Printed in Canada Priee: (or equivalellt