S/PV.625 Security Council

My first task-and, l fear~ 1. rny most agreeg,ble one - is to convey ta my predetout cessar in the chair, the representative of Colombia, seules Mr. Ui:rutia, an ex;pression of gratitude on the part of sortant, the Security Ccuncil for the able manner in which he gratitude conducted our meetings during the month of September. il 1cannat hope ta equa:l 'liis tact and his political wisdom, Sans but l shall do my best, and l ask representatives to je bear with me if l do not succeed as weIl as l should like représentants to. pa'Saussi Adoption of the agenda

May l ask everyone who 2. wishes to speak for or against the adoption of the voudrais agenda to trj t.a keep his remarks as close tothat quescontre tion as possible. l know it is difficult, since one must plus draw on one's ideas about ~he substance of the matter Je in order to explain one's motives for objecting to or puiser supporting the adoption of the agenda, but l do .ask tian representatives .10 try to ~onfine their remarks ta that ordre question. tants du 3. Mr. LODGE (United States of America); l 3.M. should like to say a few words on the question of the l'anglais) adoption of the agenda. . de 4. The decision reached hy the United Kingdom and 4. the United States concerning Trieste was an hQ\nest Royaume-Uni attempt, made in good faith, tD increase stability .in a ment very important part of Europe and to lead to a, lasting r~gion .solution of a most vexing problem. It was reached solution after the:most careful and deliberate thought. cile. r.M~i2I!. S. Olt is as plain as anything can. be tt~atrl1.~';;Sàv1ef 5. U1110n proposaI to 'disctiss this matter in the 'Security l'Union e-cü Îs n,ô,a se,,"", plan b~as tmhappüy Îs so 1 au 7. In the second paragraph, it is contended that the decision just announced by the United Kingdom and the United States "iscreating a threat to peace". In other words, in one place the Soviet Union proposaI says that the presence of our troops is a threat to peace, and immediately thereafter it is said that the withdrawal of our troops is a threat to pea.ce. vVhat kind of shenanigans is that? 8. The Soviet Union proposaI then dusts off ald concepts which were intelligent and constructive at the time they were made ,but which, of course, have long since become absolete. Maybe this talk of withdrawing troops makes the ïepres~ntative of the Soviet Union nervous. 9. ':Phe Soviet Union proposaI ta discuss' this matter in the Council is, unfortunately, quite on a par with the statements which the representaqve of the Soviet Union has made all through the summer and autumn, statements which offet an interesting 'Contrast to the :attitude which has been, public1y expressed on several occasions by Ml'. Malenkoy. Listen to these words uttered from Moscow in August: "\We firmly maintain ,that at the present moment there is no disputable or outstanding issue' that couîd not be settled in a. peaceful way on the basis of mutual agreement between the conntries concerned. This refers,also to thase issues under dispute between the United States and the USSR. We stood and stand for a peaceful coexistence of two systems." 10. The man who said these words was Mr. Malen~ kov.Cotitrast these 'Nords of the Soviet Union Premier with the following words which also were recently uttered: "The agressive North Atlantic bloc"; "fascist or:ganizations" on the free world sicle which "flex their muscles". Secretary of State Dulles is depicted as the authol' of' "the criminal plans of the enemies.of peace". The armistice. in Korea, we ara told, foUed "the forces of aggtession and international a4venture", meaning, of com"e, the nations which fought in, Korea for 'the cause'of the United Nations. Tue man who said these words was MT. Vyshinsky. And today cames this draft resolution which is a mere deb~ting.trick on a par wiih, his other statements. u> We,of th~ United: States are i"ncurably pptimistic abo.ut thë achievement of worId peaœ. We hope, :thaï' Ml'.,Vyshinsky'S:' rerilà::ks will steélldily' draw riearto the sentiments expressed hy Ml'. Malenkov which I. ha-ve; jU$~ quoted.We will not, therefQre~ oppose the iftd.u$ion of tllis itet;n in tq.e agencla., . lU)" opinion, went far outside the scope of the present discussion. He went so far as to bring up the subject of Korea in connexion with ,the question of including the problem of Tri~ste, which W'.3 long been on the Council's agenda, in the agenda of the present meeting. This in itself is evidençe that Mr. Lodge was trying to extend the scope of the discussion, for he touched on subjects which haNe no conceivable relevance to roe procedura.l matter we are now discussing. ' 13. 1 shaH refrain, however, from dealing with the substance of thisquestion, and shall confine my remarks 1 to the bearest minimum required to show the complete futility of the ideas advanced here by the·representative of the United Sta~es. 14.It is a,·fact that fue question of Trieste and of the appointment of a, governor for the Free Territory of Tries~ is on the agenda of the Security Council., Conseq!1{:;t>dy the questionwhether or not to include the Trieste problern ori the agenda does not even arise, since this problem has already ,been settled. The item is on the agenda of the Security Couneil. What did Mr. Lodge say about this? He did not, as l understand it, object to the discussion of this item, although l do not know how true to fact he was when he said that he had no objection to the inclusion of the item in the agenda; but the -essential point is that the United States representative does not object to our discussing this question. And that is aIl that .ls at issue at this moment. 15. , Mr. Lodge recalled that the d~cision adopted by the United States on the Trieste questionwas prompted by a desire to settle this question in such a way as to ensure •peaceful relations in that part of Europe. This ls wholly at variance with the facts, however. The purpose of the, 'decision was altogether different, and that purpose has already been briefly indicated in the draft resolution submitted by my d.elegation. Is it not c1ear from the events which have been taking place during· the last few days in Yugoslavi:l~ in connexion with the statement of 8 October hy the United States and United Kingdüm Governm~nts, that the political atmosp1J,ere has. become' so tense as to be ,fraught with danger ,for international peace and serurity, at any rate in.that part of Europe? We know that complicationswhich may or do arise in one part of the world inevitably have repereussions of some kind in all other parts of the wodd. Thus the facts give the lie to the assertion with which Mr. Lodge beganhis speech, that the dedsion of 8· Octobérwas prompted by a desire ta. establish peaceful relations, to esta:blish and strengthen peace in the sOttthem part of Europe, andspecifically in the Trieste area. .. .'. 16. But quite apart from the storm of protest which has been raised in Yugoslavia against the infringement ?fthe rights and int~rests of the people of Trieste, it ~ enoughmerely. to analyse the existing relations etween y ugoslavIa and Itc:.ly for. even the most unobservant eye to detect a c1eavage whichcannot ,be 18. To regRrd the proposals which we aie once agairi bringing to the attention of the S~curity Council as merepropaganda ls, of course, the result' of a completely arbitrary, unfounded and distorted conception-of the events which·are takingplace before our eyes and which 'we must not ignore,. Particularly,in view of. the natt3.re of these events, which ate'a threat to ,peaceand L~rernational security. 19. Mr. Lodge asked why, if we now say that Trieste has been illegallytransformed into a naval and air base, intoan Anglo-American base, that is, we never said so'before. MeLodge, of course,is.not obliged tb stick to facts; he assumes that if the facts are different from ms L'On:tentions, L'len so much the worse for the facts, and,not for mm. _We.have longbeeilfamiliar with this philosophy of conceited supermen, and it cannot surprise us. Blit facts are facts, and, before' making such a .statement, Mr. Lodge should at least ha'Ve recalled that as long ago as 8 July 1950 the Soviet Government presented a note on this subject to the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France which, as it happens, said just what we have now been obliged to say in the proposaIs laid down in the <irait resolution, which we have today submitted to the Security Cotltlcil. 20. We drafteda number of other notes of the same nature. l would remind you of the note of 20 April 1950, which stated that Trieste, instead of becoming a Free Territory administered on a democratic basis, hadbeen transformed into an illègal,Anglo-American naval base situated in a foreign territory in Europe belonging neither to the United States norta the United Kingdom. The riote went on to say'that this AnghAmerican naval base was illegal, since not. only were the United States and United Kingdom Governmentsnot entitled under, any international agreement to have such a base in Trieste, but article 3 of' the Permanent Statute of Trieste categorically stated that 24. We reterreâ. to the matter in 1950 and we referred to it tWice in 1951; we are now tirOO of referrÎ.'lg to it because nothing cames of it. The United States and the United Kingdom are like the cat in the .fable which "listens, but just goes l')n eating". They lister. when we speak. They answer us;though notalwayr; tf) the point, but they .go on e:tting heartily what the;y are legal1y not entitled ta.. They have made a meall)f the Treaty of Peace with ltaly and of the Permauent Statute of the Free Tenitory -of Trieste. TheUmtOO States and the United Kingùom haye in effect renounced aU the obliga.tions they ,:tssumed wi'th. regard to the organization of. the Free Territory of Triesj'e, sincethat Free Terdtory does not exîst.What dôes eJ{ists is an Anglo-American nayal and· air bas~, in other words, a milita.ry base. :1 c~ine. 25. dit li:L.4é,claration Tout a conseillers ments. 25.. We ha'Ve referred to this repeatedly. N'YN they daIm that we have never referred ta it before and have ü\ily woken l1p today to make our statanent as a. result of their statement of'8 October, That is not true..Mi:'. Lodge'must agree that the reference· niaterial preparOO for himis not very good. The ~,dvisers who éompiled thatmatèrial should certainly be punishOO, but that is hisown aftair. .. . Z6.Mr.... Lodge proba,bly regards his own statement as the last wordin diplomatic tact and mine as Soviet f.rickery. But what doesMr. Lodgeunderstand by the ward "trick"? He pl'obably thinks .. if i5 a compliment. l think it is f?!' fromcompliinentary to makeaccusa- 26. comme . va tique. M. peut-être n'est ici vôtre livrer 5 .'~ons against aState which is here on a basis of eqLtal~ Ity with hisown and in no way dependent on it, and to say that that State is engaging in trickery when it is in =effest defending a peace treaty whichMr. Lodge's country signed but has ,disavowed, thereby blatantly 27. We are told that what wepropose is in contradiction with the statements made by the Prime Minister of t.i.e Soviet Union, Mr. Malenkov, with regard to the peaceful coexistence of nations. Quite thecontrary; our proposaI was made just because we are endeavouring to live J:leaceably together with other States and because we want to eliminate all obstacles which may arise on this path. But who will deny tnat the circumstances which have now arisen in this area ciE Europe arebollnd to constitute one of the gravest obstacles? If we were indifferent to peacefulcœxistence and co-operation among the various States immediately concerned in the problem- Yugoslavia, Italy and the pêople of Trieste-and allpeace-loving peoples generally, then l think we would not act aswe are now doing, that is, introducing proposaIs . "..;igned ta secure a final· settlement of.·a question whi L has been brought ta a completedead-end. And the decisions which you propose and whicb you are endeavouring to pass off as measures whicb could reduce the tension of the situation and settle the question of Trieste are leading in precisely the opposite direction. 28. TherefQre therè is no suchcontradiction as Mr. Lodge sought to discern. between the utterances of the nead of the Soviet Government on the onehand and, on the other hand, .the utterances of the reptesen~ tatives of the Soviet Union Nations. Only the most undisciplined imagin~tion, to put it mildly, could discern sucb a contradiction. It is that which enables you to indulge in flights of fantàsy of all kinds and on all subjects. There is no other explanation for this. 29. 'l'hat is why l hope that we shall now be able to turn· to a· study of the substance of the item. If the President permits, l shall continue my speech, referring now ta the substance of the item. l consider that the question of the adoption of the agenda. has now been settled. If not, l ask the President to calI upon me later, afterit has been settled.

The two repr'.esentatîves who have spoken· ~:d not abject to the adoption of the agenda, but l must ask if there are any objections. If there are none, l shaH consider the agenda adopted. 33. Article 21 of the Treaty of Peace with Italy, which came into force bn 15 September 1947, provides for the constitution of the Fr~e Territory of Trieste, consisting of the area lyin~ l,etween the Adriatic Sea and the boundaries defip.èd :ll that Treaty. Article el goes on to state that the Free Territory of Trieste ;,S recognized by the A11iedand Associaced Powers and by Italy, which agree that its integrity and indepen- dence shaH beassured by the Security Councii of the United Nadons. Accordingly,'any actions directed against the integrity and independence of, the Free Territory of Trieste are violations of the Treaty of Peace with Italy which, as I have mentioned., came iuta , fàce ~n 15 September 1947. However, the méasures ,taken by the United Stat,=s and United Kingdom Govermnents with respect to Zone A, are precise1y actions of this kind, that is, violations of :hè Treaty of Peace. 34. Anide 21 of the Treaty of Peace with Italy also provides that; upon thecoming into force of the Treaty, Ilalian sO\'ereignty over the area of Trieste, hence- fOl'ward caIled the Free Territory of Trieste, is to be terminated. Thereafter the Free Territory of Trieste is to he governed in accordance with an instrument for a pr(}visionaI régimedrafted' by the Council of Foreign Ministers and approved by the Security Counci1. This Înstrument is to remain in force until such' date as the Security Councilshal1 fix for the coming into force of the Permanent Statute which shaII have been approved by il. 35. As we know, two special annexes, VI and VII, were attached to the Treaty of Peace. Theseannexes , define in greater detaiI the' principles of, the organiza.;. tion of the Free Territory of Trieste and also the cons:' titutional structure and administration of the Territory. !he Permanent Statuteof the Free Territory, set out lU annex VI, provides that the Territàrymust be demilitarized and. dec1aredneutral. That is the first and most important fundamental principle governing the establishment of the Free Territory. The Perma- nent Statutecontains the express injunction that no armed forces shaH,be aIIowed in the Territory except ·Upon direction of the Security Cov.nci1. Tt provides further that no para-miIitary formations, ey..ercises or .actiyities shaIIbe permitted wlthin the Territory. article 40f the PermanentStatute states that human disposeexpres~ément autorisée -du formations; interdits 37. l ought to say that, bath in the Permanent Statute and int.~e instrument for the provisional réglme, particular importance is accorded ta the question of the governor of the Free Territory. The Treaty of Peace provides that the governor shall be appointed by the Security Counci1, after which a provisional coundl of government shall be set up, in accorcl<lnce with article 2 of annex VII, a constituent t. mbly shaH he convened, and a constitution for the Free Territory sœll be drawn up. Finally, the Treaty of Peace provides - and here Mr. Lodge may find an additional answer to his question a:bout the armed forces in Trieste - that all foreign military forces shall be with- drawn from the Territory after the expiry of one hundred and thirty-five days from tlle governor's assumptirm of office. The fact that the Treaty provides that foreign troops may be stationed in the Territory for a given period certainly does not mean that the Territory may be turned into a naval base; for the insignificant armed forces which, under the Treaty, the United States and the United Kingdom are entitled to m:aintain in Zone A, and Yugoslavia in Zone B, are one thirlg, but a naval bas.e is another thing altogether. 38. It should also be noted that as long ago as 12 December 1946 the Council of Foreign Ministers of the four Powers - the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and France-decided to ensure· the appointment by t.l:te Security Council of a governor for the Free Territory of Trieste at the same time as the Treaty of P~ace ~;ith Italy came into force, that is, on 15 Septembel 1947. 39. This is' the true position with regard to the Free Territory of Trieste, what it should hé!.ve been and what it 1S. Such were the obligations undertaken by the United States, the United Killgdom, the Soviet Union and France, together with the seyenteen other coulltrTeswhîchsigned the Treaty ofPea.ce wîth Italy. Those countries affixed their· signatures to··ilie Tteaty of Peace with Italy, but they have never been consulted about anything since certain Pnwers· began to carve up the Treaty and to. infringe it at., every step, starti.tig with the dec1aration of 20 Ma.rch 1948 ,or even earlier. The provisions setttitig out these obligations 'were not fulfilled at tlle time and have not been fulfilledyet, because the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom have violated their c(.;nmitments underthe Treaty of Peace w1th regard to the estab1ish~ ment of the Free Territor~!()fTrieste.' - mont~ occupe, présenté, du M. par bassadeur ne Franco; blicaîn Nous GOtlVernenlent aucun àce été la M. par l'était ment diverses tions. juriste aValt représentant dature 42. retenue tion tant Etats-Unis, et celui 43. sentant pour avait dentales, ce tabou l'Union d'autres 44. attention qui S~~n. 'We have never had any dealings with the Franco Government and have made no agreements of a military or any other character with it. Then General Bohuslav Ecer .was proposed, and he received the support of Yugoslavia. Next, the former Belgian Minister of the loterior, Mr. Buisseret, was suggested. F:i"aLce and the United States supported his candidature, which also received the support of the sub-committee appointed specia1ly hy the Security Council to consider the various candidatures and prepare recommendations. Finally the Swiss jurist Colonel Flückiger, was sug- gested; he was suggested in the first place by the repre- sentative of the United Kingdom, Sir Gladwyn Jebb. However, doubts wereraised also about thaï candi- dature. 42. Not one of these candidatures was accepted by the Security Council because of, the attitude taken, as 1 have already pointed out, towards some by the United Kingdom representative, towards others by the United States representativG, for example, Mr. Austin, and towards 'others again by the French representative. 43. I~ is significant that as soon as the representative of the Soviet Union gave his assent to the appointment of any candidate proposed by the Western Powers,' '4hûsePowers at once hastened to disown that candidate, and straightway put a tab600nmm as if he were stricken with the plagne. From the 'Very moment when the Soviet representative said, "we support his candi- dature", that candidate becarrie unsuitable for the other Powers. 44. l shall' not confine myself to Mere assertions. Let î1:Iecall your attention to the question of the candidature of :Mr. Buisseret,who was proposed by'Belgium and 9 45. That was not thé only instance. For example, Yugoslavia and France proposed Mr. de Azcarate Florez. But when the USSR .representative indicated his asseiit to that nomination, the French representa- tive, who had himself, with the Yugoslav representative, proposed Mr. de Azcarate y Florez, stated that he did not know whether the French proposaI still held. Thus, in effect, he withdrew that nomination, and it was, of course, rejected. 46. Sir Alexander Cidogan, the United Kingdom representative, stated that he was unable tosupport any of the persons nominated. There had been twelve can- didates, who were supported, in various combinations, by the repre"entatives of various States. But Sir Alexander Cadogan refused to support any of them. .47. The question of the nomination of a governor for the F,ree Territory of Trieste has thus remained un- resolved. It is c1ear, however, that thesc governments have madeevery effort to avoid the nomination of governor for the Free Territory of Trieste, in order to avoid the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty of Peace with Italy concerning Lhe establishment oi the Free Territory of Trieste· and, primarily, con- cerning the appointment of a governor for that Terri- tory. 48. It is hardly necessary ta comment in any detail on the significance of such a measure as the appoh~- ment of a governor: It is enough to recall article 4 of the instrument for the provisional régime of the Free Territory of Trieste, which provides that the governor's first concern is to ensure the maintenance of public arder and security. It is also worth while noting other articles of the instrument, determining the functions of the governor in relation to the armed forces of the United 'States, the United Kingdom and Yugoslavia. 49. Thesè facts make it quite obvious thatthe Gov- er-nn1ents of the United States and the United Kingddm have 'violated the Treaty of Peace with Haly, and most :t-eœntly,ag~in th-=.ir dedaration of 8 October 1953. 1 think that this .dec1aratio!l iS dosely -co1h're~ted with the declarationmade by the three Powers on 20 March ·1948, when they dedded, illegally, to testore Italian 1 51. The result of the violation by the United States and the United Kingdom of the Treaty of Peace with ltaly and of the obligations they assumed with regard td the demiIitarization of the Free Territory of Trieste is, as l mentioned before, in connexion with Mr. Lodge's statement, that Trieste has been ilIegally con- vertèd into foreign naval base which has an important part to play in the military plans of the North Atlantic bloc. This Anglo-Atnerican naval base is ilIegal because there are no provisions dther in the Treaty of Peace or in any other international convention which grant the United States and United Kingdom Goverrunents the right to maintain such R base in Trieste, 52. Moreover, article 3 of the Permanent Statute of the Free .Territory of Trieste categorically states that no armed forces, exeept I1pon direction of the Seèurity CounciI, shaII be aIIowed in Trieste. Renee, if such armed forces are ·aIIowed, they can be aIIowed only under conditions previously laid ·down by the Security CoundI. The Free Territory, however, has now become something which militarily goes far beyond what was contemplated when the article of the Treaty of Peace ta which l referred was drafted. United States and British troops are being maintained in Trieste at the present time in dir.ect contravention of the provisions of the Treaty of Peace, and manœuvres and other military exercises areteing carried out. \Vas a military bastion in the full senSe of the terro, que white in 1951 the newspaper Il Papota, organ of the mot. l Ming Christian Demo.cratic Party, openly demanded chrétien, 1 that the Treaty 'Of Peace should he scrapped-as- being 4e.1>aix, .ce ~ntrary to Italy's obligations under tHe North Atlantic engag~ents Treaty. . l'AtlantIque ~4. -The·uproar deliberately raised by the Press at the 54. tIme on those lines was supported by the then Minister . étI"'dXlgè: l: Pow~rs. and it did not and, lndeed, could not be refuted because, of i:ourse, it was wholly in accord with :the facts. That, as the Germans say, is where the dog is buried: "da ist der Hund begraben". That is the heart of the matter. It means that the three great v\Testern Powers which signed the Treaty of Peace with Italy consider that th~: Treaty and its principles obsolete. Those three grea1: Powers and Italy consider that they must be guided only by the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty, or bloc. 55. What bloc? We have always said anJ continue to say that it is an aggressive bloc, which pursues aims of military aggression. It aspires to draw in Western Germany and its military bodies, headed 'by persons bent cn vengeance and by fnrmer Hitlerite generals, to establish a so-called European Defence Community, which in fact has nothing to do with defence and is nothing but a stratagem to enable them to inc1ude Westt'Il1 Germany in the North Atlantic bloc. But we need nùt refer to this at this point, since we shaH have an opportut'Jty to discuss it more fully later on and l do not wish to go outside the confines of the question of the Free Territory of Trieste. ...embasSieS?" That is a 'fact which. cannot be ignored, regatd1ess of howit was done, who'was at the head of the movement and who organized it. That is not the question now. The paper again supplies us with the answer to the question which interests us most of all: __~~~~!~~:~~~~~~~ 58. Here is the whole secret revealed. l'hat was the purpose .of the 1948 decla1"3tion and again of the declaration made on 8 October. .58.. but qui vient- d'être 59. grande devons que 59. The whole American Press, of course, is very interested in this question, and we must be very in- terested in what the American Press follows with such attention. 60. It is stated, in that Press, that the United States has realized that Italy may refuse to ratify the Euro- pean Defence Community agreement if the Trieste qùestion is not settled. And Mr. Lodge began today by saying that the.question had been settled. 60. Unis de de pas que 61. And why has it been settled. In order to utilize the decision announced in the statement.of 8 October to put pressure on Italian opinion and on the Italian Gov- ernment, so as ta induce that government ta ratify the agreement on the European Defence Community7 which in turn is nothing but an offshoot of the aggressive North Atlantic Treaty. 61. la de le ratifier de sif 62. If the Trieste question is not solved to the ad- vantage of Italy or, at any rate, if a definite gesture is not made to that effect, Italy, it would seem, will exploit Trieste just as France is exploiting the Saar. It was decided to satisfy Italy's demands, at least in part, in exchange for its ratification of the agreement on the European Defence Community. 62. de accompli vira On tion cord 63. qui, - les de points seront à 63. With regard ta the meeting which, it seems, is to beheld tomorrow, or perhaps even today, in London, between the Foreign Mii:J.isters of the United Kingdom, Fral1ce and the United States, to discuss this question, it is stated in the Press that the question of Trieste and France's attitude to the agreement about a European army will he the principal· items on·the agenda. 64. donner la daration ont quillité. trIbuer servi tion absolumE: e:l\.-ploitée, pression d'ar.rne en 64. Now, in view of this, we maybriefly answer the question whether the statement of 8 October 1953 and the declaration of the three Powers of 20 March 1948 were in fact designed to establish peace and tranquillity; Could those declarations really serve that purpose and did they _in fact· contribute to the establishment of peace? If we take all these facts into consideration, it is clear that the aim was quite definite: toexploit the Trieste question, as '1 said befare, as an instrument or weapon of pressure on. other States in order to prevail on a particular country - France and Italy, in this.case :.:.- to take part in the aggressive organizations which are -being built up under the ·leadership..pre-eminently Qtthe United States. ::tés~~~ 70.~WA ~pect the Security Couneil ta renew its efforts to achieve the aims set for it by the Treaty of Peace of 1947. We are therefore introducing the fol- lowingdraft resolution [Sj310S] d~aljng with certain fundamental matters affecting the fat,=,. of the so-called Free Territory of Trieste~ . "The Security C.ou:ncîl, "Considering that the Treatyof Peace with Italy, whichcame into force on 15 September 1947, ·has . ... not. yet .. been ... Îlllplemented.· as .far 'as .... the •section re1ating to.theesta.bHshment of the-Free Territory de prévus au lative libre Trieste ment ment permament délai Gouverneur." 71. moyen question de plus ainsi et sinage monde. 72. question de se mettra un ou la Trieste c'est ,-considérable. monde paix, l'unanimité vigueur, Il e:q..nommant davantage dans cipitent. 71. We are profoundly convinced that this is the only r:::'~lt way, the only possible way to settle this ques- tion in accordance with the interests of the States most directly concerned, that is, the States bordering on Trieste, and also with the interests of the population of Trieste, to strengthen and maintain peace, to establish ~ood-neighbotlr1y relations and to strengthen and main- tain international security. 72.· lb cannot be agreed, and the Soviet Union never wlll agree, that the question of Trieste should, be decided otherwise than on the basis of the. Treaty of Peace '.Vith Italy, or that that treaty should be by- passed or violated. That question cannot he settled by separate agreement ,among a few POlvers - in tms case, . five PDwers - the United States, the United I~ngdom, France" Italy and Yugoslavia. This is not the pr.lVate concern of those ,five States. The question of Trieste has great historical and political significance.. Its solution concerns not Europe alone but the whole \VorId. The Treaty of Peace, which was car.-efully ?rawn up and unanimously appnwed by the 'Pari.s Con- terence, has entered iuto force, and its execution is mandatory. The appointment of a governor is the indis- pensable first step towards such execution. Matters cannat be further delayed, since ~vents are taking their ~ourse. ,You must understand that there is no lega.l ,: &t';ti1neatcapahlf'._QC,Rr~venting what we desire to . ._-----'~.- .... - 76. Mr. TSARAPK.IN (Union of Soviet Socialist Repurblics). (tra~1ated fro'm R~!-ssian) : Mr. Vyshinsky has aIready drawn the Council's attention to the fact that this question is of a most urgent and pressing nature. The Soviet Union delegation would therefore consider it expedient - and strongly urges - that meeting of the Security Conncil should be fixed for Saturday, 17 October. This will invalidate the Pre- sident's argument mat it will he difficult for delegations to receive instructions from their governments in 'VÎew of the week-end, and so forth. l accordingly ask that the next meeting of the Security Council should he fixed for Saturday, 17 October.. 77. Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): This may very weIl he an urgent question, as the representative of the Soviet Union has said, but certainly it has been brought ta our a.ttention in its present form very suddenly and, although l do not know about the state of preparation of .other representatives, fDr my part, l am not yet prepared t"Ü consider this matter, and l have no instruc- tions about it from my Government. It will be several days'before l -ean reaIly come to gtips with this im- pottant· issue. It has many aspects which interests us and toncerning whic:h 'we must be very carefu!. l do not ''See how we can possibly get instructions from ourGov- ernment ·by Saturday, 17 October, nor how we can in the meantime study the voluminous material befure us. In fact, even the President's suggestion for a meeting on Tuesday, 20 October, presents some difficulty for me, It would Mt be easy for me at the moment to com- mitmyself ta being in a position ai: t~at time to ll'ar- ticipate in a vote, should it he found necessary to bring 7S. Because of my lack of preparation and the fact that the matter has been brought to our attention rather un- expectedly and req~ires c~msiderable time for thought as weIl as consultation wlth our governm~nts, and as· sorne delegations are !)C)t as fortunate as others in regard to the number of people tuey have available to help them in their work, l do not see how it would he possible for me, at least, to enter into any significant participation in the consideration of this matter by the Cauneil before the middIe of next week. l doubt whether l shall be in a position to vote before Wednes- day, 21 Oct<;lber, or Thursday, 22 October. 79. Sir Gladwyn JEBB (United Kingdom): l do !)ope that the Counci1 as a whole will accept the Pre- sident's wise suggestion that we should meet on1y next Tuesday a:ftemoon, 17 October. l myself would we1- come a little further delay, but l am prepared to agree, sa far as my delegation is concerned, to Tuesday after- noon, but certainly not willingly to anything before then. As·several representatives ha.ve pointed out, we have got to have our instructions on this extremely im- portant question, and that undoubtedly takes a little tirne; and wc simp1y must have time to think about it. Nor can it be represented, l think, reasonably, as some- thing of desperate urgency. If it were a case of des- perate urgency, natura1ly the Council would meet im- mediate1y, cr in a day or two. But this cannot legi- timately be so described. The problem has been with us for a very long time. It may have reached a certain _iage which is an important sta~e. But nobody can say that it makes all the difference to peace 01" war whether we discuss it in the next day or two, and l should have thought that, given our obligations to the 6eneral As- sembly, to which we aIl have to attend, Tuesday after- noon w0\11d 'be a reasonable time to meet and that is a proposaI which l would be prepared to support. 79. l'anglais) teront, pas Ma temps, après-midi. nisse l'ont instructions tante. parviennent -réflécrur raisonnablement meure. réunirait deux. à avoiï tant; pas dans les semblée bien soumise 80; qualité drai je recevoir pour parce Copenhague rendu, 81..En ponsabilité que cord. l'Union convoqué informé l'examen j'ai m'en 82. déclarer qu'un que SO. The PRESIDENT: First of aU speaking as the representative of DENMARK in reply to the represen- tative of the Soviet Union, l should like to say that, in any event, it would be impossible for me to have a definite Teply from my Goverrunent by Saturday, 17 Oetober. The ,fact that the verbatim record will be in' our hands onlytomorrow,after which it will he neces- sary to communicate it to Copenhagen, makes it im- possible. SI. As PRESIDENT of the Council, l should like to say that l took the responsibility of ca1ling a meeting for today, although everyone was not in· favour of it. The letter of the permanent representative ofthe Soviet Union did not request an urgent meeting; it merely asked to be informed immediately of the dLte decided upon for discussion of this matter. So l believe that l actually hurried matters more than was required of me. 82. With regard ta the remarks of the representative ?f Lebanon, 1 should like to state that it was not my Intention ta insist upon a vote on Tuesday, 20 October. 'However, 1 think we may hope to have a certain num-

Today's discussion has given rise to no ne\\" documents and no new proposaIs have been submitted. As regards the proposàl before the Security Council which is contained in the letter from the USSR representative, that document was transmitted to the President of the Security Council on Monday, 12 October, and had already been eir- <,:ulated arnong aU the members of the Security Couneil by 13 October. Thus, the referencè to the necessity of receiving instructions from governments is unfounded, since l would assumethat everyone had aIready requested such instructions. Today is 150ctober, and representatives were apprised of the question by 13 Oct6her. Three.days have passed, and we do not consider that the question of instructions from governments is ~as acuteas it may seem. 84.· The USSR delegation attaches great importance to this question andconsiders it an urgent one, in view of the events whichha'Ve taken place in that part of . Europe. It ·thereforeoonsiders it essential that the next meeting of the Security Couneil should nat be further postponed. -Members of the Security Couneil will have aIl Friday at their disposai lind we' therefore <.'onsider it possi~le .and insist that the next meeting of the Security Council should be convened on Saturday, 17 October.

Iconfess that in principle l do not like votes on procedural questions. That is why l wonder if the representative of the. Soviet Union would not agree to have the next meeting of the Security Council on Tuesday, 20 October, if, between now and then, no representativedecIares himself ready to speak before Tuesday afternoon. Already the rt::presentative of the United Kingdom, the representati'Ve of Lebanon, and the President, in bis capaeity as representative of,Denmark, have stated that next Tuesday would he the earliest possible date on which they could .fake part in the discussion. That lS my position also. l wonder whether any' representative, with the exception, of course, of the representative of the Soviet Union, would be ready to speak before next Tuesday.

Speaking as the representative of DENMARK, l should like to reply to the representative of the Soviet Union. The ciraft proposaI was, of course, known, and l havecommunicated that to my Government. However, l should like to report to my Governmel1t on the lengthy speech made by Mr. Vyshinsky today. l think it is important that the con:- siderations stated in that speech should he given to my Govemment before Iam given final instructions by my Government. 87. ·'Speàking as PRESIDENT, l have to say that, since· th~ representative of the 'SO'VÎet Union insists on bis proposaI; we shall have to vote upon that proposaI first. The Couneil willtherefore vote on the proposaI that the 0 next meeting should be held on Sattirday, 17 Qctober. SALES AGENTS FOR UNITED DEpoSlrAIRES DIS PUBI.ICArlONS "'ElIT/lIAmEllTlNE Editorial ,Sudameri~ene S) .. Ailine 500. Blienos Aires. fW(E Editions A. Ped0n., Paris V, AUSlIALIA - AUSTlALIE H. A. Godderd. 2S5e Geo,\,e St., Sydney. end 90 Queen St.. MelbourM. Melbourne University Press. Cerlton N.3. Vietori8. IELGIUII-IEL'IQUE Agence et Messageries de le Presse S.A•• 14-22 rue du Persil, Bruxelles. W. H. Smith & Son. 71.75, bouleverd Adolphe.Me•• Bru.elle•• &ClIVIA -IOLlYlE librerre Selecciones, .Casille 972. le PeL IIAlIL:"'IIESIL .. livreria Agir. Rio de Jeneiro, Seo Peulo and Belo Horizonte. GlEECE - GIECE "EleftheNudekis," tion. Ath~nes. ,G;JATWU Goubaud & CIo. 28, Guetemele. HAm librairie' "A !e III·B, Port·eu.Prince. RONDUIAS librerra Panemerican~, Tegudgelpe. HON"ION' Th. Swindon Sook Kowloon. ICElAND ~ ~UJI'.oIf. Bokaverzl•• Sigf~ser Austyrstfése':i ia. INDIA-INDE Oxford S60~ & House, New D.lhi, Calcutte. P. Varadechery St.. Madras 1. INDONESIA -IIIJOIIESIE Jejasan Pembangunan, Djekarta. IlAN CANADA Ryerson Pre.,. 299 Que.n St. We.t. Teronto. Periodice, Inc., 4234 de le Roche: Mon· treel, 34. CEYLON - CEYLAN The Assodatec! Newspepers of Ceylon ltd., leke House, Colombo CHILE-CHILI librerre Ivens. Monede 822. Sen'liego. Editoriel dei Peclfico. Ahumedu 57. Santiago, CNINA- CHIHE The World Book Co. ltd.. 99 Ch..ng King Roed, Ist Section. Teipeh, Teiwon. Commerciel Pre." 211 Honen l'<d., Sheng. hei. COLOIltIA - COLOIiIIE librerre letine, Cerrera 60.. 13415, Bogot6. librerre Américe. Modeurn. librerro Necionel ltde.. Beaenquilla. Ketab·K~~neh Den.sh. nue, Tehrati. IUQ-IUI Meckenzie', Boohhop, ISUEl 8lumstein's Bookstores Roa•. Tel·Aviv. ITALT -ITALIE Colibri S.A., Via lOANOM-L1IAN librairie Univt~.II 1II0'A J. Mol7':!. Kamar., lUIEII"JUI@ .COSTA llCA - (OSTA·lICA Trejos H.rmenos, Aperiado 1313. Sen José. CUII la Cas. Balg•• O'R.iIIy «55. la Hebene. aECHOSLCYUIA- TCHECOSlOYAQUIE Ceskoslovensky Spisovet.l. N6rcdnr Trrd. 9, Prohe t. lib~,iri. J. Schummer. 1IE1ICO-1IE1IQUE Editoriel Hermes 41. Mé.ico. D.F. ,unilANDS - "'SoIIS N.V. Martinus Niihoff. ·s.Gravenhage. DEIIIIIIk- DANEJI.IlIl Einar Munhgli.,d, ltd.. Nerr.ged. 6. Kebenhevn. K. DOIIIHIUN IEPUILIC-REPUILIQUE DCJllniCAIHE libr.rra Dominicene, M.rced.s 49, Ciu. ded Trujillo. 'NEW ZUUND- NOUYElLE·ZEWlDE United Netion. Association lend. C.P.O. 1011. NOIWn- HOY~GE Johan Grundt Tanum gustsgt. 7A, Oslo. '1illSTAN Thomas & Thomas, Roed, Karechi. 3. Publish.r, United lehor•• The Pekistan Cooperetiv. Chittagong end Decce tAKW José Menénde., Pla '''AGUA' Moreno He(mànQI, ECUADOI - EQUATEU. librerr. Cientfflca, Gueyequil end Quito. EGYPT - EGYPTE libreirie "la Reneissenc. d'Egypt.... 9 Sh. Adly Pasha, Coiro. El SALVADOI - S.UYADOI Manuel Navas y Cra., 1a. Av.nida sur 37. San Salvador. mlOPlA - ETHIOPIE Agence Ethiopi.nne de Publicité. Bo. 128, l'd'àis.Abeba. FIHlAND - FIHUNaE Akateemin.n Kirjakauppo, 2, K.skusketu. Holsinki. Order. and inqulrles from countrles where sales agents have not yet been appolnted may be sent tOI Sale. and Circulation Section, United Nation., New Yo,fc, U.S.A., or Sales Section, United Nationa OHlcl, Palais dl. Nations, Geneva, Swltzsrland• ., . . i: -- Printed in Canada L Priee: $U.S. 0.15; (or equivalent in