S/PV.577 Security Council

Members have before them the provisional agenda contained in docU111ent S/Agenda ~77. Have members any observations to make on the agenda? If not, we shall consider it adopted.

As a matter of procedure, and in order that the wording of the agenda items may be more correct, 1 would propose that items 2 and 3 of the provisional agenda should he revised and the words "Question of" inserted at the beginning of each of those items. Item 2 therefore, would read: "Question of an appeal to States, etc.", and the item 3 would read: ."Question of the adoption of a recommendation, etc.". 1 think that is a practice 1 which has been fairly standard in the proceedings of the Security Couneil, and 1 would urge the President to accept it.

Concerning item 3 of the provisional agenda, 1 would suggest the deletion of the ward "fourteen", so that the phrase would read: "of ail States which have applied for snch admission." 4.. The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian) : Wlth regard to the proposaI submitted by the delega- 5. Thus, it is not correct for the United States representativè to say that in Security Council practice it is obligatory, whcn an item is placed on t.~e agenda; for the ward "question" to appear in the wording. Sorne items are worded in one way and others in a different way. 6. As for the question of the wording of items 2 and 3 of the provisional agenda raised by the United States representative, I should like ta point out that the letter from the Soviet Union de1egation to the Assistant Secretary..General for Security Council Affairs, Mr. Zinchenko, that is ta say, ta the Secretariat of the United Nations, worded the itel!l as follows: "Concerningan appeal ta States to accede to and ratify the Geneva Protocol of 1925 for the -prohibition of the use of bacterial weapons' '. 7. The Russian text does not s~y "Appeal", but "Concerning an appeal". 1 do not presume to judge how a literaI translation into English of the Russian words should read. The translation into English was made by qualified translators of the United Nations Secretariat. If in that translation the word "conceming" in the Russian text was not conveyed, it is for the trans1ators ta decide how best ta convey t..he word in English. As for the Russian tex.t, 1 repeat that the wording of the item is: "Concerning an appeal ta States... " and not "Appeal to States". If it is more correct, in translating this iuto English to say "Question of an appeal", it would perhaps he desirable ta adopt this wording in _the ~nglish tex~ of th~, provisional agenda; but the Russmn text wIll read Concerning an appeal". Hence, I see little differenc:e between the wording submitted by the USSR delegation and that proposed by the United States delegation. 8. As for item 3, that reads in Russian: "Adoption of a recommendation". The delegation of the Soviet 9. Accordingly, the delegat1nn of the Soviet Union does not attach such great significance ta the wording of this particular item in the Security Coul1dl's agenda. What is imp'ortant is the substance of the item, not the way in which it is worded. 10. Mr. SANTA CRUZ (Chile) (translated trom Spanish): In order ta be able to form an opinion on the United States representative's proposaI and the statement just made by t.1}e President that what is important is the substance of the matter and not the titIe ùsed to describe the agenda item, l should like the President to explain to me what the issue which has been brought before the Security Council reallJT is. 11. Article 34, which, as l understand it, is the artide invoked in .this case by the delegation of the Soviet Union, says that the Security Cou.ncil may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might iead to international friction or give rise to a dispute. It is therefore essential that we should know what this pàssibility of a dispute or of international friction really consists of. As it appears on the agenda, the question seems to be concerned with the settlement of some matter of friction or dispute which has not been explained. In our view, this is of some importance, because if the question now being brought before t!le Couilcil is really one likely to t:r,danger international peace and security, the Security Council will be free to consider the case ar~d adopt any resolution calculated ta put an end to the situation, without confining itself to a specifie resolution such as that proposed in docume!lt S/2663. 12. May l therefore ask the President to provide this clarification. 13. Mr. MUNIZ (Brazil): It is not a question of adding the word "question" mechanically before every item placed on the agenda; as was implied by the President in his statement. Of course in many cases, and l will agree with !lim, the ward "question" is not pertinent. In this particulat: case, however, my delegation· thinks that the· insertion of theword "question" is necessary. W-e do not intend to. discuss here the wording of an appeal which. the Cnuncil hasalready ùecided ta send to States; what we intend.to discuss is the convenience' or' inconve!lip.nce of sending such an appea1. l think that the position of the represen- ~at,ive of the United States is correCt in this particular itlstance. In order to place this item on the agenda in a very precise and logical way, and to avoidâny misunderstanding, we should refer toit as a "question". 16. Similarly, item 3 of the agenda should begin with the words: "Recommendation to the General Assemhl).", etc., or "Question of a recommendation to the General Assembly ... ". ,

As l understand it, the French representative is making a somewhat different proposa1 from that submitted by the l!'lited States representative. If that is actually his intention,may l ask the French representative to formulatc his proposaI on item 3 of the provisional agenda more precisely.

l shaH attempt to be as clear as possible. l pi"opose that item 3 ov. the Council's agenda should be drufted as follows: "Question of a recommendation ta the General Assembly concerning the simultaneous admission ...". l reserve the right ta speak later on the propOsai made by our colleague, the representative of Greece, with regard to the drafting of the last part of tms recommendation.

l should like to clarify the question under di.scussion. Perhaps it would Le desirable first ta complete the wotding of item 2 and then to turn to the wording of item 3. l think it will be more practical ta proceed by disposing of the one item and then taking up the other. This will avoid any repetition and unnecessary overlapping. 20. If the members of the Council have no objection, therefùre, l would ask speakers to deal with the wording ,of item 2. After that, when we have agreed on the wording of item 2, we will proceed to discuss the wohling of item 3. 21. If there are no objections, we shall proceed in this manner.

l had asked for permission to speak before the President made bis suggestion, and l had intended to speak ta item 3. 1 agree that the suggestion of the President is a sensible one and that we should first dispose of item 2. 1 have no further. comment ou that except to press my

1 should like ta associate myseH with what has be~'1 said regarding th~; insertion of the words, "Question of" at the beginning of item 2 on the grounds that were explained a..rew moments aga by the representative of Brâzil. I shaH not.rèpeat his arguments.

The Eaviet Union de1egation has already stated that in .the Russian text, item 2 ~f the provisional agenda is fonnulated in1irectIy, and reads: "Concerning an appeal". 25.' If the Russian wording indicated by the USSR deIegation corresponds in English ta the wording proposed by the United Statp.$ representative, it seems to me that there is no substantial disagreement between us on this procedural question. The Russian text will continue to read: "Concerning an appeal", while the English translation of that. text will read:. "Question Qf.an appeal". 26. l suggest that we stop at this point: If there are no: objections, we will consider the questiondispo~ed of and proceed ta discuss the matter of agenda item 3. We will cŒ:lsider item 2 inc1uded in the provisional agenda of the Security Couneil in the wading l have Just indicated. .

l should like ta point out that there is a 'quite marked divergence between the English and French textS;lS translated from Russian. 1 regard the wording of item 2 in the French text as perfectIy acceptable; but the English wording, "Appeal to States to accede, etc....", requires the inserti<.n of the word "Question" at the beginning, if we are ta avoid giving the impression of prejudging the decision to be taken by the Council. Accordingly, I do not request the insertion of the word "question" in the French text, sin<:e that would render the drafting unnecessarily cumbrous. . . 28. The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): Does any other member wish to speak on this question? Then we shall consider that item 2 in' this form i5 placed oil the agenda of the Security Council. . 2.9. We shall proceed to consider the riext question. Are there âny observations on the wordingof item 3 ? 30.. Mr. KYROU (Greece): l have already requested thede1etion of the word "fourteen". 1 take it that the finafaim :of .the Soviet IInion i~tiative, is' to permit the Security Council to sûbri1it its. report on the ,àdmis-. sipn ,of.new .:M:embers .tP' the next l?ession of the Gen- êtal Assembly. Let us oot forget that the General Assembly, at its sixth session held in Paris, made a n~w. recommendation to the Security Council to submit a'report on aIl the applications for admission befo!e us. 1 On ,me other hand, if we have ta deàl orJy Wlth the SO'viet Union proposaI submitted to us _R.l seé D,(ficial Records of the General AS$embly, Si~th Session,' esollitirl1isl 1'esolution S<lQ' (Vl), 31. . For the sake of brevity l will not insist on a vote or on a more detailed discussion of my request if it is agreed that during th.;; discussion of the Soviet Union proposaI it would be not only the right but aIso the duty of aIl the members of the Security Coundl eventuaHy ta refer ta other c.::ndidates for admission ta the United Nations.

I do not think that we ought to waste much time on the phraseology of item J which is now before us. I do r::>t think it is altogether unimportant, because my delegation nas always held that possible items on our agenda. ought ta be fonnulated in, sa to speak, a neutral and non-tendentious way. It is quite clear why that is sa because, otherwise, you lnight get a delegaticn which, for reasons of its own, would put down an item that woulù read, for instance, "Violation by State X of all the prindples of the Charter", or "Horrible behaviour of State y in connexion with some inddent or other". That would tend :::>' prejudice the discussion of this incident or alleged indder:.t from the start. 33. In a slightdegree, I t.hink that the phraseology here suggested, narnely, "Adoption of a recommendation,"does tend ta suggest that we ought to adopt such a recommendation, which no doubt quite a number of us would think to' be ihadvisable rather than advisable. Therefore, l would second the proposai originally,made by the United States representative that we should put in the words, "Question of adoption of a recommendation". However, if the Presidentfeels that that is not what he would like himself, l would suggest ml alternative proposaI; n.amely, that item 3 would read simply, "Admission of new Members", which is what we have always calied ft up to now.. After that, in brackets, the. President might have his own phraseology, if he likes, "Adoption of a recommendation ... " because then itwould be made clear that what we are réll.lly discussing Is the subject of the gc;neral admission of riew Mèmbers, and as part of that, a suggestion put forward. by the' President containin'f a specific recommendation whic:h may or may not be acceptable to the others. 34. l therefore haV'e two èoncrete proposaIs to make: either thatthe words "question of" should be inserted before the word"adoption," or, altematively, that item 3. should read··"Admission of new Members (adoption of a recommendation ...)" in accordat'ce withthe President's. own ,proposai. 35. Regarding the question of substance concerning item 3; namely, whether or not we should omit the '36. Ml'. KYROU (Grcece): The alternati',e proposal of the representative of the United Kingdom completely meets my point, and 1 am prepared to adopt it. 37. Ml'. GROSS (United States of America): l would like to support the statement of the' representative of the United Kingdom. On the whole, l think that l prefer the second alternative i:o my O'wn original proposaI. 1 think it, does conform more closely to our, practice and that it does malœ it more clear, which was my odgh::al objective in Iilaking tllis suggestion. Il.1 the matter of adopting an agenda, we are dealing with questions of form rather than' with questions of substance. 1 think l would withdraw my suggestion for insertirig ·the word "question" in favour of the second suggestion made by the representative of tlle United Kingdom: 38. The PRESICEl\iT (translated from Rttssian): 1 should likè to clarify the situation which has arisen in the Security CounciI. 39. If l understand the position rightly, the United Kingdom representative has in effect submitted two proposaIs. In the first place, he supported the ploposal made bythe United States representative, i.e., he would prefer item 3 of the provisional agenda of the Security Council to' be worded as the United States representative suggests; and in the second place, he submitted an alternative proposal, namely, that item 3 of the provisional agenda of the Security Council should be worded: "Adtnission of new Members". 40. 1 did not catch whether the United Kingdom representative wished those words "Admission of new Members" to be followed by a colon or by a. full stop; b1Jt next was to come the wordin5 proposed by the Soviet Union delegation. 41. Thus the United Kingdom representative, if 1 did not misunderstandhim, appears in effect to have submitted two proposaIs. 1 should like to he clear which of those proposaIs he intends to press. 42. Sir Gladwyn JEBB (United Kingdom): 1 think 1 suggested that my preference asbetween these two formulae would be, coloured to some extent by the President's preference. But since he has not himself indicated a preference, then ! t.'!tink 1 might say here ,and now that my preference is for the second formula, "(a) Adoption of a recommendatioa ta the GeneraI Assembly concerning the sil11nltaneous admission to membership in the United Nations of aU fonrteen States which have applied for sneh admission," 43. That is my concrete proposaI. l understand it is now supported by the representatives of the United States and Greece, who have withdrawn their original proposaIs; thus, there is now only one proposaI before the CouneiI. 44. .The PRESIDENT (translated fram Russian): In his second statement, the United Kingdom representative has c:1arified his formulation. If l remember rightly - the interpreters will correct me - ms first version did not include an "(a)" before the too proposed by the Soviet Union delegation. In his second statement, the United Kingdom representative introduced a new e1ement- "(a)". It has been the practice of the Security Counci1, however, to use an "(a)" only if. there is a "Ch)". There is a Russian proverb wmch says: "If you say 'a', you might as well say 'b' ". In tms case, however, the provisionaI agenda contains only one item. We can call it what we like-"(a)", "(b)" or "(c) "; but whatever letter or number we insert, it remains a single item. The Soviet Union de1egation therefore sees no grounds for an entlmeration in this '~lcem. 45. The Soviet Union de1egation takes it as being self-evident that the USSR deiegation has placed before the Security Couneil the question of the admission of new Members. The Soviet Union de1egation therefore sees no reason why the four words "Admission of new Members" and a full stop should not be inserted before the wording proposed by the USSR delegation. 46. Let me reply at the same time to the representative of Greece. It is obvious that in accordance with the Charter, the rules of procedure and the practice of the Security Council, every representative to t~e Security Council has, has always had, and always wtIl have theright to submit any proposaI, That is the right Qfeveryrepresentative to the Security CouneiI. If an)' oth~r proposa1s are submitted, therefore, the Security Couneil will of course con~ider their inclusion in the agenda; .01' if, in the course of the discussion of the items which· are already on the provisional agenda, othe1'proposals are submitted, it will obviously be the duty of the Security Cauneil to consider them. Every delegation has that righL . 47. Tosum up: l think that we could draft item 3 as· fàllows:"Admission of new Members" -full stop or colon - and then the word~ng proposed by the PS~R delegatiçm. l do not insist on eith",r a full stop or a to10n. If the majority of th~ members of the Secririty Couneil·· would prefer a full stop to follow

The purpose - and l am sure it \vill not have escaped the President - of putting in the words "Admission of new Members" was not just a triviality, as l think the President rather sought to represent, but in order to make it quite clear that this item on our agenda would relate ta the whole matter of the admission of new Members and to a debate on the whole matter, and not, as might otherwise be thought, to a debate on the simple proposaI made by the representative of the Soviet Union. That was the intention. That has been accepted, as l understand it, by the President. But the further suggestion of putting in the mystic letter "(a)" had a rather similar intention. That was designed to make it quite clear that, in our debate on the whole question, the Soviet Union proposaI would be only one of the possible proposaIs before the Council, and not even the principal one perhaps. However, as a great concession to the President, and provid;ed the other representatives agree, l am prepared to eliminate the "(a)" from my proposal, provided the President agrees to the words "Adoption of a recommendation ... etc." appearing in a separate line. 49.. The PRESIDENT (translated jr,'m Russian): "The further you go into the wood, the thicker it gets". In every statement he makes, the United Kingdom representative submits new additicns to his original proposaI. First he added a line; now he is adding two. He would place the first four words in the first line and the remaining words in the second. 50. In order to avoid a discussion on full stops, commas and lines, it might be desirable to adopt the item proposed by the Soviet Union delegation in the following form: "ProposaI for the adoption of a recommendation tothe General Assembly ... " and then would follow the l'est of the USSR wording. This wording, l assume, will show that the proposaI has been submitted by one delegation. It will be for the other delegations to detèrmine their positions on the proposaI when the question cornes up for consideration. 51. At the same time, every delegation is entitled to submit its own proposaI in the form it regards as most suitable, whatever the subject of the proposaI may be, whether it is a proposaI on the admission of new Membel's or any other ~ind of proposaI. Every delegation has that right. In this case, however, we are dis- Ctlssing a questior proposed by the Soviet Union delegation in the wording proposed by that dele[ c ~ion. This is the Soviet Union delegation's own prolJosaI. Every delegation is entitled to take whatever position it pleases on that proposaI while it Ü· being discussed. The proposaI of a giveu delegation remains the proposal -of that deiegaLion. 53. l would stress once again that, if ot~ler delegations wish to submit their own proposaIs on the question of the admission of new Members, each of them is entitled to submit any question in any form it finds expedient ror -itself and ror others. 54. If we can agree on this formulation, we will be able to conc1ude our procedural' discussion.

It is regrettable that we should be wasting time over a question of procedure when we aU know what the result will he: in the end the Council will discuss the USSR proposal set forth in document S/2664, and will certainly also discuss other proposals which will be submitted on the admission of other applicants or on sorne other way of dealing with the admission of the tourteen States. 56. AlI we have before us is, of course, the USSR proposaI relating to the adoption of recommendations to the General Assembly on the simuItaneous admission of the foûrteen States. It is obvious, however, that, as on other occasions in the past, the Council wishes, while discussing proposals concerning the admission of certain applicants, to talœ the 0pp'îrtunity of discussing otller proposals. l feel, therefore, that the item shouId be worded as foUows: "3. Admission of new Members: " ((j,) ProposaI submitted by the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics", or simply "Proposa! for the adoption of a recommendation to the General Assembly, etc.... "; "b" - We formaUy propose the following: - "Consideration of other applications for admission of new Members, and of other proposaIs relating to admission." 57. This does not mean that we have submitted or propose to submit a resolution, but obviously, if the item is worded in this way, it will be open to other delegations ta do so. 58. Sub-item (b ), l repeat, would he worded as follows: "Consideration of other applications for admission of new Members and of other proposals rel;),ting to admission". 59. This method of procedure would ,give the USSR delegation an assurance that one of the bases .of discussion would be a proposaI already submltted and 60. 1 do not think that this wording can present any difficulty. It would also ensure that there will be a discussion of the matter similar to those held in.the Coundi on previous occasions.

The Chilean representative's proposal now contains a letter "(b)". We already have "(a)", and now we have a "(b)". From the point of view of punctuation and logic, "(b)" should follow "(a)". From the point of view of precedent, however, the Chilean rcpresentative's proposal is unprecedented. He proposes to inc1ude an unknown proposai in the agenda of the Security Council. In all the Security Council's experience there has never been a case in which the Council has taken a decision to place on its agenda an unknown proposai or a proposai which has not been,formulated precisely and clearly. 62. For if we agree to the Chilean representative's pr0posal and insert the words "Consideration ... of other proposais" in sub-paragraph "(b)", that will in fact' mean that the Security Council will have given authorization in advance for the consideration oi proposais unknown to it. 63. It is an established part of the pract.ice of the Security Council that before it is placed on the agenda, every proposeditem must be cClnsidere1 by the Council; it must be considered by means of the procedure of deciding the question of inclusion of this proposed item in the pmvisional agenda. From the point of view of precedent, it is hardly desirable to take an a priori decision to include in the agenda certain indeterminate proposais which are unknown to the Security Council. 64. 1 draw the attention of members of the Security Council to this 6rcumstance, and ask them to give .their views on the Chilean rep:esentative's proposaI.

As 1 see it, when a subject is placed on the agenda, the general item is given rather than a proposaI. There may be various proposais regarding the item. 66. The USSR proposaI is obviously not broad in scope; it does not even al10w for the separate consideraticn of the "l.pplications of the fourteen States. The proposal refers to the joint and simultaneous admission of the fourteen applicants. . 67. These applications, however, exist; they have been submitted to the United Nations. The Security Council is therefore perfectly entitled to consider them separately or together as the members of the Council !Uay see fit. Accordingly, the President may interpret th; Chilean de1egation's proposalif the President wlshes, 1 shall give a further explanation - in the 68. My proposaI was intended mainly te' avoid loss of time, because, as l have said, l believe that we shall reach the same resuit whatever procedure is adopted.

The President himseIf has said that once we say Ha", we must say. "b". The representative of Chile just now tried to give bis conception of what "b" might be. The President has certain objections to that. He said that this is an unlmown proposaI. It seems to me that it would be very simple to give identity to this unknown quantity if we simply took before us certain requests and recommendations which the sixth session of the General Assembly transmitted to us. l refer to resolutian 506 (VI) on the admission of new Members, where in part A the General Assembly recommends that the Security Couneil reconsider all pending applications for the admission of new members. In part B, paragraph 1,. the General Assembly requests the S~curity Council to report to the General Assembly at itsseventh session on the status of applications still pending. ïO. It seenlS to me that these two requests, if we wotùd consider them as item (b), under the general heading"Admission of new Members", would cover a great part of the ground, and perhaps all of it, which we may want tocover. l do not make a formaI proposal at this time, but l suggest for the consideration of the Couneil now that it might r.onsider whether it would be wise to add as sub-item (b), under the general heading of "Admission of new Members", something Iike "Consideration of resolution 506 (VI)".

Does any member wish to speak on the proposaI, or rather on the views stated by the Netherlands representative? 72. It would be helpful if the Netherlands representative would formulate his idea or his proposaI more precise1y. Then it will be clearer to the Security Couneil what he is actually propùsing. 73. Mr.: VON BALLUSECK (Netherlands): l cannot possibly be. more clear than the General Assembly bas béen, unless we should assume there is a lack of clarify in the General Assembly. Resolution 506 (V1) is very dear indeed. It makes certain recommendations, and if the President wants me to l can readthe whole paragraph, but it will take a lot of time. l suggest that we add to agenda item (3) after "Admission of new Mèmbers", followed by sub-item Ca), which isthe President's own proposaI, a sub-item Cb) saying "Consideration of resolution 506 (VI) of tlteGeneral Assembly". The resolution speaks for itse1f. Itreconunends andrequests definite things of 74. That marking cavers a wide enough ground, in my opinion, to enable aIl of us to bring forward, if we 50 desire, our views on existing pending applications and eventuaIly others which may became pending between now and .the seventh sess~on of the General Assembly. 75. The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): The Netherlands representative's proposaI is presumably now clear to all members of the Security Council. 76. 1 should like to ask the Chilean representative whether he can agree to accept the Netherlands representative's proposaI, the purpose of which, if 1 understood the Netherlands representative rightly, is ta darify sub-paragraph (b) and ta formulate the item explicitly "Consideration of General Assembly resolution 506 (VI)".

I of course accept the suggestion made by the representative of the Neilierlands, because it is the same as the proposaI 1 made in my last speech. That is t0 say, the item will read as follows: "Consideration cf pending applications for the admission of new' Members", fol1owing the precise wording of resolution 506 (VI) of the General Assembly. 78. The wording suggested by. the representative of the Netherlands also has the advantage of malcing it perfectly clear ta the President that it is not necessary tu have a previous prOposaI regarding these applications to enable the Council to deal with them. The As~~mbly has instructed us to review them and submit a report on the aubject. Delegatiol:s may submit such proposaIs as they think fit in the light of that review and of the discussion.

Let us sum up the situation as it now stands. The Security Council has before it three proposaIs. 80. First, there is the Soviet Union proposaI that item 3 of the agenda of the Security Council should be drafted as foUows: "ProposaI for the adoption of a recommendation .. .", and so on as worded in the provisional agenda. 81. Secondly, there is the proposal submitted by the United Kipgdom representative to precede it with the four words "Admission of new Members", to be followed by a new sub-paragraph containing the text of the Soviet Union proposaI as set forth in item 3 of the provisional agenda. 82. Thirdly, there is the proposaI made by the Chilean' representative, as supplemented by the Netherlands

Thus we have two proposaIs. The United Kingdom representative has withdrawn his proposaI. 1 have already formulated them, and my formulation does not appear to have given rise to any objections or comments. 87. 1 shall put the first proposal tô the vote. A votl1 'l.eJas taken by show of hands, as jollows: In favouf: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Against: Brazil, Chile, France, Greece, Netherlands, Turkey, United States of America. Abstaining: China, Pak-istan, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The. proposaI was rejected by 7 votes to 1, with 3 abstetltions.

We now come ta the second proposal, submitted by the delegations of the Netherlands and ChUe. A vote was taken by show of hands, as follo'Zvs: In favot...: Brazil, Chile, China, France, Greece, Netherlands, Pakistan, Turkey, Union of Soviet Sodalist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America".

As the proposal is adopted, the provisional agenda thus reads: (Cl. Adoption of the agenda. "2. Question of an appeal to States tp accede to and ratify the Geneva Protocol of 1925 for the prohibition of the use of bacteria! weapons. Question of an appeal to States to aecede to and ratify the Geneva Protocol of 1925 for the prohibition of the use of bactelial weapons

On the instructions of the Government of the UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, the delegation of the USSR has submitted for the consideration of the Security Council the question of the prohibition of hacterial weapons. This question is worded in the Security Council's agenda as foUows: "Question of an appeal to States to 'accede to and ratify the Geneva Protocol of 1925 for the prohibition of the üs~ of hacterial weapons'~. 91. The prohibition of the use of bacterial weapons for military purposes is of course a matter which has for many years received the sedous attention of the peoples and governments of aU countries; and as we imow, ll. great deal of thought was given to this matter in its day by the League of Nations. 92. Discussion of this question over a period of many years by the organs of the League culminated in the drafting and signature of the famous international agreement known jn international relations arid internationallegal practice as the Geneva Protocol of 1925. 93. There can be no doubt that this Protocol has been of outstanding importance in the history of international relations during the last quarter of a century. The political, legal and moral obligations assumed by States under this international agreement proved an effective restraining influence on the aggressive States which, more than once during that period, resorted to acts of aggression,and which in the end precipitated the Second World War. 94. Not a single one of h'ose aggressive States dared to ignore the importance of the Geneva Protocol. The aggressors could not fail to take into account the enormous importance, from the point of view of international politics, law and mùrality, of the Protocol's prohibition of the use of chemical and bacterial weapons 10 war. 95.. We aU know that in drafting its Charter the Umted Nations gave special attention to the task of maintaining and strengthening international peace and 96. The Charter also contains provisions for solving theproblem of disarmament and the regulation of armaments. 97. Resolution 41 (1) of 14 December 1946 on the principles governing the general regulation and reduction of armaments, adopted by the General Assembly at its first session, .referred to the necessity of prohibiting and eliminating from national armaments atomic and aU other major weapons adaptable now and in the future to mass destruction. 98. The prohibition of such weapons was recognized by the Assembly to be a matter of immediate urgency." However, the protracted discussion in the United Nations of matters relating to the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons diverted attention from the question of the prohibition of bacterial weapons, that disgraceful and criminal weapon for the mass destruction of people - a question of such importance ta the cause ofpeace. 99. Subsequently, attention was drawn to the importance of this question in the report of the Secretary- General of the United Nations to the third session of the General Assembly.2 That report pointed out that bacterial "and chemical weapons represent an enormous 9anger, as weapons of mass destruction, and that the development and stockpiling of reserves of such weapons creates a serious threat to international peace and security. The report also observed that no proposaI on this question had been introduced in the United Nations, and that the United Nations had not in general concerned itself with the discussion of the question of the prohibition of bacterial weapons. 100. There exists at present sorne difference of opinion among statesmen and leading public figures as to the admissibility of the use of bacterial weapons, although it is well known that the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925 prohibited the use of such weapons. In this connexion, it i8 essential to draw the Security Counci1's special attention to the statement in the Geneva Protocol" that "in the use in war of asphyxiating, Doisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, inaterials or devices, has been justly condemned by the generalopinion of the dvilized world." 101. An the States which signed the Protocol and acceded to it agreed with this important international declaration. In accordance with this declaration that the use of· the methods of mass destruction referred to had been justly condemned by the general opinion of the civilized worId, prohibition of the use of these types 102. The Security Council should also pay special attention to the fact that in this important international agreement the States Parties unanimously agreed that the prohibition should be extended not only to asphyxiating, poisonous and other gases and all analogous Uquids, materials or devices, but also to bacterial weapons. Accordingly, a special provision was included in the Geneva Protocol to the effeet that the States si!111atories to the Protocol not only confirmed the p;ohibition of the use of gases and all other analogous materials, but also agreed "ta extend this prohibition ta the use of bacteriological methods of warfare". 103. The States signatories to the Geneva Protocol not only conc1uded that international agreement on the prohibition of the use of bacterial weapons, but alsa undertook a solemn international obligation, as may be seen from the text of the Protocol, that they. will "exert every effort to induce other States to accede to the present Protocol". 104. As is known, the Geneva Protocol was signed and acceded to by forty-eight States, i.e., the great majority of the States' of the world, including all the great Powers. It should be noted that of the forty-eight States which signed or acceded to the Geneva Protocol, only six, an insignificant minority, have not ratified the Protocol. 105. Thus, to sum up, forty-two States have signed, acceded to and ratified the Geneva Protocol; and only six States, namely, the United States of America, Japan, Brazil, Nicaragua, El Salvador and Uruguay, have not yet ratified the Geneva Protocol. Tt is also noteworthy and weIl known that, of the eleven States which are at present members of the Security Council, only two States, the United States of America and Brazil, have not ratified the Protocol. 106. The fact that the overwhe1ming majority of the States of the worId, including the permanent members of the Security Council with the exception of the United States of America, lIave signed and ratified the Geneva Protocol, bears witness to the importance of this international agreement and to the enormous significance of the international political, legal and moral obligations deriving from it. The agreement includes a clause to the effeet that the signatory Powers declare'it to be their aim that this prohibition shall be universally accepted as a part of internationallaw. The ratification ?f this international agreemel1t by forty-two States mcontestably indicates that the Geneva Protocol and the articles and provisions therein contained relating to the prohibition of gas and bacterial warfare are a part of international law "binding alike", as the Protocol says, "the conscience and the practice of nations". admis.~ihi1ity Qf.the use of the hacterial weapons prohibited by the Gen.eva Protacol. This eircumstance, and the fact that the dp.ve1opment af the production af bacterial andchemical weapons creates a threat to international peace and security, mal<:es it imperative that the United Nations should adopt apprapriate measures ta prevent the use of such weapons. 108. In view of·its greatimpartance from the point of view of internatianal relations and the maintenance and strengthening af international peace and security, the United Nations is' in dutY bOtlnd to deal with this question.. The Security Council hears primary. responsibility for the maintenance af international peace and security and far theadaptivll of.the measures necessary for the strengthening of peace. The Security Counci! must do its dutY in this question, which is of such importance to the cause ofpeace. In accordance with thefunctians assigned ta it by the Charter ofthe United Nations, theSe~urity COUI:leil 15 in dutY bound t0 adopt measùres· to prevent the use of the bacterial weapons prahibited by the Geneva ProtocoL 109. Another imperative l'eason for the consideration of this question in the Security CÛlli'1cil is the fact that in anumber of countries preparations are at present being made for ba.cterial war.fare; a fact which constitutes a threat to internationalpeace and security. The ..Security Cauneil, in carrying aut its duty of maintaining'and strengthening international peace and security, must talœ measures to pr.event the use of bacterial weapons, which are prohihited by the Geneva Pratocal. no. The Soviet Unian now proposes that all States whicb. have not yet acceded to or ratified their accession to the GenevaPratocol should be called upon to accede ta andratify. thisProtocol and to undertake to comply v.>ithit.in every particular. It is scarce1y necessary to adduce proof of the international importance of g1l:h ._action by the Security Council and .the signi- .ficaIJ.ée which such a. decision by the Couilcil would have for the cause of international peace and security. By taking such a decision, the ,8ecurity Council will stress theinternatiollai significànce of the Geneva Protocol and the importance of the intemational obligations arising autof it. . In present circumstances, in lightof the facts l have Just mentioned, sucha Security Council decisian would make a major contribution to thestrengthening .of peace and international security. 111. Inpursuance of its unwavering policy of stren2i:hening .•• peace .and intematiQnal .security and prombting .frien<p-y ret::tions among. all c01.!ntries ~d nations, the SOViet Uillon has sub!1l1tted thisquestion to. the .•SecurityCouncil· and proposes the· adoption of the followingresolution [5/2663]: "The Security Couneil, "1..Having ..regardto the fact that ~.erencés ?f opinion exist a.mong· statesmen and public figures 11l "2. N oting that the use Ot bacterial weapons has justly been condemned by world public opinion, as expressed in the signature by forty-two States of the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925 which provides for the probibition of the use of bacterial weapons, "3.. Decides: "Ta appeal ta all States, both Members of the United Nations and non-member States, which have not yet ratified or acceded ta the Protocol for the prohibition of the use of bacterial weapons, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925,to accede ta and ratify the said Protocol." 112. In submitting this question to the SecU!1ty Conn- 1 cil and drawing the Council's attention to the draft resolution which l have just read, the Soviet Union delegation expresses its conviction that· the members of the Security Council, particular1y those of them who have·ratified the Geneva Protocol, will·be guided.by the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, and.with a view ta maintaining international peace and security will support this proposai, which is· aimed at the maintenance and strengthening· of international peace and security. 113. Mr. GROSS (United States of America): Despite the lateness of the hour, l fee! that the situation and the comments which the President has just made requir~ a reply on my part. With the permission of the Council, l should like to proceed to make such reply. 114. The PRESIDENT. (translated from Russian) : It would be useful to know how long the United States representative's statement will take.

l propose to make a statement which l consider a preliminary statement, reserving my right to speak later during the debate, and l should say that tl1ispreliminary statement will take from ten to fifteen minutes. With the permission of the President, l should likè to proceed. 116. The PRESIDB;NT (translated from. Russian) : Ican on the United States representative, if the other :nembers of the Council do not ob. t to continuing the meeting.

It seems to me that we are faced with a situation which we must consider 'very carefully. Fàr. some time there has 1een under way, 011 the part of the Government of . the Soviet Union, a campaign which has been repeated1y characterized by aIl responsible officiaIs of.the Unified Command in Korea· and by others in a position .ta know. the facts, as afalse and malicious campaign regarding the use of bacterial warfare in Korea. In vie:w of the nature of the statement whichthe repres:::ntative of the Soviet Union has made this afiernoon, l do not intend at this time ta go into details Tt'garding the. nature of that campaign of lies, nor to e.laborate on It other than to say that there hasbeen no· evidence, no evidence whatever, placed before the membership 117. de devant près.·. Depuis. un. certaill de tive campagne mandement courant lifiée la l'Union . l'intention, nature nerai .à

As President of the Security Cauneil, 1 must draw the attention of its members ta the fact that the Soviet Union de1egation has submitted a proposaI which has no connexion whatsoever with th~ question of events in Korea. 119. As representative of the UNION OF SOVIET SQCIALIST REPUBLICS in the Security Council, and as the representative who proposed t.~is item and submitted the draft resolution, l finnly declare that l am interested in the present instance only in the strict question of accession to' and ratification of the Geneva ProtocoI. The USSR delegation is not touchlng upon or raising· any other questions. Henee, nothing that the United States representative has just said has anything to do with the Security Council's agenda. l draw Lhe Councifs attention to that faet, and emphasize once again that the Soviet Union delegation firinly declares that it is concerned only with iÎle strict question of accession to and ratification of the Geneva Protocol. l consider therefùre that the United States representative's statement is not relevant to the agenda.

l think that many people will be touched, if not interested, by the respect which the President of the Security Couneil purports now ta observe for the rules of procedure, in contrast ta the abuse of those rules in August of 1950. l think that it will be dea" to the members of the COlmcil, and 1 hope as weU to the Prèsident of,the Couneil, that what 1 am about to say will show very definitely and clearly why the comments which 1 have made are completely relevant to the question of the Geneva Protocol and its ratification. 121. l had started to say that l do not intend to speak more about the germ wmare charge at this time, except to .say that we are not yet convinced by any means that the Soviet Union Government is prepared to abandon a Jalse and ma~cious charge, the continuation of which can be fraught only with misfortune and' disaster. The reason the reference ta the germ warfare propaganda cnmpaign which .the Soviet Government has been carrying on isquite relevant and inescapably connected with the sûbject of the Geneva Protocol, is, 1 am sure everyone will realize, that, in appraising the merits of the proposai of the Soviet Union·Government in the dtaft resolution regarding the Geneva Protocol, it is absolutely essential to keep in mind whether the motive of '.those who make that proposaI stands the light of truth and of inspection. 122. Th'~ draft resolution which the Soviet Union representative submitted today, and to which 1 shall address myself directly, would have the SecurityCoun- 123. Vllhen in 1925 the Geneva Protocol was proposed and signed, statesmen still hoped that exchanges of promises would be honoured by aIl States. Most of them then, as most of them today, regarde1 treaties as binding on those who signed them. An agreement \Vas an agreement, and many thought that this was sufficient without any need for machinery to safeguard the observance of agreements. 124. The United States signed but did not ratify this Protocol. The reasons why the United States Senate did not ratify the Protocol in 1925 may be of interest to an historian of American attitudes of that period, but these reasons are no more relevant to a consideration of the problem today than woulcl be, let us say, consideration by the Security Council of the attitudes of the Soviet Union toward the rest of the world in 1925. What matters deeply. to us and to all those who, we believe, comprise the freedom-Ioving world are the problems which confront us all today. 1t was in full recognition of these problems that in 1947 the President of the United States withdrew the Geneva Protocol from the Senate ca1endar, along with eighteen other treaties which had become just as ob5::llete as the Geneva Protocol. The world has moved since 1925, and the question of ratification today must be viewed in the light of today's facts. One of those facts is that the Soviet Union, in acceding to the Geneva Protocol, stated the following reservations: "The said Protocol only binds the Government of the USSR in relation to the States which have signed and ratified or which have definitely acceded to the Protocol. "The said Protocol sl1all cease to be binding on the Government of the USSR in regard to all enemy States whose armed forces or whose allies de jU1'e or in·fact do not respect the restrictions which are the object of the Protocol." ~25. The point in the first reservation to which l have Just referred means that the Soviet Union Government, . by its own reservation, feels free to use poison gases $tntem~nt of the USSR l'epresentative but by the statement in his draft resolutioll thut the use of these \\~\plmS la i\\admhlsible, -fhey nre denrly llot considered iuadmi~ible for use by the ~SQ"let UnIon Govemment un.der the cottditions· wllich are set fûrth in the t"è~r\~a.tious which the Soviet Union Govermnent made to the Protoool, 126. But the secam:1 reservation 18 equally important -and e\~t mate importatlt, It mell.ns thut the Soviet Union Go\'ernmel1t regards itself as free to use l?oison g'ases or g'erm wat'tll;re against any State wluch it deddes to"label an enelUY) and which it dec1ares has usOO tht$e weapons. Forl as l have saidl the reservation $tates that the Protocol shall cense ta be binding on tlte ()Q\,erumcnt of the USSR in regard ta all enemy States whose armed îorces or whase allies de it~rt or ilt mct do nOt respect the restrictions which are the objett of the Protocol. 127. lt 18 here t1mt the President will observe that the dose C()nne..~ion between the actions which his Go~l\lent has taken and the campaign of lies ~'atdillg ~rm warfare are so intimately related ta the question. of what the Geneva Protocol means to the Soviet Union Govemment today. l do not mean to SttggeSt. fol.' a moment. that the reservation which l have qUQted isin itself inappropriate. Other States which aœeded. te the Protocol) Inc1uding some members of thisCottncil) haveexpressed fi. sinlilar reservation. "Vhat 1 <lo $oy i5 thnt the Soviet Union Govemment) by cllatging the l.Inited Nations Command with the use of hatteria! weapons) has set the .stage for using the \\-eapons itself if itshould decide to declare that the $mtes re~sting ~agression in Kotea are its enemies. 128. The aùnese communists and North Korean authorities.are not parties t'~ the Protoco1. But even ~ tbey ~tTUed it) or should do sa today) under the Soviet Union reservation and tiU the. basis of the same false chaTgesthey have made against the United Nations :regatding the use of genn warfare) theycould proclaim this .,,-ery afttmloon their right to attack with genn weapons everyl\Iember of·the United Nations supporliüg. theaçtiQu aaaainst tbeir· aggression in Korea. 129. .It~s totue very clear how· e>..-tremely limited ils the natu!:e of this illusion of a Soviet Union promise În.1De Gefieva Protocol. In bis statement a short while 3gO# the Soviet Unianrepresentative referred to a deda.rcûion ofpolicy rq;arWng me··· stockpiling of ~The Geneva ProtocoI does not rder to nor limÎfm.any ~ythe stoekpiling ofweapons. The SP-viet umonlias not;bysignîng theProtocol or othenvise, ~ ID·stop JIlaJ1Ufacturîng weapons either for gas c~nvention; and there it does l'lot eVl;n attach that limitation of l'lot using them first. 130. Therefare, we characterize and stamp the present draft resolution before us as a fraud; for in it the Soviet Union Government asks other States, or would have the Council recommend ta ether States, that they ratify the Protocol which the Soviet Union, on the basis of its own false charges which have l'lot been withdrawn by anything said by the representative of the Soviet Union today, could declare no longer binding upon itself. That i5 the situation in which the world finds itself today. Th\' real question is not the exchange of promises, with or without reservations. The world is concerned not about the announced intentions of States, whether or not they plan to use or promise not ta use certain weapons; it is concerned about. the kno,,:n abilities of States, whether or not they possess certam weapons and have the capacity and the means to employ them. 131. The Soviet Union admits that it is engaged in research on bacterial weapons. For instance, in 1938 Marshal Vcroshilov said: "Ten years ago or more the Soviet Union signed a convention abolishing the use of poison gas and bacterial weapons. Ta that we still adhere, but if our enemies use such methods against us 1 tell you we are prepared and fully prepared ta use them also and to use them against aggressonl on their own saiL" 132. The United States, for its part, thinks it is obvious that until an effective disarmament programme is agreed upon, we must build our defences, for this is the only way left ta us to deter potential aggressors. 133. It is the possibility that States may use bacterial weapons that must be faœd. It is the danger that aggressors may use bacteri,al weapons that must be eliminated completely. 134. The best evidence of the United States' attitude towards germ warfare is our own record. The United States h&" never used germ warfare in the Second World War or at anv other time. 1 am authorized to sayon behalf of tne Unified Command that the United States has l'lot andis not using germ warfare of any kind in Korea. The people of the United States, ~long with the rest t'If the deœm '~'e!'!d,.!ll'-t' :;ickened at the very thcught of the use of weapom; of mass destruction. We, are sickened also by aggression and by.the threat of agg:i"e~sion. That is why the United States stands ready to eliminate weapons of mass destruction through the establishment of an effective system based upon effective safeguards sa that their use may be prohibited effectively and would indeed be impossible. 135. My Government proposes not the exchange of promisesagainst the use of such weapons, but the absolute elimination of suei. weapons. We want to see t..h.e world in a situation where these weapons, together 'with aU weapons of mass destruction, cannot in fact be used at all, for the simple reason that no one has them ~d that everyone can be sure that no one has them. The Soviet Union now in effect proposes a declaration prohibiting atomic weapons; the United States propo.ses a system of international control of afomic ènergy which will actuaUy prohibit and prevent 'the use of'atomic weapons because no nation will possess the means to makethem. An overwhelming majority of the Members of the United Nations have shown thtough "ne years their conviction that on1Y through this approach can the world be free from the danger of atomic warfare. An overwhelming majority showed similar conviction with regard to germ warfare when they voted last faU to establish, under the Security .Council, the· Disarmament Commission and directed it to find means of eliminating aIl weapons of mass destruction, under a system of safeguards adequate to ensure that they really are eliminated. 136. It is in the Disarmament Commission, of cour~e, thatthis vefTJ discussion properly ~elong~: Th~ SO':let Union representative, erroneously, m my v,lew, mvoking a, PQintof order under the rules, has pomted 0!lt - l regret he has not done so more frequently m the DiSânna."!lent Commission - that there is a great and important distinction between the question of r~lation of annaments, ont.lte one hand, and the question of false charges concerning their use, on the other. By hisown ,admission, this question and this proposaI deals not with the false charges of germ warfare, but w;ith theproblem,'of theregulation of armal?ents and the, prohibition. of weapons of mass.destructton. Th~t admission merely confirms what, 1 think most of us Will réaliie that the Disarmament Commission is the proper h~4y·k:t which: tQ~,pur~i:te this discussiqn,- and.at,. the ~pt~sent,time ,l.think it. ,is the ,only propér b.o,Gy·' ,We have, ,outselves' hi the Disarmament,Commtsslon, as ha'V"ea nÙmber of our colleagues, alre,ady explained ",hat was our position in regard to the Gèneva Protocol andin regard to the actual elimination of aU weapons ofmassdestruction,inc1uding atomic and germ warfare. 138. For these reasons' the United States delegation moves, pursuant ta rule 33, paragraph 4 of our rules of procedure, that the Soviet Union draft resolution be referred ta the Disarmament Commission for consideration pursuant to the terms of reftirence of that Commission, in connexion with the proposais which the Generai Assembly has directed the Disarmament Commission to prepare "for the elimination of aU major weapons adaptable to mass destruction." 139. 1 respectfully hope that the members of the Couneil will agree that this is the proper way for the Couneil ta deal with the Soviet Union draft resolution. Item 2 of the programme of work adopted by the Disarmament Commission on 26 March of this year reads: "Elimination of weapons of mass destruction and control with a view to ensuring their elimination." That is a part of the programme of work of the Disarmament Commission, and lest there be any doubt as ta what that means, the United States representative on the Disarmament Commission, aIong with several other members, has said that this specifica1ly is intended ta include bacterial weapons. He has also said at'the 7th meeting of that Commission - and this is pertinent ta our discussion today - that the United States Govemment "is interested in disarmament as a means of preventing and outlawing war, and not as a means of regulating it"; 140. That statement of policy brings us, 1 think, - and 1 conclude with this - very close to the heart of our problem here. Aggression is the enemy, not the particular weapons used, as the General Assembly itself has declared in a resolution overwhelmingly supported by the United Natjons under the title "Peace 'through deeds." 3 Aggression is the enetny. The elimination of weapons .of mass destruction, the drastic reduction of armed forces and the regulation of the weapons needed tü support those armed forces will decrease the possibility of aggression. It is because we wish ta see real progress in this vital task that we propose the referral of the Soviet Union draft reso':;,tion to the Disarmament Commission.

The . delegation of the UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS reserves the right to reply to the mendacious and slanderous assertions of the United States represenll.tive. For the present it will confine itself to drawing the Security Council's attention ta some of the ground1ess arguments which the United States representative saw fit to put forward. 142. It must be obvious ta everyone that the United States representative was improvising his speech, because he had some difficulty in revising his origina1line of argument, once he had started. He had prepared himself for a particular Hne, but in the course of the meeting it hecame necessary tochange to another. It was theref0re difficult for him to abandon the plan with which h~ had come to today's meetinga plan of which he hirrJself had informed the Press, since only recently the. United States Press pub1ished his false a1legation that the Soviet Union intel.'1ded to submit ta the Security Council a question connected with the events in Korea, whereas everybody now knows, and the USSR delegation has made an official statement to that effèct today, that il; is.submitting the question of an appeal to States to accede to and ratify the Geneva Protocol and that it is iI.1terested only in that question. The events in Korea, and what the American aggressors are doing there is a special question. If the United States delegation intends to discuss that matter in the Security Cauncil, let it submit a pr.oposal. If such a question is submitted, we shall say what we have to say about it. But the United States representative prefers another way, the cowardly way. At a time when the Geneva Protocol is being: dis- . cussed in the Security Couneil, he attempts to divert the. attention of the Council ta another matter by embarking on an entirely different question, which has no relation ta the Council's agenda. 143. Tt was preeisely for that reason, and with every justification, that as President of the Security Council l interrupted the United States representative's statement, bfecause it was irrelevant to the question at issue - apart· from the fact that it was cynical in form and openly aggressive in content. 144. On behalf of the USSR delegation; l must say that inaU its existence the Security Couneil surely can nevet haveheard a more aggressive statement. By· this bankrupt argument, the United States representative 'attempted to conceal and·disguise theunwillingness of the Government of the United States to ratify the Geneva Protocol for the prohibition of bacterial weapons. He failed'to say why the Government of the United States has, for twenty-two years, failed to accede ta the Protocol, and later suddenlydiscovered that it was "obsolete". Instead he embarked on a_ series of worthless arguments of various kinds. His statement 145. The emptiness of the United States representative's argument is obvious. He atte..111pts to speak of reservations. But the United States representative evidently fails to understand that every State has the right to make reservations when signing illternational agreements. That is to say, legitimate reservations, and at this point 1 would draw the United States representative's attention ta document A/AC.50/3 of the Committee of Twelve, on page 80 of the Russian translation of which is a Iist of the States whkh have acceded to and ratified the Geneva Protocol. 4 This document was compiled and signe~ by our respected colleague, the alternate representattve of the Netherlands, Mr. Luns. In this official document it is stated that of the fortytwo 'States which ratified the Geneva Protocol, about twenty States made the same reservations as the Soviet Union: Why does the United States representative a.ccuse the Soviet Union of making illegitimate reservations? For example,. reservations of the same kÙ1d as those made by the Soviet Union were made on signature and ratification of the Geneva 'ProtQcoi, by the United Kingdom and France. In one reservation it is stated that the Protocol is not binding on 'In<!Ïa and àll the British Dominions which were independent members of the League of Nations and had not signed and,acceded to the Protocol. . The reservation of the United Kingdom further states that the Geneva Protocol. is binding on the British Government only in re~ation.to the Powers and States which have signed ~nd ratIfi~d the Protocol or have definitely acceded to 11:. That IS to say, the satne reservation was made by the United Kingdom as' by the Soviet Union. 146. Why does he not criticize the United Kingdom and France for making such reservatiom,? The same reservations·have been made by about twenty States. Therefore his arguments are an'insult to aIl the twenty States which made'reservations to the Geneva Protocol. They are art insult ta alHorty-two of the States which r~tified this international agreement. He disputes the nght t? m~e reservations. But iliat is the universally recogllIzed rIght of every State. Surely such a iine of argument by the United States representative cannot he regarde? ·as convincing. No arguments and nothing he says' WIll concea1 the United States Government's 147. Arguments such as these will not succeed lU concealing the United States representative's reaI position, because they mere1y reveal the unwillingness of the United States to ratify the Geneva Prôtocol. 148. The assertion of the United States representative that the Government of the United States of America has submitted to the United Nations a proposaI on the prohibition of bacteriaI weapons is -not in accord with the facts. No one anywhere has ever seen or r~ad any practicaI United States proposai on the prohibition -of bacteriaI weapons in terms of -the Ge'neva Protocol. Such proposaIs do not _exist in the real.world. _ - 149.. l WQuld ask the United States representative, if such proposais exist, to produce them in clear form in a document, and to name the document to the members of the Security Council. The generaI tem~ks which the UriitedStates representative, Mr. Cohen, addressed to the United Nations Disarmament Commission have nothing whatever to do with practical proposaIs on the prohibition of bacteriaI weapons. The purpose of general rernârks by United States representatives bath in the Disarmalllcnt Commission and in the Security Council is tô' preve'1t the prohibition of bacteriai Weapons and thereby to facilitate the United States' preparationof bacterial warfare. The United States bas supmitted to the United Nations no concretely drafted proposais-on the prohibition of bacterial weapons in terms snch as those which appear in the Geneva Protocol. -l submit this as an- -official statement. Consequently the -United States representative's second "argument"-is groundiess; it does not correspond with the fads. 150. _The third argument bas to do with guarantees. If the United States representative will read the document ta which he referred, he will find on page 72 of the Ru~sian text (1 _do not know the number of the pagè in the. English text) the-conclusion reached by the League of Nations Special Committee after many years of work. l) Section 80 of the document states that supervision of preparation for _bacterial warfare could nevèr,'-in -the opinion' of the Committee, be complete, t 1.dwould therefore always be ineffective, because dangerousbacteria -capable of causing an epidemic are to . be -found in aU bacteriological laboratories and hospitals for infectious.diseases. 15L Such .was the conclusion reached by the League of. Nations Special Committee with regard to the impossibility of controlling and supervising pt'êpar.ations for. bac~eriai~arlare~ This was more than a quarter of " ... emphasize that the impossibility of control and supervision of these weapons made imperative their prohibiti0n and collective undertaking,to punish their users." 152. Only one conclusion can be drawn from these authoritative views. The best guarantee is the prohibition of the use of bacterial weapons, and the Geneva Protocol provides such prohibition. That is the conclusion at which these American scientists - the American Association of Scientific Workers - arrived on 6 May 1952. After twenty-seven years, Arnerican scÏentists have reached precisely the same conclusion as that reached by the League of Nations Special Committee in 1925. 153. From aIl this it is obvious that the delegation and the Government of the United States are referring to so-called guarantees in order to find a pretext for refusing to ratify the Geneva Protocol, and are employing a' worthless and rotten Hne of argument, intended ta camouflage their refusaI to ratify the Geneva Protocol and to enable them to take cover behind discussions about "gual':'antees". 154. EquaIly unjustified is the United States representative's proposaI to refer the question introduced by the USSR delegation to the United Nations Disarmament Commission. As is well known, the USSR delegation made a proposaI in the Disarmament Commission,that consideration should be given to the question of the prohibition of bacterial weapons and of measures for bringing ta account those who violate the prohibition, but that USSR proposaI was rejected by the United States delegation. Now, when the Soviet Union delega-: tian has submitted to the Security Council a proposaI that the Council should appeal to States to accede to and ratify the Geneva Protocol "in order to promote... peace and security", the United States representative proposes that the matter should be referred to the United Nations Disarrr.d.n~ent Commission. 155. Apparently the United States de1ega~ion is playing football with this question. But it· is impermissible to make a football of a 'significant international documenf which has become an important part of international law, a document signed and ratified by fortytwo States, including nine members of the Security Council and four of the five permanent members of the Council. 156. In the light of aIl these facts, the utter bankruptcy of aIl the arguments advanced by the United States representative is perfectly obvious; and it is obvious' that the pmpose of these arguments is to cover up, to 157.. In its statement·the USSR delegation pointed out that protracted discussion in the United Nations of the question of the prohibition of atomic weaponshad diverted attention from 'such an important question as thatof the prohibition of bacterial weapons and from the Geneva Protocol, which has becorne a part of internationallaw. 158. What justification has the Security Couneil for ignoring the Geneva Protocol?· "\iVhat justification has the S~curity Council for failing to take account of the fact that theoverwhe1ming majority of the States of the world·.--forty-two States ~ have adhered to and ratified the Protocol? What justification have the members of the Security Council for failing to appeal to.aU the remaining States to sign and ratify this Protocol?Wouldthatnot be a step towards the strengtheniligofinternational peace and security? It would utidoubtedlybe a· very significant and practical step, and only the. Government of the United States is attempting by any and ail means to delay progress towards strengthening the peace and security of the nations. 159. That is the conclusion which everyone must inevitably draw from tod2.y's statement by the United States representative. After the interpretation into English of the foregoing speech, the President made the following statement (translated fror~ Russian): . 160. Ithas been proposed that the French 'interprètation should behe1dover until the next meeting. If·there are no objections, perhaps we can agree to this procedure in view of the lateness of the hour. 161. Mr.HOPPENOT (France) (translated from French):...In· defèrence ta· the President's wish, and in t. _l' deferen~e to.the members of the Couneil, l agree to the postponernent of the French interpretation until the beginning of thenextmeeting. 162. ThePRESIDENT (translated from R1~ssian): We have to deeide on the date of our next meeting. It is proposed that we meet again at 3 p.m. on Friday. 163•.. Mr. GROSS. (United States of America): l do not wish to press the point too strongly if it does not meet .theconyenienceof the representatives, but l w(mder whether.it would be agreeable for the Council to meeton.· Friday morning, 20 June, so that, if necessary, .we may have an afternoon meeting on the same day. The weekend will follow and it might be desirable ta h:we twa meetings as the result of any c1evelôpments. Which may arise. 164. The PRESIDENT . (translated from Russian): Doesanyon~ disagree with what the United States iepresentativè has just said? l do not see or hear .'lny ôl?je!=tiqn~. It is .therefore so deeided. ',. . The meeting rose at 7.30 p.m.