S/PV.576 Security Council

Mr. President, 1 have asked to be allowed to speak at the very beginning of this meeting to protest against the way in which on Thursday last you ended the 575th meeting of the Security Council, as well as against the methods you employed to brush aside the point of order 1 raised. 6. No transcription of the various statements made at that point appears in the verbatim record of that m~ting, 3.1> distributed ta us; and it does not appear because you lodged an ohjection against its puhlicatioI:c with the Secretariat. FortUl'!ately, however, it was not in your power to suppress the sound recordings; and thanks to them we have been able to reconstnlct the incident into its' various stages. 1 wish to recall them in detail, not only to support my protest but also thereby to ensure that an account appears in the printed record~ of the Security CounciL 7. After the Greek representative's proposal to flX the date of the nOO Council meeting had been rejected, by 5 votes in favour and 6 ahstentions, you announced the result of the vote, declared the meeting adjoumed, brought down your gavel and immediately left the Chair without waiting for the French interpretation of your remarks. 8.' 1 immediate1y raised my hand on a point of order. You then repeated that the meeting stood adjourned, and l expressed surprise at the fact that it could be adjourned befere the French interpretation of your statement had 'been given. 1 added the request that in any case we should not separate without fixing the date for the nOO meeting, and proposed that the Couneil should vote to hold a meeting on Monday. You replied that you were speaking to me quite unofficially, and that yoù were no longer President, the meeting having risen. 1 again pointed out/ that the meeting could not have risen before the intérpretation of your last remarks had been given; in other words belore the French delegation was in a position to decide what answer to make or what action to take. l reéalled that our rn:eeting of 4'April had already been adjoumed hy you in similar circamstances. 9. In the meantime, the interpreter had proceeded to interpret the last words uttered hy you immediately before you brought down the gavei. You then made the !olIowingsurprisingstatement: "Now that the French :nterpretation has ,;been made, ohviously, the meeting 18 adjourned immediately·'. 11. Sir Gladwyn Jcbb then commented that there was no objection in principle to the Council's deciding f-prthwith that the next meeting should '!::le held on ~{onday, since no objection had. been expressed to that date. You replied that for .your part you had no objection ta meeting Monday or Tuesday but that we could not so decide becausc the representative Qf Chile l~adleft. You added: "At' this moment there is no rj,leeting of the Cauneil, official or unofficial". 12. Th.e representative of the United Kingdom then h'1fonned you that he intended immediately ta send you aIL9ffieial. lette.r asldng you to convene a meeting on M:ond:ty, and. added that it would he your duty ta accede to the request and to caU a meeting on that date. You replied that you would not fail to do your duty if you .recelved such a letter. You concluded with the comment that as the meeting was unofficial, you did not l'now who rould adjourn it. 13. These, Mr. President:. are the facts concerning the sta.tements made during the few minutes following the vote {)il' the Greek representative's proposal, not 'lCC'-ùrding to our reeollection but according ta the sound recordings. 14. l shOtÙd like .first to point out that during thi5 time you successively and quite inconsi.<>tent1y: refused to accept my point of order, repeating that the meeHng was adjourned;stated "unofficially" that you were no longer President, the meeting having risen; asserted that now that the interpretation l had asked for had been. given, the meeting was adjourned "immediately"; repli~ to Sir Gladwyn Jebb. that the Couneil was at that moment no !Qnger in session "either officia1ly or unoffieially", although yau had just stated that you wer~ addressing the representative of France unofficially, and were to state again a few moments later that that same meeting was unofficial and that you did not know how to close it; and, .finally, contended that the fact that the representative of Chile had left prevented the Couneil from •.setting the date of its next meeting, whereas it is fully established that the absence, voluntary or învoluntary, cf a membei: of the Couneil, .~ in no way affects the validity of its decisions. Those .are the facts. 15. As for the 1awinvolved, it is indisputable that the œnsecutÏ'\;.e interpretation of astatement is an integral part of that statement, that a statement i5 not ended and u çomplete" in the lega1sense, until its consecutive interpretation into the other working language has been 16. In wie1ding the gavel and rising from the Chair before the interpretation of your dosing remarks, Mr. President, you were committing only a technical error, which could he excused as easily as it could he corrected; but in persisting in your decision ta close the meeting, once before and again after the interpretation of your statement, while refusing ta allow me ta explain the point of order 1 had raisec1 in the meantime, you confronted us, l regret ta say, with an abuse of your powers and a breach of the spirit and the letter of the Security Council's rol<,,'l of procedure. 17. Determined as l am ta adhere strictly ta the facts and the law, l shall not seek for possible explanations of y6ur behaviour or for the reflections it might suggest in the light of mIe 20 of the rules of procedure. Nor have l made this statement with the intention of elidting a decision hy the Council. But although my case has been met in substance by the convening of the Council today, l could not refrain from raising and Rlacing on record the French delegation's protest against the treatment ta which it was subjected, in the hope that my complaint will at least prevent the creation of a precedent.

The Chair would like to make this statement in response ta the statement made by the representative of France. 19. The representative of France has accused the Chair of violation, in letter and in spirit, of the roles of procedure. First, as regards the letter: the Chair held after the last meeting, and hoIds now, that when it was announced from the Chair that the meeting was adjourned and the President rapped. the gavel the meeting, ta aIl intents and purposes, was adjou.r.ned. It is to suhtle a point as to whether the m,eeting continues for the ten seconds during which the words "The meeting is adjcurned" are translated. Whether the rapping of the ga"V'el can he translated is beyond me. Therefon~, l think that the Chair was quite right in holding that the. meeting was t.~ adjourned. 20. . Secondly, as. regards the spirit, my colleagues ' will remember that the proceedings just before the ad- 26. As the Prei'idertt pointed out at our previous meeting, it appea.rs to he a f",ct that the':"e is not the necessary majority of seve.n members in the Secerity Council to have the e.."'<ami'lation of the request of e1even Member State~ conceming the situation in Tun:sia placed on the agenda. Nevertheless, my delegation cannot resign itself to this situation without making a last effort to protect certain principles which we regard as fundamental to the very existence: of the United Nations and the success of its l1"ission. 27. These principles are freedolU of discussion and equal rights for all Member States, large and small. In face of the threat that they may he impaired, any individual case, no matter how important, is of secondary significance. When a11 is said and done, the possibility exists that the Tunisian case may be settled by direct negotiation bètween the French Govemmertt and the Government of Tunisia, and we are confident - as we have said on previous occasions - that France is capable of finding in its democratic conception of the relations between men and nations the necessary inspiration to overcome trie present confliet and find a just oolution, even without the intervention of the United Nations. 28. However, what we are chiefly interested in is that the Security Couneil, in adopting its decision on procedure today, sbo,uld respect these essentia! principles; We believe that the effectiveness of the Organization and hs ::uture existence depend entirdy upoll its success in retaining its character as an equalitarian democratic institution, at least in the examination and discussion of problems even if it.1!1ay he impossible in the field of enforcement measures under the provisions of th~ Charter. The middIe-sized and small countries which, at San Francisco, granted sptcial privileges to five of the great Powers in connexion with practica:l action in cases of aggression or df threats to peace and -security, cannot forego, and l believe are not \villing to forego, their rig~t to be heard in all United Nations organs on any problem within the scope of the Charter. Nor Can they forego their right .to exert a mora! influence --:- since they· cannot always exeit a material· influence - in the search for solutions to würld problems .in which they are. all ?eeply concemed, eii'her because of the present-day tnterdepende.nce of aU. countries and .regions, or as in the present case, for special geographical or ideological reasons. The Charter called upon aH the peoples of of the earth to build the world <of the future, and the lea.St vire ·can ask is that all should have the opportunity tOexPl'ess their opinions or defend their views befote 29. That is why Article 3S of the Oharter, in accordance with this principle, empowers any Member of the United Nations ta bring any dispute, or any situation which mlght lead ta international friction or give rise ta a dispute, to the attention of the Security CounciI. Ihave come very close to the view that the simple fact that aState makes use of this l'learly defined right should meanthat the matter i8 automatically placed on the agenda of the Counci1. The same ought to happen wnen under Article 99 the Secret&.I'y-General brings ta the attention of the Security Council any matter which may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security. For it is inconceivable that the Charter should grant such a specifie right to States and to the S~etary-General, while on the other hand these States and the Sec-etary-General himself can be deprived, by a minority of the members of the Council, of even the opportunity of explaining why they believe tbat .a dispute or a situation is a threat ta international peace and security. This interpretation is perfectly compatible with the Council's exclusive right to decide subsequently on itsCûmpetence in the matter and to band down a decision on the substance. 30. However, even if we agree that the Council has discretion to inc1ude in or exc1ude from its agenda a subject brought up by a Member S'Late or by the Secretary-General, it is obvious that this power shoù<ld be used with extreme caution. That is to say, only for very serious considerations 'Jr in very obvious circumstances such as bad faith or manifest error on the part of the complainant should the Council decide not to discuss the matter. In the past, the Council has invariably shown such caution, às our Ghinese colleague reminded es last Thursday when he told us that never in its six years of existence had it failed to place on its agenda a ll:1atter brought up by a Member State; 1 would add that even questions brought up by a single country, not by eleven as in this case, have been inc1uded, and even qU~8tions which might have seemed to be outside the Caancil's competence, such as the caseof Iran. 31. That is why we are alarmed that the Council should be on the point of departing from so wise and faha policy and creating a dangerous precedent. The countries which are not permanent members of the Security Council, including my own country, are greatly concerned that this organ, which is responsible for watching over the peace and security of the world and which is already limited in its powers by the rule requiring the unanimity of its permanent members, rhould now itself be limiting its own moral power by restricting debate, a limitation which may one day he imposed by a minority of its members. 32. Of course in the case before us k ..1ay it will apparently not be a minority but a small majority of six countries which will prevent the discussion of a matter which bas been brought iorward by cleven 34. We interpret what is happening to the request of the e1even States concerning Tunisia in this way because we realize that this is not an isolated instance. Most unfortunately, disregard for the proposals, plans and petitions of the smalI and middle-sized countries classed as under-deve1oped has recently assumed glaring proportions in the United Nations. One example of this attitude has been the coalition formed by the industrial countries whenever the General Assembly or the Economie and Social Council has discussed urgent requests for the acceleration of economic deveIopment, or for the extension of international co-operation in social matters, or for the injection of a positive content, in line with the needs and aspirations of human bejngs of today, into the provisions designed to safeguard human rights, or for the re-affirmation and application of such basie principles of the Charter as the self-determination of peoples. ~ 35. That is why l have said on previous occasion 5 ~ that l see looming on the horizon a lamentable division among the United Nations, based on grounds of colour, ethnie origin and stage of economic and social deve1op- . pement i.:::::~:i~~fiE~~~~~~~ 36. Last Thursday there were two surprisingly similar iucidents at the meetings of Committee 2 of the Di5armament Commission and of the Security Council, which were held in the morning and in the afternoon respective1y. In the Disarmament Commission, the Western representatives besought the USSR representative warmly and urgently to show his willingness to negotiate on disarmament and ta malœ it possible at least to consider a compromise formula. When the USSR represel1tative insisted on maintaining his position that his own plan must be accepted in its fundamentals, l believe that the majority of the members of the Disarmament Commission experienced a sensation of agonizing powerlessness. On the afternoon of that same day, in this very Council, the PIesident felt an equal anguish and impotence in the face of the determined refusal even to discuss the request of the eleven countries. It is plain that we should refiect on the future of an organization in which those who possess a given power in a specific situation maintain an uncompromising stand and will not talœ evèn a slnall step ta approach the position of the other members. 37. l said at the beginning of this speech that the only reason why we press this matter is our desire to prevent the destruction of the basic principles of the United Nations. No one here wishes to injure or harm France. The President made it very c1ear on behalf of the eleven complainant States that their only intention was to co-operate in the peacefu.l settIement of the Tunisian situation, and not in any way to impede any negotiations which may be initiated to settle it directly. There is no need for the Chilean delegation ta say that we desire nothing more than to avoid the slightest disagreement with France, a country whi,..h is our friend and which we admire, love and respect. 38. Moreover, we believe that in view ot other events which are taking place in Africa, every factor seems to argue - and l would ask you ta reflect on this point - that this Council should keep its agenda absolutely open to any suggestion for mediation which may be made. We must bear in mind the large non-Africau minority of European origin which lives in the African continent. We must bear it in mind both by dealing with justified Asian and Arab requests, and by helping this ethnic minority to explore any solution which will prevent it from one day becoming, through momentary arrogance, the victim of racial tragedy. 43. Speaking as the representative of Pakistan nt this stage of the discussion, l have very little to say. The draft resolution proposed by my delegation is designed to enable the Council to accede to the request made by ten Member nations who presented the complaint to the Security Council in the first instance. Theil" letters have been read out. They have said that during the course of the procedural debate certain remarks were made by the representative of France to which they fee! that an opportunity to reply is morally justified. So far as my delegation is concerned, we ourselves have briefly referred to these remarks. That, however, does not rob ten other Member natiorts from asserting their right to reply should they c.hoose to do sa. They have chosen to do so. The matter is therefore for the Council to discuss and decide upon. 44. My delegation only wishes to say that in its view rule 37 of the rules of procedure aUows the Council ta take such a decision. A point might be raised in ~omeone's mind to the effect that this request would he ' madmissible if the item, the Tunisian question, were 45. Ml'. COULSON (United Kingdom) ~ My delegation sympathizes with the spirit of conciliation in which the representative of ChHe has put forwarci the draft resolution whichhas now been circulated as document S/2600. 1 have only one comment to make on his statement. The representative of Chile gave the impression, as have some other speakers in our debate, that a minority of countries - n'atnely, five or sixwere preventing this question froin being aired in the United Nations, There seems to be a suggestion that there is somethillg ullnatural or immoral in this. 46. However, it'must surely be clearly understood that this is a criticism nat of the five or six countries for believing as they do but ~o-ainst the whole structure of the Security Council, in fact, against the rules and conditions. under which .we all agreed to enter this Orga'1ization. It cannot really be contended that we should changethese fundamental conditions from one moment to the nro. In any case, l do suggest that it ishighly misleading ta say that action is being blocked by a :ninority when, if l am fiot mistaken, a majority oJ this Council has said that it was not in favour of the inscription of !=bis ite!Il on the agenda, Of course, we know nothing of the views of all the other Members of the United Nations which have not brought the matter forward. 47. As for the draftresolution which has been circulatedby the representative of Chile, while appreciating the spirit in which it was brought forward, 1 am afraid thatmy delegation will have ta vote against it since it has the effect of putting the question onthe agenda and itwas precisely this which, as stated on 10· April by Sir. Gladwyn Jebb, we· cannot accept. 48. Unléss the President wishes ta order the business of the' Council otherwise, l should also like ta deal nowwith thedtaft resolutiori which the President in his capacifjr· ·asrepresentative of Pakistan proposed, dOèU111ent S/2598. At the stage which our discussions have reached, the effect of adopting this proposaI would be ·1:0 invite to this table certain countries which are not m~-n1Yèrs ofthe Counci1 before the agenda has been adoptt\d. It is from ~is point of viewthat 1 make the followingremarks. ' 49. In the first place, 11: is undoubted1y contrary to the g~neral precedents of Llûs Council that countries which are not members of the C'luncil should take part in ...discussions on the adoption of the agenda. The reasons for this. are· obvious. The. adoption of the agenda isa;matter of procedureand it is clearly for the n1enlbers of the Coundl alone to discuss and decide . upou" thefrp~ocedtlre.· . i:O if such a discussion tended to produce or prolong a debate on subjects which the Council did not consider suitable for inclusion in its. agenda. For thosereasons l regret that my delegation will have to vote ag~nst the draft resolution proposed by the President. . senté

l wish to state very briefly the position of my delegation ·with

In my previous intervention l had oc~ion to explain why my Govemment felt that it should abstain from the voting on the question of approving the provisional agenda now before u~. Whilst ;ecognizin~ in &"eneral the task of·the Secunty Counet! to examme dmputes or situations whidh might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, provided they do not faH under Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter, my Government is of the opinion that, apart from the question of competence of the Council, priority must always be given to ;possibilities of direct settlement between the responsible parties involved. The Council should be careful not to make such methods of direct settlement more difficult by premature debates or interventions. Since we helieve that all possibilities of direct settlement have not been exhausted, and since the responsible parties directly concerned seem now to be ready to examine new ways of finding a solution, we beIieve 1:hat nothing should ,be done by this. Council to hinder those efforts. 59. For that very same reason we feel that it would not bE:- conducive towards smoothing the way for direct discussions between the parties if we should now, before passing on to the vote on the provisional agenda, widen our debates by inviting, as the draft resolution submitied by the delegation of Pakistan proposes, the representatives of the ten States which, with Pakistan, brought this matter to the attention of the Security Council, to joiu in our discussions at fuis momentthat is to say, at a m'oment when we are still debating the provisional agenda. 60. Inasmuch as it may he felt hy some that they should be allowed to answer sorne of the remarks made by the· representative of France, l must remind the COllndl t!hat, technically speaking, we are only debating whether or not we should adopt the provisional ag-enda. We are not debating-or, at least, we are not·supposed ta he debating - the substance of the question. If· nevertheless some of the statements we heard were perhaps of a rafuer substantial nature, l may he allowed to say that these statements found most adequate rejoinder in the statements made by the representative of Pakistan. .Professor. Bokhari has shown himself· ta .he ·a very capa!ble and brilliant defender of the case which he and bis ten·coUeagues of other countries are sponsoring. Tt can hardly he said that this case has not had a very substantial airing before the Council, even ifat this stage the Council should have perhaps confined itself to a procedural debate.. We all knowthe difficulties of making a clear and absolute separation between procedural and substantive remarks. The President of the C;oundl, it s~ems to me, has not placed too narrowan interpretatIan.on. this deiicate question. He has 'allowedothers a rat~er free hand and, in bis capacity as the represen- !ativ.e of Pakistan, he has copiously permitted himself, ln hlS own statements, the same freedom. 61:. ~es~des,' the ten other sponsoring. States, in 63. It might also be harmful if we deeided to leave the matter brought to the attention of the Conneil hanging fire over this organ of t'he United Nations as unfinished business, as far as we members of the Couneilare concemed. Such a procedure has been more or less suggested by the representative of Chile. But that could still· create a disturbing influence in the atmosphere of goodwill which is indispensable for the direct negotiations between the responsible pàrties. It would be more appropriate for us, l think, to encourage the parties to find common ground hy confirming our trust intheir constructive intentions. This we can do best by not· interfering in their deIicate process of rapproche-ment - apart from the more fundamental question, which we are not now discussing, as to whether this Cauncil is or is not competent to interfeie, " 64-. It has been said .by some here that it would create a dangerous precedent not to hear those who want to have the Council seized of a particular matter regarding a dispute or a situation. But we should not try togàbeyond the Charter, as the representative of the United Kingdom has just remarked. The Charter speaks of the right of any Mentber to bring such matters before the Security Couneil. But it nowhere says !:hat the Couneil is obliged to inscribe such tTiatters ort itsagenda. That is' left to the ordinary procedure, which requires a màjority of at leastseven. votéS for sUch inscription. If the Charter hàd desired sothething different, it wouldhave said so. It could have stipulated, for instance, the right o'f any Member calling attention to a situation or a dispute to have its complaint inscribed on the agenda even if it were propased only by itself. It might have given this right automatically to two or thtee Or five Members. The Charter did not do. ·50, however. Itplaced these. matters under the ordinary procedure, which' requires seven affirmative votes for the adoption of a provisional agenda. There must have been a reason for this. l !:hink that the reason - or one of the reasons - may weIl have been that not all matters brought to the attention of the Counciishouid he piace9-0n ~.e agenda under aH clr- çumstances, but that .thlS. declslon must he left tQ the 65. Under those circumstances, my delegation, to its regret, will, be unable ta vote for the draft resolution introduced by the representative of Pakistan or for the one introduced by the representative of Chile.

If there are no more speakers, l should like, before the vote is taken, to correct two misa.pprehensions in regard to my speech, one on the part of the representative of the United Kingdom and the other of the representative of the Netherlands. 67. The Netherlands representative implied that my argument was based on the view that a matter brought before the Security Council by any member should automatically be placed on the agenda. l said that l had come very close to that view, and gave certain reasons. However, the real basis of my argument was different. It \Vas that although the Security Council had the right to prevent a matter from being placed on the agenda, it \Vas bound to exercise that right very rarely and with great caution; indeed the Council had never so far taken such action. 68. The United Kingdom representative, on the other hand, imputed to me the remark that in this case it would be a minority which would prevent the question from being included in the agenda. 1 said quite the contrar)". l did say that in accordance with the rule that sevl;:n votes are necessary on questions of procedure, five members - which would bl;: a minoritywould be able to prevent the inclusion of an item in the agenda. However, l said explicitly that in this case it would not be a minority but a small majority - in which small majority l included the four delegations which abstained and said that it was not their, intention to prevent the item from being placed on the agenda. 69. The United Kingdom representative also said that 'my remarks in effect criticized or prejudiced the very, structure of 'the S~curity Council. That was far from my 'intention. 1. undersi:and very well what that struètureconsists of; how the majority and, minority are formed and what rights they possess. 1 know that there are five members 'who in virtue of the Charter form a permanent part of the Security CounciI. l ~so know that the other six are elected by the General Assembly according to geographical distribution or to the contribution, which they are in a, position to make to the purposes, of the' Organization and that naturally the majority in the Assembly tries to secure the election of its members to the Security Council, so that the majority in the Security Council also represents the opinions of the ~ajority in the Assembly,tpat is of all thy Mepiher States. Sometimes mistakes arè made, but thlS is in fact the Assembly's right and this is what it does. ' 72. We were not at aIl surprised that even the moderate Chileàn and Pakistani draft resolutions which are before the Council today should haye been opposed by the United Kingdom. That we expected. But that theopp()sition should have l'~en argued in the way it was .ooly helped ta show us the hollowness of the case on their side. . 73.. 'fihe United Kingdom representativé was horrified that we should propOse toinvite to the Security Council table representatives of Member States of the United Nations, non-members of the Security Council, ta participate in a proceduraldebate. He did not argue, 50 far as l can recall his statement, that such an invitation would be ag-ainst the rules. l do ·not think that there isany rule in the rules ofprocedure which makes itimpossible for the Security Council to invite States ta .its •table for this or that purpose. The Security Couneil in this matter, where· the rules are not absolutely explicit, is the master of its own procedure. The United Kingdom représentative did not, therefore, appeal to the rulés. What he did say, if 1.recollect correctly, was that to invité Member nations which were' not members of thé ~ecurity Couricil to participate. in a procedural debatè would he contrary to practice. Thàt, l believe, was his argument. 74. This is exactly what we have been trying to tell Qur frierid from the United Kingdom and our other friends for the past two or three weeks: that Mt putting an item on the agerida is contrary to practice. And yet he invokes that precedent in his own favour, but not in ours. 75. He al:.U' put forward afiOther rather tortuous ~rgu­ ment. Hesaid the right of reply should be exercised with care. He said that it was not these ten delegations that ne~ded the right of reply. It was in factthe repre- 76. We did not deny the representative of France the right to deal with this complaint and its substance if he chose to do sa. Stdctly speaking, the representative of France in his first intervention should have confined himself exclusive1y to procedural matters, if at fuis stage the fact that this is a procedural debate is being invoked against us. The representative of F~'ance did not do sa. l think that in such a matter considerable latitude is possible. l do not take umbrage at the fact that the representative of France went into the substance of the question. l think that in all snch matters it is practica11y impossible not to enter into the substance of the question. l conceded him that right, although perhaps strictly legalistically it was not his right. l, as the President, did not interrupt mm. 77. Tt is not that we denied him the right to examine the complaint, even though it was purely at the procedural stage. The ten Members who have now asked ta be heard have n,)t said, "Why did the répresentative of France refer to our complaint? Why did he argue against it? Why did he find 10Dp-holes in it? Why did he demolish it?" He can do all these things. What they do say is, "Wh}' did the representative of France insult us?" That is what they were not expecting. It is exactly on that ground that they have asked to be heard. Is there any doubt in the matter? 78. For the information of the representative of the united Kingdom, l should very much like to read out a few sentences from the first intervention of my French colleague [574th meeting]. This is what he said: "Thus, disregarding the present - in other words, shutting their eyes to the reality before them - the e1even or twe1ve States are going back more than seventy years in an effort to draw a picture of the past which is as sketchy as lt is inaccurate and tendenticus and which reduces this document to the status of a propaganda instrument. 1 read anothér extract: ."lndeed l dare hope that defamatory assertions wtl! not take the place of arguments in the statements W~iC~ ma:y b~ m,;de in support of the inclusion of thiS lUvestlgatlon lU the final agenda of our meeting, and ~hat those who speak will remaÎn sufficiently conSClOUS of the responsibility devQlving upOn è2.cl1 one of usas members of the Security Council not ta ~eed the fire of popular passion with mendacious or l11accurate allegations." That the ten member nations were here hinted at, l would be glad to show in a moment. For here is allother statement from the intervention of my French col1eague; 81. Of course, e.."ctremely laudatory references have been made to my delegation's advocacy of this case. That does not bEnd our eyes to the fact that even though we may be representing here the point of view of ten other Member nations, those ten Member nations are independent sovereign States. No one ca.n take away from them the right ta speak. No one can speak on their behalf except in circumstances in which such a Member may be forced ta do sa, which was what the position of my delegation was in the matter. We still think that because one of the States happens to be a mer..:lher of the Security Council, its intervention'S should hot be regarded as though they were sufficient on their behalf, particularly when they have been called such distasteful names and when such distasteful allegatio!1s have been made against their bona fides. 82. .l wish ta make one further remark, and that concerns the Chilean proposaI. My delegation, of course, will support it because it at least saves the honour, the dignity and thE' 'Sense of justice on which the United Natiof.ls is supposed ta be built. l was again interested to listen to the arguments given against that proposaI by the representatives nfthe United Kingdom and the Netherlands. 83.. Time and again, in ail the statements that have been made against the inclusion of this item in the agenda, the one argument which has been constantly repeated is that a debate at this stage would jeopardize the chances of a negotiation in Tunisia. l could read to my British friend exfracts from the statement recentIy made by Sir Gladwyn Jebb [575th -meeting]. l wiII not do sa because l am perfectly sure that everyone of· us by now, having 1Ïstened to his statement with great -.::are, knows it practically by heart. In that statement he 84. My delegation tried to meet this point very fully in our last intervention at the previous meeting. Vve repeat now what we asked then: negotiations between whom? Whom are the French negotiating with? The representatives of the people with whom they could negotiate a peaceful settlement are aU in gaol, and, therefore, there are no negotiations at the moment except negotiations between the French and the French. Again, assuming that there are sorne people with whom negotiations can be brought to a successful conclusion and can produce happy results, and if negotiations are going on and if it is feared that a debate here is going ta jeopardize the chances of the success of such negotiations, the Chilean draft resolution at least safeguards against that. The Chilean draft resolution says: let us not do something which is unprecedented; let us not do something which the Security Council in hs six-year history has not done; let us not adopt a new attitude just when a colonial people has brought a complaint to the Security Council, a complaint of domination, exploitation and ill-treatment; let us save at least that principle and, if friends think that discussion here will mar the chances of negotiations, let us not discuss the question for the time being. 85. Of course, my Chilean colleague and my delegation see this matter somewhat differently. We think that the position at the present moment is so bad that, if it became worse, it would only become worse in this sense: thal more people would be convinced than are convincel: '3.t the present moment of the danger inherent in the situation. Ta us, it is bad enough to know that the King of Tunisia is practically, a French prisoner and that people of any importance are either killed or put into gaoI. But if it is desired that this matter should not be discussed, that is exactly what the Chilean representative has proposed. Even that is being opposed. This, ! be1ieve, so far as the hopes of colonial people are concerned - as they read these discussions - will he the last straw. It is only in order ta save the Security Council from that situation, to save the Security Council from getting about the worst name it will have had in its history, that we would support the Chilean proposaI. Otherwise, we think, as we believed, that without much ado. this item should have been put on the agenda and a dIScussion of it along responsible lines should have been undertaken two weeks ago. 86. l shaH now proceed to speak in my capacity as P~ESIDENT. l l:ave no other speakers on my list. It IS now .about twenty minutes past six. The business befor.e us 1S ta vote on the two propositions. After that l belteve there might be explanations of vote. Certainly ~he delegation of Pakistan has been instructed to explain ltS vote. This will take us, l think, until well after seven o'clock. BS, The \'oting procf.',dure will be l1rst to vote on the dràft resolution ~ublt1itted by Pakistan) documfillt 8/2598 ~ then 1:0 vote on the draft resolution subnlitted hy ChUe, dOCUll1ent S/26OO 1and thereafter, ta vote on the adoption of the ~~nda, If that procedure is accept~ abil\ l shall adoJlt it, @, Ml', SOLDATOV (UUiOll of Soviet Sodalist Republiès) (tratt..\'llltêti frot·tt RlIssiatt): At the last n\~til1g, whcl1 \ve discussed the request of the eleven StatèS tt)l' the in.clt\siou of the. question of the situation in 1\misi:l in the ~~nda of the Security Coundl) the DSSR. delegation explained its position on the matter. '90. hi. vlew 0\ the fllet that tw~ new piOp'0sals have no\V llèeli subn\\ttOO to the Secu1'1ty Counctl, 1 should lik'"è to tii:ll..'"è ~ brier l;t:itément 011 the question we al'e ditt~l~ing. '91. The tJSSR dele}tation has nlready referred in its ~tatèi~nt rS?5tlt Ut~ëtittg] to tre undémocratie manner ni \\-lncl\ the qUêstitln was dtscussed by the French ~Ï'éSè\it'-àth~,whtl i\i his st{ite111ènt took the liberty of Mâking ~ series of attacks against the eleven States whlcl\ h~\'"è t"èquested the inclusion of the Tunisian '<}\iêStiÔl1 in. Hie ~enda of the Secu1'Îty Council. We ootèd ~lso th~t the~'rench representative in his lengthy ~ten\ènt on the substance tlf the Tunisian. question had e.'tplâihM the French point of view. 011 the 11'latter :md :stâ~ that he w'ould vote agahlst the inclusion of the qnesttO'r\ in the ~da of the Seèurity Coundl. At the sat\\e tlûYè W'è fiôfud that the French representative was tims u.~ his privi1~s M a ~et111anent 111embel',of the C'èUfictl m an atte111pt t.o deprtve the representatives of tèn St:ltès which are not tnt:.ltlbers of the Seeurity (,,@U"'.M ûi àh opportintity of gi\Tin~ the views of their ~Ô\:-anmèntson the Tunisian question ta the CouncU. 92.. It is obviouslyi111possible t.o agree to such an ~'tOO.cll. The S~urity CouncU should give all the ten S~tèS ID1 oppùrtunity ta explain their attitude towards dais qu.esti<m. That i5 thclr legal right. 93. As regards the references made here to the rul(',8 of proœdure of t1le Security Coundl, wlùch have been in~ hy Cèrtain representatives t<? justify the refusai tG.n~ tlle request of the ten States, it should be recalled ~ ihereis nothing in the !'Ules of procedure of the Secm:ity Council to prevent the ten States from being heatd in The Council now, In accordance with role 37 ~ffie. mIes of procedure of the Seeurity Council, "Any ~ of the United Nations which is not a member nt the Securiiy Council n'lay be imited, as the result of a docision of The Security Couucil, to participate, wÏffiont vote, in the discussion of any question brought More the. Seœriîy Counci1 when the Security Counci1 ~s i:hat the interests of that MeI1Ù>'>..r are specially ~ecred•••"'. 94-. In the ca...'e in point, we have such a posiô0u, ~1he interests of e1even States are directly affected. The ~ Council is not entitled to deprive them of an·~ID state·their views on the attacks which baR:.been made here against ten of the States which mwe brought. ilie question of the position which has a.riBen in. Ttmisia before the Council. 98. First of aIl, 1 will take up the draft resolntion submitted by the delegatioll of Pakistan. My delegation will vote for that draft resolution, but 1 would like to resetve our stand on the applicability of rule 37 of our rules of procedure. I am not sure that that rule is applicable to the present occasion. Howéver, since the representatives of the sponsoring States tell us that they have a complaint against the language used by the representative of Fra.nce, l think equity requires that we give them a chance to reply. It is on that ground that we will vote for the Pakistan draft resolution, not on the ground of rule 37. In regard to that rule the attitude of my delegation is reserved. 99. In the second instance we have before us the draft resolution submitted by the representative of Chile. My delegz.tion will aIso vote in favour of that resolution. The basic considerations of my delegation have been made known to this Council in my previous intervention in this debate [575th meeting]. 100. In the first place, 1 feel that the Council must be faithful to its principles and traditions. That is a basic consideration with us. In the second place, my 1elegation would like to see the Tunisian" question settled. 1 do not wish this Council to take any action which may hamper the negotiations which are about to begin. Although I have heard statements in this Council this afternoon that even this draft resolution proposed by the representative of Chile may hamper the negotiations, 1 am not convinced that that argument is conclusive. 1 do not see how the passage of such a resolution could hamper negotiations about to be undertaken. ~Ol. Of. course, we are told that any possibility of mtervention. by the United Nations is a complicating factor. But If we should vote today against the adoption of the agenda, would that complicating factor be entirely ren:oved ? The General Assembly is open. States which have a grievance or States which think that sorne question may disturb the peace and security of the world m~y ask for a. special session of the Assembly. Why ~s concern for the vote we may take here? Tf the v:ote should be against the adoption of the ag~nda, sorne ~e later the same representatives, or other represen- 102. For these reasons my rle1egation will vote for the draft resolution submitted by the representative of Chile.

We shall now vote on the draft resolution submitted by Pakistan, the t<=..--::t of which is to be found in document S/2598, reading as follows: "The Security COltncil, "considering the communications dated 2 April 1952. addressed by the representatives of Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia and Yemen to the President of the Security Couneil (S/2579, S/2581, S/2575, S/2580, S/2574, S/2582, S/2576, S/2583, S/25ï8, S/2584), "Noting the subsequent communications addressed by the above-mentioned representatives to the President of the Security Council which were read out to the Couneil by the President in the 575th meeting of the Couneil held on 10 April 1952, "Decides to invite those of the above-mentioned representatives who have expressed to hope that the Couneil will provide them with a suitable opportunity to answer certain remarks made about them by the representative of France in the 574th meeting of the Council held on 4 April 1952, to take part in the proceedings of the Council for that purpose." A vote was taken by show of hands, as follows: In fav01w: Brazil, Chile, Chlna, Pakistan, Union of Soviet Soeialist Republics. Against: France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Abstaining: Greece, Netherlands, Turkey, United States of America. The result of the vote was 5 in fav'our, 2 against, with 4 abstentions. The draft resolution was not adopted, having failed to obtain the affirmative votes of seven members. 104. The PRESIDENT: We shall now proceed to vote on the Chilean draft resolution contained in document S/2600, the text of which reads: "The Security Council "Decides to include in its agenda consideration of the communications submitted by Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia and Yemen with regard to the situation in Tunisia, on the understan.ding that sucb action does not imp1y any deeision regarding the competence of the Council to consider the substance of the question; "Decides to postpone consideration of the communications referred to for the time being." 105. Mr. SOLDATOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from R~tssian): l should like to request a vote by parts, as follows: the first ~Tote to be 1 1

The representative of the Soviet Union has asked for separate votes on parts of the Chilean proposaI. The representative of Chile does not agree with that procedure and, under the rule that he has cited, he is entitled to express his views iri that manner. l therefore take it that we shaH vote on the Chilean proposaI as a whole.

The USSR delegation has asked for a vote by parts on the Chilean representative's proposaI because the proposaI in its present form, if it is taken as a whole, does not meet t~e r~quest made by the eleven States in their commul11Ca~lOns !o the Security CounciI. These States ask for ~he 111cluslOn of the questic:1 of the situation in Tunisia 111 the agenda of the Security Council, but they do not ask the Security Council to postpone the consideration 119. However, my proposaI is grounded in the good faith of the only one of the eleven complainant countries which is a member of the Coundl: the representative of Pakista..'1, our own President, has given his assurance that it is not his intention to impede any negotiations which rnay be going on with a view to the direct sett1ement of the Tunisian question. l am sure that unless other serious events occur in the near future, the representative of Pakistan will not ask the Council to consider the question immediate1y. 120. Caught between the intransigence of those countries which oppose the inclusion of the item in the agenda and the equally intransigent interpretation of the representative of the USSR, l feel tempted to withdraw my proposaI, for l see that in this, as in other cases, the small countries can do very little to bring about compromise solutions or settlements which can prevent major conflict. However, l am anxious that the Coundl should take a yote on the amendment which we have proposed. l want 11 to be placed clearly on record which countries support and which oppose this proposaI, which was put forward with the best intent and which would undoubtedlv avoid the.danger ~i~ed here by.some. represen~atives to~ justify thetr opposttlon to the mcluslOn of thts matter in the agenda.

Since rule 32 of .he rules of procedure applies, we shaII vote on the Chilean draft resolution as a whole. A vote was taken by show of hands, as follows: In favour: Brazil, Chile, China, Pakistan, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Against: France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. . Abstaining: Greece, Netherlands, Turkey United States of America. ' The result of the vote was 5 i1f, favour, 2 against, with 4 ahstenti014,s. It~ favour: Brazil, ChUe, China, Pakistan, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Against: France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Abstaining: Greece, Netherlands, Turkey, United States of America. The result of the vote was 5 in favO'ltr, 2 against, with 4- I.Ibste1~tions. Theprovisional agenda was not adoptedJhaving failed to obtain the affirmative votes of ~even me1'nbers. 123. The PRESIDENT: If the Council has no objection, the delegation of PAKISTAN would like to expiain its vote. The delegation of Pakistan would like to inake thefollowing statement in explanation of the vote that it has cast in favour of the inscription on the agenda of the Tunisian question. 124. Since about the beginning of this year there has been serious unrest in Tunisia. Many cases of killings, violence, shooting and large-scale arrests have been wide1y reported in the world Press. My Government, together with the Governments of ten other Member nations, has takena very serious view of the situation. We firmly bdieve that the distressful incidents of the past three months and more are,not mere1y a local, civil disturbance or ordinary breachês of the peace calling for the usual preventive measures by the forces of law and order. They were not brought about by a few foolish or evil individuals on either side. The situation has its roots in the past, it is extremely precariously balanced at present and it bodes ill for the future. That is why, in our view, it constitutes a serious threat to international peace and security. 125. 1 beg leave to explain this a litile further as justification and explanation of our view and our vote. 126. The conflict between the Frenc.l-t authorities, on the one hand, and the Government and people of Tunisia, 011 the other, that has recently aroused world interest,is>merely the latest phase in a struggle that has-been going on for many years. 127. Tunisia was occupied by the French in 1881 when a French force crossed over from Aigeria "under pretext ofchastising" a certain tribe - says the historian-'-- "and quickly dropping the mask, advanced on the capital and compelled the Bey to accept the French protectorate". That is a quotation from the Encyclopedia Britannica. 128~ Although the Treaty of Bardo signed in that year conforms to' the general pattern of treaties negotiated in the heyday of imperialism between the strong and the weak, nevertheless its' preamble speaks of the parties as "desirous of cementing the ties of friendship and good neighbourliness which have always existed between the two States". Article 2 of the treaty stipulates' thaï French-niilitary-'occupation "will cease when 135. The Tunisians never willingly accepted this domination. Since the beginning of this century, however, the Tunisian nationalist movement has become growingly dynamic and has taken the same form and ~hape as in many other parts of the world where sub- Ject peoples in the political climate of modern times 136. After the First World War and President Wilson's Fourteen Points, fresh hopes filled the hearts of the Tunisians. At the same time. to ouote the Economist: . ~ "The French Government started gystematically to increase the French population of officiaIs and small settlers and the political parties in France began ta take sides ~s bet'.\:een the aspirations of the 'go-ahead' left-wing element kown as th,~ Neo- Destour and the settlers." 137. The hopes and e.."5Cpectations of the Tunisians roses and fell with changes in the complexion of the French Govenllnent in Paris. By 1938, the bitterly frustrated Neo-Destour and the pro-colonist French authorities girt their loins for a large-scale conflict. About a thousand nationalists were thrown into gaol. The French authorities proclaimed a state of siege in Tunisia which, so far as our information goes, has not yet. been fonnally lifted although fourteen years have elapsed since then. . 138. Aftel' the Second World War, it became clear that direct administration of Tunisia by France, which was not justified either by the treaties between the two States or by any principle of freedom and justice, needed revision. To quote again from the Economist: "The Government which they [that is, the Tunisians and the French] set out to change was - at the time - composed as follows: The Bey ruled through a cabinet consisting of seven Frenchmen and six Tunisians but their decisions required a Frenchman's 'visa' before they were passed upwards. The cabinet was served in economic and financial matters by twa elected grand councils of equal size (one composed of Tunisians, the other of local Frenchmen) but only in an advisory capacity. Local govemmrnttoo was nominally conducted by Tunisians. But in practic~., ail internal control rernained in French hands because a French official took the chair at aIl cabinet meetings, because Frenel! cruntersignature was essential to all Beylic;ol decrees and because French civil control1ers supervised even municipal and rural authorities." To continue the quotation: "In the summer of 1950, the new moods of 1949 yieldedtwo results of importance. In the teeth of the die-hard element· among the settlers a new French Resident General was instructed to institute three major reforms and, if possible, to do sa with Tunisian collaboration. He was immediately ta reconstitute the cabinet; he was ta alter the tenns La "By February 1951 severai. changes had been secured by agreement inc1uding a ruling that rnipjsterial decrees no longer reouired the hated French visa before passing to the B·ey for signature. Everyone was pleased except the settlers. What went wrong in 1951?" The answer to this question is briefly supplied by the same writer: "The raot of the recent troubles is that whereas the Neo-Destour and, indecd, most Tunisians look on these reforms merely as t'~e start of a quick turnover to complete self-govervment, the French settiers regard them as lirnits lJeyond which Paris must not go." 139. mars il 140. au voici 139. The Prime Minister of Tunisia wrote to the French Resident-General on 30 March 1951 as follows: "The present cabinet is considerably handicapped ty a ceaseless interference with its initiatives... The prestige of a cabinet of negotiation would not withstand for long such pressure, the more so because it has been submitted for several months to the disparaging and hostile action of the French community, both in Tunisia and in Paris. The attitude of the majority of the representatives of the French community both in Tunisia and in Paris, the attitude of the executive of the French section and its attempts to wreck the negotiation are an open secret. Resignation en bloc, political motions, the referring ta a mixed de1egation of credits which had been asked for by the Prime Minister, aIl means have been used to render impossible any kind of cooperation between this Assembly and the Tunisian Government." 140. On 22 April 1951 the Prime Minister again wrote to the French Resident General: "It would", he said, "be ungracious of me, Mr. Resident General, to describe here the multiple .~anœuvres which preceded and then followed the blrth of the cabinet from the spectacular resignation of the executive of the French section of the Grand Council ta [he deputations sent to the French Government and Parliament, let alone various cases of gillal pattir kistan. 141. In other words, the spirit of 1950 had been complete1y destroyed by the French vested interests in Tunisia. The Tunisian cabinet, which had been formed to negotiate with the French Government for the restoration of Tunisian autonomy, of which the King and L~e people 01 Tunisia had been so wrongfully deprived, was rendered ineffectual by the intrigues of French settlers, by wanton interference in the day-to-day \-York of the Tunisian Ministers and by the indignities tl) which the Tunisian Ministers were constantly subjected. 142. It was in fuis mood of disappointment and futility that the Tunisian Ministerc; went to Paris later in 1951 to remind the French Government once more of its pJ.edge's and promises. The reply of the Fore!gn Minister of France dated 15 December 1951 t,) their representation dashed aH their hopes. It accepted little e1se tha'l the nepd for municipai reforms. For the rest, it was a long homily on France's civilizing work in Tunisia "'ud the so-called "essential role" that the French ...... Tunisia had played in it. This reply bitterly disappointed the Tunisians and roused serious apprehensions· in the minds of people in many parts of the world. 143. In 1950 Mr. Robert Schuman had won the hearts of the Tun;,~ia."15 by talking of "independence which is the final obkdive for all territories of the French Union". In I1is letter of 15 December 1951, however, he sought to reverse the co:-rse of history by empbatically stating: "The French Government is not averse [Q studying a modification of the present institution, but it maintains that the preservation of the continuity of French representation in the Government of His Highness the Bey is indispensable." 144. The dismay and the desperation of the Tun1- ";~,ns cannot be better described than in the words of the Tunisian Pri.'TIe Miaister, who, in utter amazement at the turn of events, wrote to the French President as follows: 148. These are the reasons why my Government regarded anù still regards the situation in Tunisia to be far more than a minor local or domestic matter. The fact that the French Government has announced a new plan of reforms, when nationalise leaders of Tunisia, 'vith whom alone such plans can be negotiated if they are to solve anything, are aH imprisoned, does not fill us with any confidence. 149. Viewed in this light, the latest news from Tunisia is disquieting. Reporting that anew "Tunisian Cabinet" had been formed on 12 April, two days ago, an Associated Press dispatch, published in the New York Herald Tribune, says: "The Cabinet has no powers to speak of. Observers present at the announcement ceremony in nearby Carthage said the Bey of Tunis, the nominal roler 150. This indicates that once more the French Government is substituting the shadow for the substance and repeating the too-frequent colonial situation in which the aspirations for self-determination are silenced to produce an illusory calm to fit the shortsighted policy of the colonial Power. The only wise course for the colonial Power would he to enlarge its own vision and respect subject peoples for the sentiments which in other contexts they would regard as constituting noble and heroic patriotism. 151. An author writing in a well-known American magazine coÎlsiders it "ironically appropriate that the problemsof withdrawal from Africa are posed first and above all for France, the weakest of the Atlantic powers. Now that the British have dismantled h~lf their empire", he goes on to say, "the French stand forth as the greatest colonial power in the worId. They govern 80 million subject people gird1ing the globe inhabiting an area roughly one and a haH tirues the size of the United States ... In Africa, with wisdom, the French still have time to prepare the structure of co-operation to replace the structure of dominion for the inevitable withdrawal. In this they act as trustees of the whole Atlantic world." 152. In such withdrawal there is no shame or defeat, for if the Charter of the United Nations means anything, notbJng will ultimately become the metropolitan Powers in their colonies more than the leaving of them. 1t ia the earnest hope of all peace-loving nations that such withdrawals will be orderly, involving the least possible .moral or physical destruction, and that they will leave happy memories on both sides in order that peace should be strengthened in the w!=,rld. 153.... In v()ting for the inscription of this item on the agenda,the aims of mydelegation were: first and foremost, to seek thegood o~ces of the Security Council to save the Tunisians from the indignities, hardships, destruction ."of life ~nd pJ;'operty and 105s of çivil liber- 154. In the end, 1 wish to say that my Government and my country have the greatest affection for the people of France, and sincere respect for their great liberal traditions. As one of Pakistan's leading dailies, Dawn, has observed: "Whatever our differences on certain political questions with France may be, we in this CCU:.1try hold the people of France in the highest. esteem because of that noble cry of Liberty, Equality, Fraternity. We want the French to be our friends in a free world and no effort is being spared by this country to strengthen Franso-Pakistani ties." 155. If, in trying to uphold here the very principles for which history will ever honour the name of France, l have made heavy demands on the patience of my colleague, the representative of France, 1 sincerely crave his pàrdon. 156. Ml'. HOPPENOT (France) (translated fro11t -French) : Despite the lateness of the hour, 1 cannat allow this meeting of the Security Council to he concluded without replying to the long speech we have just heard - a speech of which the explanation of vote which was its ostensible purpose occupies barely a pag'~, and polemics and pseudo-history fourteen. 157. First, 1 would observe that after the Council's vote had terminated what was in fad a procedural discussion concerning the agenda, the President nevertheless proceeded to make a speech which did not touch once on matters of procedure and which dealt with a great number of questions completely irrelevant to that discussion, which in any event had been closed. He was abl~ to do that unch~cked, beC'Ause there was no President in a position, as the higher authority, to calI the représentative of Pakistan to order. 158. AU 1 shall say about the "President's indictme.'lt of France's achievements in Tunisia during the last ?eyen~y years is that it bears an the marks of partiality, 111Justtce and inaccuracy. It is too late for me to give a detailed reply. 1 will merely say, however, that the best proof of his determination to distort the ~acts is !hat he. ~ompletely ignored France's civilizing work 111 TU1l1S1a, except for a sneer at Ml'. Schuman for havlng referred to it. His picture contains nothing but the blackest s1:tadows; there is no light at aU. That is enough to discredit and invaliùate it.

l should like to make only one concluding remark. 161. The situation in which a certain delegation occupies the Chair occurs every month. l take it that, every month, any delegation which oc<mpies the Chair has a stand, an attitude, a view with regard ta any question that is discussed. Therefore, a situation similar to the one in which the intervention of the delegation of Pakistan could not be checked by anyone could recur every month in the Security Couneil. It was perfectly open ta any member of the Security Couneil ta call the representative of Paldstan to arder. l assure the representative of France that in such a case, I, as President of the Security COtmcil,' should have placed the point of arder before the Couneil for .its deeision. 162. l have no other names on the list of speakers and, if there is no objection, l propose ta adjourn this meeting now. SALES AGENTS fOR UNITED DEPOSI1AIRES DES PUSI.ICAflONS AlGENTINA - ARGMINE Ellitori.1 Sud.meric.n. S.A.. Al.in. 500. Buenos Aires. GRF.ECE - GR~CE "E1ertheroudakis." tion. Athènes. AUSTRAlIA - AUSTRAliE H. A. Godd.rd. 255. G.orge St.. Sydney. m.IUM-BELGIQUE Agenc. et Mess.geri•• de 1. Proue S.A., 1'!-22 rue du P.rsil. Brux.II... W. H. Smith & Son. 71·75 Soul.v.rd Adolphe·Met, 9rux.II... GUATEMALA Goubaud & Cra. Guatemal•• HAITI Libr.iri. "A 1. III-B, Port·au-Prince. HONOUIlAS Librerl. P.n.moric.n., Fuente. T.gucig.lpa. IOlIVIA - IOLlVIE Ubrerl. Selecciones, C.silt. '772, Le Paz. IUIIL- IIESIL livr.ri. Agir, Ru. MeXico 9S.B. Rio d. Janeiro. INbIA-INDE Oxford Book House. New Delhi. P. V.r.d.chary St.• M.dr.s 1. CAIlADA Ryerson Press. 299 Que.n St. West. Toronto. Les Preu.s Universit.ires Laval, Quebec. INDOHESIA-IHDONESIE Jaias.n Pemb.ngun.n, Di·kart•. CEYLON - CEYLAN Th. A$$oci.ted Newspapers of Càyion, Ltcl., Leie House, Colombo. IRAN Ket.b·Kh.neh CHIlE-CHILI Q\l~, T.ehran. Ubrerr~ Ivens. Monado 822. S;'litiüg~ IRAQ-IRAK Madenzie's Bookshop, CHINA- CHIllE Commerci.1 Press, Lld.. 211 Hon.n Rd.• Sh.ngh.i. IRELAIID -IRLAIIDE Hibemian Gener.1 merci.1 Buildings, COLOMBIA - COLOMBIE Librerl. L.tina Ltcl... Ca"er. 6... 13-05, Bogot6. ISRAEL Blumstein's Bookstores, Rood, Tel Aviv. COSTA RICA - COSTA·RICA Tr.ios Herm.nos. Ap.rtado 1313. San Jos6. ITALY -ITAlIE Colibri S.A., Vi. CUBA L. C.s. Selge. O'Reilty 455. Le H.ban•• LEDANON - LIBAN librairie universelle. CZECIlOSLOVAKIA - TClIECOSLOVAQUIE Ceskoslovensky Spisov.tel, N.rodni Trid. 9. Pr.h. 1. LIBERIA' J. Mamolu Kamar~t DENMAIlK - DANEMARK Elner Munhg.and. Ltcl.. Njl".gade 6, KlIb.nhavn. K. LUXEMBOURG librairie J. Schummer, DOMlNtCAH REPUBLtC - REPUB. DOMlIiICAINE Libr.rla Domlnicana. Merc.des 49. Ciu- d.d Trujillo. MEXICO - MEXIQUE Editorial Hermos 41. M6xico, D.F. ECUADOR- EQUATIUR Lib'e,le Ci.ntlil..., Box 362. Gu.yequil. MmlERLANDS - N.V. M.rtinus 'saGravenhage. EBYPT- IGYPTE Ubr.lri. "La R.nelssànc. d'Egypte." 9 Sh. Adly P.she. Ceiro. HEW lEAlARD -1l0UVElLE.ZElANIJE U. N. Aun. of Wollingfon. EL SALVADOR - SALVADOR M.nuel Nevas y Cie., la Av.nida su, 37. S.n S.lv.dor. NICARAGUA Dr. Ramiro R.mlre. mllOPlA- ETHIOPIE Ag.nc. E:'hiopienne d. .publicité. Box 12B, Addis.Abebe. NORWAY - NDRVEIE Johen Grundt gustsgt. 7A. Oslo. f1NlAIID... FlHLANDE PAKISTAN Thomas & Thom.s. Ro.d. Ker.chi. Publlsh.", Unit.d hore. A~meminen Kiri.k.uppe, 2. K••ku,k.tu, Helsin~i. RANG Editions ..... Pedon., 13 rue Soufllot, P.risV. Orders cme! inquiries from countries whllre sales agenb hCl\"" not yet been Ç1ppolnted may be sent tOI Sales and CIrculation Section, United Nations, New York, U.S.A.; or Sales Section, United Nation. Office, Pola!s Nations, Genevo, Swltzerland. Priee: (or equivalent Printed in Canada