S/PV.633 Security Council

Due note will be taken of the correction given by the representative of France. The letter submitted proves that we can rely upon the Chief of Staff to follow through with the matter. May I ask the representative of Lebanon whether he wishes to speak on a point of order? 5. Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon) : Yes, it concerns the letter. Since the President has read it out to the Council, I have a remark to make on it.

If it is not a point of order regarding the letter, I shall put the name of the repre­ sentative of Lebanon on the list of speakers, as the delegations of Syria and Israel have already submitted their names. The representative of Lebanon will have every opportunity to refer to the letter at that time, unless he wishes to speak now on a point of order. 7. Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon) : I think it is a point of order. However, should the President feel that my intervention is not on a point of order, he may certainly interrupt me at any time. 8. I am not competent to judge whether the reference in the last two sentences of the letter concerning the divers and the leakage means that in some sense work is still continuing there. Therefore, I should like to ask that the Council, or the President, request General Bennike to explain to us whether the activity referred to in his letter interferes in any way with the decision adopted by the Council at the 631st meeting. I cannot conclude from the letter, nor does General Bennike himself explain, whether the activity which is going on under the guise of divers attempting to plug leaks is permissible. I am therefore asking the President to request General Bennike to clarify this point.

I am afraid that I ought to have interrupted the representative of Lebanon — with his consent, for once — because, after all, his statement constituted a request for action on my part, or on the part of the Council, and not a point of order. That request can be brought up at a later stage in the discus­ sion. The representative of Lebanon will have noted the correction of the text made by the representative of France, to the effect that we "rely upon" the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization. As I have said, the representative of Lebanon is free to bring that question up later, but not at this time as a point of order.

My Government felt compelled to bring before the Security Cotmcil this complaint about the activity of Israel in the demilitarized 11. The United Nations Chief of Staff has summed up the subject of the dispute, his decision concerning it and, in a way, the efforts that he has made to implement it. He did so in his report to the Council dated 23 October 1953, and in its annexes {S/3122]. 11. l'objet du différend, la décision qu'il avait prise à ce sujet et, d'une certaine manière, les efforts qu'il avait déployés pour la mettre à exécution. Il l'a fait dans son rapport au Conseil en date du 23 octobre 1953 et dans les annexes de ce document. 12. Certain facts, drawn mainly from the report and its annexes, need to be recalled and emphasized before we proceed further. 13. Israel informed the Acting Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission about the work on 2 September, after it had been started, and without disclosing its real nature and scope. In its note of 24 September, annex II, paragraph S of the report, Israel expressed the view that : "... it was but natural that the Chairman of the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission, when informed of the commencement of the project on 2 September 1953, should have expressed his concurrence with it". 12. tamer de nouveaux débats, certains faits dont la plupart sont consignés dans le rapport et ses annexes. 13. par intérim de la Commission mixte d'armistice au courant des travaux; mais ces travaux avaient déjà commencé, et Israël n'en a dévoilé ni la nature réelle ni l'ampleur. Dans sa note du 24 septembre, que le rapport reproduit au paragraphe 5 de son annexe II, Israël déclare Président de la Commission mixte d'armistice syroisraéHenne, lorsqu'il a été informé le 2 septembre 1953 que les travaux avaient commencé, ait marqué son accord à ce sujet". 14. Israel recognizes that the concurrence of the Chair­ man was necessary, but says that it was natural. Yet that concurrence never took place after the real scope and nature of the work came to be better known, for, on 9 September, the Acting Chairman sent a letter to Israel in which he informed the Israel authorities that he was putting the whole matter into the hands of the Chief of Staff, who was then absent in New York. Israel started to act, therefore, with no real author­ ization. 14. nécessaire, mais déclare qu'il était parfaitement naturel que le Président ait marqué son accord. Cependant, le Président n'a jamais donné son accord lorsque l'am­ pleur réelle et la nature des travaux ont été mieux connues; en effet, le 9 septembre, le Président par intérim a adressé à Israël une lettre par laquelle il informait les autorités d'Israël qu'il soumettait l'affaire au Chef d'état-major, qui se trouvait alors à New-York. Israël a donc commencé les travaux sans autorisation réelle. 15. Upon his return, the United Nations Chief of Staff investigated the situation and, on 23 September, instructed Israel to stop the work in the demilitarized zone as being in contravention of the Armistice Agreement. 15. Unies a examiné la situation; le 23 septembre, il a enjoint à Israël d'interrompre les travaux entrepris dans la zone démilitarisée en violation de la Convention d'armistice. 16. What was the response of Israel to that decision? On the one hand, Israel brought up more men and machines and the work went on literally day and night in successive shifts. On the other hand, it started an argumentative give and take with General Bennike ; the Israel authorities were trying to woo him by declaring their respect for the armistice while remaining argu­ mentative in order to create delays with no other result except the continuation and the development of the works. 16. Israël a envoyé plus d'hommes et de machines sur les lieux, et les travaux se sont poursuivis littéralement jour et nuit par équipes successives. D'autre part, les autorités d'Israël ont commencé à parlementer avec le général Bennike; elles ont essayé de l'amadouer en l'assurant de leur respect pour l'armistice tout en parle­ mentant pour faire traîner les choses en longueur et permettre aux travaux de continuer et d'avancer. 17. ^ It is evident from the report that the initial infor­ mation given by the Israel authorities to the Acting Chairman on 2 September was inaccurate and deceitful. The project was called the "Northern Irrigation Pro­ ject". Later, it turned out to be a canal leading the waters of the Jordan away from the demilitarized zone into Israel-held territory, with no object of irrigation in the north of the zone. At a later stage, when the nature and scope of the project became better known, Israel 17. gnements donnés le 2 septembre par les autorités d'Israël au Président par intérim étaient inexacts et fallacieux. Le projet était désigné sous le nom de "Travaux d'irri­ gation du Nord". Mais bientôt on s'aperçut que l'on creusait un canal qui détournait les eaux du Jourdain de la zone démilitarisée pour les amener en territoire israéhen; il n'était plus question d'une irrigation de la partie nord de la zone. Plus tard encore, lorsque la 18. This was the response of Israel to the decision of the United Nations Chief of Staff. He therefore com­ municated to Israel his note of 20 October and to the Secretary-General his report of 23 October [S/3122], which has been transmitted to the Council. 19. All the time Syria was anxiously waiting in order to give the United Nations Chief of Staff time to give his best efforts to the enforcement of the Armistice Agreement and to allow him to become convinced of the ill will of Israel. At last, we had to send to the Security Council our letter of 12 October [S/3106], calling atten­ tion to the matter, and our letter of 16 October [S/3108/Rev.l], asking for urgent consideration of this dispute by the Council. 20. The decision of the United Nations Chief of Staff of 23 September and his final note of 20 October leave no doubt whatsoever as to the fact that these works are unwarranted and therefore should be stopped. 21. The decision of the Security Council on 27 October was a wise one in suspending the work and diminishing, for the time being, the tension in the area, while keeping the merits of the case intact. Israel, sensing the opinion of the Council that day that a suspension of the work would be decided on, acted wisely in giving its under­ taking before the Council and cleverly, too. Its attitude was indeed accounted for the next day by the United States Government's release of funds under special economic aid which that Government had previously blocked. The pretext, according to a large part of the Press, was that Israel, of its own accord, was kind enough to help facilitate the work of the Council. Yet the kindness was one that was given, it seems, for a price. These are the facts — and facts, at least, can be mentioned. 22. That may seem a side issue and it is one in which we do not like at this stage to indulge. It would be fair, however, to say that, in view of the consensus of the Council on 27 October, and of the bilateral dealings which Avould seem to have taken place that same day between Zionism and the United States, and of the refusal of Israel to abide by the decision of the United Nations Chief of Staff, the satisfaction with the attitude of Israel which the Council expressed in the circum­ stances should be interpreted only as an act of courtesy in which all the members of the Council took part. That satisfaction will not be allowed, I hope, to influence the merits of the case during the discussion. It certainly did not influence our opinion or our feeling of the urgency of the issue of upholding the decisions of the United Nations Chief of Staff and thus maintaining real peace in the area. 23. A communication from the Chief of Staff to the Council has been read here this afternoon. It seems that the work has not yet been completely stopped. Indeed, 24. The merits of the case being fully safeguarded by the previous decision of the Council, we can now proceed from that decision to deal with the matter. We shall try to do so as objectively as possible and without being lulled into any lack of diligence. It is evident that the final decision is the one that really matters, as the work is only suspended and, only suspended also are the attending tensions which it has created in the area. 25. The issue under consideration is undoubtedly the most important one that the Security Council has had to deal with since Count Bernadotte became United Nations Mediator in 1948. Yet, important as it is, the issue is distinct from other phases of the Palestine problem ; and it is clear. It consists of the activity of the Israel authorities in the demilitarized zone, as General Bennike described it, nothing more, nothing less. We sincerely hope that this issue will remain clear and that it will not be muddled with irrelevant issues of an economic nature so as to cause confusion which might blur the vision or divert attention from the real point at issue. We feel it necessary to emphasize the real and actual need for objectivity and clarity in the discussion because we already sense that our Zionist opponents are apt and ready to inject into the discussion irrelevant motives of Israel and its wishes to take away the waters of the Jordan, under some pretext, for its own purposes and its own use. 26. At one time, Syria was made to seem opposed to a constructive and useful project for irrigation and now is made to seem opposed to a similar project on hydro­ electric power. We, too, could have constructive projects on the Jordan waters, but the motives and wishes of Israel, and for that matter of Syria, are not to serve as criteria in cases of international action and discussion. They are not the object of the complaint we brought before the Council. What we are considering is the implementation of the Armistice Agreement with respect to the demilitarized zone. The Security Council itself is neither equipped nor, I might say, empowered to deal with problems other than those of security. The possible economic advantages and plans, wishes or motives of Syria or of the Israel authorities are not in themselves within the present purview of the discussion nor within, I might say, too, the high competence of the Security Council on matters of security. Whenever any aspect of the Palestine problem is discussed, Israel seeks to turn a simple and clear question into a complex one in order to confuse the discussion and to befog the atmosphere of the Council; the reason for this attitude is that Israel is making every effort to escape its clear international responsibilities under the Armistice Agree­ ment. We hope, therefore, that the discussion will be limited to the question under consideration and that the discussion of other matters will be ruled out of order by the President. 26. telle façon que la Syrie semblait hostile à un plan d'irrigation de caractère constructif et utile, et main­ tenant on les présente de telle manière que la Syrie semble hostile à un plan analogue relatif à la production d'énergie hydro-électrique. Nous aussi nous pourrions élaborer des plans constructifs concernant l'utilisation des eaux du Jourdain, mais les raisons qu'invoque Israël et ses désirs, et aussi les raisons et les désirs de la Syrie en cette matière, ne doivent pas servir de critère lorsqu'il mener des débats sur le plan international. Ils ne font pas l'objet de la plainte que nous avons portée devant le Conseil. Ce qui nous occupe, c'est la mise en œuvre de la Convention d'armistice en ce qui concerne la zone démilitarisée. Le Conseil de sécurité lui-même n'est nullement préparé à traiter des questions autres que les questions de sécurité, et je dirai même qu'il n'est pas habilité à le faire. Les avantages et les plans d'ordre économique, les désirs que pourraient exprimer les auto­ rités syriennes ou israéliennes et les motifs qu'elles pourraient invoquer n'entrent pas, quant à eux, dans le cadre de la discussion, et je dirai aussi qu'ils ne relèvent pas de la haute compétence du Conseil de sécurité qui doit examiner des questions relatives à la sécurité. Quel que soit l'aspect du problème palestinien qui est examiné, Israël s'efforce de transformer une question simple et claire en un problème complexe pour introduire dans la discussion un élément de confusion et embrouiller les débats du Conseil de sécurité est qu'Israël fait tout ce qui est en son pouvoir pour échapper aux responsabilités précises qui lui incombent. 27. In this preliminary statement, I shall try to avoid details and to put before the Council, as objectively as I can, the main reasons which gave rise to the present dispute and the main elements which form it. I shall, therefore, try to visualize the question from various angles; first, from the point of view of the obligations assumed under the Israeli-Syrian General Armistice Agreement by the two parties and the responsibilities deferred on the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization; then from the point of view of the work and the activities undertaken by the Israel authorities in the demilitarized zone; and finally, from the point of view of the Security Council's role and the possible remedies which the Council may, with its high authority, envisage. 28. The nature of the Syrian-Israel Armistice Agree­ ment, as in the case of armistice agreements in general, is a military one. This armistice, like many others, is a military and not a non-political act. This was em­ phasized by various provisions of the agreement and particularly in article II, paragraph 2 which provides that the agreement in question was "being dictated exclusively by military, and not by political, consider­ ations." In dealing, therefore, with the problem before us, the military, and not the political, economic or other considerations, are paramount. 29. This general and basic military and non-political purpose governed the negotiations and led to a series of specific provisions in the agreement concerning demar­ cation lines delineated in it and in the demilitarized zone, which is also one of its fundamental aspects. The demili­ tarized zone is now the main object of discussion. Article V, paragraph 1, emphasizes that the arrange­ ments made in the Agreement for the demarcation line and the demilitarized zone are "not to be interpreted as having any relation whatsoever to ultimate territorial arrangements affecting the two Parties ..." 30. Although no disposition of territory was made by the armistice, the authorities of Tel-Aviv, now in Jerusalem, are, by their works, trying to divert the Jordan River. In their other activities within the demili­ tarized zone, they are acting as if that territory were disposed of in their favour and as if Israel were sover­ eign in the area. We abide by the Armistice Agreement whereby neither the Syrian Government nor the author­ ities of Tel-Aviv are entitled to undertake, by their means and for their purpose, unilaterally, any activity whatsoever in that internationally controlled area intended to be a bulwark of the armistice system. The United Nations Chief of Staff clearly supports this view in his report. If no territory was disposed of by the Armistice Agreement, as it is clear from the texts I have quoted, then why were the demarcation lines and the demilitarized zone made? The answer to that is found in article V, paragraph 2, which clearly states the following : 32. à la question dans les termes suivants : "The principle that no military or political ad­ vantage should be gained under the truce ordered by the Security Council is recognized." 32. It is also answered by article II, paragraph 2 which provides that: "It is also recognized that no provision of this Agreement shall in any way prejudice the rights, claims and positions of either Party hereto in the ultimate peaceful settlement of the Palestine question, the provisions of this Agreement being dictated exclusively by military, and not by political, con­ siderations." 33. à cette question. 34. procurer aucun avantage militaire ou politique à l'une ni à l'autre partie, et qu'en aucun cas elle ne "porte préjudice aux droits, prétentions et position de l'une ou l'autre partie". Il est non moins clair que la zone démi­ litarisée a été créée pour séparer les deux parties et pour réduire au minimum les possibiHtés de conflit. Il s'ensuit donc que toute activité du genre de celle que poursuivent actuellement, dans la zone démilitarisée, les autorités israéliennes, et à laquelle s'opposent à la fois la Syrie et le Chef d'état-major, est injustifiée, et doit être interrompue et suivie du retour au le rapport envoyé le 23 septembre 1953 par le Chef d'état-major faisait déjà connaître au Conseil de sécurité la nature, l'importance et les effets de ces travaux. Ainsi que l'a mentionné le Chef d'état-major, ces travaux sont contraires à la Convention d'armistice aussi bien par leur nature et leur importance que par leurs effets ; ils sont le résultat d'une activité, exercée par Israël dans la zone démilitarisée, qui constitue une violation formelle des dispositions de la Convention. 35. blissement progressif de la vie normale dans la zone démilitarisée et le retour de la population dans ses foyers. Il est évident que ce rétablissement du régime civil doit profiter à la population de la région et qu'on ne saurait l'interpréter correctement comme impHquant la mainmise sur la zone démihtarisée par la Syrie ou par les autorités de Tel-Aviv. Les travaux considérés, de par leur nature et leur importance, ne constituent nullement un retour à l'état de choses antérieur, mais tendent bel et bien à créer une situation nouvelle, qui porte préjudice à la vie normale dans la zone démih­ tarisée proprement dite et sert les intérêts d'Israël, qui essaie de détourner le fleuve, causant ainsi un préjudice sérieux aussi bien à la région qu'aux prétentions, aux droits et à la position de l'autre partie à la Convention. 33. The provisions of article V apply to this situa­ tion, too. 34. It is clear that neither side under the Armistice Agreement can gain any military or political advantage and that the Agreement did not "prejudice the rights, claims and positions of either party". It is clear, too, that the demilitarized zone was established to separate the two sides and to minimize the possibility of conflict. It follows, therefore, that any activity of the nature now undertaken by the Israel authorities in the demilitarized zone, which is opposed both by Syria and the United Nations Chief of Staff, would be unwarranted and should be halted, and the situation restored to its original status. The nature, scope and effect of these works have, however, already been described to the Security Council in the report of the United Nations Chief of Staff of 23 September 1953. The nature and the scope of the works, as well as their effect, are contrary to the Armistice Agreement, as the United Nations Chief of Staff has mentioned, and are the result of Israel's activity in the demilitarized zone which is totally in opposition to the provisions of that Agreement. 35. The Armistice Agreement provides also for the gradual restoration of civilian life in the demilitarized zone and the return to it of its inhabitants. It is clear that that restoration is intended for the inhabitants of the area and cannot properly be interpreted as implying a mainmise by Syria or the authorities of Tel-Aviv of the demilitarized zone. The present works, by their nature and scope, are not a restoration but an innovation, detrimental to civilian life in the demilitarized zone itself and serving the interests of Israel, which seeks to take the river away from that zone and cause serious prejudice to the area as well as to the claims, rights and positions of the other party to the Agreement. That also has been made very clear in the report of the United Nations Chief of Staff. To say the least, Israel is not entitled to give its unilateral interpretation to the provisions of the Agreement concerning the restoration of civilian life in the demilitarized zone. This would be done by Israel in contravention of the provisions of the Armistice Agreement, especially articles II, V and VII. Yet Israel sought and implied the concurrence of the United Nations Chief of Staff without obtaining it. 36. I should like to explain very briefly how the inter­ national machinery is composed in the area and how it functions. In pursuance of the Armistice Agreement, a special international machinery for ensuring the im­ plementation of that Agreement was established, and it is composed of the following : first, the Mixed Armistice Commission headed by the United Nations Chief of Staff or his deputy; secondly, the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission, who has special powers and attributes of his own, separate and distinct from those of the Commission as such; thirdly, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, headed by the United Nations Chief of Staff; and, fourthly, the Secu­ rity Council, under whose vigilant supervision the whole set-up of the local machinery is to function with a view to the implementation of that Agreement. 37. The Mixed Armistice Commission is dealt with by article VII, especially by paragraphs 1 and 4 of that article. Paragraph 1 reads: "The execution of the provisions of this Agreement shall be supervised by a Mixed Armistice Commis­ sion composed of five members, of whom each Party to this Agreement shall designate two, and whose Chairman shall be the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization or a senior officer from the observer personnel of that organiza­ tion designated by him following consultation with both Parties to this Agreement." 38. Paragraph 4 reads : "Decisions of the Mixed Armistice Commission, to the extent possible, shall be based on the principle of unanimity. In the absence of unanimity, decisions shall be taken by majority vote of the members of the Commission present and voting." 39. The fact that the United Nations Chief of Staff is chairman of the commission, as stated in paragraph 1, and the fact that in the case of disagreement between the two parties his opinion becomes decisive, as stated in paragraph 4, makes his opinion a determining factor in the decisions of the Mixed Armistice Commission. 40. The chairman of the commission also has special attributes and powers of his own, distinct from those of presiding over the commission and casting a determining vote. The chairman is himself responsible for the full implementation of article V of the Agreement, and para­ graph 5 (c) of that article provides as follows : "(c) The Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Com­ mission established in article VII of this Agreement and United Nations observers attached to the Com­ mission shall be responsible for ensuring the full implementation of this article." 41. The distinct responsibility of the chairman, separate from that of the commission, covers a wide ground and range of questions, because article V is itself the main article of the Agreement with respect to the system of the Agreement, its machinery and its implementation. 42. Then there is the United Nations Truce Super­ vision Organization now employed to observe and help the implementation of the Agreement. This organization is under the command of the United Nations Chief of Staff. It is evident now that the chairman of the com­ mission has a triple capacity. First, he presides over the Mixed Armistice Commission and has a decisive vote in the case that the two parties disagree. Thus, he is expected to formulate final decisions. Secondly, he has the responsibility for ensuring the full imple­ mentation of article V, which includes, as we have seen, control of the activities within the demilitarized zone of the nature of those now under question. Thirdly, he directs the United Nations staff. In view of his triple capacity, the United Nations Chief of Staff, from Syria's point of view, is the central element of the whole machinery of the Armistice Agreement for ensuring the implementation of that Agreement locally. It is to his decisions that we have to look. 43. His decision concerning the works in question is well known, and the defiance of his decision by the Tel-Aviv authorities is also Avell known. We in Syria do not consider his decision concerning the works in question as adequate to meet the situation. In view of the attitude of Israel, something more must be done by the United Nations or else the policy of Israel, based on defiance of the United Nations authority and on the creation of what Israel considers to be accomplished facts, may lead to the use of the full right of legitimate defence in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. 44. The choice before us is clear. Either the Security Council will take measures to support the Chief of Staff, who represents international authority in that area, or events will be allowed to take their course. It is evident that Israel is now trying hard to knock out the central piece and pivot of the United Nations machinery in the area so that the whole machinery will be stilled or destroyed. That central piece of the machinery is the function of the United Nations Chief of Staff, whose authority Israel wants to destroy. If that authority is destroyed, for all practical purposes there would no longer be an armistice. Unilateral actions and events would take their course and no United Nations machinery and authority would be left. 43. bien connue, comme l'est aussi la méconnaissance de cette décision par les autorités de Tel-Aviv. La Syrie n'estime pas que la décision du Chef d'état-niajor con­ cernant les travaux réponde pleinement aux exigences de la situation. L'attitude d'Israël commande aux Na­ tions LInies de prendre des mesures plus énergiques pour éviter que la politique d'Israël, fondée sur la méconnaissance de l'autorité des Nations Unies et le recours à ce qu'Israël considère comme des faits accom­ plis, légitime défense que reconnaît l'Article SI de la Charte. 44. sont clairs. Ou le Conseil de sécurité prendra des mesures pour appuyer le Chef d'état-major, qui repré­ sente l'autorité internationale dans cette région, ou l'on permettra aux événements de suivre leur cours. Il est évident qu'Israël s'emploie par tous les moyens à détruire la pièce maîtresse des organes des Nations Unies dans la région, afin de paralyser ou de faire crouler tout l'édifice. Cette pièce maîtresse est constituée par les attributions du Chef d'état-major des Nations Unies, on pourrait dire qu'il n'y aurait plus de Convention d'armistice. Les actes et incidents unilatéraux suivraient leur cours, et il ne subsisterait en fait rien des organes et de l'autorité des Nations Unies. 45. désigné un médiateur, le comte Bernadotte. Il a été assassiné. L'autorité des Nations Unies, que celui-ci représentait, a ainsi été détruite par un acte sanglant, sans que l'Organisation des Nations Unies dans son ensemble ni ceux de ses Membres qui appuyaient Israël réagissent si peu que ce soit. 46. cette première expérience, Israël a tenté de nombreuses autres. Aujourd'hui, les autorités de Tel-Aviv ignorent d'une façon flagrante, en argumentant et en faisant preuve de malhonnêteté intellectuelle et d'arrogance, les décisions, non pas d'un médiateur ou d'un conciliateur, mais de celui qui détient une autorité internationale, qui lui a été conférée en vertu des décisions du Conseil de sécurité et d'une convention à laquelle les autorités de Tel-Aviv sont partie. 45. At one time, the United Nations appointed a Mediator, Count Bernadotte. He was slain. Thus, the authority of the United Nations •— which he repre­ sented — was destroyed in cold blood, and there was hardly any reaction from the United Nations as a whole or from those of its Members which supported Israel. 46. That was the signal for a new trend in Israel's policy. After that first experience, Israel proceeded to many others. Today, the Tel-Aviv authorities flout, in their argumentative and intellectually dishonest and arrogant manner, the decisions not of a mediator or conciliator but of the holder of international authority — authority acquired in virtue of the Security Council's actions and of an agreement to which the Tel-Aviv authorities are a party. 47. How can that policy lead one to believe that events in the Near East are developing for the better, or that this Council should continue to withhold true and effective international action ? 48. In the past, the Israel authorities certainly did not act on their own. They had the suppoil of some large Powers which were influenced by Zionist groups. Today, in this Council, we seek objectively, true impartiality, justice and prompt and effective action to put an end to a rapidly deteriorating situation, a situation which is already tense and highly explosive. 49. As I have said, the Security Council stands over and above the local international machinery. It was at the behest of the Security Council that the Armistice Agreement was concluded, and it is under the Security Council's supervision that that Agreement should operate. It is to the Security Councfl that we have now resorted. In that respect, it is proper to remain faithful to one basic consideration which governs the situation. 50. The Security Council may interest itself in the military and security aspects of the problem and not, therefore, in wide economic and other developments pertaining to Syria, Palestine or any other territory. The consideration of economic developments has no place here — either in virtue of the Agreement, which is a military act, nor in virtue of the Council's attributes as a body dealing with security problems. "Surely, the Security Council may examine matters which are speci­ fically mentioned in the Agreement or which are implied by that Agreement. 51. Our duty now is to direct our efforts towards presenting the facts of this case, facts which have already been summed up in General Bennike's report. In this connexion, I should like to draw the Security Council's attention to the following considerations: 52. At the time of the cease-fire and the conclusion of the armistice, practically all of the demilitarized zone within which the present work is being undertaken was in Syria's hands. In those circumstances, there was no reason whatever to force Syria out of that area; there was no reason for us to diminish our hold on it or to allow anyone except ourselves to exercise control over it. Nevertheless, we signed the Armistice Agreement and withdrew from that area, which is now demiH- tarized, at the behest of the United Nations Mediator, in order that the area might be put under international control — although it is actually under Israel control — and in order that the inhabitants of the area might return and normal civilian life might be restored. Although, under the Armistice Agreement, the truce continued, the Israel authorities subsequently used various pretexts and means in order to bring the zone under their control. 53. The Security Council is aware of the nature of those authorities' activities in the demilitarized zone, since, from March until May 1951, the Council dis­ cussed some of the aspects of those activities. Since that time, the situation has deteriorated. I shall do no more now than remind the Council of those activities so that members may retain them in their minds as indica­ tions of the Israel authorities' tendency to behave as though they were sovereign in the demilitarized area 55. It is best to remind the Council of some facts con­ cerning the work, although those facts are quite evident. 56. All of the Jordan River between Lake Huleh and Lake Tiberias flows through the demilitarized zone. Members of the Council have maps of the area to which they may refer, if they so desire. The river forms the main, the true geographical feature of the middle sector of the demilitarized zone — the zone which was estab­ lished to separate the parties and minimize friction and incidents, the zone which was demilitarized and placed under the system of international control which I have already described. 57. If the work in that demilitarized zone were com­ pleted, the whole situation would be substantially changed. For the work consists of canalizing the river and diverting it from the demilitarized zone into Israel- controlled territory. Without the river, the demilitarized zone would become almost meaningless from the mili­ tary point of view. From a landmark separating the two sides, the river would be transformed into a body of water held and controlled by Israel, from the northern tip of the demilitarized zone south of Huleh all the way down to Tiberias. It would be taken away from the demihtarized zone. 58. Without wishing to be too technical, using an allegorical expression to illustrate a fact I might say that Israel has penetrated the demilitarized zone to try to steal the Jordan. The thief hid his real purpose at first, but he was detected. He is now being followed by the United Nations Chief of Staff, and we, too, are following him into this Council. Let us hope that he will find no support in the form of delay in taking action, so that he may get away with his prize. There is always some motive or purpose behind the taking of any prize, but no motive or purpose could justify taking away the rights of others, or the very object of an agreement. 59. If Israel succeeds in its attempts to divert the Jordan River, there will necessarily be the following results, among others: 60. The river as an obstacle to the movement of troops in the demilitarized zone is, in the place where it now flows, within firing range of our artillery and infantry, should Israel forces move to attack. Were the river to be removed from the demilitarized zone to Israel, the entire defence set-up would be changed, and a military gain would be realized by the other side. But, under the Armistice Agreement, there should be no military gains by either side. 61. The factor of military gain is aggravated by another factor. There would be no water, or little water, flowing in the present bed of the river, and ordinary infantry, mechanized units, tanks and other means of combat could easily make the crossing. Without water, the river would no longer be a real obstacle. 62. The new canal in Israel, Avhich is to replace the present bed of the river, would remain an obstacle, but it would be completely controlled by Israel, outside the demilitarized zone. Israel could at will put bridges over the canal for the use of its own forces. No such bridges over the river could be built in the demilitarized zone — nor could they be charted and prepared in advance. 63. There is more. What is very important is that it would be possible for Israel, if the works were com­ pleted, to drain the present bed of the river or the new canal at will and thus to be able to form, in case of action, an obstacle at a time and place befitting its own plans. Israel could do so because the works are intended to regulate the flow in the old bed — or in the bed to be created — so that the water could be turned either way. 64. The control of the course of the river and the possible use of the canal by Israel as a military factor enables that country to reduce its forces in that area for use elsewhere. It is a very important military advantage. Moreover, the river now separating the two States and minimizing friction would be removed. The diversion of the river would have other effects too. It would put the whole civilian life of the demilitarized zone literally at the mercy of Israel, for the water it would control is vital in that arid area. Water gives life to cattle, crops and men, a life which Israel would control. That would not be a restoration of normal civilian life to the inhabitants of the demilitarized zone but an exceedingly important and dangerous situation. Instead of a gradual restoration to normal civilian life in the demilitarized zone, as the Armistice Agreement has provided, Israel would be abruptly creating a situation whereby civilian life would not be restored to normal. In fact, these works are already prejudicing the established rights of irrigation and motive power which the flow of water was giving to the Arabs. If these works are completed, then neither the rights of the inhabitants of the demilitarized zone nor those of Syria, will remain secure. 65. General Bennike, in his report of 23 September [S/3122, annex /] and in his note of 20 October [S/3122, annex III], referred to such rights, and I need not take up your time at this stage to go into any details concerning them. He has forgotten, however, to mention a number of them which we may later bring before the Council. Suffice it to say that the property in the demili­ tarized zone could be affected by the works, which give control of the water to Israel. That property — more than 99 per cent of it — is owned by Arabs. The poten­ tial usefulness, in the future, of the Jordan River for the Republic of Syria and the Kingdom of Jordan would also be jeopardized by the current works, for, once the 66. les travaux dans la zone démilitarisée sont-ils, oui ou non, entrepris sur des terres appartenant à des Arabes Cette question est, à notre point de vue, peu importante, car nous considérons la zone démilitarisée comme un tout au titre de la Convention d'armistice. Israël n'a aucun pouvoir d'y entreprendre des travaux, non plus que la Syrie. Leurs droits sont, à cet égard, absolument égaux. Toutefois, pour plus de clarté et à titre d'infor­ mation, je voudrais faire observer que plus de 99 pour 100 des terres de la zone démilitarisée, entre le lac de Houle et le lac de Tibériade, au sud de Kasr-Atra où les travaux ont été commencés, appartiennent à des Arabes. Comment les travaux pourraient-ils se pour­ suivre dans cette zone sans porter atteinte au droit de propriété des Arabes? Il s'ensuit donc que les travaux ne peuvent être accomplis dans la zone démilitarisée à moins d'utiliser des terres appartenant à des Arabes. Les propriétaires refusent de céder leurs terres. Quant à l'expropriation, ce serait un acte de souveraineté qu'Israël ne peut accomphr dans la zone démihtarisée. Il serait certes curieux d'imposer une expropriation de terres arabes ou de porter atteinte aux droits des Arabes, dans la zone démilitarisée, au bénéfice d'Israël et au détriment de cette zone, de ses habitants et de la vie civile. 66. There is another question which I should, hke to deal with, and that is as follows : whether the works in the demilitarized zone are being undertaken on land owned by the Arabs or not. This question is, from our point of view, immaterial, because our view is based on the fact that the whole demilitarized zone is one unit in the system of the Armistice Agreement, where Israel has no power to undertake any activity. This also applies to Syria. Their rights in that zone are, as far as that is concerned, equal. Yet, for the sake of further clarification and information, I should like to mention the following; more than 99 per cent of the demilitarized zone, between Lakes Huleh and Tiberias, to the south of Qasr Atra where the works have started, is, as I have said, owned by Arabs. How could the works in that zone be continued without infringing on Arab- owned property? It follows, therefore, that the works cannot be done in the demilitarized zone without the use of Arab-owned land. The owners refuse to cede the land. As to expropriation, that would be an act of sovereignty which Israel cannot perform in the demili­ tarized area. It would indeed be queer to require the expropriation of Arab land or of Arab rights in the demilitarized zone for the benefit of Israel and to the detriment of the zone itself, its inhabitants, and the civilian life in it. 67. rapport, une bonne partie de cette zone tomberait en friche. Comme je l'ai déjà dit, le différend ne porte pas sur la question de savoir si ces terres appartiennent ou non à des Arabes, car la zone démilitarisée forme un tout indivisible, mais sur le fait que ces travaux ont été entrepris sur des terres possédées par des Arabes au point de coordonnées X 208.900-Y 267.700 et alentour. On doit y créer un bassin et un canal régulateur. Depuis le début de ces travaux, Israël n'a cessé d'utihser des terres appartenant à des Arabes. 67. As General Bennike said in his report, a good part of that area would be turned into a wasteland. Whether the lands are owned by Arabs or not is, as I have said, not the point of contention, because the demilitarized zone is one unit. But the fact is there that the works have, indeed, been started on Arab-owned land at and around the co-ordination point X 208,900- Y 267,700. There a basin and a regulator are to be established. Israel, since the initial stages of the work and after, has constantly been using Arab land. 68. présent dans le détail de la question: les terres de la famille Al-Hindi ont été utilisées pour ces travaux par Israël, qui a installé des machines, abattu des arbres fruitiers, creusé des canalisations et surtout fait venir dans la zone démilitarisée ses forces paramilitaires et sa police afin d'y mettre ses intentions à exécution. Les 68. To illustrate my point, I will mention one example without going into too much detail at this stage: the lands of the Al-Hindi family were used for the works. There Israel stationed machinery, cut fruit trees, made canalizations, and, above all, brought into that land in the denfilitarized zone its para-military forces and police to enforce its will. United Nations observers have some information about that particular example and were seen taking photographs. 69. Summing up, I should like to state the following : (1) The object of these works is to divert the Jordan River, draw it to Israel-held territory, and make it a military factor within Israel borders, putting its waters, an essential element of civilian life of the zone, under Israelite control. That is being done to the detriment of military and other considerations involved. (2) The works are being carried out/in defiance of the Armistice Agreement and the decision of General Bennike, Chief of the United Nations Trjace Supervision Organization, and entails serious consequences which motivated his decision as explained in his report. (3) These works demonstrate a policy\on the part of Israel defying the United Nations machinery and disregarding the Armistice Agreements. 70. Let us now move on to consider what the Security Council may, in its wisdom, do. We should like, at this stage, simply to give an indication of our view, while reserving the right to state if in full at a later stage of the discussion. The present acts of Israel in the demili­ tarized zone are, indeed, acts of sovereignty which it does not possess. Israel should be told by the Council to behave in a way which does not factually or legally influence the rights, claims or positions of the other side, safeguarded by the Armistice Agreements. Needless to say, these rights are not to be disposed of by the Council itself. The situation in the demilitarized zone in general, and in particular with regard to the unwarranted works under consideration, may be brought back to its original status and condition. 71. The international machinery to help supervise and implement the General Armistice Agreement can be locally strengthened so as to enable it to fulfil its func­ tions properly, promptly and effectively. That local international machinery is the one which can act on the spot. It is essential to strengthen it and that may be achieved by combining two methods. One way is for the Security Council to uphold the local international authority by practical, clear and unambiguous decisions — decisions befitting their name. The second way is to build up that machinery in membership and means at its disposal so as to render it apt and adequate to achieve its purpose. The economy in men and means which has prevailed up to now if permitted to continue, may wreck the whole armistice system. 72. Previous experience has taught us, I hope, that the United Nations decisions have been and are being systematically flouted by Israel. In no instance did it abide by any of them. Israel and its supporters in the United Nations have previously sought to have the United Nations take these decisions largely in an effort to legalize Israel's actions at a given stage, from which stage Israel then proceeded to create new situations in disregard of these very decisions and recommendations and in contravention of the General Armistice Agree­ ment. It is essential to look for the reasons which enabled and encouraged Israel to act in such a manner. Reasons can best be found in the attitudes and actions of some big Powers, and particularly in the support of a military, diplomatic, financial and economic nature which Israel has been receiving, aided as it is by the 74. We concluded the General Armistice Agreement with the authorities of Tel-Aviv who now occupy Jerusalem. Experience in the implementation of that Agreement may, therefore, be looked upon as a reflection of Israel's real attitude. Without positive decisions and proper sanctions it may be impossible to implement it. Past experience may make us call upon the Council to look in that direction.

I should like to say at the outset that, unlike the representative of Lebanon, I am competent to express an opinion on the letter which was read at the beginning of the meeting. It is, of course, as any study of its contents should reveal, a statement of complete compliance with the undertaking which I gave to the Council at the 631st meeting. 76. I welcome this opportunity to give a preliminary outline of my Government's views on the unfounded objections raised by Syria against the execution of the Banat Ya'qub canal project under a concession held by the Palestine Electric Corporation. I have an opportun­ ity now of making the first serious contribution to today's discussion and I will try to use it carefully and with restraint. 77. The problem before us raises many points of detail, on each of which I shall be prepared to make a fuller submission at future meetings. I shall invite the Security Council to reaffirm such principles and proce­ dures as will facilitate the resumption of this work. I have no doubt that the Security Council, in conformity with the highest judicial principles, will embark upon this investigation with no prior commitment to any of the viewpoints submitted to it, and especially the kind of vituperation which figured too largely in the previous speech should not determine the atmosphere of this discussion. 78. Amidst the difficulties and stress of recent weeks, we have endeavoured to demonstrate the high serious­ ness of this problem for our present welfare and for our future destiny. Neither Syria nor any other people has its whole national future at issue in this case. For Israel and for Israel alone, the principles here involved touch the very essence of national and economic independence. 79. I have circulated a detailed map of the project under discussion. It provides for the erection of a power station to be located at the southern end of a new canal marked in black which will extend from the River Jordan south of the Banat Ya'qub bridge to Lake Tiberias. Starting 40 metres above sea level, the canal will proceed to a point 200 metres below sea level at a distance of some 2 kilometres west of the Jordan where the power station will be built. The power generated will, in the course of three years, pay off the cost of the entire project. When the construction of the canal is completed, which will be within a period of two to three years, the amount of water required for the generation of electricity will be diverted into the canal and thence into Lake Tiberias. 80. Thus, even after the construction of the canal, the River Jordan will continue to flow in its existing bed without alteration of its general course. All the waters of the Jordan, both in their original bed and in the newly constructed canal, will flow into Lake Tiberias. The diversion of water into the canal is contemplated after the completion of its construction, which will be in a period of between two and three years. 81. This project is being carried out under the con­ cession granted on 5 March 1926 to the Palestine Electric Corporation, a concession for the utilization of the waters of the rivers Jordan and Yarmuk for generating and supplying electric energy. This conces­ sion constitutes a legally established private right, deriving from the period before Israel's establishment. It is a right which, according to the principles of inter­ national law, any government would be obliged to respect and to uphold. 82. The electricity to be generated in the new plant near Lake Tiberias will be used for industrial and civilian purposes. It could also be integrated into broader national or regional power or irrigation schemes. The canal itself could form an organic part of any regional or national water arrangement. Indeed, its construction and location are entirely consistent with all regional water schemes which we have had an oppor­ tunity to study, including those recently brought to our notice. At present, however, and for a few years ahead, we are considering only the hydroelectric project now under discussion. The existence of this project has been on public record for many years ; and in every stage of its planning and execution the Government of Israel and the Palestine Electric Corporation have been author­ itatively advised by experts of international experience and renown, mostly from the United States of America. 83. The River Jordan, which supplies the waters for this project, flows through Israel territory into Lake Huleh, thence into Lake Tiberias, entering Arab terri­ tory for the first time south of Lake Tiberias in an area occupied by the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. The River Jordan does not touch the territory of Syria at any single point. At no place does the Syrian border come up to the banks of the River Jordan. Thus the statement of the representative of Syria in a letter to the Security Council on 16 October 1953 [S/3108/ Rev.l] that "the Jordan separates Syria from Palestine" is simply untrue. The international frontier of the Syrian Republic was established in 1922, and has not been modified in the General Armistice Agreement, under which all Syrian forces were withdrawn from territory which they had aggressively occupied beyond g4. This point is of some importance in the broad perspectives of our debate. The immediate issue is a hydro-electric project essential to Israel's economic development. To execute this project is a worthy and legitimate objective in itself; but behind the specific project lies an issue of principle of far greater magnitude and scope. The question is whether Israel's access to the only meagre source of natural power and surplus water available to it shall be submitted to the mercy of a neighbouring State implacably opposed to co-operation with Israel and bent upon our economic downfall. If any such sinister veto policy were approved — which we cannot believe will happen — our country would face economic servitude and dependence ; its bright vision of social progress and stability would be obscured; large areas would be doomed to perpetual aridity, while sur­ plus waters in the north remained piled up in useless swamps, imprisoned by an illegitimate Syrian veto. Israel would have nothing before it but permanent dependence, even for its daily bread, upon external sources of aid. 85. This is a fate which we are absolutely determined to avoid, and against which we must develop every resource of legitimate resistance. What is for Syria a single phase of its avowed political and economic war­ fare against Israel, and for other countries an inter­ national dispute of marginal importance, is for Israel a vital issue of national freedom and economic inde­ pendence. For Syria to control Israel's water sources would be to clutch our country at its throat and to command its prospect of development and growth. For Israel to command them has no such effect on Syria, whose vast abundant rivers dwarf our meagre water resources and poignantly illustrate the unseemly avarice of this complaint. 86. This project for the construction of an electric power station on Israel's soil deserves nothing but sym­ pathy and support. This plan, as I shall show, is not inconsistent with any instrument of international law, nor is it incompatible with any provision of the Syrian- Israel General Armistice Agreement. Nor was the Syrian representative accurate in stating that the incom­ patibility of this project with the Syrian-Israel General Armistice Agreement had ever been stated by any United Nations authority. It cannot legally, or morally, be made subject to Syria's veto, for it does not adversely affect Syrian interests. It has no relevance to any legi­ timate military considerations to which the United Nations owes deference. Moreover, the jurisprudence of this very Security Council in a case of simi ar effect in the same area in 1951 provides the most explicit au­ thority and justification for this work. 87. While it is true, as I have said, that all established private or public rights can be reconciled with the continuation of this project, its non-continuation wonlá constitute an arbitrary violation both of a valid private concession and of the legitimate development interests of the State of Israel. Finally, this project can be carried out without prejudice to any private land rights and 85. This is a fate which we are absolutely determined to avoid, and against which we must develop every resource of legitimate resistance. What is for Syria a single phase of its avowed political and economic war­ fare against Israel, and for other countries an inter­ national dispute of marginal importance, is for Israel a vital issue of national freedom and economic inde­ pendence. For Syria to control Israel's water sources would be to clutch our country at its throat and to command its prospect of development and growth. For Israel to command them has no such effect on Syria, whose vast abundant rivers dwarf our meagre water resources and poignantly illustrate the unseemly avarice of this complaint. 86. This project for the construction of an electric power station on Israel's soil deserves nothing but sym­ pathy and support. This plan, as I shall show, is not inconsistent with any instrument of international law, nor is it incompatible with any provision of the Syrian- Israel General Armistice Agreement. Nor was the Syrian representative accurate in stating that the incom­ patibility of this project with the Syrian-Israel General Armistice Agreement had ever been stated by any United Nations authority. It cannot legally, or morally, be made subject to Syria's veto, for it does not adversely a.ffect Syrian interests. It has no relevance to any legi­ timate military considerations to which the United Nations owes deference. Moreover, the jurisprudence of this very Security Council in a case of similar effect in the same area in 1951 provides the most explicit au­ thority and justification for this work. 87. While it is true, as I have said, that all established private or public rights can be reconciled with the continuation of this project, its non-continuation would constitute an arbitrary violation both of a valid private concession and of the legitimate development interests of the State of Israel. Finally, this project can be carried out without prejudice to any private land rights and without depriving any lands or populations of their normal irrigation waters. 88. In elaboration of the arguments which I have enumerated, I shall invite the Security Council to a more detailed consideration of each single point at issue. Today my main objective is to lay down the general outline of our position. 89. Let me first explain how this matter comes before the Security Council. The plan of the Palestine Electric Corporation to proceed with work on this project was communicated orally to General Bennike in Jerusalem on 31 July 1953, and more formally on 2 September and again on 3 September to Colonel Tillotson, Acting Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission, who was given information on the project and shown a map thereof. Assurances were given that all arrangements for the plan would be consistent with the principles laid down by the Security Council in May 1951 for civilian work in the demilitarized zone, and specifically that no digging would be undertaken on Arab-owned land and that existing irrigation needs would be fully preserved. In the light of these assurances, the Chairman expressed his concurrence with the project, and a letter confirming these understandings was despatched to him on 4 September 1953. In the ensuing weeks, the United Nations Chief of Staff and his representatives drew our attention to certain aspects of the work which should be modified in the interests of civilian life in the demili­ tarized zone. They did not, however, raise any questions concerned with the project itself. 90. On 23 September 1953, when the work had been in progress for over three weeks, the United Nations Chief of Staff addressed to my Government a letter, now before the Security Council, requesting the sus­ pension of the work on certain specific grounds. The Israel Minister for Foreign Affairs rephed in detail on 24 September 1953, pointing out that the objections raised against the project were in part factually in­ accurate, and in other parts inconsistent with the under­ takings and conclusions previously reached by the Security Council. General Bennike was accordingly invited to reconsider his request. 91. Discussions on many complex and intricate details followed in subsequent meetings; in a meeting held on 28 September, the Minister for Foreign Affairs made an offer, later confirmed in writing, to suspend tempo­ rarily the work for a period of reasonable length to enable the investigation to proceed. In a letter dated 14 October, General Bennike wrote "that the very grounds which in your opinion would have justified a temporary suspension of the work no longer exist today", and at a meeting on 15 October the Israel Government and General Bennike mutually agreed that the matter might be pursued in the Security Council. I must point out that the action which the Security Council so generously and unanimously applauded at the 631st meeting has been our policy in this matter — and has been known to be our policy — since 28 September. I therefore cannot accept the Syrian representative's observations on this subject, and his intrusion into a discussion of American-Israel relations seems to me to fall far short of the most elementary level of international courtesy. 93. I do not recollect all the fearful consequences for Syria, the Near East and for humanity at large which were then ascribed to the drainage of the Huleh marshes; but all the arguments heard in our present discussion were invoked by Syria at that time, and rejected or surmounted. It was alleged that private Arab rights were prejudiced; it was alleged that a so-called "military-advantage" would be gained for Israel, and that Syria's consent was indispensable to the pursuit to any work in the demilitarized zone. The Security Council and the United Nations Chief of Staff devoted much time and thought to these claims and charges. It was finally revealed that Syrian objections to the drainage of the Huleh marshes lacked any substance or justification ; and after measures had been taken for the protection of private land interests, this development project went forward without international challenge, notwithstanding Syrian opposition. 94. In the course of its 1951 discussions, the Security Council and the United Nations Chief of Staff developed a specific and detailed jurisprudence, which has since, in our view, constitued the policy of the United Nations in matters relating to civilian development in the Demili­ tarized Zone. The Security Council expressed a con­ sensus of opinion in favour of encouraging such develop­ ment work in the Demilitarized Zone provided, of course, that legitimate private interests could be adequately protected. The Syrian attempt to invoke an issue of "military advantage" was categorically rejected by General Riley in his capacity as Chief of Staff. The project was adapted to avoid encroachments on private and interests. It was specifically ruled that the proce­ dures for carrying out the project in the demilitarized zone should be approved not by Syria, but by the United Nations Chief of Staff acting as the custodian of the interests of local Arab inhabitants ; and then the work went forward in the demilitarized zone with specific United Nations authorization, notwithstanding Syria's opposition. Indeed, the rejection of the doctrine that Syrian consent was required for the execution of Israeli development projects, even involving work in the demilitarized zone, was the most conspicuous and emphatic conclusion to which the United Nations came in its 1951 discussions. ^5. It is really strange to see an alleged Syrian right of veto invoked in the Syrian complaint, when this Matter has been decisively settled in the jurisprudence of the United Nations. I ascribe this issue of the Syrian ^eto to Syria, because it has not been heard of officially 95. dans sa plainte un prétendu droit de veto syrien, alors from any other source. My point is that it has been decisively established in United Nations debates that the agi-eement required for such projects in the demih­ tarized zone is between the concessionaire company, on the one hand, and the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission, on the other hand, in his capacity as custodian of private interests of the inhabitants oí the demilitarized zone, and it has also been estabhshed that the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission pos­ sesses a right to influence such normal civilian projects only for the purpose of protecting other private interests. 96. Let me illustrate these conclusions from the record. In April and May 1951, a situation very similar to that now before the Security Council, relating to the same area and to the same agreement, was exhaustively discussed. Israel had embarked upon a scheme to drain the Huleh marshes by working in the demilitarized zone a few kilometres north of the present hydroelectrical project. Syria asserted that this work could not proceed without Syrian consent. The Israel position was that since the concession was a valid legal right, and since there was no bar in the General Armistice Agreement to normal civilian life in the demihtarized zone, neither the consent of Syria nor that of the United Nations Chief of Staff was required. 97. The Security Council took a middle view. It rejected the view that Syrian consent was required. But Israel was not upheld in our contention that the Chair­ man of the Mixed Armistice Commission lacked juris­ diction to delay the execution of a normal civilian project. Thus the Security Council reached the view that such projects could not be vetoed by Syria but could be held up at the behest of the United Nations Chief of Staff only for the purpose of ensuring that other legitimate private interests were saved from prejudice. 98. Thus, in reply to the question whether United Nations authorities were concerned with the Huled drainage project itself, the Chief of Staff, General Riley, said [544th meeting] : "Only where it involves land within the demili­ tarized zone which is the property of Arab refugees. That is the only part of that concession with which we have anything to do. It is not the concession itself but the expropriating of land essential to the carrying out of the project of the Huleh concession. It is regrettable that within the demilitarized zone there should be 7 or 8 acres of land so located as to inter­ fere with the project itself. However, I am not involving myself at any time in the Huleh concession as a concession. I am only interested in protecting the rights of Arab refugees who are within the demili­ tarized zone and whose land is expropriated without their consent." 99. At a later stage of the same meeting, the General said: "I feel that the United Nations should never impede progressive work. However, I am involved here with the Armistice Agreement in which the United Nations is charged with the normal restoration 100. The Chief of Staff was interrogated at this table and was asked directly whether the Huleh project violated any provision of the Armistice Agreement. He replied : "I do not believe that you will find anything in the Armistice Agreement in this respect. I have never questioned the right of the Huleh concession as a whole. I have always maintained that if it can be done without expropriating Arab land within the demili­ tarized zone, it is not a problem for the Mixed Armistice Commission or for the Chairman." 101. At its 547th meeting on 18 May 1951, the Security Council was clearly disposed to accept General Riley's limited definition of the reservations applying to development projects in the demilitarized zone. The operative paragraph of the draft resolution under dis­ cussion [S/2152/Rev.l] asked that the Palestine Land Development Company should be instructed to: "cease all operations in the demilitarized zone until such time as an agreement is arranged through the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission for continuing this project". 102. The Security Council will note that similar language concerning the need for an agreement now occurs in General Bennike's request for a stay of work on the hydro-electrical project. But the problem before us is to define more specifically who the parties to such an agreement must be, and it is here that we have the clearest and most specific answer in the 1951 debate. The representative of the Netherlands, Ambassador van Balluseck, asked whether the requirements of agreement through the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commis­ sion meant that nothing could happen unless the interested parties agreed. He went on to say that : "In that case, protracted disagreement among the parties could well mean the indefinite stoppage of the work. I wonder whether such is the proper inter­ pretation. If, in the eyes of the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission, the drainage works were considered to be in the interest of the restoration of normal civilian life, would it indeed be the right course that the continued absence of any agreement between the parties should be an obstacle to any progress ?" 103. Then on behalf of the sponsors of the resolution — France, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States — Sir Gladwyn Jebb replied with the utmost precision : "If I may summarize the intentions which the sponsors of this draft resolution had in mind... I should like to say that they hope that a negotiated settlement between the Palestine Land Development Company and the landowners might be quickly achieved" — here was a specific definition of the parties involved — "but that if in spite of the clearly expressed views of the Council to this effect no such negotiated settlement proved possible, then the proce­ dures and the machinery provided by the General Armistice Agreement should be used in order to make a final settlement possible." 104. The Council will note how the entire emphasis in these declarations is in favour of the continuation and resumption of the work by the removal of such legitimate obstacles as existed in their path. I should therefore fike to draw the Security Council's attention with the utmost care to this authoritative definition of the provision concerning the need for an agreement. 105. It will be seen that the parties did not include Syria. The parties are the concessionaire company and certain Arab landowners with interests in the demih­ tarized zone. It was ruled that the interests of the landowners might be represented by the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission as the custodian of civilian life in the zones. The views presented then by Sir Gladwyn Jebb were supported on behalf of France. Mr. Lacoste said : "What will happen if the agreement which General Riley is instructed to facilitate does not later materialize? Will this lack of agreement indefinitely prevent the resumption of work which is of great utility and which the Israel delegation justly regards as of great urgency? That is certainly not what my delegation understood." 106. On behalf of the United States, Ambassador Gross, referring to some apprehensions which I had expressed, said : "The representative of Israel referred in his state­ ment — I quote from it — to the apprehension of his Government that, as he said, 'the text of the draft resolution : irrespective of the intention of its sponsors, does confer a veto power upon the very interests which are implacably opposed to the drainage of the Huleh swamps. Since there will be no agreement, there will be no drainage'. That is a quotation from the statement made by the representative of Israel this afternoon. In associating the delegation of the United States with the statement made by Sir Gladwyn Jebb just now, I hope that the appre­ hension expressed by the representative of Israel will have been met. I should like to underline, on behalf of my delegation, the comment made on behalf of all the sponsors by Sir Gladwyn Jebb, that the sponsors of the draft resolution are all agreed that the Lake Huleh drainage project would undoubtedly promote the general welfare of the area, and on general grounds they would like to see it put into effect as soon as possible." 107. All this concerns a development project which necessitated work in the demilitarized zone. 108. The representative of the Netherlands then summed up the position as follows : "This, in effect, would mean that neither of the parties possesses in practice a veto power over the other in this respect, which I believe is a very sound position." 109. An eloquent observation to the same effect came from the representative of Ecuador. 110. If, in 1951, Syrian veto power was not accepted by the United Nations in theory, it is even clearer that that veto power was not accepted in practice. For the Palestine Land Development Company found it possible 111. This decision is of special interest because at a preliminary stage of the discussion General Riley had been under some impression that Syrian consent was required, but the emphatic pronouncements which I have quoted illustrate how he reached a different view under the impact of the Security Council's own discussion. Finally, the United Nations doctrine about the parties between whom an agreement must be arranged reached its most specific definition at the sixty-second Israel- Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission meeting, at which General Riley said: "At no time in my capacity as Chief of Staff and in statements made before the Security Council did I ever deal with the Huleh drainage project as a project. The project itself, in my mind, is outside the competence of either the Mixed Armistice Commis­ sion or the Chairman of the Commission. "Therefore the Security Council resolution as adopted does call for the stoppage of work within the demilitarized zone until the Chairman can make arrangements that are satisfactory to the Arab land owners and to the Palestine Land Development Company." 112. Syria continued to oppose, and the United Nations to support, the drainage of the Huleh marshes. Those members of the Security Council who remember the rather tormented discussions which we had three years ago will be glad, I think, to .hear that the Huleh drainage project is going forward to swift completion, liberating thousands of acres for food production, banishing swamps and promising in time to create a new volume of water for the Jordan river bed. 113. But the whole purport and balance of those con­ clusions are clear: first, a clear and definitely respon­ sible bias in favour of the continuation of development projects; secondly, the reservation, for their con­ tinuation, hmited to the protection of other private rights, without, however, any cancellation of the recog­ nized private rights which at that time belonged to the Palestine Land Development Company and which, in our present case, pertain to the Palestine Electric Cor­ poration. But the doctrine that there was some initial or abstract ban upon the carrying out of concessions in the demilitarized zone had not the slightest shred of international support. 114. My delegation attaches great importance to the background which I have cited. The armistice system cannot operate honestly or effectively if there is to be no consistency and continuity in its jurisprudence. In 1951 it was held lawful for a concessionaire holding statutory and legal property rights in the demilitarized zone to alter the Jordan bed for drainage, provided that private land interests were respected. It is then equally lawful for a legitimate concessionaire now to construct a canal for electric power in the same area and under an equally valid title, provided that other private rights are not prejudiced. If Syria's objections to work in the demilitarized zone leading to the drainage of marshes outside the zone were rejected in 1951, then equally they cannot be accepted now with regard to work in the demilitarized zone leading to power and irrigation devel­ opment outside the zone. If the drainage project was subject only to the reservations of private rights in 1951, then another project in the same area cannot be subject to new and more far-reaching reservations today. The Security Council cannot, in all honour and justice, transform the law of yesterday into the illegality of today. We cannot be selective in the application of principles. If the United Nations and the governments concerned will show fidelity to the ideas and principles which they enunciated in the summer of 1951, there is no insuperable obstacle to the peaceful execution of this hydro-electric project, with the fuh protection of other legitimate interests. 115. I shall now make some general observations on the objections which have been raised against this project in the demilitarized zone. 116. In his letter to Mr. Sharett of 20 October [S/3122j annex III], General Bennike brings us, I think, considerably nearer the possibility and the prospect of a solution. In paragraph 4 of his letter, he specifically and correctly defines the limits within which the authority of the Chief of Staff operates under the Armistice Agreement. He makes it clear, as did his predecessor in a similar case, that he does not feel called upon to pronounce on the legitimacy of the devel­ opment project as a whole. He is concerned only with Article V of the General Armistice Agreement, which lays down the functions of the Chief of Staff with respect to the demilitarized zone. Only in so far as any •work on this project in the demilitarized zone may afïect the rights of other parties in that zone does General Bennike feel that he has a responsibility. Thus, he writes in his letter of 20 October: "I can state today that the question of the rights involved in the concession granted by the High Com­ missioner for Palestine to the Palestine Electric Cor­ poration Limited on 5 March 1926 does not fall within the jurisdiction of the Mixed Armistice Cominission or its chairman, but that I am only concerned with the implementation of article V of the General Armistice Agreement. The provisions of article V include the protection of the rights of Arab owners whose land should not be worked upon, flooded or deprived of water without their consent, and also the protection of acquired rights to the water of the River Jordan which flows in the demilitarized zone and which has been used up to now for irrigating lands, watering cattle or operating mills." 117. Here, then, we have a clear and specific definition, I think, in rather limited terms, of the responsibilities and concerns of the United Nations Chief of Staff in the demilitarized zone. A similar picture emerges with even greater clarity from paragraph 6 of the same letter rétablissement graduel de la vie civile normale dans la zone démilitarisée; (a) Whether the work so far performed has inter­ fered with normal civilian life in the demilitarized zone ; à gêner le rétablissement de cette vie; et (b) Whether the construction of the projected canal within the demilitarized zone will interfere with such life ; and de l'article V de la Convention d'armistice général con­ cernant la séparation des forces armées des deux parties sera compromis par les travaux en question. 119. vérité il me semble qu'elle ne pourrait avoir d'autre signification — que, si l'on peut trouver des réponses satisfaisantes à ces trois questions, les travaux entrepris dans la zone peuvent être poursuivis. C'est pourquoi elles méritent d'être étudiées de très près par le Conseil. Sur les trois points que j'ai enumeres en me fondant sur cette correspondance officielle, un certain nombre d'ob­ jections et de questions particulières ont été soulevées au cours des quelques semaines qui viennent de s'écouler. Selon les termes de la lettre du général Bennike, il s'agit propriété foncière, sur les pratiques d'irrigation exis­ tantes et sur la démilitarisation. Ce sont là, en réalité, les questions que nous avons à examiner. (c) Whether the first object mentioned in article V, paragraph 2 of the General Armistice Agreement, con­ cerning the separation of the armed forces of the two parties, will be afifected by the work in question. 119. It is a fair conclusion from this letter — indeed, it seems to me to have no other possible meaning — that if satisfactory answers can be found to these three ques­ tions, then the work in the zone may proceed. These details therefore deserve the Security Council's close and meticulous attention. Under the three headings which I have enumerated, on the basis of this official correspondence, a number of specific objections and questions have been raised over the past few weeks. In terms of General Bennike's letter these are issues of land rights, issues of existing irrigation practices and issues of demilitarization. Those are really the three issues before us. 120. I feel fully entitled to state on the basis of the 20 October letter that these are the only three sub­ stantive issues before the Security Council. An answer to these questions is, therefore, an answer to the prob­ lem which now confronts the Security Council, whether or not the United Nations has any reason to oppose the continuation of work on the hydro-electric project. 120. me fondant sur la lettre du 20 octobre, que ce sont les seules questions importantes dont est saisi le Conseil de sécurité. Une réponse à ces questions serait donc la solution du problème auquel le Conseil de sécurité doit maintenant faire face, à savoir: l'Organisation des Nations Unies a-t-elle ou non des raisons de s'opposer à la continuation des travaux de développement hydro­ électriques 121. After careful and deliberate consideration I am able to state that the Government of Israel is able to offer binding and conclusive proof and assurance covering all three of the considerations involved: question, je suis en mesure de déclarer que le Gouver­ nement d'Israël est à même de donner des preuves convaincantes et concluantes et des assurances concer­ nant les trois points en question : 122. First, with re'spect to land, the project under discussion does not necessitate any digging on Arabowned land within the demilitarized zone. The Syrian representative's statement that 99 per cent of the land affected by this canal project is Arab-owned is so startling and fantastic that I have no words with which to describe it. At the top of the map the members of the Security Council may see marked as Arab land the area involved. I am very little impressed by some of the specific details which he gave us as regards the lands of the Al-Hindi family, lands which cover onehalf of an acre, and in which the complaint of encroach­ ment has been that a branch was cut off a tree. But, at any rate, this land exists. And to avoid such encroach­ ment and in order to conform with the principles which pas nécessaire, pour exécuter le projet qui fait l'objet de nos débats, de creuser dans des terres arabes, à l'intérieur de la zone démilitarisée. La déclaration du représentant de la Syrie selon laquelle 99 pour 100 des terres sur lesquelles les travaux nante et fantaisiste que je ne saurais comment la qua­ certains des détails particuliers que le représentant de General Riley had laid down in 1951 that we could not encroach upon private Arab land interests лvithout consent, a special diversion of this project was made, sacrificing 3.5 metres of height in the water drop, in order to ensure that no work should be carried out on Arab land. This can be seen on the map which I have had prepared. You can see that the canal has deliberately been commenced to the south of the area marked "Arab land". 123. General Bennike's letter of 20 October indicates that there may have been inadvertent passage over some Arab-owned land on the way to and from the project. It is hard for the imagination to conjure up a more slender encroachment on a private interest in the pursuit of a great project of national utihty; but in any case, this is something for which remedy has been found. My Government has ascertained that with respect to the four Arab plots described by General Bennike, they have not been affected by the work in question ; that if any debris of any kind was inadvertently thrown on these plots of land in the process of digging, it has been subsequently removed. What is more important, my Government undertakes to ensure that these plots of land shall in no way be affected in the continued course of this project, and is prepared to take all suitable measures accordingly. Indeed, for this purpose these parcels of land have already been specially fenced off. Furthermore, we shall undertake that no further plots of Arab land shall be affected by the execution of the project. Therefore, again, without reference to the extremely minor interest involved in relation to the general welfare, this Arab land question is one which has been overcome and which, in any case, is easily capable of swift solution. 124. Secondly, with respect to water, the Government of Israel reserves its position on some of the legal assumptions in General Bennike's letter, especially the suggestion, which we really think remarkable, that Israel in its relations with Syria must be governed by the Franco-British agreement entitled "Agreement of good neighbourly relations concluded between the British and French Governments on behalf of the territories of Palestine, on the one part, and on behalf of Syria and Great Lebanon, on the other part, signed at Jerusalem, February 2, 1926". 125. Israel does not inherit the international treaties signed by the United Kingdom as mandatory power, and I do not know if Syria inherits the treaties signed by France. That we should be bound in the context of Syria's attitude of belligerency and hostility to Israel to recognize a defunct treaty of good neighbourly relations between the United Kingdom and France is a thought of which the humorous possibilities are infinite. I really have not heard that Syria wishes to maintain such a treaty relationship with Israel, although if Syria will now announce its readiness to sign such a treaty we shaU not, of.course, fail to respond. Never­ theless, despite the absence, in our view, of any legal commitment, the Government of Israel is prepared to undertake that the supply of irrigation water to the Buteiha farm area — that is, towards the southern part of the map — will be maintained. That is the only irrigable area which has been invoked in the course of this discussion as being affected by any change in the level of the Jordan water. The Government of Israel is prepared to give a binding undertaking that the 126. terres de la ferme Buteiha qui peuvent être irriguées par le Jourdain étaient cultivées jusqu'au dernier centi­ mètre carré, 1,5 pour 100 seulement du volume total des eaux du Jourdain serait utilisé en cet endroit, ceci donne une idée de l'importance relativement faible des intérêts en présence et montre qu'il est tout à fait possible de les satisfaire. Le moulin à eau n'emploie en effet qu'une quantité d'eau insignifiante-—je ne possède pas de chififres à ce sujet, mais il milliers de pieds cubes. Pour ce qui est de la ferme Buteiha, l'important est de savoir si des particuliers qui consomment 1,5 pour 100 du volume total des eaux peuvent compromettre le développement économique d'un pays tout entier, alors qu'il serait même possible de satisfaire intégralement ces intérêts tout en exécutant notre projet de grands travaux. 126. The Council should bear in mind that if all the Buteiha lands which could be irrigated by the Jordan were cultivated up to the last inch, no more than one and one-half per cent of the total volume of water in the Jordan at that point could be used. This illustrates the relatively small dimensions of the irrigation interests here involved and the clear possibility of their satis­ faction. The water mill is a question of such negligible quantity — I do not have the figures on it, but it is a few thousand cubic feet. The issue is concerning Buteiha, whether water interests involving one and one-half per cent of the total can be invoked to stultify the economy of a whole country at a time when even the satisfaction of that one and one-half per cent interest is entirely reconciliable with the main project itself. 127. la plainte de la Syrie est, à notre avis, son caractère entièrement réclamer de l'eau pour elle-même, au nom d'une coopé­ ration régionale avec Israël que nous pourrions respecter — mais uniquement pour la refuser à l'Etat d'Israël. Or, la Syrie possède de grandes ressources hydrauliques, alors que cette partie du Jourdain est le seul endroit où l'Etat d'Israël puisse s'approvisionner en eau pour ne pas devenir un désert brûlé et desséché. 127. Indeed, one of the most disquieting features of the Syrian complaint, in our eyes, is its entirely negative character. Syria comes on the scene not to claim water for itself in regional co-operation with Israel — which is something that we could respect — but simply to deny it to Israel. It is not only that Syria possesses vast water resources whereas Israel's only water supply is this section of the Jordan without which we could become a parched and withered desert. 128. The point is that Syria cannot have plans for utilizing the Jordan, or, at least, cannot have such plans beyond the Buteiha needs which I have already discussed, unless it has plans for aggression involving expansion beyond its frontier. Those are the facts of the geographical relationship between the Syrian frontier and the River Jordan, and these facts of geography make it quite impossible for Syria to use Jordan waters itself since its frontier is wholly east of the Jordan. It is interesting that a recent scheme worked out by the Tennessee Valley Authority endea­ vouring to find new water for Syria takes it from the Yarmuk and not from the Jordan, since it is physically impossible for Syria to utilize the Jordan for its water supply. There is, therefore, not even a single shred of valid comparison between the positive 128. des plans d'utilisation du Jourdain ou, du moins, que ces plans dépassent les besoins de la région de Buteiha dont j'ai déjà parlé, si elle n'a pas de plans d'agression qui supposent une expansion au-delà de sa frontière. Cette constatation découle de l'emplacement de la frontière syrienne par rapport au Jourdain: les con­ ditions géographiques ne permettent pas à la Syrie d'utiliser elle-même les eaux du Jourdain, sa frontière étant nettement à l'est du Jourdain. Il est intéressant de constater que le projet que la Tennessee Valley Authority a récemment élaboré pour essayer de trouver à la Syrie de nouvelles sources d'approvisionnement en eau prévoit de capter l'eau du Yarmouk et non celle du Jourdain, puisqu'il est matériellement im­ possible que la Syrie utilise le Jourdain pour son approinterests of Israel and of Syria in the Jordan River. It is the only source of Israel's water supply, and it is not a possible source of Syria's water supply. 129. I am left with the third and final issue. It is apparently upon this that the representative of Syria rests almost the entirety of his case. I refer to the question of military advantage. I am a little puzzled by a point of view which asserts that this question is relevant to article V of the General Armistice Agree­ ment. That is not a military article at all. Article V of the Armistice Agreement says not a single word in favour of the proposition that a public utility project may not be carried out in the zone for any military reasons. On the contrary, both the article and the accompanying official correspondence makes it clear that the objectives of those who proposed the demili­ tarized zone were principally to encourage economic development. The only objective of the demihtarized zone was to secure the departure of Syrian forces from the area which they had occupied in their invasion beyond their frontier. Thus, the Acting Mediator of the United Nations, addressing my Government on 26 June 1949, said: "From the beginning of these negotiations" — that is, the Israel-Syrian armistice negotiations — "our greatest difficulty has been to meet Israel's unqualified demand that Syrian forces be withdrawn from Palestine. We have now with great effort persuaded the Syrians to agree to this. I trust that this will not be undone by legahstic demands." 130. On 26 June 1949, the Acting Mediator addressing both Syria and Israel stated: "In respect to this question of economic develop­ ment, I may also assure both parties" — I think that those who know the history would agree that this was addressed chiefly to my Government — "that the United Nations, through the Chairman of the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission, will also ensure that the demilitarized zone will not be a vacuum or a wasteland." If I understood the Syrian representative correctly, he seems to imagine that the demilitarized zone must be a vacuum and not topographically changed. 131. I should like to say another word about this whole principle of military advantage. It is clear from • the language of article II, paragraph 1 of the Agree­ ment, which the United Nations Chief of Staff has not invoked, that the question of "military advantage" is relevant only "under the truce". In our view, the truce has been replaced by the General Armistice Agreement, which is envisaged as the permanent end of all military phases of the conflict. It is therefore our contention that neither party of the Armistice Agreement is entitled to invoke the question of military advantage; for this would mean that we "Although I have already covered that question of military advantages pro and con in my memo­ randum to the Mixed Armistice Commission in reply to a specific question that had been put to me by the parties themselves, I would prefer staying away from the question of military advantages either for Syria or for Israel, for the simple reason that it is contrary to the Armistice Agreement." 133. 134. Riley, et nous estimons que la question des avantages militaires ne doit pas entrer en ligne de compte. Si vous reconnaissiez à l'une ou l'autre des parties le droit de s'opposer à ce que l'autre partie obtienne un avantage d'intérêt militaire pendant la période au cours de la­ quelle la Convention d'armistice est en vigueur, vous reconnaîtriez aux parties le droit d'avoir recours à la guerre contrairement aux dispositions de la Con­ vention d'armistice et — pour pousser ce raisonnement jusqu'à sa conclusion logique — il faudrait que vous éleviez des objections à propos de chaque route qui serait construite, de chaque accroissement de popu­ lation, qu'il résulte de l'immigration ou de la natalité, ou de chaque amélioration apportée à l'équipement militaire de l'un ou l'autre des deux pays. Il faudrait interdire tout cela, car il est évident que ces éléments contribueraient à faire pencher la balance des forces militaires beaucoup plus qu'aucune des considérations que l'on a fait valoir au Conseil. 133. On the same day. General Riley stated: "The question of military advantage can be taken out of the picture. It was answered because it was a question that was put to me by both parties. Believing that both parties were acting in good faith, I gave an opinion." 134. We firmly adhere to this view of General Riley that the question of military advantage should not enter the picture at all. If you recognize the right of either party to object to military gains by the other during the period of the Armistice Agreement, then you are recognizing a right to go to war in violation of the Armistice Agreement and to carry that to its logical conclusion, you would have to object to every road that was built or to every increase of population, whether by immigration of natural increase, or to any improvement in the military equipment of either country. You would have to stop all of this because clearly such things would affect the balance of military advantage certainly far more profoundly than any of the considerations which have been raised here. 135. aucune considération de caractère militaire en évoquant l'article V, qui est le seul d'où le Chef d'état-major tire l'autorité juridique dont il jouit en ce qui concerne la zone démilitarisée et en fait le seul sur lequel il se fonde dans sa correspondance avec le Conseil de sécu­ rité. ayant trait à la zone démilitarisée que la présence ou l'absence d'obstacles naturels quelconques dans cette zone est entièrement, totalement et absolument sans rapport avec son caractère de zone démilitarisée et le rôle qu'elle doit jouer dans le système d'armistice actuellement en vigueur. La zone démilitarisée n'a que ceci de militaire: il est défendu aux forces armées des deux parties d'y pénétrer. C'est le seul attribut de son caractère de zone démilitarisée. C'est grâce à cette disposition que la séparation des forces armées est assurée. Du point de vue de la Convention, il n'importe nullement que la zone démilitarisée ait telle ou telle caractéristique topographique. Je suis ici sur un terrain solide, celui de la doctrine officielle 135. It is also true that no such consideration of a military character are possible under article V, which is the only source of juridical authority for the Chief of Staff in the demihtarized zone, and indeed the only article on which he relies in his correspondence with the Security Council. For it is clear from many state­ ments concerned with the demilitarized zone that the presence or absence of any natural obstacles is entirely, totally and completely irrelevant to its demilitarized character or to the role which it has to play in the armistice system. The only special military character­ istic of the demilitarized zone is that the armed forces of either party are forbidden to enter. That is the only attribute of its demilitarized character. It is by that provision, and by it alone, that the separation of the armed forces is assured. It is of no significance under the Agreement what properties of topography the demihtarized zone possesses. Here I am on solid ground of established United Nations doctrine. In response to a joint request by Syria and Israel in 1951 to give an opinion on military advantage in the Huleh scheme, in the same area, in the same demili­ tarized zone, under the same Agreement, General Riley, after expostulating that talk about military advantage should not go on at all in respectable armistice circles, handed down the following decision of 2 May 1951 on military advantage in reply to the invitation of Syria and Israel : "From these articles, it is conclusive that a demilitarized zone was created where the truce hnes did not correspond to the international border be­ tween Syria and Palestine, and not in locations where no natural obstacles prevented the movement of armed forces." 136. I would repeat "not in locations where no natural obstacles prevented the movement of armed forces." General Riley continued: "It is concluded that: "(i) In draining Lake Huleh, the Israelis will not enjoy any military advantages not equally applicable to the Syrian; "(ii) The demilitarized zone was not created where natural obstacles to the movement of armed forces were non-existent." 137. The latter is the point which has an effect on our present project. In other words, the Syrian contention that the presence or the absence of a water obstacle or water obstacles has any significance in the armistice had already been authoritatively considered and rejected. 138. While, for these reasons, we share this established view that military advantage arguments are without validity in this context, our case becomes even stronger if we put aside for the sake of argument this reservation of law and principle to examine the actual military effect of the construction work. Supposing that it were proper or justified to discuss this issue of military advantage and the topographical attributes of the demilitarized zone under article V of the Agreement, what will be the military or strategic effect of this work? As I have explained and as this map makes very clear, the effect of this work is that there will be two water obstacles instead of one water obstacle in the demilitarized zone. Where there is now the River Jordan, there will be — in two or three years time — both the River Jordan in its original bed and the new canal running roughly parallel to the Jordan River bed down to Lake Tiberias. 139. Both of these obstacles — the River Jordan and the canal — will for a short distance of their general length pass through the demilitarized zone. This means that it will be twice as difficult as it now is for Syria to invade Israel, and that it will be twice as difficult as it now is for Israel to invade Syria. The more canals we dig in a demilitarized zone, the more 140. As a digression on the same theme, I would point out that we have recently studied a regional water scheme sponsored by one of the permanent members of the Security Council. Under this scheme, more canals would be dug in the demilitarized zone and there would be a far bigger effect on the topography of the zone than under the project to which I have referred. But the engineers who drew up that plan quite rightly did not bring these considerations into mind, because the verdict of General Riley in this matter is quite clear — as are also the text of the Armistice Agreement and the accompanying inter­ pretative documents. 141. This is a very fascinating subject, and much can be said on many points. I do not, however, wish to occupy the Security Council with any further detailed argument at this stage. I should, however, like to summarize my conclusiors. 142. First, the hydro-electric project, involving the construction of the Jordan canal, is a legitimate civilian project which the Palestine Electric Corporation has a legal right to execute. The project itself is of vital economic benefit, and the canal, when completed, could easily be integrated either into national or into regional water projects conducive to the general welfare. 143. Secondly, the waters concerned at no point pass through Syrian territory, so that Syrian complaints are ill-founded. Moreover, the principles and practices adopted by the Security Council and General Riley in 1951 commit the United Nations firmly to the view that Syria does not have a lawful right of veto in connexion with legitimate development projects in the demilitarized zone. I should add that, as a matter of general equity Syria, which itself has no physical ability to use the Jordan and which has vast water resources, should not be encouraged to deny access to Jordan waters for Israel, in whose territory that river does flow and for whom it is the only source of water supply. 144. Thirdly, the powers of the Chief of Staff in this m^atter are defined in General Bennike's letter of 20 October in terms of protecting land and water interests in the demilitarized zone and ensuring that the zone fulfils its role under the Armistice Agreement. That later clearly states that these are the only issues which determine the right to continue the project. 145. Hence, with respect to these three issues: (a) With reference to land rights : the execution of the project does not necessitate any encroachment on Arab lands without the permission of their owners. In cases where any encroachment by passage — how­ ever sHght — has been proved, the Israel Government undertakes the avoidance of any such encroachment in the future. (b) With reference to water: it is an undoubted fact that the hydroelectric project under discussion can be reconciled with the full satisfaction of all existing irrigation needs. The Government of Israel is prepared to give an undertaking to this effect and to discuss procedures whereby such an undertaking could be statutorily invoked, even in an area where Israel has no legal duty to make such provisions. (c) With reference to the military aspects of the demilitarized zone: the Government of Israel adheres to the terms of the Armistice Agreement, according to which the consideration of military advantage is relevant only to the truce, which has now been replaced by the armistice. But in any case it also holds that neither party should invoke this argument under the principles of the armistice — an argument fully sup­ ported by General Riley's statement of 2 May 1951, which I have quoted. Subject to this reservation that no one has the right to raise this matter at all without discrediting the basic assumptions of the Armistice Agreement, the Government of Israel points out that the practical effect of the new canal would be to make the aggressive movement of armed forces in either direction through the demilitarized zone more difficult than it is at present, and that the maintenance of the exact topography of the zone is not something which either party is entitled to invoke—and here, again, I rest upon established doctrine. 146. I shall say only a word about the Syrian objection — made in a letter addressed to the Security Council — that Israel has militarized the demilitarized zone. Here, it will suffice for me to say that we have a letter from, the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Com­ mission, expressing satisfaction with the absence of any military units or guns not entitled to be in the zone. 147. I do not even now fully understand why Israel is called upon so frequently to justify the most modest exercise of rights and facilities which nearly all other countries possess in more abundant measure. We have only 8,000 square miles of soil, the greater part of it arid and desert, requiring the utmost sacrifice, inge­ nuity and devotion to enable its restoration to fertility. Yet the neighbouring countries which have millions of square miles of rich, fertile territory at their disposal continue to begrudge us this small stretch of land. The same is true of water. Through the rich domains of the free Arab world flow the great historic rivers, the Tigris, Euphrates, Nile, Orontes and Litany, and a host of other streams. On the other hand, all Israel's hope of enlarged food production, of power develop­ ment and irrigation hangs upon the Jordan, flowing for a few miles from, northern Galilee to south of Lake Tiberias. On this meagre resource which, small as it is, is the bloodstream and the life artery of our country, covetous eyes are cast by governments to whose projects of development and growth our river has no real relevance at all. 148. In this struggle between the Syrian attempt to ensure Israel's economic strangulation and Israel's 149 The project under discussion is just as beneficial, just as compatible with the Armistice Agreement, just as legal and just as reconcilable with every legitimate affected interest as was the project for the drainage of the Huleh marshes, which now advances towards early completion. The Israel delegation invites the Security Council to examine these statements and undertakings which I have made, with due care and gravity, and on the basis of these patently established facts to help us with the utmost speed to overcome the obstacles which have been raised against this wholly peaceful and constructive work. 150. Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon) : I take it that I may now refer to the substance of the matter, since we are not engaged in a procedural discussion. 151. I should first like to comment on the letter from General Bennike which has been distributed to members of the Council. In this connexion, I would revert to a point which I have raised before and which I regard as being of some importance. 152. The representative of Israel said that he was competent to judge this matter, whereas I was not. He gave us what he called his assurance that the letter from General Bennike indicated that the digging had completely stopped. Well, I certainly hope the repre­ sentative of Israel is right. It will be recalled, however, that at the 631st meeting after the representative of Israel gave us his assurance about what would take place, the Council took note of that assurance and took some action. It asked General Bennike to inform the Council "regarding the fulfilment of that undertaking". 153. General Bennike has now written the letter in question. As I have said, I cannot conclude from that letter that the undertaking has been fulfilled. The representative of Israel says it has been fulfilled. I say that I honestly hope that is true, but I cannot conclude from the letter that what we asked for the other day in our draft resolution has indeed been fulfilled. 154. I am only asking, therefore, that the President be kind enough to ask General Bennike to confirm what the representative of Israel has just told us and I ask that the other members of the Council support me in this request. I assure you this is a simple request. I have no intention of stirring up any difficulty. I am only asking that what the represen­ tative of Israel has just told us be confirmed by General Bennike according to the resolution of the Security Council. It seems to me that we ought to take our resolutions seriously; I am sure we do. Therefore, we ought to check on this point now. The letter says that there are divers who are attempting to plug the leaks in the concrete dams. It says that all other work has ceased. There is no doubt that there are leaks and there is no doubt that there are divers who are attempting to plug those leaks. I am only requesting that there be no other kind of leaks — I mean leaks of work — and I should like to know whether this plugging process really stops the work in the sense of the Council resolution of the other day. 155. I am not at all casting any doubt on the truth­ fulness of what the representative of Israel has told us. I am only asking that General Bennike should confirm what he said, because the other day we took exactly the same step with respect to a similar assurance made by the representative of Israel. I think this is a legitimate request and I hope that the President will ask the General to confirm this point. 156. With résped; to the two lengthy statements we have heard this afternoon, one of which was made by the representative of Syria and the other by the representative of Israel, I will naturally have many comments to make, but at this stage, if I may be permitted to do so, I will make only one comment in a very general way about what we have just heard from Mr. Eban. 157. It is obvious that almost the first three or four pages of his statement raised issues which have no bearing on this immediate item of the Security Council agenda. Mr. Eban tried to picture his country as embarking on wonderful programmes and to snow that only the malice of the Arab States is preventing if from continuing these projects. 158. I do hope — in fact I am certain — that the honourable members of the Council will not be taken in by these tendentious over-simpHfications of the matter. We are not sitting around this Council table to Usten to Israel's appeal with respect to under­ takings that the Arab world is preventing it from carrying out. We are here in this Council to face the issue which Mr. Eban later on went into in great detail and with a sense of responsibility. Of course, all that he says will have to be very carefully examined by us, but I do hope that the Council will put aside all of these general appeals, all these over-simplifi­ cations, all these tendentious statements which the repre­ sentative of Israel has made today. 159. I should also like to make another remark. At the very end of his statement he made this classic declaration which representatives of Israel have dinned into the minds and into the ears of the rest of the world ; certainly they have dinned it into the American Press. He said: "We have only 8,000 square miles of soil, the greater part of it arid and desert, requiring the utmost sacrifice, ingenuity and devotion to enable its restoration to fertility. Yet the neighbouring countries which have millions of square miles of rich fertile territory at their disposal continue to begrudge us this small stretch of land. The same is true of water. Through the rich domains of the free Arab world flow the great historic rivers, the Tigris, Euphrates, Nile, Orontes and Litany, and a host of other streams." 160. Consequently, the only moral I should like to draw from this is that we should all of us try not to use false images but stick to the point at issue and argue the facts before coming to any decision on those facts. If we start resorting to false over-simphfications, to false images, I assure you we shall be completely lost.

Before recognizing the next speaker, may I just be allowed to say that, at the beginning of our meeting, the representative of France called attention to the fact that the translation of the French proposal which we adopted the other day was not quite correct since the word "requests" did not translate properly the French words. The correct trans­ lation is "relies on". 162. In his letter today, the General has given us infor­ mation with respect to divers' attempts to plug the leaks in the concrete dam. All other work has ceased. I am quite sure that when the General reads the record of today's meeting, he will determine whether he has any further information to give us. However, the ques­ tion as to whether we should put a request of this nature to the Chief of Stafl: is open for discussion. Any member who speaks can discuss that question. The decision will be up to the Council itself.

I have no inten­ tion of answering the remarks which were made today by Mr. Eban. My answer will be forthcoming at the next meeting. Yet I should like at this stage to call attention to some rather salient discrepancies in these remarks and variations from the reality of the situation there. 164. Generally speaking, the speech that we heard a short while ago from Mr. Eban is similar in substance to the note which the Israel authorities sent to General Bennike on 24 September [S/2122, annex II]. In fact, hardly any point was raised which was not dealt with previously. In his statement, Mr. Eban tried to avoid the real issue. That we fully expected. He therefore spoke of the interests of Israel in taking the waters of the Jordan. Nobody doubts that Israel is interested in diverting the waters of the Jordan. 165. He referred to international frontiers, but inter­ national frontiers are not in question. The General Armistice Agreement did not dispose of any territory and the question of international frontiers is not the one we are discussing. We are discussing the question of the zone demilitarized by virtue of the General Armistice Agreement, and the River Jordan flows in that demilitarized zone. As to the international bound­ ary, that is a question which is far more difficult to deal with, but it is not under discussion at the present moment. 166. Mr. Eban also went ahead to refer to previous discussions in the Council about an altogether different project, one which has hardly any relation to the one that we are now discussing. The Huleh project deals with Lake Huleh which is in the defensive zone and not in the demilitarized zone, as is the Jordan River. This, from the military point of view, is an altogether different issue. He tries to show that, on the question of military advantage, the United Nations Chief of Staff has no authority to act because that advantage can be realized on account of the fact that the truce was replaced by the armistice. This is completely untrue. The armistice con­ tinued the truce. Otherwise there would never have been any armistice and no United Nations Truce Super­ vision Organization, as the organization now functioning is called. 167. The armistice having continued the truce, that military advantage in the demilitarized zone and within the defensive lines have a certain criteria which should be followed and considered in trying to decide whether or not there is a military advantage. In the previous cases concerning Lake Huleh, the two parties agreed to defer to the opinion of General Riley, and their agreement shows that they were discussing that point of military advantage. But the ruling of General Riley at that time was different from the one we have at the present time because the two issues were different due to the fact that the Huleh situation is within the defensive zone, whereas the present issue is in the very centre of the demilitarized zone. 168. In fact, Mr. Eban tried to refer to opinions that were expressed in the course of deliberations on a different issue. I wish he had referred to the decision taken then, for that decision was the one which Israel did not abide by and refused in fact to implement. The decision on that issue should also be taken into con­ sideration in dealing with the present matter if only to determine Israel's recalcitrance in abiding by the decisions of the Security Council. Mr. Eban also said that no agreement need be made between Syria and any other party on this question. He should have added that Israel does not abide by previous international agreements. 170. I do not intend to go into any detail at the present moment, but may I be permitted at least to refer to certain points of fact merely to give an example? Mr. Eban said that the Al-Hindi property which was used for the works was only a half-acre in area. Previously, Mr. Sharett, the Foreign Minister of the Israel authorities, referred to an island there which he said had an area of only 400 square metres. General Bennike, in his answer, said that it was at least twenty times larger than Mr. Sharett has indicated. I should like to say that the half-acre is more than twenty times larger than Mr. Eban said it was. But that is only one property of an Al-Hindi family; there are many more. He was obliged to hear the Syrian side say that more than 99 per cent of the land in the demilitarized zone, in that sector, is owned by Arabs. That is a fact. 171. Mr. Eban spoke at a later stage about the 8,000 square miles which Israel now possesses. That 8,000 square miles is also more than 90 per cent Arab-owned and its people are now destitute refugees who have been driven from their land; this applies also to the people of the demilitarized zone, who were driven from their property in large numbers. The decision of 18 May 1951 [S/2157] ordering their return was not implemented, just as the return of the refugees was not implemented. When Mr. Eban speaks of his land, we should try to see to whom that land really belongs. 172. There is another question which I should hke to call to the attention of the Security Council. The map which was circulated by the Israel delegation is not exact if it is compared to the map that we have also circulated to the members. We hope that the members of the Council will look into that situation ^Iso. 173. As the discussion proceeds and as many points of fact are presented to the Security Council, it would be helpful and fair to ask General Bennike to be present here so that in this case, as in other cases, he would be able to explain some points, to elucidate on them and, if need be, to answer some questions. Therefore, I ask that General Bennike should be invited to be present at the next meeting.

I sould like to thank the President for his reference to the explanation I gave at-the beginning of the meeting regarding the precise interpretation to be placed on the French text of the resolution. I think it was in fact advisable to ascertain whether we had "requested" General Bennike to observe the fulfilment of the undertaking given by the Israel Government or whether we had merely relied on his discretion and initiative in the matter. 175. As regards the question raised by Mr. Malik, I would remind the Council that at the beginning of our last meeting, i.e., in the early stages of our work, there was some question of asking the Israel Government to give an assurance that it would fulfil the undertaking it had just given. After a brief discussion, all members of the Council agreed that such a request would be superfluous. The Council accordingly confined itself to noting the undertaking Israel had given. 176. Mr. MaHk has just made a somewhat similar proposal that we should ask General Bennike to confirm what he has just told us. I do not quite understand the point of such a request — the text of General Bennike's letter seems to me to be perfectly clear. He states in fact that all works have been stopped, with the sole exception of work undertaken by divers to plug the leaks which would have diverted the waters of the Jordan into the canal. In attempting to plug these leaks, it seems to me that the Israel Government is acting completely in accordance with the wishes of the Syrian Government which was anxious above all to ensure that the waters of the Jordan were not diverted and channelled into the canal. 177. In the first place, it seems quite clear that the Israel Government has suspended all works. In the second place, in order to prevent some of these works from resulting in leaks or the diversion of water which would be against the interests mentioned by Syria and would constitute a breach of the undertaking it has given, the Israel Government has sent workers to detect and plug these leaks. The situation is quite clear and straightforward. I see no need to look for some sinister ulterior motive and in the letter he has addressed to us General Bennike in fact finds that Israel has fulfilled its undertaking. 178. This being so, I do not see what useful purpose would be served by approaching General Bennike with a request to confirm what in my opinion and certainly in that of several other members of the Council he has already clearly stated. In the spirit of the resolution we adopted a few days ago, I think we should continue to rely on General Bennike to keep us informed of the manner in which the Israel authorities are fulfilling the undertaking transmitted to us by Mr. Eban.

I shall have compassion on the Council, which has listened to me at great length, and I shall be very brief. 180. My first remarks refer to the points just dis­ cussed by the representatives of Lebanon and France. The technical assumptions expressed by the represen­ tative of France are accurate, namely that if you do not plug the leaks, then unpleasant things happen. The consequences of stopping a project of this kind do require the kind of preventive action which is expressed in General Bennike's letter in terms of plugging the leaks. As regards the wishes of the Council, we could either plug the leaks or not plug the leaks, whichever Mr. Malik wanted. If we did not plug the leaks the result would be bad, and he really should take our word for that, and also the explanation of the representative of France, to which we agree with the exception that we do not accept the right of Syria to object to the canal. We have not stopped the work out of deference 181. With reference to the observations just made by the representative of Syria, I believe that they would argue the wisdom of some further considerations of these rather technical matters which have been put before the Council. There is one matter of great impor­ tance to which I would refer. Syria relied very largely on military advantage in discussing that question. One of my arguments, though by no means the only one, was that the truce, referred to in the Armistice Agree­ ments which were signed between February and July 1949, has now been superseded by the armistice. That is our case, and I should like to give what is for the Security Council conclusive proof of that. I refer to a resolution [S/1367] of the Security Council adopted at its 437th meeting on 11 August 1949: "The Security Council, "Having noted with satisfaction the several Armi­ stice Agreements concluded by means of negotiations between the parties involved in the conflict in Palestine . v. "Finds that the Armistice Agreements constitute an important step toward the establishment of per­ manent peace in Palestine and considers that these Agreements supersede the truce provided for in the resolutions of the Security Council of 29 May and IS July 1948." 182. I should therefore like to amend my statement. The statement that the armistice supersedes the truce is not an Israeli position ; it is a decision of the Security Council. 183. Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): There were certainly no sinister motives at all in what I said. I have no arrière-pensées, as hinted by the representative of France. ' été arrêtés. Cette exception peut-elle avoir une autre 184. In his letter General Bennike states, exactly as the representative of France has said, that all the work has stopped, except for one thing. AH I am asking is that General Bennike tell us that the one exception is as simple and innocent as Mr. Eban says it is. In fact, I tend to agree with Mr. Eban in what he says. If General Bennike would tell us that this one exception is exactly as he says, I should be perfectly satisfied. I am almost certain, in fact, that he will tell us so. Therefore, there is nothing at all sinister in what I am requesting. All the work, with the exception of one aspect, has been stopped. Does this one aspect have any impKcation other than the one just given it by Mr. Eban? If it is as simple as that, I shall be perfectly satisfied and everybody will be satisfied. 185. I am not pressing for a decision by the Council in this matter. I am merely requesting, through the President, that General Bennike — perhaps he will hear me and will respond on the mere strength of my request — tell us in another letter that this one excep­ tion is as useful and beneficial as Mr. Eban has just told us. That is my position.

I should like to assure Mr. Malik that I certainly did not mean to accuse him of having any ulterior motives. I said exactly the opposite. I said that I could see nothing in General Bennike's letter to show that Israel had had sinister intentions or ulterior motives in having the leaks in the dam plugged. But I was not referring to Mr. Malik.

I certainly do not wish to prolong the debate unduly, but I should like to recall that I have asked that General Bennike appear before the Council, if possible, at the next meeting, so that certain questions may be put to him or certain points elucidated by him. This is very important, because his authoritative opinion can contribute greatly to our work and can be very helpful. I move that by virtue of rule 38 of the rules of procedure. 188. Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon) : First of all, let me say that I have no quarrel whatsoever with Mr. Hoppenot. I have the fullest faith in him, and I am sure he reciprocates that feeling for me. 189. Secondly, I should hke to say that, if the proposal just made by the representative of Syria requires the support of a member of the Council, I am, of course, ready to be of service.

I have no other speakers on my list. However, the proposal made by the repre­ sentative of Syria and supported by the representative of Lebanon raises the question of whether we should ask General Bennike to be present at our next meeting. I take it that, if there is no objection, that will be done. It was so decided. 191. The PRESIDENT: There is one question re­ maining before I can declare that all our work has ceased: the question of our next meeting on this item. The Council will recall that meetings are scheduled for Monday, Tuesday and, tentatively, Wednesday. In the circumstances, I propose that the decision as to when to hold the next meeting on this item should be left to the next President of the Council. SALES AGENTS FOR UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATIONS FRANCE Editions A . Pedone, Paris V . GREECE-ORECE "Eiettheroudakis," tion, A t h è n e s . CUATEMAU G o u b a u d & Cía. Ltda., 28, G u a t e m a l a . «HGENTIN* _ ДИСЕНПНЕ Editorial Sudamericana S.A., A l i i n e 5 0 0 . Buenos Aires. tUSTRtUt-AUSTRALIE H . A . G o d d a r d , 255a G e o r g e St.. Sydney, a n d 9 0 Q u e e n St., M e l b o u r n e . M e l b o u r n e University Press, C a r l t o n N.3, V i c t o r i a . i E l G I U M - I E l C I Q U E A g e n c e et Messageries d e la Presse S,A., HAITI Librairie' " A la C a r a v e l l e , " 14-22 rue du Persil, Bruxelles. W . H . Smith & Son, 71-75, b o u l e v a r d A d o l p h e - M a x , Bruxelles. 111 -B, Port-au-Prince. HONDURAS Librería Panamericana, C a l l e T e g u c i g a l p a . I O l l V I » - 8 0 t l ï l E Librería Selecciones, Casilla 9 7 2 , Le Раь HONG-KONG The Swindon Book C o . , 2 5 Kowloon. BRAZIL-SRESIL Livrarta A g i r , Rio d e Janeiro, Sao Peulo a n d Belo Horizonte. ICELAND-ISLANDE Bokaverzíun Sîgfusar Austyrstraeti 18, Reykjavik. I N D I A - I N D E O x f o r d Book & Stationery House, N e w Dolhi, C a l c u t t a . CANADA Ryerson Press, 2 9 9 Q u e e n St. W e s t , Toronto. Periodica, Inc., 4 2 3 4 d e la Roche", M o n ­ treal, 3 4 . СЕЛ0Н-СЕУ1АН The Associated Newspapers of C e y l o n Ltd., Lake House, C o l o m b o . C H i i E - m u Librería Ivens, M o n e d a 8 2 2 , . Santiago. Editorial del Pacífico, A h u m a d a 5 7 , Santiago- CHINA-CHINE P. V a r a d a c h a r y & C o . , 8 St., M a d r a s 1. INDONESIA-INDONESIE Jaiasan P e m b a n g u n a n , G u n u n g Sahari D j a k a r t a . IRAN K e t a b - K h a n e h Danesh, nue, T e h r a n . IIAO —IRAK Mackenzie's Bookshop, ISRAEL Btumstein's Bookstores R o a d , Tel-Aviv. I T A L Y - I T A L I E C o l i b r i S.A., V i a M e r c a l l i lEBANOK —LIBAN The W o r l d Book C o . Ltd., 9 9 C h u n g King fîoad, 1st Section, T a i p e h , T a i w a n . C o m m e r c i a l Press, 211 H o n a n R d . , S h a n g ­ hai. COLOMIIA-COIOMIIE Librería Latina, C a r r e r a 6e., 13-05. Bogotá. Librería América, Medellín. Librería N a c i o n a l Ltda., Barranquilla. COSTA RICA - COSTA-RICA Trejos H e r m a n o s . A p a r t a d o 1313, San José. Librairie Universelle, Beyrouth. LIBERIA J . M o m o l u K a m a r a , LUXEMBOURG Librairie J . Schummer, MEXICO-MEXIQUE CUBA La C a s a Belga. O ' R e i l l y 4 5 5 , La H a b a n a . CZECHOSLOVAKIA - TCHECOSLOVAQUIE Ceskoslovensky Spisovatel. Nérodnf T r i d a 9, Praha 1. Editorial H e r m e s S.A., 4 1 . M e x i c o , D.F. DENMARK-DANEMARK Einar M u n k s g a a r d , L t d . , N ^ r r e g a d e 6. K e b e n h a v n , K. NETHERLANDS-PAYS-BAS N.V. Martinus Nijhoff. L a n g e V o o r h o u t ' s - G r a v e n h a g e . NEW ZEALAHD —HOUVEltE-ZElANDE U n i t e d Nations Association l a n d , C . P . O . 1 0 1 1 , NORWAY-NOVEGE J o h a n G r u n d t T a n u m gustsg-t. 7 A , O s l o . DOMINICAN REPUBLIC-REPUBLIQUE DOMINICAINE Librería Dominicana, M e r c e d e s 4 9 , C i u ­ d a d Trujilío. ECUADOR - EQUATEUR Librería Científica, G u a y a q u i l a n d Q u i t o . E6YPT-E6YPTE Librairie " L a Renaissance d ' E g y p t e , " 9 Sh. A d i y Pasha, C a i r o . El SALVADOR-SALVADOR M a n u e l Navas y Cía., l a . A v e n i d a sur 3 7 , San Salvador. PAKISTAN Thomas & Thomas, R o a d , Karachi, 3. Publishers U n i t e d Lahore. The Pakistan C o o p e r a t i v a C h i t t a g o n g a n d D a c c a PANAMA José Menéndez, Plaza ETHIOPIA - ETHIOPIE A g e n c e Ethiopienne d e Publicité, Box 128, A d d i s - A b e b a . FINLAND - FINLANDE Atateemînen Kiriakauppa, 2, Keskuskatu, Helsinki. PARAGUAY M o r e n o H e r m a n o s , Orders and inquiries from countries where sales agents have not yet been appointed may be sent to: Sales and Circulation Section, United Nations, New York, U.S.A.; or Sales Section, United Nations Office, Palais des Nations, Geneva, Switzerland. Printed in Canada. Price: $U.S. 0.30; 2/-stg.; (or equivalent in other currencies)