S/PV.622 Security Council

Mr. President, l wish to thank you sineerely for your kind and courteous expression of appreciation of my. humble services during the past month. . Adoption of the agenda

The Security Council will now continue to discuss the adoption of the agenda. 4. Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): We have heard a number of statements sa far on this important question. For my part, I am still studying thé statement of the representative of France [619th 1ne'eting] and, hecause of its. particular importance, I do not wish to comment upon it at present. I shan reserve my right to do 'So at a later stage in the proceedings. At this point, however, I wish to take up the interesting s!atements made by the representatives of the United States [620th meeting], the United Kingdom [620th 1/leetin(q])!11d Greece [621st meeting], which indeed merit attention and, on the part of my delegation, some comment. I shall begin with the statement by the representative of Greece. 4. glais) de ma de importance commenter faire formuler ressantes sentants Uni ces attention de .déclaration 9. Now l come ta the remarks made by the representative of the United Kingdom. l am sorry that he is not present today, but l at"il sure lyfr. Crosthwaite, who represents him, will also faithfully represent us here to him by passing on to him whate\ ~r comments we have upon his point of view. 10.· It was very interesting that the representative of the United Kingdom, Sir Gladwyn Jebb, referred [620th mleehng] , as we all remember, tu precedents in the history of the Security Council, as indeed he should, being an Englishman who, in many matters in life, must go by precedent and tradition. He referred to the Tunisian case. He said that there was some similarity between the present situation and that case. Then, when he spoke about the request of the thirteen States to he heard" by the Council, he referred to three previous cases where similar requests, he -said, had been tumed down. He seemed to argue from those precedents that we could at present dismiss this request. . Il. However, with every respect for the empirica1 British approach to things on the basis of precedent, it is obvious that precedents by themselves prove almost nothing. Now, precedents are importantfar he it from me to deny their importance - but, and this is the important part, they are not decisive. In ail faimess to him, l think that Sir Gladwyn did not contend· that they were decisive. He used the argument based on precedents to strengthen and reinforce other arguments based .on principle. 11. rique, que rien. moi là pas qu'il argument forcer 12. critère à que Et quoi presque du 12. What is decisive in any silbmission is the principle of selectivity, the motive, the present interest which leads to the singling out of certain precedents rather than others~ It happens tha:t'we are dealing \Vith a long history of the Security Council. And just as you cau prove almost anything from the Bible or from Aristotle, so you can aImost argue from any precedents that exist in the history of tue COunai beeause it abounds in such preceQents. 13, comme de 13. l made a little research myself, just as Sir Gladwyn Jebb did, into the history of this Council. 1 now find that l can adduce precedents that are 14. 1 refer in the first instance ta the famous case 'Submitted in March 1948 with respect ta the item on Czechoslovakia. l do not know how many of the gentlemen here were then on the Council but 1 am sure that Mr. Tsiang was and that he will remember what 1 am about to read. 1 want these precedents ta be noted by the United Kingdom delegation sa it can ren1ind Sir G!adwyn of them. 1 anll sure that he would have convinced me far more yesterday had he said something about what 1 am going ta read ta you now, ta the effect that it is true that these other precedents exist but that he also thought that what he read ta us was more important. That, 1 think, would have been far more convincing. 15. In any event, at the 268th meeting of the Security Council on 17 March 1948, when the question of the inclusion on the agenda, of the item proposed by Chile concerning Czechoslovakia waS being discussed, the representative of the United Kingdom - 1 think it was Sir Alexander Cadogan-said [268th meeting, p. 94]: "It is true that the representative of the USSR has said that this charge is pure invention, unfounded assertion and gross slander; but that is no reply, and 1 should have thought that the proper thing for the Security Council to do would he to investigate this grave allegation, and give to those who have made it a chance of substantiating it and, ta the Soviet Unioo, the possibility of refuting it. l shall, therefore, give iny vote in favour of inc1uding this matter in our agenda." In that debate, if you substitute for. the word "Czechoslovakia" the word "Morocco"; for the word '''Chile'' the wards "fifteen Asian and African States"; and for the Soviet Union, which was then objecting, the 'lame of our distinguished co1J.eague, the representative of France - if you make these three simple substitutions, 1 assure you that everything in that argumen~ would apply, mutatis nmtandis, to our present argument. Consequently, although Sî-r Gladwyn did not quite use the words"pure invention, unfounded assertion and gross slander" with respect ta our allegation, his predècessor did use these words with respect to a comparable allegation tha,t was made in 1948, and he conc1uded that the on1y reasonable thing to do was to inc1ude the item in the agenda of the Security Coundl and to have the two 'sides debate their points of view. 16. At the same meeting, .the representative of Syria stated [268th meeting, p. 95] : "Without studying the matter, however, the Security Council cannot formulate a1W opinion on the question of whether the change in the Government of Czechoslovakia reprèsented a spontaneous movement by the people themselves and their political nature contraire, vues. manque a 18. sentant savoureuse. déclaration eu ce du texte dans sation que des paroles: 17. Then, 1 found a very interesting quotation by the representative of Colombia on that occasion - and this may interest the President because Colombia had a representative on the Council at that time. 1 must confess that 1 do not know what the position of the President is as yet on this matter. At the same time, however, 1 think this is illuminating to him because if his position is as 1 hope it will be, this will reinforce it; if it is not, it might cause him to change it. At any rate, it is interesting. The representative of Colombia said [268th meeting, p. 95]: "1 am substantially in agreement with what the representative of the United Kingdom said in favour' of including this item in ·the agenda of the Security Couucil." 18. 1 now come to the representative of France. This is still more exciting. Mr. Hoppenot will pardon my qùoting it in the English version because 1 am sorry that 1 did not have enough time to carry out my investigation to the bitter end by quoting his very words in French, but 1 think this is ciear enough for l have every confidence in the authenticity of the translations that are made here in the United Nations. l shall quote now what the representative of France said then [268th 'meeting, p. 98], and 1 am sure that sorne of Mr. Hoppenot's associates ,vill remember this event: "More than once already" - and 1 think it was Mr. Parodi who spoke these words - "when dealing with questions which arose earlier, we have had oocasion to discuss whether certain matters should he induded in the agenda or not. We had this - discussion, for instance, on the occasion of a complaint which was made by the Ukrainian SSR itself regarding the Greek question. At that time also one of the members of the Security Council objected to the inclu;;ion of the question in the agenda. The position which 1 took then, and which 1 see no reason to alter today, was that, to be discussed, a question must first be inc1uded in the agenda; and if it is contended, as the representative of the USSR contended a moment ago, that a complaint submitted to' the Council has no facts to support it, we must still be able to examine it to find out whether or not that is really the case; to do that, we must first of aIl inc1ude it in the agenda." - 21. l know very well what Sir GladWYn is going to answer tomorrow - or perhaps Mr. Crosthwaite will· do it. They are going to say, "Precisely so, we are not dealing with two Memhers of the United Nations here. vVe are still dealing \Vith an internaI problem within the exclusive jurisGiction of France." And sorne of the gentlemen who .are probably going to write a brief are nodding their heads there behind Mr. Crosthwaite. l know that very weIl, but we are not denying that; we are saying that this is a problem that raises issues of international peace and security and we are affirming it; you are denying that. Therefore, the rest of the argument of the representative of'tneUnited 'States wOllid apply perlectly to this <.Hfference between what you affirm and what you deny. The representative of the United States then said [268th meeting, p. 99] : 1 1 "Consequently, in arder to he able to determine whether the case cornes within the meaning of Article 2, paragraph 7, the Security Council must consider tlie Chilean complaint." That is to he done in order ta he able to determine whether it cornes under Article 2, paragraph 7, and we must first include it on the agenda of the Security Caùncil and examine it. l think that this applies to our present case perfectly. 23. émane Nations Charte, menace c'est le a ensuite une sur 24. difficultés, connaissent lités sentant Conseil, si pays recommande ration 25. l'affaire au certaines sécurité, [559èmc Unies ou latent menace je rité une 26. déclarait de les C'est l'inscription le comme uniquement savoir noncer questions 27. occasion en de déclaration intéressante cation peJ.t ment quées, "In this case these conditions are clearly fulfilled. Moreover, inclusion in the agenda merely settles the question of admissibility and in no way prejudges a decision on the substance of the question, or even a decision regarding the competence of the Council. 24. Small States usually do not have the e~tan~le­ ments and the preoccupations and the comphcations that usually occur to the minds of representatives of States with greater responsibilities. When, therefore, the representative of Belgium spoke here, he spoke \Vith such clarity, without any complications in his rnind that 1 think aIl of us who belong to smaller countdes should profit from it. 1 commend, i~ particular, this statement .to my colleague the representative of Denmark. 25. But that is not aIl. We all remember the case which the United Kingdom urged upon the Council with respect to Iran, and here 1 wish to make a few quotations also. At the 559th meeting of the Security Council, the representative of Ecuadorstated [559th meeting, :.pa.ra. 5]: "If a Member of the United Nations submits a complaint regarding a situation or· an action whicb in its view contains an inherent danger and may cçmsequently threaten international peace and security, l do not see how the Security Council can refuse to include sucb a complaint in its agenda." . 26. At the same meeting the representative of India slated [559th meeting, petra. 40]: "Even to decide the issue of competence, of jurisdiction, we should have all the facts from bath sides before us ... My delegation is therefore in favour of includîng the item in the agenda... my delegation's vote is not to be taken as a vote on the question of competence but only on the issue of whether we should discuss the subject for the pUt"pose of deciding the question of competence, as weIl as any other questions that may be involved." 17. The representative of France said at that time 1559th mei8ting, paras. 26 and 27] : ttSeveral delegations have already spoken in favour of including in our agenda the complaint made by the United Kingdom" -what is given here is most Interesting because it is so devoid of any extraneous complication, and it is in the purest ~ogical fonn in which the matter can be put - "regarding the failure by the Iranian Government·to comply with the provisional measures indÎL.:'.:ed by the International Court of Justice on 5 July 1951. On the "Do many Frenchmen seriously believe that they can educate young Moroccans in the ways democracy and simultaneously stop the march time in Africa? Or that they can permanently save French residents from the aspirations 'of the proletariat they have created by backing e1derly feudalists like the Glaoui? Or that they can rule by fO'r~e 100- je1tre a territory that contains five NATO bases run by the United States Air Force?" That expresses, not official United Kingdom opinion, obvionsly, but the opinion of a very respectable British journal. 34. l should like now to say a few words about statement which Mr. Lodge made to the Council the other day [620th ml$eting]. l shall deal first with the negative side and then with those parts of statement which should he emphazised and about which the whole world should know. 35. On the negative side, Mr. Lodge referred candour and to realism. He said that, in aU candour and reaHsm, he found in the present situation Morocco no international complications of such character as to warrantthe Security Council's being seized of the problem. We disagree with Mr. Lodge's judgment. We have given many instances of ~omp1i­ cationsinconnexion with the present situation which, it. seems to us, prove that this is precisely one of those cases which should he taken up by the .Security Couneil. 36. l shouldlike ta read excerpts from articles which have appeared in newspapers since Mr. Lodge spoke. l hope that, after l have read and commented on these articles, Mr. Lodge. and his associates. will reconsider their position on the matter. For, again based on principle of the open mind, it may he that they will change their minds and vote for the inclusion of this .item in our agenda. We are not aiming at a simple majority in this case;we desire a unanimous decision - including the vote of the representative of Francethat the item should he included in the agenda; are aiming. as high as that. l think it could harm one if this item were if' Juded in the agenda and fully discussed by members of the Council. 37. Thefollowing statement appears in the 29 August 1953 issue of The New York Times in a dispatch from. Casablanca by the Associated Press: "United States militaryauthorities have doubled the guardsaround three American jet and figh1er 38. It would seem.. then, that there are international complications of such a. character as to invohre peace and securit<; throughout the world and that Mr. Lodge did not take these facts into account when he made his statement to the Council. 39. l should like to quote a,nother article in The New York Times - this time a dispatch from Cairo by the United Press, appearing in the issue of 31 August 1953: "The Council of Ulema of Al Azhar University, a powerful Islamic group, cal1ed today for a complete economic and social boycott of France and all who supported· French policies in Morocco. The Council said French policy in Morocco would force Moslems throughout the world to wage war against Franœ with every' means at their command.': s'il 40. Those facts are intel'esting; they are relevant to our present case; they are what we have in mind when we speak of the international complications in this question which Mr. Lodge should take into account in deciding for or against the inclusion of the item in the Security Council's' agenda. 41. The last article on the Moroccan situation to which l should like to refer - l shall not read it out, but shall only bring it to the attention of members of the Councilappears on page, 2 of this moming's New York Hemld Tribune. 42. If the United States delegation will earefully ponder ·those facts, it will realize the validity of our argument that we are dealing with a situation which, from the international point of view, is dangerous arid abnormal. . . 43. l now come to certain statements by Mr. Lodge which we must emphasize and for which we are grateful. Mr. Lodge said [620th nz.eeting, pMa. 9]: "The United States is certainly one of the gi"eatest examples in the worId today of a. country which has s~ccessfu1ly freed itself and helped to free others from a colonial status. We applaud the fact -that ir.. the brief time since the United Nations came into existence 600 million people in the non-Soviet world haYe won their independence... We have recently public1y applauded the !announcement made on 3 July 1953 of the French policy of complete independence for the Associated'States of Indo;.China.. Wé look for increasing self-government in Morocco and elsewhere. Such are our sentUnents." 44. l think it is only fair toemphasize th~e words of the United States representative, to have the whole ,,:orld ponder them, and to ask Mr. Lodge, through hls· representative here, to do everything in. his power 46. 1 said that my delegation was completely openminded· and, if 1 may, 1 should like to quote what 1 said from the verbatim record of yesterday's meeting.. 1 said that we were champions of the prlnciple of the "open daor", but 1 was careful enough to add that "the open-daor principle implies a corollary and is contingent upon a condition siM q1œ non!'. 1 then continued [621st meeting, para. 6]: . "That condition is a reasonable expectation that the application of the principle to a particular case in a particular 'Set of circumstances will prove beneficial to the case the consideration of which bas been requested." 1 stated further [para. 7]: "Thus, with regard to the concrete case hefore us, we have already listened to views squarely in opposition ta the opinion held by the fifteen delegations, which state in their letter [Sj3085] that we are faced with 'international friction and [a] danger to international peace and security'. We cau thereforecertain1y expect that, were the Moroccan case to he p1aced on our agenda, the tone of the discussions regarding the Security Council's competence would reach such a high pitchas to preclude the possibility of. achieving a positive solution in the following stage of our procedure." 47. As for the interpretation to he given to Article 12, paragraph 1, of the Charter, 1 am in complete agreement with Mr. Malik. 1 certainly agree with him that "while the Security Council is exercising, in respect of any dispute or 'Situation the functions assigned to it in the present Charter," the General Assembly, although it cannot make any recommendations on that

Among the valu&.1->le statements WB have heard 'So far~ we find the stah.'- ments of the representatives of Fr-aIlce, the Uniteû States ... of America~ the United Kingdo!!l; and the Union (\~ So',iet Socialist Republics~ who are not only permanent members of the Security CDuncil but are aIso signatories to the Act of Algericas of 1906. On açcount of their position of great responsibility and their abiding interest in anything that concerns avons socialistes Morocco~ their valuable statements deserve most carefuI consideration. Yet, the difference i,n the approach of these delegations to the problem of Morocco wi11~ l am sure, not go unnoticed. j~en 49. Let us consider first Mr. Lodge's statement. He said [620th meeting~ pQJYa. 9] : 49. Il séance, Il ••• we must decide whether the deve10pments in Morocco constitute a situation the continuance of which etldangers the maintenance of international peaœ and seeurity." 50. 'This is exactly our point of view. We were therefore very surprised when Mr. Lodge said he was going to vote against the inclusion of the item in the agenda. Surely everyone acquainted with the procedure of the United Nations knows that the item is inc1ud~ in the agenda for the very purpose which he recommends, name1y~ to decide - l repeat, to decide ~ whether the subject-matter of the item constitutes a. . situation the continuance of which endangers the maintenance of international peaœ and security. The United States' vote against this item would have the effect of saying that it is not necessary for us to decide by discussion whether the events in Morocco constitute a tt;reat to intemat~onal peace. and security~ but prim'a jaCte, we must assume that they do not, and therefore the United States will not even vote for discussion of this item, that is, for the inclusion of the item in the agenda. 50. avons-nous Lodge question avec est comme - constitue risquerait internationales. cription équivau:dtait par sentent nationales, qu'ils pour pour qu'elle 5.1. We are now trying to' show the inherent incon- 51. les diction gation. déclaré ~lstency between what Mr. Lodge has declared his mtention to be and the action which his de1egation will take. We shall presently show tha.t had Mr. Lodge said that he would bar diScl1ssion of the item, whatever its merits, it woul4: have been a more· forthright expression of his stand, although completely oppose4 to what the United States hasstood for in these seven. years of the United Nations. question~ présentés~ encore que Unies. 52. Mr. Lodge bas also said [620th meeting, pOlYa. 9] : 52. par. In other words, he applauds the liheration of the people of Indo-China from the yoke of the foreiglomination of France and aImost in the same breath ignores the people of Morocco, who, though valiantly struggling to throw off the same yoke of domination do not even deserve a hearing in the Security Council because, to quote him again, "the situation in Morocco does not in fact endanger internati:>nal peace and security" [620th meeting, para. 9]. 53. People are likely to interpret this attitude to mean that because the Communist element in Indo- China rose in arms for its liberation, the United States is prepared to recognize the deep-rooted and human feelings of the Indo-Chinese people for freedom, but because the Istiqlal Party fer Moroccan independence has categoricaUy dissoci~ted itself from any Communist inspiration, the United States is not willing to recognize the brave and glorious struggle of the people of Morocco and of His Majesty Sultan Mohammed V, who has been deposed. Nothing will please us more than to he assureà that this intelpretation is not the correct interpretation. 54. We have taken a deep interest in what Mr. Lodge had to say hecause we had great expectations; we had faith that the United States would support the people of Morocco and in this we were strengthened by the knowledge that the people of this great land, the people of the United States, are whole-'heartedly in sympathy with. the' unhappy people of Morocco. Our faith in t!J.e support of the United States arose also for another reason - the history and tradition of this great people. . 55. Take, for example, that heartening document the . Amerieat1. Declar",tion of Independence, which is nearly a century and three-quarters old: "W;.;hold these truths to he self-evident, that aU· men are created equal; that·they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." These are prerogatives that a man inherits, that he hasbeen endowed with. It is a definition of man's rights, when they ,,'ere cnunciated and for aIl time to come. 56. Nearly eighty years thereafter, o"'e of the ~test Americans, Abraham Lincoln, said that these words gave promise that in due time the weights would he lifted f!"Om the shoulders of aU menand-that all should have anequal chance. 57.' In the middle of the Second Worlrl Wal the Atlantic Charter promised, ainong other things, that afterthe war had been won'and peace restored. all men shnuld live under the form of government that they freely choose. 58. Then came the Charter of the United Nations, which reaffirmed "faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and. worth of .the human person, in the 61. Mr. Johnson, another distinguished representative of the United States, discussing the complaint of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic against Greece in September 1946, said [59th meeting, pp. 175 and 176] : "The position of my Government has, consistently, since the organization of this body, been that the Council cannot deny to a Memher of the United Nations who states that a condition exists which is likely to threaten international ~ce and security, the opportunity to present its case. My Govemment attaches importance to that principle!' 62. Again, speah.ing on the Chilean complaint regarding the violation of Czechoslovak independence by the USSR, Mr. VVarren Austin said. [268th meet'ing, p. 99]: "A decision on the question now pending is not a decision on the substance, and it would not constitute a judgment upon the merits of the question. But when a question is raised., as it is here, whether an item should he placed on the agenda for discussion or not, there must he a consideration of the character of ..the question in order to learn whether the competence of the Security Council reaches the item." Mr. Austin went on to say [p. 100] : "Can the Security Council evade or avoid the responsibility that is placed upon it to give these charges a hearing - aIl of them? For these reasons, the United States wiII vote to place this item on the agenda." 63. When we compare the attitude of the United States in the Security Council in the cases cited above and its attitude when the question .of Tunisia was considered in the Security Council in April 1952, when it abstained, and today when xt declared. that it would vote against the inclusion of th~ matter before us , concerning Morocco, we cannot help wonderirig at the radical change. \Vhen one compares the previous cases with those of Tunisia and Morocco, one notices the significant fact that whereas in the earlier cases the United States was opposed to the view of the USSR, today it is France which is in the position of the USSR. 1s one, then, to infer that had the USSR înstead of France attempted domination over Morocco, "We, as a people, never have acquiesced and never will acquiesce in the enslavement of other peoples. Our Nation, from its beginning, was and is inspired. by the spirit of liberty. We do not accept or tolerate captivity as an irrevocable fact which can he finalized by force or by the lapse of rime. We do not accommodate ourselves to poIitical settlements wmch are based upon contempt for the free will of peoples and wmch are imposed by the brutal occupation of alien armies or by revolutionary factions who serve alien masters ... "President Eisenhower proposes that our nation should reaffirm its awareness that the struggle in the world today is, above all, a moral conflict. We propose to attest our fidelity, without compromise or vacillation, to the principles of honor and political freedom upon which the nation was founded and which had made us always the dread of the oppressar and the hope of the oppressed. We propose, in the spirit of the early days of the Republic, to do what we peacefully can do, in order ta revive the hopes of those now enslaved. "This resolutibn is. no calI ta bloody and senseless revolution. On the other hand, it is no idle gesture." 65. We have drawn attention to the lofty ideals for wmch the United States has always stood sinee it attained its independence. Mt. Lodge has also reiterated the anti-colonial ideology of the United States. We have also shown what the policy of the UtÜted States bas been with· regard to the. inclusion of any item in the Security Council's agenda. Yet - and this completely bewilders us - the United States today is acting in a fashion contrary to these great and noble avowals of policyby supporting the dominatipn of Franee in Morocco and not allowing an adequate discussion of the question in the Security ·Conncil. 66. l should like~n9'ALtQ. !pfer 1:oJhe-Statement made by the UtÜted Kingdom representative [620th meeting]. l shall not dea.l with that statement in as much detail as l have dealt with the statement by the UtÜted States representative, sinee we helieve that our appeals, base<! on however good a case we may have, will yield no .results, sinee the United Kingdom delegation haJLalreadymade up its mind, rightly or wronglywhatevcr our estimation......,. and will doggedly adhere to its decision. In passing, .however, we must say that we disagree with the United. Kingdom. delegation a§ r~r<is its~.S?IlteI1:ti0:t1.that }1ff~ir§jn Moro.cco of the IBulktin of the De/Jartmetlt of State, vol. XXVIII, No. 715, Mlli"ch 9, 1953, pp. 372-3. . 70. The United Kingdom representative wams us that debates in the Council would be accompanied by an immediate outbreak of violence. According to this postulate, the Security Council should seldom take cognizance of any situation, because one of the parties, in a dominant position, could always take caver hehind the fear of inciting an outbreak of violence soniewhere. 71. While drawing a close parallel between this debate and the one which took place on Tunisia, the United Kingdom representative observed that it should require new and convincing reasons to persuade the Council to reach a different conclusion. Between the two debates, the General Assembly at its s~v-enth session not only decided, by an overwhelming majority, to include bath the Tunisian and Moroccan questions in its agenda, but debated the substance of both questions and adopted resolutions on them. Would l, then, be lacking in courtesy if l asked the United Kingdom representative to act upon his own dictum and give some new and original reasons,in addition to Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter, for not inc1uding the item in the agenda? 2 Case concernil~g d.ghts of nationals of the United States of America 1:» Morocco, Judgment of August 27th, 1952: I.C.!., Reports 1952, p. 176. 74. 1 should like now to refer briefly to the state~ ment made by the distinguished representative of Greece. That representative draws a line of demarcation hetween the Arabs and the Berbers and reaches the conclusion.that 70 peI' cent of the population is Berher.lt is surprising that the intermingling of the Arabs and Berhers for the last thirteen centuries has still left distinguishing marks of their separate origin so that some members of the Council cau tell the difference between: the various strains. 75. The representative of France, in a very able speech which, in our opi'lion, was mostly substantive rather than procedural, would have us - and, through us, the worldhelieve his account of events that led to the present situation. vVe would gladly do it but for some material lacunae in his statement. According to the French representative, a numher of caïds and pashas - varying in numher from 270 to 356 - who were executive and judieial officers appointed by the Sultan, that is, civil servants of the State, mad~ one or two petitions to the French Government hearing upon the competence of the Sultan, namely, that he failed to he arbiter above an factions and, secondly, jeopardized the Muslim faith. 76. The French representative would have us believe that these civil servants were truly the spokesmen and leaders of the people, while other reports say that most of them were illiterate and, in the performance of their judicial duties, were advised by French officers who not on1y acted as public prosecutors but also advised on the sentences to he meted out. 77. The French representative déclares that the French Government responded to the appeal of the Sultan under article 3 of the Treaty of Fez and acted as mediator between the two opposing parties, namely, the legally constituted spiritual and temporal head· of the State, the Sultan: nn the one side, and the civil servant El Glaoui ..ml his band, on the other. He further daims that the French authorities put pressure .on .the Sultan, constantly advised the Pasha; and at lea:st three times mediated with the Pasha. On one occasion the Resident-General managed to dissuade the Pasha from immediately deposing the Sultanwhich would mean that· the French Government 78. In this lucid account by the French representative, we do not find anywhere any mention of the role that France played - the role of the protecting Power under the Treaty of Fez. There is no mention of what it did or did not do. 79. To he quite logical, on the same. analogy, if any other political party in Morocco - for example, the Istiqlaltomorrow petitions the French Government, the French Government and its representatives in Morocco will do no more than try to mediate between them, thus giving them a status of equality. In other . words, the French Government will at once r~'}gnize the two rival parties of unequal status and put the Sultan, so to speak, in the dock, and then perhaps arrange for his personal safety and disposal out of the country. But this is not such a hypothetical question. It actually did take place when the Istiqlal petitioned the French Government on 11 January 1944. But with what result? Banishments, massacres etc. Strange1y enough, now when another political faction submits a similar petition, it receives a status of equality with that of the Sultan. 80. Vve have an authentic document here in which a caid who signed the petition against the Sultan' confesses that he was compelled to do 50. 1 quote from the document: "Praise be to' God and His Blessings be on the Prophet Mohammed. "Written on the 13th of Shaoual 1372 - 25th of June 1953. "To His Majesty Sidi Mohammed Ben Youssef, symbol of Moroccan unity and of national sovereignty, may God save him for the good of the nation: "Sire, "l, the undersigned, regret to bring to Your Majesty's attention that the local authorities have forced me to sign that ill-omened petition against Your great person. l have signed it against my will. Therefore, 1 raise my voice in protest against the acts of the Administration, and thereby 1 add my voice to thoseof the Moroccan people in denouncing and protesting against the conspiracy which was 81. Now 1 come to t1lis interesting implication in Mr. Hoppenot's statement. Here was El Glaoui, with, admittedly, a backing of 4,000 men, and, on the other hand, the entire might of the French army in Morocco, which we believe is not less man 100,000; and we are told that El Glaoui with his band, of whom we believe only a 'Small fraction is armed, intimidated the total French forces in Morocco. We are not prepared to helieve that, had the French authorities desired, they could not have very quickly extinguished the so-called revoIt of El Glaoui and his henchmen, when they could so ruthlessly put down popular risings with tremendous slaughter and bloodshed, as they did in Casablanca 'Sorne time ago. 82. Mr. Hoppenot has deeply touched our hearts by his statement [619th meeting, para. 7]: "1 shall suppress every reaction of a Frenchman who, every day, sees the work done by ms country in Morocco for over forty years misunderstood and its intentions travestied." 1 do not think that Mr. Hoppenot has denied anywhere that there has heen martial la~ in Morocco for· forty years. Are we to understand, then, that this good work done by France had to be thrust on the unwilling people of Morocco by military measures? Surely this goodness of France has miscarried somewhere; otherwise l am certain that there would have been no movement in Morocco to oust the beneficient French Administration, nor would it have heen necessary for the Sultan to be deposed. 83. As wè have already said, we have nothing but admiration for Mr. Roppenot's intervention. Take, for example, the modest, forthright and fair statement made by him [619th meeting, para. 18] : "As France's attempt at mediation unfortunately failed, it was inconceivable that the Government of the Republic should resort to force to impose on an entire people the domination of a sovereign whom it had rejected". " ... to impose on an entire people... " , in our opinion, is gem and worthy of wide quotation. Who are the "entire people" on whom the decision was to be imposed? Admittedly, El Glaoui and ms clan. So far as we know,:there are no elections or representative legislative assemblies of the democratic type in Morocco. The only vocal party which claims to represent 90 per cent of the M;oroccan people is the Istiqlal. We know that the Istiqlal wasdefinitely - and is definitelyagainst the French policy in Morocco· and is paying heavy price for its opposition. Does the Government of France imply that El Glaoui and his band represent Morocco? If the Sultan was 50 unpopular, .why is it that the gaols ure full of his supporters, and his detractors are not only allowed to go free but are feted, decorated, and even put forward as representing Moroccoand its people? 84. The representative of France, in all seriousness, has suggested .that it would be an irresponsible act 87. I should like merely to tell the Couneil that I have been authorized by General Guillaume to deny in the most formaI manner that any appeal to the United Nations or ta the Security Council was transmitted to the French Resident-General either directly or indirect1y, either personally or through an intermediary, by the Sultan before his departure from Morocco. 88. Mr. KYROU (Greece): l am very sorry to intervene again, but l shall he very brief. My friend from Pakistan, in his polite and quiet manner, took exception to the percentage - 70 per cent - of the Berbers in the Moroccan population wmch l gave in my intervention yesterday [621st l1U!etin'g]. l took this figure from the same .urticle in The Eco1tmnist of London of 22 August which Mr. Hamdani quoted at our meeting on 26 August [619th meeting] and which Ml Malik quoted today.. I did that because I share thcil" respect for the impartiality and the objectivity of this London periodical, and at the same time, because l thought that this percentage was better and more impartial than other percentages which l have found given in dictionaries. For example, in Colliers Encyclopedia. of 1950, the percentage of Berbers in the population of Morocco is given as 85 per cent. But what l did in my intervention yesterday, if I rnay quote myself again, was to put the question [621st meeting, pœra. 131 : "Why should we not bear in mind thé fact that 70 per cent of the total Moroccan population consists of Berher elements, whose chieftains are not - to say the least - always of the same opinion in matters 01 allegiance as the population in the plains and the dties?" . ! did not refer ta the opinion of the Berbers, whether lL1 favouT of or against the former Sultan or in favour of or against the present Sultan. 91. l should like to know the views of memhers of the C-'uncil on this suggestion. 92. Mr. HOPPENOT (France) (translated trom French): The French delegation has no intention of making another long speech. It desires, however, an opportunity to study at greater leisure than tonight will afford the two statements made today by the representatives of Lebanon and of Pakistan. If 1 may say so, 1 expect that those two representatives have more or less got everything off their chests and that the only remaining speakers are the President and the representative of Chile. If that is -so, then 1 should think that with a little goodwill aIl round we could finish tomorrow afternoon. 1 sincerely hope that we shaH not he given the extra burden of a morning meeting, which might deprive sorne delegations, and would certainly deprive the French delegation, of the time necessary to prepare for the final debate. 93. 1 therefore ask that our next meeting he held tomorrow afternoon only. At least, that is the view 1 venture to express. 94. Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): 1 agree with the representative of France on one point and disagree with him OIl another. 95. 1 agree with him that it would he better if we did not meet until the aftemoon tomorrow, so that aIl of us might come fully prepared for the battle. 96. 1 do not agree with him that 1- at least - have got everything off my chest. 1 wish to assure mm that, although 1 have got two or three things off my chest, 1 still have about half a dozen more. How many of those other things 1 get off my chest will depend on the development of thisaffair and on the further statements we shall hear from Mr. Hoppenot. 1 think it would he too optimistic, however, to suppose that we had completed. our arguments and had nothing left. 97. As a. matter of fact, we are still arguing only about whether or not the item shouid he included in the agenda. When the Council has voted unanimously - as I fully ex:pect - to indude the item in the agenda, then the real battle will begin. 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