S/PV.570 Security Council

Before submitting the provisional agenda to the Council, I should like to pay tribute to the cclleagues who have just left us and to welcome those who are about to join us today. 2. Foremost among those who are leaving us 1 should like to pay tribute to the representative of Ecuador; 1 am sure that I shaU be voicing the views of aU members of the Coundl in recalling here in particular the authority, skill and independent judgment with which he presided over the Council's meetings during December. Sil" Renegat N.Rau has left us to assume a very hîgh international juridical office; I have no doubt that the tmfailing good will and ingenuity which he sa often displayed here will prove a great asset in his work in the International Court of Justice at The Hague. Mr. Bebler, l am sure, will bring to any future position he may hold that sturdy good sense and frank approach which have so often relieved and enlivened our discussions. S. Our three new coUeagues are all weIl known to us. While one of them, Mr. Santa Cruz, hM rendered our Organization particularly valu:lbl~ sCi";-1ces as President ,of the Economie and St)dal Council, Mr. Kyrou and Mr.-Bokhari. as pennanetlt representatives to the United Nations and as members of the Greek and Pakistan delegations, respectively. to sessions of the General Assembly, ha.ve proved worthy of our admiration of

l shouldlike first of aIl to thank the President for the words of weIcome which he has addresscd both ta my country and to me personally as l take my place as the representative of Chile tD the Security COl111ci1. 5. Chile is deeply appreciative of the responsibility and the honour conferred upon it by the General Assembly in electing it almost unanimously as a member of the Security Councii. 6. My country is particularly honoured that, in this important organ of the United Nations, it is replacing Ecuador, which has so ably represented Latin America on the Council for two years. My delegation wishes to associate itself with the trihute which the President just paid to the work of that country's distinguished representative, Ml'. Quevedo. 7. The Chilean delegation will wholeheartedly devote its efforts ta its \Vorie on the Security Coullcil, just as it has done in the General Assembly or the Economic and Social Council, because Chile believes in peace, and in peace achieved through the United Nations and above ail, through the full illlplclllentation of ail the Purposes and Principles of the Charter, which form an indivisible whole. 8. The experience of llly delegation during six years' worie with the Economie and Social Council has strengthened our conviction of the indivisibility of the elements which rnake for peace, namcly collcctive security, economic and social progress and respect for :fundamental human rights; that cxperience has also strengthened 0111' conviction as regards the interdependence of those elements. 9. Our delegation is convinced that economic and _ social backwardness and poverty constitute and have always constituted the 10ng-ten11, and sometimes even the immediate, causes of conflicts and aggression, and that the worie of the United Nations in remedying those conditions is one of the most vital elemcnts in the struggle for pcace. . 10. . The Chilean delegation wi11not forget these things or these realities now that it is a member of the Security Council, and we hope that the Council also will be mindfui of them. 11. Chile also believes in the pacific settlement of disputes and of aIl questions. Chile believes that the United Nations, particularly the Security Council, shoulc1 seize every opportunity which may offer itself ta bring about understanding between the blocs into which the world is divided and which are threatening mankind with all the terrors of a new \Var. In that unclerstanding, our delegation will join in the work of the Security Council with zeal and a sense of high responsibility. 12.. Mr. KYROU (Greece) (translated fl'om Fl'e11ch): l thank the President with aIl my heart for his kind ;__-C,k~, Th, lad that th", wocd, ==-._fa_i_t_q.u_'e_l_le.s_a_ie.n_t.e_'t.é.p.r 13. On ta1dng my seat in this Council, 1 take pleasure .in expressing my country's thanks to all who have deemed it worthy of this honour. The Greek Government is fully aware of the great responsibilities that this entai1s and would like ta assure aH Member States that it will perform its task to the best of its ability. 14. In making my small contribution to the discharge 'by the Security Counci1 of its prime responsibi1ity of maintaining international peace and security, 1 shall be guided only by a spirit of sincere objectivity and complete impartia1ity. 1S. Greece has repeated1y demonstrated its unwavering faith in the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. It has even devoted to them what it holds most dear - the lives of its citizens. The Greek Government 'is convinced that no sacrifice is too great when the essentia1 principles of the United Nations are at stake. 16. It is in this spirit that l shall discharge my functions.

On behalf of Pakistan and a1so, if l may say sa, on behalf of Ambassador Bokhari who wou1d normally be occupying this chair, l thank the President for the very kind words with which he has we1comed Pakistan to the Secllrity Counci1. vVe are deep1y sensible of the honour done to Pakistan and the confidence reposed in it by its election to the Security Council. 1t will be the constant endeavour of the Pakistan de1egation ta justify that confidence and to discharge its heavy responsibilities in accordance with the Principles and Purposes of the Charter. Adoption of the agenda -'Il!:! a.gen":;,u 'Ze'as adopted. India·Paldstan question At the invitation of the President, Sardar H. S. Malik, representative of India, and Mr. Graham, United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan, took places at the Security Cou,ncil table.

As United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan l have the honour to present formally to the members of the Security Couneil the report which appears as document S/2448. 19. The Security Council is well aware of the details of the dispute between India and Pakistan concerning the State of Jammu and Kashmir - it has been dealing periodieally with this question since January 1948. Therefore it does not seem necessary to me to repeat ~gain its history and the different stages which have leen reached since then. All the members of the Secu- 'city Cog.ntil are acquainted with the facts. 21. The Security Council will recall that on 10 November 1951 [566th meetingJ it instructed me to continue my efforts to obtain agreement of the parties on a plan for effecting demilitarization of the State of ] ammu and Kashmir and to report to the Security Council on my efforts, with my views, concerning the problems confided to me [5/2392J. Within the period of six weeks given me by the Security Council l submitted the present report [5/2448J . 22. The positions of the Governments of India and Pakistan on the principles of demilitarization have been set forth in paragraphs 37 through 44 of the United Nations Representative's first report in connexion with paragraph 35 of the same document. 23. At the very first stage of the mission, and also in this second attempt, the United Nations Representative found that not only were there differences regarding the stages required for demilitarization, but there were also fears and emotional tensions, which became bitterly vocal in the summer of 1951 and obstructed the way toward an agreement. . /J 24. These differences and fears involved, in the views of one side or of both sides, such matters as war psychosis, minor violations along the cease-fire !ine, troop movements, the prospective convening of the Constituent Assembly in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the staging of a programme of demilitarization, the time required for carrying out a plan of demilitarization, the timing and the amount of disarming and disbanding of the Azad Kashmir forces in relation to the withdrawal or reduction of the Inclian and State armed forces, the number of armcd forces to be left at the end of the period of demilitarization on each side of the cease-fire line, the contentions concerning the security of the State at ail times and in all contingencies, and the timing of the induction into office of the Plebiscite Administrator. 25. To try to overcome these obstacles, to help remove distrust and fears, to narrow the differences and to assist the parties toward reaching an agreement, the United Nations Representative made twe1ve proposals and presented them on 7 September 1951 to the two Governments for their consideration as a basis for an agreement on a plan for demilitarization [5/2375, annex 2]. 26. Ag1'eement on proposais 1, 2) 3 and 4: In my first report l explained the scope of each one of the proposais and also the agreement of both Governments • 27. Agreement on proposaIs 8, 9, 11 and 12: In the . report that 1 am submitting formally now to the Security Council 1 have pointed out [S/2448, para. 27] that the two Governments have agreed on four more proposaIs - 8, 9, Il and 12 - with the qualification concerning proposai 12, which appears in the same . report [para. 28]. 1 do not think it necessary to go into more details on these questions. 28. No agreement on proposaIs 5, 6, 7 and 10: The United Nations Representative unfortunately cannat inform the Security Council that substantial progress has been made in reaching agreement between the two Governments on proposais 5, 6, 7 and 10 of the draft agreement [S/2448, para. 29]. 29. ProposaIS: Proposai 5 provides that the demilitarization envisaged bath in part II of the 13 August 1948 resollltion of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP), containing the principles of the truce agreement, and in sub-paragraphs 4 (a) and (b) of the 5 January 1949 resolution, 2 is to be effected in a single continuous process. This proposaI was and is designed to solve the problem of the phasing and quantum of the disbanding and disarming of the Azad Kashmir forces in connexion with the withdrawal and reduction of the Indian and State armed forces. 30. If the members of the Security COllncil will recall what was said by UNCIP in its thircl interim report, a the members of the Security Council will understand why the United Nations Representative does not enter again into a detailed account of this problem. 31. ProposaI 6: In arder ta remove the indefiniteness and consequent fears and unrest which have developed from a failure to reach an agreement on a definite time required for demilitarization, proposai 6 was made to the parties. This proposaI provided that the process ~arization shall be completed during a period of ninety days after the signing of the whole agreement unless another period is decided upon by the representatives of the two Governments referred ta in proposaI 9. 32. The Government of India maintained that its responsibility for the security of the State from invasion or large-scale infiltration of hostile elements would, in view of the recent war spirit and temper on the other side of the cease-fire line, make ninety days, or any other such specific period, an impracticable period within which to be sure of being in a position to make the arrangements necessary for the beginning of the plebiscite period. , 3 Ibid.} Fourth Year, Special Supplement No. 7 (8/1430/ .Rev.1), paras. 197-270. 34. Proposals 7 and 10: Proposai 7 provides that "the demilitarization should be carried out in sueh a way that at the end of the period referred to above the situation would be as follows: "(i) The tribesmen and Pakistan nationals not normally resident therein who had entered the State for the purpose of fighting will have been withdrawn; "(ii) The Pakistan troops will have been withdrawn from the State, and " (iii) Large-scale disbandment and disarmament of the Azad Kashmir forces will have taken place. "(b) On the Indian side of the cease-fire line: " (i) The bulk of the Indian forces in the State will have been withdrawn; "(ii) Further withclrawals or reductions, as the case may be, of the Indian and State armed forces remaining in the State after the completion of the operation referred to in sub-paragraph (b) (i) above will have been carried out; "so that at the end of the period referred to in paragraph 6 above there will remain on the present Pakistan sicle of the cease-fire line a force of ... civil armed forces, and on the Indian side of the cease-fire Hne a force of ..." 35. As it will be reealled, the United Nations Repre- sentative left blanks in this proposai, ta be filled in by the Governments, as ta the number of armed forces ta be left on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization. 36. Pakistan suggested that there should preferably ~ be left approximately 4,000 armed forces on each side ··~of~tateMilitia. 37. India suggested an arrangement which wouId have provided that (1) the Azad Kashmir forces should be entirely disarmed and disbanded; (2) that a civil ;_JllJ'tSf.~L ef 4,QQQ ~QHstitl.1!ed, haH of whom should be armed and half of whom shèmld be unarmed; (3) that haH should be followers Of Azad Kashmir and half should 110t be followers of A~ad Kashmir; and (4) that i \ 33. India proposed that, on the Indian side of the ll:ease-fire tine, there should he an infl\l1trydivision and ;supporting units, which hQ~ ~ince been tatalled as ;amounting to 28,000. T~is total does not, and in India's 'Vi-ew should not, inc1ude the State M~.titia, cons:dered hy India to be a State police force of approximately l6,OOO. 39. At the lJutset of the consultations il! Pari!, the United Nations Reproes~ntative asked for concentration on two very basic questions: (1) the minimum number of forces ta be left on each side of the cease-fire tine at the end of the J;>eriod of demi1itarization; and (2) the fixing of the defimte time when the Government of Indi& would cause the Plebiscite Administrator to be inducted iüto office. 40. The representathre of India. indicated that, ~s the security of the State was involve~, for which In~tia was responsible, he woddneed e-s:pert military advice on the question !'egarding the number oÏ amled forcesto be lef~ and on related mUitary matters. 41. To this'end, as it is said in my present repcrt f3/2448, paras. 12 lmâ 21], the Miütary Adviser of tne, United Nations Representative, at separate meetings with the Military Adviser of the representative of Indit:. and with the representative of Pakistan, discusseJ relevant military m~tters in a purcly exploratory manner. Aithough in f~'oposal 9 if. Is contemplated that the representatives 0 the Indian and Pakistan Gov- ernments, assist~d by their mi1i~aryadvi.sers, would meet, under the auspIces of theUl1!tefi NatIOns, ta draw up a programme of demilitarization in accol'dance with the provisions of the drait agreement, during the discussions m~ntioned above the phasing of the withdrawaIs of troops was considered, without prejudice to proposaI 9 of the draft agreement. These discussions showed that, although agreement might have been r~ached on the phasing of some of the withdrawals, the differences between the parties on the quantum to be left at the end of the period of demilitarization were ,~sseqtially thesame basic ones which hadpreviously Im~ed~d.,agreement. On the other hand, asJ1l.~_~demili­ tarl,~%tiort.was contemplated/ in a single, continuous prJ~,~,",~,S,la,Ud,. as suh-paragraJ?hs, 4 (a) and, (b,) of", the reSOtilttion o~ 5 January 1949 conferred upon the :fle1:ïisÇ:ite A-dministlator, in consu'tation with the United Natir.ns Rçpresentativeand the respective authorities, certai!l furiçtions with respect to the final disposaI of forces, the appointment of thePlebisc1te AdmitiÎstr~tor at a, certain moment in the pe.riod of demilitarizatioll was cons:idered necessary. On tms bask point, also, no agreement could be .reached. ' cease~fire on l January 1949. 43. The representative of Pakistan indicated th:lt any proportionate reduction, however heavYI would be matched on the Pakistan-Asad Kashmir side of the cease-fire Hne as an interdependent part of a continuous process in the proposed programme, of demilitarizatic!'. 44. Th~ official replies of India atld Pakistar.l to the basic questions asked by the United Nations Represen- tative made formaI the wide differences between the two Governments on the most basic questions. 45. With the additional reduction of 7,000 armed furl:es, India he1d the position that ai: the end of the period of demiHtarization there shoulo be on the Indian. side of the lirle 21,000 Indian and State armed forces, exclusive of the State Militia of 6,000, and there should be on the other side of the line a civil armed force of 2,000 and an unarmed civil force of 2,000, half of wh(\m were ta be followers of Azad Kashmir and half of whom were not te be followers of Azad Kashmir, as specific:.d above. 46. Pakistan maintained that at the end of the period of demilitarization there should be approximate1y 4,000 armed forces on each side of the cease-are line, but for the sake uf agreement would accept a slight disparity in favour of India. 47. The wide differences in the number of armed forces proposed by the two Governments to be left on each side of the cease-fire Hne at the end of the period of demiIitarization made it clear that no agreement could be reached on proposaI 7 at this time. 48. The United Nations Represeiltative does not have the expert knewledge to suggest what the exact figures should be. However, he does suggest sorne principles as a .basis for an approach to the problem. :de suggests: Ca) that the number of armed forces to be on each side of the line at the end of the period of demilitarization be as small as possible; and (b) that they be based, in proportiOl.., .on the number of armed forces. existing on each side of the cease-fire line on 1 January 1949. 49. Concerning the first point, the reasons are obvious: both parties have agreed to the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and thè Security Council has recommended··that the deinilitarization should be effected. ~lt the lll'ginning of tll\.' \xase-l1re dh 1 January 1949. SI. In regard to the induction of the Plebiscite Admin- istrator, the United Nations Representative had suggcstetl, in !lroposal 10, that the Govermnent nf llldia l'anse the Plebiscite Administrator to be inducteù into offi.cc not later than the last day of the period of demi1itarization, cl1ntl'mplated as ninety days from the signing of the agreement. 52. The Government of Pakistan maintained that as the Pkhiscite Administrator had (luties under sub- p:trngraphs 4 (Il) and (b) of the UNCIP resolution of 5}anuary 1949, which were envisaged asinterdependent parts of a single continuous process, he should take office early during the wntinuous process. 53. The Government of India maintained that the Plebiscite Administrator should be appointed as soon as conditions in the State, on both sides of the cease-l1re line, permitted of a sta!'t being made with the arrange- ments for carrying out the plebiscite; appointment before that time would be premature. .54. It is the view of the United Nations Represen- tative that an agreement for a specified time for the induction into office of the Plebiscite Administrator would l'ontribute ta the further development of a more friendly atmosphere. One of the main keys to the 'complex problems of demilitarization, the possible linchpin \vhich would integrate the twe1ve-point programme, the c1eareE:t symbol both of the necessary ,and ultimate demilitarization and the promised plebiscite, would be the fixing of a del1nite day for the induction into office of the Plebiscite Administrator, ,55. The United Nations Representative holds the view that the best day for the induction into offce of the Plebiscite Administrator is not at the beginning or midway but the last day of the contemplated period, whïch ~s not later than 15 }uly 1952. 56, From the above statement the United Nations Representative deems that there is no substantial change in the positions of the Governments of India and Pakistan in regard to their main points of differenc:e concerning demilitarization of the State of Tammu and Kashmir on the basis of the draft agreement submitted to them on 7 September 1951, which were set forth in paragraph 60 of the I1rst report of the United Nations Representative [5/2375]. The United Nations R.epresen- tative consider;; that ,the two divergent poilïts of view on the main points of the proposaI of 7 September 1951 flow from the different conceptions of the GOyer111uents of India and Pakistan on their status in the State of 57. While the Government of India accepted the },roposa!s of VNClP c~mtained in the rl'solution of 13 August 194$, with the \mden.tunding set forth in the letter of the Prime Minister of India of 20 August 194$ r,~ïll(1(l. l'ara, 781 which accepted, praetically spe.\kil1g'. the cense-fire, the Government of Pakistan did not al'Cept the proposaIs contained in that resolution \mtil Decemher 19+8 [S/H96. atlnl".t' 5] when VNCIP presentt'o. to bcth parties pr()posals rS/110j, aHne.l· 31 M"e10Flng part II of the 13 :mgust 194t~ resolution, as established in the 5 Januarv 1949 resolution that is, setting up the principlC:'s'and procedure for a plehiscite in the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. In otlter words, the \rtwernment'of India \Vas ready to accept a simple cessation of hostilities, whereas the Government of Pakis~an \Vas re1uctant to accept a cessation of hostilities if guarantees \Vere not made that the will of the p'eople of the State of Jamnm and Kashmir \Vould he mamfested in a free and 'impartial \Vay through the method of a pleh!scite under the intemational auspices of the United NattOns, 58. The United Na",ms Representative deems it necese~ry to cmphasize thatt from his experience, he heHeves that an)' negotiations that could he undertaken lIy the United Nations to obtain the demilitarization of the Stnte of Jammu and Kashmir under the UNCIP resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 Ja1l\'lary 1949, taking into aC,-'ù'i.1nt the resolutions thernselv-eil or following the proœdure proposOO by the Unite.q Nations Representative in the draft plan for agreement submitted to the parties. would find almost insurmount- able obstacles if the circumstances prevailing are the same as now, unless in one way or another p;,;reed solu- tions are found for the following: (1) a deLdte period for demilitarization; (2) the scope of demilitarization and quantum of forces that will remain at the end of the period of demilitarization; (3) the day for the formaI induction into office of the Plebiscite Administ,tor. 59. An agreement between the two countries upon demilitarization would have potential values for the people of Jammu and Kashmir and the people of India and Pakistan. Agreement on proposaI:; 7 and 10 would probably lead to certain agreements on proposaIs 5 and 6 as well, be the linchpin, as has been suggested, binding all twelve proposaIs together in an effectively integrated programme, and prepare the way for the promised plebiscite. 60. The plebiscite would keep the promise made to the people of Jammu and Kashmir, who are worthy of the right of their own se1f-determination through a free, seC11re, and impartial plebiscite. They are a people of legend, song and story, associated with snowcapped niountains, beautiful valleys and life-giving waters. The 61. The a&,reement of two sovereigu nations on a plan of demilitanzation of the State of Jammu· and Kashmir, as the basis of self-determination, p{:ace and co-operation in the great humane programmes On the sub-condnent, might help tG contrihute its bit to the hop!':s of the people for an eventual agreement of aU the: nations through the United Nations for universal disarmament as a basis for freedom, peace and co-operation in great humane programmes across the earth. 62. The peoples of the earth who do the wor1( of the world and carry Lhe loads of these desperate days still look for sorne sign of better times for themselves and their children. Without flinching from the privations of ,lelf-defence or the burdens of their daily toil, they look east and west for the intelligent and spiritual leadership which would guide the ways of the world from selt- destruction to se1f-realization of the co-operative and creative capacities of the sons of God and the brothers ·of men, 63. On the sub-continent of India and Pakistan today, the place, the time, the opportunity and the leadership have met in one of thè great junctures of human history for the possible weal or woe of the peoples of the world. 64. The place is where meet the three largest nations and perhaps the fifth largest nation in the world. 65. The time is past when society can safely take siow del':J.des and centuries to muddle through in -adj~lstlU~;.1ts toscientific and technological revolutions. Social drift and unsettled disputes, such as the Kashmir issue, heavily charged with high potentials, did not then, as now, possibly involve mankind in the swift and total tragedy of global war and the scientific destruction of civilization. Human society with an atomic bomb in its bosom cannat lag in h'l.1mane and creative adjustments to its potentially suicidaI power. «56. The opportunity in time and pInce is for the leadership on the sub-continent, tested in the struggles and sufferings for the humnn liberty of 400 million human beings, to help prewmt the destruction of human freedom an..t the self-d~.$truction of civilization by setting chaUenging examples of demilitarization, self- determination, reconci1îatton and reconstruction in a fearful and broken world. 67. Out of the East have come the great retigious md spiritual hopes of mankind. Modem man, with aU his scientific but yet unma~tered POWi;!" looks with increasing humility and hope to the East where founders and e:'Cempl~rs of great religions taught peace on earth and good will among men. The vVest needs the East and the East needs the V\Test. Now the twain must meet to • save and advRnce the best of both. 68. Spiritual idealism with scientific mechanisms can accclerate the wa.ys and widen the meaning of peace and brotherhood. Scientific mechanisms without spiritual idealism can destroy them both. Spiritual ideatism and sdentific mechanisms must join forces for building freer, nobler and more creative societies in the East and the W ~st. 69. The international mechanical framework of our dynamic industrial society which encompasses the earth and catches up a depression or a war anywhere and involves human beings everywhere, needs for its international control around the earth the political fra.'nework, world forum and peaceful procedures of the United Nations. Both the international economic society and the international politieal organization of the United Nations need the world communion of the spiritual brotherhood of peoples for the increasingly humane mastery of tyranny, antagonisms, racism, industrial:sm and imperialism. 70. The sub-èontinent is the place for a time1y example of demilitarization and self-determination. Now is the time for the dedicated leadership of two great pcoples to rise to the caU of their spiritual heritage, the responsibility of their power and the opportunity for their greatness to give in a dark world challenging examples and fresh hopes to the peoples in the unresting adventure of the hU111an spirit, through' the United Nations, in the long pilgrimage towards a freer and .fairer world, in anSwer to the prayers of the. people for peace and freedom on God's goo,~ earth.

Does any representative wish to comment on the account which Mr. Graham has just givfu'l us?

In conformity with the usual procedure followed in the Security Council, there was simultaneous interpretation of Mr. Graham's speech. . 74. Ml'. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated jrom Russian): More than four years have passed since the Sel:urity Council began to deal with the question of Kashmir. The United States and the United Kingdom have been, during the whnIe of that period, and are now, particularly active in the discussion of this matter in the Security Council and in the preparation and implementation of plans for the 1'io-ca1led settlement of this question. Throughout that pedod, the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom in the Security Council have submitted quite a number of proposaIs and draft resolutions on th1s matter, and secured their adoption by the Council. Commissions to settle the Kashmir question have been established, and mediators and United Nations representatives have been appointed to settle the matter. Up to now, however, no progress has been made towards the settlement of the Kashmir question. A leading pl>.rt in these commissions, and in the plans for settling the question by mediation and United Nations representati':es, has invariably been played by the United States and the United Kingdom. 75. In 1950 the Australian Sir Owen Dixon acted. as United Nations Representative for Kashmir. After the failure of his mission, the American Mr. Graham, whose report is now before the Security Council, was appointed, at the insistence of the United States, to replace him. Mr. Grahan1's mission, however, met with exactly the same fate as that of his predecessor. The question of Kashmir is still unsettled. The dispute between India and Pakistan continues. The United States and the United Kingdom are conti.nuing as before to interfere in the settlement of the K:.lshmir question, putting forward one plan after another. AlI these plans are failing. 76. What is the reason why the Kashmir question is still unsettled and why the plans put forward by the United States and the United Kingdom in connexion with Kashmir have proyed fi:uitless from the point of view of a settlement of the Kashmir question? It is not difficult to see that the explanation of this is èhiefly and above aH that these plans in connexion with Kaslunir are of an annexationist, imperialist nature, becau.;e they are not based on an effort to achieve a real settle"üent of the Kashmir question. They pursue different aims, different - directly contrary - objectives. The purpose of these plans is interference by the United States and the United Kingdom in the internaI affairs of Kashmir, the. prolongation of the dispute between India and Pakistan on the question of Kashmir and the conversiop.. of Kashmir into a protectorate ot tht:;! .UnitedSta.fes aMtPe United Kingdom under the pretéXt of ·fend~ring .it '~étssist~ce throrigh the United Nations". Final1y, the· :pùrpose of these plans in 79. This was nothing but a flagrant act of interference by the United States and the United Kingdont in the internaI affairs of the people of Kashmir and a direct violation of the principles of the United Nations Charter. As is well kno'\<\'11, the Charter of the United Nations provides for the equality of rights of all nations, large and small. Article 1 of the Charter contains one of the most important prineiples, providing for the development of friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self~ determination of p~oples. 80. The plaL!s advanced by the United States and the United Kingdom for the .. so-called settlement of the Kashmir question flagrantly violate this importantprinciple of the United Nations Charter. They deprive the people of Kashmir of. the right of sèlf-detènnination. They embody an attempt to replace the tight of self-determination by an Anglo-American dictated setilement. The people of Kashmir are deprived of the opportunity to decide their own future and determine the future shape and affiliations of Kas~ir independently and freely by means of a free declaratIon of will. 81. Instead of this, the above-mentioned Anglo- American resolution foi&l.ed upùn the people of Kashmir 82. As is well k-noV't"tl, the joint draft resolution submitted to the Security Council on 21 February 1951 by the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom [S/2017] contained an open d~.mand that foreign troops should be introduced into the territory of Kashmir under the prete.xt of the provisi.on of armed forces by the Member States of the United Nations for assignment ta Kashmir. As an excuse for the sending of troops ta Kashmir it was alleged that such troops were necessary for the purpose of "facilitating demilitarization and the holding of the plebiscite". The draft resolution contained an open demand that the so-called United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan should he empowered ta deal with the question of the introduction of "forces of Member States of the United Nations" inta Kashmir under the above-mentioned pretext. 83. Furthermore, if it is borne in mirid that, at the request of the United States, an American 'Was at that very time appointed United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan, the purpose of the proposal that the armed forces of Member States of the United Nations should be brought into Kashmir will become perfectly obvious. That American "United Nations Representative" went ta Kashmir, as is weIl known, accompanied by a large staff of·American experts and advisers, the most important among whom are military. The post of chief military adviser is held by an American general. 84. Later, because of the' Indian representative's objection [553rd meeting], the Anglo~American propos~l for the introduction into the territory of Kashrnlr of armed forces of Member States of the United Nations was omitted from the draft resolution, but that was merely a formal gesture. In hct, not only was the idea of introducing Anglo-Americ~tl forces under the guise of "United Nations armed forCl.:'>" not drcpped, but steps were taken to put it into effect. It was Mr. Graham himself, the so-called United Nations Represefltative for India and Pakistan, who resurrected this idea in his activities in Kashmir, India and Pakistan. 85. This is app~l'ent from the report he submitted to the Security Council on 18 December 1951 [S/2448]. . Questionnaires to. India and· Pakistan are annexed.to this report [S/2448, anne.x 3]. Both these questionnaires wen.. sent by Mr. Graham tothe Governments of those States. They both contained the fol1owing question: . ".. .ls the Government of India (Pakistan) ready to accept forces to he provided by the United Nations in order ta safeguard the security and to maintain laV'l 'and order in the whole State of Jammu and Kashmir ils long as the United Nations, in consultation with the Governments of India and Pakistan, deems necessary?" ,1 mto Kashmir. 8& Cc Mr. Graluun had no right ta ask the Indian and PakIstan Govemments that question without the ~Jmowledge and authorization of the Security Council. Nevertheless, he did ask them. The question naturally , arises: Who authorized mm to do. sa? The Security Council did not. Who did, then? There is only one ob'rious answer: Mr. Graham was, it would seem, wthorized directly by th~ Pent:8g0n in Washington. It therefore follows that Mr. Graham, as the United Nations Representative, exceeded his powers and, fuUowing the general line of the Anglo-American bloc1 endea..voured for his part ta prepare the ground for the llitroduction of United States and United Kingdom a..'"'llled. forces into Kashmir in the guise of ccUnited Nations anud forœs". 89. AU this reveals the troe character of United States and United Kingdom plans and intentions with regard ta Kashmir. The history of the Security Council's handlùm" of the Kashrnir question over the past four yœrs wholly confinns the predatory, imperiaiistic nature of those plans. . 90. From the very outset the United States and the United Kingdom adopted the policy of interferirlg in the domestic affairs of the people of Kashmir. Everyone will recaJl, fQr example, the. instance of direct United States and United Kingdom intervention in the Kashmir question when, in August 1949', President Truman of the United States and Prime Minister Attlee of the Uhited Kingdom proposed that the Kashmirquestion should he referred ta arhitration by a third party. Direct pressure was brought tobear at that tinte on the States concerned with the question. The pressure was. 50 heavy that the Prime Minister of India was ~ ta state in a speech that attemptB were being made to put pre>sure on them, particularly with regard ln Kashmir; that he had never seen anything to equal iI:; and tbat the pressure proved that matters were being ronsidered not on their merits but on the basis of other,. quite· different, considerations. 91. This provides eüdenœ that from the very outset the United States nnd the United Kingdom have fuBowed the poJicy of imposing their "arbitration" upon the people of Kasbmir, of imposing their proposaIs upon hod:i the people of Kashmir and the Govemments of .India and Pakistan •. 95. These press reports shed light on the true intentions of the United States and the United Kingdom with regard to Kashmir, and reveal the essence of the Anglo- American plans which are being imposed with such zeal andpersistence upon the people of Kashmir. The Press in the United States, too, has ~epeatedly indicated United States efforts to dominate Kashmir and the people of Kashmir and to conyert its territory into a United States military base. The Christian Science Monitor, for example, report:l~d that in. Pakistan and Kashmir the United States hoped to obtain a weIlprepared ally of exceptional strategie importance in the event of any future. conflict with the Soviet Union. 96. The predatory nature of United States ,and British plans with regard to Kashmir areâlso clea:rly understood in Kashmir itself. Ill,·Z. ,recent speech, GhUlattl Mc.hammad Sadiq, the President of the Kashtnir Constituent Assembly, stated ~that the sole aim of thê Anglo-Americans was to" convert Kashmir into a ' military base against the SO"liet Umon and the new China, and that it was for that reason algne tbatthey were studying the question so zealously. " satisfaisante 97. AIl these factsshow that the chief obstacle tothe settlement of the' Kashp:lir. problem is United States and United. Kingd0rtl. interference in the affairs of .Ka$hmir.The ~peci:fic i?Stànce.of theso-called settlement of 'the Kashmlr questIon,has revealed once more to the' world that in no case cau the fate of a nation be suecessfully dedded ifthere i5 interference in that 98. The USSR Govermnent considers that the Kashmir question can be resolved successfully only by giving the people of Kashmir an opportunity to decide the question of Kashmir's constitutional status by themselves, without outside interference. This can be achieved if that status is determined by a Constituent Assembly democratically elected by the Kashmir people. Such a solution of the Kashmir question would be in harmony with the Principles and Purposes of the United Nations Charter and, in particular, with Article 1 thereof which lays down that it is one of the purposes of the United Nations "to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples".

l should merely lilee to say that the l'eally extraorc1inary fantasies apparently entertained by our Soviet Union friend and colleague in regard to the Kashl11ir dispute are typical, as l think, of the whole Soviet Union approach to international problems. Whatever the dispute before us, the first thing to do is, it seems, ta discover how and why it is part of an anti-Soviet plot designed mere1y to advance the cause of the ruling circles of the United States and of the United Kingdom with the object of clamping down an Anglo-Al11erican domination or dictatorship on a suffering world. Any attempt by the Security Council to deal with the dispute by applying principles of reason must - unless, of course, it is concurred in by the Soviet Union Government - be viewed in the light of those general pl'inciples; and it is by snch a process of reasoning, if it can indeed be so termed, that the Soviet Union Government comes to the conclusion that, for instance, the Kashmir dispute has been invented and subsequently carefully fostered by the diabolical Anglo-Americans for the one end of turning Kashmil' inta an Anglo-American armed camp full of imperialistic troops destined for an eventual invasion of the ~oviet Union. ~'alder on totalitarianism or on Marxist society. It i8 possible to believe that; and people, indeed, can mways be found who will belieye anything. But when it cornes to accusing our friend' Mr. Grahanl of being the secret agent of th~ Pex:tagon-welI, tha! should, 1 th!nk, cause - ' even the most mgenuous to Sit up and .thmk.· Does Mr. Graham look like a secret agent? 1 cau only say that 1 am sorry that the absence of television cameras prevented the public from forming its own conclusion on this important point. At any rate, Mr. Graham is used to this kind of tlling. Council members will reca11 that when he was in Indone$ia he wa.l;\ always caIled by the Soviet Union the secret agent of wau Streeta slight difference. Now he is the secret agent of the Pentagon. But that did not prevent the secret agent of Wall Street from ultimately achievin&, in Indonesia a solution of a very difficult dispute, which riow, 1 think, even the representative of the Soviet Union would admit was both statesmanlike and in accordance with United Nations principles. That is what the secret agent of Wall Street did iri Ind,onesia. 101. But r should like, in aIl seriousness, to say that we really must, if Wf:; are ever ta achieve anything, try to raise at least some of our debates above the level of the Iow-lying poisonolls mists of suspicion that so often seem ta prevent us from finding the right way. Surely '~ile Kashmir dispute is capable of bei1.1g considered with some degree of objectivity, and surely the dictates of reason, if they are firmly and consistently fostered by this Council, will, one day, succeed in enabHng the two great nations involvedto agree on a settlement w}11ch will be satisfactory ta both and which will, or wruch may, relieve even the Soviet Union of the nightmares which now seem ta surround its contemplati.on of th.is long-standing dispute. 102. In any case, the concrete matter now before usis the report of the United Nations Representative. Vve have heard the explanation of this important document which has bee.'1 given to usby Mr. Graha..-n, anô we have listened to the powerful and eloquent words in ,;vhich he solemnly urged üE aIl te give it the attention which it undoubtedly deserves. 103. May 1 suggest that we aU need rathermore time to consider the report in aIl its aspects, and that vIe should, therefore, now adjourt1, leaving it to the President .to summon us again when he thinks that this would be in the general interest. 104. Mr.MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated trom Russian); 1 have just a few words to sayon the observations of the United Kingdom representative. He did not refute a single one of the facts adduced by the USSR representative. Sir Gladwyn Jebh's laboured imaginings abQut the Penguin Empire are the strongest evidence that the facts cited cannot be

There are no more speakers on my list. 107. 1 am sure 1 am ex.pressing the sentiments of the whole Council when 1 thank the United Nations Representative for India a~d Pakistan for his assiduous efforts to settle a difficult question. 108. In his second report Mr. Graham has given us some further information on various aspects of the problem. This, 1 think, he has done without passion of any kind, and 1 have not heard any complaint from the parties ta the dispute that he has ex.erted any pressure on them or has in any way exceeded his duty. 109. 1 am sure that the members of the Council will wish ta study this report close1y in the light of the ex.planation which our representative in the .subcontinent has given us and of aIl that has been said today. 110. Unless anyone wishes ta say anything more, 1 propose ta declare the meeting closed, and will convene .it again at the direction of l"nembers of the Security Council when they are ready to make fresh comments -or ta present propc::,als. Tite meeting rose at 1.15 p.nt. SALES AGENTS FOR UNITED DEPOSITAIRES DES PUBI.ICATIONS FINLAND - FINLANDE Ak~ttemlnen Klrlakauppa, katu, Helsinki. FRANCE Editions A. Pedoncr.. Paris V. GREECE - GRECE "Eleftheroudakls," nale, Place de la GliATEMALA Goubaud & Cia. num. 20. :1: do Plso" HAITI Max Bouchereau,' velle." BoUe JlO$\ale Prince. HONDURAS llbrerra Panamerleallll" Fuente, Tegucigalpa. ICELAND - ISLANDE Bokaverzlun Slgfu$lr AusturstreU lB, INDIA":'INDE Oxford Book lit StaUonery House, New Delhi. INDONESIA -INDONESIE Jajasan Pembangunan. 84, Dlakarta. IRAQ-IRAK Mackenzle's BooksllOP, Statloners, Baghdad. IRAN Ketab·Khanel\ Avenue, Teheran. IRELAND - IRLANDE HlbernIan General cial Buildings, Dame ISRA!':L lllO Blumst~ln, P.O.B. 35 Allenby Raad, ITALY - ITALIE Colibri S.A., Via LEBANON - LIBAN Librairie universelle, LIBERIA J. Momolu Kamara, Streets, Monrovia. LUXEMBOURG librairie J. Schummer, Luxembourg. MEXICO - M~IQUE Editorial Hermes, cal 41, Mexico, NëTHERLANDS - N.V. Martlnus NlJholf. 9, 's-Gravenhage_ NEW ZEALAND- NOUVELLE·ZELANDE United Nations Association land, G.P.0. 1011, NICARAGUA Dr. Ramiro Ramlrez Pùbllcaciones, Managua, ARGENTINA - ARGENTINE Edltorl~1 Sud~merlc~na S.A., CAli. Alslna SOO, Buenos Aires. "USTRALIA - AUSTRALIE h. A. Goddard (Pty.l, Ltd., 2SSA GIlOI'llt Street, Sydney, N.S.W. BEL'~IUM -BELGIQUE Agence et MesRgerles de la Presse S.A..,. 14·22 n,e du Persil, Bruxelles. W. H. Smltl\ & Son 71-75 Boulev~rd Adolphe·Ma~ Bruxelles. BOLIVIA - BOLIVIE llbrerra Cllll1tffica y Llterarla, Avenlcla 16 de Julio 216, C4slll... 972, La Paz BRAZIL - BRESIL Llvrarla Agir•• Ru~ Mexico 98·B, CAIxa Post~1 3291, Rio de Janeiro. CANAOA - CANADA The Ryerson Press, Z99 Queen Streèt West, Toronto. CEYLON - CEYLAN The Assoclated Newspapers of Ceylan. ltd., Lake House, Colombo. CHILE - CHILI lIbrerralvens, CAlle Moneda 822, Santl~go. CHINA - CHINE The Ccmmerelal Press, ltd., 211 Honan Raad, Shanghai. COLOMBIA - COLOMBIE llbrerra Latina ltda., Apartado Mreo 4011, Bogoti. COSTA RICA - COSTA·RICA TreJos Hermanos, Apartado 131.3, San Jos~. CUBA la casa Belga, RenE de Smedt, O'Rellly 455, La Habana. CZECHOSLO\'4KIA - TCHECOSLOVAQUIE ëeskoslovensteY SplsoYatel Narodnf l'Ffda 9, Praha 1. DENMAliK - DANEMARK Einar Munksgaard, N_rregade 6, K_benhavn. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC- REPUBLIQUE DOMINICAINE Librerra Domlnicana, Calle Mercedes No. 49, Apartado 656, CIudad TroJlllo. ECUADOR,..... Efl'UATEUR Muiioz Hermano.' y Cla., Plaza dei Teatro, Quito. EGYPT- EGYPTE· libraIrie "la Renaissance d'Egypte," 9 SH. Adly Pasha, calro. EL SALVADOR - SALVADOR Manuel Navas y Cla. "la Casa dei libro Barato" la Avenida sur num. 37, San Salvador. ETHIOPfA - ETHlllPIE Agence Ethloplellne de PcblleltE, Box 8, Addis-Abeba. Vnl;~<1 Nations publications con lurl1ler be obtalned Irom ;,~.J 10110wlng booksel1ers: l~ERMANY- ALLEMAGNE AUSTRIA - AUTRICHE Euchhandlung Elwert & Meurp.r, Haupt-' B. Wüllerstorff, strasse, lOI, Berlin-Schôneberg. Salzburg. W. E. Saarbach, Frankenslrasse, 14, Kôln·Junkersdorf. JAPAN - JAPON ~Iexander Horn, Splegelgasse, 9, Maruzen Co., Ltd., Wlesbaderr. Nihonbashi, Tokyo Orders and inquÎries from countries where sales agents have not yet been appointed may be sent to: Sales and Crrculation Section, United N'ltlons, New York, U.S.A.; or Sales SectiCln, United Nations Office. Polais des Nations, Geneva, :Swifzerland. Priee: 25 (or equivalent in Printed ln Canada