S/PV.583 Security Council

The provisional agenda for this meeting is contained in document SIAgenda 583. If there are no objections or observations, we shall consider the agenda adopted, \Vith the reservations entered at our last meeting. 1. jour SI vations, adopté cédente The agenda "":;'; 'T.dopted. Proposition Queatr.')~ of an appeal to States to accede to and ..-atify the Geneva Protocol of 1925 for the prohibition of the use of hacterial weapons (continued)

The first item on the agenda is the interpretation into French of the USSR delegation's statement. 2. va du a en du des séance 3. d'orateurs

1 have no speakers on my lïst. Yesterday the represen- 5. The draft resolution submitted by the USSR delegation is contained in the document l quoted. 6. The Council has come ~o prefer ta have a draft resolution reaù when a vote is being taken on it after a long debate. In that case, l shall ask the A.sistant Secretary-General ta read ît. The Assistant Secretary· General in charge of Security Cfiuncil Affair.~ read the te:~t of document S/2663. A vote 'lvas takeu by show of hands, as foiiows: In favour: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. A bstaininy: Brazil, Chile, China~ France, Greece, Netherlands, Pakistan, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and N01them Ireland, United States of America. There was 1 vote in favour, with 10 abstentions. The draft ,'esolution was not adopted, having failed to obtain the affirmative vote of seven me'mbers. 7. The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): The representatives who abstained from voting on the USSR draft resolution Imew that sucb abstention represented in essence a vote "against" ex:actly as was the case in the vothlg in the Security Council on the Tunisian question [576th meeting]. Those of them who officially declared in the course of the discussion their loyalty and devotion to the obligations arising out of the Geneva Protocol, have, at the same time, under pressure from the United States, been compelled to abstain from voting in order to prevent the a.doption of a USSR draft resolution designed to strengthen the cause of peace and security of the, ,peoples. 8. This action of the Security Council today will go down in the history of the United Nations as the day on which the Security Councilor rather, noi: so mucb the Council itself as the Anglo-American bloc in the Councilunder pressure from the United States, which had refused to ratify the Geneva Protocol, recorded in the history of the United Nations yet another shameful instance of how tht: United Stat;;s is opposing and hampering the cause of strengthening international pcace and security. 9. Ml". GROSS (United States of America): l wish to explain my vote on the motion which has just been defeated by the Security Council. l think it is clear to aIl that the ten votes, the roll-call of the membership of the Security Council othet than the vote of the Soviet Union, have been cast as a measure of the scorn and of the tepudiation which all ten membets of the Councii, except the Soviet Union represerttative, fuel for the futile and vain trick which the Soviet Union Government has attempted to perpetrate u,pon this 10. l have tried to ex:plain in my statements why the United States Government considers the ratification of the Geneva Protocol to be an utterly fraudulent and false issue, but l have not suœeeded in stating the point, l am afraid, as well as the representative of Pakistan, Mr. Bokhari, who in our debate yesterday [582nd meeting] stated in one sentence all l have been trying to say in numerous long speeches. Mr. Bokhari said: CtIt would not satisfy them if this Protocol were signf'1 ten times over, because we have seen it broken, seen poison gas being used and we see the possibility of bacteria being used in any major world conflict in the future." 11. l think most of us know what Mr. Bokhari meant when he spoke that sentence. l do not think it can be disposed of with the usual ridicule and contempt for decent public opinion which is so often shown by the representative of the Soviet Union when he attempts ta distl?-iss actions taken by this body as actions dictated by any one of its members. That l think, Mr. Malik, has lost its punch. 12. It seems to my Government tliè'\t it should be dear to the world, when States like Brazil and the United States, which have not ratified the Geneva Protocol, join together with States which have ratified it, and dismiss with scarn the effort which the Soviet Union representative has made to confuse the issue by bringing in the Geneva Protocol at this stage, what is the real issue before the world. 13. The United States Government has not ratified the Geneva Protocol. l think it is dear why we have not. vVe have not ratified thè Geneva Protocol because there is another effort, a major effort, in which We are 10yally engaged. That is an effort to achieve genuine disarmament and the genuine control of weapons of mass destruction which will make it possible to eliminate theseweapons. The public opinion of the United States, and the public opinion of the rest of the free world, abhors the very thought of using these weapons, and that is why we are dedicated to efforts to make it possible to eliminate them. 14. The Soviet Union Government is not, l notice, seeking to obtain a verdict from the Seeurity. Council condemning my Government for \not having ratified the Geneva Protocol. Such an effort would tax: even the boundless capacities of the Soviet Union Government to create false issues. The Soviet Union Government has not sought to obtain suc:\1 a decision from the Council. The Soviet Union Government has sought ta ohtain from the Council a recommendation that aU Governments which have not done so should ratify the . 15. We now have the ability to eliminate the weapons of mass destruction from the armouries of the world. In 1950,. the overwhelming majority of the United Nations made clear their sentiments when they adoptee! the resolution entitled "Peace through deeds",l in which that overwhelming majority of the free nations of the world solemnlyreaffirmed that, whatever the weapons used, any aggression was the gravest of all crimes against peace and security throughout the worId, and when that same overwhe1ming majority determined that is was indispensable that every nation agree to accept effective international control of atomic energy in order to make effective the prohibition of atomic weapons and to strive for the control and elimination under the United Nations I)f all other weapons of mass destnlcti«:m. . 16. 1 have pointed out at a previous[577th] meeting that the problem of the climination of germ warfare is before the Disarmament Commission of the United Nations. That proble111 is inc1uded in the plan of work of the Disarmament Commission. That problem is under discussion there in the context of the gelleral problem of the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, of which germ warfare forms a part. 17. In 1928, a number of nations of the world signed and ratified a treaty providing for the remmciation of war as an instrument of national policy. That, of course, i5 known as the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and l am sure that it ,will be recalled that the first article of that Treaty· provided: "The high contracting parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples that they condenm recourse to war for the solution of international controversies and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another." 18. The first signature on that treaty is the signature of therepresentative of Gennany. Another signature is that of the representative of Italy. l believe that, when the Soviet Union Government thinks back upon the effectiveness of the Kellogg-Briand Pact as a treaty for the renunciation of war, it will realize,as it perhaps may not have .done in introducing this drait resolution, 19. The Soviet Union Government, which stands repudiated today for having sought to create a false issue, has since the war done nothing ta justify coniidence in its statements or in its motives, and this underscores the reason, the imperative necessity, for machinery and for procedures which will safeguard any methods of control seeking to eliminate weapons of mass destruction. 20. The Soviet Union's refusaI ta disarm after the war, when the United States and other peoples of the free world W(lre leading a disarmament race, is the first poit;lt which cornes to anyone's inind. The aggressive policies of the Soviet Union and its eX.pansion by terrar, by suht,'el."sion and by the instigation of aggression, is another example which leaps to t.lte mind of everyone who is free to think for himself. Now we witness a campaign of lies and of hatred unequalled in the memory of man except, as 1 said the other day, perhaps the unlamented memory of Hitler. 1 think that the ten members of the Security Council who today repudiated with scorn this effort of the Soviet Union to raise this false issue perhaps were motivated in part, as my own delegation was, by the crude and obvious fraud which was sought ta he perpetrated here. The Soviet Union representative pretended that the issue of the ratification of the Geneva Protocol had no relationship to the false charges of germ warfare which his Goveniment was continuing to make. He went so far as ta rule the United States representative out of arder for seeldng to refer ta the subject of the false charges of germ warfare. Yet the Moscow radio on 23 June, the very day of one of our meetings [580th] at which the Soviet Union representative was going through this type of performance, itself said: "The American militarists, as is known, have already brought barbarie gernl weapons into use against the civilian population of Korea and China. It is impossible not tolink these fads with the refusaI of·the United States Government to. ratify the Geneva Protocol of 1925." 21. Unless tr: Moscow radiohas achieved the free.- dom of which 1 am sure if-would .surprise the Soviet Union representative to be apprised,. this, l think, demonstrates most clearly.the fraudulent nature ·of the position taken in this Cauncil by the Soviet Union representative. The Peking radio during the same 22. 1 think that to the armoury o~ the big lie - the campaign of hate summarized in the tactic of the false charge - there nas in this instance been added a new tactic: that of the false issue. 1 think we must at our peril take note of the possible sigllificance of this new campaign. Is it that'the Soviet Union Govemment intends to repeat, in a slightly different form, the propaganda falsely labcled "peace' in which, through communist~ft'lU organizations throughout the world - such as the World Peace Council- 50 much effort was spent in preparatio'l for the last session of the General Assembly where, 1 think, aIl of us will agree the Campaig11 fizz1.ed? Is this issue of the Geneva Protocol conceived of as a tactic by the Soviet Union Govemment which will find an echo throughout the world through aIl the communist-front organizations which foIlow the Moscow line? "!li it intended to build up petitions of hundreds of millions of so-caIled signatures to be used at the next session of the General Assembly? We do not know what the purpose is. But we are confident that the action taken today holds any such effort or any such intention up to the scorn which it deserves. 23. In view of the faet that the Security Council. has today decided to repudiate this effort by the Soviet Union Government to inislead, and in view of the fact that we have rejected with scorn the ~.ttempt to mislead us and others throughout the world into believing that the Geneva Protocol is the secret of security today, 1 d(\. not consider it necessary to press my motion for reference to the Disarmament Commission of the Soviet Union draft resolution which has now beerl repudiated. I withdraw my motion to do so not oruy because it is academic, now that the Soviet Union draft resolution has been defeated, but aiso because - and most important - the matter is tluder discussion in the Disarmament Commission. That :ls where the issue has been; that is where it remains; that is where it should be. 24. It is for· that reason that I withdraw my motion of referral and conc1ude with this simple comment: I think today a fraud has· been exposed. 25. Ml'. BOKHARI (Pakistan): This is a very brief statement in explanation· of the vote of·my delegation. As you know, we abstained in the vote on the Soviet Union proposaI ta appeal to nations to accede to and ratify the Geneva Protocol of 1925. My delegation has already fully explained, in its first statement [582nd meeting], sorne of the reasons for its attitude. 26. On this occas\on, however, l should like tv stress that our abstention was not a negative attitude and that it was not due to any lack of interest in the problem with which we are faced. vVe abstained merely because we thought that the proper forum for the discussion of this question and for plaeing proper checks on, and indeed for the elimination of, bacterial warfare, was the Disarmament Commission. 27. We are, in a sense, sorry that the United States thought it fit to withdraw its proposaI to refel' this qttestion once more to the Disarmament Commisilion. We aIl know that the question of bacterial warf;:;.re is within the purview of the Commission. If the Commission does make any headway, this question is bound ta be discussed there and will find it3 proper place in any plans or schemes for a peaceful world that may be developed in that Commission. Nevertheless, since the question had been raised here, we shoulci have preferred the discussion in the Couneil to be tiedup neatly and this question once more to have been referred ta the Disarmament Commission, with perhaps an increast:d emphasis. 2F Since the United States delegation has withdrawn its proposaI, there ls nothing further that my deleg~tion can do in that matter except perhaps to raise its lone voice at the moment and request the Disarmament Commission to redouble its efforts and, when it cornes ta the 'question of bacteriaI warfare, to take the depate in this Council into consideration. 29. If l had e:l.::amined my mind at the tinte when l abstained from the vote on this proposaI, l would have found in myself a certain amount of despair, p~rhaps some hope, but certairily no seorn, unless it be for the sad state of the werld in which such problems should create such heat without producing much constructive results. Yesterà<i.y. in bis address [582nd meeting], the President was kind enough to make two references to the intervention of my delegation. In his first reference, he reminded methat perhaps in 1925 or thereabouts, when the Geneva Protocol was ratified, no great threat of the use of this horrible weapon of killing was hanging over my country. On that l am perfectly willing ta accept anybody's reading of the situation. At that time, my country was not a free country. As a free, independent country, it is only five years old. Nevertheless, l wish ~ain to rCi-nind the Council that my country has been a party to this Protocol, has signed and ratified it, .and therefoie must have considered it useful.to a large pxtc,,~t. The J?oint was not that this Protocol was not useful at one time or another but whether, in the context of the world situation today, it is. adequate. In other words, today we want not something 1ess. than that Protacol, but something more. That isa task which confrontsthe Disarmament Commission, to whièh we wish success. 30. In any case, if no such threat hung over my c()untry in, the twenties, .the same cannot be said of 31. Therefore) it is nQt with an easy mind that we voted on the question in the way in which we have done. It is not because we have any illusions about the situation. Our countries and the countries of Asia ~,nd Africa are the more likely to be the victims) for) as is kno\Vt1) the use of bacterial watfare is a sort of grisly and gruesome game which only the so-caUed more advanced and more progressive countries Qf the world can indulge in, and not the SQ-called backward CQuntries of the WQrld. Therefore, we have a very high stake in the matter. Perhaps it may be difficult fQr peQple tQ believe if we say, Qr my country says, Qr las my country's representative say, that aU human lives are dear tQ us. It may be difficult perhaps in thi.!> cynical world tQ believe that) but l hope YQU will be1ieve that the lives Qf the 80 milliQn peQple of my cQuntry - and especiaUy of the young anlOngst them - e'l'Iery one of those lives is dearer to me than my own; and when we sit here we realize that their lives are in jeopardy because of the action that the major Powers of the world may make. 32. Therefore~ there is neither scorn nor apathy in our mind when we take a stand 011 this matter. 33. Lastly, l do want to make it quite clear, in spite of any suggestions or doubts that may lurk in anybody's mind, that our decision was taken and our vote was cast in the capacity of an independent and a selfrespecting couptry. 34. Mr. VONBALLUSECK (Netherlands): l wish to explain my vote very briefiy. My government is one of the signatories of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, and with regard ta bacterial warfare it has ratified this Protocol unconditionally. As l said hefore [578th meeting], it has no reason ta regret this. At the same time, my Government is quite willing to exatnine whether the Geneva Protocol can be reinforced and its scope widened, and whethe:. ways and means could be devised to eliminate the bacterial weapon altogether. T~.e General Assembly has given the Disarmatnent Commission very definite diœctions in this respect. That is why we should have preferred to refer the Soviet Union drait resalution to the Disarmament Commission. 35. .On the proposaI which was just voted upon, we abstained not under any pressure, as the President suggested. We are Ï!1 these matters quite able to take care of ourselves. We abstained because, on the one hand, we do not for a moment underestimate the , significance of the Geneva' Protocol of 1925, whereas, on.the other hand, we do not want to support an effort to use the Protocol as a means tG create a pu~ely artifi~ial division between sorne peace-Ioving and free countries and one other peace-Ioving and free country, and also because wesee no useful purposr: in bringing this matter up now in the Security Council aiter twenty~ seven years, since the question·of bacterial warfare in its widest sense really belongs in the Disarmament

1 would like to explain my vote as bdefly as possible. In the 578th meeting of the Security Council 1 had explained the fears of my delegation in the presence of this innocent-sounding Soviet Union appeal. 1 shall state my own words at that meeting: uThe whole device smacks tao uncomfortably of a certain Stockholm Appealand one cannot help hearing the fluttering of the wings of that hapless Picasso dove." 37. 1 am very sorry to say that aIl the statements and the whole attitude of our Soviet Union colleague during this debate have fully confirmed those fears. For this reason my delegation abstained, although Greece has ratified unconditional1y, without any reservations, the Geneva PJ,'otocol of 1925. 38. The Soviet Union representative, in his rather passionate explanation of his vote, charged the members of the Council who abstained on his proposaI with "killing" this p.o1Josal. He paid those members a compliment he usually reserves for the member States of the "aggressive", as he caUs it, North Atlantic Treaty Organization. He said aU the ten members of the Secu~ rity Council, with the exception of the Soviet Union, belonged to the Anglo-American bloc. l leave it to the representatives of Brazil, Chile and Pakistan to draw their. own conclusions, but 1 would like to say that if anyone bas "ldUed" the Soviet Union P~'oposal it was its own mover, who tried by a last ditch procedural trick to avoid voting first on the United States amendment to refer this question to the only competent organ of the United Nations - that is to say, the Disarmament Commission. 39. In his long speech yesterday [582nd meeting] the Soviet Union representative said intei' alia: " ...they" - the United States - "embarked on a course of breaking down and violating the Charter on the e..'{cuse of 'making it more effective' or 'completing' it. One has only to recall tht:: notorious 'Uniting .for peace' resolution to see the practical results of this policy. "They" - the United States - "violate the United Nations Charter on the excuse of 'making it more effective' .'~ 40. 1 respectfully submit that the Soviet Union repre~ sentative, by his whole attitude\during thisqu-:bdon, has tried his béat to make or at leàst have the United Nations Charter appear ineffective. 41. One last .point. The Soviet Union representative referred to sorne laughter during our voting and he

This fable talks ahout obtiging simpletons. 45. Sir Glad\\"yn JEBB (United Kingdom): ln exp1aining my vote, 1 should first like to make a very short comment on the action of the United States delegation in withdrawing its motion.' The effect of that motion, if it had been ado~ted, as we aU know, would have been ta refer the SOVIet Union drait resolution to the Disarmament Commission. The representative of Pakistan said that he partially regretted this dedsion on the part of the United States de1egation, but neverthdess 1 venture to suggest that this decision was not unnatura1 in the circumstances. After aIl, the President has made it entire1y clear during the course of the long debates on this 8.;bject that if it had come to a vote on the United States motion, he wou1d have vetoed it. That was the impression 1 had obtained. ln· any case, what is the point of adding yet one more to the very long list of unfortunate Soviet Union vetoes? 46. Moreover, 1 suggest that in substance the matter is already before the Disarmament Commission" and there is no reason why, whatever the action or lack of action taken by this Council, the Disarmament Commission cannot even now, if it so desires, examine the Soviet Union drait resolution, as it should be examined, in the whole context of the problem of the elimination of aU weapons of mass destruction. 47. In explaining my abstention further, 1 feel 1 must just make sorne very brief comments on one point made by the President in his speeches of 20 June and 25 June [579th and 582nd meetings]. 1 do not want, on a serious subject like this, to be unnecessarily contentious, but sorne remarks were then made about the policy of my country which must be countered, if only very briefly and if only in the interests...

The United Kingdom representative is reopening discussion on the substance in·spite of the fact that, aiter the interpretation of the USSR representative's statement into French, 1 reminded the Council that the United States and United Kingdom representatives had reserved the right to speak on the substance of the USSR delegation's comments. The United Kingdom

After the considerable liberty which the President has allowed in this respect te my colleagues who have preceded me in explaining their votes, l had thought that the President would not object if l made a few cornments of the nature l have suggested. Of course, l bow to the ruling of the President - naturally l do - on the assumption that if l do not now make the remarks which l was going to malœ, the President, on his part, will forbear from making the remarks which he has threatened to make. Therefore, instead of reading my statement now, l bow before the ruling of the President and 1 shall hand it to the Press instead. 51. The PRESIDENT (translated from Rttssian) : Your delegation is entitled, as is every delegation, to state its point of view. As for the USSR delegation, it has reserved the right to state its views not only on the statement, which you are about to make, but also on t.h~t of the United States representative who touched on the substance and whose statement calls for a reply from the USSR delegation. The choice is yours: continue or stop, as you wish.

In that case, and with the President's permission, l shall resume where l left off. In the first place, with regard ta those two statements in the President's previous speeches to which 1 called attention, l noted with interest that the Soviet Union Government apparently believes that, if it had not been for the Protocol of 1925, Mr. Churchill wculd, in 1940, have ordered the Royal Air Force to drop gas bombs on the civilian populatior~ of Germany. The President frequently talks about slander and, in fact, anything which criticises - however remote the degree - the policyof the Soviet Union is always characterized by him as slander. But 1 must saythat l think that this particular statement definitely sIa."1ders a great man and a fine gentleman. 53. Mr. Churchill, it is suggested, would have had no hesitation in being the one to employ. this horrible weapon of gas against a large1y defenceless civil population had it not been for the restraining influence 0t the Geneva Protocol. Sufe1y not eventhe SovietUnion Govermnent really believes this particular insinuation. Is it not aIso obvious that,evenif Mr. Churchill had been t~e sort of man who could have taken the action suggested, it would hardly have" been in the interest of the population of Great Britain at that time in 1940 because then aIl that would have happened, if he had ' taken that action, would have been that the German Air Force in tum would have dropped gas bombs on Great Britain. 55. 1 have flO doubt at aU that Mr. Stalin at one time, at any rate, set very great store by the Fuehrer's word; no doubt, when he concluded a non-aggression pa,ct with him in 1939, he did )t think that Hitler was reaUy likely to tear it up , lid ~o invade the Soviet Union' in 1941. Indeed. 1 believe that history shows t!J.at, in spite of repeated warnÎ11gs by Mr. Chu.iCÎliIl, Ml'. Stalin continued to think ttntil almost the day at which the attack took place that the Fuehrer would in fact keep his word. Unfortunately, Mr. Stalin's absolute confidence in Hitler was rather misplaced. If anything is clear, it is that, having repeatedly broken his solemn word of honour a11 through his career, it was not the Geneva Protocal which stood in the way of Hitler's using gas, but only his ca1culation or estimation of the effects on Gennany if he did. As is conclusively proved by the correspondence which l referred to in my own speech of 20 June [578th meeting], it was made clear to Hitler by Ml'. Churchill that, if he used gas: on the Russians - who, incidentally, l believe, had not been fitted out with the means of resisting such an attack - gas would then be used on the Germans themselves. Any non-prejudiced person will, l think, agree that this is what really deterred Hitler and not the Geneva Protocol which, as such, he was no doubt perfeci-ly prepared to violate. It was also this action on the part of Ml'. Chtirchill, talœn, be it noted, at considerable risk to the population of Great Britain, which spared the Russian people enormous sufferings. 56. What it all comes down ta, therefore, is simply this: An aggressor will always tear up his international obligations provided he thinks it worthwhile. When, for instance - as has been pointed out before - the Italian dictatar used gas on'the unfortunate Ethiopians, he knew that the Ethiopians could not use gas back on him. If there had been a possibility of this kind, there is yery little doubt that gas would not have been used in the Ethiopian war. In other words, if he violates his major undertaking, namely the undertaking not to aggress, there is not the slightest guarantee that an aggressor will not be the first to use the gas weapon or, indeed, any other weapon 'of mass destruction, pravided a!ways that he does nat think that the use of it will recoil on his own head. 57. In default, therefare, of sorne disarmament convention properlynegotiated and properly enfarced, the only real impediment in the way of the use of these horrible weapons, should war break out, is, in the case of the demactacies, a sense of conscience and, in the case of the' aggressors, a sense -of fear, 59. Ml'. MUNIZ (Brazil) : l wish ta explain the vote of the Brazilian delegation. During the debate on the: item that has now been voted upon, the Brazilian delegation had the opportunity to explain its position regarding the advisability of an appeal for ratification of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 [578th 'meeting], as called for in the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union delegation. 60. Although we favour international action aimed at the complete elimination of bacterial weapons, we are not convinced that the ratification of the Geneva Protocol would in practice serve the purpose of bringing about real security against the actual use of these dreaqful weapons. l wish to repeat our stand once again. We will give our full and enthusiastic support to any appropriate action which may lead to the international proscription of all kinds of weapons of mass destruction. We do not believe that any useful purpose would be served by an appeal of the Security Council as suggested by the Soviet Union delegation. 61" Another important reason for our vote lies in the fact that the Soviet Union delegation has brought this question to the attention of the Security Council in circtlmstances which lead us strongly to believe that the suggested appea1 serves the cause of Soviet Union propaganda rather than the cause of world peace. 62. Ml'. SANTA CRUZ (Chile) (translated from Spanish): l feel obliged to say a few words 'with regard to the remarks the President made after the vote. 1 am not referring to the President's interpretation of the public's reaction. The public which attends our meetings has no right to engage in any demonstrations, and if it does so, he can interpret them as he wishes.,.- according to· Krylov or according to Bergson - and no one will take issue with him. But there is something which l think he has no right ta do and that is to interpret our vote in the offensive manner in which he just did, because this vote is based on honourable, . serious and, in our opinion, convip.cing reasons, which are stated with sufficient clarity for the President or anyone else not to misunderstand them. 64. Ml'. DERINSU (Turkey): l have already made c1ear the position of my delegation on thisquestion during the general debate [S78th meeting]. Now, in a few words, l should like to explain our vote on the Soviet Union draft resolution. 65. Although my Government has acceded to and ratified the Geneva Protocol of 1925 on the prohibition of gas and. bacterial warfare, we have abstained in the voting on the Soviet Union draft resolution because the essence of this question already forms part of the programme of work of the Disarman1ent Commission. During the general debate, l had aiso explained that my Government attaches the utmost importance ta the ._"elimination of such weapons through the work of the Disarmament Commission, and that we could not overlook the fad that the Soviet Union action in the Council on this matter coincided chronologicaUy with a world-wide campaign of accusations on the use of such weapons by the United Nations forces in Korea. 66. These are the reasons why we have abstained in the final voting.

The delegation of the UNION OF SOVIET SO- CIALIST REPUBLICS reverts to its right to make a few explanatory comments (\a the substance of the questions dealt with in the statements made in expianation of their votes by the United States, United Kingdom and certain other delegations. 68. To comment first of aU on the principal question: the United States representative dec1ared that the membel's of the Security Council had scorned the Geneva Protocol and the USSR proposaI for an appeal ta States to accede to and ratify that Protocol. The subsequent statements by members of the Council showed that the United States representative':3 ass~rtion was faise from beginning to end. The United States representative spoke falsely and hypocritically throughout the discussion and concluded his last statement with a falsehood. . 69. Thus, everyone, and the Secùrity Council as a whole, has once again l'ealized that the United States representative~s assertions have nothing in common with the truth. AU the representatives of the countries which have ratified the Protocol reaffirmed, in the explanations of their votes, their countries' loyalty to it and explaîned that they had abstained from voting, not because they scorued the Protocol or the USSR proposaI, but because theywere provoked into doing sp by the United States t'epresentative. 70. The United States representative has taken up a c1early provocative and challenging position in the discussion of the question. submitted by the Soviet Union concerning the Geneva Protocol. To begin with, 71. This is a concrete example of how the United States representative put his colleagues ·on the spot. Here is where the problenl lies, and not in any scorn for the Geneva Protocol. 72. The statenlents made by representatives of countries which have ratified the Geneva Protocol have again shown the Council that not one of them is depr:ecating the Geneva Protocol. That Protocol was, is and will be an important international agreement, which has become a part of international relations and international practice, as well as an important standard which is morally and ethically binding on aU peoples. 73. This is the basic conclusion which must be drawn from the discussion and explanations of vote. This is how the United States representative failed once again and came to be in the minority, aione, on this question. These are the facts. 74. The United States representative tried ta refer to the statement made bythe Pakistan representative yesterday; but the Paldstan representative's subsequent statement today thwarted that attempt. It is obvious frem the Pakistan representative,s statement that the United States representative has no grounds for relying on a foreign "spokesman". The representative of Pakistan again officially reiterated his Governmenfs respect for the Geneva Protocol and not its scorn of that instrum<.:nt,as the United States representative false1y asserted. When the United States representatives to the United Nations have found themselves in a difficult p,osition, they have frequently tried ta enlist a foreign 'spok~sman", but that mil.1lœuvre has never borne any results. They have only shown the weakness of their position. 75. If the United States representative has to refer to a Pakistan authority, let us refer to the Minister f-or Foreign Mairs of Pakistan, to his interview with a correspondent of the United Press, after the Anglo- American bloc in the Security Council had rejected the Arab-Asian proposaI for consideration of the 76. That is why proposals directed towards strengthening the cause of peace and security and proposais directed towards granting freedom and independence to peoples which aspire to be free are not adopted in the Security Council; the reason is that they .are blocked and rejected by the Anglo-American bloc which commands a majority in the Council itself. This has long been clear to the Government and people of the Soviet Union. Now it has become c1ear to all the peoples of the world. This is the reason for the impotence of the United Nations and the Security CotrLci1. 77. The United States representative entered the discussion on the USSR proposal with the intention of referring the USSR draft resolution to the United Nations Disarmament Commission; he announeed thus officiaIly. But at the last moment his courage failed him. No one will be convinced by bis remarks to theeffect that he withdrew his proposaI to refer the USSR draft resolutibn to the United Nations Disarmament Commission for the reasons he himself set forth here after the vote had been\taken. He merely found himself in a difficult situation. 78. In its statement yesterday, the USSR delegation exposed the United States representative'sattempt to hide behind a procedural vote on this matter. He n~ither had, nor does he have, any justification for this, as such questionscannot be put ta a proeedural vote. Now, not only he, but many others, understand that reference to rule 33, paragraphs 3 and 4, of the Council's rules ofproeedure is bath futile and deeeitful. When bis attempt failed, he lacked the courage to repeat officially today his proposaI to refer the USSR draft resolution to the United Nations Disal'll'1ament Commission. 79. He is trying to put a good face on a bad show by announcing, after. the event, that he has withdrawn bis proposaI, .but l formally stated befo're the vote that apart ftom the USSR proposal, no other formaI proposaIs had been submitted. He was silent on that point. Henee, he did not submit any formaI proposaI, although he formally promised to submita proposa1.to refer the USSR draft resolution to the Disarmament Commission. The result was.that he forced hiscolleagues' hand. They.followed his lead. .At the last minute his nerve -failed him and he placed them in an awkward and. ridiculous situation. 81. That is how matters stand with regard to this question. The result was a lack of co-ordination in the explanation of votes. The United Kingdom representati'\l~ tried to get his United States colleagues out of his difficulty. He tried to present another version. He stated that, after the USSR delegation's statenlent yesterday, he, the United Kingdom representative, considered it inexpedient to refer the USSR draft resolution to the Disarmament Commission. He did not, however, have the courage to vote against the USSR draft resolution, He, too, abstained. 82. l am sure that if the members of the Security Couneil did in fact scorn the Geneva Protc.col .and the USSR proposaI, as you assert, they would have had the courage to vote agail1st that proposaI. Only Mr. Gross and his Government scorn the Gèneva Protocol and reject the USSR proposaI. He alone in the Security Couneil, as the debate revealed, said that he scorned the Geneva. Protacol, yet he also lacked the courage to vote against the USSR proposaI. He fainthell.rtedly abstained. AlI this is the best indication of the fact that the proposaI is directed towards strengthening the cause of peace and that the Geneva Protocol is an important international document, regarded by the peoples of the world as a serious instrurr_ent which has prevented, is preventing and will prevent the aggressors of our time from using prohibited bacterial and chemical weapons. 83. l do not intend at this time to enter upon a discussion with the United Kingdom representative on the reasons why Hitler did not use prohibited weapons. Sir Gladwyn can address his question ta Hitler. But no one will deny that the existence of the Geneva Protocol represented a constraining factor for Hitler. When l adduced this example, l did not have Hitler's honour in mind, as the United Kingdom representative falsely asserted; Hitler and the fascists had and have no honour, since in their sanguinary misdeeds and crimes they fell to the level of wild beasts. However, fearof the indignation and wrath of the peoples of the entire world forced Hitler - even Hitler, who had fallen to the level of a predatory beastto take intoaccount the obligations arising out of the Geneva Protoco1. These are the facts, and none fJi Sir Galdwyn Jebb's arguments can strike them froril the· pages of histoxy. 84. Mr. Gross quoted my words - "the world has changed..., and n.ot to the advantage of aggressors". y es, l will asœrt again that the world has changed radically, but not for the benefit of aggressors, including the United States aggressors. Even present day United· Statesaggressors are obliged to take world public opinion into account, and·thatis why, announcing their 85. Mr. Gross spoke here of the notorious resolution 380 (V) on "peace through deeds". But that resolutian, submitted by the United States delegàtions, was foisted on the General Assembly toassist the regime of Syngman Rhee, who is now despised by every honest person, with the obvions e.'{œption of the Unhed States Government and the United States ruling cird.es. Syngman Rhee has now become the synonym 'to;;: everything contemptible. That was the reason why this resolution was submitted and imposed on the United Nations. By this and other similar resolutions, and by its policy of aggression, the United States has prevented other Members of the United Nations from participation in the sOllltion of international questions, inc1uding that of Korea, and has introduced international c1ub-Iaw and is domg as it pleases. . 86. None of the Members of the United Nations is allowed to have a say in the matter. General Clark and the Pentagon are directing it, along with the terror and the mass slaughter in which the United States aggressors are engaged in Korea. The United States representative is blinded. He should listen to the representatives of other countries to the United Nations. In private conversations they say they are disgusted with the United States Governmenes policy, inc1uding its policy with regard to the Korean question. Meanwhile the United States representative is trying to refer to the support of other representatives. 89. Ml'. Gross today stated officially in the Security Council that the United States Government is following a policy cf peace based on strength. Members of the Security Council, that was Hitler's mottù, the motto of the fascist aggressors - "Peace through strength"• Hitler dreamed of·a thousand years of a German-fascist dominion after he had subjugated the entire world. He also dreamed of a peace based on strength. The United States is following iu bis footsteps. It is a dangerous course which the people of the wotld are not prepared to follow. They will wring, the necks of the present day aggrt:ssors, even as they wrung the neck of Hitler, whose motta was "Peace through strength". 90. You tried ta slander the Soviet Union and its policy of peace; you said that the Soviet Union has "resumed" its campaign for peace No, the Soviet Union does not have ta resume it - the Soviet Union never stopped that campaign. From the first days of its existence, when the Soviet Uni.on and its Governrr..ent were built on the ruins of the Tsarist régime, the first cry of the young Soviet Republic and the first word uttered by the Soviet people was "peace", and from that time until the pr~sent, the Govern."llent and people of the USSR have carried on a noble and energic struggle for peace. 91. You trie;d to discredit tlie great international popular movement for peace and the appeal which hundreds of millions of honest people signed. Those people are not all communists. They are l1eople of different political belief, race, colour, professh.nsand ways of life, both rich and pOOl', who signed tIlls appeal in the honest desire to promote peace. .And now you and your Greek assistant are trying to besmirch this great cause. You will not succeed. 92. You try to spea.,~ about communist morale. l shall not enter into a discussion with you on that point. l shall merely refer to astatement which you should <'onsider as authoritative. l have before me the M onthly Bulletin of the Chamber of Commerce of New York, in which there are appar~nt1y no communists. There can be no doubt of that, as it is an or6 ~ of Wall Street. At a meeting of this Chamber no less a person than' Congressman Walter H. Judd from Minnesota gave a report. on the question or "Power Politics in the Far East". This happened nat so long ago - November 1951. This is what he said - l shaH read two sentences only from his report: "But my estimate of the morale of the cOn1munist world i8 that it is much higher than that of the democratic world". 93. This was said by a United States Congressman, whom the United States representative Cé.\Unot disbelieve. l shall read the second sentence: "My estimate . is that the morale of the communist world is the higher". a~ression. 95. Only yesterday, according to Press reports, thousands of New York women came to the United Nations, hoping that is was a "temple of peace". Even the United States representative did not dare say they were communists. They were led to the United Nations by a noble yearning for peace. How didthe United States officiais of the United Nations deal with these women? They did not allow them to enter the building and did not receive their delegatio.::. These women held a meeting in front of the United ~ations building and sent their representatives to United Nations delegations. 96. These are. the fruits of the policy of the United States, which has made of the United Nations, not a "temple of peace", but "a den of aggression and war". AU the indicated arguments of the United State'_ representative on the matter are false and unfounded. They only show that he cannot support his position, since whenever a proposai is made to strengthen world peace, he makes every effort to prevent its adoption. 97. In·explaining his vote, the Pakistan representative said that· it w~s only the so-called advanced and mor!" progressive countries, and not the so-called backward countries, which could and would manufacture and use weapons of mass destruction. l cannot agree with Ml'. Bokhari: it_\Voqld not be the progressive, but the . reactiotfary and aggressive countries which would manufacture and use such weapons for aggression, as no advanced country would ever allow the use of weapons of mass destruction for purposes of aggression. 98. The Greek representaüve tried to refde my statement that the USSR draft res?lution was lost because of the shameful and cowardly abstention of the Anglo- American bloc. In that connexion, he stated that Chile and Brazil do not belong to that bloc. It is generally known, however, that Chile and Brazil were among the first to conclude military alliances with the United States. ~.razil has given the United States militarists a free hand to establish military bases in its country. Chile also has a military.alliance with the United States, with sorne reservatio!1s, and both COUJ;ltries were in a miiitary alliance with the United States before Greece became a. member of the aggressive North Atlantic alliance: 99..•The.Greek representative slanderously alleged that l had resorted to procedural trickery during the vote. That. statement is untrue and ablatant falsehood,since apart from the USSR draft resolution no other was submitted, AIl the members of the Secnity Council could see there was therefore no need to mai1œuvre. As l have already said,the United States representative 100. 1 should also like to draw attention to the Brazilian representative's reluarks. He said that every action taken to strengthen pence is used by the USSR delegation for propagandist purposes. This is not true Every action designed to strengthen peace i;; in the interests of international peace and security, and if the Brazilian representative feels that it is also in the interest of the Soviet Union and its people, 1 can only we1come that view, as that is the truth. But 1 should like to add that it is in the interest of the Brazilian people, as well as of the people of the Soviet Union and of all the peoples of the world who are aspiring towards peace. It is against the interest only of those who foUow a policy based on force. Who those proponents of a policy based on force are, we learned toda,Y in the Security Council when the United States representative officiaUy stated that the policy of the United States Government is based on force. 101. The Chilean representative has stated that his position on this question is "honourable". 1 beg to differ with him. 1 see nothing honourable in his position on the USSR draft resolution and the Geneva Protoco!. He has been led on by his United States coUeague and he said in his. statement that he supports bis prooosai to refer the draft resolution to the United Nations Disarma\. 'ent Commission. But the United States representative never made the promised proposaI, and the Chilean representative was left in mid-air, to say the least, as were aU the other representatives who took the same position. There is nothing honourable about such a position. After the English interpretation of the foregoing statement had been give'n, the President added the following (translated from Russian): 102. It is now 6.30 p.rn. vVe still have ta hear the interpretation and there is another speaker on the list. It would be advisable to decide whether we should continue the meeting until we have completed the discussion of this question, and especially until we have heard the interpretation into French of the statement made by the' USSR delegation, before we caU on the Chilean representative, or whether we should postpone everything untH the next meeting. What is the feeling of the representatives of the Council on this matter? 1 am at the Security Councî1's entire disposaI. 103. Ml'. SANTA CRUZ (ChUe) (translated from Spanish): l very much wish to reply to the President's remarks concerning my delegation, and 1 should like to do so now. If you would defer tothe Council and agree to the French interpretation of your statement being

The usuat procedure in the Security Councit is first ta listen to the interpretations of the statements made by various detegations and then to allow other dele~a~ tions ta state their views. If the Chilean representatlve insists on maldng his statement today, we shall go on with our work. 105. Mr. SANTA CRUZ (Chile) (translated from Spanish): 1 insist on speaking today. The French i1'~tcrpretation of the statement of the representative of the U'$ion of Soviet Socialist Republics was given. 106. Mr. SANTA CRUZ (Chile) (translated from Spa1'~ish): First 1 wish ta refer ta the President's assertion that Chile has signed a military alliance with the United States. Chile has not entered into any military alliance with the United States or any other country, nor has it any international undertakings relating to its own security or to collective security, other than those deriving from the United Nations Charter and membership in the Organization of American States. 1 take it that 1 have no need to justify my country in so far as its participation in the United Nations is concerned. This is a meeting of its executive organ. And as far as our participation in the Organization of American States and the inter-Amedcan system in general is concerned, 1 challenge the representative of the Soviet Union to tell me what undertakings Chile has contraded that are not strictly defensive, and defensive within the specific confines of the American continent and ln strict accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter. l also challenge the U~SR representative to indicate any other treaty or undertaking binding us to any country, in military or defensive matters, apart from those l have cited, upon which the USSR representative could base bis assertion as to our lack of independence in the United Nations. 107. Speaking of the independence of the vote taken here, the President referred to the words of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistâri concerning the vote on the case of Tunisia. But it is the very fact of the difference between the results of that vote and the vote just taken-in wbich the President's own vote was a solitary one - which refutes bis assertion; and it is bis own .arguments which give validity and moral force to the présent vote, according to his own standards. 108. Adding a further insult to his previous ones, the President·referred to the dishonourable nature of Chile's position in the matter in question. l do not consider the President qualified to pass judgment upon the nature of our condnct in the Security Council. Refraining, for my part, from basing this opinion on any offensive argument, l will confine myself to referring to Ihe President's biased attitude in the matter. It is an attitude of violent and self-interested bias, devoid of reason or 109. l have been consistent in my voting. In my speech on Friday, 20 Jup.e [579th meeting], l made two basic points. The first was that we could not be a party ta a political manœuvre the scope and intent of which was obvious to aU j the second, that l .-:onsidered that the subject of the President's proposaI was within the competence of the Disarmament Commission. In accordance with my first reason, l abstained from voting on the President's motion. And l could hardly vote for the transmission of the proposaI ta the Disarmament Commission, when it had already been withdrawn. 110. The President has attacked the members of the Council one by one, and the Council as a whole, accusing members of serving thl. policy, interests and dictates of a certain country. :le has covered the Council with insults and each ot its members with abuse•. l should have no lack of arguments to answer him, if l were to refer ta his Government's conceptions of international affairs, but l do not wish to do so. l do wish to warn him, however, that, unless his intention is ta sully the prestige of the Security Council, the world's main instrument for the maintenance of peace and security, unless his intention is deliberately to ruin its efficiency, his conduct is dangerous, because, if there comes a time when his own country wishes to make use of this instrument, it may find it blunted and useless for the task. It would appear that he had a special interest in preventing the Council from retaining any ability to keep the calm which is essential if it is to serve the cause of peace adequately and even, at times, that he wished to prevent it from being able to dissipate the misunderstandings which lead to violent conflict. By his offensive violence he appears to wish to drag us aU into an attitude of intransigence and violence which it is our declared aim to avoid.

Every delegation is entitled to give its views on the position taken by another delegation. The Chilean representative explained his views on the USSR proposaI. l explained the views of the Soviet Union concerning his position. If he is offended, l can only repeat the proverb: "If you are angry, you cannat be right". 112. A~ regards the references to defensive alliances, we heard only today, in the United States representative's statement, what thepoiicyof the United States is. It, is a policy of force, and Chile Ïs promoting this United States policy by conc1uding so-caUed defensive alliances with the United States. \ 113. As regards the prestige of the Security Council the United States is making every effort to undermine that prestige, and Chileis helping the United States to . do this to the fuU extent of its capacities. These are the well known facts. 1

I wish to have the floor before the closing of the discussion simply to correct a misstatement which the Soviet Union representative has now œpeated twice. The Soviet Union representative has - according to the interpretation, at least - misrepresented the statement which I made. I said - and I quote now from the text of my statement: "Security, we feel, must be based upon strength and safeguards. We cannat rely upon treaties which do not contain effective machinery for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction." 120. I caU the Council's attention to the words "strength and. safeguards". In our dictionary there is a world of difference between strength and force. We believe that with strength it will be unnecessary to use force, and 1 wish to have the record corrected .in this respect.

1 am not well enough acquainted with the English language to go into aU the nuances of the word sila ("strength" or "force"), but 1 understood from the simultaneous interpretatiùn that you are basing your policy on force and 1 would point 011t that you were not the first ta mention this. If you read Mr. Truman's and Mr. Acheson's statements made in the spring of last year, you will find that the United States is basing its policy on fMce. Your interpretation is your own affair, but in international relations, there is a policy of force and a policy of peace. A policy of force is always placed in juxtaposition ta a policy of peace. A policy of force is always placed in juxtaposition 1:D a policy of peace. Your President and your Secretary of State declared long ago that the policy of the United Stateswas apolicy offorce. We are basing our position on that facto

1 do not wish toenter into a semantical discussion on the difference between "force" and "strength", but 1 have ~o state that

l would ask the Brazilian representative whether he really believes that, when Mr. Truman asks Congress to assign $75,000 mmion to $86,000 million for military expenœtures, he is guided by idealistic and moral, and not materialistic, military-aggressive, considerations. 124. It is indeed a strange concept of morals and ideals when tens of thousands of millions of dollars are requested for atomic weapons, for aircraft carriers) for all types of armaments and for the extension and expansion of the armed forces of the United States to 3.8 million men. These are indeed wondrous moral considerations. 125. Mr. MUNIZ (Brazil): But these forces are not going to be used violently or unjustly for attack or aggression in violation of the principles of civilizatio'l, but to defend the very foundation of civilization. Thus there is a moral purpose behind them.

It would indeed be more accurate to assume that the representative of Brazil will not decide the question of how these United States forces are to be used. That will not depend on Brazil. 127. l would ask members of the Security Council to give their views concerning the next meeting. There is a proposaI to convene a meeting on Monday morning for the discussion of agenda item 3. 128. Mr. KYROU (Greece): With a rather inadequate reference to the statement of the representative of Chile, you said yourself that when someone is angry he is necessarily wrong. We had a very heated discussion during this whole week and l think it would be useful for the Council to let sorne .days pass before having the next meeting. l would rather propose a meeting on Tuesday or Wednesday.

The Greek representative's argument is unconvincing, but if Monday is irlconvenient for him, a meeting of the Security Council could be he1d tomorrow morning at 10.30 a.m. 130. Mr. KYROU (Greece): l am very sorry but l used your own argument not to conduct discussions while we are angry. And l very respectfully submit that an of us, including perhaps our very respected President, are angry by now. So perhaps it is better not to have a meeting but to let sorne days pass. 131. The PRESIDE~T (translated fram. Russian): l assumed that only the Chilean representative :i5 wrong, but it appeàrs that the Greek rt'presentatïve 133. Ml'. GROSS (United States of America): If the President insists on a meeting tomorrow morning. l have no objection. l am not speaking ta the date. l understood the President to say that at our next meeting, we will discuss item 3 of the agenda. l will remind him that l have reserved the position of my delegation and will insist at our next meeting that we move at once to a consideration of the item, "Question of a request for investigation of alleged bacterial warfare:'. l do not, therefore, agree with the suggestion of the President that we discuss item 3 at our next meeting.

Yes, l remember your remark and you apparently remember my reply ta the effect that we would return to this question when we had concluded the debate on agenda item 2. ·We have now concluded the discussion on agenda item 2 and can take up your question again. If you are raising this matter, let us discuss it. If you insist on transposing the items, contrary ta the mIes of pracedure and contrary ta the accepted method of discussing agenda items in the order in which they stand on the' agenda, let us discuss this matter, as we previously agreed to do, that is to say, after the debate on agenda item 2 is concluded. We can now discuss your proposaI if you submit it formally. 135. Ml'. GROSS (United States of America): According to the well-established mIes of procedure of the Security Council as l understand them, l think that when the Council meets it adopts an agenda. l do not think that a decision need be taken today as to what our agenda should be at the ne..'{t meeting. 1 am not suggesting that this be done. l do insist that when the provisional agenda for the next meeting is submitted, it inc1ude the item, "Question of a request for investigation of alleged bacterial. warfare", and at our next meeting, 1 shaH argue for the Ïtnmediate discussion of that item, regardless of its place upon the provisional agenda. 136. In serving this notice now, 1 do not think that . l am in any way violating any practice, procedure or rule of the Security Council. It is quite the contrary. 137. l would also suggest that we meet on Monday instead of tomorrow morning unless the President, for reasons of his own, insists on a meeting tomorrow morning. Inthat case, l, for one, would be very glad

In reply ta the United States representative, 1 would say that the agenda fOl' our next meeting is very c1ear. There are three items on the Cauncil's agenda: items 2, 3 and 4. We have discussed item 2 and the next in order is item 3 - "Admission of new Members". Subparagraph 3 (a) was proposed by the USSR delegation and sub-paragmph 3 (b) was submitted jointly by the Netherlands and Chilcan delegations. Hence the next question with which we must deal is that coming next in arder, and the agenda for our next meeting will be as follows: "1. Adoption of the Agenda. "2. Admission of new Members" (with two subparagraphs). "3. Question of a request for investigation of alleged bacterial warfare." 139. The United States representative is interested in my views about tomorrow's meeting. 1 ~uggested that we clhould meet on Monday. When the Greek representative opposed this, 1 took into consideration the fact that for some reason Monday was inconvenient for him and proposed that the meeting be held tomorrow. Within these two days l can do as 1 see fit, in my capacity as President. The Greek representative, however, proposed that we should meet on Tuesday. This doel? not come within my competence and l would asIe him to make this request to my colleague on my left, Sir Gladwyn Jebb, as he takes over the pre!:idency on 1 July. If you agree to meet on Monday, you will be supporting my view i it will mean that our views coincide. 140. Thus, we have three proposais before us, or rather two: the Greek representative's proposaI that we should meet on Tuesday (he did not, however, say whether it was to be in the morning or the afternoon) and the USSR-United States proposaI to meet on Monday. l believe this is the first time in the history of the Security Council that there has been a USSR- United States proposaI.

l am very sorry that l did notmalœ myself clear. l did not raise any objections to a meeting on Monday. l only suggested that it would perhaps be better fo'r the Security Council ta allow some days to pass. l was very astonished to see the re,action of the President to the proposition of having a meeting tomorrow. In arder to put an end ta that, l formally move, if it is convenient to the President of the Security Council for the month of July, that our next meeting be held on Tuesday, 1 July, at 10.30 a.m.

l think, on the whole, if an appeal is made to me as the next President, l would be quitehappy to have a meeting take place on Tuesday. Alternatively, if the members 143. Mf.. GROSS. (United States of America): In order to make the po·sition even c1eate!', l withdraw my suggestion for a meeting on Monday. 1 macle that suggestion only when 1 understood that the President had announced that it was his intention to caU a meeting on Friday. I wanted ta know what the reasons were for that. I see that there were no particular teasons for that suggestion. I would withdraw my suggestion for a meeting on Monday and would support the proposaI of the representative of Greece to meet on Tuesday morning.

The picture is now clear. One of the "sponsors" of my proposaI has reversed his position. We thus have two proposaIs before us. The first is that of the Greek representative that the 'Security Council should meet again next Tuesday, 1 July. A vote 'Was taken by sho'W of hands, as follo'Ws: In fm/our: BraziI, China, France, Greece,Netherlands, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America. Abstaining.' '"::hile, Pakistan, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The proposal 'Was adopted b'jl 8 votes in fav01w, with 3 abstentions. The meeting rose at 7.50 p.m. SALES AGENTS FOR UNITED DEPOSITAIRES DES PU8UCAT'OMS AhnmllA - ARGENTINE Edilorlel Sudemericona S.A.. Alslna 500, Buenos Airas. GREECE-GRECE ..Eleftheroudekis... tion, Ath~n.s. AUS1llA~1A - AUSTRAliE H. A. GocIdarà. 2550 Gaorge St.. Sydney. InG1UM-IEL3IQUE 'lo Agence al Messagaries de la Prosse S.A.. 14-22 rue du P~...i1. Bruxelles. ,W. H. Smith & Son. 71·75 Bouleverà Adolphe·Mai. Bruxelles. IOllVIA -IOllVIE librerfe S~I.cclones. Cosille 912. le Pez." IUIlt-IIESIL livterie Agir. Rua Moxico 98·8. Rio de Jeneiro. GUATEMALA Goubeud &Cio. Gual.mal•• NAITI libroirie "A la IIl·B, Port·.u·Prince. HONOI!W Librer!. ·Panameric.n., Foeote. tllgucig.lp•• INbIA-INDE Oxford Book & Stetionell: Hous., New Delhi. P. V.r.dach.ry St., M.dr.s 1. CANADA Rve...on Press. 299 Qaeen St. West. Toronto. les Presses Unl""...itelres levai. Quebec. CmON-CEYlAN The Associated N.wspape... of Ceylon. Ltd•• leke Hou.e. Colombo. INDt.1lESll_IIlDONESIE Jojas,'n Pemb.ngun.n. Diok.,,'.. IIWI Ket.b·Kh.neh D.nesh, oue, Tahron.. IRAQ-IRAK M.ckenzie·s Bookshop, CHIlE - CHILI librerle Ivens. Monede 822. Sentiego. CHINA-OIINE Commerciel Press, lld., 21l Honen Rd. Sh.nghel. IRElAND -IILANDE Hibernian GenerelAgenc;, merci.1 Buildings, COLOMBIA- COLOMBIE librerie letln. lido.. Corrore 60" 13-05, B09016. ISRAEL Blum'tein's BookStores, Ro.d, Tel Aviv. COSTA llCÀ- COSTA·lICA Treios Hermonos. "portodo 1313. Sen Jos6. IrALY-ITAlIE Colibri S.A.. Vi. CUBA L. Case 8elgo. O'Reilly 455. le Hebol/o. &EIANON-lIl.\N Libr.irie universelle, CZECNOSlOVAKIA- TClIEtOSlOVAQUIE Ceskoslovensky Spi.ovofel. N.rodni Tride 9. Prohe 1. DENMARK- DANÈMARK Einer Munksgeorà. ltd.. N"rregode 6. K"benhevn, K. LIBERIA' J. Momolu K.m.r., LUXEMBOURG Libr.irie J. Schummer. DOMINICAN REPUBlIC~IIEPUI. DOMINICAINE librerle Dominicono, Mercedes 49. Ciu'· dad Trujillo. ECUADOR- EQUATEUR librerle CientIÏi~o. Box 362. Gu.yoquil. MEXICO -MEXIQUE Editori.l Hermes 41, México. D.F. NETHERlANDS - PAog.9AS N.V. M.rtinus Nijholf, 's-Graveph8ge. EGYPT- EGYPTE Librllirie I1La Renaissà.nce dIEgypte." 9 Sh. "dly Pasha. C.iro. U SAlVADOR-SAlVADOR Manu.1 Noves y Cio.. le Av.nlda sur 37. Son Salvador. HEW ZElLAND - NOUVElLE.ZElANDE U. N. Assn. of New Wellington. NICARAGUA Dr. R.miro Romlrez UIlIOPlA- ErHIOPlE "gence Ethiopi.nne d. ,Publicit6. Box 128. Addis·Abeba. NORWAY - MORVEGE Joh.n ' Gruncft T.num gushgl. 7A, Oslo. FlNLAND.,.. FINlANDE Akateeminen Kirjekeuppe. 2, Keskusketu, Helsinki. ' PAIIISTAN Thomas & Thom.s, Ro.d. K.r.chi, 3. Publishers United hore. bANCE Editions A. Pedone. 13 rue S"uffiot. PerisV. Orders and inquiries from countries where sales agents have not yet been appointed may b~ sênt to,Sales and Circulation Sect'~n, United Nations, New York,. U.S.A.; or Sales Section, Unit~d Nations Office, Palars des Nations, Geneva, Swi\'Zerland. .Olt Priee: 25 cents (or equivalent Printed in Canada