S/PV.585 Security Council

The agenda as we adopted it this morning is before us. I take it that we adopt it again in the form in which it WaS adopted this morning.

The USSR delegation maintains its position with regard to the agenda.

The positions of aU of us remaill, I am sure, exactly as they stood. Question of a request for investigation of alleged bacterial wmare (continued) 4. The 1-';'~ESIDENT: We are now at the point at which the representative of the Soviet Union this morning has asked to speak on a point of order. 1 therefore caU on him now.

As the President is probably aware, in my first statement on the question under discussion I said that l did not want to lengthen the debate and for that reason 1 did not speak on the substance of the question. The latest intervention of the United States representativ:::, however, forces me to dea} with the substance, the more so as the President himself has said that it was not quite deat to him what was being discussed. 6. 1 have already said that the whole matter is quite clear, but 1 should like to draw the Presidenfs attention to the single fact that the United States draft resolution [S/2671] on the question now placed on the agenda at the United States delegation's request even provides for the entry of an investigation commission into the territory or within the borders of unspecified States, to regions which the commission may deem it necessary . .. l 7. This is the heurt of the matter. Obviously, we cannot nccept such United States infractions of the territory of other States. In order to decide tlùs question, we must henr not only one~ but both sides. Meanwhile, the United States represelltative's statement has indieaoc-d to the Security Council that the entire speech which he intends to make is aimed at preventing an invitation being issued to the representatives of the People's Republic of China and the People's Democratie Republic of Korea. 8. This confirrt1s the USSR delegation's statement that the United States proposed its item for the Security Council's agenda with the delih~rate intention of im,POSirlg on the Council its o'wn procedure for con-' sidering this question in the absence·of the Chinese and Korean representatives. 9. The P:ŒSIDENT: l am afraid that l must point out ta the ~<presentativeof the Soviet Union that what we are discussing now is simply a point of arder. The question of a possible invitation to the GQvernment of Peking and the authorities in North Korea is not itself under discussion. The point of order that we are discussing Îs whether the Council would prefer to vote on whether we should accept the Soviet Union suggestion to l.ave a vote now on the question of an invitation to the representatives of the governments l have .!!1eiitioned. or whether we shüuld follo'W thé suggestion which l previously made. That· is the only question which is now under discussion. l therefore really cannot pennît the representative of the Soviet Union to make a speech on the substance of the matter at this point. \>Vhat l should like him to say is whether he agrees \\"Îth my sugg-estion or whether he agrees with the proposaI by the representative oLthA United f:tates, which îsnot even objected to at this moment, that we should here and now take a vote on the question of the invitation. This Îndeed is what Mr. Malik himself suggested. 10. Ml'. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated j1'o1n Russian): Ml'. President, r am llot speaking on the substance of the question. r am merely referring to matters l'elating to the USSR draft resolution [S/2674/Rl'V 11 which we are discussing and which deals with an invitatiop to he îssued to the official representatives of the People's Repnblic of China and of the People's Democratie Republie of Korea. 1 have not dea!t with the substance of the question and do not intend to do so. 11. With regard ta the present question, the USSR delegation insists that a vote should be taken at once on its ciraft resolution which provides for an invitation to representatives of the People's Republie of China and the People's Democratie Republic of Korea to attend the meetings of the Security Council at which the question propased by the United States delegation is c1.~scussed. 12. The USSR delegation has the following reasons far taldng up this position. Members of the Security Council have before them document S/2684, which cantains the official statement to the United Nations Secretariat by the Governments of the People's Republic of China and the People's Democratic Republic of Korea to whieh the USSR delegation referred at today's Security Council meeting. The last sentence of the official statement by the People's Democratie Republic of Korea, dated 22 February, reads as follows: ftln protesting categoricaHy against this new crime of the American imperialists in spreading infectious bacteria in Korea, 1 caH upon the peoples of the world to demand that an end should be put to the crimes of the interventionists and that those responsible for the use of bacterial weapons should he called to strict account for their crimes before the entire world." 13. This document constitutes a serious international accusation against the United States Government. Similar statements are ta be found in the official notes of the People's Republic of China. What grounds can the Security Council have fQr refusing to invite and hear the official .representatives of these two States? How car..: we discuss this serious international question on the basis of the United States version alone~ôn the basis of what the United States representative is going to say here in the Councîl? 14. This moming's discussion shows that, so far as the United Kingdom representative is concerned, any givenquestion becomes dear to him only after he has heard the United States representative's opinion on it. Not aIl repl'esentatives, however, take that attitude. Some of theltl feel that a question is dear to them aftel' they have heard both sides, ~nd not only the United States opinion. 15. In view of these circumstances, the USSR delegation insists that the representativesof the People's Republic of China and -(Jf the People's Democratic

\Ve must try to reach a decisi<ln (lU thts compnratively simple point of procedure at an early date: \Ve can do that, of course, only by a proceM of voting. li. \Ve are, a~ 1 umlerstallc1 it, in the presence of two proposaIs. The first, my own, is that \ye should dec:ide to hear the United States rcpl'esentative develop his case before we discuss and vote on the Soviet Union draît l'l'solution to invite certain repl'esentatives to the Conncil. The second, as l understand it, is the Soviet Uniol""i representative's proposaI that we should now vote on his own draft resolution calling for the invitation - although l imagine that anyone who wished il) speak on the dl'aft resolution would have the right ta do sa, or, indeed, ta e..~plainhis vote. Œ. Uniess there 1S nny objection, l would propose ta put my proposaI to the vote now. If that is rejected, l shaH put ta the vote the Soviet Union propo:-:al. 19, Ml', MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republies) (tratf.Slatl'd front Russian): Ml'. President, there are no grounds for taking a vote on your proposaI. The Chilean repr~sentative has explained quite c1early fS8·lt!t n~ecting] ta the SecufÎty COtlncil that at a pr\'vious [58.1Jt] meeting the COtmcil agreed and, in effect, decided that as soon as we began to discuss the qllestion raised by the "Jnit~d States delegation, we \vould discUlllS the question of invitations and would put the USSR draft l'l'solution to the vote. T'his statement appears iu the records and no objections were lodged against it. 'Vhat grounds are there, therefore, for rec:onsidering this so-ca1led gentlemen's agreement? 20. If you dedde to reconsider or violll.te this agreement, that will m~.rely caU attention ta the lack of respect which certain gentlemen ha.ve lOI' their gentlemen's a..~l'eements, when they attempt to prevent a vote on the USSR draft resolution bi means of procedttral manŒuvres, There are no grounds for tIlis. 21. In aecordance \Vith our prior agreement of 25 June, the USSR draft resolution should he voted on immediatelYf before the Security COl1ncil proce~ds to diS1:uSS the substance of the question, It would be in strict conformity with. precedent and with the nccepted 23. There are no gro\.ttlds whatever for postponing the consideration of and voting on the USSR draft resolution. That would be an unprecedented violation of the establi!'hed order of the Security Council's work. Tht Soviet Union delegation insists that its draft resolution should be put to the vote, especially in view of the fact that, so far as is kuown, you withdrew your proposaI at this morning's meeting. If you now insist on your proposaI, tllis mcans that YOtl have reintradu~ed it, but after my proposaI. In that eventl if you insist on it, your proposaI should be put to the vote after, and not before, my draft resolution. But l can see no reason why you should insist on it.

Before calling on the repre- $entative of Greece, 1 should like ta say that: in my view, there is really no need fol' the -Soviet Union represelltative to get at aIl excited about this p,int. and still less ta try to confuse the issue by introducing irrelevant issues ... 25. Ml'. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (trallslated !rom Russian): l am perfectly calm. 26. The PRESIDENT: l am glad to hear that. In that case, we can proceed calmly. 27. The point is that l made a. proposaI this morning, and l maintain that it was a reasonable proposaI to have made. It does not, howe"l'-er. neem to have enlisted auy very great support. AtQne stage, 1 think even the United States representative said that, so far as he was concerned, he would not minet proceeding ta a vote on Ml'. Mames draft resolutiün to invite certain govern- 1l1ents ta attend meetings of the Council. 28. If that is the position, 1 wottld propose, in order ta 1110ve on quickly and without prejudice to the inherent justice of my caœ as l see it, to withdraw 111Y proposaI and put the Soviet Union proposaI to a vote as soon as 1 cano After that, we shall presumably begjn the main discussion. 29. Ml'. KYROU (Greece): l would be very sorry to see the President withdraw his proposaI, a proposaI which is e.."<treme1y logical and sound. My delegation - and l am quite confident aU delegations around this table - is anxious ta be absolutely fair towards the Soviet Union representative, but we want to be fair also to his draft proposaI: and l submit that. even with the best intentions in the world, we cannot be fair and objective towards this oronosal heforewe know\vhat it isail about. ~ • "On 11 February enemy military aircraft dropped on our military positions in the Chorwon district large mmlbers of paper packets contained fleas, spiders, mosquitoes, ants, flies and other types of small insects." 31. What would be the aim of the r~quest of Mr. Malik? Would it be to have these gentIremen bring ta the Security Council table here this CO'IPUS delictil to show us aU these fleas and other insect,s? l really think it would not be objective to tal;:e a vote now on this proposaI, and l would really regret to see the President withdraw his proposal.

l sympathize of course with the views of the Greek representative, but l would ask him to agree with me in thinking that the best tbing for me to do would be to withdraw my proposlll because sucll informatfon as l have leads me to belie"e that my proposaI would quite Hkely not get sC'7en votes, and l do not \Vant to drag on this sterile procedural debate a second longer than necessary. If the representative of Greece will agree with me, l will in fact withdraw it and wc ,\lm thenapproach the Soviet Union draft resolution set forth in document S/2674/Rev.l. 33. There is one representative on my list who wishes to ~-plaÈ':\ his vote before the vote is taken. l shall now ca11 on the representative of France and then, unless anyone elsù wants to u-plain his vote before the vote 1S taken, l shall take the vote. 34. 1':-, HOPPENOT (France) (translated from, French): It is customary in France, at least in parliament and the assemblies, to explain one's vote before rather than after .the voting. l should therefore be grateful if the President would permit me to follow that custom. 35. In'the nrst place, l personally regret that the USSR de1egs.tion, by pressing its point, has obliged us .ta vote on its proposal beforr ' hearing the United States representative explain bis position. In my opinion, Mr. Malik had the right to aet as he did and the President, by upholding him, mere1y kept to the tacit "gr'P.PITlPnt .'made ~ few. ~ago_dtn'ingth.e debate....as the Chilean representative has reminded us - an agreement to the effect that the vote on the USSR draft 36. 1 regret that Ml'. Malik insisted on our voting on his draft resolution before hearing the United States representative because. 1 think that after hearing Ml'. Gr08s' introductory statement we should have votcd more intelligently and more objective1)r, as Ml'. Kyrou has said, than we are going to vote now, being guided solely by questions of principle. 37. The fact that my delegation is compelled to vote against the USSR proposaI does not mean that, in its view, there can be a complete investigation unless bOth sides are heard. What the Council is about to do, howcver, is not ta conduct an investigation but to decide whether such an investigation is to be conducted and by whom. The Council has sufficient basis for taking su-:u a decision in the documents submitted by the Peldng and Pyongya.'1g Governments [S/2684] and the text of the United States draft resolution itself [S/2671] . 1t is only at a later stage, that is to say, when the international investigation commission has been set up and is ready to function, that the question will arise; 1 must add that at that time the obligation will also arise to hear both parties. At the present stage of our discussion, however, the question seems to me premature and irrelevant to the issue. For this reason the French delegation will, at this stage of our debate, vote against issuing an invitation to the Peking and Pyongyang Governments. 38. Ml'. BOKHARI (Pakistan): 1 should like to explain why the delegation of Pakistan will vote against the Soviet Union proposaI. 39. My delegation considers it sound in principle that when a dispute is before the Security Couneil, the parties to that dispute should he here to state their case. But in applying this principle we should be careful to determine what the dispute is, what the stage of the dispute is, and what action is likely to be proposed under it. So far as we know, we are discussing this item with a view to deciding whether an investigation should or should not be undertaken, as impartially as possible. 40. The situation is that certain charges have been made. They also have been stoutly denied. So far as my delegat.ion is concerned, there is little e1se it wants to know, not only from one side, but also, if l may say 50, from the oth,;r. If we are going to proceed to hold an investigation, we think we ought to get on with that task as quickly a.s possible; in faet, we think it has been considerably. delayed. For that purpose it is not quite essential at this stage ta ask either.the representatives of the People's Republic of China or a representative of the North Korean authorities to state their case. Theil' case has already been stated, namelv, that certain charges have been made by them. Thé other case has also been stated, namely, that they have been denied.

1 should like to make a very brief explanation of my vote. 1 shall vote against the proposaI made by the representative of the Soviet Union. 1 have two reasons for doing so. 43. In the first place, 1 believe that the Soviet Union proposaI defeats the purposes of an impartial investigation. This matter of gernl warfare has been in the field of propaganda. What the'Security Council may do is to remove it from the field of propaganda to the field of fact-finding. 1 think that none of us could possibly hold any illusions as to the facts of such an invitation because these people whom we are asked to invite will only repeat and intensify and continue that awful propaganda of which we have already had too much. That being the case, 1 do not see why the Security Council, in aiming to remove this matter from propaganda to fact-finding, should play the game that way. That is ID:- first reason. 44. In the second place, any invitation by this' body .inevitably cünfers a measure of prestige on the recipients. Whether we intend that or not, it is inescapable. The people in Korea and the people in China are doing their utmost to free themselves from these puppet régimes. Members of this Council may not be in a position to help tL~ Chinese and Korean peoples in this struggle. Perhaps we are unable to help, but 1 believe it is not right for any organ of the United Nations to add to the difficulties of the Chinese and Korean peoples in their struggle for freedcm. 1 believe that such an invitation would add to thei.r difficulties. That is my second reason for voting agaÎllst the Soviet Union proposaI.

My delegation would have preferred ta vote on the Soviet Union draftresolution aftel' having heard the presentation of the United States case. Since this is not to be the procedure, we shall vote against that draft resolution for the reasons sa brilliant1y and dearly expressed by the representative of France. 46. We also believe that in this particula:- case it is unnecessary to invite representatives of the People's Republic of China and of Nortll Korea ta attend our meetings. These are the two parties which first stated their case, in the form of accusations. The accusations are before us in the document distributed ta the Council through the good offices of the Soviet Union delegation. Weknow what the charges are; they are dear enough in many ways and need no further explanation for the purpose of considering the item p~ced on our agenda by the United States delegation, calling for the establishment of a commission of inquiry. 1 agree with the representative of France that only when we have before

l wish ta remind the Council that the USSR delegation reserves the right ta speak after the vote, according ta the results of the vote. 48. The PRESIDENT: Every representative has the right to explain his vote, either before or after the vote is taken. 49. Mr. SANTA CRUZ (Chile) (translated from Spanish): Our delegation defended the USSR representative's right ta ask for an immediate decision on his proposaI, but, for the reasons explained by the representative of France, we are sorry that we should have been induced ta make a premature decision. The contributions to the discussion of the question that have so far been made do not convince us of the need for deciding, at this time, whether to invite the representatives of the North Korean authorities and the Government of Peking, alld consequently we shaH vote against the motion. . 50. We nevertheless reserve the right to change our standpoint should the matter be raised again after the discussion which is ta be opened by the representative of the United States. 51. Mr. MUNIZ (Brazil): l wish ta explain why the Brazilian delegation will vote against the Soviet Union draft resolution to invite representatives of the People's Republic of China and of the North Korean authorities to participate in our debate at this stage. 52. The issue before us is simply whether or not to entrust a fact-finding task to an impartial body. The item on our agenda deals specifically with a request for an investigation of alleged bacterial warfare. We are not calledupon now to pass ju.dgment on the validity of the.charge'> preferred against the Unified Command in Korea. At the presentstage, all the Sl::curity Council is caUed upon to do is to establish sorne procedure ror secudng aU proper data. and information, on the basis of which, at a Iater stage, a decision can be taken. 53. Tt is not a question, as the Soviet Union representative has implied, of deciding an issue after having heard only one of the parties. 'ThePeople's Republic of China and the North Korean authorities will have ample 'opportunity thoroughly, to discuss ."the matter' with the fact-finding body acting on behalf of theSecu-' rity Council. Paragraph 2 of the United States draft

There are no further names on the list of speakers. Before the vote is taken, 1 propose, as representative of the UNITED KING- DOM, very briefly to explain the vote which my del~>.ga­ tion will cast on the Soviet Union draft resoluL.vn. 56. My reasons for opposing the Soviet Union draft resolution are almost exactly the same as those expressed by many other members of the Councilnotably the representatives of France, Pakistan and The Netherlands. Charges have been made and denied. They can be proved or disproved only by an imparcial investigation. This investigation must take place 011 the scene, since it is obviously not in the Security Council that any evidence which may be produced cau be considered and weighed. It would not, therefore, be helpful or indeed appropriate, in my delegation's view, to invite repres(lntatives. of the People's Republic of China or of North Korea toparticipate in our meetings. If they were to come, the only result, in our view, wouid be a further repetition of the charges already made. 57. For·these reasons, we shall vote against the Soviet Union draft resolution. 58. As PRESIDENT, 1 now put to the vote the Soviet Union draft resolution, set forth in document Sf2674/Rev.1. A vote wastaken by show of hands, as follows: In fa~Tour: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Against: Brazil, Chile: China, France, Gree.ce, The Netherlands, Pakistan, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northem Ireland, United States of America. Thedraft resohttion was re/ecteil, by 10 votes to 1.

1 call on the Soviet Union representative for an explana':ion of vote.

By its rejection of the Soviet· Union proposal that the representatives of the People's Republic of China and the People's Demociatic Republic·of Korea should be invited to the meetings of the Security Counci1 during the Council's consideration of the question of the investigation of the waging of bacterial warfare, the United States hasshown the whole world that it is afraid of the truth about American 67. Relevant documents from such international .organizations as the International Association, ofÎJënio-:'" ]- cratic Lawyers, the World Peace Council and others 63. This, therefore, is a usual aggn~ssive device on the part of the ruling circ1es in the United States, the intention being ta violate the sovereignty and territorial integrity of another State, commit an act of aggression against it, cause damage to that State and at the same till1e propose an "investigation on the spot", with the idea of sending its agents into foreign territory. 64. It is also well known that there are United States representatives in aIl the so-~alled United Natians local commissions, whatever theÏ1' composition and putpose; and that those representatives are there, if not as members of the missions, then in the capacity of "servicing staff" or "United Nations officiaIs", to do what they are instructed to do by the Department, of State of the United States and the Pentagon, and not by the United Nations. ' 65. The United St.ttes will not sur,ceed in concealing this widely-known fact by any references to "impartial investigators". 66. As regards the use of bacterial weapons by United States troops <lgainst Korea and China, the fads are clearly set fürth in the statements of the Goveriunents of the People's Republic of China and the People's Democratie Republic of Korea, to which 1 have already drawn the Security Council's attention today. The facts about the use cf bacterial weapons against the Korean and Chinese peoples by United States armed forces have also been authoritatively established by a number r:f international organizations and foreign correspondents, and are well known ta the world. 68. Tt is pnrticulal'1y advisable to draw the Security Councirs attention to the foUowing highly important c1rcumstances. In all the discussions of the question of the use of bacterial weapons) the United States Government has rdus~d to condemn bacterial warfare. This can only he explained hi its wish to retain a free hand and to continue in the future to use shameful bacterial weapons. This obviously serves to explain the United States Govel'nmenes stubborn objection to the USSR proposaI to caU upon State'\l to accede ta and ratify the Gen.ev~ Protocol [S/2663].This also explains the United States Gover111nent's refusaI to ratify the Protocol. 69. The tJSSR delegation has stated in the Security Council from the outset that the USSR agreed ta place on the CounciPs agenda the question submitted by the United States deleg~tion) but felt that no discussion of tha.t question was possible witho~ït the participation of t1~ represent::.tives of the Pe?plù Republic of China and of the People'!> Democratic Republic of Korea. 70. SOlne repl'esentatives) speaking in explanation of their vote) havt~ ptlt furward the excuse that, if the United States representative made a statement, they would see the situation more c1early and be able ta vote mûre impartially. That is an odd explanation) ta say the leaat) since there is no' teason to suppose that the Kuomintang representaèive) or the representatives of Gre.ece -and Brazil, would vote differently from the United States representative, no matter what arguments he presented inhis statement. 71. ThE. USSR delegation continues to think that it 15.impossihle to consider this question in the Security Coundl ~.. the absence of the Chinese and Korean reptesentatives ··because the Omncil wiIi be able to ascertain the true facts ·only with their participation, sinœthe faets in question relate to the territories of à:he People's Republic of China and the People's DemocrancRepublic of Korea. 12. The Uttited States, for its part, is confinuing the illegal practice, clearly in 'Contravent'on of·the United Nations Charter, .which.it instituted· when itfirst began ,jtsaggressionin Korea. Making uSIa of the majority of .the .Security .Council, which 1S at its orders, the 'Uttited States is attempting te·impc<ie· on the· Security CmmciI its own one-sidedversion of questions connected with events ;n Rorea, and, by denying the other side access.tothe Security Counciland other United Navons organs,is milingit. impossible for. thatside to btate .âts.)?fIÏn:tofview on thesequestions. At the same time, the Unitèd States is endeavouring toimFùse on the {;-- urity Councl1. unjustand one-sided decisionson these questions, decisiofiS which are in violation of the ~• . 1, 7.3•.. Th~USSR de1~tion wishes to.declareonce againthat, in the ab~enceof representatives of the ,. . . . ' , -'\

We now finally approach the substance of the question before us.

The facts which l am about to relate should be viewed, l think, by the Council in conn~on with the actions and statements by the Soviet Union representative this afternoon. His threat, his announced intention to use the veto in connexion with the United States draft resolution, cannot be regarded apart from the general course of conduct in which the Soviet Union Government has engaged and which will be the major subject of my statement. l hope that the members of the Council 'will keep his threat to use the veto of this draft resolution in the front of their minds as these facts unfold. l believe that the Soviet Union representative may try to evade the truth by a sit-down strike, but l tell him that you can do many things with the trttth but you cannot sit on it. 76. l should like to explain to the Security Council why the United States Government had requested the addition to our agenda of a new item entitled "Question of a request for investigation of the alleged use of bacteria1 warfare". 77. The draft resolution which my delegation has circulated [S/2671] refers to the concerted spreading of grave charges by communist governments and authorities, induding charges made in the United Nations by representatives of the Soviet Unie>:., that United Nations forces fighting against communist aggression in Korea have resorted to the use of bacterial weapons. 78. For many months the world has been exposed to a campaign both false and malicious, the target of which is nothing le8s than. the United Nations itself. Few people are deceived. The very methods employed to fabricate evidence and to propagate the charge have revealed the lie for what it is. However, the campaign should not be shrugged off or ignored as merely another example of the evil nature of international communism. The venom which is being injected into the minds of 11len is intended to confuse, to divide and to paralyse. That is why the Soviet Union representative threatens ta use his veto. J 79. .Another objective of the Soviet Union Government in this campaign is to isolate the free wor1d from the United States. They try ta do this by singling us out for special condemnation. This. is why the people of the free world should, for their own security, take a cold hard look atthe facts. Tt must be remembered that the gerlll warfare charges a,s such are but a part of a still larger campaign of hatred which is now in progress in the Soviet Union and areas under its influence and control. The United Nations will do weIl to wâtch this ro. \Vhnt are the facts concerning the originR and nature of the campaign of false charges roncerningthe ~se of germ warfnre in KQren hv the Unified Commancl? 1 shaU refer tu fnets, nnd the·Soviet Union representative cannat veto f1\ct~. 81. In 1951, during the period of cmnmunist military setbacks in Koren, there was a minor cnmpaign nlleging the use of bacteria! weapons by the United Nations forces in Korea. The 1951 cmnpaig11 was launched on 22 Marehbv a briei itelu on the Pekingradio, imtnediatcly picked 'l\'P by Pravda. This news item from Peking. re~rting th&.'t the United Nations Command \VaS erigaged in the prOd\\lC'110n of bacterial weapons for KQ~ was allegedly drawn from Japat1~se sources. The actua1 source of the rellort was a Soviet Unll4"t publication review'ed in Red Star, a Soviet Urdon newspaper, on 4 April and entitled~ "Bacterial warf~\re i8 a criminal weapon of the imperl.\list aggressors;' Thut was the dtle of the report in the Soviet Union press. In March and April of 1951 there were othe:r brief mentions ~"'lll'atory to a major charge on 30 April. Pravda :repeated the {aIse charge on 5 Ma)r and then on 8 May, ~ days 1ater) the North Koreans dutifully sent an official protest ta the United Nations [S/2142fRw.l]. But this campaign saon diee! out e..~cept in North Ko1'ea, whicll had ta justify a breakdo\vn of sanitahon and medical facilities and a smallpox epidemic. It was not tmtil 1952 that the heavy gons of Soviet Union proJXiboanda blasted out on germ "'mare. 82. ''The present campaign has been gaining momentum since 23 February, ,,,hen the official Moscow press repeated a Pekin~ radio broadcast charging that United Nations airerait had dropped genns on North Korea. There followed protests by the North Korean and Chinese çonununistforeim ministers) a sharp increase in Soviet Union press andradio comment, denundations by the Soviet Union-controlled World Peate Council, andst.aged mass meetings of protest in the Soviet Union. 83. My Govenunent and the United Nations Command ttalïzed. that the tha.rg~s aired in February 1952 portended· a •world-\'iide eatnpaign of far greaterscope than thesniping character of previous germ warfare ~ On 4 March the Se<:retary of State of the Unitèd Sta~ therefore said: Ullitl~l nuy sort of huct<.'rial warfare/' M. The (iovernmellt (lf the United Stntell takes this llccnllion herc\ ngnin tu rl'll('nt nnd t('ufl1rm this deninl. HS. Simîlnr Hat deuialB Wt\re made by the Secretary- <telwrnl (lf tht\ United Nations, Ily the United Nations Comtl.lnndl'r~in-Chil'f, hr. t'lw SC'.crt'tal'Y of Defense of the United Stntl's, and by llUllU'l'OUS ot11er responsible officiaIs of othcr United Nations Mcmherll) induding those contrihuting forcl's to the rcp111Biou of aggression in I{orea. AU of theRc IwrsollS were and are in a position to 1<now wlmt they are talldng about. Their d<'llials mny hurt the Soviet Union represelltatîve, but they cannot he vetOl~c1 hy him. 86. My Governmellt took further steps in an attempt to forcstall this cnmllllign of hate before it developed ta its present dangerous propul'tiolls. 8i. As soon as the campaign was launched, the Secretary of State challenged the communists to submit their charges ta the test of truth by allowing an impartial kr\lcstigation. On 11 March he requested the International Committee of the Red Cross, as a disinterested, international body, to dctermine the facts. This investigatioü, the Secretary of State said, would determine the extent of the epidemic then apparent1;v in progress in North Korea and wottld provide addibonal evidence of the falsity of the biological warfare charge. 88. To these ends, the Secretary of State emphasized the need for an investigation on both sides of the batt\e lines in Korea. A specific invitation was issued to the Red Cross investigators to cover the areas behind the United Nations lines. 89. The International Committee of the Red Cross agreed to set up a committee to make such an investigation, provided both parties agreed to it and offered their co-operation. The committee was to consist of "persons who will offer every guarantee of moral and scientific independence which could be offered by experts who have the highest qualifications, especially in epidemiology", and would a1so inc1ude, said the Red Cross, scientific experts proposed by Far Eastern coun~ tries "not taking part in the conflict". These are the proposais which the Soviet Union representative this aÎternoon, with effrontery, characterized as a plot to infiltrate intelligence agents into Korea. Itis dear trom this alone why the Soviet Union represeritative threatens the use of the veto) for with persons who will offer every guarantee of moral and scientific indepen~ dence, and scientific experts proposed by Far Eastern count1'Îes not taking part in the conflict - these are the procedures which the Soviet Union Government fears and would threaten to use the veto to prevent. 90. The Secretary of State, howev~r, at on~e accepted the offer of the International Committee of the Red Cross. 92. The Kremlin has often tried to divert and confuse public opinion b~~ seeking to destroy confidence in fairer methods of learning the t1'1.1th. The fairer the method, the more difficult it seems to be for the Soviet Union Government to nccept it; the worthier the organh:ation, the more vile their assmtlts against it. TIlt.'re is no e::;:cuse for these nttncks upon the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the Soviet Union pro~01\ndn mi11~ should not be permitted to grind IIp and destroy so valuable and important a sen'ant of the international community. Only five days before the Soviet Union Government denounced the International Committee of the Red Cross as n tool of the "imperialists", the communist newsoaper in Paris, l'Humm.itt\ itself suggested the possibility of a Red C1R~ investigation. The Intemational Committee of the Red CroSS was not etimperialist" thenJ because the communists had not yet labelled it sa. 93. Moreover, Red Cross societies in a uumber of the Soviet Union satellit~ States had themselves shown their respect for the Illtemational Committee of the Red Cross and their t:onfidence in it. On 6 March 1952J th~ Romanian Red Cross petitioned the International CQInnùUee of the Red Cross - and I quote from their petition- «ta make urgent approaches to the United States Government and the United Nations to the end that Immediate meaStlres would be taken" ta end the alleged use of germ weapons in Korea. 94. The Soviet Union-controlled Polish and Hun... garian Red Cross societies in February of this year made similar appeals and addressed similar petitions ta the International Committee of the Red Cross. 95. The Red Cross of communist Caina itself, .in 1951, addressed appeals to the International Committee ofthe Red Cross - the very organization which it now began to assault and seeks to undermine. 96. Tl:ùs rapid reversaI of attitude on the part of the international comtnunist movement toward the Red Cross is itself an exposure of the falsity of the germ warfare campaign, and to this exposure the Soviet Union representative has add.ooJ with contempt,. an attack upon the United Nations missions engaged in 97. Soviet Union propaganda, on the heels of United Nations denials and the requests for impartial investigatiO!l, at once began to push the campaign of hate and lies with intense vigour. r will pause long enottgh here to caU ta the attention of the Council that l am dealil?g' with statemel1ts made, charges launched and action taken by the Soviet Union Govemment. Soviet Union propaganda went inta full action at once. 9R. On 13 March, the day aiter the International Comlllittee of the Red Cross sent its communication to the communists, the Soviet Union authorities launched in :.loscow an organized mass meeting of "workers"- a mEeting which \Vas characterized by parràting of the charges in a manner designed ta create a bitter ane' burning hatred against the United States and the United Nations efforts in Koren. Typically, P.ravda on 14 March reported tJ,e following stutement made at a Moscow mass meeting: "Theil' (that is, the United States) barbarQus activities threaten the spread of terrible epidemics of fatal illness in countries of Asia and Europe. The peoples' conscience cannot recondle itself to inhumane and savage crimes of these misanthropists who defy elementary laws o{ general morality!' 99. The venom was being injected. The Moscow meeting formed the pattern for similarly staged sessiolis throughout the controlled world of international communism. The Moscow newspapers, Pravda and Izvastia, both devoted full pages on 14 March to the Moscow "hate" session and the Soviet Union radio gave far greater attention to the germ warfare charges than to any other item. 100. On 13 March Peking announced the formation of a so-called "investigation commission" care7ully seJected from among Chinese communists to ensure its pf.trtiality. Before it began its work, its Chairman ~no.unced that its purpose was "to gather the various cruuma!s faets on bacterial warfare waged by the American imperialists". That was the task announced by the Chairman of the commission before it began· its labours. On 14 March the Soviet Union representative, Ml'. Malik, made.a further move to enlarge the SCOpe of thecampaigl1 by introducing the charges· of germ warfare improperly in the Disarmament Commission of the United Nations.1 On 15 March the satellite Hungarïan Goverll1nent loyally echoed the 101. Another sc-called investigation was staged by a t'(lmmittee ta which the Soviet Union representative referred this nfteru(){)U, tht' International Association nf Democratie Jm:ists, \vhich 1 shall describe in a moment, This, as is knowtl, i5 another of the many Soviet Union front organi:latiotls. This group was sent out, acoording to P"wda. ou 4 March: Clin arder to investigate and estahlish the crimes committed hy the interventionists in Korea, in violation of aU international ag-reetuents l " That \Vas the directive to this group, and that directive was received while the group was in Soviet Siberia olt its wav to Korea. This commission \,~s made up of currt'titly faithful followers of the Commun!st Party line, althot~gh its chairman, one Brandwe111er~ \Vas a former naZi, as was another member) Dr. Melsheimer. lndeed, Brandweiner, the Chairman of the ~roup, \Vas not merely a Nazi Party memberhe was a member of the Reichswehrbund of Berlin. 102. In short, all the familiar e1ements of Soviet Union pro~O'Qnda are present in this campaign: the liuking of alleged Japanese bacterial warfare experiments with the United St~téS, t11.e charges of so~called ''''''al' crouinals"' and the demand for ~rials. the accusations of violating the Geneva Protocol ànd the Red Cross conventions, the so-called "eye-witness. ae- ~nts'\ the so-called "confessions» of United States prisoners of war who suddenly begin talking in the stereotyped e."\:pressions of marx,sm, the so-called ""scientific') evidence revealing the unnaturnl appearanœ of bugs out of season in unusual places, the a1Ilegedly "impartial» investigations by puppet groups, t'ile hoUo\\'" pr(ltests organized on a world-scale by commumst-front organizations. 103. These devices became increasingly apparent as fue.campaïgn gained momentum. In the last weeks of Marcl1 the Soviet Union propagandists concentrated thcir fire primarily on the captive. audience behind the Iron Curtain. 1t can he asSt1111ed that there was some degree of corrosion in the mindsof men and women hehind .the Iron Cttrtaïn, who bave so little opportunity for accr'.ss to the truth. A most ominous aspect of the campaign is its intensity within the So~et Union itse1f. 104. -VVe do not need the Chinese communists or fbe North.Koreans to tell us tbese facts•. 106. At the meeting of the Soviet Union-controlled World Peace Council Executive Committee in Oslo, Norway, on 29 March to 1 April, this year, Moscow gave the signal to open the major phase of the germ warfare campaign throtlg'hout the ~lon-communist world. The basic propaganda material was passed out either at Oslo or at the World Peace Council headquarters in Prague. To take just one example; the socalled "peace leader", the communist José Laris Massera of Uruguay, was summoned to Prague on 4 April and was given instructions by Soviet Union agents to wage an intensive germ warfare campaign when he returned home tû Uruguay. 107. From April to the present time the so-called "peace parthjans" have danced to the Kremlin tune. In each country - we have aU witnessed itthey hnve gone through virtual1y the same aet:·a national meeting, a series of local meetings, pamphlets, posters, petitions, rumours, statements by other front organizations, doctors, scientists, lawyers, and so forth; aIl the familiar communist fronts, stooges and war horses have been dragged out to support the germ warfare campaign. In a few countt'Ïes there have been added flourishes: in Brazil a travelling exhibit, modeUed after a .Peking show; attempts to introduce the charges iuto parHamentary bodies in Israel, India, Denmark, Brazil and Sweden; a "word of mouth" campaign in Iraq. At the same time the communist press in these countries has continu.ed to blare forth. 108. The parallel tactics of these so-called "peace partisans", and the repetition by communist newspapers throughout the world of stories and propaganda material first emanating from M:oscow, make clear the high degree of co-ordination and planning exercised by Moscow in the germ warfare campaign. 109. And ln the face of these faets the Soviet Union representative stages a sit-down strike here in the Security Council to prevent the Council from finding the facts. 110. The official Soviet Unio~ press and radio organs set the tone for the world-wide campaign of venom and hate. Typical of Moscow's words of hate are three recent statements in Pravda and Izvestia, the official organs of the Soviet Union Communist Party and the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union. From Pravda, 7 June 1952: "The idoologues of American imperialismcall for a haIt in the growth of the population in an countries, except the United States, and more killing of the living by wars, hunger and epidemics. And this isn't just a 'theory' of the cannibals. Theil' whole "The Amerknn t:atlnlhnlll are wnlking in the foot.. steps of tht.' hitlcrite plul1derer~. In Kurea they have killed hundn-d:> of tl'1ùUl!Il\nds of the peacefui mhabitants, indudil1j{ 300,000 children, Unleashing germ and dlcmÎcal war, the Atl1eri~an interventioni!1ts h<l.Vé tht' \vkkcd Olim of maldng Korea a dellert land, unlnhahited," ;~ain in l'rat'tkt 011 25 June 1952: "The Amerkan il1vade~ are using the most in.. hmuàu, barbarie meansof warta1'e on a targe. scale... "rampling on ~tleranr. recogni:ted international U~$s th~ A.m.erkatl mtIitlU'Y used crlminal, large.. stlÙè bacterial and chemical warfare.,.. bomba." 111. Mark the date - 25 June. On tbut SW11e date f<$t'tSM suid: "But. ,. this is a trifle oompared with the atro.. dties t() \\-'h1ch the United States interventionists re~'Ot'ted latet-the t1:nited States interventionists woo ~t their prèdec~ssors in internatiomü brigan.. d~, the hitl~!ite f~cists.,In I~o~ea and Nôrtheast L1nna, the Umted Stat'2S lmperutltsts used the barblarous oo(:terial weapon which i5 oondemned by the éntlre mankind and prohibited 1>y the Geneva Pro~ t0001 of 1925,>1 112, And 'On that same day, in the Security Councll [581.st and 582nd mel1tings], the Soviet Union repre.. sentative pretended that his Government saw no con~ nexÎQn bet\~'een the Geneva Protoooi propaganda ~ttempt and the false charges of germ warlare. liS. Thèse accusations have. been reiterated '. by the Sovid: Unionrepresentative in the Disarmament Com8 mission. Mt. Malik. on 9 April 1952. was not engaged in 3. sit-down strik-e in the Disarmament Commission; 'he '''"aS making the following statement2 : "Having launched a bloody war against the heroic freedom-Ioving Korean people, the United States a.ggressorsm the very first days of their nlU1'- derous adventure in Korea became guilty of atro~ citi-es :and l.mheard-of savagery towards that œuntry's .unarmt::d and peaceful population. After an their attempts ta break that heroit population's ti.ghting. spirit had failed. the United States aggressors committed a horrible.erime against peace and ~oainst manldnd, They resorted to the use, ir. Korea , and China) of the hacteria! weapo~ which lus long ken œnde111ned hy aU. civilized countries and na~ ti<ms as.sbameful and cril'ninal;' n4~ Do we need to invite the Cmnese communist réghne and the North Korean authorities to confirm to the Security Coundl that Mr.Malik made this sta~entthis false charge __ in the Disannament COUlmission Qn 9 April1952? 115. Moscow's direction and control of the enter- P~. is illustrated.· by an. event .at the beginning of ~y. The Krem1iu'spropagandists-realized that. a very ~(H.:nlled "evldence" fai' these jtt1'ists. The jui"Ïsts had 1Il'('11 phJviûed 0111y with the standard totU·s of bombedout a.t'eas il1 PYdtl!H'a11g and â few photographs, which wt'l't' ohvlously 111eanÎ11g·less. The Soviet U11iotl agents l'l·ttuested thek Chinese nud North KoreàU col1eagues tu get hus)' aud l'l'ovide a hlgher quality of propaganda. evitIl'l1ce for the SUt11111et phase of the gel'm warfare clul1palgl1. ,. 116. It was ouly a few daye ~ater t1tat Peldng an- 110unced the so-called tlclJufessionsll of two UlÛted Sttltes fliers. The so-càllE!d ItconfessionsH WE!re dletttted, if Hot Wi'itten, by souleone ohviously uufàlniHar with the EngHsh lauguage. For eXàmple, a photostat of a 1mudwritteu document called a f'confessiOl1" was pubtished lu the Paris newspaper Cé Soir ou 13 June, The title of th~ letter reads: "How l was fotced ta take part hi hacteria1 warfare by the US VVI111 Street'J. The last 1il1f~ <1f the photosta.t leUer reads:. "I was blamed by my Ctlt~sciellce al1d good wi11 fot the crh1les.u No AtlIel'Îtau would use these foi'U1S of speech. 'There are in these documents othet expressious typici:Û of the cOlnintil1ist propagtiuda Htle which we have heard so ofteil fto111 the Sl1viet tJilio11 represeutatJve il1 the Security Cou11dlJ whel1J befoi'e eugagJi1g îl1 li. sît-down sttikeJ he el1g&ged 111 the hit-and-ru11 tacHes of fa1se chafges. These phNtses to which r have referred would be fis li11fat1li1htf to the two ttviators as would the Russhttl 1ufiguage itse1f. 117. Such Soviet tJ11îon cyuicism about /fevidellce" ls Mt ul1usual. COlt11nUtlÎsts havealways had a repug11tlnCe for open legal inquiry al1d proceediug's. The glare tif open publicîty has had the effect of wilting' tne so~ca11ed "evidence" so carefu1ly mauufa.ctul'ed by SO'VÎet Unkm propagandists. 118~ l have not hesitated to repeat and rebroll.dcast these lies, these slanders, from Soviet Druon papel'S because ùf my confidence and certaint'v that no one free to think for himself would give thettl any credence. But the extraordinarily c1umsy nature of these attempts to fahricate evidence seems t!D me ta re'V'eal the Soviet Union'g contempt for the common sense oÏ rree men, 119. We do not need the Chinese cùmmunists and the North Koreans to sit at the Counciltahle and tell Us that. It is revealed by the actions of the Soviet Union Government itself. 120. In the original comtnupiêt broadcasts, each alIegedincident was described in detail. Reference haB been made by several represcntativeson the Security Council in the past we<;k or 50 to sorne of the items 121. We do not need the Chïnese communists and the North Koreans here to t~ll us what the Moscow radio broadcasts andwhat is printed in Pra7/da. Of c:ourse, as would be expected, aU indeper.dent scientists, inc1uding at 1east ten Nobel prize winners, ·have public1y expressed complete sc(~ptidsm of the charges. They have ridiculedthe t~les of spreading typhus and plagne through the !!led~um of infected Reas an.-t lice in the freezing winter tempe-ratures of K01."ea. 'illey have pointed to the establis.aed pattern of epidemics :n that part of the world, where diseases sucb as typhus and plague maybe exj:>ected to assume epidemic proportions un1ess the authorities are tireless jn cont'rolling theirnatural carriers. The Chief United Nations Public Health Officer in Korea, Dr. Feisal Cheikh El~Ard, of Syria, bas recalled the taskwhich h\e~nnited. Nations faced in combating disease in the Republic of Korea. He said: ., \ "Eighteen million people Were vaccinated against tyPhoi.d, 16 million against typhus, 15 milli.o.Il against smallpox, and 2 million· against cholera. . ' , ~1 "AIl this resulted in the deerease of victims of these epidemics from between 15,000 to 30,000 a mont1.l, to from 40 to 70 a month." 122. Dr. Feisal pointed out that the only North Korean comment on this life-saving work was a radio br()adcast saying tbat the.United· Nations forces were spreading gernis .,in South ..Kotea and that we were trying to·· kill the greatest numberpossibleof· that population. 123. It isl-ypical of the real United Nations attitude toward epidemics and disease that, when the charges ofbacterial warfare were·first made, the World Health Organization offered to provide.tecbnica1 assistance in controlling the reliorted. epidemics in North Korea. This offer was transmitted to. the North· Korean. and Chinese . communistauthorities in three. successive cablegramsby . the Secretary-General .of the United Nations. After one month of silence, this ot.:er of 124. If the Soviet Union Government had any regard for the truth, recourse to the Security Council wp..s always open to it. Instead, the Soviet Union repreSb.t1- tative brought the charges to the DisarmameIît Commission, which was not competent to discuss tllem under its terms of reference. In tlie Security Counei1, in contrast, he insisted, with a straight face, that his Government saw no connexion whatever between its germs warfare charges and its draft resolution on the Geneva Protocol. The distinction was not as apparent in Moscow. On 15 June Pravda stated that the United States "began ta apply the criminal methods of mass homicide condemned by all honest men and banned by international conventions on poisonous substances, bacterial weapons, and napalm". 125. The Moscow radio, on 23 June, stated: "The American militarists, as is known, have already brought barbaric germ weaporis into use against thecivilian !,1,j~'.1lation of Korea and China. It is impossible not to link these facts with the refusaI of the United States Government to ratify the Geneva Protocol of 1925." 126. On that very same day, 23 June, the Soviet Uuion representative was-saying in the Security Council [S80th meeting] that the two matters bore no relation t'J each other. l have already referred to the Moscow papers of 25 June again linking the two matters. 127. The Soviet Union p:-etence that its request for Security Council action on the Geneva Protocol has nothing to do with its germ warfare charges is also shown up by a request of its puppet organization, the International Association of Democratic Lawyers. At the Vienna session of the Association's Council, held 16 to 18 April 1952, it passed a resoltttion, including the following appeal to the Security Council of the United Nations: "We propose that the Security Council immediately consider the findings of our commission as well as other proofs pertaining to bacterial warfare." 128. In asking for an investigation of these charges, we believe that much more is at stake -than the establishment of their falsity. We arE: not asking mere vmdication of the honour and good name of the people of the States which compose the Unified Command in Korea. The history, of the States resisting aggression in Korea, the character of their people, and the nature of their gQvernments can withstand this type .of attaek 129. The strategy of aggression by lie demonstrates what can happen when a tyrannical State, possessedof modern means of mass communication, chooses to whip up hostility against freedom-loving peoples. Here is a case study of a means that are being used to a c1early 130. These charges are a qirect assault by che Soviet Union Governmentupon the Member States of the Ul}ited Nations who ha.ve sent their sons to protect the independence of Korea frtlm communist aggression. It i5 part of the campaign of lies which. the Krem- Hn leaders have waged ever since the unprovoked communist attack'f)f 25 June 1950 - a campaign which centres upon the big lie that the United States and the United Nations were the aggressors in Korea. It ls ~rpart o~ the canlpaign which pretends that the So':iet Union hastaken an initiative for peace in Korea when the truth is that. at each step and at every turn it is the United Nations which has taken the initiative for peace, whereas the Soviet Union leaders have aided in the aggression and have refused to say the word which could bring it to a haIt. 131. This is why, up t0 now, at le...,.', the So'-:;~: Unh:l11 Government has conducted this c,·mpaign, while using its power to stave off an impartial investigation into the facts. If what l say 1s not true, then the Soviet Union Govermnent must allow the investigation to proceed. If what l say is true, then we will witness here, as We have witnessed e1sewhere, a calculated attempt ta prevent· the worId from· determiningthe real nature and purpose of tl1ese baseless accusations. 132. The methods used to spread these charges are Mt unkIiown to modern· history. .. In .t1l~J)ast. .belli HjJ;1er ~d thfi.-.Soviet-BllÎon cautIiorities resorted to the ~~--aem)erate lie as an instrument of national policybot~ at Jme· and abroad. There is àn ominous simila.ritytlt.rt:ween the tactics used by the nazis and those of the ..Kremlin leaders. . 133. Thedraft resolution which l ha'vesubmitted to the CounciI, .and whichthe Soviei TT~ion representa.;. tivebas nowthreatet; ed to veto, is anhonest challeng-e tothe Soyie\~.TJnion GQvernment. Ravingbeencaught in a lie. itn:laybedifficult for thatgovernmentto a('.- ceptanirnpâ-rtial body which exposes. ifs con.spiracy. When. I-Ja}:è this prediction of eXPO$ure, it is be- éause tlJ:.e United Nations is charged with germ warfare, and we knowas a &tark{ad thaf no. such weapon hasbeenused, oris being used, by the United Nations in. Kor<;1q.or anYW~t1~re· e1at, .134. .Thef.orrtierUnite~ Nations commander, General .Ridgway,. sàid in Rome on 7 June: 'TkilOW of na better illustration of the deliberate use, of deliberatd.:' iabricatec1 falsehoods by como Î1mni~! leaders than theirchat'ges that the United ·'N'ati3,os ..···Command emp!oyed ger"1" ·\varfare in 135. Any truly impartial body will verify these facts. Rut if l may repent in different words a statement which 1 made a few moments aga, there is a much larger issue involved here. 136. Recently, in the official newspaper of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, Izvcstia, there was a front-page editori&.l which carried a message of hatred to the. peoples of the Soviet Union. The 'y'cry violence of the language is almost incredible. The United Nations Command in Korea - in Moscow they caU it the American Command - is accused of "utilizing the 1110st fantastic and revolting means lor achieving theiT criminal purposes". Speaking on behâlf of the Soviet Union Government, Izvcstia tells the Russian people, who have no access to the trnth, that the United Nations fortes in Korea have tortured prisoners with red-hot irons and forced them to sign, so-called "treasonable" statements in thdr o'vn blood. Tt is sinister indeed that a modern government, of the size and power of the Soviet Union, should be feeding its citizens on such raw poison. In this campaign, truth is the first casualty of a calculated . .:>licy of that State. 137. Nor is this campaign confined to the Soviet Union. As the source of lie::; that go out by conveyor belt ta communist parties round the world, the Soviet Union régime spreads this me~sage of hate far beyond its own frontiers. 138. We do not know where this policy of hate will lead the Soviet Union GovernmeüL Vve do know that the United Nations, and the world as a whole, must be vigilant and alE:rt to its effects. For it is a revoIt against the fundamental purpose of the Charter: to develop friendly relations among nations. 139. But the United Nations can deal with this threat to international pèace and security - a threat which ismade in Moscow. The charges have been sponsored and spread by the Soviet Union Government. That government has made allegations as to dates and places of so-called germ raids. The Soviet Union Government has 'co11?pired in fabricating arid publicizing so-called eviderice 'in. support of these charges. And the Soviet Union rE'Presentative engages in a sit-down strike here as a means of attempting ta evade discussingthese facts. 140. An impartial commission of investigation is the only means of getting to the bottom of these charges. If what we say about the campaign of hate is not true, the Soviet Union Gavernment can show us up. What we propose is an impartial investigation inta ë.le facts. We are confident that any such investigation will wreck tnehgerm warfare campaign. But. if theyrejeet the investigation, they_ wreck· the campaign justas 141. There is the challenge. Let them accept it in the name of the truth. 142. The PRESIDENT: l think the Council will agree that the moment has come when we might pro{it~illy adjourn the meeting- If theJ'~ is no objection to adjourning, it remains only to consider wheo we should meet again. l would suggest tomorrow at 3 p.m. It was so decided. The nHletïng rose at 6.35 p.1'n. SALES AGENTS fOR UNITED DEPOSI1'AIRES DES PUBUCATIONS ..UŒ-tIlU "EI.ftheroud.kls." tlon. "th~nos. ~lCA-~ Edilor:ol Sudomoricono SA, "Illno 500, eutnol Airol. "lb"tRA1IA- AtJmAlIE H. A. Goddord, 255e Geer<JO SI.. Sydn<lV. anIlUll-InIIQUE "gonco 01 MOllngerles do 1. PttuO S':", '4-22 1'\10 du p.~i1, Bnlxtll.l. W. H. Smith te Son, 71.7S Boulev.rd Adolpho·Mot. BMell... IOUVIA-IOUVIE Ubttrle SeleccionM, Casill. 912. Lo P.z. UAII1-IIESIL Uvrerle Agir, kil. 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