S/PV.581 Security Council

Members have before them the provisional agenda of four items, items 2 and 3 of which, as you know, have been confirmed by the Security Council. Thè Security Council has already begun ta deal with one of them, and item 4 was placed on thè provisional agenda at the request of the delegation of the United States of America. The inclusion of this item was discussed at the last meeting, and a number of views were expressed on the subject. l would therefore ask the members of the Security Council to givetheir views on the question ofthe agenda. 2. l should add that at the end of the last meeting, the Greek representative proposed that the inclusion in the .agenda of the item submitted by the United States delegation should be put to the vote, and that a vote should also be taken on the USSR delegation's proposaI that simultaneously with the inclusion of item 4 in the agenda, representatives of the People's Republiç of China and the People's Democratie Repub- 3. If no member wishes to speak (111 this subject, we may proceed to the vote. 4. Sir GIadwyn JEBB (United Kingdom): 1 am not sure that 1 personally agree with the proposaI Qf the representative of Greece. 1 think that we could certainly vote either for the adoption of this agenda or, if the President 50 desires, or members 50 desire, for the adoption of what is now item 4 on the ~g€nda. But 1 do not think we cottld take the second vote suggested nntil we have deeided, in principle, to put on our agenda what is now item 4 on the provisional agenda. . 5. The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): Wha.t definite proposaI has the United Kingdom l'epresentative to make? 6. Sir Gladwyn JEBB (United Kingdom) : My concrete proposaI is to adopt the provisional agenda which the President has put before us. 7. The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): The United Kingdom representative has moved the adoption· of the proposed provisional agenda. The wording used by the United Kingdom representative, if 1 understood it rightly, was as follows: "to adopt the provisional agenda". . 8. The USSR de1egation submits the .following amendment to that proposaI: "and simultaneously to invite a· representative of the People's Republic of China and a representative of the People's Democratie Republic of Korea to take part in the discussion of this item of the agenda." 9. The USSR delegation is submitting this amendment in ccmformity wiL;' the rules of procedure, in particular, rule 36, under which every member of the Security Council is entitled to submit amendments and addenda to any proposaI. 10. Accordingly, the USSR delegation submits this amendment and insists that itbe voted on bèfore the substantive proposaI submitted by the United Kingdom'delegation. 11. Sir Gladwyn JEBB (United Kin!~dom) : As far as 1 can understand it, the remarks which the President has Just made relate to what is now item 4 on the provisional agenda. As we all know, the Council considered this matter at its last meeting and, as 1 understand it, the view of the great majority of themembers of the Security Council was that we would certainly 'not he in order to consider the Soviet Union draft resolution concerning ,the invitation to the Peking Government and the authorities in North Korea [S/2674] and, even less to vote upon it, untit, first of all, we put the item on the agenda and haveat least heard the case to be submitted by the representative of·the United States. Until we have heard that case, we a,re not, aS l think at any rate, in the least in orderin taking a decision on the item proposed by the President. 1 am 12. However, as the President knows, we could n,'t come ta an a.~~ement on that. The President maintained his view, using his presidential powers, if l may sa}' so, ta enforce it and, therefore, we could not adopt the agenda at aIl. But what do we find today? We find quite a dîfferent provisional agenda. We find a provisiana! agenda consisting of four items. The first item relates ta the adoption of the agenda. In second place we have the matter originally submitted by'the President, namely, "Question of an appeal to States to accede to and ratify the Geneva Protocol of 1925 for the prohibition of the use of hacteria! weapons". 13. It seems to me that v,'e have reuched the position in whir.:h we have: this provisional agenda of four items before us. The President is making what is in fact an objection to the adoption without conditions, which the majority could not accept, of the pre~ent item 4. What cau we do now? The only sensible thing for' us to do is to take a decision that we will restrict today's agenda to the present item 2 which, after all, is the President's own proposaI. We have debated it at some length already. We are fairly ready for taking the vote on this mattt:r. The President must presumably wish to do so since it is his own item. Therefore, it seems to me that there is no reason in 10gic, nor any other reason, for not restricting today's agtmda to what is now item 2 on our proV'isional agenda. Therefore, let us aU, with· the President's consent - ta which l am sure he will agree because it is his own item - agree to limit our agenda to what is now item 2, and. have a vote on that at once. 1 am sure the President will agree. 14. Ml'. BOKHARI (Pakistan): On the question whether the Soviet Union amendment to the United Kingdom pre.posal to adopt the agenda is in order, my de1egation reserves its position. 1 cannot anticipate the outcome of this procedural debate. But should it he considered that the Soviet Union amendment is in order and should we arrive at voting on that amendment, 1 would request that the words "and simultaneously with it" be voted upon separately. 15. The PRESIDENT (translated fram Russian): The United Kingdom representative correctly interprets the USSR amendment as relating to item 4 of ~~e provisional agenda. 1 cannot, however, agree with htm when he says that it is not an amendment but a substantive proposaI. It is not a substantive proposaI h~t an amendment to the proposaI he himself submltted, an amendment based on the rules of procedure and absolutely in order. 16. Rule 9 of the rules of procedure of the Security Coundl provides that "Thefirstitem of the provisional agenda for each meeting of the Security Council shall he the adoption of the agenda". This rule does not prec1ude the submissicc: {lf amendments to ,the proposaI 18, The UllÎted Kingdom representative said that he W3S apparently unacquainted willi the substance of the United States proposaI. That, to say the least of it, sounds somewhat naive. We all know what it is about, the more so since the United States delegation submitted its draft resolution [S/2671] sorne days ago, and it is quite obvious from the draft what t.1le issue is and what the United States representative has in mind. Herlce there is no point in playing the innocent and asserting that we do not know the nature of the item submitted by the United States delegation. Thus the. United Kingdom representative's Hne of argument is entirely devoiq. of fou:lldation. 19. Nor are thereany grounds for confining the provisiona! agenda to item 2 alone. Why should that he done? The provisional agenda contains three items in addition to the first, "Adoption of the agenda". Two of those items haye been submitted by the USSR de1egation· and on~ by the United States delegation. Why should the United States delegation be given less favourable treatment than the USSR delegation? The USSR delegation has submitted two items and insists that they should be included in the agenda and discussed. The United States delegatlon has submitted its own item, and insists that it should be placeG. on the ag~nda and discussed. What justification is there for giving preferential treatment to the USSR delegation by leaving the USSR items on the agenda and not inc1uding the United States item? There is absolutely no logic in that. 20. The United States representative apparently agrees with me for the first time in his life. 21. As President 1 therefore put the USSR amendment to the vote. After a vote has been taken on this amendment, we shaH vote on the. United Kingdom representative's basic proposai concerning the adoption or rejection of the provisional agenda. 22. l mayadd that the United Kingdom representative has aIready explained the substance of the matter as he understands it. 23. Sir Gladwyn JEBB (United Kingdom): 1 wish to speak on. a point of order. 1 must point out thàt my proposaI, which is to adopt the provisional agenda a.s it presently stands, was· based on the assumption that this would be, in fact, the provisional agenda and Dot.

There are thus two proposaIs. The first proposaI (if the United Kingdom representative withdraws his original proposaI) is the proposaI made by the Presi~ dent of the Security Couneil: to adopt the proposed agenda. There is therefore the President's proposaI to adopt the provisional agenda proposed for today's meeting. To this proposal there is the USSR amend~ ment which 1 read out. 25. The second proposaI came from the U:nitêd King., dom representative and suggested that only the item 2 of the provisional agenda should be adopted and dis~ cussed. These are the proposaIs which·1 am putting to the vote. 26. In the OfJd of submission, in accordance with the rules of procedure, 1 put to the vote first the USSR delegation~s amendment to the President's proposal relating to the adoption of the agenda. The representative of the United Kingdom indicated his desire to speak. 27. The PRESIDENT (6'Yanslated /rom Russian): l have put the matter to the votet and therefore cannat recognize any speaker. Those in favour of the USSR amendment p!ease raise their hands.

1 must insist on deveioping my point of order which is ... 29. The' PRESIDENT ètranslàted from Russian): If thatis à challenge, Y0t,1 may submit a proposaI. 30. l have not recognized the United R:ingdom representative. ~f he questions the President's decision, he may challenge it. . '

Thus, the President of the Security Council has given aruling that pa will put to the vote first the USSR amendment to the President's proposaI relating to the adoption of the provisional agenda submitted indocument S/Agenda581.

There are ten votes in favonr, one against and no abstentions. Consequently the USSR amendment will not be put to the vote. We shall nOw vote on the President's first proposaI to adopt the agenda in the form in which it was submitted. 35. 1 shaIl put it to the vote in parts: we shaIl first vote on the first three items, and then on the inclusion (If the fourth. Actually, since we decided at the last meeting to inc1ude these items in the agenda, there is no need to vote on them again if there are no objections. 36. I shaH now put to the vote the question of inc1uding, as an additional item, item 4 proposed by the United States representative. A vote was taken by show.of hands, as follows:, In favour: Brazil, Chile,. China, France, Greece, Netherlands, Pakistan, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northem Ireland, United States of America. . Against: Union of Soviet Socialint Republics.

There are ten' votes in favour of including the United States proposa.! on the agenda and one against. The de1egation of the UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS considers it essential to make the following statement in connexion with the vote that has just taken place .. < 38. I caU upon the United. States representative on a point of order. 39. Mr. GROSS (United Sta-',es of America): ,The delegation of the United States asked ta speakon a point of order before the representative of the Soviet Union had started to make his statement. The point of order is to indicatc, withont the slightest question, that the United States delegation, in voting for the adoption of today's agenda in the form in which it basbeen adopted,do.es not col1sider that it has in any way pre,:" judiced its position that the item relating to the·itlvestigation of germ warfarecharges, which figures as item 4 of today's agenda, sho'l11d follow the conclusion of the item relating to the Geneva Protocol. Last Friday, 1 made·it clear, in proposing the addition of this new item to the agenda r579th meetitzg], that we wished it to be discussedby the Council immediately fol1owing the item .. relating to the Geneva Protocol. In agreeing.to the .~doptionof the agenda this moming, the. United States adheres ta that position. and fully reserves the right to in5ist that the item relating

Strictly speaking, that is not a point of order but a new proposaI which .the United States representative cou1d have introduced aiter the USSR delegation had explained itsvote. Nevertheless, tlie United States representative has in fact introdùced a new proposaI in the guise of a point of order. 41. Speaking as representative of the UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, l wish to say that, since the Secnrity Council did not agree to settle the question of inviting representatives of the People's Republic of China and: the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. at the same time as the question of inc1uding the United States proposaI in the agenda and, in fact, completely rejected the USSR proposaI that those repte,,~ntatives should be invited,the Soviet Union delegation voted against the inclusion in the agenda of· the item proposed by the United States delegation. 42. Tt is general knowledge that the Soviet Union delegation stated from the outset that it was prepared to include on the Council's agenda the item proposed by the United States delegation but that it considered that that item cauld not be discussed in the ab!'l~nce of the representatives of the People's Republic of China and the Democratie People's Republic of Korea. The USSR delegation indsted that such representatives shoulo. be invited and proposed that the question of including the United States item on the' agenda should be decided simultaneously with the question of inviting them to attend. The USSR delegation also l'laid that its attitude with regard to the inclusion of the United States proposaI on the agenda would depend on what rlecision was !'~ached about inviting the representatives of the People's Republic of China and the Democratie People's Republic of Korea to take part in the discussion oUhe question. . , 43. The .Anglo-American' bloc rejected the USSR . delegation's proposaI· and· refused 10 allow the repre- ôentatives of the People's RepubIicofChina and the Democratie People's Republic of Korea to participate in the discussion of. the question introducedby the 1!nited States. delegati?n...·~he· Sovi~tYnion delegat~o,n .voted aga1fist 1;he mcluslOn on the ~ecQrity. Councd 5 ag~nd~ of the Item 'proposed by the United States delega;tIan... bec~use' of .th~t .action by· thê·'Aflglo- Amer'lcan bloc. 10 the Counetl and because it considered that th\; question submitted by the United States delegation could. not beccnsideredin the abse.tice of the representatives of the. People's. Republic of. China and th~. Demo~r~tic. People's Republic of Korea; only with thetr .partlctpation could t4e true facts be established in 50. fa!' as faets relating. t'f..l the· territoties of China, atld K~r~q. were·at issue. 46. The same spirit absolutely inspired me in the two votes this morning. May l respectfully remind the President that the Canneil did not reject the Soviet Union's amendment; the Council only upheld the challenge made to the President's ruling by the representative of the United Kingdom. We cannot take any '1rote on the Soviet Union amendment before the United States proposal has been included in our agenda. Only when 'We discuss this proposaI and when we learn the faets by the exposé of the United States representative will the Cauneil be in a position ta adopt.a point of view on the Soviet Union amendment. 47. Mr; l'SlANG (China):. 1- voted against the 50- çalled· Soviet Union atrtendment being put to the vote, and l voted for the inc1usitm of the'item proposed by the delegation of the United States. l should like to explain briefly my reasonsfor the two votes l cast. 48. Speakers in this debate who have preceded me, bath on Monday last [580th meeting ~ and this morning, andparticulat1y the representative of the United Kingdon:t, have shownhow the Soviet Union amend- 49. The aim of the United States delegation in moving the inclusion of this item is to have an im~ partial investigation by a 'competent. and responsible international body so that the truth m regard to the charge of germ warfare may be scientifically and res~ ponsibly established and issued to all the peoples of the world. The amendment of che Soviet Union is aimed at the continuation and intensification of propa~ ganda, right here in the heart of the United Nations. Since the latter part of February, Moscow, Peking, Pyongyang, Prague, Warsaw, Bucharest and Sofia have turned loose the Press and radio and so-called popular organizations on a concentrated campaign of hatred against the United States on the false charge of germ warfare. The representative of the United King~ dom on Monday last dealt with that propaganda in su<:b. a realistic way that the world must know by this time, if it did not know before, the fantastic nature of this propaganda. If the Security Council should accept the amendment of the Soviet Union representative, what would happen here, what would be the net result? The net result would be that two more communist pm~ pagandists would repeat i!1 the Secu:ity C~uncil w~at the radio and the Press In the SOVIet Umon and ItS satellite countries have been saying during the past four münths. 50. Such a procedure would defeat the purpose of the proposaI of the United States. Indeed, the proposaI of the United States to include this item on the agenda is to try to rid the world of false propaganda. On the other hand, the amendment of the Soviet Union, if accepted by this Council, would defeat the fact~finding purpose behind the United States proposaI. The Soviet Union amendment would not only prevent fact finding, it would inflame the present propaganda. 51. The propaganda based on a charge of germ warfare is a propaganda of hatred, and mass hatred, in the communist .(11ind, has a high military potential. The communists and their fellow-travellers believe in that. With a barbarous fanatieism, they have l;oneeived the propaganda of hatred as a weapon of war. My delegation is unwilling to allow the Secitrity Council to be explûited for such a purpose. My delegation, in '-é\ting for the inclusion of this item, is eager that this Cc~mèil should at least make an effort to establish once and for aU the truth in regard to these charges. 53. As y01.' knowl nt the last meeting the USSR delegation submitted a draft resolution invitinR' the representatives of the Chinese People's Republic and of the K(lrean Peoplels Detn<lcratic Republic. This draft resolution is contained in document 8/2674. When submittinR' this draft resol~tionl the USSR delegation urged that it should be put to the vote simultaneously with the inclusion on the agenda of the item proposed by the United States. Sillce this question has already 1>een inclttded in the agendn, the first part of this draft, which read~: USimultaneously with the inclusion in the agenda of the Security Council of the item proposed hy the United States delegation H , is no lonR'er relevantl and is hereby deleted. There remains the se(.~ond part of this draft reso1ution which rends: ClTo invite ta the meetings (lf the 3ecurity Council at which this questiOtl is discussed" - in this case, the question introduced by the United States delegation - ttrepre_ sentatives of the People's Republic of China and a representative of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea U • 1 54. 1 now p·..tt the USSR draft resolution to the vote, which will complete the disc~lssion of the agenda.

As l understand the suggestion - and 1 am not sure whether it is a s~stion of the President of the Council or of the represehtative of the Soviet Union, though ! assume it is a suggestion made by the Presidentit is that we should now proceed to vote on a revised draft resolution submitted by the representative of the Soviet Union. This revised draft resolution would constitute a decision to invite to meetings of this Coun~ cil at which this question is discussed - though it does not appear from what the President has just read which question is referred torepresentatives of.the People's Republic of China and representatives of the Korean People~s Democratie Republic. 1 challenge the right of the President to put this resolution to a vote at this time; even i~ it should he recast in a form which made it intelligible, which it is not. as it has been read by the President of the Council, 1 thîP..k that it ilS out of order and improper to put this resolution to a vote ai this time. 1 The fullowing is th!' text of the USSR revised draft resolutioo set fotth in document S/2674/Rev.l: "'The Securif~ Council ~e~~ "To invite ta the meetings of the Security Couuci1 at wlich the question suhmitted by the de1egation of the United States of America is discussed representatives of the People's Republic of China and a representative of the People's Democratie Republicof Korea." 57. We should then proceed to the discussion of the first item of the agenda, which relates to the Geneva Protocol. l would assume that the President, speaking as the representative of the Soviet Union, would desire ta see a discussion upon his own item carried forward and carried to a conclusion. The only alternative assumption one could make would be that the Soviet Union Government was wholly insincere in putting forward this proposaI in the first place. Quite apart from that, 1 think that in carrying out the rules of procedure the President ehould now put ta a vote the adoption of the agenda. . 58. If the agenda is adopted, then we should proceed at once ta the discussion of what would then be the first item, that relating to the Geneva Protocol. When, at some subsequent meeting, we reach what is now item 4, the United States' insistent demand that there be an investigation by the International Committee of the Red <:ross of this charge, it seems ta me it will then be in arder for the representative of the Soviet Union ta propose anything he wishes to propose. 59. Sa far as the present suggestion is concerned, we, for reasons which 1 stated at a previous meeting, consider that the suggest~d invitation to the <:ommunist authorities of <:hina and of Norch Korea to come ta our table is an improper suggestion, is a useless suggestion, is an obstructive suggestion. We will oppose it, and 1 am confident that the <:ouncil will reject it, but it is not now timely ta discuss it, and 1 urge the President ta put ta a vote the question of the adoption of the agenda and, if it is adopted, to proceed ta a discussion, in the retiular order, of what would then be the first item, the Item relating to the Geneva Protocol. We should dispose of that and then proceed to our next arder of business.

The agenda has, in effect, been apprqved. 1 stated that the first three items had been adopted. If there is no objection we shall consider that these itE'ms are' :ndùded in the Security <:ouncil's agenda. As far as the fourth item is concerned, it has been put ta the vote and included; Gonsequently, the <:ouncil's agenda has been approved. If the United States representative wants me ta repeat iithe agenda is adopted" 1 can do so without much difficulty to set his minci at rest. 62. In the course of the Security Coundl's work, there have been occasions when the Council had adopted a decision about inviting the representatives of certain States to take part in the discussion of certain items hefore that discussion had in fact begun. That is all the morè necessary when we bear in mind the great distances involved. That is just the position in this case, if the Security Conneil is favourably inc1ined towards inviting the representatives of the People's Republic of China and the People's Democratic Repuba lie of Korea and if it is not gQing to be influenced by the remarks of the representative who spoke before the United States representative. That speaker expressed the opinion that to invite these Korean and Chinese representatives here would he to give them an oppommity for tfcommunist propaganda". That is a ridiculous argument. If the United States delegation does not intend to be influenced by that argument, there is no reason why we should not put the Soviet Union draft resolution to the vote immediately, and if the Security Council decides to invite the representatives in question, that would give them the opportunity to reach here in.good time. In view of the great distance involved, they will need a considerable amount of time. 63. These are the considerations which lead the Soviet Union delegation to propoSe that its draft resolution should he put to the vote immediately.. r feel that the United States de1egation has no grounds for opposing the USSR proposai.

The President has just said that the agenda has been adopted. I believe there is no precedent for discussing a proposai rclating to item 4 when item 2 should he discussed. It has happened a few times that the Security Council and other ort,'ans have decided to extend an invitation before entering upon the actual diSCUSSionQf the item of the agenda to which it was related. but never when that item was not under consideration. 65. 1 should like tu remind the President that the rules of procedure have been specially drawn up to pmtect the rights of themjnority. Those roles, if correctly interpreted.especiaUy favour the minority to which the Prf".sident frequently belongs. Hence he, more than. anyonc, should he mterested in ensuring that the 66. l formal1y move that the President's proposaI should not now be put to the vote because we should now consider item 2 of the agenda.

The situation now seems to be perfectly clear. The President has announced that the agenda has been adopted. On the basis of the adoption of the agenda just now announced by the President, it seems clear, as the representative of Chile has said, that the regular order of business requires us to take up the first substantive item, which is the item relating to the Geneva Protocol, and l have nothing to add except that l hope, as l am sure most of my colleagues do, that we do proceed to a discussion of the Geneva Protocol, dispose of it and then proceed to the next arder of business. 68. The PRESIDENT (translated from Russüzn): Do any other members of the Council share the views of the Chilean representative? 69. Sir Gladwyn JEBB (United Kingdom): l certainly do. .

Silence, as they say, signifies assent. 71. Mr. VON BALLUSECK (Netherlands): l share the point of view of the representative of Chile. 72. The PRESIDENT (translated from Russüzn): This merely confirms my statement. In view of the Chilea'n representative's remark that the USSR proposaI should not be put to the vote until the item to which it related was taken up by the Council, the President will not press for a vote on the USSR proposaI at this time. 73. We shaH now go on to item 2 on the agenda. First, we shaH hear the interpretation of the statement made by the Chilean representative at .an earlier meeting of the SecurityCouneiI. Question of an appeal to StalGliI to accede to and ratüy the Geneva Protocol of 1925 for the P!~~ibiüon of the. use of bacterial weapons (continued) The statement made by the. representative of. Chile atthe 579th meeting of the Council (paras. 129-143) was interpreted into English and French.

l should like to ask the French representative whether he thinks his statement will take more than twenty minutes. If so, we. mightnow suspend our work and resume itat 2.45 p.m., if that is agreeable to the members of the Council. If the French representative wishes to make his statement in the time remaining before one o'clock, he may do so, and we shaH hear the interpretation at the afternoon meeting. 75.. Mr. HOPPEN~T. (France) (translated from French) : l did not tiine 111Y speech exaetly in advance, but l have·anidea that it will lâst for twenty-three

Three minutes are neither here 1101' there. As regards the hungry members of the Council, 1 believe tlint in stifling their hunger pains they will listen to the French representative's statemetlt more attentively. I therefore caU on the representative of France. 77. Ml'. HOPPENOT (France) (translated f1'om FrencÎl) : The French delegation would like as briefly as possible to e."\:plain why it will vote for the United States motion [577tlt m"",,g] referring the draft.resolution submitted by the USSR delegation [S/2663] to the Disarmament Commission. 78. France signed the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925. It ratified the Protocol as early as 1926. Like a score of other States~ it made its ratification subject to reservations which, in the opinion of the French Government~ in no way weaken the effectiveness of .the engagements tmdertaken. These reservations, indeêd~ merely constitute the explicit formulation of the implicit conditions for carrying out any bilateral or multilateral engagements ent(;red into in good faith. Such engagements •can have validity only in relation to contracting parties which themselves respect them. The violation of an engagement by one of its signatories sets free the other signatories from the obligations which they may have contracted in relation to that signp,tory. That is an elementary principle of private as well as of international law. In taking cognizance of this principle in the fornl of reservations, 1 am sure, the French Government~ like the otner States which have acted in the same way~ was merely doing what regard for c1arity and honesty suggested. Nothing in the reservations in the slightest degree weakens the e."\:tent and sincerity of France's adherel'lce to the stipulations of the Protocol. 79. In this connexion, 1 should like to lnform the President that 1 \Vas no more offended than was Sir . Gladwyn Jebb by the considerations which the existence of those reservations may have suggested to the representative of the United States, first beeause tllose considerations did not seem to me to have the importance whiclt the President rather insidiously ascribed to them, and, secondly, because, as partners freely associated for the defence of a free world, we do not feel in any way insult~d every time the positions we may have adopted give rise to divergencies of view among us, or even to criticism. 80. The reasons which 100 France to sign and ratify the Geneva Protoc{)l in 1925 and 1926 are no 1ess valid no\v than !hen. The Protoco1 is the cullmination of a long period of work in which France pb\yed a 1eading pa.rt, and at the same time the ratification of principles and ideas tO which the French people remain deep1y 81. For aU these reasons, as the representative of ChUe pointed out in his remarkable and lucid statement on 20 June rS79th meeting], there would at first sight appear to be no reason why the Security Councilof which eight members out of eleven have signed and formaUy ratified the Protocolshould not greet the USSR delegation's draft resolution sympatnetical1y in so far as it simply reealls the existence of the Protocol and its provisions, and the tmdertaking, entered into by ail the States which ratified it, to caU upon aU other countries of the world to accede to it. However, we are not living in an abstract universe. Our sincere acti(,)tls and their consequences take place in an historical context which we cannot ignore, and it is impossible for liS to lsolate the USSR proposaI from the circumstances, Imown to atl, which accompany and have provoked it. 82. These circumstances, to which 1 resel've the right toreturn in a few moments, mean, in the first place, that the French delegation would not feel able to caU lIpon States which have not yet done sa to ratify the Protocol or accede to it, unless they were at the same time offered certain guarantees that they would not be immediately and insultingly accused of violating it, without any means of recourse whereby they could defend themselves and justify their actions. Yet this is the spectacle before us today, for the makers of these virulent charges against the United Nations Command refuse to have their accusations examined by an impartial commission of investigation and, rejecting the most respectable and acknowledged international legal processes, declare that they will only abide by the decisians of judges appointed by themselves. 83. Once upon a time it was universally accepted that one could not be both judge and party. We Imow from other examples that matters are different under a totalitarian régime. But we have not the right to allow this new concept of justice ta he extended, even tacitly, to the international sphere. Thus, the French delegation ~ould cnly have considered the USSR draft resolution If there had been an additional paragraph embodying the Security Council's decision tO submit automaticaUy to exanlination by an international commission of investigation. such as the International Red Cross 01' the World Health Organizr.tion, any chargeby a 84. The absence of any specification of this kind, guaranteeing the States called upon to accede to or ratify the Protocol against being exposed without defence ta the accusation of havingviolated it, is the first renson why the French delegation could not in any event support the USSR draft resolution. 85. There is a second reason, still more invalidating, which has ta do with the very existence of the campaign ta which l allude and the responsible instigators of which are the same people as the authors of this draft resùlution. After six months of an unprecedented campaign, duringwhich aU the resources of the Press and radio of haH the world have been Olobilized on a twenty-four hour basis for the purpose of launching against the United Nations Command charges as monstrous as they are unfounded) after germs of hatredin this case only too realhave been relentlessly scattered to all the winds that blow and on aU wavelengths, we are today asked to believe - and this is Mr. Malik's contention - that the USSR draft resolutian is neither intimately nor remotely oonnected with the whole Qf this propaganda campaign organized by the Government in whose name the draft has been submitted) and that it is doubtless a pure chance that the one coincides in time with the other. 86. Allow me to inform the President that that would he asking a great deal of our credulity, and that after aU we must not be taken for children. If, for months on end, you accuse some one of beingan incendiary and then, on inviting him to spend the weèk-end in your house, you ask aU the firemen in the neighbourhood to he ready to put out the fire at your home, you would have a great dea1 {lf difficulty in convincing anyone that there was no relation between the charges and the precautions. . 87. In the archives of the world's chancelleries are to he found many other international instruments, some of them of great importance and scope, which are still awaiting the ratifications.of sorne of the States which signed them.. Why this particu1ar predilection for the Protocol of 1925? Why·draw attention to it today more than yesterday or tomorrow~ if not because you are hoping, without admitting it but -without being able ta deceive us, that by the ado{>tion or. rejection of your draft resolution the Security Council will provide a new weapon and new armaments for the campaign of prüpaganda unleashed by your Government? The manœuvre is obvious and we shaU not allow ourselves to he deluded. 88. In other circumstances we would have been aole ta discuss the expediency and practical interest of the President's draft resolution. It would have deserved our interest and careful thought But it is quite dear that in other circumstances, that is to say if there had been no such campaign, of which it is ooly one aspect, the dtaft resolution would never have seen the light of clay before this Counci1. Its apparent candour cannot 89. The competent body and, in my view, the only competent body to discuss the USSR draft resolution set forth in document S/2663 is the Di"larmament Commission, organized in conformity with the General Assembly resolutions 502 (VI) and 504 èVI) of 11 and 19 January 1952 and with the Soviet Union's proposaIs in paragraphs 3 to 7 of document A/C.l/698 [DC/2]. It isonly in this Commission that the problem of the universal prohibition of bacterial weapons can be placed again in the setting of the more general problem of the control and abolition of weapons of mass destruction, Only in this setting can the draft resolution itself b~ effectively studied in the spirit of the Gel,1eral Assembly's resolutions. It is only by transmitting the USSR draft resolution to the Disarmament Commission. that the Security Council will show its resolve not ta serve the propaganda ain.s which were behind the submission of the draft resolution, and at the same time its desire te have the problem of principle, which the USSR delegation claims to be the only one raised, examinc::d by the body set up for that purpose. 90. As for the spirit in which the French representative in the Disarmament Commission will study this problein, what I said at the beginningo of this speech is • sufficientlyindicative. As Mr. Moch said as early as 20 March last at the 4th meeting of the Disarmament Commission, "to dispel aU doubt or ambiguity, I wish ta state that the French Government inc1udes bacterial weapons among the forms of'warfare to be prohibited". And, in his speech yesterday morning before the 16th meeting of th,e same Commission, my compatriot, after explaining that he proposed the prohibition of hacterial and chemical weapons at the end of the first of the stages of disclosure provided for by the French plan, added the following: . , "~ . . The 'prohibition of bacterial weapons .ls in our view dictated by a categorical imperative. This is not amerely casual proposaI, and the discussions at the Security Council in the last few days have iri no way influenced my views. They refiect a permanent attitude on the part of France, so many of whose children, as I can witness in my own person, were the victims in 1917 and 1918 of Germany's atrocious gas warfare. France has always hoped for the effective and practical prohibition of the most frightful forms of war. It ratified the Protocol of 1925, sûbjeetto 'the legitimate reservation that any future eueillies' shoitld' also have renounced the employment of such weapons, and shollid not violate their undertakings and treacherously resort to them in the course of hostilities. However, we recognize that the 'Protocol has weaknesses, since itinstituted no form of control. ' We therefore beHeve thaï the 93. The fondest wish of all the President's colleagues on the Security Couneil and the. Disarmament Commission would be to see him take his place in that team, hitting theball in his turn and to the best of his abilit'j', not in order ta send it out of play or 10seit in a bunker or in the rough, but ta send it straight and true ta that little flag at the .end of the fairway, whichin this case would he the flag of peace.

The French representative's statement lasted less than twenty minutes. I was therefore right in asking him ta speak before the end of the morning meeting. 95. I take itthat, as we have agreed, the interpretation of his statement into English will be postponed until the afternoon meeting, and if there are no objections, I shall now close the meeting. . 96.Mr. GROSS (United States of America): l should lik:e information as ta what will be the provisional agenda for this afternoon's meeting. 97. The PRESIDENT (translated from R11,ssian): The same, of course, as was adopted at this morning's meeting. 98. Mr. GROSS (United States of America): Thankyou. The meeting rose at 1 p.m.