S/PV.607 Security Council

Tuesday, Sept. 16, 1952 — Session 7, Meeting 607 — New York — UN Document ↗ OCR ✓ 1 unattributed speech
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Diplomatic expressions and remarks General statements and positions General debate rhetoric Humanitarian aid in Afghanistan Peace processes and negotiations

NEW YORK
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The President unattributed #171060
Our distinguished colleague, Mr. Tsiang, the representative of China, presided over the Security Council during the past month. In expressing our appreciation of the manner in which he carried out his functions, 1 am not merely conforming with our usage. Mr. Tsiang's high inteUectual qualities, his extensive historieal and legal learning, the perfect dignity he has shawn in many different circumstances and his courtesy to aU deserve our esteem and friendship. In succeeding him in this office which has been honoured by his presence, 1 am happy to be able to express this esteem and friendship. 2. 1 call upon the representative of the USSR on a point of order.
1 cannot associate myself With the views which you have just expressed, since the USSR delegation has pointed out at a previous meeting that the representative to whom you have referred attends the Security Council illegally. 4. ~r. TSIANG (China): l wish to thank the PreSIdent for the very kind words he addressed to me at the beginning of this meeting. As to the remarks of the man from the USSR, it is evident that, with hi!> presence in this CounciI, it is almost impossible for this Important body of the United Nations to maintain the usuaI standards of dignity and civilization. Adoption of the agenda 6. It seems to me that the principles on which we are trying to proceed to assist the parties to carry out their Charter obligations are these. 7. In the first place, a lasting political settlement must be an agreed settlement. 8. Secondly, the Security Council will, we feel, always we1come any agreement which the parties themselves can reach on any basis which will settle the dispute, provided of course that that basis is consistent with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. 9. Thirdly, we feel that it is the l'ole of the Security Council to assist the parties in seeking to reach· agree- ment. In this case the Security Coullcil has made avail- able the services of Ml'. Frank Graham as the United Nations Representative. 10., Fourthly, we believe that agreement most fre- quently is reached step by step through negotiation and that negotiation involves an e1ement of compromise. Il. Finally, we believe that the Security Council should consider with care the views and the recommendations of its representative and indicate to him and to the parties its views on the positions he has taken. 12. With the permission oi the President, l should like now to examine the draft resolution [S/2839] before the Council in the light of these principles. 13. The draft resolution recalls the basic agreements which the parties have reached thus far, the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949. 1 These resolutions provideû that the question of the accession of Kas1.unir would be decided through a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices 1 For the text' of the Commission's resolution of 13 August 14. The draft resoh~tion before the Council goes on to recall the three resolutions of the 5ecurity Council during the period when Mr. Graham has been acting. Then it endorses the general principles which he has formulated and on all but two of which an agreement has now been reached between the parties. The draft resolution goes on to note that a plan of demilitarization is not now in existence because agreement ras not been reached on one issue. As the United Nations Represen- tative has narrowed the difference down to this one issue, we feel that it is quite appropriate for the Security Council to examine the ways in which the United Nations Representative and the parties have approached this issue. As a co-sponsor of the draft resolution, my Government's examination of this process and our reflection on Mr. Graham's views have led us to arrive at and agree with the United Kingdom Govern- ment on the document now before you. 15. After sixteen moni:hs of effort, of' wise effort, Mr. Graham is reporting that he has narrowed the problem down to the number and character of forces to remain on each side of the cease-fire Hne. He has put before the Security Council two methods, either of which might, in his view, hdp the parties to settle this issue: either the establishment of the number and character of larces to remain on either side of the cease- fire Hne; or the determination of these numbers as a result of studying criteria or principles. This means that the parties would consider why any troops are needed, what they are needed for, and in view of their mission, how many are needed. 16. The draft resolution, inits operative paragraph, urges the parties to negotiate for the purpose of reaching agreement on a specifie number of forces within certain bracketed ranges suggested to. them by the United Nations Representative. The draft resolution also urges tlle parties to negotiate, bearing in mind the principles or crit~ria which would lead to a decision on what the pr:ecise numbers should be. Presumably, we venture to think, the United Nrtions Representative suggested these bracketed ranges .of figures as a result of his own study of these principles or criteria which he later put to the parties. . 17. The United Nations Representative, Mr. Graham, reported to f~!e Security Council, on 10 October 1952 [60Sth meeting], that the parties had been able to agree on ten. points of his twelve-point programme and that thr dlfferences between them on the twelve-point programme had been narrowed down to one main point on which the whole plan depended. 18. Mr. Graham describes this - and l use his own words - as "the issue of the number and character of forces" to remain on either side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization. In l>Js third report to the Security Council [S/26ll and Carr.l], dated 22 April 1952. Mr. Graham recommended that 19. Mr.. Graham ha.s, from time to time, put before the Security Council various proposaIs which he has suggested to the parties during his sixteen months of devoted efforts. Originally Mr. Gl'aham left open, in the form of blank spaces to be inserted by the parties, the number of forces on which thev woul::1 agrce. On unother occasion Mr. Graham suggested that the numbers he arrived at by relating them to the propor- tion of forces as they existed at the tirae of the cease- fire and the cessation of hostilities. Agnin, more recently, he suggesteu on 1.6 July of this year [S/2783, anne:r 3]. certain brad<'eted numbers within which he recom- mended that the parties seek a specifie figure. After that he arrived at the point of suggesting, on 2 September of this year [S/2783, anne.t· 7], that at the end of the period of demilitarization there should be an armed force of 6,000 on the Pakistan si·:le of the cease-fire line, the tribesmen and Pakistan troops having been with- dra...m, and large-seale disbanding and disarmament of the Asad Kashmir forces having taken ",lace, while on the Indian side of the cease-fire line ther'~ should be an Indian army force of 18,000, including the 5tate armed forces. Mr. Graham also came forward with the sugges- tion that it might be helpful to the parties to cons1der theprinciples or criteria for arriving at figures, and thi~ he suggested on 4 September 1952 [51/2783, annex 8]. 20. . l think it is fair to conclude that in coming forward with these proposaIs, Mr. Graham had taken the advice ofhis milita!)r adviser, and that the numbers he has suggested a:i:e not guessp.s arising from some sense of politieal expedièncy. Rather, it is fair to view them as carefully considered suggestions of the United Nations Representative, bearing in mind the basic agreement of the parties heretofore reached in the forro· of the resoIu- tian", of " e United Nations CorntJ:lJssion for India and Pakist4.1~. Mr. Graham has emph'asized over and over again the importance of these agreements, the way in which they present problems whi~h will exist for bo~h parties at the· end of the period of demilitarization. In his most recent statement Mr. Graham tells us that there· is an agreement between· the parties.that on the F'aki.c:tèL.l side of the cease-fire Hne, the tribe~men and Pakistan. nationals not normally resident therein who have entered the state for the purpose of fighting will have been withdrawn, and that the Pakistan trvops Will havebeen withdrawn from the state. There is aiso an·ag":'eement that on the Indian side of the cease-fire line the bulk: of the Tndian forces in the State will have been withdr3.wn. He has suggested the various methods l have outlined f(~r assisting the parties to agree1)n what fotces shall rema.ln. 2LHaving considered the' United Nations Represeu- ta'tive's~refully formulated suggestions on this ques- tion,. ::tlldrecognfzing th~ considerable thought and .·~tIort tllat ''''ust·have gone into .J.rriving at ihem, the United Kil 1mand 'theTTnitcd. States Ghverrunenf;;, 22.. As the United Kingdom representative has pointed out [606th meeting], the Kashmir Militia and the Gilgit Scouts, occupying as they do a special position, would not he computed in arriving at figures within the range on which the parties are urged in our draft resolution to negotiate. 23. The ranges of numbers contained in the draft resolution were taken from the 16 July 1952 proposaIs of the United Nations Representative, on which the parties had agreed to go to Geneva and negotiate. 24. Thus, the co-sponsors, the United States ~.nd the United Kingdom, are relying upon a suggestion of the mediator, and for that reason the draft resolution, document S/2839, reads in part as follows: "... this number to he behveen 3,000 and 6,000 armed forces remaining on tL~ Pah~~tan side of the cease-fire line and between 12,000 ar.cl 18,000 armed forces remaining on the Indian side of the cease-fire line, as suggested by the United Nations Represen- tative in his proposaIs of 16 July 1952 (annex 3 of S/2783) ..." , 25. The Security Council will notice that the draft resolution urges the parties to negotiate "bearing in mind" the principles or criteria wbich the United Nations Representative suggested on 4 September of this year. The co-sponsors feel they are worthy of careful attention. 26. These principles, as they relate to .the point we are discussing, ~:e contained in annex 8 to the United Nations Representative's fOl.1rth report (S/2783). Paragraph 7 reads as follows: "7. Agree thatthe demilitarization shaH be carried out in such a way that at the end of the period referred to in paragraph 6 above the situation will he: "(a) On the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line: "(i) The tribesmen and Pakistan nationals not normally resident therein who had entered the State for the purpose of fighting ~il1 have been.withdrawn ; "(H) The Pakistan troops will have been with- drawnfrom the State; "(iii) Large-scale disbanding and disarmatrient of the Asad Kashmir forces will have taken place; so that at the enn of the period of demilitarization the..- shaU he the minimum nuniber of forces that <. required for the maintenance of law·andorder ar. Il(i) The bulk of the Indian forces in the State will have been withdrawn; CCCii) FUl'ther withdrawals or reductions. as the case may bl~. of the Indian and State armed forces remaining in the State after the completion of the operation referred to in sub-paragraph (b) (i) above will have been carried out; sa that at the end of the period of demilitarization there shall be the minimum number of Indian forces and State armed forces that are required for the maintenance of law and order and of the cease-fire agreement, with due regard ta the security of the State and the freedom of the plebiscite." 27. It will be recalled that the parties had agr~ed that: "... the demilitarization shaH be carried out in such a way as to involve no threat to the cease-fire ag ieement either during or after the period referred to in paragraph 6 above" (S/2783, annex 8, para. 8). 28. The parties had agreed to a revised version of the ninth principle, wbkh is firmly based on the two United Nations Commission resolutions, that: "... pending a final solution, the territory evacuated by the Pakistan troops will be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the United Nations" (S/2783, annex 8, para. 9). 29. 1 have t~ken the liberty of reading these principles or criteria because, in the nature of things, they must be the considerations which have led the United Nations Representative to arrive at the concrete figures he has suggested to the parties, including the range of figures concerning which we are urging the parties to negotiate. It will be noted that Mr. GrahamÏlas suggested as one principle here, as on previous occasions, that the large- scale disbanding and disarmame;lt of the Azad Kashmir forces will have taken place so that at the end of the period of demilitarization there sha11 be the minimum forces required for the maintenance of law and order and of the cease-fire agreement with due œgard to the freedom of the plebiscite. We haye accepted what we conchide .to be the view of the United Nations Repre- sentative that the forces - and that is what he ca11s them - which remain on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line should be those Azad Kashmir rorces which would remain after large-scale disarming and disbanding of the Azad Kashmir forces. We have also accepted the view of Mt. Graham that on the Indian side of the cease-tire line the forces should be Indian army forces and State armed forces. 30. The resolution of 13 August 1948 of the United ~ations Commission for India èlnd Pakistan provides m part: 33. He finally suggested that the remaining Asad Kashmir forces should be the minimum number necessary for the maintenance of law and order, with due regard to the freedom of the plebiscite. Thus, it is fair ta say that the United Nations Representative ccinsiders tha'; some Asad Kashmir forces would remain. The co-sponsors agrec with this position. 34. The United Nations Representative has specified what the function of these remaining Asad Kashmir forces would be. He has described it as "the maintenance of law and order and of the cease-fire agreement, with due regard to the freedom of the plebiscite". ' 35. As the resolution of the United Nations Commis- sion for India and Pakistan statp.s in the part which I have just read, these forces would be in territory evacuated by the Pakistan troops and administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the United Nations. Considering then what the functions of these remaining Asad Kashmir forces would be - as Mr. Graham has stated them - operating in an area ~vacuated by Pakistan troops, I think it is clear that they would he separated from the administrative and operational control of the Pakistan High Commando This position was apparently acceptable to the Govern- ment of P~kistan when, it indicated ta MT. Graham that it was prepared to accept, subject tt) certain observations not here relevant, his proposaIs of 16 Ju1y 1952. The draft resolution takes into accoùnf the con- clusion which the United Nations Representative had previously reached. 36. He also indÎcates that the role of the Indiaa army forces on the 11ld1an side of the cease-fire line would 37. It may weU be that the United Nations Represen- tative's assis~uce will help the parties in approaching these problems. Therefore, the operative paragraph of this resolution attempts to organize and put before the Security Council and' the parties sorne of the suggestions of the United Nations Representative on the one issue which aU are agreed is at the root of the problem. From what I have said 1 hope it is clear that the co-sponsors, like the United Nations Representative, have attem~ted to build on the United Nations Commission resoluttons and at each stage to narrow rather than to broaden the areas in which agreement is thus far lacking. As the representative of the "C'nited Kingdom has observe,d, we hope that there will be no tendency on the part of either of the two Governments to reopen questions already agreed on under these resoluti0ns. 38. We have attempted to put before the parties sorne oi the wisdom and sorne of the suggestions of the United Nations Representative and ta urge th'*U to negotiate to attempt ta reach a solution. We have asked them to provide the Security Council with their own account, in their own words, of where these negotiations lean them. We have done this because we see in this case an element of urgency-. It is a case which, as M:r. Graham stated to the Security Council on l(} October [60Sth meeting], should not he allowed to drift lest the parties and the organized society of nations should find them- se1·...es in a position of greater dang~r. 39. In the areas of agreel11ent thus far reached, the United Nations Representative, by formulating his proposaIs and by' his negotiations,. has, in the view of my Government, assisted the parties. The draft resolu- tion does not in any way impair or limit Mr. Graham's .authority under the previous Security Council resolu- tions, and we expect and hope that he will continue to exercise his functions under them. Therefore, the draft resolution not only expresses the gratitude of the Security Council to him but requests him to continue to make his services available to the Governments of India and Pakistan. It also endorses the principles on which hehas sought to bring about agreemf'..nt. 40. In conclusion, 1. retutn ta thegeneral principles with which I began my statement. This draft resolution offers to the parties.an opportunity to arrive, by their negotiations, at a settlement of .the final issue now standing in the way oi the demilitarization of the St.ate and the planning for a plebiscite, including the induction into office of the Plebiscite Administrator. 41. The settlement itself, when it cornes, will be the result of ftee.agreement by the parties~hernselves. Tl.le Securi.tY Council a\.:d the United Nations:Representative can simply assist ~he·.parties in reaçhirtg .agreement.• 43. Of course, the numbers of troops which we have urged the parties to negotiate on, and the criteria which we have urged them to bear in mind, are not now agreed on by them. If such agreement had, happily, been reached, there would be no occasion. for this or any other draft resolution except, perhaps, an expression of gratification for a solution reached. Negotiation must, in the nature of things, involve the element of 'give- and-take and the possibility of compromise. VVe have attempted to restate in the draft resolution an appre- ciation of the 'riews of the United Nations Represen- tative about how such compromise might be brought about. 44. The United States. takes seriously the view of Mr. Graham that there is danger to us aU in allowing this case to drift. As the representative of the United Kingdom put it, we cannot leave it to settle itself. 45. AIl Members of the United Nations have an interest in seeing this dispute settled peacefully. The United States, for itG part, feels that it has more than an interest in the matter: it has the most earnest desire to see the two great States of the subcontinent join together to assure their mutual peace and security as well as their mutual prosperity. 46. These two ).lations have much more in common than the fRet that they are neighbours. vVhole areas of understanding between them should and, we believe, will exist once this dispute has been settled. Leadership . and statesmanship by the Governments of India and Pakistan can bring about that result which we devoutly seek. 47. 1 have no words to match the eloquence of Ml'. Graham, and 1 take the liberty of conc1uding with a quotation from the statement he made in the Security Council a year aga [570th 1neeting, paras. 66 and 70] : "The opporttmity in time and place is for the leadership on the subcontinent, tested in the struggles and sufferings for the human liberty of 400 million human beings, to help prevent the destruction of human freedom and the self-destruction of civilization by setting challenging exatnples of demilitarization, ··The subcontinent is the place for a timely example of demilital'Îzation and of self·determinatian. Naw is the time far the dedicated leadershi~ af two great peoples to rise to the caU of their splritt.ml heritaç:e, the responsibility of their power and the appartumty for their greatness ta give in Il dark world challenging examples and fresh hapes ta the peoples in the unresting adventure af the human spirit, through the United Nations, in the long pilgrimage tawards a freer and fairer world, in answer to the prayers of the people for peace and freedom on God's good earth." SALIS AGINTS fOR UNITED DIPOSI1'AfRiS DIS PUBUCArlONS UIIIl1lIlA- AlttIImlII Edlf<:lrl.1 SucI.me.tçen. SA, "lllnt 600, BuenOi "tfll. AUmAllA-AUJOoUIl H. A Eioddercl, 255. e,orQt St~ Svc/n.y. anill/M- an.1 "gençe et M.nellerle. d. le 1'rttI. SA. 1~2 rut d~ ~rsll. 8n1XtHtt. W. H, Smith le Son. 71.75 Bour.val'd Adolph••Mli. Bruull... lIOlIVIA-IIOl.IYlI L1bttrl. S.leççlon", Colme Vn, la Pe:, 1IA!l1-1IIISl& L1v••rle Açlr. ItUe Motço 98.8. Rio dt oIenell'o. WWIA Ryerson Plwt. 299 Ou..n St. Wtlt, Toronto. 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The agenda was adopted.
The meeting rose at 4.30 p.m.
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