S/PV.620 Security Council

Friday, Aug. 21, 1953 — Session 8, Meeting 620 — New York — UN Document ↗ OCR ✓ 2 unattributed speechs
This meeting at a glance
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General statements and positions General debate rhetoric Security Council deliberations War and military aggression

NEW YORK
Symbols of United Nations documents with figures. Mention of such a symbol document.
Les cotes des documents de l'Organisation lettres majuscules et de chiffres. La simple qu'il s'agit d'un document de l'Organisation.
The French illterpretation of the statement by Mr. Charles Malik (Lebanon) at the 619th meeting u'Os gwen.

Adoption of the agenda

The President unattributed #172443
The provisional agenda for the 620th meeting of the Security Council is before you in document 5/Agcnda/620. Since there is sorne objection to the adoption of the agenda, the Council must, at this present stage, confine its proceedings ta item 1 of this provisional agenda. That is our parliamentary situation. 2. 1 wish, however, to remind the members of the Council that yesterday afternoon [619th meeting) the representative of Lebanon moved that, in conne.xion with item 1 of this provisional agenda, representatives of thirteen States he given a hearing. 1 therefore think that statements covering either the adoption of the agenda or the invitation to representatives of thirteen States or bath are now in order. 3, Does the representative of Lebanon wish ta <peak on a point of order? 4. 1\1 r. Charles 1\1:\LI K (Lebanon): It may be considered a point of arder, if the President wishes to treat it as such. \\'hat 1 want to S.1Y is simply that as the representative of the United Kingdom said yesterday that he might have something to tell us this afternoon, it would be onh' fair ta listen to him and ta other members of the l'ouncil who may wish to speak before we take up the question whether. we should invite the other th,rteen .\s'an and .\tncan Powers. 1 think it would be Pf('lll'f at this moment not
l have a point of arder arising out of that point. l simply wish ta say that l am perfectly prepared ta give my views on bath points raised by the President, if that is his desire. If, however, the President thinks it definitely better ta keep the procedural point for sorne later stage, l shaIl abide by his decision; but l should like sorne indication of the President's view.
The President unattributed #172452
l tried ta make it clear that statements dealing with the adoption of the agenda, or with the invitation ta the representatives of the thirteerr Sates or dealing wih bath in one statement are aIl in order.
In passing on the question of inclusion of this item in the agenda we must decide whether the developments in Morocco constitute a situation the continuance of which endangers the maintenance of international peace and security. We are not asked ta express our position on colonialism. or on other similar questions, important and appealing though they may be. The United States of America is certainly one of the greatest examples in the worid today of a country which has successfully freed itself and helped to free others from a colonial status. We applaud the fact that in the brief time since the United Nations came into existence 600 million people in the non-Soviet worid have won their independence - just as we deplore the fact that in the Soviet-dominated world a comparable number of people have lost the reality of independence. vVe have recently publicly applauded the announcement made on 3 July 1953 of the French policy of complete independence for the Associated States of Indo-China. We look for increasing selfgovernment in Morocco and elsewhere. Such are our sentiments. But it must be obvious ta anybody who· looks at the facts candidly that the situation in Morocco does not in fact en'danger international peace and security, just as it must be clear ta anyone who surveys the United Nations candi'dly that the surest way ta undermine the position of the Security Council is ta divert it from its primary mission of maintaining the l:reace of the worid and use it instead ta deal with all sorts of other questions under the pretext of safeguarding international peace and security. 1I. In his statement ta the Council yesterday, the representative of Lebanon referred to the interest of the United States in peace in Morocco. Of course we are interested in peace in Morocco, and 1 would add that we are also interested in the well-being of the people of Moracco. Our interest in peace, however, is not limited by place or time, nor is it greater in one area than in another. The United States record in that respect speaks for itseH. It is precisely because of our profound interest in peace now and in the future that we cannot pretend that a threat exists when as realistic men we believe the contrary. 12. It is our conviction that the situation in Morocco does not endanger international peace and security, and we therefore shall vote against placing this question on the agenda. 13. Sir Gladwyn JEBB (United King-dom): Many of us here will recall that in April 1952 r574th meetillg] the Security Council was faced with a situation very similar ta that which now confrants us. A number of Arab-Asian delegations then called to the urgent attention of the Council the situation in Tunisia which, they claimed, seriously endangered the maintenance of international peace and security. On that occasion, Professor Ahmed Bokhari, who presented the case on behalf of the Arab-Asian delegations, spoke with emotion and, indeed, with great brilliance. Illness has unfortunately robbed us of his presence today, and although he and 1 would certain'!y have argued diametrically opposing theses, 1 am sure ail my colleagues will agree that the standard of our debate can only suffer through his absence. 1 know also that ail my colleagues will be with me in sincarely wishing him the quickest possible recovery, 14. It will be rernembered that the Securitv Council decided [576th mcct;'lg] in the Tunisian cise not ta place the item on its agenda. This does not in itself mean, of course, that we should automatically take the same decision on the item which is no\\' before us. It does not mean that, but in our "iew there is, after alI, a close parallel between the two cases and it should require, 1 submit, new and convincing reasons ta persuade the Council ta reach a conclusion different from the one which it reached just over a year aga. 15. As in April 1952, we are today concerned solely with the procedural question whether or not the item should be placed on our agenda. The sponsoring delegations have asked the Council urgently, as they say, "ta investigate the international friction and danger to international peace and secunt)''' cause<! by 18. Indeed, members of the Council will recall that duringthe seventh session of the General Assembly the United Kingdom delegation expressed the view that the questions of Morocco and Tunisia were outside the competence of the General Assembly. Our views were fully expressed, in particular, by Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, our Minister of State, who has iust left us, in his speeches on 6 and 15 December 1952.' In short, our view was that these questions were not international in character, but were matters of domestic concern to France, in which the United Nations is not entitled to intervene. 19. That view is based on the special relationship of Morrocco ta France existing under the Treaty of Fez, the validity of which has been recognized by both the Permanent Court and the International Court of Justice. The chief characteristic of that relationship, for present purposes, is that the sole and entire conduct of the external affairs of Morrocco is vested in France. 20. The effect, internationally, of this special relationship - the effect of the fact that France does conduct the external affairs of Morocco - is necessarily to place the relation's between France and Morocco on the domestic, and not on the international plane; for if they were on the international plane, France, having 21. Sa we suggest that the relations concerned are as much on the domestic plane as are the relations, for instance, between two states of a federal union or between a federal government and a constituent state. The fact that Morocco is a State or even, as it may be said, .. sovereign State, makes no difference ta this position, because it is only partly sovereign. The sovereignty is Iimited and limited precisely by the Treaty which, by giving France the sole conduct of its external affairs, necessarily places its relations with France on a plane which is not the international plane. 22. It follows, therefore, that a difference between France and Morocco, if any should exist, would not have any international character. Accordingly, it could not lead to international friclinn, nor is it likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. 23. Yesterday the representative of Pakistan complained that Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter had been "overtaxed". My delegation, on the contrary, believes that it has not been treated with sufficient respect by organs of the United !\'ations. We think in fact, the exact contrary. We do agree, of course, that it should be read within the entire framework of the Charter, but that does not mean that we should ignore the injunction which it contains. Surely we should not. As has often been said before, the opening words of paragraph 7 of Article 2 c1early show that, sa far from being subject to other provisions of the Charter, it is an overriding stipulation. It states: "Nothi.ng c~~tained in the present Charter shall autbonze ... 24. Leaving aside for the moment the question of competence, let us examine the facts of the situation in Morocco. 1 find it ven' hard ta see in that situation any danger ta international peace and security. 1 agree with my United States colleague on that. 25. The internaI position in ~[orocco has sa far heen calm since the new Sultan was proclaimed. If it had not been calm, there wnuld still not, in our view, be any danger ta international peace and security. 1 would even submit that there is a close relationship between the degree of friction in ~[orocco and the degree of international interierence in lIIoroccan affairs. The proper function of the Security Council, we think, is to deal with any real or potential threats to international peace and security. Basically thi, question does not concern international peaœ and security. It is a political issue concerning the interna! affairs of a certain temtorv. The Council was never intended 5 26. Finally, we should ask ourselves what practical good would be achieved by discussion of this item in the Counci\. The delegations which have proposed it have at heart, just as we all have at heart, the interest of the Moroccan people. VITe all wish to see a peaceful settlement and relaxation of tension in that country. In the view of my delegation a Council debate will certainly not achieve that particular purpose. Experience has shown, unfortunately, and has shown in the last year, that United Nations debates on' bath Tunisia and Morocco are usually accompanied by immediate outbreaks of violence in those countries. This, l helieve, is by no means a coincidence. Let us therefore act with restraint, and let us not forget that words spoken by us here may mean perhaps tears and bloodshed there. . 27. During the Council debate on Tunisia in 1952 l urged that our discussions should he based on reason rather than emotion [575th meeting]. l said then that Her Majesty's Government would be the first to admit that national feeling existed in many dependent territories and that existing systems could not in these days of technological and educational advances be maintained precisely as they were. l said that then and l repeat it now. l think, in fact, that ail these arguments hold good today. Progress towards selfgovernment must be peaceful and orderly, and it can rarely he attained at one bound. Interference by the United Nations may well retard rather than accelerate such progress and also, l regret to say, provoke the very international friction which it is intended to allay. Such, we believe, is the case with the proposed item before us, and my delegation will accordingly vote against its inclusion in the agenda. 28. If l may, and in order to get it off my chest, so to speak, l wi1l make a few remarks about the other item on which the President said we might legitimately comment, namely, the presen'ce" or possible presence at our meeting of the signatories of the original request [S/3088]. which was, as l understand it, fonnally moved yesterday by ML Malik, the representative of Lebanon. The effect of adopting the suggestion at the present stage of our discussion would he, of course, to invite thirteen countries who are not members of the Security Council to sit at this table and to express their views before the agenda is adopted. 30. That latter case is, of course, in many ways similar to the proposai before us today, and my delegation can do no more than repeat the arguments put forward at that time, which, as is known, were actually endorsed by the Counci!. 31. In other words, our first task, which should take precedence over everything else, is to decide whether to adopt the agenda. This is strictly a matter of procedure on which the Council alone must decide. As 1 have said before, we would indeed be creating a dangerous precedent if the Council had to cali on nonmembers to help it make up its own mind on this procedural point. 32. In the second place, 1 have no doubt that, if the representatives of these thirteen countries were now invited to the Council table ta make statements, wc should inevitably be extending the debate far beynnd the immediate question of the adoption of the agenda. We have already heard lengthy, powerful and exhaustive statements by the representatives of Pakistan and Lebanon. 1 find it hard to believe that additional statements by thirteen delegations would produce further substantive arguments on the particular matter now at issue - although, to judge from a previous experience of this sort, 1 fear they might weil raise contentious issues which wouId only provoke further comment and reply. \\Te would indeed find ourselves engaged - and this, 1 think, woulcl be inevitablein a protracted debate on a subject which the Council as a whole will, 1 hope, consider unsuitable for inclusion in its agenda precisely hecause it considers that a debate woulcl do more hann than good and because, as 1 have already said, it is not ,vithin the Council's competence to discuss the question at all. To that extent, the view of what 1 feel is probably a majority of the Counci! - that the matter should not even be put on the agenda - wouId c1early be frustrated in aclvance. 33. For ail these reasons, 1 would urge that effect should not be given to the request of the thirteen countries [5/3088]. 34. 11r. HAl\lDANI (Paki,tan): l ,vish to thank Sir Gladwyn Jebb for his "ery kind and sympathetic sentiments with regard to Professor Bokhari. 36. We think that the States Members of the United Nations which have shown such deep concem in the grave situation in Morocco have a right to convey their point of view to the Security Counci!. It may be said that the delegations of Pakistan and Lebanon have adequately expressed what the thirteen nations could have to say. So far as my delegation is concemed, we think that it would be extremely immodest of us to presume to speak adequately for other nations, however f1attering that presumption might be to ourselves, and we must state emphatically - recognizing our limitations in speaking for others, although we may think alike - that we do not accept such a responsibility. 37. vVe were amazed at the attitude of the United Kingdom delegation, which would wish to deprive thirteen States Members of the United Nations of the right of speech. What are these thirteen Member States going to speak about? They will speak about the gravity of the situation in Morocco and the necessity of the Security Council's discussing this question. 1 hope that members of the Council who oppose this motion do not imply that thirteen fully f1edged Member States of the United Nations will not be able to make a valuable contribution. This would obviously be insulting the intelligence of those thirteen nations, and we do not think that in voting against this motion anyone would put forward that reason. 38. What is the case for voting against this motion? Is it that the members who will vote against it have already made up their minds about the matter before us and will shut their ears - none of them will, of course, allow their hearts to interfere - to any cogent arguments which the thirteen Member States may put forward? 39. We believe that the surest way to vitiate the Security Council's usefulness is for members, especially the permanent members, to allow extraneous circumstances to influence their judgment rather than to decide on the basis of the discussion of a matter in the Security Counci!. If, in this case, they will allow themselves to make up their minds on the basis of discussion in the Security Council as to whether the item should or should not be placed on the agenda, then, obviously, a discussion must take place before they can make up their minds. We consider that principle to be one of the fundamental principles of the United Nations and to conititute the only realistic and honest approach to the problem. 40. If, then, our decision on the matter of the grave situation in Morocco is to be based on discussion here, why should we not make that discussion as comprehensive as possible and allow the thirteen Member States to participate in it? 1t must not be forgotten that among the thirteen nations asking to speak are such worthy States as Burma, India, Indonesia, Iran, SALES AGENTS FOR UNITED DEPOSITAIRES DES PUBLICATIONS FRAIlCE Editions A. Pedone, Paris V. GREECE-GRECE "Eleftheroudakis," Place tion. Athènes. lRGENTllll-ARGENTINE Editorial SudameriCIlM S.A.. 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