S/PV.579 Security Council

l should like ta draw the attention of the United States representative to the fact that it has not been customary in Security Council practice to propose draft resolutions on one subject while discussing another subject not yet inc1uded in the agenda. l presume that, having announced his intention to place his item on the Council's agenda on Monday, the United States representative will be able to publish his draft resolutian and send it to the Secretariat. The Secretariat will issue it as a document and corr.municate its contents ta the members of the Council. 42. It hardly therefore seems appropriate to introduce this draft œsolution now on a matter whkh has not been formally placed on the Security Council's agenda.

l do not wish to make a point of this. l have advised the Council of m)' intention to file an agenda item at Monday's meeting. l have circulated the draft resolutian. It would be, l think, preferable for the convenience and information of the members of the Council to read the draft resolution at this time. l have in mind, for example, that the Soviet Union representative circulated a draft resolution prior to the time of the adoption of the agenda item which we are now discllssing. However, l do not press the point. The cîrculation of the draft resolution has gone forward.

l am proposing precisely the method which was followed by the Soviet Union delegation when it submitted its item. The USSR delegation submitted two items, and on each of them, together with its official letter, submitted draft resolutions which were issued by the Secretariat of the United Nations as official documents. That is the usual practice in the proceedings of the Security Council. l have expressed my opinion that it would be desirable for thé United States representative to proceed in the same way. The official sub-

The delegàtion of the UNION OF SOVIET SO- CIALIST REPUBLICS considers it essential to make some preliminary observations in connexion with to~ day's discussion on the question before us, which was included in the Council's agenda on its proposaI, while reserving the right to submit more detailed observations at a future meeting, should the necessity arise. 46. The representatives of Greece and the United Kingdom have aUeged that the aim of the USSR delegation is to achieve propaganda effects. The USSR delegation categoricaUy rejects such as"ertions. It never has been, is not and does not intend to be concerned with propaganda effects. The question at issl':e is quite different. . 47. The purpose of the proposaI which the USSR delegation has submitted on its Government's behalf, that the Security Council should appeal to States to accede ta and ratify the Geueva Protocol, was ta further the cause of international peace and security, to promote the wider dissemination of the provisions of the Geneva Protocol among States, and to ensur~ that the States which have not acceded to or :-atified the Protocol should do so and assume the weighty political, legal and moral obligations imposed by the provisions of 't.;'e Protocol. 48. That is what the Soviet Union Government, the people of the USSR and the USSR delegation in the Security Council seek to achieve. 49. The representative of Greece tried to say a few flattP..ring words about the USSR delegation's statement. l can only express gratification that that statement should'have pleased the Greek representative. He also med to descrihe the unenvillble position in which the United States representative found himself at our previous meeting and, l would say, depicted it very well. He referred to the fables of Krylov; but let me remind him of anothet of Krylov's fables - the one about favours that do more harm than good. He should read this other fable - "The Hermit and the Bear". 50. What has the Anglo-American bloc, which has attempted to to"s an important international document, an important international agreement, about like a baIl from one United Nations organ to another, achieved :in today's discussion, and what are the reasons for this behaviour? 51. First of aU, we must observe that all the representatives of nations which have ratified the Geneva Pmtncol h:we again confirmed their countries' adherence to it. Accordingly,· none of those delegations, none of the Governments of those countries, has said anything against the Protocol. AIl of them, including the United Kingdom representative, have treated the Protocol with the respect it merits and announced that their countries will continue to adhere to it. ~ar as to use when he said that the Geneva Protocol is "obsolete", That is the mGlst important fact which emerges from today's discussion. 53. The United States representative's attempt to make capital out of the speeches of his colleagues today bas proved vain. The United Stat~s delegation's position has litile to back it in the way of capital; what tbere is consists more of liabilities. All the representatives of the countries which bave ratified the Geneva Protocol bave said here that they continue to respect the Protocol; but there they have stopped. The situation of their Governments in the conditions created by the aggressive military alliance forged by the United States prevents them from follO'\,ving "a" with "b". Although they confirmed their respect for the Protocol and the obligations arising out of it, they have proved incapable of going further and openly declaring that the Protocol imposes upon them the obligation t0 do everything possible to induce all other States to accede to and ratify it. No such statement has been made by the said de1egations. The reason why many of them, in the position in which they find themse1ves, have been unable ta do this is that to say "b" after they have said "a" would mean going further down a road different from that along which they are being led, jostled, püshed and driven by the United States. 54. l cannot refrain from drawing attention to this circurrÎstance. Yet the fact that none of these de1egatians has repeated the cynical term which was used by the President of the United States in connexion with the Geneva Protocol proves that in thlS matier the United States is isolated; for an international agreement ratified by forty-two States and constituting an important rt:.ie of international law gives no one,. not even the President of the United States or the delegatian of the Unite.d States in the Security Council, the right to ignore this important international agreement, which imposes an obligation on the conscience and practice of nations. 55. When, therefore, the Government of the United States says that the Geneva Protocol is obsolete, it is assuming tao great a responsibility. It is issuing a challenge to the people of tl:.e worId and to international law, a challenge to those States and peoples which have acceded to and ratifieEi the Protocol, with the result that it has become an important and significant rule of international law imposing weighty and responsible legal international and moral obligations on States and peoples. 56. That 1S the basic conclusion and outcome oftoday's discussion. 57. The United States representative has unsuccessfully attempted tô explain his Government's refusaI to ratify the Protocol by referring. to the difference between 1952 and 1925. . . . ?8. l would point out that there has been no change lU the past twenty-odd years in the attitude of the United States towards the Protocol. If we refer to official documents - the records of the United States Senate - we find that bventy-six years ago, on 9 59. In 1te first placel chemical weapons are cheaper ta produce and more effective when put into use in warfare. . œ. That is the fir:;t argument. Is not thatsamt: argument playing the main part in the attitude taken by the Government of the United States in 19521 twenty-six years later? It is indeed. United States generalsl admirals, politicians and Congressmen cynically announce that weapons of mass destruction, including bacterial and chemical weapons are cheaper and more effective, and that they can kill more people at less cost. Consequently, the reason for refusaI remains the same as it was twenty-six years aga. In 1926, ruling circles refusing to ratify the Geneva Protocol did sa with the ruthle!:.s intentions of killing more people by chemical weapons, by weapons of mass destruction, and now again in 1952 we see the same aggressive intentions. 61. At the 577th meeting the United States representative tried to evade explaining why the United States had not ratified the Geneva Protocol by saying in effect: "Let the historians C:eal with this matter". l would remi."ld him that the rime dcies not allow this, that it may take the historians toc long to deal with this matter, partièularly here, in the United States, where progressive and objective historians are not at present allowed to WOl."k. We do not doubt that there are honest and impartial people among AmefÎcan historians, people who will show the whole world why the United States has for twenty-seven years failed to ratify the Geneva Protocol; but 1 think the world will have to wait a long time before American historians do this. 6)2. Questions of peace and security, however, do not wait, and those who bear responsibility for strengthening peace and security are obliged to repl)', and to point out why the United States has not yet ratified the Protocol. l have indicated the first reason. It existed in 1926, and it still obtains in 1952. 63. 1 do not wish to impose upon the attention of the Security Council by quoting the statements which individual Congressmen made in 1926. They are callous and inhuman statements. And they coincide with similar statements being made today by General Bradley, General Bullene, General Creasy and a number of others in the United States. The reason is the same now as it was then - more people can be killed with bacterial, chemical or other weapons of mass destruction; therefore they must not be prohibited. 64. Thus the original reason for which the United States did not ratify the Protocol in 1926 is dear. It intended to use chemica1 weâpons; this was sa then 66. At a Senate meeting at that time, a statement by the late General Pershing, who was considered a military authority in the United States 'at the time, was cited. Let me quote General Pershing's stateOlent. When Senator Fletcher asked him: "Would it be safe, in other words, for us ta say that the use of poison gas is inhuman and that it would not be permltted again?" General Pershing replied: "No, decidedly not, because we cannat trust the other fellow". 67. That was the position taken by United States military leaders twenty-six years ago. They were opposed to the prohibition of chemical methods of warfare because they did not trust the "other fellow"; that is to say, they did not trust other States. That was twenty-six years ago. What reason have the rulers of the United States at the present time for refusing to ratify the Protocol? The answer to thi!;l is ta be found in the statement made by the United States representative at our ~.:st meeting. The United States, he said,does not trust the Soviet Union and for that reason will not ratify the Geneva Protocol. This argument is merely ludicrous; but the substance of the matter remains what it was twenty-six years ago. Twenty-six years aga the rulers of the United States did not trust other States or peoples, and they do not trust them now. That is why they are preparing ta use weapons of mass destruction against them. That is the second reason; and there is no difference between the situation then and the situation today. 68. Now far the third reason. We find in the official Senate records that Senator Borah, who'spoke in favour of ratifying the Protocol, quoted a long passage from the Washington Post, in which it was statedthat the most active opponents of the ratification of the Geneva Protocol were the well-known reactionary organization, the American Legion, and other military organizations. Behind these organizations are the American chemical firms which fear that ratification of the Geneva Protocol by ~he United States will affect their business and war profits, thus causing the merchants of death in the United States ta suffer. These same mel'chants of death, who are now producing not only chemical but also bacterial and other weapons of mass destruction, are now, in 1952, opposing the prohibition of atomic weapons, the prohibition of bacterial weapons and the prohibition of chemical weapons, just as they are opposing the ratification of the Geneva Protocol. Here qistary .repeats itself. 69. Such are the three decisive reasons which reveal why the United States has not ratified t.he Geneva ~rotocol for over twenty years, why it did not ratify it m 1926 and do~ nol wish 10 do 50 DOW, an:,:h~~_~0:::qU:i~:~P~S~tifi~~::= 70. If the problem is approached from this angle, the accumulation of falsehood, hypocrisy and slander in the United States representative's atatements will be cIearly seen, and regardless of his nebulous proclamations, the rensons for whichthe United States leaders are opposed to the ratification oi the Geneva Protocol will become obvious. No slanderous and false innuendoes directed against the Soviet Union will avail either the United States representative or his Govemment in this CounciI. 71. As the United Kingdom representative recalled, the Soviet Unionnot only l'atified the Geneva Protocol but immediately took steps to improve it; and the passage which the United Kingdom representative quoted in considerable detaiI has merely served to lighten my tast<:. The United Kingdom representative recalled that, after signing the Geneva Protocol, the USSR Government put forward in the League of Nations, in April 1926, a proposal to complete the Geneva Protocol by providing that methods and appliances fa:.' chemical aggression and for bacterial warfare should be destroyed within three months of the date of the entry into force of the Convention, and that industrial undertakings engaged in the production of means of chemical aggression or hacterial warfare should discontinue production from the date of the entry into force of the Geneva Protocol and that they should he placed under a permanent labour control. I was going to mention this myself had the United Kingdom representative"not forestalled me, for which l am most grateful to him. He omitted to mention, however, that the United Kingdoman.d the United States prevented the adoption of this USSR proposaI. \iVhen the USSR put. forward its proposaI for the improvement of the Geneva Protocol, the United Kingdom de1egation, which at the time led the Anglo-French blocas the United States delegation 1eads the Anglo-American bloc todayprevented the adoption of this proposaI. 72. This also proves that the Soviet Union did not merely ratify the Geneva Protocol. It took immediate steps to improve it, while complying strictly with its provisions and regarding it as an effective international instrument for the prohibition of chemical and bacterial warfare. Thatwas the position which the Soviet Union took twenty-six years ago, and that is its position today, 73. I could also recall that after the Soviet Union had 4 ratified the Protocol, it immediate1y submitted a proposal inthe competent League of Nations organs that all Governments which had signed but not ratified it should. be invited to do 50 as soon as possible. That proposaI was adopted by the preparatory Commission j:U~:f~~J:~~nc~~~~c~n:~a~~oY~:~dr~::J the Protocol. 76. The United States representative tried to refer to certain proposaIs which his country allegedly submitted to the United Nations with regard to the prohibition of bacterial weapons. But he named not a single document or date, and failed to make any specific references tu these tnythical proposaIs, since, as 1 stated at our last meeting, no such proposai:> exist. We cannot regard as a concrete United States propnsal Mr. Cohen's statement concerning the desirabiHty, at some vague and unspecified future date, of the prohibition of atomic and other types of weapons \;f mass destruction. 77. The opponents of the Soviet Union proposal have tried to base their objections on the need for a general disarmament programme, and that the prohibition of bacterial weapons is mere1y a component part of such a programme. Of course, that is undeniable. The Soviet Union has been making a tremendous effort for many years, since the early days of the establishment of the United Nations, to draw up such a general programme, which would include aIl the e1ements - the prohibition uf atomic ,,[eapons, the prohibition of aIl other types of weapons of mass destruction, including bacterial, chemical and other weapons, the real and effective reduction of armed forces and armaments - but,- for reasons of which you are aIl aware, no such" agreement has yet been reached. 80. The United States representative has spoken of an "open world". The term "open world" is a new one in United States demogogy and propag&nda, and suppl~­ mente the old term "free world". l would submit to the United States representative that it is not for him or his country to speak of a "free world". l have before me the records of the Commission on Human Rights. The position taken by the United States delegation in that Commission shows what kind of "free world" the United States Goveriunent and itsdelegation defends in the organs of the United Nations. 81. The United States delegation to the Commission on Human Rights voted against the inclusion in the Covenant on Human Rights of a guarantee that everyone should enjoy the rights proclaimed in the Covenant without di.stinction as to race, colour, nationality, social origiU, property, religion or any other criterion. 4 The United States voted against tbis. What kind of "free world" can there be if you vote against the fundamental provision that everyone, without distinction as to riationality, race, colour or property, should be free and equal and should enjoy all rights? The United States delegation which voted against tbis, nevertheless has the temerity to say that it represents the free world and· daims to he the· defender of the free world. 82. The United States delegation also voted against the provision that women should enjoy equal privileges with men at work and should receive equal pay for equal work. 5 vVhat kind of freedom is this? What kind of a free world is it in which women cannot receive the Sélme pay .as men for equal work and are given worse working conditkms than men? Spare us from such a "free world".. 83. The United States delegation voted in the Commission on Human Rights against a form of education designed to suppress any incitement to hatred on racial pT other grounds. 6 That means that the United States is in favour of racial hatred, of the incitement of such andpf racial discrimination. And yetyou say that you have a "free world". 'iVhat kind (!lf a free world have you,if in your country a Negro and a non:-Negro cannot attend the same school, a Negro. cannot enter a restaurant frequented by white men, and Negroes and non- Negroes cannot sit side by sicle as free and independent people? 84. Other examples of the way in which the United States de1egation has voted in the Commission on . 4 sée decument EjCN.4jSR.274. GSee dGcument EjCN.4jSR.281. 6 See document EjCN.4j285. 85. The United Kingdom representative, following in his United States representative's footsteps and supporting his intention to refer the USSR draft resolution to the Disarmament Commission, failed to reply to my question. Does he consider that an appeal by the Security Council to aU States to accede to and ratifv the Geneva Protocolthe importance of which hi also does not deny - would in any degree prevent the United Nations Disarmament Commission from achieving a better, more adequate international agreement, inc1uding all the elements of a disarmament pro-- gramme - the prohibition of atomic weapons, the prohibition of aIl other types of weapons of mass destruction, the reduction of armed forces and armaments, control and the submission of full official information on armaments by aIl S~::.tes and their verification? The United Kingdom representative evaded a reply to that question. He announced that it could not he answered either by "yes" or by "no". That, however, is the root and essence of the problem under discussion, for an appeal by the Security Council will in no way prevent t.'1e United Nations Disarmament Commission from continuing its work on the problem of the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons. On the contrary, such an appeal will assist th,,; Commission's work. A thing which is old but useful should not be ignoreci and thrown away until something new and more adequate is available. Only those who are preparing themselves for new acts of aggression, only those who are preparing to precipitate a new world war, only those who are preparing to use bacterial weapons and aIl other weapons of mass destruction can disseminate propaganda to the effect that the Geneva Pro.., tecol is obsolete - propaganda which is hostile to all mankind and which contradicts the elementary standards of international law. 86. The United Nations Disarmament Commission, and its two predecessors, which have been dissolved, have as yet been unable to reach agreement on a more complete instrument. The Disarmament Commission is continuing its work on this problem. Let us wish it success in reaching positive results as soon as possible in preparing a comprehensive programme for the reductian of armaments and armed forces, the prohibition of atomic weapons, etc. So long as it has not produced such an agreement, however, so long as no such international agreement exists, why do we cast aside the existing universaUy-known agreement, the Geneva Protocol? 90. In view of ail this, what grounds has the United Kingdom representative for disparaging the significance of the Geneva Protocol and the obligations deriving therefrom? It is obvious that the example he quoted proves .the very opposite, proves the great political, 91. Furthermore, it explains why the United States leaders fear the Protocûl and its ratification. It is precisely the tremendous force of the obligations which the Protocol places on States, governments and nations which is compelling the rulers of the United States to evade ratification of the Protocol, for the reasons l have already mentioned. That is the gist of today's discussion, the very substance of the question under consideration. 92. Thus the discussion has shelWn that the opponents of the USSR proposai have been unable to refute its force and logic. They have been unable to minimize the significance of the Geneva Protocol. It is obvious that there is an understanding among sorne of them; their statements make this plain. The United States Press shows that they bave he1d very long conferences on the strategy and tactics to be adopted in the Security Council to prevent the adoption of the Soviet Union proposaI. There: is an understanding arnong them to prevent the ado'ption of this proposaI. If such a plan exists, however, it constitutes a direct violation of this international agreement by those States which ratifieè. it, since the ratifying States assumed a solemn international undertakingto bend their efforts toward the States' acceding to the Protocol, an undertaking to seek ta persuade other States to accede to and ratify the Protocol. 93. In present conditions, and for the reasons set forth by the Soviet Union de1egation in its statement of 18 June [577th meeting], it is the dutY of the Security Council to approach this problem seriou· and with a sense of responsibility, and to solve it, bearing in mind that an appeal by the Security Council ta aU States will appreciably promote the strengthening of peace and international security by e..-v;:erting a substantial restraining influence on the modern aggressors, who'arè preparin6" to use weapons of mass destruction, including bacterial weapons. Such an act by the Security Cot1l1cil will be itt the interest of peace, and if that is so, the Security Council has no right, either moral or legal, ta refrain from taking such a step, a step ca1cul(lted ta strengthen peace and security. 94; It is for precise1y these reasons that the Soviet Union de1egation, on the instructions of the Gov·ernment of the USSR, has submitted this proposaI and urges its adoption. The USSR delegation considers the United States proposaI ta be unfounded and false and 95. The USSR delegation vigorously protests against these plans on the part of the United States delegation. The conclusion which the USSR delegation draws from this is that the United States delegation and the Government of the United States c,mtlot bring itself openly to reject the Soviet Union proposaIs, since that would be too OllOUS a course even for the Governroent of the Uniteu States. Other devious methods have therf'1ore been chosen, manœuvres designed to channel :the USSR draft resolution into the Commission and bury it there. 96. Who can fail to know tha( the reduction of armamentsand the prohibition of atomic weapons have been discussed in the United Nations since its very earliest days - that is to say for six years? But not one step forward has been taken. How much longer will ::he discussion of this question continue? No one knows. 97. How long will the Govemment of the United States, which has officially rejected the policy of peace and officially proc1aimed a "policy of stœngth", and which, in accordance with that policy, is conducting a frantic annaments race and preparing a.new world war - how long will the Government of the United States continue to oppose the adoption of definite decisions on the prolùbition of atomic weapons and on the prohibition of aIl other types of weapons of mass destruction, including bacterial and chemical weapons? How long will the United States, with its "poUcy of strength" and its armaments race policy, continue to prevent the United Nations Disarmament Commission from adopting a really concrete decision on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons? No one knows. 98. Why must we wait until s0mething happens, at sorne indefinite time, in the United Nations Disarmament Commission? lt would be more correct, more honourable and more fully in accordance with the obligations laid upon the Council by the United Nations Charter if the Security Council adopted the Soviet Union proposaI to appeal t0 aIl States to accede to the Geneva Protocol ';vithout waiting for the United Nations Disarmament Commission to formulate sorne better and mor~ complete. agreement - if indeed it ever succeeds in doing sa. 99. That is the situation. In the light of these facts, anyone who opposes the Soviet Union proposaIs - and their chid opponent is the United States of Americareveals himself as an adversary of the Geneva Protocol, which provides for the prohibition of the use in war of chemical and bacterial methods. 100. In the documents issued by the United Nations Secretariat to which the USSR de1egation referred at the last meeting, and fr.om which the United Kingdom representative read extracts today, details will1Je found cn how the League of Nations and its organs regarded 101. That was the tme judgment made a quarter of a century ago. It cannot be denied - and this is the tntth, Sir Gladwyn - that this judgment is stiU absolutely valid and correct ta this day. The Security Couneil is therefore in duty bound to take measures to prevent the use of these weapons, which are directed against aU mankind and the use of which is a crime under international law. Tt follows that anyone who opposes the Soviet Union proposaI ta invite governments to accede to and ratify the Geneva· Protocol is acting against the interests of all mankind. These are the facts, and the Security Council must act in the light of these facts. 102. As for the "open wodd", the United States representative in the Disarmament Commission, in proclaiming the "open world", proposed that aU States should give full information concerning their armaments and armed forces, while the United States was to give no information concerning atomic weapons. In ~merican, this is caUed an "open wodd". At this point, the interpretation into English of the foregoing statement was gt:ven. 103. The PRESIDENT (transiated fr01n Rttssian): We have a proposaI that, in view of the lateness of the hour, we should postpone the interpretation into French of the statement made today by the USSR representative until the next meeting, if the French representative agn~es. If there are no objections and if the French representative agrees, we shaU do sa.

May l ask when the next meeting will be held? Will it be tomorrow? lOS. The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): l am at the disposaI of 'the Security Couneil. l am prepared to ho!d a meeting even on Sunday. 106. Mr. GROSS (United States of America): On the basis of sorne quite informaI discussions which l have had during the last few minutes, l think that severa! members 'of the Couneil would prefer not to have a meeting tomorrow or Sunday. 107. l, myself, should like to suggest that this meeting should continue in order to hear the French interpretatian of the President's remarks. 108. The PRESIDENT (translated from 109. To clarify matters, r' should add that l have another speaker on my list, the representative of Chile. May l ask him how long he will require for his statement and whether he insists on speaking today.

l do not think my remarks will take more than about fifteen minutes. With regard ta my wish ta take the floor today, l do not think my remarks are important enough to justify the Council's departing from its usual practice. In this respect, l am at the Council's disposaI: if it is deeided to continue the present meeting, l shall speak today; if it is decided to hold a meeting tomorrow or sorne other day, l shall speak then.

According to my arithmetic, about thirty-five minutes 'will he required for the interpretation into French of th.eUSSR de1egation's statement. If the representative of Chile speaks for fifteen minutes in his own language, thirty minutes will be required for the interpretation of his statement. That will make thirty-five minutes, plus forty-five minutes - one hour and twenty minutes. Thus, unless l am mistaken, we must possess our souls in patience for another hour and twenty minutes. 112. If the members of the Security Couneil intend ta work for another hour and a haH, let us continue our work. But perhaps we can postpone the interpretation of the USSR de1egation's statement, and the Chilean representative's statenlent, since he does not insist on speaking today, urftil the next meeting, and we could now decide on the date of that meeting.

(translated from Spanish): l should like ta know whether there are any other speakers on your list, Mr. President, because ii there are, l would have no objection ta speaking after them. 114. The PRESIDENT (trcmsiated from Russian): l have no more speakers on mylist. One representative has' told nie unofficially that h~ might speak at the next meeting. l have not mentioned the USSR de1egation, which has reserved the right ta make sorne observations at the next meeting.. US. Mr. GROSS (United States of America): l am certain that the :President of the Security Couneil would not have any secret Couneil meetings ta ascertain the fact which he just announced, and l think that it was quite inappropri~te to construe.my ~emar~s the way the President dld. l had a discusslOn wlth several members, including the.representative of Chile. l think the representative of. Chile was too modest in saying that his reinai'ks may 1;1ot be of sufficient interest to the Counci1 tôbe heard this evening. l, for one, would be 116. In any event, l should like ta press, if l may, for at least a continuation of the meeting with the French interpretation of the President's remarks. Then l should hope that we might at least have the henefit of the original of the statement by the representative of Chile. 117. The PRESIDENT (translated front Russian): In making my arithmetical calculations, l took into account the faet that we have he1d two rather long meetings today and that the members of the Security Council are tired. If members of the Security Council wish ta continue working, however, let us .continue. 118. Mr. HOPPENOT (France) (translated from Frenclt): l waived the French interpretation of your statement, Mr. President, in deference ta what l took to be the Council's unanimous wish. However, since sorne members wish to hear the French interpretation of your statement today, l would ask that that course be followed. l am ready, not, as you have said, to arm Plyse1f with patience - that would not be very courteous either ta your remarks or to those we are about ta hear from the representative of Chile - but ta carry on with our proceedings until the Council sees fit, this evening, to conclude them.

l did not make my remark out of deference ta anyone personally, but out of deference ta aU the members of the Security Council, who have sat here aU day and are rather tired. That was the consideration by which l was guided. l would repeat, however, that if the members of the Security Council wish to continue to work, let us continue. 120. Let us consider this ciiscussion closed, and continue our work. The French interpretation of the Presidents statement was given. 121. Mr. SANTA CRUZ (Chile) (translated from Spanish): The interpretation lasted for over thirty-five minutes and l do not know whether the Council will wish to go on working. 122. The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): l .am at the disposaI of the Security Council. The United States representative expressed the wish that we should continue our work. l am prepared to continue. 123. Mr. SANTA CRUZ (Chile) (translated f1'om Spanish): My position is this: If there are any more speakers who wish ta speak at this meeting, l shall be glad to make my remarks taday. However, if l am ta be the only speaker, l should .prefer to speak at the next meeting.

The situation is extremely c-Dnfused. Before the interpretation into French of the USSR delegation's statement, the United States and Chilean representatives stated that they were prepared ta continue our work. 1 made a calculation and informed the Security Couneil that that would require a minimum al one hour and twenty minutes. On that basis, we decided ta go on working for an hour and a half, taking into account the time that would be required ta interpret the USSR delegation's statement into French and the further forty-five minutes required for the Chilean representative's statement and for the two interpretations. 128. We tooIç that deeision and I cannot see why w~ should reconsid~r it. I caU upon the representative of Chiîe. If he does not wish ta speak that is for him ta decide. 129. Mr. SANTA CRUZ (Chile) (translated from Spanish) : 1 shall start my speech at once, Mr. President. 1 only made my remark in deference to aIl my colleagues and ta yourself, not because I had any objection ta spealOng today. 130. At a previous [S77th] meeting, Mr. President, 1 asked you a question which was not answered. When we were discussing the inclusion of this item in the agenda, 1 asked you under what Article of the Charter it was being submitted to the Security Council. 1 added that 1 supposed that it was under Article 34, which authorizes the Security Couneil to investigate any situation whjch might lead to international friction. 1 supposed that the representative of the Soviet Union, who had becn trying to have the Disarmament Commission make a study of charges which he had made regarding the alleged use of bacterial weapons in Korea, had deeided to take those charges to the Security Couneil in view of the fact that the Disarmament Commission had declared itself to be incompetent ta dea1 with.specific charges concerning the use of weapons of any kind, and had said that the Commission's terms of reference were to prepare plans or proposaIs for the reduction of armaments and armed forces and the prohibition ofatomic weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, including bacterial weapons. 131. As 1 have said, Mr. President, you did not reply explicity, but from what you said in submitting your draft resolution and in replying to the United States representative, the foIlowing is clear: The Soviet Union de1egation has definitely not caIled the attention of the Couneil to a situa.tion endangering international peace and security, of the kind envisaged in Articles 34 and 35 of the Charter. On the contrary. You made the following very clear statement, which 1 quote: " ... the Soviet Union delegation has submitted a proposaI which has no connexion whatsoever with the question of events in Korea... 1 firmly declare that 1 am interested in the present instance only in the strict question of accession to and ratification of the Geneva Protocol." 132. You have just repeated that statement now. There can be no doubt then that the question raised by the representative of the Soviet Union falls under some other of the provisions of the Charter which lay down the powers of the Security Council, and in particular under Article 26, which establishes that "the Security Cauncil shall be responsible for formulating plans to he submitted to the Members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments". 133. The Soviet Union's draft resolution appeals to the Couneil to decide "to appeal to allStates, both Members of the United Nations and non-member States, which hàve not yet ratified or acceded to the Protocol for the prohibition of the use of bacterial weapons, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, to accede ta and ratify the said Protocol". 134. The preamble of the draft resolution, far from mentioning specifie facts which made this appeal by the Security Council imperative for the maintenance of peace, tums exclusively on alleged differences of opinion among statesmen and public figures in various countries concerning the admissibility of using bacterial weapons, and on the fact that world public opinion has rightly condemned the use of such weapons. 135. The general nature of the USSR proposaI is then perfectly c1ear: it aims at securing the effective prohibition of the use of bacterial weapons in future by ensuring that all States, whether Members or nonmembers, accede to or ratify a treaty which has existed hetween a number of eountries sinee 1925. As several speakers have said, however, there is a special organ under the authority of the Security Councilthe Disarmament Commission - whose function it is to study and propose plans for obtaining the prohibition of aIl weapons of mass destruction, inc1uding, of course, hacterial weapons. The plan of work which the Commission adopted at the outset of its work expressly refers to this. The Commission is composed of the members of the Security Council, with the addition of Canada. Tt seems to me, therefore, that nothing could he more reasonable than to refer this proposaI, which r~lates to the prohibition of a weapon of mass destructIon, to the technical body of which we ourselves are the members, andwhich is attempting to formulate 136.. The advisnbilitv of sa doil1g is increased by 'the f~ld that th~ Gellerai Assemblyattil1g otl a Soviet tinian p~oposa: which won mn)ority support - ngreed ta the J01l1t study of the whole problem of armannmts, bringing to an end the former dIvision betweencertain types of arnUll11ents, and, for that purpose estabtish~d a OOn1111ission with terms of l'eference which caver aU arms and armed forces and aU measures relating to their existence and use. 137. F'urthetmore, 'thè representative of the Soviet Union hM been arg'uillg in the Disarmall1ellt Co.uunis- SiOll thaï the platis and prelil11inary drafts under consider{ltion should cover every ~sped of the problem. He has severely critidzed the United States plan for the disdosure and verification of information 011 armed torëes and armnlUel1ts, and the three-Power plan for the reduction oi afnl~d.forces 't on the~rottnds that they are mcomplete and hmited and do not ll1c1ude proposais for the reduction. of armaments or the prohibition of afumic weapol1s alld other wenpons of 111Ms desttttction. The Soviet Union delegation, theretore, is llOt COl1~ sistent in nskÎllg tor the separa.te shtdy and adoption of an isûlated measure (111 the prohibitiol1 of one type of firmllment. 138. ! mustmsolllentlOl1 certain other considerations which indÎltê mè to the view that the Seêurity Counell shùuld not {:onsider this drait resoluHon. According to its sponsor, theobjeetis tb ma.ke an appeal to aU coun~ tries which have Mt yet acceded to Of ratified the Geneva Protocol, to do 80. It would See1l1 at first sight that there is no reason whv such an appeal should meet with. resistance in nn· orgân like the Seeurity Coundl, which Is made upof e1even members of wholl1eight have fàtifled the Protoeol. Moreover, the request has been made by one of the great Powers, whith suggests that the matteris.urgent and.lends the request a certain obvions dramatitquality. ChUe would have no objection in prindple to repeating 110W its support Ot the·Prototôl which it ratified some seventeen yearsago, because as far as ChUe is COllcè1'ned the Protocol IS in tOrcé. My (i()verl1111l'mt dOéS not ètll1sider that treaties lapse simply through thepMsageof time j on the contrary, itbelieves in the legal and moral value of treaties and the need to. respect them. My country' would nlso like this Protocol .to he sigued and ratified by the greatest possible number· of countries. :But it. must not be deduced trom tros thât we consider that it would be ndvisable at this tïme and against a background ùf which weare aD aware - l shaH refer to ... this point later......:for the. Security Coundl to make a recomméndation on this matter~ the implications of which are clear to us, as l am sure they are dent to every member of the Coundl. 'i Sire 0 flicial Records of the DisarflUllllent· Commission, Suppl",')(en.t for Aprit, May and Jlme 1952, documents DC; Cl/l and DC/IO. 140. No, Mr. President. What we have here is either a political manœuvre of an astonishingly primitive type or a monstrous .mistake in the timing 01 the proposaI, if it is held that there is no conne..,don between the two sets of facts. We cannot lend oU1"selves ta a manœuvre or mistake of this kind,even though the USSR representative includes us in the football team to which he has referred. We did not come to the Security C01:1ncil to deepen the differences between its members or to fan the flames of the war wJ.i.ich threatens to destroy the world. And in this connexion, l feel it is my dutY to say with aU. frankness that we are deeply alarmed by the scale ôf this campaign on the alleged use of bacterial weaponsand that we are firmly convinced that the proposai under discussion isan Integral part of that campaign. vVe wonder whethêr the intention is ta arouse such fearand hatred in the people of the USSR and·in the countries which follow the politieal line of the Soviet Union that the peoples of those countries will, >?ee no other way out, no other defenceagainst the p,uppqsedattack, tQan open aggression .on their part. ]V~ ,~lso wqnderwhether the intentioiIis not to .prepare cpffi11111nists and.· their sympathizers psychologieal1y ta l?ho'[kle iext(;lrnalsupport for an adventure the consequences.of which no one can foretell. ./ , .• -_.",,'.' • .1 .'., , ...... " , .. , '., ~4t, .!Ihi§f':possibhity; îs extremely dangerous•.. Itis à1rriost as dangerous as it would be if the Sovie t Union 142. Wc also feel profound discouragement on seeing that, at a time when public faith in the United Nations is tottering under the impact of propaganda from many sides, the Security Council, the organ chiefly responsible for the maintenance of peace and the supreme instrument for removing causes of·international friction or tension, is being called upon to deal only with proposals whichcannot lead towards these objectives and wqich tend to deepen the differences and to increase the international tension which we wholeheartedly desire to see diminished. 143. Mr. President, unlessyou or the other members of the Council want the consecutive interpretation of the remarks l have justmade, ~he interpretation need not bemade at this meeting. 144. '. ThêPRESIDENT (translated from Russian): If there are no objections, we can dispense with the interpretation. Does that raise any difficulties for the Secretariat, {rem the standpoint of the official records? 145.. The Secretariat considers that we can dispense with .the Interpretation. We shall consider that this unprecedenieà request.by one of the represeritatives does not constitute. a precedent. , 146. l\ifr.. SAN'I'A CRQZ (Chile) (translated fram Spanish): l beg your pardon, Mr. President. Apparently l do nothing ,but makeunprecedentedsuggestions,=- l bêlieve th!s is the second, tim~. you have draWn my attention to this. Please remember. that l have only been a member of thé Council for a few months.' 147. l have not offered. to forego the interpretation. JY.1y sugge~tion 'Vas that it could be postponed. 148. T.hePRESIDENT (translated from Russian) : According to the simultaneous interpretation into Russian,you were prepared.to dispense with the consecutive interpretation. 'l'hatwas why 1 said that your requestwas ..unpr~cedented. ·If you are foregoing the interpretation for this .. meeting only, that is another matter, J'he Interpretation will be given at the next meeting. 149. Sir GladwynJEBB (United Kingdom): l am credibly'informed, though l wasnot here at the time, that in 1948 the consecutive interpretation was often waived, so that it would not be constitttting a precedent to waiveit now:. l thinkindeed the President might be constituting a •.precedent if he considered this request to be exceptional.

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