S/PV.574 Security Council

At the outset, on behalf of the Security Council I &o.uld like to thank our friend ancl ---. 1. Le PRESIDENT (TV&& de Z’a+zgZais) : Je tiens, d&s l’oqverture de la prbente skance, a remercier, au ing of the Council, we nevertheless know that this did not: relieve Mr. van Balluseck of the cares of his office and of the necessity for exercising vigilance over the various matters of which the Security Council is seized. For his readiness always to give us advice in informal ckxssions and For his ability and care, we thank him. Iuauguration of the Security Council Chamber “a 2. The PRESIDENT: Before we address ourselves to the business of the day, I should like, if my COIleagues would permit me, to pause for a moment and take note of our new surroundings. As this is the first meeting of the Security Council to be held in this hall, it is proper that we should tilarlc the event in a manner befitting the occasion. The Security Council is not the first principal organ of the United Nations to hold its sessions in its new home. That privilege belonged to the Trusteeship Council. For that reason, some little envy on our part would perhaps be pardonable. But we can have no hesitation in following the example of the Trusteeship Council in rendering our tribute of appreciation and admiration to all those who by their skill, their artistry and their. generosity have helped to initiate architecturally a new epoch in the history of the United Nations. 3. Personally, I feel proud that fortune should have fortuitously, it seems, chosen a representative of my dear country to preside at the first meeting of the Security Council in this hall. But I also feel not a little embarrassed when I realize, as I do, that ten other members of the Council would have adorned this occasion much more than I can. The scroll, which should bear the names of all those, both high and humble, who have by their joint effort built for us a beautiful place in which to serve and work for the highest interests of peace and security in the world, would be very long indeed. It would have on it the names of our distinguished Secretary-General and his energetic staff who have laboured unceasingly to provide the United Nations with a permanent local habitation. But it would also have many other names of persons, nations, countries and governments whose faith in the United Nations urged them to help in varied ways to rear this noble edifice. them all, I refrain at this moment from naming since the formal inauguration of the new United Nations I-Ieadquarters has, I understand, been planned for a later occasion. But the Council, I all1 sure, will agree with me if on this occasion we allow ourselves one exception and mention in honourable and grateful terms the name of Mr. Arnstein Arneberg of Norway, ~110 designed this chamber and whose, Governnleiit made a munificent contribution for the decoration of this room. 4. With the permission of the Council, I \vould, therefore, invite the representative of Norway to the rouncil table in order that we should tell ,hjm and his Inauguration de la salle du Conseil 2. Le PRESIDENT (trnduit de I’nnglnis) : Avant de passer B l’examen de l’ordre du jour, je voudrais, si les membres du Conseil le veulent bien, appeler l’attention sur le cadre nouveau oil vont se derouler nos activitCs. C’est la premikre Fois que le Conseil “cle &cm-it& se &unit dans cette salle, et il convient d’en prendre solennellement acte. Le Conseil de sCcuritC n’est pas le premier, parmi les organes principaux des Nations Unies, i se rCunir clans sa nouvelle salle. Ce privil&ge est revenu au Conseil cle tutelle ; clu’on nous pardonne de lui envier un peu cet honneur* Mais nom suivrons sans la moindre hCsitation rexemple du Conseil de tutelle: comme lui, nous sommes heureux d’exprimer notre gratitude et ndtre admiration Q tous ceux qui, par leur talent, leur art et leur gCnCrositC, ant contribu6 & ouvrir une nouvelle 6re arcbitecturale dans l’histoire cle I’Organisation des Nations Unies. 3. Je suis personnellement tr&s fier que le sort ait dCsignC un reprt%entant de mon pays pour prCsider la premi&re sCance que Ie Conseil de sCcuritC tient dans cette enceinte. Mais je me rends compte Cgalemnt, non saris confusion, que mes dix coll6gues auraient Ctk bien plus dignes, que je ne le suis d’occuper le faded prCsidentie1 en cette circonstance. La liste de tous ceux, petits et grancls, qui ,ont r&iii leurs efforts pour Cdifier cette enceinte magnifique clans laquelle hous travaillerons en faveur de la paix et de la s&rite du monde, serait en v&it& une liste bien longue. En t&e viendrait le nom de notre Cminent Secretaire gCnCra1 et de ses collaborateurs, qui n’ont nCgligC aucun effort pour dormer a l’0rganisation des Nations, Unies un sihge permanent g New-York. Mais cette liste comprenclrait encore bien d’autres noms, ceux des particuliers, ceux cles pays et ceux des gouvernements que leur foi dans les Nations Unies a poussCs d contribuer par divers moyens a 1’Crection de ce noble Cdifice. Je ne veux pas procider maintenant & une 6numCration compl&te, puisque l’inauguration officielle du nouveau siPge de l’organisation cles Nations Unies est prkvue, je crois, pour une date ultCrieure. Mais je suis siir que le Conseil me permettra de faire aujourd’hui une exception et de mentionner en termes Clogieux et reconnaissants le nom de M. Arnstein Arneberg, de Norvkge, qui a dtabli les plans de cette salle & la d&oration de laquelle le Gouvernement norvCgien a si gCnCreusement particip&. 4. Je voudrais done, avec Ia~~~~rmission du Conseil, inviter le rep&s&ant de la ?L\Torv&ge d prendre place d la table du Conseil afin de<‘.1 ’ , Ll. aprimer, ainsi qu’& SOL At the iwvitatiolz of the President, Mv. Arne SujZde, repres~ntahh of Norway, took a place at the Council table. 5, The l?R.E3DENT: The Security Council, since its birth in 1946, has journeyed a great deal and pitched its fants in many places. Those who are not novices, as I am, mill recall with a kind of feeling not difficult I’ to guess, the first meeting of the Security Council on 17 January 1946 in Church House, Dean’s Yard, LOnclon, where it availed itself of the hospitality of the Unitecl Kingdom. Between the end of March and the beginning of July 1946, the Security Councif had its abode in Hunter College, New York, and from 10 July to 7 August 1946, in the Henry Hudson Hotel situated on West 57th Street in New York. Then came Lake Success ancl Flushing Meaclow, places that all of tls remember, I am sure, with affection ancl nostalgia. Nor must I o’mit to mention the beautiful city of Paris, where on two occasions the Security Council, along with the General Assembly, was received by the people ancl the Government of France with their traditional graciousness. 6. These wanderings ‘are now over, or at least the Security Council has a permanent home from which to venture forth should duty call. Seated at last as we WC ia this dig& :d and impressive room, I think we may, in this moclent of some historical significance, congratulate the Government and the people of Norway ancl that distinguished son of Norway, Mr. Arnstein Arneberg, who designed this chamber and the best clualities of whose mind are reflectecl around us. Norway itself was a distinguished member of this Council during the years 1949 ancl 1950 and, through its wise and highly respected Ambassador Sunde ancl his assistants, served the cause of international peace with clevotion and distinction. 7. It has been my great privilege to open the first nleeting of the Security Council in this chamber, with a consciousness that some of our inspiratioa will have its origin in the artists and craftsmen of Norway who were in their turn inspired by their belief in the noble spirit in which the Charter of the United Nations was conceived and inscribecl. I am sure I but put in inadequate words the feelings of the Council in offering our sincerest thanks to the Government of Norway ancl to the great and high-minded people of that beautiful land. Here we shall henceforth pursue. the work which a war-weary ancl peace-hungry world, nervous yet hopeful, expects of us. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights states in its preamble that: If . . . it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to haverecourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights sl~oulcl be protected by the rule of law”. It goes on to say that “it is essential to prolllote the development of friendly relations between nations”. On this, our first clay in this chamber, we would do well humbly to dedicate ourselves afresh to the noble p&p.ose that is expressed in these words. and I._ SW l%avifatbn du Prksident, M. Arm Swde, rq'wdsmhwt de Ia NomQe, #rend place & la table du C01asci1. 5. Le PRESIDENT (k&tit de I’nnglais) : Depuis sa crkation en 1946, le Conseil de sCcuritC a beaucoup voyagk et a plantC sa tente sous bien des cieux. Ceux qui, il ma cliffkence, participent depuis longtenips & ses travaus se souviendront, avec me Pmotion facile j imaginer, cle la premik-e sPance que le Conseil de s&zuritC, b&iCficiant de l’hospitalitd clu Royaume-Uni, a tenue le 17 janvier 1946 & Church House, Dean’s Yard, B Lo&-es. De la fin de mars au clkbut de juillet 1946, le Conseil de s&uritk a si&gC au E-Iuiter College, ?I New- York, et du 10 juillet au 7 aoilt 1946, au Henyy H~~cIson Hot+,, .57?me rue Guest, 2t New-York. 11 s’est ensuite rdunl a Lake Success et B Flushing Meadow dont nous gal-dons tous, j’en suis stir, un souvenir quelque peu nostalgique. Je me garderais ,bien d’oublier Paris, cette ville magnifique oil, par deux fois, le Conseil cle sPcuritC, en m&me temps que l’AssemblCe gCnCrale, a joui de la traclitionnelle hospitalitC du peuple et du Gauvernement frarqais. 6. Nos 1kCgrinations sent maintenant terminkes ; du mains le Conseil de sCcuritC a-t-i1 maintenant un siPge permanent qu’il ne quitters que si l’exercice de ses fonctions l’appelle en d’autres lieux. Alors clue nous nous installons enfin clans cette salle imposante, il convient, je pense, clue nous fklicitions, en ce moment historique, le Gouvernenieiit et le peuple norvCgiens, ainsi que M. hrnstcin Arneberg, I’Pminent architecte norvCgien qui a conqu cette salle d’une mn&re qui reflite toute I’Clkvatinn cle sa pen&e. La Norvkge a CtC, en 1949 et en 19.50, un membre clistinguC du Conseil de sCcuritC ; par l’entremise de son &ninent ambassadeur, M. Sande, et de ses acljoints, elle a servi la cause de la paix internationale avec un ddvouement en tous points digne cl’doges. 7. C’est pour moi un grand honneur de prCsicler B l’ouverture de la premik-e sPance clue le Conseil de s&u-it6 tient dans cette salle. Je suis convaincu que l’rruvre cles artistes et des artisans de Norvige contribuera $ nous inspirer clans nos travaux, car ils ont iti: eux-m&les animk par leur foi dans le noble esprit qui a prCsid& j la conception et g la rklaction de la Charte cles Nations Unies. Je suis certain de parler au nom clu Conseil lorsque, de mani&re helas imparfaite, j’exprime notre profonde gratitude au Gouvernement de la Nordge et au gramI peuple si gCnCreux de ce magnifique pays. C’est dans cette salle que nous allons poursuivrc nos efforts en vue d’accomplir l’ceuvre clue le moncle attend de nous, un mode las cle la guerre, affamC de paix, inquiet et cependant plein cl’eqkance. La DCclaration universelle des droits de l’homme affirme dans son prCambule “qu’il est essentiel que les clroits de I’homme soient protCgCs par un rCgime de clroit pour clue l’homme me soit pas contraint, en suprtme recours, r3, la rCvolte centre la tyrannie et l’oppression” et “ql’il est essentiel sencourager le cl~veloppeii~ent de relations ,amicales entre nations”. 8. Mr, SUNDE (Norway} : May I, on behalf of my Government, express my sincere thanks to the President for his kind words about the contribution which my country has made to the decoration of this chamber. I shall be happy to convey the President’s expression of appreciation to my Government. p1-0~10m!e~ au sujet de la part clue 111011 l)ays a prise $ la decoration de la salle clu Ccmseil. Je serai heureux de &-ansmettre i 111011 g0:ouvernenient les remerciements que le PrCsident lui a &-es&. 9. Je tieus &-alement j dire clue le Gouvernenlent norvCgiei1 collsi&re comnte ml glYmC1 honneur cl’ayoir pu ccmtribuer g l’installation de la salle oh doit d&rmais si&ger ce Collseil qui joue ltli rale si iiminent Clal1.S les efforts que l’organisation des Nations Unies dCploie en faveur de la paix moncliale. Je puis donner au Conseil l’assurance qu’eu participant ;i I’amdnagen~cnt de cette salle, man pays s’est IaissC guicler par l’espir qu’il a de voir atteindre les nobles buts que vise le Conseil de sCcuritC. 9. Allow me to say also that the Norwegian Government feels deeply honoured by having been given the opportunity to assist in the setting up of the permanent meeting place for this august body, which plays such a vital part in the work of the United Nations to secure world peace. I can assure the Council that my country’s contribution is inspired by the hopes which it entertains towards the fulfilment of the high purposes of the Security Council, 10. M. AUSTIN (Et&s-Unis cl’Am&rique) (fr&z& de l’cwglnis) : Le moment oit le Pr&dent a ClCclar~ ouverte la pr&ente sCance a marcluC une nouvelle &ape dam l’bistoire de I’Organisation des Nations Unies. C’est la pren&e fois que le Conseil de sCcurit& SC r&unit au nouveau siige de l’Organisal?on. 10. Mr, AUSTIN (United States of America) : When the President rapped his gavel a moment ago calling this meeting to order, the United Nations passed a milestone. This is the first meeting of the Security Council in the new I-Ieadquarters of the United Nations. 11. What manner of stones, what manner of buildings are here? This international Secretariat, this Headquarters, this great assembly of nations, this grand council room, this rockbound Manhattan Island, dedicated as the permanent address and residence for the world organization is officially the “United Nations, New York”. 12. The hospitality of the United States of America totwrds all Members of the United Nations was expressed through the gift of these lands on Turtle Bay, on the East River bounded by First Avenue, and six lh~ks from 42nd to 48th Streets. 13. ‘President Truman expedited the financial means required for stones ancl buildings. The Government of the United States loaned, without interest, capital for construction - $65 million, 14. The governments of the State of New York and of the City of New York provided exemptions from taxation and donations of lands within and adjacent to the grand site, including waterfronts, easements and improvements. The vision of the officers and citizens of the City of New York in facilitating tunnels, subways, avenues and landscaping will be glorified in our treasured archives, 15. The prolonged emotional and critical disagreement and debate of United Nations Members concerning choice of the location of the site was providentially ended by the last-moment idea of Mr. John D. Rockefeller, Jr., and his proficient generosity in the gift of $S.S miltion. 11. Quelles sont ces pierres, clue1 est cet Cclifice? C’est clans ce cadre, sur cette ile rocheuse de Manhattan, clue le SecrCtariat international, qtie cette grande assemblCe des nations sent ventls installer leur si&e permanent, Cdifier cette salle grandiose pour y conduirc les travaux de notre Orgaiiisation, dent l’adresse est maintenant “Nations Unies, New-York”, 12. L’hospitalitC clue les Etats-‘Unis d’An$rique out offerte a tous les Etats Memhres des Nations Unies s’est manifestke par le don des terrains de Turtle Bay, compris entre 1’East River et Ia Premih-e avenue, et la 4Zhe et la 4She rue. 13. Le. prCsiclent Truman a hrit& l’ouverture rles crkdits nicessaires A l’achat des pierres et des installaths; le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis a p&e, saris inter& une somme de 65 millions de dollars pour la construction du siege de I’Organisation. 14. Les autoritCs de 1’Etat de New-York et rle la villc de New-Yol-lc out accorctC des exonirations d’itnpbt; elles ant fait don de terrains situ& B l’int&-ieur et aux envirm de l’emplacement principal, notamment de terrains sit&s au bord de la rivihe, et elle en a facilitk et am~lior~ l’acds. Les archives de 1’Organisation conserveront le tCnloignage cle l’aide que les alltor-t& et les citv=s de New-York ont apporthe en facifitant la mstmction de tunnelsZ de chemins de fer n-&ro- Plitains et d’avemes, ainsi que l’ambnagell~ellt du site. 15. L’initiative de M. John D. R.o&.feller, Jr,, qui, $ Ia den&-e minute, a fait si g&~Cl-euselnellt dot1 de ~~5OO~OOO dollars, a nzis fin au d&accord qui avait si hWYJs p=tagC les Membres de I’Organisa~ion, ell ce Cpi concerne le chcrjx du site. was co-ordinated with fast-operating leaders of though! including Secretary-General Trygve Lie and architec Wallace I.. Harrison. 17, The achievement of a unanimous design wa promptly agreed upon among eleven consultants. consider the act of the Board of Design Consultants tl be imperishable for its spirit of voluntary co-operation The men who agreed on the design were from Aus traIia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, France Sweden, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and Uruguay. The principal mem hers of the architecture and engineering staff arf Mr. Wallace K. I-Iarrison, Director of Planning Mr. Max Abramovitz, Deputy Director and Mr. Jame: A. Dawson, Co-ordinator of Construction. 17, Les onze architectes-conseils n’ont pas tardC g s’entendre SLIT un plan d’ensemble. La dCcision du Bureau des architectes-conseils restera un exemple eclatant de ce clue peut une coop&ration librement consentie. Les architectes qui se sont mis d’accord sur le projet venaient de l’Australie, de la Belgiyue, du BrCsil, clu Canada, de la Chine, de la France, du Royaume-Uni, de la S&de, de 1’Union des RCpubliques sacialistes sovi&iques et de I’Uruguay. Les principaux architectes et ing&lieurs Ptaient M. Wallace R. Harrison, directeur clu service des plans, M. Max Abramovitz, directeur acljoint, et M. James A. Dawson, coordonnnteur de 1’exCcution des plans. 18. It might be said that we are at the mid-point 0. the answer to the question: “What manner of stone: and what buildings are here ?” 18, Nous ne sommes pas loin maintenant de pquvoir rCpondre j la cluestion clue je posais tout a l’heure: ‘iQuelles sent ces pierres, quel est cet &difice?” 19. Le Secrktariat est installd & cBtC de nous, clans ce b&&lent qui surplombe celui O~I nous nous r&missons. Nos coll&gues cltt Conseil 6conomique et social et du Conseil de tutelle si6gent d&ji dans leurs salles respectives du bgtiment des confCrences ; c’est l?i qu’ils s’emploient 5 apporter, confor&ment B la Charte des Nations Unies, les an+liorations fondamentales dont la paix dCpenc1. Le bhtiment de 1’AssemblCe g&&ale est en vaie cl’ach&ement. 1’9. The Secretariat is established in the towering workroom adjacent to us, OLIN colleagues on the Economic and Social Council and the Trusteeshi Council are already in their respective chambers in the conference building, carrying on the work of improving those basic conditions of peace required by the Charter of the United Nations, The General Assembly building is proceeding toward completion. : , : . / 20. Nous sornmes reconnaissants & tous les hoinnies et & tous les pays qui ont contribuC Zt donncr g notre si&ge permanent sa beaud et sa grandeur. En ce qui concerne la saIle du Conseil de s&uritC, nous expri- ~nioiis notre gratitude toute particuliLe au Gouvernement et au peuple norvegiens que notre Cininent aini Monsieur l’Ambassadeur Suncle a reprCsent& ELI Znseil avec tant de comp&tence. C’est ; Is Norvige lue le Conseil est redevable de la conception et de .‘amCnageinent de cette salle. Les plans sont l’ceuvre :le l’&ninent architecte norvegien Arnstein Arne- Ierg ; une fresque de l’artiste norvCgien Per Krogh 3oit d&corer le mur qui se trouve derrikre le Pr&sident. 20. We are grateful to many men and many COUP tries for the beauty and sturdy grandeur of this new E~llcl permanent home, For the Security Council chamber, we are especially indebted to the Gavernmenl and the people of Norway, who have been so ably represented here by our esteemed friend, Ambassador Suncle. The magnificent design and the many appointments of this chamber are the gift of Norway. The clcsign is the work of the eminent Norwegian architect Arnstein Arneberg. A mural is to be painted on the wall behind the President by the Norwegian artist Per Krogh. t I I f ; '( 1 ( I ‘ c !l. Le marbre qui d&ore l’intkrieur de la salle vient je: Norv&ge, ainsi clue les portes et les balustrades ncrustCes d’argent. La tenture bleu et or qui recouvre es niui-s est Cgaleinent un don de la Norvhge. La :oopCration qui a perrnis d’Cdifier et de d&corer cette ,alle imposante constitue une des applications pratiques lu grand principe CnoncC clans le prCambule de la Zharte : “Unir nos forces pour rnaintenir la paix et la &uritC internationales”. 21. The interior marble comes from Norway; so do the doors and railings, inlaid with silver. The blue and gold fabric of the walls is the gift of Norway. The Inany contributions which have provided this inspiring structure symholize the grand resolve written into the preamble to the Charter : “ . . . to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security”. ; C f C ( S M. Sunds, rq’&sentant de la Nowdge, p&s Za able du Colw&l. Mr. Sunde, represent&ve of Norway, withchew k (rowa the Councz’l table. Adoption de I’ordre du jour Adoption of the agenda i t 12. Le PRESIDENT (0,ad&E de Z’a&ais) : L’adopion de l’o,rclre du jour so&ve-t-elle des objections? 22, The PRESIDENT: Is there any objection to the adoption of the agenda? 13. M. HOPPENOT (France) : La demande d’ins- ,ription d’une certaine question $ I’ordre du jour du Zonseil de s&u-it&, que vous avez introduite, Monsieur 23, Mr. I-IOPPENOT (France) (tratilaEed fron4 Fmch) : The of the Security request for Coulicil of .e the inclusion in the agenda a certain item submitted by C sibility has been dangled before US. We knew that it had been discussed by the councils which had assembled to decide on it ; and steps have been taken, most of them friendly and disinterested, to notify or forewarn this delegation and its Government. But we did not think that this undertaking would survive the eveuts which might have occasioned it, nor that-at the very moment when the responsible French and Tunisian authorities were again entering into negotiation and agreement, which we were assured the intercessory States wishect only to encouragethat, at that very moment, I say, the delegations of a number of African and Asian States would persist in their intention of opening in the Council a discussion which had become pointless. 24, The duty of the Security CounciI is not only to watch over the maintenance of peace but also to ensure, by its action, the ‘best conditions for promoting reconciliation and understanding among the peoples from which it receives its mandate. This duty obliges it, ancl obliges each of its members, to avoicl heedlessly laying hold of events which are themselves outside its purview and which external intervention is liable to inflate to a passionate intensity which they would never have acquired by themselves. I do not feel that these considerations have always been sufficiently appreciated by the inspirers and sponsors ‘of the procedure which has just been initiated. 25. On what is their action in fact originally based? It is based on a petition addressed to various United Nations bodies by members of the former Tunisian Government, a petition which, under the basic laws of the Regency, was completely invalid because of the absence of The beylical seal, and which was no less unacceptable under the very terms of the Charter. While this petition was, at that time, considered and treated in. that .light both by the Secretariat and by the then President of the Security Council, the increased efforts of its sponsors in the corridors of the General Rssembly found favour in the eyes of a number of delegstions, and the encouragement thus given to, the instigators of the dispute could not but stir up irresponsible passions and undermine the conciliatory efforts at appeasement which the French authorities, were making at that moment. If the representatives of the various Powers approached by the Tunisian emissaries had made it clear to thenz at the very beginning that their respective governments could not take cognizance of a matter which did not threaten their own security or peace in general, and which strictly speaking concerned only France and Tunisia, I have not the slightest doubt that the French and Tunisian authorities, thus freed from all outside intervention, would much more quicltly have found a common ground for legitimate and necessary agreements. But on the contrary, the willingness with which the most outrageous claims of persons without ally regular authority were heard and encouraged promoted tlmtlghout the territory of the Regency an 24. Le clevoir du Conseil de &curitC est, non seulement de veiller au maintien de la paix, mais de m&lager, par son action, les meilleures conditions de rapprochement et d’entente entre les peuples dent il tient sa mission, Ce clevoir lui impose, et impose 6 chacun de ses membres, d’kviter de se saisir & la l&g&e d)&knements, &rangers en eux-m&es & sa compktence, et auxquels la seule CventualitC d’une intervention extkieure risque d’insuffler une virulence qu’ils n’auraient jamais acquise par eux-m&mes+ Je n’ai pas l’impression que ces considkrations aient toujours &tC suffisamment prkentes g l’esprit, et des inspirateurs, et des auteurs de la pro&Lure ‘qui vient d’&tre engagCe devant nous. 25. A l’origine de leurs d&arches, que trouvonsnous en effet? Nous y trouvons une requZte adresske & diverses instances de I’Organisation des Nations Unies par des membres de l’ancien Gouvernement tunisien, requite qu’au regkd des lois fondamentales de la RCgence, I’absence du sceau beylical privait de tout caract&-e de validitk, et qui n’etait pas mains irrecevable maux termes m&mes de la Charte. Si cette requite fut bien, j cette kpoque, considCrCe et trait&e comme telle, aussi ‘bien par le SecrCtariat que par le P#rt%ident en exercice du Conseil de sCcuritC, les dCmarches sque ses auteurs multiplikent dans les couloirs de 1’AssemblCe rencontrkent, aup& d’un certain nombre de cEl6gations , une audience favorable, et les encourageiiients ainsi don&s & ceux qui avaient cl4 clench6 le conflit ne pouvaient qu’attiser les passions irresponsables et contrecarrer l’ceuvre de conciliation et d’apaisement que les autoritb franqaises s’efforqaient, au m&me moment, d’entreprendre. Si les rep& sentants des cliverses Puissances approchks par les Cmissaires tunisiens avaient, db le dCbut, marquC & leurs interlocuteurs que letuk gouvernements respectifs’ n’avaient pas a connaitre d’une affaire qui ne menat;ait ni leur &cm-it& propre, iii la paix g&kale, et ne concernait striotement que la France et la Tunisie, je n’ai pas le moindre doute que, sur un terrain ainsi d&gag& de toute intervention extkrieure, les autoritks franqaises et tunisiennes n’auraient bien plus rapidement jet6 entre elles les bases des accords Egitimes et nkessaires. Au contraire, la complaisance avec latyr!elle ont et& CCIDU- 26. I sincerely believed that, in view of the new turn which these same events had been taking for some days, I would no longer have to submit to the President these considerations which developments in the Regency some weeks ago had inspired. We were prepared to maintain in the Council that the petition, which we heard would be brought before it by the Pakistan delegation, was unacceptable, that it should not be included in the agenda and that ‘the Council was not competent to deal with it. We were prepared to show the Council that it was not concerned with a France-Tunisian ,disagreement. But, f;ollowing the official proclamation of the Bey to his people solemnly ratifying his agreement with the French Government, we did not think that any further attempt would be made to, bring before the Council a disagreement which no longer existed. / 27. That, however, is the somewhat astonishing situation with which my delegation and, I may well say, the Security Council are today confronted. Even a few weeks ago it was possible to speak, strictly on the basis of facts, of a domestic dispute, not between France and Tunisia, but between the Residency General, in which French responsibilities regarding the Regency are vested, ,and some ministers discredited because of their administrative inefficiency and disqualifiecl because they had tacitly aided and abetted persons organizing and perpetrating sabptage, attacks and murders which were creating a serious state af disorder and unrest throughout the territory. It was even possible to place a certain intel*pretation on the Bey’s prolonged silence, which he was himself solemnly to cleny later. I dso not say that, viewed in this light, the situation would have entitled the fifteen States -of which only eleven or twelve no,w remainto bring the matter before the Security Council through the Pakistan delegation. I merely point out that the shadow of substance which the situation at that time might have lent Pakistan’s action has now disappeared; and with it have vanished the legal arguments invoked to justify that action by feference to the provisions of the Charter. An) discussion 011 including the item in the agenda o’r on the Council’s competence is now completely out-of-date ; or rather, it has become pointless. Where there is no substance $o,r discussion, there can be no item for the agenda. The Security council no longer has to consider whether it should or should not take up what was submitted to it as a dispute or as a situation within its competence; it can only note that, as a result of the agreement arrived at between the Bey and the Resident General, any situation and any dispute that may have existed, however narrow or broad the meani+igs given to these words, has been settled and has disappeared, and that there are therefore no grounds for placing ‘on its agenda a question which no longer exists. 26. Ces rkflexions que m’inspirait, il y a quelques semaines, le dbroulement des &+nements dans la R& gence, je croyais fermement, Monsieur le P&&lent, clevant le tours nouveau pris depuis quelques jours par ces m&es CvCnements, que je n’aurais plus B vow les soumettre. Nous nous Ctions prkparb ri soutenir devant le Conseil l’irrecevabilit4 de la requete, dont il 110US &sit annon& que votre clClCgation se prCparait g le saisir, l’inopportunid de l’inscrire B notre ordre du jour, I’inoompCtence du Conseil g la traiter. Nous n.ous disposions g remontrer au Conseil qu’il n’avait pas $ s’occuper d’un d&accord franco-tunisien. Mais, depuis la proclamation officielle adressCe par le Bey g son peuple, entCrinant solennellement l’accord intervenu entre lui et le Gouvernement franfais, nom ne pensions pas qu’une tentative serait encore faite pour porter devant le Conseil un d&accord qui n’existait plus. 27. Telle est cependant la position assez Ctonnante devant laquelle ma dClCgation et, je puis bien le dire, le Conseil de s&u-it& se trouvent aujourd’hui placCs. On pouvait, il y a quelques semaines encore, parler, en se plaqant dans le domaine strict des faits, d’un diff&end d’ordre intCrieur, non point entre la France et la Tunisie, mais entre la RCsidence g&.&ale, dCpositaire des responsabilitCs franqaises dans la Rkgence, et des ministres, cliscrkditCs par leur inertie administrative, clisqualifiCs par leur complicitC tacite avec les organisateurs et les auteurs des sabotages, des attentats et des meurtres qui crCaient sur tout le territoire un Ctat grave de cl&ordre et d’ins5curitC ; on pouvait m&ne arguer du silence prolong& du Bey,, en lui donnant une interpr&ation qu’il devait X-m&me, dans la suite, solennellement dCmentir. Je ne dis pas que la situation ainsi co,nsidCrCe aurait justif% la prCtention cles quinze Et&s-qui ne sont plus aujourd’hui que onze ou douze - d’en saisir le Cmonseil de s&rite par I’intermCdiaire de la dC1Cgation pakistanaise : je me borne B faire remarquer simplement que cette ombre de substance que 1’Ctat de chases alors existant pouvait pr;ter a la dCmarche du Pakistan s’est aujourd’hui Cvanouie et, avec elle, les arguments juridiques appelCs d la justifier au nom des dispositions de la Charte. Les debats sur l’inscription ou sur la compCtence sont aujourd’hui entiQement dCpassks ou, plutAt, sent devenus sans objet, L$ oti il n’y a pas mati&e, il ne peut pas y avoir lieu d inscription. Le Conseil de &uritC n’a plus A examiner s’il doit ou non se ssisir de ce qui lui Ctait prCsentC comae un differend ou une situation ressortissant ; sa compCtence; il ne peut clue se borner B constater qu’A la suite de l’accord intervenu entre le Bey et le RZsident gCnCra1, toute situation et tout diff& rend, quels clue soient les sens restreints ou Ctendus que l’on puisse donner d ces mots, se sent r&orb& et ont disparu et qu’il n’a pas, en cons&quence, d se saisir de ce qui n’existe plus. Unies et ren&l un homlllagc si lllckit6 i tOUS CfWX qlli ant ct& jes artisans de cette mm-e mag&lue, 29, Je sais bien, pour l’avoir h1 ChllS k?S diffire1lteS 29. 1 ,,.ell ~~~~~~~~ since I have read it in the various lettres des &&gatiolls req&rallf;eS, Cllli 1lOUS 0llt h! letters sut)ttlitterI to US by the petitioning delegations [S/2.574 - L F;/2ja4], that reference has been arfd will lE macje to pressure alleged to have been exercised on tl,c ney, 1 do llot know the sources from which the nuthors of these documents obtain their information’ ,>r on rvtrat verified facts they base themselves in making such an assertion, which is as damaging to the ~~~~~~~~~ representatives in Tunisia as it is to the Person ,.,f a sovereign who is today being accused, by the same voices which yesterday praised him as the embodiment c,f Tunisian patriotism, of sacrificing the interests of his country under a pressure of which there is no evideuce. The truth is that for the first time since the arrival of the new Resident General in Tunis, it has been possible for him to enter into talks with the Bey in complete freedom, without the interference of the very persons whose behaviour and derelictions were at issue, and whom it was as embarrassing for the sovereign to disavow as it would have been for the Resident General to expose while they were present. The d&ion concerning them taken by Mr. de Haute- CIWC~UC was therefore based primarily on the need to ensure, in his conversations with the Bey, an atmosphere free of constraint in which he could express his view and be heard away from the presence of our enemies. The Resident General’s decision, based on this legitimate consideration, was further justified in his eyes, as in the eyes of the French Government., by the kt that men who had for several months f&d in their official duties by paralysing the entire administrative machine through their inefficiency and hy tacitly, if not ope~~ly, encouraging every kind of breach of the peace or oi public security, could no longer be allowed to exercise power. The first duty of a government, whatever it may be and whatever the circumstances, is to cn~uf’e the reign of order and respect of the law and, if it refrains not only from suppressing but even from (lisowuitig those who disrupt order by breal&g the l;l\~, it loses both its legitimacy alid its legality in the eyes Of all. This intolerable situation could continue no kWSr’ and the French Government, by authorizing the commulliqL~&s [J’/2~7~-S/2.%‘~], qu’il a 636, (]u’i! sera fait &at c-une pr&-yldtle pression escrck 5111’ le Bey. Je ne s& d’,$ les sigllataircs de C&i dOCltIll~lltS ~kel~t leurs informations, sur quels faits vfkifi&s ils s’appuient pour avancer une telle affirmation, 4galt~~~el~t injurieuse pour 15 representatiotl frmc;aise CII Tunisie et pour la perso*ue l~&~e cl’un souverain, (1% ICS 1llOl~~~S voix qui louaient bier en lui l’incarnation du patriotisme tunisien accusent aujourd’hui d’avoir sacrifik les int&-t$ts de ~011 pays, SOLIS l’effet d’une colltr~~illte que rien n’autorise A sqqxlser. La v&ritC est clue, pour la premikre fois depuis I’arrivke du nouveau Resident gCnCra1 A Tunis, le dialogue a pu s’ouvrir en toute 1ibertC entre ce dernier et le Bcy, saris qu”interECrent entre les deux interlocuterrrs ces persurmalitks m&lies dont le comportement ou les dkfaillances itaient en cause et qu’il etait aussi embarrassant pour le SOllVCrain de dksavouer que delicat ~OLW Ic R.Csident gi?nkral de dCmasquer en leur prkence. La dkcision prise 6 leur kgard par M. de Hauteclocque s’inspirait done, en premier lieu, de la nPcessit4 de n&lager A ses entretiens avec le Bey une atmosphk-e libre de taute contrainte et dans laquellc il pGt s’cxprimer et Stre entendu, en dehors de la prkcnce de nos adversaires. InspirCe par ce souci lCr$time, la clkision du RCsidcnt g6nCral se justifiait en plus i ses yeus, ctmme 1 cetls du Gouvernement franqais, par l’impossibiIit& de laisser plus longemps en &.t d’exercer If: lmtvoir des hormnes yui avaient fm-fait depuis plusieurs mois aux choirs de km-s fonctions, en paraIysaut par Ietlr inertie le jeu de tous les organes administratifs et en encourageant tacitement, sinon ouverteniel& 1~s atteintes de tmte nature portkes A l’ordre et :L 1:~ &curitc’: l)ublics. La Prel++e tkhe d’un gouvernenlent, Clue1 qu’il soit et welles clue soient les circonstances, est de faire regner I’ordre dans le respect de ~a loi, et, s’ii s’abstient, non seulement de r&primer, mais n&e de d&avouer ceux qui troublent l’un en violalIt l’atltre, it perd j Ia fois, aux yeux de tous, sa l&gitimite et sa l&alit& Cette situation intokable ne pouvait se l)rololJger, et le Gouvernelnent franqais, en autorisant 1~ R&&lent gCnCra1 d Y mettre un terme, a pris la d<cisioIl clue lui imwsaient les resp+msabilitCs sup&ieures dent la France est hvestie dans la RCgence, d&&ion dent elle n’a A rendre compte A personne. 30. En ridit& si me pressiotl a ht& exey+e p,llr le B~YJ ce n’est Pas de de la menace QU de la force, lIlais --11 , 1 ,, ceile cle ia uemonstration qui lui Ctait faite de la bonne volontk de la Franc, de sou d&r constructif de conciliation et de sa sinc&W. Le plalz de riforlaes soumis A l’al)prohation du souverain est aujourd’hui connu de tous; on sait qu’il va au-devani de toutes les 14gitimes aspirations’ du nationalisme tunisien ; qu’il ne met en cause 16 la souverainetk du Bey, ni l’autonomie interne de son royaume ; qu’il prkvoit l’institution d’assemb16es lZ.Pside~~t ~~~eKil t0 put a stop to it, has takell the de,-iskitl %‘hich the hi$gher responsibilities ,hrne by France ill the R%Vcy demanded, a decision for which it is ~KCfJLUltabk to no One, 3o* ActL14, if an)’ pressure was brought to bear on thc 13eY, it Was not the pressure of threat Or force but that d&d from France’s display ,of its goodwill ‘cO1lstructivc tksire for COilCiIiatioll alld sinCeritya T& plaLl ‘If reforms submitted to the Sovereign for his approval is ‘?v rtfjw known to ali. It is also known that it goes IKy?“~ . ;$I1 the , Iegitimate aspirations of Tunisian *“““!lal’*lt~ ; that It brings neither the Bey’s sovereigl;ty *“” the illterd al~tOllOLlly of his kil~gdo~ll intO questictn ; that it provides for the establishment. of an As- 31. The calm which once again reigns in the country and the almost total failure of the political general strike which the extremists tried to start are suffkient proof’ that this appeal has been heard. Yet the letters addressed to the President of the Security Council, which have caused the Council to be convoked, contain not the slightest reference to the Sovereign’s appeal, to the response to it or to the agreement which preceded it. 32. Naturally, it wlould have been surprising had it been otherwise, It is easier to stop history at a certain point and to overlook new developments, which cannot be denied, when such developments remove every pretext and every ground for the step it has been decided to take. Thus, disregarding the presentin other words, shutting their eyes to the reality before themthe eleven or twelve States are going back more than seventy years in an effort to draw a picture of fihe past whic,h is as sketchy as it is inaccurate and tenclentious and which reduces this ‘document ho the status of a propaganda instrument. I do not intend to point out, one by one, the falsehood’s ‘or inaccuracies of these allegations, We are not met here to discuss the past but to draw the proper conclusions from present events. I may, however, be permitted tom hope, when I’see the word “atrocities” used to describe the Frtnch Army’s action in the explanatory note attached to this letter which the President addressed to, himself, that 33, What practical decisions are the letters and explanatory notes addressed to the President intended to achieve? It is difficult to pick them out of the hotchpotch of propaganda and historical untruths which litter them. Is it the release of the political leaders and agitators who have been temporarily removed from their homes? A public assurance has been given that this will be done as soon as possible after the new Goveroment is formed. former Govcrnmenf Is it the recall to power of the which was rather dubiously styled the “Popular Tunisian Government” ? I do not see how an international authority, or even a French one, could force a sovereign to recall ministers he had &&ssed for inefficiency or malfeasance. Is it the recognition of the Bey’s lawful rights and powers? They have just been solemnly reaffirmed. Is it the granting to the people of “their democratic right of self-government and self-determination” ? The French Government’s plan of reforms, as proposed to the Bey and approved by him, provides for that in a manner and to an extent which, I think, should meet the wishes of those peoples which ‘(believe in the principles of liberty and democracy” and invoke them in behalf of their Tunisian brothers, even as the civilizing lvork accomplished by France in Tunisia during the past seventy years would perhaps make them envious if they knew more about it. Lastly, if the ‘Lsuitable action”, so carefully left vague, which the complaining States demand, is designed to “open the bvay to better understanding between the Tunisian and French peoples”, I .should like to say that there, too, the agreement reached a few days ago between the Resident Gem-al and the Bey is the best proof of the mutual LlnderShnditlg which already exists. It i’s not by a~- Cusing France of all kinds of misdeeds and even crimes, in an explanatory note containing gratuitqus 33. A quelles dCcisions pratiques tendent, en effet, Monsieur le PrCsident, les lettres et notes explicatives qui VOLIS ont &ttk adressCes? 11 est difficile de le dtgager de ce fatras de propagande et de contrevCrit&s historiques qui les encombre. Est-ce a la 1ibCration despersonnalit& politiques et des agitateurs, provisoirement CloignCs de leur rksidence 7 L’engagement a it& pris publiquement d’y procCder ,dans les moindres dClais, aprb l’installation du nouveau gouvernement Est-ce au rappel au pouvoir de l’ancien gouvernement assez 6quivoquement qualifiC de tunisien” ? “Gouvernenient populaire Je ne vois pas comment une instance internationale, ni m&me francaise, pourrait prktendre imposer B un souverain le rawel de ministres congCdi6 par lui pour incapacitC OLI pour malfaisance. Est-ce i la reconnaissance des droits et pouvoirs 16gitimes du Bey ? Elle vient g nouveau d’2tre solennellement confirmee. Est-ce B l’octroi au peuple tunisien ‘(de son droit dCmocratique de s’administrer lui-m&me et de disposer de lui-mkne”? Le plan de rCformes du Gouvernement franqais, tel qu’il a CtC proposC au Bey et approuve par lui, en prCvoit la realisation dans des termes et avec une ampleur qui me par& rCpondre aux prCoccupations de ces peuples “qui croient aux principes de la 1ibertC et de la dCmocratie” et qui les invoquent en faveur de leurs frhres tunisiens, de m&me que leer ferait peut-Ctre envie, s’ils la coniiaissaient mieux, l’ceuvre civilisatrice accomplie en Soixante-clix ans par la France en Tunisie. Si c’est enfin (‘A contribuer j rendre possible une meilleure ConlprCllension mitre le peuple tunisien et le peuple franqais” que tendent les “mesures appropriCes”, et soigneusement 1aissCes dans le vague, rklamkes par les Etats requkrants, je me permettrai de dire que, l& aussi, l’accord r&alisC il y a quelques jours entre le Residellt g&&al et le Bey est la nleilleure manifestation d’une co.nyr&ension mu- 34. To sum up, the French delegation does not propose that t,he Security Council should declare that the question of .Franco-Tunisian relations is nut within its competence, or that it should refuse to include the problem in its agenda; we have gone beyond these legal points today. What it asks is &at the Council, confining itself to the facts, should note that the agreement reached between the French Government and the Bey, and solemnly proclaimed by the latter, has put the problem on the road to ,solutian, has ended this question and removed anything which, even by the broadest interpretation that might be given to the terms of the Charter, coulcl be found to. be a “situation” or a “dispute” ; and that the Council need not therefore include in its agenda a question and a problem which no longer exists. The only thing which conk1 reopen the matter would be a decision by the Council implying that the question and the problem still exist and that, in spite’ of the agreement reached between t’he two parties, there is still a dispute between them likely to threaten international peace and security. Such a repudiatian, not only of the facts but of the solemn declarations of the highest French and Tunisian authorities, might have such serious consequences in Tunisia and neighbouring countries, and would so dangerously shake the prestige of the United Nations and the trust placed in its objectivity, that I refuse to, contemplate the possibility that the Council would take the responsibility far it. 35. The PRESIDENT: Before I call upon the next speaker inscribecl on my list, I should like to address a question to the representative of France from the Chair. The last part of his speech, as it came through to me in the interpretation, was not entirely clear. I dicl not know whether there was a proposal in that part of the speech that the adoption of the agenda was unnecessary, or if there was any ,other proposal. The representative of France will appreciate that I am asking this question in order that any proposal made by him, if it has been made, shoulcl not escape the notice of the Chair. 34. Mr. I~IOPPENOT (France) (t~a~&~fea! j~onz Frepzclz): The conclusion to be drawn from my statement - and I must apologize for my inexperience of the Security Council’s procedure if I dkl not make it sufficiently clear - is that France will vote against the inclusion of the Tunisian question in the agenda, and hopes that most of the delegations present wilI follow suit. 37, The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of France for his explanation; I think it makes one part of his statement quite clear. However, I hope the representative of France will forgive me if I press him again ai to w,hether there wa3 a proposal that the adoption of the agenda was unnecessary. This would not be incompatil$e with what he has said just now. Therefore, it is also possible, in spite of his last intervention, that there may still be a proposal he wishes to make. 34. En r~sutn~, ce que la dClCgation fraqaise propose au Conseil de sCcurit~, ce n’est pas de cKclarer que la question des rapports franc+tunisiens est &rang&e & sa comp&tence; ce n’est pas de se refuser B inscrire ce probl&me a son ordre du jour : ces points de droit sont auj ourd’hui cl6pasds. Ce qu’elle lui cleinande, c’egt de constater, en s’en tenant aux faits, que l’accord intervenu entre le Gouvernement franfais et le Bey, et solennellen~ent proclanG par ce dernier, a achemink ce problf!nie vers sa solution, a mis fin g cette question, a supprimC, quelle que soit l’Clasticit6 que l’on tente de donner aux termes de la Charte, toute “situation” et tout ‘~cliff&ei~d” et que le Conseil n’a, par cons&quent, pas A inscrire A son ordre du jour une question, un probl6me qui n’existent plus. Si quelque chose pouvait les faire renaitre, ce serait une d@cision clu Conseil impliquant qu’ils persistent et clue, nialgrf. l’accorcl &alis& entre les cleux parties, il subsiste entre elles WI cliff&end de nature 21, mettre en danger la paix et la s&n-it& g&&ales. Un tel d&nenti i&g&, non senlemerit aux faits, mais aux cleclarations solennelles des plus hautes autoritCs frangaises et tunisiennes, risquerait d’avoir des consCquences si graves en Tunisie et clans les pays voisins, elle Cbranferait si clangercusemerit Ie prestige des Nations Unies et le crCdit fait h leur objectivit& que je me refuse & envisager que notre Conseil puisse en prendre la responsabilitk. 35. Le PRESIDENT (t!n&it de I”nti&is) : Avant de donner la parole h l’orateur snivant, je voudrais, en ma qualit de PrCsident, Imser une question at1 repr& sentant de la France. L’interprCtation de la derni&e partie de son discours n’a pas dtk enti&enient Claire pour moi. Je ne sais done pas s’il a proposC de dCcIarer inutile l’acloption cle l’orclre clu jour, ou s’il pr& sente quelque autre proposition. Le repr&entant de la France con~prenclra que je lui pose cette question afin cl’Cviter qu’une proposition qu’il aurait pu prPsenter n’krhappe j I’attention de la prCsidence. 36. M. IZOPPENOT (France) : La conclusion qui se dkgageait pratiquement de man intervention - et je m’excuse cle nion inexpirience de la procCdure du Conseil de s&u& si je n’ai prqs rendu cette conclusion asset Claireest que la France votera centre l’inscription de l’affaire tunisienne g l’ordre du jour et qu’elle souhaite que le plus grand nombre de dklCga- Lions prCsentes au Conseil suive son exemple. 37. Le PRESIDENT (trudz& de Panghis) : Je remercie le rep&entant de la France de son explica- :ion, qui &&ire une partie de sa cl&laration. Toutefois, i’espkre que le reprbentant de la France me parclon- !lera si je lui demande de nouveau de prCciser s’il a ,r&sent& une proposition formelle tendant ?I d&arer nutile I’adoption de l’ordre clu jour. Une proposition le cette nature ne serait pas incompatible avec les ob- ;ervations. qu’il vient cle faire. 11 est possible pue, -l nCme apr&s sa der&re intervention, il soit toujours r %sireux de p&enter une proposition, / 42. My delegation does not consider it necessary - nor is it possible at this moment-to give its views sn the question whether the Council is or is not competent to intervene in the situation in Tunisia. N0r do we wish to revert to t’he actual facts of the situation, which have been presented in a different light by the eleven countries which signed the application to the Council and by the representative of France, in the statement he has just made. We must respect both versions, in view of their arigin and the responsibility and honesty of their authors. My delegation will therefore state its views on this question at the proper time when the question of competence is under consideration and we have f0rmed a final opinion on it, and when, in addition, after hearing the arguments statecl in the Council, we have been able to form a final opinion on the facts, 111 111~ view, only a debate in the Council will clarify the situation to the satisfaction of those delegations w&h harbour doubts on the question of competence 0r 0n the realities 0f the situation in Tunisia, 43. The Chilean delegation has further reasons, in addition to t’hat which I have just outlined, for voting in favour of the inclusion of this item in the agenda, Before I expl+ these reasons I must make it clear that this position in no way commits my Gvernment with regard to the substance of the question, o,r to t,he question of competence, should it arise in the C0uncil. 44. F must not overlook the fact that the Security Council ComPrisW a minority Of eleven Members 0f the United Nations ; a minority which, under Article 24 ,of the Charter, acts on behalf of aI1 Member States in 39. M. SANTA CRUZ (Chili) (tuaduit de l’espag1zol) : 0172X EtM Menibres de 1’Orgatlisation des Nations ‘Units -- I’:!fghanistnn, 1”Arbie saoudite, la Birmanie, l’I.<gyl>t(l, I’Tntle, l’Indon&ie, I’Irak, YIran le Pakistan, les Philil~l~ines et le Y&en - ant saisi 1; Conseil de &irit& de 1~ situ&ion qui &gne en Tunisie, en vertu du droit quc leur mnf6re l’hrticle 35 de la Charte. Ces onze pays 0nt, de plus, demand& au Conseil dlexaminer cl’urgence cette situation parce qu’ils estiment qu’elle menace la pais et la &curitC internationales et qu’elle relhve, de ce fait, des dispositions de 1’Article 34 de la Chartc. 40. Ccs 0nze Etats, xuxqnels se sont joints I’Ethiopie, le Liban, le Lib&a et la Syrie, ont clemandC 0fficiellemerit au Gouvernemcnt du Chili d’appuyer, en sa qualit& de membrc clu Conseil, l’inscription de cette question h I’ordre tlii jour clu Conseil. 41. On vient cl’Clever des objections centre l’inscription de la question h l’ardre clu jour en invoquant que les faits qui auraient 1x1 constituer un diErend entre la France et la Tuiiisie n’esistent plus, et, pour le clQnontrer, 0n naus a esp0sC I’Cvolution de ces faits au tours des cierni&es semaincs. 42. Ma cl&Zgation ne juge pas nCcessaire -et elle ne pourrait le faire en cc moment - cl’&mettre im avis sur la question de savoir si le Conseil est conipCtent ou non pour intervenir dans la situation clui existe en Tunisie. Elle ne d&sire pas non plus examiner les faits euxm&nies, qui ant Cti! l&sent& difff%emm.ent par les onze pays signataires de la reclaete soumise au Conseil et par le reprCsentnnt de la France dans l’exposk qdil vient de faire. Les cleux versions nous paraissent clignes clu plus glXllC1 intCrCt. par leur origine, Ctant ClonnC le sens de ia responsabilitC et le souci de la vCritC clue nous attribuans B leurs auteurs. Ma dClCgation exp0sera cl0nc ses vues h ce sujet en temps opportun, lorsque la question de In con~l~~tence sera posCe et qu’elle aura pu se f0rmer un jugement clCf?nitif sur cette question, de ni&iie clue suf tous les faits survenus, .en se fondant SLIT les arguments p&sent&s au Comeil. Je pense que set11 ~11 d&at at1 Conseil pourra Cclairer les dGgations qui ont des doutes sur la compbtence du Conseil ou SUT la situation qui existe rCellement en Tunisie. 43. Cette rais0n n’est pas la seule qui pousse ma d&Idgation B voter en faveur de l’iascription de cette question g l’orclre du jour. Avallt d’exlx)ser les autres raisons, je tiens B prCciser que l’attitude de ma dkl&ation sur ce point n’engage en rien Ia position de man gouvernement, ni quant au fond du probEme, ni quant i la question de compCtence, si celle-ci doit &tre soulevCe clev~nt le Conseil. 44. Now ne ~OUVOIIS oublier que le Conseil de s&rite est. compass d’une niin0ritC de cmze Membres de I’Organisation, mimritk qui agit, aux termes de 1’Article 24 de la Charte, au nom de tous les Etats Membres lorsqu’elle s’acquitte des devoirs qbe, 1 impose sa &he, B savoir Ia resp0n@$litC princl 4.5. Moreover, the number and importance of the countries which have brought this question to the Council’s attention carry much weight, These countries constitute a quarter of the membership of the United Nations and embrace a third of the population of the world. By their geographical situation, their size, their population and their cultural and spiritual heritage, by their conception of the world and of the relationships between peoples, they are playing and are bound to play a role of increasing importance in international affairs ; t,liey constitute a keystone in the edifice of peace and achievement of all the objectives of the San Francisco Charter - Nations, and therefore, in all the wqrlc of the United 4% In our view, these States and these peoples cannot be silenced when they come before the Organization of which they are Members and ask it to give consideration to a situation which in their opinion gravely endangers peace and security in the region to which they belong or of which they are neighbours. My Govermnent believes that these countries have the right to be heard, and sees the fact that sovereign nations, representing so much in the world, should desire to discuss the problems of concern to them under the procedure laid clown ‘by the United Nations Charter, in the light of a great aclvance in international relations,. Whatever may be the outcome, these facts and this attitude cannot but increase our confidence in the principles and procedures ,of the Charter. 47. My Government feels that to prevent these eleven States from outlining the situation in Tunisia and from presenting the argument,s for intervention in the matter hy the Security Council would constitute a serious denial of justice, the more so because their actions have macle it clear that this course has not been taken as the result of a decision arrived at in haste ‘or withc’ut due consideration, for they have been attempting since January to draw the attention of Member States and of the principal organs of the Unitecl Nations to events in Tunisia. It is also my Government’s view that a flat rejection of these States’ request would constitute one of the most ill-advised acts in the history of the United Nations. It would be a cogent argument in support of those who’ claim wrongly, in our judgment, that the United Nations is powerless to protect the interests of small or weak nations when they conflict with those of powerful States. Moreover, it would widen the unfortunate division which is appearing in international affairs and has already begun to make itself felt in the United Nations ; a division based on differences of colour,. ethnic origin and level of economic or social development. 45. Le non&e et l’importance des pays qui ant soumis cette questioll au Conseil confkent du poids a ]eur dkmarche. Ces pays repr&entent le quart des Etats Membres, et leur population s’Cl&ve g pr&s du tiers de la population du monde. Par leer situation geegraphique et l’itendue de leur territoire, I’importance numirique de leur population, les liens culturels et spirituels qui les unissent, leur conception du monde et des relations entre les peuples, ces Etats jouent et doivent jouer un rBIe toujours plus important sur le plan international. C’est sur eux que reposent pour tine grande part le maintien de la paix et la &a&ation de tow les ohjectifs de la Charte de San-Francisco et, par condquent, l’euvre tout entike de l’organisation cles Nations Unies. 46 A notre avis, on ne saurait imposer silence g ces Bats et j ces peuples brsqu’ils viennent demander i Kkganisation dont ils font partie d’examiner une situation qui leur parait menacer grsvement la paix et la sCcuritC, surtout lorsyue cette situation existe dans la rCgion a laquelle ces pays appartiennent ou dans une rCgion voisine. Mon gouvernement estime que ces pays ont le ‘droit d’itre entendus et que c’est un grand progrk dans la vie internationale lorsque des, nations souversines, qui occupent une si grande place dans le monde, se montrent dCsireuses de discuter les probl&iies clui les prkoccupent clans le cadre du syst&me dtabli par la Charte des Nations Unies. Quels que soient les rbultats ,que donnera l’examen de la question, l’attitude de ces pays doit augmenter ilotre confiance dans les principes de la Charte et dans le systkme qu’elle a iiistaurk 47. Man gouvernement pense clue ce serait un grave d&i de justice que d’emp&cher les otlze Etats requk- . rants d’exposer la situation qul existe en Tunisie ainsi que les arguments qui militent en faveur d’une intervention du Conseil de skcuritk. Le dCni de justice serait d’autant plus grave clue ces Etats ant prouv6 par cles actes clue leur dCmarche ne pro&de pas d’une 1&sion h?ltive ou irr&%chie, puisque, depuis le mois le janvier, ils n’ont cessC d’appeler l’attention des Etats Membres et dCs principaux organes des Nations Utlies sur les &&ements de Tunisie. Mon gouvernenent pense aussi clue repousser purement et simplenent la demande de ces Etats serait l’un des actes les 11t1s impolitiques que I’Organisation ait commis. C&e l&ion fournirait uii argument puissant Zt ceux qui tffirment, j t,ort selon nous, que 1’Organisation des vations Unies est incapable de protkger ks ink-& les petites nations ou des pays faibles lorsque ces in& -&ts s’opposent j ceux des Etats puissants. Elle ren- ‘orcerait, d’autre part, une division dkplorable qui se profile sur l’llorizon international et dont l’Organisa- ‘. ion des Nations Unies a dkjj comrnenc6 g seiitir les :flets division qui .se fonde sur la couleur de la pea& ‘origine ethnique ou le degrC de d&veloppement &nonique et social. -8. Le &veil des peuples de l’Orient, les mouvements [e lib&at& politique et konomique en Asie;. en 49. We should like our position to be clearly understood in all its honesty and sincerity by all Member States, and particularly by France. Our long-standing, indeed permanent relations of friendship with that great nation, which have been put to the test on many occasions in the United Nations, should suffice to prevent any misunderstanding and to preclude any suspicion that we may be prompted by any consideration other than the desire to serve peace and the principles of the Charter. 50. We are confident that the debate, if it should take place, will lead to positive results, and that great efforts at conciliation will be made in the Council. I do not think that the States which have submitted the matter to the Council *have any other purpose in mind. As for France, that country’s antecedents, its history, its democratic conception of the domestic life of peoples and of international relatimons and, above all, its realism, make us confident that it will facilitate a constructive solution of the problem. We believe that this is an oppor.tune moment to discuss matters such as the Tunisian question. It is precisely at times of international tension that we must be concerned to ensure that temporary and superable misunderstandings are eliminated by United Nations action, thereby eliminating a new and serious element of future tension, 51. We believe, lastly, that the doors of United Nations organs should be opened, not closed, to the consideration of major problems which are causing concern to world ptpblic opinion and are capable of discussion by these organs. For the United Nations to avoid discussion or even lnention of such problems cannot but bring discredit to the Organization and weaken its efficacy. We believe that nowhere else in the world can we work for peace and frienclship among Peoples so efktidy as in the United Nations, which was established to serve those very ideals. In that ligllt alone should we view the fact that a number of Member States have submitted to us a problem which they believe to endanger internati’onal peace and security. 49. Nous dCsirons clue notre attitude, toute ct’honn&- tete et de sincCritC, soit bien comprise par tous les Etats Membres, et tout spCcialement par la France. Les relations d’amitie clue nous entretenons depuis toujours avec cette grande nation et clont nous avons dam35 maintes preuves au sein ni&iie de cette Organisation doivent s&%-e pour Ccarter tout malentendu quant aux motifs qui WLIS guident ; nul ne doit nous soupqonner d’avoir d’autres intentions que de servir la paix et les principes de la Charte. 50. Nous sommes convaincus ,que la discussion, si elle a lieu, aura des r&ultats FsitiEs et qu’elle permettra LIII grand effort de conciliation. Les Etats qui ont soumis l’affaire au Conseil ne IIOLIS semblent pas avoir cl’autre but. Quant j la France, son pas&, son histoire, sa conception clCmocratique de la vie in& rieure des peuples et des relations internationales, et, surtout, son rCalisme, nous clonnent confiance et nous font croire qu’elle facilitera la recherche cl’une solution: constructive. Nous crayons que I’heure est favorgble B la discussion de questions comme la question tunisienne. C’est prCci&ment dans une pCriode de tension internationale qu’il faut tenter cl’aplanir, par l’intervention de 1’Organisation des Nations Unies, des malentendus passagers et Pvitables. On &carte ainsi un ClCment grave de tension pour l’avenir. 51. Nous crayons, enfin, que les organes des Nations Unies cloivent accepter et non refuser d’examiner les grands problimes qui prhoccupent l’opinion publique mondiale et qui se pr@tent g la discussion. En Cludaut k dCbat, en kvitant m&e de mentionner ces prob%mes, l’organisation risque en dkfnitive de perdre de son prestige et de son efficacit& Nous estimons clue nulle part ailleurs dans le monde on ne peut travailler pour la paix et pour l’amiti6 entre les peuples d’une faqon aussi efficace qu’g I’Organisation des Nations Unies, qui a CtC crCCe g cette fin. Tel est le seul souci qui doit nous guider lorsque plusieurs Et&s Membres appellent notre attention sur une situation qui, Zt leer avis, menace la paix et la sCcuritC clu monde. * 54. If one is to follow the logic of the speech made by the representative of France, it is not only necessary to adopt the agenda ; it is necessary forthwith to ask the ten delegations - Member States which have approached the Security Council on this. matter -to take their seats at the Security Council table and to oppose their paint of view to the French point of view. 55. The representative of France went further. He read out passages from the explanatory note which the ten delegations had appended to their letters’ and such unpleasant remarks - unpleasant to ‘him - a he thought needed countering. He not o’nly did his best to counter them, but he also called them slander. In other words, he accused eleven nations of having made a slanclerous statement against the Government of France. Against this accusation, I, speaking as the representative of Pakistan, protest-and I am sure that the other ten delegations, had they the chance to speak, would also. protest. It was not our business, our intention or our desire to slander either his great country or his Government in any irresponsible manner. 57. AS the world now knows, t’wo Ministers of the J Government of Tunisia - two Ministers who, so far as I know, as long as they were Ministers of the Government of Tunisia, enjoyed the confidence of the Government of France - came to Paris and wrote a letter to the President ‘of the Security Council, drawing the attention of the Security Council to a certain sad and lamentable state of affairs in Tunisia. Nothing came of that letter. It lay in the archives of the United Nations for a long time, It did not officially see the light of day either in the Palais de Chaillot or in this mansion of many windows. It lay there until my delegation asked that copies of it should be circulated [S/2571 ] . 58. After that, although we knew that this letter had been lodged with the President of the Security Council and although we knew that, during the same days, massacres, riots, arrests, sabotage were taking place in Tunisia- I mention merely the acts of violence ; I have no intention at this stage of apportioning blame to anyone-although we knew this, we waited patiently in the hope that the French Government in its wisdom would realize the gravity of the situation and try to come to an amicable understanding with one of the most gentle people on the face of the earth. ‘^-~-‘59. We waited for many .days. We parleyed. We discussed the matter amongst ourselves. We made informal and friendly approaches to the French Government through various channels. Nothing happened. We realized that this was a matter of grave importance, but not one in which we should be in any indecent haste to embarrass the French Government, provided it was’ full of good intentions, which we hoped it was. 60. There was a strong feeling that the matter should be raised in the General Assembly in Paris during the last weeks or even earlier. However, wiser counsels prevailed. We were asked to ‘be patient. Fifteen nations in a body went to the President of the General Assembly, Mr. Padilla Nerve, and begged him to approach the French delegation and, through it, the French Government, and ask it, in the name of peace, security and friendly relations among nations, not to drive the ----, Tunisians to a point of desperation. Otherwise, feelings in our own countries, which are most sympathetic to the cause of the Tunisians because f&y are a ‘Ippressed nation, would run high. 62, After another wait, we went again to the Presidellt ,of the General Assembly and once more begged hiIn to convey our feelings to the French Government through such channels as he thought best. We told him that the most natural and the most normal thing for us to do would be to give vent to our feelings in the Gelleral Assembly. But during the last days of the Assembly, we did not want to make the task of the United Nations difficult ancl complicated. He then promised to convey ,our message to the French Government. We presumed -and I am sure-that he did. Nothing came of it. 63. We then asked ourselves whether we should raise the matter in the General Assembly. However, we were handicapped considerably because not long bef,ore, the same nations, whose names are now inscribed on this complaint, had had a most lamentable, undortunate and unhappy experience. Some of us had tried to raise the question of Morocco in the General Assembly. This item on the provisional agenda had to go to the General Committee I, where nations such as those the names of which are on this document di’d not ‘have a majority. The General Committee did not allow that item to be discussed. True, it said that the discussion of this item should be postponecl for the time being. But we know very well that the words “for the time being” merely meant stalling and indefinite postponement. 64. The matter of Morc~cco came to the General Assemb,ly in plenary session and representative after representative spoke very strongly about it. 2 But we did not succeed in getting that item on *he agenda, 65. Disappointecl, we stili thought we would wait. Ilicked, we came over t,o New York. We discussed the Tunisian situation amongst ourselves. Every day, we read the news in the Press. Every day we hoped for some signs of improvement. Every day we hoped for some sign of better understanding between the French and the Tunisians and we prayed for the safety of the Tunisians and of the French Republic. Every clay, the lle.ws got wo’rse and worse. 66, We then thought that perhaps we should not rely eiltirely and solely on newspapers. Perhaps it would be best to see if we could not get some Tunisians over to New York so khat we should cross-examine them and find out exactly what the situation was before we, as responsible delegations, took the matter to the Security Council. We found that there were insurmountable difficulties in the-path bf the Tunisians coming to New yorlc. We tiklerstood that the diplomatic passports of __J__ l See Ofihtl Records of the Gelteral Assembly Sixth Session, $te&es, agenda item 7, document A/1950, para,’ 5. 63. Nous nous sommes alors demand& si nous devions soulever la question devant 1’AssemblCe gCnCrale. Toutefois, nous itions t&s g&k par le fait que, r&emment, les pays mknes qui prksentent la plainte dont 11ous nom occupons aujourd’hui avaient cot~nr~ un Cchec cles plus clCplorables. Certains ,d’entre nom avaient, en cffet, essay6 de poser la question marocaine devant I’AssemblCe gCnCrale. Cette question, qui figurait d l’ordre du jour provisoire, devait &tre soumise au Bureau l, oti les pays qui prkentent la plainte actuelle n’avaient pas la majorit& Le Bureau n’a pas permis que la question soit examinCe. Certes, il a d&lark que cet examen n’ktait que provisoirement remis. Mais nous savons fort bien que les mots “provisoirement” Cquiv& laient j un ajournement si~zs die. 64. La question du Maroc a &tC soumise j I’AssemblCe gCnCrale en sCance plCnike, et les reprkientants se sont succCdC j la tribune pour dkfendre Cnergiquement notre th& 2. Mais nous n’avons pas rCussi ,g faire inscrire la question a l’ordre du jour. 65. D&p, nous avons nkanmoins dkiclC d’attendre. Now sommes rent&s B New-York. Nous avons discut& entre now la situation en Tunisie. Chaque jour, nous lisions les nouvelles dans la presse. Chaque jour, now espCrions que la situation s’ainkliorerait. Chaque jour, nous guettions iiii signe qui montrerait que les Franc;ais et les Tunisiens s’entendaient mieux, et nous formions des vceux pour la sCcuritC des Tunjsiens et pour cell& de la RCpublique francaise. Mais, chaque jour, les nouvelles qui nous parvenaient ktaient pires que la veille, 66. Nous avons pens& qu’il ne fallait peut-&tre pas se fier uniquement aux informations de presse.’ Peut-gtre vaudrait-il mieux que des Tunisiells viennent & New- York afin que nous les interrogions et nous fassions une id&e exacte de la situation avant de porter, avec le sentiment de 110s responsabilitCs, la question devant le Conseil de sCcuritC. Or, nous avons constat& que des obstacles insurmontables s’opposaient ?t la venue des Tunisiens g New-York. Nous avons cru savoir qu’o~~ */A’- 1 Voir les Documents o~cial.~ de l’dssemblke gknkrale, +&we sessiojt, Ajtrzexos, point 7 de l’ordre du jour, document A/1950, par. 5. “ aIl&., .$ka?zces plin&rss, 3428me, 3538me et %&me s&ances. 67. Then, very great friends of all the nations whose names are given here told us that the French Government, which was then going through a parliamentary crisis, could hardly be expected to take any clear action in this matter with such a great problem as the parliamentary crisis facing it. We were not full Of optimism but we thought that it would at least be chivalrous on our part, if not wise, to wait until a government in France was stabilized. The Government was stabilized. We were happy for the sake of France. We were lull of hope that now that the Government had been stabilized, a step forward would be taken. 68. A few days after the stabilization of the Government, we found that not only did the situation in Tunisia not improve hut, to our dismay, horror and surprise, the entire Cabinet had been arrested by the French Republic. When I say the entire Cabinet, I mean all those whom they could get hold of. I understand that the French have not been able to arrest two members of it. This was the Cabinet which had been set up in Tunisia as a result of a great rnpprockewe~at between these two Governments in the year 1950, and which was to negotiate reforms with the Government of France for a better understanding between these two great nations. This Cabinet found itself in gaol. It comprised the last of the most prominent Tunisians to go to gaol. Every other nationalist leader of, the Neo- Destour Party, which undoubtedly has the largest following in Tunisia, was already in gaol. Not only that, but according to our information - and I should be glad to hear it contradicted-thousands of people were in concentration camps, hundreds of Tunisians had been killed and it was difficult to get information from certain parts of Tunisia. 0 69. We waited. We said, “After all, we cannot be more catholic than the Pope himself. If the Tunisians form another government and it works smoothly, we should have nothing about which to worry,” 70. We waited. After days and days, we found that a gentleman by the name of Baccouche had been appointed Prime Minister. We looked up his record. We asked such people as knew the Prime Minister of Tunisia about his past ,history. They told LIS that this ,gentleman had at one time been a civil servant, that he 11-qd occupied the position of Prime Minister for a little wh% during the war years, that he was a man ,with no great “3ollowing in Tunisia and that ,he was the only perso who, under French pressure as we understood, 71. Mr. Baccouche, in spite of being the Prime Minister, of having the sympathy of the Resident General and the support of the French Government, cannot form a cabinet. According to reports appearing in the New York Hwald Tribwae or The New York Tiwm, when this gentleman goes to see the Bey, so great is the resentment that he arouses amongst the people of Tunisia that he goes into the palace by the back door. 72. The Prime Minister, or the French, did, by the use ,of pressure, persuade one other person to become a minister -one person. But when the time actually came for him to be appointed Minister, he found that public feeling was far too much against him. Then, very wisely, deciding that discretion would be the better part of valour, he refused to be Minister-whereupon the French threw ,him into gaol. 73. It seems to me that, nowadays, Tunisia is a Utopia in reverse: either you become a minister or, if you refuse to become a minister, you become a prisoner. 74. We tried to* find out what had happened since the arrival of Mr. de Hauteclocquewho, I understand from the representative of France - had gone to Tunisia with new reforms, with a promise of ,hope for the Tunisian people. We gathered information. For the benefit of other representatives at this table, I should like to read out a few sentences which give a description of Mr. de Hauteclocque’s arrival in Tunisia, the country which he had gone to, befriend, the country to which he was going to give freedom and reforms - according to the French claim. 75. Mr. de Hauteclocque arrivkd in Tunis on 13 January, His arrival was made an occasion of the greatest display of force ever seen there. He landed from a cruiser. The whole town was occupied with troops, with armoured cars, with tanks, and all the streets through which he passed were lined with troops. It was not an ordinary reception, but a display of military might. 76. From his first intervention with the Bey, the Resident General gave him to understand that he would like to maintain direct contact with him. The Prime Minister, however, informed the Resident General, in the name of the Bey, that all official contacts should take place through the Prime Minister. 77. When the Tunisian Government submitted its complaint to the United Nations, on 12 January 1952 [s/2571], the Resident General demanded an interview with the Bey alone, but the latter refused and directed him to the Prime Minister instead. On 15 January, the Resident General agreed to’ lbe received by the Bey in the presence of the Prime Minister. Thereupon, he demanded, first, that the complaint should be withdrawn ; secondly, that the Ministry should, be changed ; thirdly, that the Bey should sign ~VO decrees, the first appointing the Resident General 71. Tout en &ant Premier Ministre, tout en jouissant de la sympathie du RCsident g&&al et de I’apptri du Gouvernement francais, M. Baccouche n’arrive pas & former un cabinet. D’apr& des informations publiCes dam le New York Herald Tribune ou dans le New Yoyk Tifmes, la population tunisienne garde une telIe rancune & ce personnage que, chaque fois qu’il va voir le Bey, il est oblig& de p&Ctrer au palais par l’escalier de service. 72. MaIgr& toute la pression qui a c% exercke par lui, ou plut8t par le Gouvernement franqais, le Premier Ministre n’a pu persuader qu’une autre personae de devenir ministre. Cependant, lorsque cette personne a dfi assumer ses fonctions ministCrieIles, elle a constatC que le sentiment populaire lui etait par trop hostile. Jugeant avec beaucoup de raison qu’il vaIait mieux s’effacer que de jouer un rBle ‘de premier plan, elle a alors refuse le poste de ministre, aprks quoi les Franqais I’ont jet&e en prison. 73. I1 me semble qu’d Yheure actuelle, la Tunisie est 1’Utopie B rebours: ou bien on devient ministre, ou bien, si l’on refuse de le devenir, on est appr&hendC. 74. NOUS avons essay& d’Ctablir ce qui ttait aclvenu depuis 1’arrivCe de M. de Hauteclocque, qui, si j’ai bien compris 15 reprgsentant de la France, s’Ctait rendu en Tunisie pour y introduire de nouvelles rCformes, qui permettraient certains espoirs j la population tunisienne. Nouk avons recueilli des informations. Je voudrais, g l’intention des autres membres du Conseil, donner lecture de quelques passages qui dCcrivent l’arrivCe de M. de Hautecloeque en Tnnisie, pays oh il se rendait en ami, pour apporter la libertk et des rCformes - du moins d’aprb ce qu’affirment les Fransais. 75. M. de Hauteclocque est arrivC % Tunis le 13 janvier. Son arrivCe a servi de pritexte au dhploiement de forces le plus important qu’on ait jamais vu dans cette ville. M. de Hauteclocque a dbbarqd d’un croiseur. Toute la ville ktait occupCe par Ia troupe, on n’y voyait que chars et voitures blindCes ; les soldats faisaient la haie dans toutes les rues par lesquelles il passait. ,Ce n’&ait pas une rCception ordinaire, mais tm dkploiement de force militaire. 76. D;ls sa premisre entrevue avec le Bey, le R&dent g&&al a signif?& B ce dernier qu’il dCsirait entretenir avec lui des rapports directs. Cependant, le Premier Ministre, au nom du Bey, a fait connaitre au RCsident y&n&-al que tous les contacts officiels devaient avoir lieu par l’entremise du Premier Ministre. 77. Lorsque, le 12 janvier 1952, le Gouvernement tunisien a prbsenth sa plainte B l’organisation des Nations Unies [S/2571], le Resident g&n&al a deman- :E a &tre recu seul par le Bey, qui a rCpondu par la ligative et l’a envoy& au Premier Ministre. Le 15 ianvjer, le Rksident g&&al a accept6 d’&tre rec;u par le Bey, en prhsence du Premier Ministre. Au tours de ;ette audience, il a exigk: premihement, que la plainte ;oit retirke.; deuxiemement, que le Cabinet sait rempla- :e ; trojsi.&ement, que le Bey signe deux dCcrets, l’un jortant nomination du RCsident gitnkral aux fondions 78. After this, the Resident General and General Garbay were called to Paris. They returned to Tunis on 22 March. The Resident General immediately demanded a private interview with the Bey. The Bey received him on 24 March, but in the presence of all the Tunisian Ministers who were in Tunis at that time. The Resident General inform@ the Bey that the French Government was prepared to resume “egotiations, on the condition that the Cabinet should ,be dismissed and the complaint to the United Nations withdrawn. When the Bey refused, the Resident General produced a document, signed by the French Foreign Minister, giving ,him, the Resident General, full powers to act in any way he deemed suitable to re-establish law and order - I hope I shall have a later opportunity to explain what the phrase “law and order” means in colonial governments - and to protect French interests. The Bey replied that he needed time to think it over and that he reserved his position on this subject. The Resident General gave him an ultimatum of three hours. This was the King of Tunisia, whom the French claim they befriend. Almost at the point of a pistol, with almost the worst methods of arm-twisting, this old and venerable King was being bullied by the Resident General into giving him a formal answer which would satisfy the Resident General’s logical and constitutional conscience. What other conscience could it possibly satisfy? 79. Seeing himself ill-treated in this manner, the Bey then cabled to the President of the French Republic, drawing his attention to the pressure exerted on him by the Resident General in ‘the name of the French Government and demanding the recall of the Resimdent General. During the same night, the Resident General arrested the Tunisian Prime Minister and three &her Tunisian Ministers. The fourth Minister who was present in Tunis, Sadullah, was not arrested, because he was very old and ill. But this old and ill Minister demanded that he should be arrested by the French authorities in order that he might accompany his colleagues into captivity. All were sent to the south of ‘Jhlisia. At the same time, the great nationalist leader of the Tunisian people, Bourguiba, who had already been incarcerated, was transferred with his conlpanions to the squth. Hundreds of political workers - journalists, teachers, lawyers - who had shown natifonalist sympathies, were arrested. All nationalist newspapers were suppressed. All high schools were closed. Martial law was applied, We have no means of ascertaining the 80, The Bey’s palace was surrounded by troops, 81. The Resident General visited the Bey on the morning of 25 March, and no. one was allowed to be present during the interview. It was after this interview that the Resident General declared that the Bey had consented, that a decree was to be issued in the &y’s name. It does not, so far as we know, bear the &y’s signature. 8.2. So far as we know, what happened between the Resident General and the King of Tunisia inside the closed room could not have been very pleasant for the Bey. But the Resident General, as he walked out of the room, told those present-with grim hurnourthat what had happened inside had been a “feast of love”. It was a cruel, sadistic joke to play on an old man, all of whose companions had been taken away and who had been left there to, face as best he could this terrific military pressure of the French authorities in Tunisia. 83. That is the situation as it now exists. Mr. Baccouche, a figurehead who has been propped up by the French, is the Prime Minister. How long he will last as the Prime Minister we do not know, but if I were to venture a prophecy, I wotrlcl say that either his own sense ,of shame or the sense of shame communicated to him by his nationalist brothers in prison will make him drop this post as soon as possible. In any case, up to this time he has not been able to muster one single minister for his Cabinet. Yet the French authorities, we are told, stand t,here waiting with beautiful reform schemes and plans ,of autonomy. With whom are they going to negotiate these plans? With whom are they going to have these conversations ? Or is it the intention of the French authorities to discuss these plans at a table with the French sitting on both sides? Do they merely want to negotiate these terms with their own stooges ? If they mean business, if words have not lost their meaning, and if they do want to reach an understanding, it is essential - not only in the name of humanity, but also in the name of ordinary wisdom and logic -that they should negotiate these terms with people who, on their side, can ,deliver the goods. What is the use discussing these terms with people of their own making ? 84. That is how the situation stands at the moment. Yet the French representative tells us: Perhaps a few weeks ago the situation might have warranted discussion by the Security Council or the General Assembly, but not now. The worst is over. From now on, an era of great peace, prosperity, happiness and friendship is going to dawn over Tunisia - with thousands of people of Tunisian origin in gaols, with the Cabinet in gaol, with all the great leaders of the nationalist movement -persons who have for years been respected not only at horfe but also abroad-in gaol, 85. Is this the new era that is going to dawn ? And are f e at this stage asked not to discuss this question? 80. Les troupes ont cernC le paIais du Bey. 81. Le Rksident g&&al a rendu visite au Bey dans la matinie du 25 mars, mais personne n’a eu le droit d’assister & l’entretien. C’est aprhs cet entretien que le Rksident g&&al a d&larC que le Bey avait clonnb son assentiment et qu’un d&ret allait Ctre publiC en son nom. Ce dicret, pour autant que nous sachions, ne Porte pas la signature du Bey. 82. I1 y a lieu de penser que l’entretien qu’il a eu avec le R&dent gknkral clans cette pi&ce close n’a pas .+,tC des plus agrkables pour le Bey. Mais, en qujttant la piece, le R&dent g&n&al a dit avec un humour macabre que le Bey et lui avaient &hang& le “baiser de paix”. C’etait l& faire preuve de cruautC et de sadisme a l’& gard d'm vieillard dont tous les compagnons avaient it6 emmenCs et qui restait seul pur risister de son mieux ?t la pression militaire considCrable qu’exerqaient Ies autoritCs fragaises en Tunisie. 83. Voici la situation telle qu’elle se prCsente actuellement. M. Baccouche, criature des Franqais, est Premier Ministre. Combien de temps restera-t-i1 Premier Ministre, now l’ignorons ; mais, si je devais hasarder une prophCtie, je dirais qu’un sentiment de honte ou les remo’rds qu’&veille en lui le sort de ses fr&es nationalistes emprisonn&s lui feront quitter ce poste d&s qu’il le pourra. En tout cas, jusqu’8 present, il n’a pu trouver m seul ministre pour son Cabinet. Pburtant, les autoritCs franqaises sont li, nous dit-on, avec de beaux programmes de rCforme et de beaux prdjets d’autonomie. Avec qui vont-elles pouvoir en discuter ? Avec qui auront-elles des entretiens ? Auraient-elles par hasard l’intention de discuter ces projets i une tabIe autour de laquelle seuls cles Francais seront assis ? Se proposentelles de con&u-e des accords. avec les fantoches qu’elles ont mis au pouvoir? Si les mats n’ont pas perdu leur sens, si les autoritCs franGaises sont sin&es et cherchent &eMement & zboutir j un accord, l’humanit; aussi bien que la sagesse et la logique pures et simples exigent qu’elles s’entendent avec ceux qui peuvent valablement parler au nom de la population. A quoi leur serviraient des discussions avec des gens qu’elles ant elles-m&mes mis en place? ,, 54. Tel est I’Ctat de chases actuel. Et pourtant, le reprksentant de la France vient nous dire: La situation aurait. peut-&re pu justifier des discussions au Conseil de s&rite ou a l’Assembl&e g&&ale il y a qudques semaines; ce n’est plus vrai aujourd’hui. Le pire est pa&, Une &e de paix, de prospCrit6, de joie-et d’amiti& va s’ouvrir en Tunisie - et des milliers de personnes d’origine tunisienne sont en prison, les l&&reS sent en prison, tous les grands chefs du mouvement nationaliste - qui jouissent depuis des an&es du respect de tous chez eux et g l’kranger - sont en prison. 85. Est-ce Ia la nouvelle &re dont on nous parle? Une telle situation n’appellerait-elle done aucune discus- ;ion . ? 87. Would it please the French Government if the Tunisians, agitating for the redress of their wrongs, should do so from irresponsible points of vantage? Is there any organization to which they could do better to come than to the United Nations? Where else would the French want them to go ? I would repeat that question for all the Frenchmen who sooner or later might get extracts of this speech. Wshere would they want the suppressed Tunisians to go if not to the United Nations ? What is the United Nations for if a situation like this cannot be aired here? W’hat are we to understand to be our functions around this table if a suppressed people cannot raise its voice here, through eleven responsible nations representing, as my cdleagues well know, the whole of Asia with a few exceptions and barring those which are not Member States. Practically tthe whole of Asia knocks at the door of the United Nations. Does it say, “Please punish the French”? God forbid. Does it say, “Please make the Tunisians free tomorrow” ? At this stage it merely says one thing: CUSS this question”, “Please, in heaven’s name, dis- 88. But’ if seven members of the Security Council are not availab’le to discuss it, it will amount to this : that the eleven nations are told, “you can go to hell. We will not discuss your question, You may feel strongly about it, but we will not even put it on the agenda to find out what the truth is”, 88. Mais, s’il ne se trouve pas sept membres du Conseil de s&curit+ prets g proc&der a cet examen, cela revient j dire g ces ooze pays: “Vous pouvez aller au diable. Nous ne discuterons pas cette question. Ek vous tient peut-&tre B ccEur, mais nous n’ircms m&me pas jusqu’a l’inscrire a notre ordre clu jour pour C~CCOUvrir la v&it&” 89. We are like people who have seen a fire, We are not guilty of arson OurSeheS ; we have just seen the fire, and we have come and reported it to the fire department here, saying, fire and put it out?” “Please, will you look at this 90. The fire department says, “We will not even lool~,” This is a strange situation. But we will go on taking an interest in this question because of the feelings we have for suppressed People whom we regard as our brothers. 87. Le Gouvernement franqais voudrait-il que les Tunisiens cherchent g obtenir satisfaction en montant inconsid&Cment j n’imgorte quelle tribune ? Les Tunisiens auraient-ils pu mieux faire clue s’adresser g 1’0rganisation des Nations Unies? 021 les. Fransais voudraient-ils qu’ils aillent ? Je r&p&e cette question pour tous les Franc;ais qui, un jour ou l’autre, auraient l’occasion de lire des extraits ,de ce discours: Oh les Franc;ais voudraient-ils que les Tunisiens opprimCs s’adressent, sinon g l’organisation cles Nations Unies? A yuoi sert l’Organisation si des griefs de ce genre ne peuvent y &re exposCs? Quelles sont nos fonctions ici, autour de cette table, si un peuple opgrimC ne peut se faire entendre, par l’interm&diaire de ooze nations qui reprCsentent - mes collhgues ne l’ignorent pas - 1’Asie toute enti&e, g I’ex.ception d’un tr& petit nombre de pays et de ceux qui ne sont pas m.embres des Nations Unies? C’est, pour ainsi dire, 1’Asie tout entikre qui frappe B la Porte des Nations Unies. L’Asie ditelle : 231 vous plait, punissez les Franqais” ? A Dieu ne plaise. L’Asie dit-elle: “Faites, db demain, des Tunisiens un peuple libre” ? Non, elle se contente de dire: “S’il vous plait, pour l’amour de Dieu, examinez cette question.” 89. NOMS avons vu un incendie. Ce n’est pas nous qui avons allumC le feu, mais wus 1’avons vu, et nous sommes Venus le signaler aux pompiers en disant: “Regardez, il y a le feu, il faudrait l’&eindre.” 90. On nous rCpond: “Nous ne voulons regarder.” Quelle Ctrange situation ! Nous rons quand mfme & nous intCresser g cette q cause de la sympathie que nous kprouvons 91. That is where my delegation, in this intervention, would like to stop. The representative of France has referred to certain incidents of past history. My delegation reserves the right also t’o refer to them and to expose still further the situation in Tunisia, the co810nial conditions that exist there and the basic reasons for the whole of this agitation. For the present, we are only taking part in the procedural debate, and although my speech, I confess, had certain points of substance in it, these were roused mostly because the representative of France had also thought fit to include points of SKIstance in his. 92. That concludes my intervention as the representative of Pakistan.

The Brazilian delegation wishes to explain very briefly the reasons for which it will vote favourably on the acloption ‘of the agenda. 94. The Security Council is seized of communications signed by eleven Member States whic,h contend that the present situation in Tunisia seriously endangers the maintenance of international peace and security, and that thereby it falls within the scope of Article 34 of the Charter. 95. In voting lor the inclusion of the item in OUT agenda, the Brazilian delegation is not prejuclging the merits of the case, nor even the competence of the Security Council to deal with ihis particular matter; neither can a favourable vote by Brazil be construed as expressing an opinion on the opportuneness of a debate on the Tunisian question. As a matter of cold fact, we do not feel that a protracted discussion on Tunisia would serve any useful purpose at the present stage 0% affairs, when the means have not been exhausted for reaching a solution by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, or other peaceful means provided for in Article 33 of the Charter. It is, moreover, our deep-seated conviction that the United Nations should not be overburdened with questions which may eventually prove capable of being solved t,hrough direct negotiations between the parties concerned. My delegation will therefore be quite receptive to any motion or proposal towarcls the postponement of consideration of this item, after its inclusion in the agenda of the Security $ouncil. 96 Such, however, is not the immediate issue before 11s. We are now called to decide, not on the merits of the case, nor on the competence of the Security Couneven on the tirneliq-,ss or usefulness of a : 92. Je terniine ici la cklaration que j’ai pronon& en qualit& de reprkentant du Pakistan. 93. M. TBIXEIRA-SOARES (BrCsil) (&adz& de I’anglnis) : La d&gatEon brCsilienne tient g exposer t&s brikvenient les raisons pour lesquellcs elk votera en faveur de l’acloption de l’ordre du jour. 94. Le Cons&l de s&uritC est saisi de coilillzuliicatiofls portant lcs signatures de onze Etats Membres qui affirment que la situation actuelle en Tunisie menace gravenient le niaintien de la paix et de la &cm-it6 internationales et qu’en consCquence 1’Article 34 de la Charte s’applique ici. 95. En votant en faveur de l’inscription de cette question & l’orclre clu jour, la clklkgation brCsilienne ne prCjuge pas le fond de la question, ni m&ne la COSTINGtence du Conseil de sCcurit& dans le cas particulier ; elle ne se prononce pas non plus SW l’opportunit& d’un d&bat sur la question tunisienne. En fait, nous ne crayons pas c$une discussion prolongke puisse k-e utile, d l’heure actuelle, &ant clonn~ qu’il est encore possible de rCgler la situation par voie de nkgociations, d’enclu&te, de mCcliation, de conciliation, d’arbitrage ou d’autres moyens pacifqes prkvus g 1’Article 33 de la Charte. En outre, IIOUS sommes fermement convaincus ,/ clue I’Organisation ne devrait pas s’encombrer de pr - bl&es qui pourraient 6tre r&olus par voie de &ociations directes entre les parties intCressCes. Ma dklkgatioii accueillera done favorablement toute motion ou proposition tendant B diffker I’examen de cette question, une fois qu’elle aura Ctt inscrite B l’ordre du jour clu Conseil de sCcurjtC. 96. La question qui nous intkresse de f&On ird.-.w\ diate est tout autre. 11 nons laut, ncm pas statuer sur le fond de la question, sur la conqktence du Cons&l de &curit,C, iii mime sur r’opportunitC: 0t7 l'utilitk 97, The President will recall that such was the position adopted and the procedure followed by the Security Council when it was originally seized of the complaint of failure by the Irailiaii Government to comply with provisional measures indicated by the International Conrt of Justice in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company case. At the Security Council’s 559th meeting, held on 1 October 1951, Mr. Queveclo, the representative of Ecuador, stated his opinion in words which were generally felt to reflect the views of the majority of the Security Council at that time. I quote from his statement as it appears in the official records in English [559th VW&~, finm. 51. “If a Member of the United Nations submits a complaint regarding a situation or an action which in its view contains an inherent danger and may consequently threaten international peace and security, I do not see how the Security Council can refuse to include the item dealing with such a complaint in its agenda.” 98. The representative of India, Sir Benegal Rau, emphhasized the preliminary character of the questi of the adoption of the agenda as follows [559th meetitzg, pan-L. 401 : “Even to decide the issue of competence, of jurisdiction, we should have all the facts from both sides before us. . ( My delegation is therefore in favour of inchiding the item in the agenda. , , my delegation’s vote is not to be taken as a vote on the questi of conVetelKe hut 011ly on the issue of whether we should discuss the subject for the purpose of -. decidillK the question of competence, as well as any -* -. ~.. other questions that may be involved,” .-* i 99, The President of the Security Council, at its 56&d l=ting, recalled as follows [5,5znd lfieet;ng, fiara. 91 : ,‘ . . . the ~omil will not be able to determine whether it is competent or not to ,deal with the Specific Vesti 011 its agenda unless it has thoroL~~hly investigated the matter and is actL,ally calwTOll t.0 decide on any particular cOurSe of action under the Charter. This derives from the fact that, before the question of competence is decide& the Security Council still has the .power to : ,, “. 0 . . . clonner l’examen par In suite. @e leur t&e S0it fond& ou non, onze Etats R4eiiibres estiment que la situation menace la pais, ce qui est en soi suRiSa~~~nlelIt important clu pint de me interwttioiial pour ret&T toute l’atteiitioii cl’nn orgniie international A cpi incon& la responsalditi: principle ClLl maintieii de la paix et de la sdcuritk. 97. Le Pr~siclent se souviendra clue le Collseil de s&wit6 avait agi de la sorte, lorsqu’il a &$ saisi d’une plainte contrr le Gouvernenient cle 1’Iran pour non. observation ties inesures cimscrvatoires iiidiq&es par la Cour internntionxle de )ustice dans l’affaire de l’Anglo-Iranian Oil Cntnl~uly. A la 5%&ne sCance du Conseil de sCcurit6. le ler octobre 1951, M. Quevedo, reprksentaiit de l’Equateur, a esprini4 son avis clans cles termes clui scmblaient, de 1aqon ~-d&ale, traduire l’opinion de la majoritk cles membres qui sikgeaient alors au Conseil de skuritk Je cite LUI extrait de son discours, d’nprPs le compte reiidu officiel [5.59&u sc’a7m, par. 51 : “Si LIII Etat Membre de I’Organisation des I\rations Unies prkente une plainte au sujet dlune situation 0~1 d’un acte qui, h son avis, prCsfiite un danger latent et qui, par conskquent, peut constituer me menace ;L la pais et A In shiritb .iiiternationales, je ne vois pas pour quclle rnison le Coiiseil de sCcurite pourrait refuser cl’iiiscrire j soil orclre du jour uiie telle plainte.” 98. Le reprtsentant de l’l’nde, Sir Renegal Rau, faisaut observer que l’aclol~tion de l’ordre clu jour n’hait qu’une premike iiiesure, S’est expriinC en ces terlnes [559ho sr’n~tcc, par. &I] : “M&e pour prenclre une dkision SLIT la questioll de comp@tence, nous devons Ctre inforn& de tous les faits clue les cleus parties ont B prkenter. . . C’est p0LtrqLtoi iiia ClCldgation se proiionce pour l’inscrip tion de cette question in l’ordre ctu jour. . I le vote de ma dClCgatiotl ne doit pas gtre consid& comUle uii vote sur la question de cotnp~tence, mais un@ement cornme LUI vote Sur la question de savoir si nom devons cliscuter en vue de 110~1s pronoimr stir la question de comp&tence et to:outes nutres questiolls connexes.” 99. A la 562~me skance, le PrCsidcnt du Comei de sCcurit4 a rappel& que [5622ms s~a~zcc, par. 91 : I( . * . le Conseil n’est pas en mesure de dCterminer s’il est conipCteiit OLI 11011 pour s’occuper d’une cluestion prkise inscrite & son ordre du jour, avant ‘$1 n’ait &die la question a fond et qu’il ize soit effec” tivement invitC B se prolioncer sur uiie ligne de conduite d&ermin~e conforn~Cment aux ternles de* 1s Charte. Cela rkulte clu fait qti’avant que la qc’esflon de la compktence ne soit tranchCe, le Conseil de ec* tY 100. Mr. Lacoste, who represented the Government of France at the 559th meeting of the Security Council, stated views which strike us as particularly pertinent alld cogent today [.5591h ~pzec&g, fiwas. 26 and 271 : “Several delegations have already spoken in favour of including in our agenda the complaint made by the Unitecl Kingdom regarding the failure by the Iranian Government to Comply with tihe provisional measures indicated by the International Court of Justice. . . On the other hand, several other delegations have spoken against the inclusion of this item in the agenda on the ground that the case was not within the Council’s competence. “It seems to my delegation that this very ‘divergence of views on the subject among the members of the Council c1earl.y indicates the need for a debate. My delegation will therefore vote in favour of the consideration by the Council of the complaint. . . ” 101. Having these precedents in mind, and having carefully examined the present situation in light of the Articles of the Charter, the Brazilian delegati.on will therefore vote for the adoption of the provisional agenda, with the clear understanding that we reserve our full liberty to consider the merits of the case, the particular issue of competence or any procedural motion for the postponement of consideration of this item. 102. We feel called to give particular stress to this last point, as we are convinced that no permanent, fair ancl equitable solution will be reached without the full and unrestricted co-operation and goodwill of all the parties concerned. The Brazilian delegation has no reason at all to question the sincerity of the assurances extended by the Government of France, when it reasserts its desire and intention of striving towards the solution of the problem in the spirit of the Charter and in the best interest of the Tunisian people. Such considerations clearly indicate the necessity for the Security Council to forego any action which might hamper the utilizatian of the means provided in Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations for ‘he peaceful settlement of disputes. The task of the Security Council is to seek, to facilitate and to pave the “ay for solutions rather than to impose them in a manner which might eventually prove inconsistent with the principles and purposes of the Charter.

In view of the lateness of the hour, I might perhaps suggest adjourning the lneeting for toclay. . The date and time of the next meeting will be announced in the usual manner, after consulting the delegations and considering their convenience,

Since we were convened today under emergency procedure, forty-eight hours after the proposal wgs ‘subhlitted, I wonder whether we should not con- 100. M. Lacoste, qui reprCsentait ie Gouvernement franqais A la 55’hne seance ‘du Conseil de sCcuritC, a exposC l’opinion suivante, qui nous parait particulib rement pertinente et incontestable auj ourd%ui [.%&he s&mm, pw. 26 et 271: “Plusieurs dClCgatians se sont clejd prononcCes en faveur de I’inscription h notre orclre du jour de la plainte formulCe par le Royaume-Uni au sujet du dCfaut, par le Gouvernement iranien, de se conformer aux mesures provisoires indiqu&es . . . par la Cour internationale de Justice. En revanche, plusieurs sutres d&lCgations se sont exprimCes centre cette inscription, motif pris de ce yue l’affaire en cause ne serait pas de la compttence du Conseil. “I1 apparait d ma d&gation clue le partage m&me des opinions cles nlenlbres du Conseil sur cette affaire indique clairemcnt la n&essitC cl’un cl&bat. C’est pourquoi ma dClCgation se prononcera en fa- +eur de la prise en considCration, par notre Conseil, de la plainte dont il vient cl’&e saisi. . . ” 101. Compte tenu de ces pr~ddents, et ap&s avoir exami& soigneusement la situation actuelle en s’inspirant des articles de la Charte, la d&!gation brCsilienne votera en faveur de l’adoption de l’orclre du jour provisoire, Ctant bien entendu qu’elle se &serve pleine et entil‘re 1ibertC cl’examiner le bien-fond6 de l’affaire, le probl~nie particulier de la comp&ence 0~1 toute autre motion de procCdure tendant B diff&er l’examen de la question. 102. Nous nous jugeons obhgCs d’insister particulib rement sur ce ‘clernier point, Ctant donne clue 110~1s soninies convaincus qiie l’on tie pourra parvenir B une solution dCfinitive, juste et Cquitable, Sans la collaboration et la bonne volont&, entihres et sans rQerves, de toutes les parties int&essCes. La dClCgatinn brCsilienne n’a aucune raison de mettre en doute la sin&ritd des assurances clu’a fournies le Cfluverneinent fran$ais, lorsclu’il a reaffirm& son dCsir et son intention de s’efforcer de parvenir ?I Line solution clu dif%rend clans [‘esprit de Ia Charte et au inieux cles intCrits de la population tunisienne. Tl ressort clairement de ces :onsiclCratians que le Coiiseil de sCcurit& doit s’abstenir :le toute action clui puisse faire obstacle & la misc en -euvre des moyens prCvus i 1’Article 33 de la Charte :les Nations Unies en ce qui concerne le r&glenient ,acifique des cliff&rends. Le Conseil de s$curitC doit &chercher, faciliter et favoriser le r&glenient @es-. alf 7;// &-ends, plutbt que cl’iniposer des solutions,~~lui pou - ;&tit, par la suite, ne pas &tre co@rmes aux lrincipes et aux buts de la Charte. ,;a. 103. I;e PRESIDENT (tra&if de Z’afrglais) : Etant l0nnC l’heure tardive, 110~x5 pourrions peut-ktre lever a sCance. La date et l’heure de la prochaine seance ;eront annon&es selon la pro&lure habituelle, apl-b :onsultation des dClilgations. !04. M. HOPPENOT (France) : Puisque nons lvons et& rCunis aujourcl’hui g la suite d’une p;? _ - l’urgence, quarante-huit hem-es a-prb rpuz la proposiion cut &t& -dCposCe, j e me demande s’il ne conviendrait

As far as I am concerned, there could be no objection, but I understand that there is a meeting of one of the Committees of the Disarmament Commission tomorrow. In view of the fact that a number of delegations are very short-handed, it may not be convenient for a number of the representatives here to have a Council meeting tomorrow. I therefore hope that the representative of the United Kingdom will not press his point.

We have the advantage of having with us here the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission. Perhaps he would give ~1s his view on whether it would be possible to ask the Committee of the Disarmament Commission to postpone its labours scheduled for tomorrow,

I should have preferred that we hold the meeting of the Committee of the Disarmament Commission as originally scheduled and not have a meeting of the Security Council tomorrow morning. I have a personal reason for that, as I expect to speak in the Security Council on this question whenever we nieet next. In view of the importance of this question and in view of the important statement made by the representative of France, I think it is only right that I sl~o~~lcl prepare my statement rather carefully.

Speaking as Chairman of the Disarmament Commission, ]: feel that in deciding the date of its meeting the Commission will have to give priority to the Se&-ity Council. I agree that the Disarmament \ Commission is a Commission of the Council and that “~ dher efore if the Council decides to meet tomorrow I shall be &l@d to cancel the meeting of the Disarma-, merit Commrssion. That would be necessary if tile Council should decide to meet tomorrow, 1 do not think that tihe Security Council call await the convenience of the Disarmament Commission, 111. 111 short, this & a matter for a decision by the Council itself and not by the Disarmallent Commission, still less by the Chairman of the Disarl;lament Commission. i -;G2 by - %I-. KYROU (Greece) : I am ready to abide ally decision taken in regard to the time of our next meeting and I am ready to come here tomorrow if it is

Si je puis nie pernlettre d’sjouter c@- :pes mats, je crois clue le repr6sentant de la France a parfaitemeiit raison. Nous pourrions aussi bien poursuivre maintenant ce &bat sur l’inscription & l’ordre clu jour. Nous son~nes parvenus au lnilieu de la discussion, et je ne vais pas pourquoi iiotls ne pourriolls continuer clemain. Nous n’aurcms peut-ttre pas fini nlors, mais nous pouvons au mains poursuivre le d&at. 107. Le PRESIDENT (f~nduit de I’wglais) : Je n’y vois aucune objection, niais je crois savoir qu’uiie r&tnion de lJtul des cornit& de la Commission clu dCsarmeinent est 1xCvue pour demaitl. Etant donnC clu)un certain nombre de clC1Cgations lie disposent que dluli personnel restreint, il se peut Clue certains reprbentants Cprouvent quclques difficult& & assister 2. la prochaine sCance du Conseil si elle a lieu denlain. J’esptre done clue le repr&sentant du Royaume-Uni n’insistera pas sur ce point. 108. Sir Gladwyn JEBB (Royaume-Uni) (&u&it de l’nnglais) : Nous avons l’nvantage cl’avoir parmi notis le Pr&iclent de la Comiiiission du cl&armement. Peut-&tre voudra-t-i1 notls dire s’il serait possible de demander au ComitC de la Commission du dbarmement de difErer les travaux qui itaient prCvus pour demain. 109. M. TSIANG (Chine) (t&z&t de Pnnglais) : Je pr&%erais cpe la rCunion du Conlit& de la Commission du clCsarmement ait lieu, conxne il avait d’abord CtC p&t, et que le Conseil de sCcuritC ne sikge pas demain matin. J’ ai p our cela une raisan persomielle: je pense prendre la parole au Conseil de sCcuritt au sujet de la question tunisienne lors de sa prochaine sbnce. Etant don& l’importance de cette question et de la d6claration clu repr&entant de la France, je crois qu’il serait assez normal clue je puisse p&parer trb Soigneusement in011 intervention. 110. M. SANTA CRUZ (Chili) (tmduit de l’e.@g gnol) : En ma qualit de PrCsiclent de la Commission du d&arnienient, j’estime que cette Commission doit fixer la date de ses rCunions en laissaiit la prior% att Conseil de &urit& La Commission du dCsarmemellt est une commission du Conseil; si done le Conseil de sCcuritC decide de Se rhlir demaill matin, je dew-2 annuler la seance de la Commission du dCsarmement~ Je ne pense pas que le Conseil ait ?i tenir compte d%ne dCcision prise par la Commission du clCsarrnemeilt. 111. En r&ui~, il s’agit li cl’uiie question qui doit etre tranchCe par le Conseil lui-n&l~e, non par la COI:- mission du d&armement, et encore nloins par le President de cette Commission. 112. M. KYROU (GrBce) (tmduit de Z’aq$~) 1 Je suis prCt & me conformer & Is dCcision qui sera pri en ce qui concerne la date de notre prochaine &an 113. Mr, SANTA CRUZ (Chile) (&~~Zated from $pafiizislz) : It was my impression that the Commission was to meet undel’ the authority of the Security Council even though it was set up by the General Assembly. If, as the Greek representative asserts, that is not the case, then I have even greater reason for not consideriiig myself entitled to cancel, at the request of the representative of France , a meeting of the Disarmament Commission which was decided upon this morning by all its members. 113. M. SANTA CRUZ (Chili) (traduit de I’es$ngaol) : J’avais l’impression clue la r&,olution c&ant la Commission du dCsarmement prhoyait que celle-ci fonctionnereit sow I’autoritC du Conseil de sCcurit6. Si, comme le dit le reprCsentant de la G&e, tel n’est pas le cas, j’estime avoir encore moins le droit d’annuler une rCunion clue ce matin la Commission du dksarmement a d&id6 g I’unanimit6 de tenir, & la demande du repr&entant de la France,

It has ,become clear that at least two members of *he Council find it inconvenient for various reasons to meet tomorrow. I take it, then, that it is the sense of the Security Council that a meeting should be held as early as possible, although perhaps it is not feasible to $old it tomorrow. 114. Le PRESIDENT (t~~dzlit de Pangluis) : I1 semble clue deux membres du Conseil au mains voient, pour cliverses raisons, quelques difficult& & ce que le Conseil se rCunisse demain. Dans ces conditions, je considkre que le Conseil est d’avis de se rCunir le plus tdt possible, bien qu’il ne lui soit peut-&tre pas possible de siCger demain. La dame est levbe li 18 h. 50. The meeting rose at 6.50 p.m.