S/PV.623 Security Council

The first speaker on my list is the representative of Chile. Since he has been slightly delayed, may 1 begin bv stating the Colombian point of view? Then, after we have heard the Chilean representativl"s statement we shall have concluded the general statements by members of the Counci!. The representative of Denmark has informed me that he will speak later metely to explain his vote. 2. VVe will therefore continue ta consider the adoption of the agenda. 1 will explain my Government's point of view on that subject. 3. Our main concern is whether the Council can examine this question withont violating Article 2, paragraph Î, of the Charter. 1 shall therefore con,ir!er the arguments advanced here, namely that the judgment given by the International Court of Justice in 1952 and resolution 612 (\'11) adopted hl' the General Assembly on 19 December IlJ52 have already settled the is,ne in sa far as thev have ruled that French-I\Ioroccan relations are not a domestic matter. 4. The delegation of Colombia [l'eis that there mal' be sorne misunderstanding on this matter. "'hat does a l'rotectoratl' imply? Under the protectorall' ,ystem tlll' two Stat,·, do nut lose their personalitv. The only difference is that the protected Statl' retains its full internai sovereignty while ceding to the protecting Stall' the right 10 exercise ils sovereignty in foreign affairs. 5. How did the Treatv of Fez affect this ,itnation? On the one hand. we Stt that ~I<)rocco's internai sovereignty intenn~diary between the Sultan and the representatives of foreign Powers. 6. With these considerations in mind, let us first examine the arguments advanced with regard to the judgment delivered by the International Court of Justice in 1952. ' \Nhat is this judgment concerned with? Flrst, with taxes, fiscallaws and import rights to be respected under the clause prescribing economic equality between States signatory to the Act of Algeciras; secondly, with the special rights granted to the United States by the treaties of 1787 and 1836 on the jurisdiction of Moroccan courts in cases in which an American citizen or protégé is defendant. The judgment of the Court dealt only with these two questions, which are by their very nature within the domestic jurisdiction of Morocco. They are questions of taxation and jurisdiction. Fiscal and jurisdictional matters have always been within the domestic sovereignty of States. The Court did not and could not state that Moroccan sovereignty in fiscal and jurisdictional matters proved that Morocco had recovered the right, which it had expressly renounced in favour of France in the Treaty of Fez, to exercise its sovereignty in external matters. 7. Consequently we have not been convinced by the arguments advanced and the statements that have been made here to the effect that the Court's judgment no longer entitles us to consider this question because it is res judicata and ail the relations between Morocco and France are international relations. That does not mean that we wish to go into the substance of the question. In view of the fact, however, that this judgment is brought up whenever we speak of the Moroccan question, we should like to state once and for ail that the judgment dealt only with questions relating to the internaI sovereignty of Morocco and not with questions relating to its sovereignty in external affairs, and hence that that argument cannot be invoked at this juncture. 8. General Assembly resolution 612 (VII) of 1952 reads as follows: (the General Assembly) "expresses the confidence that, in pursuance of its proclaimed po1icies, the Government of France will endeavour to further the fundamental liberties of the people of Morocco, in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter"; and it "expresses the hope that the parties will continue negotiations on an urgent basis towards developing the free political institutions of the people of Morocco ..." 9. When this resolution was discussed last December our Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Sourdis, who was then the principal representative of Colombia, 1 Case concerning rights of nationals of the United States of America in Morocco, Judgment of August 27th, 1952: I.C.!., Reports 1952, p. 176. la. That being 50, are the proVISIOns of Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter really applicable? At recent meetings both the representative of France and the representatives of Lebanon and Pakistan explained the events that have occurred in Morocco. But the very fact that we are being asked to study the question who is right - the Sultan, the Pasha of Marrakesh or Sidi Mohammed Ben Moulay Arafa - shows that we cannot give an opinion without trying to find out who, under Moroccan domestic law, is entitled to elect or depose the sultan. 1I. The French representative tells us that the Makhzen and the Assembly of Chiefs at :\[arrakesh were entitled to appoint a new imam and to depose the sultan. We cannot consider this question without violating Article 2. paragraph 7. of the Charter. In our opinion, while by the Treaty of Fez Morocco ceded t" France its right to exercise ,"vereignty in external matters, it at no time (C'r1ed il-; internaI sovereignty tn France. 1 wouId go even [arther, and ad,\ that this is the only deduetion which can he drawn from the judgment handed down by the International Court of Justice in 1952: namely, that Morocco retains its fllll sovereignty in domestic matters; if it did not retain that domestic sovereignty it would not constitute aState separate from France. 12. Now, if Morocco has not renounced ils domestic sovereignty, we cannot pass judgment on the "'a)' in which its people have decided to acquire a new government, neither can we state that the Moroccan chiefs or the Makhzen were or were not entitled ta aet as thev did. without thereby interfering in the domestic policy not of France but of 1\[orocco. 1\Iorocco is entitled to follow its own domestic policy in complete independence. and in my opinion it will be able ta do so onl)' if we do not interfere in its domestic affairs. That might indeed take us very far: as Sir Gladw)'n Jebb very rightly said at a meeting of the Security Conncil on 10 April 1952 1575th IIItrt;llgJ, once we agree that the Council is competent to study such questions. the next thing will he that we shall be asked ta intervene in a dispute between, say. the Soviet Union and L'zbekistan. 13. The SOllth American countries. and more particularly the Colombian representatives. at the San Francisco Conference insisted on - and with difficultv obtained - the insertion of Article 2. paragraph 7, in the United Nations Charter. \\'e feel that that is one of the major victories of the young American republics. and that nothing would be more dangerons than ta question this principle. 15. After that failure, Morocco turned to the United Kingdom for assistance. The result was the Declaration of 1904 in which the United Kingdom undertook to give France a free hand in Morocco if France gave it a free hand in Egypt. Morocco then appealed for intervention to the Powers signatory to the Convention of Madrid. The Conference of Algeciras followed, at which those Powers recognized the Sultan's authority on condition that they be allowed to divide between them ail the commercial markets, which were really the only thing in which they were interested. 16. One last hope remained for Morocco: the possibility of German support. It was then that the Agadir incident occurred and the Kaiser, far from supporting the Sultan, hurriedly took advantage of the situation by signing an agreement with France which left Germany full freedom of action in the Congo and Equatorial Africa while giving France a free hand in Morocco. 17. In our opinion ail these experiences, which have brought only suffering to Morocco, show that nothing is more dangerous to the most legitimate nationalist movements in a new country than to try to obtain foreign support. We are, of course, convinced that there is a nationalist movement in Morocco which is entitled to our whole-hearted respect. We simply doubt, first, whether we can legally and under the provisions of the United Nations Charter intervene in this particular case; and, secondly and more generally, whether we should really be helping the nationalist movement, not only in Morocco but also in any other country which hopes for independence, by provoking foreign intervention. 18. l would go even farther. In my opmlOn foreign intervention, or intervention by the Security Council, would only delay the attainment of independence and might give rise to complications and obstacles which would undoubtedly benefit only those Powers who would like the Moroccan question never to be settled, either because they still hope that Morocco will sorne day become part of their sphere of influence, or because they wish success to any m0'lement likely to disturb the stability of the Mediterranean area. 19. At yesterday's meeting [622nd meeting1Mr. Malik referred to the speeches of certain members of the Council made in 1948, and quoted in particular a statement made on 17 March. This statement does not convince us that his thesis is right but rather supports our own. If we read the official record of the 268th meeting of the Council we shall sce that, precisely in connexion with the adoption of the agenda, our Soviet 4 " 'Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter .. .' "It would almost seem that those who drew up the United Nations Charter knew that there would be hotheads who would try to use the authority of the United Nations to intervene in the internai affairs of other States and attempt to seize control of their internai and external policy. But, as we see, the Charter of the United Nations safeguards the independence of States and protects in this respect the interests of ail peoples, great and small ... "The formation of the new Czechoslovak Government is the business of the people of Czechoslovakia, who are exercising their sovereign rights in their own country. Only the people of Czechoslovakia can determine the composition of their government and ail other questions which are within the domestic jurisdiction of Czechoslovakia as a sovereign State. ..As you know, the Chilean document asserts that the changes in the Government of Czechoslovakia were brought ahout by the intervention of the Soviet Union. Such assertions are pure slander against the USSR and the Soviet delegation flatly rejects them. If, notwithstanding their complete absurdity, such an assertion still figures in the Chilean communication, this merely shows that the authors and instigators of this move will stoop to any expedient to use the forum of the United Nations, and in this case the Security Council, for further hostile attacks on the Soviet Union. There is no other possible way of looking at it." 20. nous l'exemple a certains ,'aloir rité Cette ment politiques, qu'un 20. We feel sorne hesitation when we see that certain .' great Powers - 1 am mentioning the Soviet Union as " an example - to which Mr. Malik referred yesterday, ~ have changed their point of view and in certain cases ~ have advanced the same arguments and adduced the ~ same principles in the Security Council in support of " diametrically opposed positions. This attitude of the f great Powers simply shows that they change their ~ opinions in the light of their political interests, whereas ~ we smaller countries have only one guiding Iight, that ~ of principle. 21. l'Article nous atteindre affaiblissons nous il 21. We should Iike to abide by Article 2, paragraph 7, ,lof the Charter because we know that if we fail to do so n' even once, and if we undermine the principle contained Il in that paragral?h even in order to achieve what may ~ he a perfectly Justified ideal, Article 2, paragraph 7, 1 win become a dead letter. In that case we shall fall 23. The representative of the Soviet Union had stated that the Chilean proposal to examine the situation in Czechoslovakia was "unclean". Our representative stated in reply that that was going too far, that we could not allow the great Powers to dub such a proposaI unclean. It might be good or bad, but it must not be termed "unclean". That was the reason, and the only reason, why he said that in view of that situation he wou1d like us to go a little further. 24. This past history to which reference was made yesterday has still further convinced me how dangerous it would be for the small countries involved to give way on the question of intervention. 25. l have only two more comments to make. The first refers to Ml'. Malik's statement. He told us the other day [619th meeting] that he would be disappointed if the events in Morocco brought about the rupture of that agreement and co-operation between Christendom and Islam which are essential to world peace. Ml'. Malik is well aware how strongly we feel that this co-operation is essentia!. He has seen proof of our support, and should remember the crusades to that end which we have undertaken and still undertake whenever we are appealed to in cases such as that of Jerusalem. If we have any, doubts about the legality of our action today l should like to be very clear. We are not unaware of the merit and importance of this point of view, but we must choose between two difficulties: either we must not discuss the question, or we must open the door to intervention. We have to make the choice, and we have to abide strictly by our principles. Even when we have supported Islam on other questions we have done so not out of political interest bpt purely on principle. VVe feel that the small Powers must act on principle alone. 26. l should like to make one last comment. l refer to a remark made, l think, by the representative of Pakistan to the effect that France had violated article 3 of the Treaty of Fez. Under article 3 of the Treaty of Fez the French Government undertakes to protect the sovereign against any danger to his person or his 27. The point upon which we bave doubts is whether this is the time ta study questions of treaty violations. If countries think that the Treaty of Fez or other treaties bave been violated, and if the signatories ta those treaties have accepted Article 36 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice and are bound thereby, 1 think that the proper course would be ta ask the Court whether or not there bas been a treaty violation. That is a matter not for the Security Council but for the countries concerned. 28. Article 36 of the Statute of the Court is very clear. It states that parties which have accepted the optional clause undertake ta submit ta the Court alliegai disputes on the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation. If there are any countries which believe that there has been any such breach or that any facts exist which establish the breach of an international treaty, 1 think that they should address themselves ta the Court rather than ta the Security Council. 29. That is, as 1 have said, a simple question, merely a problem of procedure, and 1 hope that our friends the representatives of the Arab States will understand that if we vote against the inclusion of this item on the agenda it is not because we do not agree with them in wishing ta see ail Arab countries achieve the full indepenclence ta which they are entitled, but purely for technical reasons, because we think that under Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter the Security Council is not competent ta consider this question.

The purpose of my delegation is rather ta explain its vote than ta intervene in the debate, but since the President has invited me ta speak now, 1 think 1 can do sa at once. 31. My clelegation will vote for the motion made by the Arab and Asian States ta include the Moroccan problem in the agenda of the Security Council. , 1 32. We know that the Sultan of Morocco, the political and religious leader of the nation, has been deposed. We also knOIV that that fact has already had international repercussions of undeniable importance. as the motion nolV before the Couneil shows. l' 1 1 33. It is also true that the crisis bas procluced friction between Spain and France, as has been stated in this Couneil Chamber and as is clear from the evidence of d provoqué comme ressort connaissance. profonds blessés ces pays 7 ~ which IVe have been infonned. No one can fail ta be ~ "ware that deep nationalistic and religious feelings bave ~' been roused; and for ail these reasons it is difficult 1: to believe that the events which have occurred have liJ no real me,ming. 35. From the foregoing we must conclude that this is not a political incident which may reasonably be supposed to affect only the territory of Morocco, in which case we might justifiably reject the proposaI under discussion. 36. On the contrary, we know that the problem with which we are dealing has already inspired a protest from the representative of the Spanish Government in the Spanish zone of Morocco, and is a just cause of concern to a group of countries of such importance internationally and in the United Nations as the whole Arab-Asian group. There can therefore be no doubt that these events are endangering international peace and security, the maintenance of which is one of the most important, if not the most important, purpose of our Organization. 37. In the opinion of my delegation there are therefore adequate reasons for holding that this subject should be examined by the Security Counci!. Failure to examine it would amount to indifference towards a problem which may become considerably more serious unless measures are speedily taken to allay the anxieties of people by applying in their !avour the principle of equality of rights between nations and by securing respect for the right of peoples to self-determinationboth fundamental principles of the San Francisco Charter. 38. Article 34 of the Charter provides: "The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security." 39. Chile therefore holds the view that the Moroccan problem is serious and of such a nature as to justify its inclusion in the agenda of the Security Council, to enable that important political body to analyse it, to seek quiet1y the possible solutions to this international dispute, and to present the parties with a just and equitable formula which may open the way to a period of harmony and of moral and political peace in that part of the world. 40. Without prejudging the substance of the problem, Chile will accordingly vote for the inclusion in the Council's agenda of the item proposed by the Arab and Asian States. 41. ML HOPPENOT (France) (trans/ated from French): The French delegation has no intention of replying, however brief!y, to the four speeches which we have already heard from the Lebanese and Pakistan delegations. We hold the view that, as regards points of law and procedure, all objections to the inclusion of the Moroccan problem in the Council's agenda have been adequately placed before the Council in my first speech [619t1l meeting1 and in those of the represen- 42. problème, lumière nant fasse tion que tion, M. 42. The various speakers have emphasized different aspects of the problem and have laid bare ail its details. The Council is now in a position to reach a decision, and l hope that it will do so speedily. It is far from being my intention to deal with the substance of the matter, which will not come up for discussion unless the Council decides to include the item in its agenda; and l do not want to discourage my friend Mr. Malik from hoping for that decision. 43. première ment ces aujourd'hui indûment permettrai que fond sienne, sance à appelé je élastique Conseil. mème sentiment. a 43. In my first speech l said no more about the facts than l considered indispensable to the understanding of the legal position. l kept within that limit, and l shall not exceed it any more today than l did yesterday. Mr. Malik has reproached me with being unduly lengthy on the substance of the question; l would venture to point out to him that l only devoted six pages of my speech to .it as against eleven and a half pages of his, which was evidently written before he had heard mine. If we have both been obliged to submit to the Council what he himself referred to as a minimum statement of facts, l must point out that his minimum was much more elastic than mine. In deference to the rules of procedure of the Couneil l shall not extend my minimum, even to make it as large as his. 1 hope that he will feel the same way and will not attempt to increase his present lead. 44. deux :-'1. sion le séjour après affection avoir, mes un Nul ments récente jamais 44. My speech today has only two purposes. In the first place l want to assure Mr. Malik that l am deeply grateful for his expression of his country's feelings towards my own. Mr. Malik knows the memories which l have of the four years which l spent in Lebanon. l there experienced, day after day, the deep and age-old mutual affection between Lebanon and France. Under the authority of a great leader l think l made every effort to ensure that that affection should expand in a climate of confidence, understanding and freedom. No one is happier than l at the thought that these feelings have survived the temporary strain of recent events and are springing up more strongly than ever in the heart of the young Lebanese Republic. 45. quelques plusieurs les Traité 45. In the second place, l \l'ant to try to give .ome explanation of a question whieh has arisen on several occasions during these debates : the interrelation between the Act of Aigeciras and the Treaty of Fez. 46. treize à la textes bule de le économique est lient les 46. The Act of Aigeciras \l'as signed on 7 Februarv 1906 by thirteen Powers and comprises a statement o~ police, regulations for the supervision and punishment of arms smuggling, and four economic texts. It is in the Preamble of that Act that there occurs the sentence ~eferring to the "triple principle of the sovereignty and II1dependence of His Majesty the Sultan. the integrity of his domains, and economie liberty without anv inequality". The Act of Algeciras is still in force; that is to say. its provisions are still binding upon the parties but upon them alone. Ta ail other Powers, and ta international institutions such as the l'nited Nations, 9 47. The Treaty of Fez of 31 March 1912 established the Protectorate. It is a bilateral treaty between France and Morocco. It too is res inter alios acta in respect of all Powers other than France and Morocco. 48. The relation between the Act of Algeciras and the Treaty of Fez is clear. Although the two treaties are on a different plane, they are based on the same principles. It was by using the sovereignty recognized as his by the Act of Algeciras that the Sultan was able to agree, by a treaty with France, on the methods of exercising that sovereignty. The International Court of Justice in its judgment of 27 August 1952, to which so many references have been made, expressly recognized that principle and did not for an instant cast doubt on the validity of the Treaty of Fez. 49. The Court stated in its judgment that under the Treaty of Fez of 1912 - and l quote - "Morocco remained a sovereign State, but it made an arrangement of a contractual character whereby France undertook to exercise certain sovereign powers in the name and on behalf of Morocco, and, in principle, all of the international relations of Morocco" 50. l would add, for the benefit of those who continue to imply that the Treaty of Fez is incompatible with the Act of Algeciras, that any international convention may be amended by simple agreement of the parties. Ali the signatories to the Act of Algeciras expressly recognized the Treaty of Fez. There is no ground, therefore, in my opinion, for the reasoning which seeks to set these two treaties up against each other; the Act of Algeciras and the Treaty of Fez are quite compatible and, where necessary, complementary. The only additional limitation which the Act of Algeciras places on the rights of France in Morocco under the Treaty of Fez relates to the open-door régime, to economic equality for all, a right which France has never intended to infringe. These economic rights are the only rights which the Powers signing the Act of Algeciras reserved, while renouncing all the other rights, political and otherwise, granted to France simply by its recognition of the Treaty of Fez. 51. In this connexion l should like to refer to a certain sophism which l have heard stated, or rather implied, here on several occasions. It is that the relations between France and Morocco were determined by a treaty, therefore they are international, and therefore they are within the competence of the United Nations. 52. The first premise is so obviously true that it somewhat camouflages the fa1sity of the other two. lt is true that the relations between France and Morocco derive from a treaty; it is true that this treaty between two nations is an international instrument; but, precisely in virtne of the treaty in question, French-Moroccan relations are not international relations so far as third parties are concerned; indeed, this possibility is categorically excluded, since the provisions of the treaty reserve to France, and to France alone, the conduct of the foreign affairs of Morocco.

The position is as follows: the representatives of Lebanon and Pakistan have asked for the f1oor, and the representatives of Denmark and the United States of America have expressed a wish to explain their votes after the voting has taken place. 55. 1 should like to know whether any member of the Council other than the representatives of Lebanon and Pakistan intends to take the f100r before the vote. The Counci1 must first decide whether or not it wishes to invite the fifteen representatives who sent the letter to the President of the Counci! requesting inclusion of the Moroccan problem in the agenda; we shall then proceed to vote on the question whether that item is to be included in the agenda. 55. Liban l'intention le vote. sur représentants du jour mettre question. 56. à même séance midi demain. 57. glais): observations tant France. aujourd'hui, ration d'inconvénient. 58. délégation pour sentants pas faites ce plus ce à la 59. façon représentant moment, d'hui à demain. 60. glais): mon plus exprimé l'avantage que cet néanmoins ration 56. 1 am asking this question so that we may ascertain approximately how long this meeting will continue, and whether we may hope to conclu<le the <Iebate this afternoon or whether we shall be obliged to continue it tomorrow. t 57. Mr. HAMDANI (Pakistan): My delegation would like ta make a few comments on the statement made by the representative of Colombia and on that made by the representative of France. If it is tao late ta do sa today, my delegation could make that statement tomorrow, if that is convenient to the Security Council. f 58. Mr. HOPPENOT (France) (trans/atcd from jl French): My delegation has no intention, in princip1e. ~ of taking the f100r ta reply ta the speeches of the repre- ~ sentatives of Lebanon and Pakistan of which we have !- been given notice. 1 cannat however give any assurance I~ that no statement will be made requiring correction from us. Ali 1 wish ta say for the moment is that 1 am anxious ta shorten the debate and ta conclude it this " evening if possible. That being so. 1 shall resist ~ temptation with ail my strength. ~; 59. The PRESIDENT (trans/alcd from Fretlch): We ~~ shall proceed as follows: 1 shall first of ail give the ~ f100r ta the representative of Lebanon and then ta the , representative of Pakistan. We shall then see whether we can complete the debate today or whether we shall i~1 have to contmue it tomorrow. ,(II: 60. Mr. Charles MALIK (Labanon): !Ilr. Hoppenot 111 has just complained that my intervention of a few days J ago was double the volume of his sa far as penetration I!P into the substance of this question is concerned, and he ,Ill expressed the hope that 1 would not today increase the lIli advantage 1 had gained over him. 1 assure him that sIII 1 shall do my utmost not to increase it beyond necessity, êJn!1 but 1 have to make a few comments on the very imporo~: tant statement he made the other day [619tll nrcetitlg). /, ,1 1 propose to deal adequately with those points, but 61. Furthermore, 1 think that ML Hoppenot will agree that there is a difference ?etween the situa~ion.of a person who brings a complamt to the CounClI wIth the argument that the complaint falls within the competence of the Council, and who must therefore argue for that position and enter into the substance of the matter, and the situation of another person who, as Mr. Hoppenot himself said in his statement, rejects that position in principle and will have this Council do nothing in connexion with the complaint in question. The second person, who rejects the competence of the Council in regard to the point under discussion, is obviously contradicting himself if he penetrates even one centimetre into the matter. But a persan who starts with the position that sooner or later this whole matter must be thrashed out by the Council cannot be blamed for entering a bit into the substance of the matter in order to clarify this position. 62. 1 repeat that 1 shall be as brief as possible but that 1 must make a few observations on Mr. Hoppenot's statement of the other day. 63. The whole burden of what 1 want to say is simply this : that there is another version of the facts in addition to that given us by the representative of France. 1 wish to assure Mr. Hoppenot that, had he not given us his version, 1 would not be attempting now to state this other version. 1 shall constantly refer to it as "the other version" - and 1 shall, of course, support my statements with references to journals and magazines and official documents written by French official personages themselves. At this point, in connexion with a procedurai matter, 1 am obviously not raising the question which of these two versions is the right version. 1 have my private opinion about that, but at this moment the Council is not asked to pass judgment on which of these two versions of the facts is the right version. However, if the Council should include this item in its agenda, and if we debate it substantively. then obviously we will put forth positions and urge resolutions which will make the Council pass judgment on which of these two versions is the correct version of the facts. 64. My method will be to follow Mr. Hoppenot's speech in the English translation. 65. At the very beginning, Mr. Hoppenot says: "For the second time in less than eighteen months, the French delegation finds itself obliged to take a stand in the Security Council against aIt attempt by a group of Mrican and Asian delegations ..." 66. "For the second time", ML Hoppenot says. 1 ask the Council and Mr. Hoppenot, with ail respect: Why should this be so? Does anybody take any pleasure in bringing this matter to the attention of the United Nations for the second time, or even for the first time? Who is there to take pleasure in it? 1 am sure that none of my colleagues representing the fifteen nations that are trying to bring this matter to the attention of the Council derives any pleasure from airing this matter 70. Mr. Schuman entreated us in December 1951 not to press that issue before the United Nations, and when the vote was taken the matter was not admitted to the agenda of the General Assembly. Then, a year later, Mr. Schuman said what Mr. Hoppenot told us the other day he said. After that, what happened? After that there was a change of government in France and Mr. Schuman was no longer the Foreign Minister. When he was free and no longer a Minister of France he wrote an article in March of this year, which was published in La Nef, entitled. "Necessity for a Policy" 71. 1 shall rad now certain passages from this article, which Mr. Schuman himself wrote when he was no 2 See Officiol RtcordJ of th, enm·.l Ass,,"bly, Sixlh S,.sio~, Pl....,y M"tillg" JS4th meeting, para. 277. st.ssio,.~ 72. Far be it from me to say any word, or even to think of saying any word, that would imply anything against France itself. But this problem is a very deep problem. It is a problem of real division between Paris and Morocco. There are two schools of thought in France itself about this solution. Ali of us know this, and Mr. Schuman is going to testify to it here. He goes on to say: "The two Residents-General rank first in the hierarchy of those responsible for making the policy." He says "two" because he is speaking of Tunisia and Morocco at the same time. He continues: "They are right on the spot. They receive and furnish all the information. The scope of their activity is vast and varied, and in addition they have a tendency to enlarge it, especially if their views coincide with the views of the French population. They interpret the instructions received from Paris and determine the methods of their execution. The fait accompli is the big and constant temptation which, much to their credit, the Residents-General resist to the extent that they do not succumb to it." Then Ml'. Schuman goes on to say - and this is an important sentence: "They, moreover," - namely, the Residents-Generai- "find themselves in a similar situation in regard to certain administrative departments (police, news agency etc.), which enjoy greater independence and easily escape efficient control due to the lack of public opinion which elsewhere exercises a healthy check." Ml'. Schuman is describing the internai situation in the two Protectorates. l shall not comment on this sentence. We should read between the lines to understand what the gentleman is saying. He then goes on: "Over the Residents-Gene'ral the Minister for Foreign Affairs is responsible for their administration, which is supposed to conform to his own views. It is one of the fictions on which the democratic régime rests that when everything is quiet the credit is given to the Minister." ML Schuman is complaining. He must have suffered enormously during his years of office in this whole matter. "When everything is quiet", he says, "the credit is given to the Minister. In case of the contrary he 14

My reference to :\1r. Schuman and his speech occupied exactly two lines in my statement the other day, 1 merely mentioned it to recall :\Ir. Schuman's stand on the competence of the Vnited Kations. It is now being used as an excuse bv the Lebanese representative to read us four or five pages of Mr. Robert Schuman's opinion, published in La N.-j, on the Governmen!'s powers, the relations between the Govemment of the Republic and its Residents and the constitutional and administrative reforms that should be introduced. 80. Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): 1 was reading the most important sentence of Mr. Schuman's statement, and 1 shall take the liberty of reading it again: "1 have acquired the conviction that no important reform concerning relations between France and Morocco or Tunisia will be possible without a return to an exact definition of responsibility and hierarchical structure." What this means is perfectly obvious and 1 shall not comment on it. We ought to be able to read the meaning between the lines. 81. It appears, therefore, that Mr. Schuman almost gave up after two years of hoping that anything could happen. He gave up because of the absence of an exact definition of responsibility and hierarchical structure as between France and its Protectorates. 82. This same thing was quoted in a very interesting booklet entitled Cahiers du témoignage chrétien - Le drame I1wrocain devant la conscience chrétienne. ML François Mauriac quotes, this very sentence by ML Schuman that 1 have just read. Mr. Mauriac says: "The courageous leading article published by Mr. Robert Schuman in the special number of La Nef devoted to Morocco and Tunisia should be read and read between the lines." 83. It follows from all these things that no progress was actually made with respect to Africa and, as 1 said, it was not made precisely because of the absence of these exact definitions of responsibility which Mr. Schmnan talks about. Therefore, it follows that the "Rowever, in deference ta the members of the Council, l think l may refer brief!y ta the facts which gave rise ta the situation mentioned, and misrepresented, in the letter of the fifteen delegations submitting the request. The Council should know these facts although it cannat pass on them." Later on, he repeats this point about presenting us only with the facts of the case for our information. Now it is obvious ta any student of these matters that ther~ is no such thing as an approved fact but that every fact presented ta us is presented with its own interpretation. Therefore, we cannat be informed without also judging the matter about which we are informed. As l said. there were two versions of the facts which were narrated ta us by Mr. Roppenot. It is not for the Council ta judge at the present moment which of these two versions is the true one. It is only for the Council ta know that these two versions exist. If the Council judges that the divergence is sa important and that the matter falls within its competence, it ought ta include the item in its agenda immediately and give us a chance ta expound these facts further sa that the Council will come ta a decision on the merits of the case. 86. The next point on which l want ta comment is the passage in Mr. Roppenot's speech in which he says [para. 8] : "The first fact is that for a number of years a large segment of the Moroccan people have become increasingly dissatisfied with their sovereign. We are not concerned at ail with the reasons for that dissatisfaction or with the merits of the grievances upon which it is based." 1 contend that they concern us and that the whole question is precisely how this dissatisfaction arase and ta what extent it was real. Re says that, for several years, this dissatisfaction was growing. The other version says that this dissatisfaction never existed prior ta 1950 when the Sultan came ta Paris and presented certain demands ta the French Government and that, therefore, the disaffection began to he fomented immediately after 89. Morocco has expressed its will, and the treaty has recognized that will, that it should be a Moslem State whose Constitution is Moslem law, and Morocco has an official Moslem body of Ulema in the University of Karaouine, a body recognized by the French authorities themse1ves as alone able ta elaborate upon and judge the teachings of Islam and the practice of Moslems throughout the land. This body of Ulema, recognized by France itself, has itself decided that the Sultan, far from having deviated from Moslem truth and Moslem practice, was himself a faithful Moslem and that the pashas and caids and other leaders who have criticized him were themse1ves heretics within the Moslem religion. 90. In my first statement to the Council [619th meeting] 1 read out the exact facts of the ruling of this body of Ulema in Morocco. According to this body, which is the only authentic body that can judge in these matters, the Sultan was a pious and faithful Mos1em and the people who criticized him, above ail El Glaoui, were heretics of the Mos1em religion. In addition, to prove this point - because Mf. Hoppenot made a great deal of it - that the disaffection throughout Morocco was a religious disaffection against the Sultan, 1 have before me here a ruling by the Ulema of AI Azhar University in Cairo about this same situation. And it will be remembered that the Sultan and the Ulema of Fez had both appealed to the Moslem Ulema throughout the Moslem world to give a ruling on the question whether the Sultan was a Moslem heretic or not. 1 have before me this ruling signed by hundreds of Ulema from Al Azhar University, which is the highest Moslem university in the world, and this proves the exact Mr. Malik spoke in Arabie; he then continued in English. "In response to the appeaI which has been made by the Moslem Ulema in Morocco to the Moslem Ulema throughout the Moslem world for supporting the noble position which has been taken by His Majesty, the Sultan of Morocco, the Ulema of AI Azhar Sherif and the Moslem Ulema who are residing in Cairo add their voices ta that of their brethren, the Ulema of the University of El Karaouine, in stressing the faithfulness of His Majesty the Sultan of Morocco to the Moslem traditions - and they add their voiee to that of the Ulema of Morocco in denouncing what El Glaoui has done and aU those who have followed him from among the caids and other leaders of certain fraternities in Morocco." 91. This is absolute proof that the contention made by Mr. Hoppenot about His Majesty the Sultan is an unfounded contention. 1 certainly have not gone one iota outside of the limits of our debate at aU. 1 am simply trying to point out to you - and 1 am sure Mr. Hoppenot will agree with me - that there is another version of aU these matters. 92. The next point is this. He says [619th meeting, para, 8]: "... it is not for us ta say whether or not those charges are justified, any more than it is for us ta pass on the merits of the charges whieh have been leveUed in other countries against other sovereigns and have led to the downfall or weakening of other rules." 1 shou~d like to comment on this point also. The companson between what happened in Morocco and anything that happened elsewhere in the world in recent rnonths, e~peciaUy .in the Middle East - which may have been 10 the mmd of the honourable representative of France here - is absolutely invalid. In the first place, all the changes that occurred in other countries - that 1 am sure was in the mind of Mr. Hoppenot - were purely internai changes. In the second place, ail these other countries were cornpletely independent and there was no foreign intervention in their internai affairs. But Morocco is not completely independent and there are two authorities in Morocco, It is evident 1 think ~hieh of these two authorities is the overriding'authoritY 10 th,e long run. 1 can only reler to what 1 quoted in my prevlOUS statement [619th meeting, para. 100] from !'ir. Edgar Faure about any changes that could accur 10 these protectorates. 93, The next point concerns Mr. Hoppenot's statement t~t a petition containing 356 signatures had been subrnltted to the French authorities, again requesting them to rernove the Sultan from his throne. At the beginning of August there were 356 signatures. Now there is another version to this, and 1 want to put this other version before the Council. 1 have before me a letter da!ed sorne time in June 1953, signed by pashas and ClIIds who were suspended from their duties. a letter in which they state that aU these pashas and caids and caliphs who had signed this other letter were forced 94. Then, on 31 May 1953, a telegram was sent to the President of the French Republic, a telegram signed by the Assembly of the Ulema in Fez. This telegram stated that the Assembly of the Ulema of Fez, the guardians of lslamic orthodoxy, who, by virtue of the lslamic Constitution of Morocco possessed the right of investiture of the Sultan of Morocco, expressed to the President of the Republic the profound indignation of the Moroccan people at the petition signed by certain pashas and caids and published in the Press. 1 shall not read this telegram to the end, because 1 read it into the record last time. However, it shows that there was another voice that rose in support of the Sultan and attacking those 356 signatures claimed by the French representative. 95. In Le Monde of 3 June 1953 there was a dispatch from Rabat which stated that a certain communiqué was broadcast on the evening of 2 June by the Grand Vizier himself, the same very old gentleman to whom ML Hoppenot referred, a gentleman who is more than a hundred years old. In the communiqué which he broadcast, the Grand Vizier said that he had been greatlY surprised to learn from the Press that a petition directed against His Majesty the Sultan and signed by a number of pashas, caids and caliphs had been submitted to the Office of the Resident-General for transmission to the Government of the French Republic. Although he was not l'et in possession of definite facts concerning the petition, he wished to observe that the pashas and caids were government officiais appointed by decree of the Sultan to represent him in the cities and villages; that they couId not rise against the central government without seriously breaking the elementary rules of hierarchical discipline; and that, moreover, they had no authority whatsoever to express their opinion about the general policy of his Majesty's Government and still less about religious questions, which had never been within their competence. He stressed the fact that they could not claim to interpret the opinion of those under their administration, who had nothing to sayat any level. 96. Then they go on to denounce what these caids and pashas had done and to say that the Sultan was still the legitimate sovereign of his country and that no person could pass any judgment upon his religious fidelity except the Ulema of the University of Karaouine. That was a proclamation made by the same Prime Minister who later, we were told by Mr. Hoppenot, made the proclamation in favour of the new Sultan. In L'Observateur of 4 June, we find the following statement: "rt is difficult to consider othis petition" - of which Mr. Hoppenot spoke- "whose signatories are practically dependents of the French authorities, as a manifestation of Moroccan opinion." 97. The article contains many other statements to the same effect. Then in Combat of 6 and 7 June 1953, we find the following statement: "The text of a new 'Proclamation of the Ulema' of Morocco has been given tonight to the Press of Tangier.... "However, France does not intend, at the present juncture, ta give any political consequences ta such an initiative" - the initiative of the petition - "The legal relations between the two Powers will remain unchanged." Later, in its issue of 12 July 1953, Le Monde stated: "Let us recall that these 280 names have been presented as the names of pashas and caids but they have not been publicized. This persistent silence has allowed doubts ta arise about the exact position of the signatories. It has been suggested they included subordinate officiaIs whose careers depended, in fact, on the pashas who appointed them and who could revoke their appointments." 99. It is obvious, therefore, that the mere statement that there were 356 signatures, without indicating whom these signatures represented, is not enough ta make us believe that there was a general uprising against tloe Sultan, an uprising, indeed, that impugned his own religious practices. 100. Later in his statement, Mr. Hoppenot said that there was a growing isolation of the Sultan amongst his i subjects. It is fair ta ask here how this isolation arase. '1- If we had the time, and if the Council was discussing \: the substance of the matter, 1 can assure the represenu' tatives that 1 could prove how this isolation arose. It ~i began in February 1951, when the Sultan was forced ~ to expel many of his friends and when he was forced ta permit people ta be appointed next ta him who were ,. not friendly to him at ail. In this connexion, 1 want ;1' to refer ta the French magazine JIa/ch of 22 ta 29 August 1953. There is an excellent article in that issue :- which, if read by any dispassionate persan, ihows ( beyond any doubt that throughout the last two or three ,J(' years the Sultan was intentionally isolated by the Il> French authorities in North Africa and that he reached UJ/' the point where he could ntlt even trust his telephone Jni~ bu~ ~d ta depend on other means of expressing his /.lIt,op!D1on ta the French G.overnment. Ta prm'e the same point, 1 would refer to an article by John Gunther in " the weekly supplement ta the N,'u' York H•.,.ald Trib- ,n~ une, This W"k, of 9 August 1953. In that article, John n[ 21 101. From ail this, it follows that this isolation to which the representative of France referred in his statement was an isolation that was artificial, an isolation built up by the French authorities, and that the Sultan was simply put in a position in which he could not communicate with the outside world. 102. l wish now to refer to an interesting point which was made again and again by Mr. Roppenot in his speech, namely, that France played only the l'ole of a mediator or appeaser between the two opposing parties. But a mediator mediates between two more or less equal parties. The French Government was obligated by the treaty of 1912 to protect the Sultan. If there was any insurrection against the Sultan, obviously one cannot speak of France's mediating between the legitimate authority and any powers that might rise against it. The dutY of France w"s clear: ta suppress the insurrection - if there was an insurrection. One cannat speak of mediation and appeasement at ail and at the same time remain true to the terms of the treaty. No mediation is possible if one party is legal a.nd the other is illegal and subversive. The mere thought that the role of France was one of mediation reveals the extent to which the treaty of 1912 was not fully observed. 103. Ml'. Roppenot also says [619th meeting, para. 15] that El Glaoui and his followers refused to recognize the Sultan any longer.as the religious leader and Imam of Morocco. The other version is this: that El Glaoui and his followers are completely incompetent in religious matters; that these religious matters fall exclusively within the competence of the Ulema of Morocco; that the Ulema, far from passing any judgment on the Sultan, completely confirmed him in his faith and practice; and that it was definitely incumbent upon the French authorities to take sides in this matter.' Mr. Roppenot says in his statement that that was a decision of a purely religious nature concerning only the Moràccans and that it was not incumbent on the French Government ta take sides in the matter. l claim that it was incumbent upon France ta take sides in the matter because the Treaty of Fez, in article 1, says that France is ta safeguard the exercise of the Moslem religion and of the religious institutions. As l have just proved, the claim by El Glaoui was completely contrary ta the Moslem religion, and therefore France was bound by the treaty to safeguard the exercise of the Mohammedan religion by recognizing only the voice of the Ulema and not the voice of El Glaoui and his supporters. 104. Then, further on, Mr. Roppenot says that tribes converged on Rabat from the north and the south in order to depose the sovereign. The other version asks this question: Who gave the tribes permission ta come to Rabat? 1s it conceivable that they could have converged on Rabat without the French authorities at least closing their eyes ta it if not actu"lly instigating it? France is fully responsible for the security and order of Morocco. 105. The picture that we have before us here - the picture that Mr. Roppenot tried to paint - is one of a sovereign who was rejected by his people, a sovereign whom the French couId have kept on the throne only 106. Before closing, l shall refer ta certain matters of the highest importance. Sorne of these items l shall read, and sorne 1 shall not. First, however, for the sake of the completeness of the record, 1 shall cali the attention of the Couneil to something which occurred Iast April: General Catroux, who. is very weil known in the Near East - certainly in my country - and who bas written books on the Near East and on French policy abroad, tried ta get ta Morocco but was prevented from going there. In that connexion, he made an important statement which 1 have here before me and in which he explained why he was prevented from going to Morocco, namely, because he had different ideas about the Moroccan administration from those which that administration wanted to hear. He concluded his statement with the remark that one could, at least temporarily, forbid men to enter a territory, but one could not forbid the entry of their ideas. He added that there was no exception to that law except in the countries subjected ta totalitarian tyranny; and Morocco, as far as was known, was not to be numbered among those countries. 107. Next, 1 should like to refer ta an article which , appeared in a Moroccan paper entitled La Vigie maro- 1 caine on 21 August 1953. This article shows that ail 1 the events that took place in Morocco were carefully , planned long in advance; it is an article written in a Moroccan French paper, and it very candidly acknowledges this advance planning. It points out, first of all, that it is not without interest, now that the Moroccan crisis has finally been solved in the only reasonable ft way, to emphasize the attitude of the elected representatives of the French population of Morocco. The article 107. le prouve 111aroc l'avance; cet tation. intérêt, la des Maroc. ~éjà, tIon des ~ notes that for a long time the French representatives il had been calling the attention of the public authorities to the necessity of taking energetic measures in order ~ to prevent an aggravation of the erisis. On 17 December ,. 1952, following the first riots of Casablanca, the French : representatives drew up a memorandum addressed to ~'aggrave. emeut~s un qui U the French Government, which the delegation trans- 1,1 mitted to the President of the Republic. According ta ,1 the article in question, the document was meant ta dél~gation. avaIt ment que ment - au 1952 - suivantes: gnement tion sant tamment pouvoirs l'importance assumée démocratiques du DI: c1arify for the French Government the origins of the Moroccan crisis and indicate the measures necessary ô1 in order to put an end ta the crisis. The document, :~u: which had been submitted by the French cololls in Ill! Morocco ta the French Government as early as Decemr~ ber 1952, concluded by advocating the following II~ measures: deposition of Sultan Sidi Mohammed; final II~H removal of Prince Moulay Hassan; solemn affirmation i/ll of the maintenance of the treaty of protectorate, the fil' application of which had constantly been blocked by 'u)if the Sovereign; strengthening of the pm,'ers of the ., Resident-General, in conformity with the importance o~ .of his task and the continuity of the French mission; ~fimplementation of the democratic reforms decided on j:'~by the Govemment and postponed by the systematic 23 "1 knew the Sultan personally. l thought l could have confidence in him on the basis of French- Moroccan co-operation. That confidence l did not find. "As regards Al-Istiqlal" - the independence party - "it did not want the reforms but demanded total independence and the formation of a government of young Moroccans. "1 do not have material proofs that an oath tied the Sultan to Al-Istiqlal, as is affirmed by certain persons, but the Sultan has always acted as if an oath had been formulated. "Every time that l asked the Sultan to take a decision, to give his consent, l was unable to obtain a definite answer from him. "1 knew that the chiefs of the Istiqlal were summoned to the Imperial Palace for talks. l intervened. The answer was negative êvery time. l never obtained from the Sultan the initiation of a plan of reform." l shall not enter into what is meant here by "plan of reform". That is not my point. The General goes on to say: "1 notified the French Government of the' danger. The situation was extremely critical. In reply they told me that l had to be patient once more .... The chief, El Glaoui, came to see me. He warned me and repeated to me things which l already knew about "I secured sorne respite by demonstrating that their action troubled France in the international field. But the Istiqlal accelerated its preparations. The riots became bigger. Meetings were held even within the Imperial Palace." 110. He then goes into these matters in detail; finally, he says that he had further meetings with El Glaoui and the pashas and caids, and adds: "I asked the [French] Government to reach a logical solution of the conflict since they could no longer watch France supporting its enemy against its friends. "rt was not thinkable that one should use machineguns against the Berber horsemen." General Guillaume then concludes with this important statement: "Then, in order to let France derive benefit from an action which it had not initiated, l asked the Sultan to abdicate." He asked the Sultan to abdicate. "But," he adds, "[I] coulp not obtain an abdication from him." Therefore, the"~ultan did not ahdicate. The General's statement ends: "At once l ordered his banishment. The Berber horsemen were camping at the gates of Rabat." Ill. Thus the Sultan was banished. lt follows from this that the Sultan did not abdicate but that he was banished by the French authorities. The French authorities had no power to depose the Sultan. Therefore the Sultan today, as far as Moslem law is concerned, is not deposed. He is only banished by the French from his own realm, whatever else they claim happened inside Morocco. But the important statement by General Guillaume to which l want to draw the attention of the Council is this: "Without hesitation l struck. l destroyed the Istiqlal. l was reproached for harshness in political repression. Nevertheless, the serpent which l had eut in two continued to move. The head was still there: the Sultan carried on his action." l shall not comment on these words at ail, but shall merely say that in all sincerity and in ail truth this is a different version from that which Mr. Hoppenot gave us. The Council is fully entitled to know of the existence of this different version before it decides whether it wants to inc1ude this item in its agenda or not. 112. One word in conclusion. This is a much deeper question than most of us realize. As l said at the begiMing, it is not at all a pleasant thing for me, or for any of my colleagues, to find ourse.lves at this table, th~ authorities in the development of their own countr~es. For 1 fear - and 1 say it with sadness but also wIth truth - that Morocco and North Africa in general will become a recurring feature of the agenda of United Nations unless something far more drastic and more pronounced is done to satisfy the people who live there. No matter how much we argue here legally and on the basis of the Charter, or to what extent we have recourse to international law and to Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter, or to anything else, it is a fact that there is profound disaffection throughout Tunisia and Morocco, that such disaffection finds its own echo throughout the Near Eastern, the Middle Eastern Asian and African worlds, and that the \iVestern ~orld -the United States of America, the United Kingdom, France, Denmark and other countries of the Western world - cannot close its eyes to this constant clamour on the part of these peoples for their rights and their sense of dignity and independence. 113. It may be possible to prevent this item from being fully discussed in the Security Council, but unless something drastic is done about the situation this same item is going to appear time and again within the chambers of the United Nations. For this is not only an international matter in the strictest sense of the term. It an i,:,ter-cultural matter. It may be possible, through legahsm and recourse to the Charter, on international grounds to prevent it from being discussed here, people throughout the world are deeply perturbed from ~n inter-cultural point of view, and 1 am convinced that If we have at heart the cause of peace - and 1 am sure every representative on this Council has it at heartwe should redouble our efforts to the end that pe01;'le of Morocco and of North Africa in general may attam a greater measure of happiness and dignity human beings. 114. The PRESIDENT (translated trom French)' The next meeting will be held tomorrow afternoon 3 o'clock. The meeting rose at 6.40 p.m. Printed in Canada Priee: $U..S. (or equlvalent