S/PV.606 Security Council

l calI uj?on the representative of the Soviet Union on a point of order. 2.. Ml'. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated fram. Russian): The Soviet Union delegation holds that the presidency of the Security COtUlcil cannat legally devolve upon the representative of the Kuomintang group, who does not represent China and whose presencein the Security Council is iIlegaI. 3. China can only be represented in the United Nations by a person appointed by the legal Government of China - the Central People's Government of the Peaple's Republic of China.

This point of order was raised a year ago when I in my turn became the President of the Security Council. I ruled then that it was out of order. Its repetitjon does not make i.t any more ~o~rect than on lthe previotts occasion. I again say that It IsùUt of order. Trlliute 10 the retiring President

It is my pleasure to express the thanks of the Security Council to Ml'. Santa Cruz for his distinguished services as President of the Council during the month of October. I now wish to caU attention to the fact that Ml'. Lea Plaza is taking the seat of Chile for the first time, as the alternate r~presentative of ChUe. It is mypleasure to welcome h101 to theCouncil table. 6. ~r. LEA PLAZA (ChUe) (t'ranslated fram Spamsh): On behalf of my delegation I should like 7. The Government of my cotmtry which recentIy came to power in accordance with the provisions of our Constitution tau1\: over the democratic rule of the Republic on 3 Novernber of this year and has appointed me to represent it in this important international body. 8. In the spirit of Chile's political tradition of peace and respect for international commitments, l have the honour to reaffirm its intention to co-operate in the work of the United Nations and in that of the Security Council, which performs the most important of all the tasks laid down in the San Francisco Charter. 9. May l express my best wishes to the President for his successful conduct of this Council's debates. Adoption of the agenda The lndia-Pakistan question (continued) LETTER DATED 16 SEPTEMBE'R 1952 FROM MR. FRANK P. GRAHAM, UNITED NATIONS REPRESENTATIVE FOR INDIA AND PAKISTAN, Ta THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TRANSMITTING Hrs FOURTH REPORT TO THE' SECURITY COUNCIL (S/2783 AND CORR.l) (continued) At the invitation of the President, Mrs. Pandit, representative Df India, and M1'. Graham, United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan, took place.!J· at the Council table. 10. Sir Gladwyn JEBB (United Kingdom): The object of my intervention this afternoon will be to explain as best l can the draft resolution which has now been distributed to all members of the Council in document S/2839, dated5 November 1952. In what l say l shall not, of course, be speaking on behalf of my United States colleague, who has associated himse1f with this draft resolution, but l hope that what l say will be agreeable to him. 11. Now that we are about to resume our de1iberations on the India-Pakistan question, l am sure of one thing: that l shall be giving expression to the views of most of the governments represented round this table when l say how deeply we regret that no solution has yet been found to the differences between the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan with regard to the future accession ·of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. 12. For its part, Her Majesty'; Government in the United Kingdom has always recognized the great delicacy of the issues involved in this question. At the same time, however, it has always been encouraged by the firm agreement of the two governments concerned bn the principles to be fol1owed in order to achieve a settlement. It has therefore always hoped, and it con- tinues most strongly ta hape, that agreement can be reached on how these principles can be put into e:ffect- 15. Before l do this 1 should like, if l may, to explain to ~he members of the Council the general considerations which have guided the United Kingdom as co-sponsor of this draft resolution. . 1~5. In the first place, we do not believe that this dtspute over the future accession of the State of Tammu and Kashmir can be left simply ta settle itself, 'or that the efforts of the United Nations to achieve a settlement can 111 any way be relaxed. It may be that there are some problems which can with advantage be placed on one sideand just allowed ta develop and perhaps come to a head in their own way. 1 do not know, b~t that may be so. But l do not believe, personally, that repre- 17. As l have already saidl the dispute over the future accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir is of a lcind in which the Security Council Qught to be able to be cf great assistance. The parties have agreed- and they have many times reaffii:'t11ed their agreement - to decide the future accession of the State by means of a free and impartial plebiscite to be held under the auspices Qf the United Nations. And l repeat that: "under the auspices of the United Nationsll • Can the United Nations, thereforel do other than continue to strive to create the conditions in which this plebiscite may be held? Indeed, the Jangerl which we aU have reason ta fear might arisc1 to the peaceful relations of the peoples of India and Pakistan if this question were to be shelved by the United Nations is enough to persuade us that there cau be - or there shoula be- no relaxation of effort on our part to bring about a settlement. 18. Of c01.lrse, the United Kingdom Government has in no sense closed its mind to the possibility of a seitle- ment of the problem on lines different from those which we :have considered in the Security Council up to now. We have always insisted that the solution to this problem cau come o!11y as a result of an agreement by the two govermnents concerned, and it would foUow from this, we should have thought, that if these govern- ments choose to reach a settlement in accordance with principles different from those contained in the two resolutions of the lTnited Nations Commission for India and Pakistan,. on which aU our recent action in the Security Council has been based, that sf.'ttlement would be none the less we1come. r am sure that l spe~'_for other representatives in the Security Council in saying that we d0 not reg<>rd ourselves as naving any monopoly of wisdom in regard to this problem and that any agreement h~tween the parties to.settle the dispute in any wny w~.dtever would be most we1come to aU of us. Neverthe1ess, the only agreement which has been p!acèd on recorci so far between th Governments of India . and Pakistan on this question is that container', in the two resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan. It is because the original agreement between the governments has, tJ..,.erefore, been to decide the future accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir through the democratk method of a free and 1mpartial plebiscite conducted U!1der the auspice") of the United Nations that the United Kingdom G<,'rernment has always ·lent Its support for a' s<::ttlem~nt on such lines. ThiS' we ..shaU continue to do un1ee~ there is, ~ud until there is, some indication from both governments that they prefer to work for a se~lement in some. other form. In drawing up a draft resolution ta place before theSecurity Council, therefore, the Government l represent .has, fa: this very reasonJ concentrated attention onresolving the main differences standing in the 'fV.ay .of ~greement between the two parti~s on the Jemthtanzation of the State and the holdmg of a plebiscite. . 19. Tshould now like to examine for a moment, if .l may; the extent to which Dr. Graham h?~' P~~Jl able 20. It has also been agreed that on the Pakistan side of ~:lC cease-fire tine the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals not normally resident in the State will have hcell withdrawn by the end of the period of demi- litarization. In faet, we understand tlmt this has long been the case. Nevertheless, we welcome also this restatemcnt of agreement by the two parties. 21. We understanci that they are further agreed that the Pakistan regular army nnits should be withdrawn frolU the Pakistan side of the cease-fire tine and that 011 the Indian side of the cease-fire tine the bulk of the T'ldian and State armed forces shonld likewise be with- drawn. These are the steps which the two governments concerned have agreed on as the method of reducing the'military forces in the State to whatevcr final figures they may determine between them. 22. Dr. Graham has also reported that they have accepted his proposal that demilitarization should be conducteG. in such a way as to involve no threat to the cease-fire agreement either during or after the demili- tarization period. This seems to us at any rate to be of great significance. If it is taken as a criterion in deciding the stages by which, and the extent ta which, the military forces on each side of the cease-fire tine should be reduced, it should provide a way of resolving at least the major differences of view that may exist 1::etween the two 'governll1ents. We believe that Dr. Graham, in suggesting the limits within which the final numher of armed forces on each side of the cease-fire line should be fixed, was guided by this principle. 23. If the two governl1!ents CGuld now decide on a final figure for the strength of their arll1ed forces within the limits suggested by Dr. Graham and, indeed, within . tJ.e limits which we have incorporated into our drait ~esolution, they· can, Wê think, assure thell1selves that, III spite of a considerable reduction in the strength of the armed forces on each side of the cease-fire,line, this ~eduction.wi1l,~t any .rate,. involye no threat ta the mtegrityor to tne security of the t.erritory on either side. 24. Therefore,it is our view that, withîn these limits, final. fi~ures for the strengthof the armed forces· on each ·stde of the cease~fire Hne can and shouldbe 25. The Knshnlir Militin and the Gilgit Scouts, which Ot."Cupy a spedal position, need not, in the view of the sponsors of this dmft re$olution - 1think 1am speaking fôr the representative of the United States tao - he inc1uded in the total of the forces to he detennined in accordance with the dmft resolution which we have tlOW jointly put hefore the Council. 26. 1 am sure that representatives have noticed with deep satisfaction the agreement recorded in the first of Dr. Graham's twelve proposaIs, namely, that neither govemment will resort ta the use of nrnled force ta settle this dispute. 1 believe that once some evident progress towards the organizntion of a plebiscite is achieved. the efforts of the people of Kashmir on bath sides of the cense-fire line ~nd, mdeed, of the peoples of India and Pakistan also, would he concentrated on the task of organizing the methods and procedures to enable the people of Jammu and Kashmir ta express freelv their wi~hes on the question of the accession, and that: once this stage was reached, the talk of war and threa.ts of war, which we have aIl sa much regretted in the past, would, as it were. become a thing of the pasto Of course, should there still be doubts on this score, l should hope that the parties would remember the pro- posaI which my Government and the Government of the United Stàtes put forward in the draft resolution of 21 Fehruary 1951 [S/2017]. It may be remembered that at that time we suggested that a neutral force might he usec1 ta fncilitate demilitnrization. If d'emiHtarizntion on the Hnes suggested by Dr. Graham and by our own draft resolution can be brought about, I do not believe thnt the device of a neutral force would in any sense be necessnry. Of course not. But, should the fear that demilitarization may lend to a renewal of conflict in .Kashmir still exist, perhaps we might, with respect, urge whichever of the parties feels this fear ta reconsider the proposaI·that a neutral force might then he made available. 27. In this way, therefore, we would hope that an agreement might at last be reached by the two govern- ments on the extent of demiUtarization i on the number of armed forces to be left on each side of the cease-fire Hne at the time when the plebiscite is to take place. Dr. Graham, in paragraph 38 of his last report [S/27831, observes that not only the number of armed force~bttt also their character remains ta he settled, whieh of course is true. On this questil)tl of the character of the forces, 1 would simply say that we would hope that agreement could quickly he reached, basp.d on the principle .I have mentioned earlier that at no stage should demilitarization involv~ a threat to the cease- fireagreement. This wouldmean that the forces of ea.ch side. of .the cease-fire Hne should be, broadly speakiugl of thesame kind. 1 should make.it dear that 28. In the draft resolution [S/2839] which the United Kingdom and the United States have placed before the Council, it is songht to concentrate attention on this one questiO:i1, namely, of determining fin::\11y the figures to which the armed forces on both sides of the cease-fire Une are to be reduced, It will he seen that the suggestion contained in the draft r~~lution is that the two govern- ments should negotiat~ 1irectly with each other to this end. We would hope that Dr. Graham will be ready to nssist the two parties in any way they may indicate, and we have framed the draft resolution so as to provide for this possibility. We would hope, however, that the Council will agree that at this moment the pdmary responsibility for working out an ;lgree.ment should lie with the two governments themselves. The United Kingdom Government, therefore, would earnestly hope that th6 Governments of India and Pakistan would each appoint representatives with adequate powers to enable them to negotiate a final agreement on demilitarization. In the draft resolution we have suggested that these negoti6tions should take place in New York. This seelns likely to be the most convenient arrangement since, after aIl, while the General Assembly is in session, the ministers and representatives oi the two governments who will be concerned with the negotiations al'e in addition likelJ.. to be engaged with the worIe of the General Assembly. ~ 29. It will also be seen that the draft resolution requests the two goverhments to inform ';he Security Council of the results of their negotiations within a period of thirty clays. In view oi the urgency of a solution and the narrow gap, as we think, to which the differences between the two parties seem to have been b!.'ought, the sponsors of the draft resolution believe that members of the Council will think it desirable that a further report should he placed before them within the period which we have indicated in the draft resolution. 30. Once agreement is reached on the level of the arnled forces nt the end of the demilitarization, surely it will be but a short step for representatives of the two governments, sitting in joint sessiûn .with military e:cperts, of course, ~ draw up a ctetailed programme of dlsbandment and Wlthdrawal. 31. The two governments have already agreed that s~cb a programme should he carried through within mnety days from the date of its signature. by them. Within a ·matter of months, therefore, we· tnight hope ta see the forces in Kashmir reduced to the level at wWh.ich a fair and impartial plebiscite could take place. Ithin a matter of months we might hope to see the Plebiscite Administrator formally appointed and estab- 32. SA near are we to a solution - or so it lleems to us - of this difficult and dangerous problem which has sa long exercised our minds and unsettled and weakened an extensive and vitally important region of the world; so near are we to a solution if only the spirit of compromise and the determination of both parties to achieve a settlement can be brought to grapple with the outstanding differences between them. 33. The sponsors of this draft resolution hope that there will he no tendency on the Dart of either of the two governments to go behind the âgreements enshrined in the two resoluticus of the United Nations Commis- sion for India and Pakistan which have been agreed on. These resolutions, as we think, contain all the elements of a settlement. Reinforced and amplified as they are by the agreements of the two governments to all but two of Dr. Graham's twelve proposaIs, they provide the Security Council and the parties with a framework on which to build, and they also provide certain agreed principles according to which that building should be done. 34. The ultimate objective of a fair and impartial plebisciteunder the auspices of the United Nations has, after aU, been written into solemn agreements by the two governments and endorsed by this Security Council. These agreements have be~'.n affirmed and reaffirmed 'by the two governments many times during the last three and a half years. The transformation of this agree- ment into the reality of the actual voting ought not to present insuperable difficulties. We have recently seen the tremendous achievement - if 1 may· say so, \vith respect - of the Governmcnt of India in organizing and carrying through a fully democratic election throughout its vast territory. From this great example it is clear that the will of the people of Kashmir and Jammu in this question of accession could be ascertained without auy insuperable difficulty. 35. Is it therefore too much to hope that the two governments can now resolve their differences and show by·example how the precepts which the United Nations frequently affirms can be put into practical effect and made the instrument of a political settlement which would not only satisfy the aspirations of the people of Jammu and Kashmir but wouldalso add greatly, as we l.Jll know, to .the happiness, prosperity and securîty of peoples throughout the free world? ,

As there are no other members who wish to speak at this time, 1 propose th9.t we should adjourn the: meeting. 37. We are not in a position today to set a date for our next meeting,. but most probably the Council will meet in.the course of the next week. The meeting1"ose at 4.15 p.m. SALES AGENTS fOR UNITID DfPOSnAIRIS DIS PUaUCATlONS lIAIlCI Edlllolll /\. P~.. ...rilV. IIIICI-IIICI ..S.fthll'Oll<l.lel.... Plac. tlon. Athin... AIIINtlNAlIOlNtlNl Editorl.1 Sudemeric.n. S.A.. Nllna soo. eu.nct N.... . lUSTlAlll-lUSTlAUI H. /\. Godderd. 255. Georga SI~ Svdn.v. IUtlUM- IUtlQUI • Ag.nco 01 Mouagerlo, d. la Preuo S.A.. 1'1-22 NO du P.~I. BNUUeL W. H. Smith .. Son. 71.75, boulevard Adolph..Ma.. Bruxell... 1IIl1'UlALA Goubaud & CI.. lId.~ 28, Gual.m.le. NAIn llbreirl. "II 1. COrey.II III·B. Port·eu.Prlnc•• 'OUYIl-IOUYlI llbrorl. S.locclono•• C••U'" 972. le PIL IIAIll- 'IISIL livrerla Agir. Ruo M..ico 98-8. Rio do Janoiro; Sio Paulo, B.lo Horizonl.. lIONllUIlS librer'a Panomoricen•• Ta,guclg.lpe. CANADA Ryttn,on Pre... 299 Qu••b SI. Wllt. Toronlo. INIlIl-INH Oaford Boole .. SI.Ilon.'Y Hou... Naw D.lhl•• C.lcullo. P. V.red.cho'Y & Co P~lodlca. '123'1 de la Roche. Monlrael. CmON-aYLlN The A..ocl.t~--l N.wspep.n of Ccvlon l! ' •• loko Hou... Colombo. SI~ Medre. 1. INDDNlIIl-INDONISII J'fos.n Pombargunan. Djokorto. CHILE-CHIU llbrorlo Ivens., Monoda 822. Santlogo. Edllorlol dol P.clfico. Ahumeda 57. Sanli.go. IIAN Keleb-Khanoh O.nesh. nUI. T.~r4n; IIAO-11l1 M.ckonzie·, Booleshop. CHINA':"'CllINI Tho World Book Co. lId.. 99 Chung King Ro.d. ht Soction. Talpeh. T.lwan. Commorclel Prau. 211 Honon Rd•• Shang. hel. IWU Blumll.ln·, Booksfor... Road. Tai Aviv. COlt/MlIl- COLOMIII librorle lelino. Carrara 6a~ 13.05. BogoiA. Ulirerla AmArico. Madeilin. Ubrtirla Naclonol L~da.. Bonanqulll.. conl llCA- COS'l·IICA T18iol Hermenct. Apartedo 1313. Son JOli. IJAlY-lJlUI Colibri SA.. Via Morc.1Il UIlIlllll-UIlIl libreiri. Unlvorsolla. BeVrouth. L11D1l J. Momolu ;<amora. Monrovia. CUd le Ces. Belge, O'Railly 455. le Hobono. LUX_DUn Ubralri. J. Schummer. aICllOSlOVlKll-'CHICOSLOVlQUII ClSkoslovon.k9 Splsov.t••• NArodnl TIlda 9. Pr.he 1. MUICO - MfIIQUI Edilori.1 Hermos SA. 41. M6alco. O.F. DINMlIIC- DlNIAU.iI! • Ein.r Munhgoord. lIcf.. N."og.cfe 6, K.bonh.vn. IC. NnNElLANDS-'lYl"lS N.V. M.rtinus Nijhoff. ·,.Grayanhag•• OOMINICAN REPlMUe-lIlPlII. 1IOMINlCAIIlI librer!a [)orninicane. Morcedos '19. Ciu· d.d Trujillo. NIW UlLANO - NOUVELLE-JlLANDE Unitod Notions Associ.tion land, C.P.O. 1011. Wellington. ICUlDOI-IOUlJEut _ • Libror!o Cionllfic•. '3uoVaquil en~ Quilo. NOIWU-1lOIVE01 Johan GNndt Tanum gushgt. 7/\. Oslo. EIYr'-IOUIt Librairie "la Renaissan.ce d'EgVpht." 9 Sh. AdlV Posho. C.iro. '''ISIAN Thoma. & Thom.s. Fort Ro.d. Kerochi. 3. Publishors Unilod lId~ lohoro•. n SllVlOOI - SlI.VlOOI . Manual Noves V Cio.. la. Avonlde sur 37. Son Solvador. IIHIOPIAnNlOI'l1 IIgonco Ethlopienno de Pubiic1l6. BOl 128. Addls Abobo. PlNAMl Jos6 Mon6ndo.. PI..od. flNLAND - flNLAIlIII llleofllmlnen Kirioleeuppe. 2. Keskusle.lu. Holslnkl. 'lIlIUAI Morono Hermonos, lIsunci6n. Orders and inqulrles from counlrles where sai. agenlll hClVlI not yet been appolntlld May be sent toI Sales and Circulalllrii Section, Ùnlted Nations, New York, U.S.A., or Saies Section, United Nations CHlce. Palais dlls ~btlons, ~n.~;: Swltzerland. Priee: 10 cents (or equivalent in other Printed in Canada