S/PV.635 Security Council

As representative .of FRANCE, l support the proposaI made by General Bennike. l consider that if, at·the 632ndmeeting, we adopted Mr. Vyshinsky's suggestion to allow a delay of at least twenty-four hours. between the distribution of General Bennike's replies and the meeting at which those replies would be eXatnined, it was precisely because we did not wafit to consider those replies for the first time during the meeting itself but wished to allow ourselves sufficient time beforehand to acquaint ourselves fully with· them. In other words, if we had thought that General Bennikie would read his repliesduring the meëting, there would have been no need for a. delay of twenty-four hours between the time those replies were made and the time when he could inform us of them. 19.. l think, moreover, that the questions and replies have taken up rather more space than we anticipated, In fact, l do· not see why we should inflict on the Council, and even on. the public, the waste of time which would result from reading a document ,which everyone here has before him and acopy of which any interested member of the public can obtain ünmediately. 21: As PRESIDENT of the Council l would be the last person to {Jeny the right of any member to speak for as long as he thinks fit during a general debate or to read out any document he wishes. l-must however point out to Ml", Malik that there is a difference between rights and expediencies. l do not believe that it would he expedient for a Council member to inffict on bis colleagues such a reading after a decision ta the contrary had been taken. 22. l therefore rule that General Bennike's request shaH be càmpiied with and that he shall not read the questions put ta him nor bis replies but that those questions and replies shaH be annexed tomorrow to the record of this meeting. Since this ruling has been questioned, l shall put· it. to the vote immediately after the translation of this statement. . 23. Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): l wish to speak on a point of order. l fii"st-made a motion and now the Fresident is making a ruling. l have not yet han a chance te challenge it or not to challenge it. l do not !mow why the President prefers ta make a ruling and force me to challenge it rather than put my simple original motion to the decision of the Security Council. Of course it is for the President to decide as he likes. 24. 1 heard'the President sayat the very beginning that thé general favoured tbis procedure. Ithen moved that the report should be read. Now the J?resident is making the ruling. But there is no need for that roundabout way. The Security Council can consider my motion and decide whatever it pleases conceming the matter. 2.1. l should only like to add, while l am speaking on this point of order, that l have just been informed that it is simply not true that the text is available for everybody. There are delegations here in the United Nations who asked for copies of tbis text and they were refused. There is something secretive about tbis whole'affair ; the more it is protracted, the more it will he talked about and the more the truth will come out. 26. There is no reason at aIl for that procedure. We could have heard the report from the very beginning; ~Y now we probably would have heard about a third of Itand we would be approaching the end of the· reading of the text. ?7. Furthermore, you spoke, Mr. President, of what 15 right de jure and what is right by propriefj..rassure you, in the same spirit with whîcb. youspoke, that l would be the last person to inflict any imprôpriety upon my colleagues here. But it is also a fact that l Was faced with a certain. impropriety this afternoon when, aIl of a sudden, l was told that this textWas not going ta be read. l was not prepâred for that. Cei-tainly . when we parted last week nnbody said that in view of the twenty-four hours delay which Mr. Vyshinsky asked ~or, the general would dispense with reading his· replies mpublic. " 31. Having, asked to speak in order to reply to MI'. Malik's qü.estion, l should like to add that a rather irregular procedure,was chosen this time by the Security Council ~ having an advance circulation of repliesand l think it is but proper that this arrangement should also have its, ,reflection in further measures in'order to expedite the work of the Security Counci!. It 13, from the point of View of the Secretariat, a slightly awkward position to have to hold an advance Press release before distribution. But l can assure the representative of Lebanon that there is nothing secretive about it.

l would point out to the Secretary-General thp.t the Security Courtcil is not responsible for the fact that this document has been distributed in the form of a Press release. lmu&ot say that l was somewhat surprised when l was told that it would be pubHshed in this form. l toûk the view that it should be published as a Security Council document and distributed to members, and only then released for the public. l was informed that for reasons of convenience which l accepted, though they did not seem to me to carry much weight, it would be better to publish the documeni: il:). that {orm. But repeat that the Security Council.is not responsible for theirregular procedure mentioned by the Secretary- General. 33. Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): l have nodoubt that what the Secretary-General has just told us is the information which he has obtained and which, in his opinion, is the right information. At the same ti1l1e, l myself have {rifferent information. The information which" l have is that at least two delegations, at 3.30 p.m. - two delegations to the United Nationsasked for this report and it was refused them. There We have an obvious conflict of facts. l may be mistaken, but that is the information which keeps coming to me persistently, and apparently the Secretary-General has Qi'! the grot. · ...s that it is only for the Press and not for regular delegations. 34. l should like to know whether Press releases are denied delegations. At least l was told that' this happened this afternoon. There seems to be a contradiction. If there is a contradiction between the information at the disposaI of the Secretary-Generaî and the information l have, tbis can be cleared up by a very simple investigation:

Of ~ourse, l shaH go into the matter to see what has happened, because it is quite obvious that a communica~on, the very moment it is published, should be available not on1y to the Press but te. delegations as weIl and with priority; that goes without saying. 36. 1 may aê.d, concerning the heading "Press release" that that special technical detail was for reasons of. ::onv~nience which were, as the President pointed out, entirely the responsibility of the Secretariat., My ·:;l.rgument referred to the fact that we had the replies of General Bennike eirculated in document form before the replies were given here.

We shall now proceed to the vote. ! caIJ on the representative of Lebanon. 38. Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): l do not know in what form the President wants to put this question to the vote. For my part, after thisexchange of views which has just taken place, l am not going to insist on my first motion. If the President has made a ruling, I:l..ll1 Dot aware that anybody has challenged it. l do not knaw what he is going to put to the vote. 38. glais): mettre après l'échange terai sident que qui va être mis au voix. 39. employé d'une façon Dès terais proposition cette 40. vienne tion du sera pas donnée 41. je que général oralement dera séance 42. l'anglais): d'étudier

1 may perhaps have used the, term "ruling" somewhat loosely. l said at the beginning of the meeting that 1 wauld put to the Couneil the question whether it accepted General Bennike's proposaI. That is the way in which. l was proposing to .consult the CouneiI. 40. If Mr. Malik does not press for a vote on the matter, IshaH assume that the Council has no objection to accepting General Bennike's request and decides that the questions and·answers shaH,not be read out. 41. If no member of the Cauneil wishes to speak, l shall·take it that the Council agrees that the document containing General Bennike's replies to the questions put ta him by members·oralIy and in writing shouIrl be annexed to the record of the meeting. 1 It was so decided. 42. Sir Gladwyn JEBB (United Kingdom): We have now an had the opportunity to study the report pre~ pared by General Bennike for presentation to the 1 See annex below. 43. In my statement of 20 October [627th meeting], l said that l would wish ta express my Government's views at greater length after some examination of the substance of this question. Having now considered the detailed report on the raid on Qibya prepared by the Acting Chairman of the Mixed Armistice CominÎssion, Commander Hutchison, and included in the Chief of Staff's report, as weIl as the supplementary information contained in the answers to the questions put to General Bennike, my Government, on the evidence so far submitted, is in full agreement with the view e:lI..-pressed by ·the Chief of Staff.·-namely, that the technica1 arguments tending to show that Israel military forces were implicated are completely convincing. 44. As we all know, Israel has already been condemned by the Mixed Armistice Commission for· this incident in the following terms: "Paït one "(a) The crossing of the demarcation line by a force approximating one half of a battalion from the Israel regular army, fully equipped, into Qibya village on thè night of 14-15 October 1953 to attack the inhabitants by firing from automatic weapons and throwing grenades and using bangalore torpedoes together with TNT explosive, by which forty-one dwelling housesand a school building were completely blown up, resulting in the cold-blooded murder of forty-two lives, inc1uding men, women hmd] children, and the wounding of fifteen persans'and the.damageof a police car, [and] at the same time, the crossing of a part of the same group into Shuqba village, [are] a breach of article III, paragraph 2 of the General Armistice Agreement. "(b) The shelling by a supporting unit to that force by three-inch mortar gons from across the demarcation line on Btidrus village, which resulted .. in the damage of some houses and a bus and the wounding of an N.C.O. in charge of the National Guards, is a breach of the article III, paragraph 3 of the Ge1'l;eral Armistice Agreement 2. "Part two "The Mixed Armistice Commission deddes· that it is extremely· important that the Israel authorities should take iminediately the most vigorous.measures to prevent the recurrence of such aggressions against Jordan and its citizens:' 46. With the greatest respect, 1 suggest that the braadcast statement made by the Prime Minister of Israel on 19 October 1953, does not in itself preclude such a conclusion, since that statement only denied the allegation that 600 men of the Israel defence forces took part in the action and asserted that no unit was absent fram its base on the night of the attack on Qibya. 47. The Acting Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission, however, considered that some 250 to 300 well-trained soldiers took part in the operation, and painted out that the approaches to the village passed thraugh an area protected by Israel military forces. 48. Whether this hody consisted of regulars or of militia has reaIly no bearing on the case. In either event it was a disciplined, organized, well-armed Israel military force. In the view of Her Majesty's Govemment, therefore, it is very difficult for the Israel Govemment to escape responsibility for the attack. fait~ent Gouvernement Gouvernement la 49. déjà il médiaire qu'il qui supplémentaires du gouvernement et titué .une 50. nement été par israéliennes, de qu'on sidérées. le 1er de peut logues; à pour 51. prétendues incident, frontière 'On danie trêve d'empêcher, vils, tion divers parties tail faire. 52. les 49. Her Majesty's Government has, in' any case, already stated that in its view there was no possible justification for such action and, through Her Majesty's Ambassador in Tel Aviv, it has informed the Israel Gavemment of its horror at this apparently calculated attack. The further information that has come to hand and the increased to11 of life can only confirm my Government in condenlning it and reinforce its opinion that it· has constituted a threat to the security of the entire area. 50. l should like to repeat that my Government's feelings would not be very different whether this attack \Vas undertaken by miJ.itia, that is to say settlers armed and organized by the Israel authorities, or by the regular army of Israel. The unfortunate thing is that thiskind of wholesale and indiscriminate reprisaI should he indulged in at aIl. And the whole situation is made \Vorse by the apparent unwillingness of the Israel Government to punish those responsible and hence, by implication, its willingness to condone it. This can only encourage other such incidents, as weIl as the growth of a spirit of violence in its citizens, which may bode iIl far the future. . 51. Now we have heard and read a good deal about the alleged provocation which gave rise to this incident, the increase of tension on the border, the perpetration of crimes by so-called infiltrators, and the alleged failure or inability of both the Jordan Government and the Truce Supervision Organization to control the unaut?n.~zed crossing of the armistice demarcation lines by UV1lIans. I should like to touch on each of these factors o~ the situation, leavingit to the two parties most directly concerned to dwe11 upon them in detail, if they deem fit. ?2. No one denies the existence of what is called Infiltration, nor that it involves the Israelis in loss of 53. It has been alleged that this movement across the lines has been organized and encouraged by high authorities in Jordan. That is a matter to which, no doubt, the representntive of Jordan will tum his attention. 1 should like, however, to point out that 1 do not know of evidence to prove this, whereas there is ample evidence to show that trespassers cross the line on their own responsibility and in the full knowledge that they may pay for doing so with their lives. 'T-hetrouble about such a reprisaI raid· as that at Qibya is that it will probably only result in a growth in the number of persons who decide to cross into Israel to revenge themselves by takinglife for life. Thus this reprisaI raid may bring upon Israel the very thing which it has hoped to stop. Trespassers may now enter Israel in a spirit of revenge prepared to commit desperate acts; and Israel may then retaliate with more raids, until the fabric of the Armistice Agreement, by which both sides are bound to keep the peace, is tom to shreds and general hostilities foUow. 54. Clearly the situation ansmg from this VlC10US circ1e must be controlled before it gets completely out of hand. Israel accuses Jordan of failure to control its own civilians, and of inability to take th:e nece,ssary measures to prevent them from crossing the armistice demarcation lines, or of punishing them severely enough when they are caught and tried. But there are great difficulties inherent in this problem. There is the nature and length of the border. There in the whole history of these last years. These things must be taken into account. 55. In the circUi'ristances, it seems that only by local co-operation between the police and defence forces of the two countries can an adequate degree of control over infiltration, as it is called, be achieved. For this reason, my Govemment has ahvays viewed with favour thee.xistence and operation.of local commanders' agreements, and has used its good offices to have them restored whenever they have been cancellèd or broken off. vVe think it is a mistake to decry them, as sorne have done, as being of too minor a degree of importance to be effective. After aU, one should walk before one tries to run, and only by observance of the terms of local commanders' agreements and the cnnsequent liberation of the Mïxed Armistice Commission from too much detaiI, can the general tension along the border decrease and an atmosphere less prejudicial to the settlement of differences be created. 57. Such voluntary action by the Governments of Israel and .Jordan would be of great assistance to the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization. The officers and observers in that organization have, as we ail know, a very arduous and, indeed, a very invidious task. They have to depend upon the goodwi1l, and the offer of full facilities in investigation, of both sides. Should these facilities be withheld the observers are hindered in the proper performance of the duties placed upon them by the Al'mistice Agreenlent and, indeed, by the Chief of Staff. Any such obstruction is likely to lead to a decline in the ability of the observers to provide accurate reports of the result of their investigations. Irresponsiblepersons could then profit by the knowledge that their actions might escape notice, and a general deterioration could then set in, with very serious consequences to one side or the other. Therefore, my Government considers that it is of the highest importancethat both the parties to the Armistice AQ'l'eement 1howct° respect the -officers of the Truce Supervision Organization and give them full facilities in the petformance of their duties. Combined with the proper observ,ance of the local commanders' agreements this conséqt1enc~i) pourquoi plus vention d'état-major de quitter commandants quête général. ~reed'Om of investigation may ,vell result in a marked !mprovement in the general atmosphere. At least, that IS ourhope. . 58. 1 should like at this point particularly to mention the very difficult position in which, as we see it, the Jordan Governmenthas been placed by reprisaI raids. 58. tion avis, 11 - "~~~~~~.!'1~~~~};.~~:~~~-!llll~.~~~-,~_;, -";·,.i!!l·~!!!·.~.:~~'1~~'-".~-.,~.!!\'J"~":1!!~!l3~-!'!'._._ 59. In conclusion, let me just say this. However much the Israelis may consider that they have been provoked - and, as l have said, there is sorne douht about the exact extent of the provocation - it 1S sad, we think, that the lex talionis should apparently find such ready acceptance among a small people, themselves composed for the most part of refugees who have suffered unspeakable hardships and oppressions. It is human to err. AlI of us, as nations, have done things which we would prefer to forget. No nation is perfect. But if the small liberal democracy which, we believe, the sons of Israel are seeking to establish in Palestine is to preserve the sympathy of its friends throughout the world, then we suggest th;:tt it wouId certainly be well advised not to try to show, as some of the Israel Press have sought to show, that the destruction of a village in Jordan territory and the slaughter of its inhabitants, most of whom were undoubtedly quite innocent, was thoroughly justified, and indeed the logical and final result of chain of incidents. We cau, indeed, regard this raid in its wntext, and against the whole unhappy background of the relations of Israelwith its neighbours. We cau, and we sMuId, do our utmost to rectify a situation fraught with dangerous possibilities and to diminish the mutual hatred and recrimination which must. necessarily result from the continuance of a state of war and the failure up till now to agree on a frontier. But that does not mean that we should seek to find any excuse for the raid on Qibya itself. l can hardly believe that any member of tl!è Council will try to excuse that. And myearnest hope is that the representative of Israel when he .comes to speak will, on consideration, not seek to ex~.use it either.

As was !Dade clear by the United States Government shortly before the Security· Council decided to inscribe this item on the agenda, there appears to be no doubt concerning the facts of the military action which took place in Qibya. The testimony by General Bennike con..; firms the fact that this action was a violation of the cease-fire resolution of the Security Council of 15 JuIy 1948 [5/902] and of the Jor<lan-Israel General Armi-

Speaking as the representative of FRANCE, l wish to state that ',my delegation does not intend to speak today on the substance of the question, for we shaH feel competent to do so only after examining more closely the replies made by Gene~al Bennike ta the 9.uestions put to ,him and after hearmg the representatives of Israel and Jordan. 63. l must, however, point out todaythat my delega- . tion is in full agreement with the generallines of the speech just made by the United Kingdom representative and .shares his feelings on the grievous and tragic incidents which have led ta this Council meeting. The feelings of horror and disapproval' provoked by the Oibya massacre in France have been a measure of my èOuntry's feelings for the people of Israel sa many of whose sons suffered side by side with ours under the German yoke and mingled their blood with that of many martyrs of the French resistance. If there is one nation which, in our eyes, has less than any other the right ta take vengeance on innocent people, it is the one linked by racial and spiritual bonds to the millions of innocent victims of Nazism during recent years. It 'is with aIl the greater sorrow, but with no less firmness than other delegations, that my own delegation is compelled to associate itself with the condemnation aIready expressed here for the action undertaken by the armed forces of Israel against the inhabitants of thè village of Qibya. The fact that sum an action cannot be lifted out of its general historical context is no extenuation of it. 64. My delegation, l repeat, reserves the right during 64. the coming debate to revert to the circumstances surau rounding this action and to examine how the Security rechercher Council can contribute, whether by the adoption of pourra contribuer, resolutions or recommendations or, at the same time, , dations by the support it may give to its representatives on the l'appui spot, towards the improvement of the situation on the améliorer froutiers between Jordan and Israel. jordano-israéliennes. 65.Mr. KYROU (Greece): My delegation also 65. reserves its right to come back to this questionafter délégation IVe have heard the representatives of Israel and Jordan. cette My hope is that the representative of Israel, when he représentants s~eaks, will find the way to condemn in the name of . représentant bis Government, in the most categorical manner, the condamnera ~orrible massacres perpetrated in Qibya, and eventually ribles !n!~rl11 us. that disciplinary measures have already been que lWt1ated against the perpetrators of these, massacres. auteurs'de 66. Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): l will say only 66. ~ few words at this stage in the development of this glais): 1Jllportant affair. l listened with great interest to the mots. sta~ements which have Just been made by the represenreprésentant tative of the United Kingdom, by the President and by représentants the representatives· bf the United States and.of Greece. sûr 1hope the Council willin fact, l am sure it willdans continueitsconsideration 'ofthis item,in the same spirit il 68. Then l should like to say that as l read these documents with the care they deserve, l could not help arrivingata few conclusions in a spirit of complete objectivity. l shan try to place these conclusions before the Council at the appropriate moment. l shan do sa in a form which a great philosopher of the seventeenth century adopted. There lived, in the seventeenth century, a famous man whom l deeply respect, although l do not foUow his philosophy. His personality and his life are a constant source of inspiration to me. l refer, of course, to the great philosopher, Spinoza. Spinoza wrote a great work on ethics, and in it he tried ta prove by the mathematical method about two hundred fundamental propositions concerning Gad and the nature of the universe. Obviously, that method appealed a great deal in the seventeenth century, the century of Newton, Leibnitz, and Descartes. This method appealed a great deal to the minds of the civilized Western European world. l shaU fonow Spinoza's method. l shaU try to state a dozen. or sa fundamental propositions that can be easily deduced from these two documents before us, without any reference to any other documents extraneous to the ones General Bennike has put in our hands. 69. l shan try to prove every one of these dozen or so propositi,ons by the strictest mathematical method. If my proof is correct, l shaU then be entitled at the end to add precisely what Spinoza added at the end of every proof of his - Q.E.D. l shaU use this method with the greatest restraint and in. a spirit of complete objectivity, and without trying ta be provocative in any manner whatsoever. l think the only way in which we cau aU be helpful in the present tragic circums~nces is to use r-estraint and to refrain from provocation. 70. To conclude, l shaU only say that it is my sincere and earnest hope that the Security Council, in this instance, mindful as l am sure it is, of Îts great responsibilities for the maintenance of peace and security in the Near East and for promoting conditions under which peace c6uld reaUy flourish· in that unhappy part of the world, will act firmly and justly and with due consideration to aU the known and ascertained facts. 71. l wish to assure the President and the members at this table that if the Security Council, in this glaring instance, should ad iu that spirit and in that manner, we may then aU hope that conditions inay improve in OUï part of the world and that peace and security may be strengthened.

t have listened with interest and care to the observations which have been made by the representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States, France, Greece and Lebanon, and l have also given some preliminary study to the replies just published on behalf of the Chief of Staff Qf the Truce Su.pervision Organization. 74. Since the compass of this question is so wide, l should be glad if the Security .Council would agree to give me the opportunity of making this presentation at the beginning of its next meeting on this subject. l have been given to understand that members of the Security Cauncil have a priority in the right of speech over invited Members of the United Nations, but on the other hand the viewpoints of the only Government which lives within all four of these frontiers and which has to operate all of these agreements may perhaps, as sorne representatives have indicated, be an important element in any further consideration of this question. For that reason, I should not like to enter the substance of this complicated matter now, but I should be able, l hope, to make a nioderate and constructive contribution to the Security Council's discussions if l were ~ven the 0P1?0rtunity to address it at the beginning of Its next meeting. . . 75. The PRESIDENT (translated front French): If l understand him correctly, the representative of Israel is asking me to place him at the head of the list of -;:neakers for the next meeting. Provided that no member of the Council wishes '1:0 speak before him, his .request will be met. 76. The next meeting will fake place tomorrow morning at 10.30. The agenda of that meeting will consist of the complaint by Syria against Israel concerning work on the west bank of the River Jordan in the demilitarized zone. 77. If members of the Council have no objection the next meeting to consider the Qibya incident and related questions will be held next Thursday, 12 November, at 3 p.m. It was so decided. The nteeting rose at 5.15 p.nt. ANNEX ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS PUT TO MAJOR GENERAL VAGN BENNIKE, CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE UNITED NAtIONS TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION, EITHER ORA!LLY AT THE 632ND MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON 29 OCTOBER, OR IN WRITING UP to 3 NOVEMBER 1953 • 1. Questions put by the represe;;,tcitivé of the United Kingdom 1. On 19 October 1953, the Prime Minister of Israel broadcast a statement' on the Qibya incident in which hedenied that 600 men of the Israel defence forces took part in the action against the village and said that investigation showed, thêt not co-op~rating in any way ~ mur~èrs' at Yahud..They wl;>uld do their utmost to bring those guîlty to justice, if they were in Jordan territory. The gist of this conversation was immediately communicated to the Israeli authorities. l, moreover, thought that l should inform the Chief of Staff of the Israeli Army personal1y. adding my appreciation of the co-operation between Israeli and Jordan authoi:ities and my hope that it would continue in the future. My letter was forwarded to the Chief of Staff who was at the time away from bis headquarters, supervising the autumn _,,~, ,', .éA,"~.~~~!i-~c~"O~",,+i2',.,~~:~~'~:~~;_w_~~~~~_~;a._,,,;pC_';~'_:'i\':'(Ii!~!iJ!;~~~é~o~;:=: m~0.euvres of the Israeli Arniy. The Mixed Armistice Commission met on 14 October at 0940 local time to discuss the Yahud incident. The Jordan Delegate stated in the meeting: "As 1 said, this is a horrible crime. We don't know yet who are the criminals and 1 want ta say to Major Nutov (the senior Israeli delegate) that it would be better to wait for the investigation started on the Jordan side. This investigation started early this morning. The Chief of Staff of the Arab Legion himself is going to carry out the. investigation. At the same time 1 want to ask Major Nutov to ask his people not to retaliate. If any retaliatory action is taken, then the whole issue will be difficult and it will confuse the investigation on our side." 3. GeneraI Bennike has remarked upon the efficacy of the local commanders' agreement. Would he say if this is considered by both sides to be of value? . Answer. The two governments do not attribute the same value to the agreement. The fundamental difference in the attitude of the tw'o countries. may be explained by the fact that in Israel, responsibility for border security rests with the Israel defence forCeS and the Israel authorities hold that illegal crossings of. the demarcation line by Arabci;vilians and the incidents connected with su!:h crossings would greatly diminish if, on the Jordan side also, the defence forces were made responsible for bordersecurity. The Jordan authorities, for which civilian infiltration is a matter for the police authorities and not for the defence forces, have attributed more importance to the local commanders' agreement and to regular meetings of local commanders, especially where the local commander is a representative of the police department. At present, aU local commanders on the Jordan side are police officers assigned to investigate incidents and maintain control over a certain sector of the demarcation line. In Israel, army officers or police officers have been assigned as local commanders to investigate incidents and to maintain con1 roI. In some·instances, the Israeli local commander, if a police officer, will be accompanied by a rcpresentative of the army, and alsothe local commander, if an army officer, will sometimes be accompanied by a police officer. It seems that in most cases, where an army officer is present, he takes over the Israeli representation. 1 may add that United Nations observers who have attended local commanders' meetings have statedthat on both sides local commanders in general, and particularly police officers, consider the agreement to he of value. 4. Would the Chief' of Staff say thaf, sillcethis agreement was signed early in June 1953, there lias been until recently and on the whole an improvement ~" the Jordan-Israel boundary areas? . Answer. During the three months preceding June, when there was no local commanders' agreement, 143 incidents occurred for which complaints were handed to the Mixed Armistice Commission. During July, August and September, when the new local commanders' agreement was in full force, 77 incidents occurred for which complaints were handed to the Mixed Armistice Commission. Between 8 and 11 local comrnanders' meetings have been held week1y at different points along the demarcation line. In each of these meetings an average of one or two problems have been settled. The above figures confirm the impression that, following the signature of. the local commanders' agreement on 8 June, there has been tmtil recently and on the whole an improvement in the Jordan-Israel border areas. An improvement was also noted by my predecessor, General Riley, after the signature of the first agreement on measures . ta curb infiltration (30 January 1952). In a report to the 5. l understand that the local commanders' agreem~t is for three months oruy and can denounced by either side without notice. Does General Bennike consider that it would be useful for the agreement to form part of a more permanent system; in particular, that the Mixed Armistice Commission should he consulted before its denunciation or non-renewal by either side? Answer. The local commanders' agreement, signed on 8 June, was valid for three months. It wasextended on 31 August 1953 for. an additional three months. Paragraph 6 of the agreement reads: "This agreement is yalid for three months from the day of signature and sha11 be subject to discussion by both parties one month before its expiry.". There is no provi.sion in the agreement concerning denunciation. Acceptance of the suggestion. to make the agreement part of a more permanent system would, in my opinion, be useful. In this connection l should like to point out that a previous agreement, signed on 13 May 1952, contained the fo11owing clause: "The provisions of this agreement will remain in force un1ess either party gives two weeks' notice to the other of its intention to abolish it" A similar clause, ta which mipht be added an undertaking to discuss a new agreement before or after giving notiÎ:e of the intention to terminate the agreement in force, should' be of value. 6. In his statement in paragraph 40 of the 630th meeting of the Security Council, General Bennike said that no detailed arrangements were made at two meetings of policeofficers held in July. What. importance does he attach to improved contacts between the police on either side of. the border? Answer. l believe that improved contacts between the police on either side of the border would improve conditions along the border. Police officers know the local situation and can cooperate professionally with success. The Jordan authorities have for several years advocated that the settlement of day-to-day incidents on the demarcation line should be decentralized to local police officErs aIl along the border. They claim that whenever this system has been adopted in the past, in any given sector, incidents have been greatly reduced. It is, in their opinion, common experience on aIl frontiers that criminals redouble their activities when they see the two governments at loggerheads, but that when would-be criminals see the police forces of the two countries acting in close co-operation, they are constrained greatly to reduce their activities. Arguing that speed is the most essential element in l agree with the view that gteat importance should be attached ta improved contacts between the ~)Qlice on eitlier side of the border. 7. Would General Bennike explain exactly how the ohserver corps at his _disposaI works? Does he believe that there are enough observers? Have they adequate transport and communication? Are they based i1l Jerusalem or do they cover the whole frontièr? Could the Chief of Staff say whether in n}s view the observer corps could be. strengthened and, if so, how? Answer. At the present time, i have nineteen military observers at my disposaI. FoUI' of them are serving as Chairmen of the Mixed Armistice Commissions. One observer works as my military assistant; another is in charge Of the Mount Scopus demilitaI'Îzed area. The others are assigried, according ~o the work load, to the armistice commissions. At the present time, two observers are assigned to the Israel-Lebanon Commission, four to the Egyptian-Israel Commission, six to the Israel~Syrian Commission, and five to the Hashemite Jardan Kingdom-Israel Commission. These 'figures indude the chairmen. We.will take, for example, the workings of the Jordan-Israpl Mixed Armistice Commission. The five observers assigned to it are based in Jerusalem, wmch is the headquarters of the Commission. They have a border approximately 620 kilometres in length to caver. Each observer attends from two to three local commanders' meetings pel" week, in addition to the investigation of complaints assigned him by the Chairman. . It is not, moreover, uncommon for military observers to be called into quick action to obtain a cease-fire. In tms, they have been very effective on several occasions. With 6~0 kilometres of demarcation liries between Israel-and Jordan to cover, and the fact that 34~ complaints have been handed in so far th~s year, many of which have been investigated, it is easy to. sec that the obserVers' task is not an easy one. . About one month after l assumed my ùuties as Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization, l was invited by the ccSecr.etary-General to come to Headquarters in order to review the functioning of thé Truce Supervision Organizatian, and in particular, to consider such recommendations as onecttionfu'sexperience in the field might have enabled me to make with a view to strengthening the effectiveness of the Truce Supervision Organization. During that visit to Headquarters, which lasted from 9 to 28 August; l had very full consultations with the Secretary-General and with the-members of the Missions Co-ordination Committee, consisting of s,enior officiaIs of the Secretariat who have various responsibilities in connexion with the work of United Nations missions in the field. These consultation:; were very fruitful and resulted in theacceptance of my recommendation that the number of observers beincreased .' .~-bysevenandthat additional observers be drawn from Sweden, Denmarkand New Zealand.The Secretary-GeneraJ'has requested the Governments of New Zealand and Sweden to second twoofficers each and the Government of Denmark to second three officers' for this assignment. My intention is to station four officers on the Israeli stde of the Jordan-Israel demarcation 1 also requested the Secretary-General to increase my civil:ian secretariat staff by the addition of a political affairs officer and a legal adviser; this has already heen done. 1 have exa..-nmed in detail the question of transport and communications, and 1 believe that 1 shall have sufficient equipment to meet the needs of the work. II. Qtlestions put by the representative of France 1. Can General Bennike tell the Council, with a few details, how the various bodies subordinate to the Truce Supervision Organization, in particular the Mixed Armistice Commissions such as the Jordan-Israel Commission, are operating at present? Answe1". Ta explain with a Îew details the actual happenings when a complaint is received 'by the Jordan-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission, I will relate as an example the Mixed Armistice Commission activities during the recent Qibya incident. On the night of 14-15 October, just after midnight, the Chairman of the Jordan-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission received a calI from the Jordan delegate who alleged that a major attack was at that time being carried out against the v'J1age of Qibya by Israeli military forces. He asked for a cease-fire, an immediate investigation and an emergency Mixed Armistice Commission meeting ta discuss the case. The chairman told the Jo.;dan delegate he would act immediately on his requests for a cease·fire and an investigation, and asked him ta make sure that his people did not return the fire. He then went ta the Mbced Armistice Commission office ill the Jerusaiem no man's land, contacted the Israeli delegate, informed him of the Jordan complaint, and requested an immediate cease-fire and permission ta se."1d out an investigating team. The Israeli delegate agreed .to the investigation and said that roe would contact the area for information as to what was happening, and tr.at he would ask for a cease-fire. The Jordan delegate was then told that Israel had agreed to an investigation, and arrangements were made to send out the investigating team. Two observers were called and told to go ta the spot and carry out an investigation. The Jordan delegate called shortly after, stating that mortar fire was being directed at the village of Budrus in the same area. This information was forwarded to t1leIsrael delegate, who later reported t1lat he had learoed that firing had been heard in that area, but that it had stopped. At about dawn, the Jordan delegate called to say that aIl firing had ceased. The investigating team had already departed for t1le area. An observer was then sent wit1l a member of the Israeli delegation to stand by inside Israel territory in case the investigation had ta be continued on the Israeli side of t1le demarcation line. The chairman, who had withheld his decision to hold t1le emergency meeting requested by Jordan, t1len went to Qibya ta gain first:"hand information. (According to an agreement reached during the· 49t1l meeting of the Mixed Armistice Commission on 14 February 1951, t1le chairman of the Jordan- Israel Mixed Armistice Commission has the sole right to decide on an emergency meeting; if he decides to call an emergency meeting, he must call it within twenty-four hours of the submission of thecomplaint.) On his return from Qibya, t1le chairman notified t1le parties that an emergency meeting would be held t1lat afternoon. At t1le meeting, the Jordan delegation presented its complaint, the The l'ules of procedure of the Jordan-Israel Mixed Armistice ComQ.lission also provide for the possibility of referring to a sub-committee any daim or complaint relating to the application of the Armistice Agreement presented by either party. A suhcommittee, made up of delegates from bath sides and Uuited Nations observers has met from time to time in an attempt to settle minor questions or to agree on the \vithdrawal or settlement of complaints. Ali decisions reached by the subcommittee must be unanimous and must he later ratified by the Mixed Armistice Commission during a formal Mixed Armistice Commission meeting. Z. Could General Bennike inform us whether in his opinion tliere is anything lacking in the operation of the various organs and whether he could make any suggestions with a view to improving their organization? Allswer. The operation of the Mixed Armistice Commissions, and in particular of the Jordan-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission, would be improved if, instead of acting "as lawyers defending a case in court" - this phrase was recently used by General Riley in a report to the Security Council (S/3007, para. 12) - delegates of the parties acted in conformity with the spirit and the letter of the Armistice Agreemel1Îs. The Armistice Agreements .provide that action by the Mixed Armistice Commissions on daims and complaints shaH be taken "with a view to equitable and mutuaHy satisfactory settlement". l have presided over em.ergency meetings of the Israel-Jordan Mixèd Armistice Commission, soon after l took over from General Riley. Like him, l found out that one delegate acted as the prosecuting attorney, the other defence, and l had to sit as a judge, without the benefit of a· jury. Another unsatisfactory aspect of the procedure is that the votingis on a draft resolution presented by· one side or the other. Although in some respects the chairman's position may be compared to that of a judge, he is at a disadvantage in that he cannot formulate the verdict. He can cast his vote only after bath parties have cast theirs. It is, therefore, impossible for the chairman to submit a draft resolution of his own; as this would be tantamount to announcing his vote in advance. This would open mm to the accusation of partiality or of prejudging the issue. As the debate on the complaint continues right up ta the moment of voting, the chairman is compelled to cast his vote on whatever text has been submitted by one side or the other. Consequently there is a very wide variation in the language of resolutions, particularly with respect to adjectives used to describe the breach of the Agreement. In this situation, .'.1 'v the Chairman's sole concern must be to establish the facts and ta determine whether a breach of the Armistice Agreement has in fact occurred. It would have a generally moderating effect on public opinion if the parties agreed to vote solely on the question whether a breach of the Agreement has taketl place, leaving it to the chaîrman to formulat~ the verdict in appropriate terms. When presiding over emergency meetings l also felt - and this impression has been confini1ed by experience-that the Mixed Armistice Commission could be compared to a scoreboard; with the parties fighting to stack up decisions, one against the other. If the parties agreed to take action on c1aims and complaints "with aview ta equitable anti m"tu~l1y First, there is the question of congestion of work in the Israel-Jordan Mixed Armistice Commission. Many cases, which are not dealt with in emergenCY meetings, accumulate on the list of itenis to he considered in future regular meetings. An incident is sometimes long past before it cornes up fo.. hearing. If such incident \Vas not investigated immediately or scan after it took place, the decision ta enquire inta it when the Mixed Armistice Commission begins to consider it several weeks or months later leads ID many cases to no results. On 31 August 1953, the Israel and Jordan delegations took a drastic decision in wiping out 338 cases from the Mixed Armistice Commission's agenda. Normally, however, the reference of as' many cases as possible to a sub-committee or to meetings of local ~om­ manders should greatly reduce congestion of work. Congestion of work would he lù,lited to periods of tension, when practically every incident is either dealt with immediaœly in an emergency meeting or put on· the list of questions to he dealt with later at regular meetings. • In the secœ.d place, there is the question of possible improvements in the investigation procedure. In the Israel-Jordan Mixed Armistice Cotn.'11ission observers may not be sent on an investigation unless the commission so decid-:;s. (It may take decisions by a majority vote.) In practice, when th.e consent of bath parties is obtained informa1ly by telephone or otherwise, a formal meetÎllg is not required. When the consent of bath parties is not obtained informally, an investigation may be considerably delayed and its results rendered worthless. The roles of procedure of the Israel-Egyptian Mixed Armistice Commission are more liberal. .An investigation takes place following. an agreement of the parties or a ·requ~st by one of them to the chairman or his representative on either side. If, at the request of either party, the chairman decides to hold an emergency meeting of the Mixed Armistice Commission, he arranges for an investigation to be held within twenty-four hours of the submission of the claim or complaint The investigation procedure in the Israel-Jordan Mixed Armistice Commission would he improved if its rules of procedure were amended ta include sùnilar provisions. In the third place,it might he usefu1 for the parties to discuss matters from time to time on a higher level than the Mixed.i\nnistice Commission. Such taIks might, if desired, be carefully prepared. The United Nations Troce Supervision Crganization would lend such· assistance as the parties might !'eqnest 3;t~dthé General tell us to what ex1:ent the parties are complying with the commission's decisions which have been notified to them? Answer. The usual pattern for' a decision of the Israel- Jordan Mixed Armistice Commission isas follows: first, the Mixed Armistice Commission decides that sucb and such an act by a. party is a breach of suchand such an article of the Armistice Agreement; second, the Mixed Armistice Commission calls upon the same party to take measures to prevent the recurrence of sucb acts. In other cases, the Mixed Armistice Commission requests a party to take certain definite mea.sures . to remedy the situation resulting from a breach of the Armistice Agreement • "16. Jordan authorities have also reported the following measures in effect from 1 November 1951 to curb infiltration: "(a) National guards and village authorities have been instructed topoint out the location of the demarcation liue to villagers, and to warn them of the danger they face in making illegal crossings; shepherds are instructed ta keep their flocks as far as practicable from the line, to prevent accidental .crossing lUld consequent confiscation by Israeli authorities; guards are stationed along the demarcation line, and a list of people oWlling or cultivating lands along the lhle has been established. "(b) In areas difficult to control (particularly along the Wadi Araba), Bedouin tribes have been ordered to move back from the demarcation line to areas deeper inside Jordan." Since Genera! Riley's report was ~ritten, the Jordan authorities have increased the numher of guards along the demarcation liner As regards punitive measures, knoWll infiltrators have been imprisoned or removed from the border villages and local authorities have been replaced where a laxness of control was suspected. Israel, on its side, complied with the rules goveming the return of infiltrators and fumished information concerning known infi1trators; Orders have been given and measures taken to .stop military units on manoeuvres from firing across the liner The Israel authorities have also educated the Israeli inhabitants of the border area as to the actual position of the line on the ground. Both parties have also, from time to time, issued orders to control the firing by border guards. As régards compliance withdei:isions in which a party is requested to take such and such concrete measure, l regret that l have at my disposaI too little time and too s'canty information to answer ilie question with the necessary accuracy. On the whole, however, my general impression is that compliance with Mixed Armistice Commission decisions could be improved. 4. My delegation is anxiou5 to know how the supervision of the truce is actually organized, how many observers are at General Bennike's disposaI, what active measures these observers can themselves take, how soon after an incident has occurred these observers are able' to intervene, and whether they alVv"aYs receive froni the local authorities the assistance and cooperation to which they are entitled. Answer.. In accordance with the Security Council resolution of 11 August 1949 [Sj1376, IIl, adopted after the conclusion of the several Armistice Agreements, the pérsonnel of the Truce Supervision Organization performs two functions. The first is "observing and Il1aintaining the cease~fire" order.ed by the SecuritY Council on 15 July 1948 (the order is reaffirmed in the resolution of 11 August 1949). The second function is "assisting the parties to the Armistice Agreernents in the supervision of the application and observance of ~he terms of those With regard to functions under the Armistice Agreements, the Security Cauncil resolution of 11 August 1949 makes a distinction, which is in conformity with the terms of the Armistice Agreements, between the Chief of Staff and the personnel of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization under his commando The Chief of Staff is e:o officia cl1airman of the four Mixed Armistice Commissions which supervise the execution of the four Armistice Agreements. He may delegate bis powers as chairman in each Mixed Armistice Commission toa senior officer from the observer personnel. Other officers from the observer personnel, while remainitlg under the command of the Chief of Staff, are attached to each Mixed Armistice Commission and employed by it. Theil' assignments are subject to approval by the Chief of Staff or his designated representative on the commission, whichever is serving as chairman. United Nations observers are eml'loyed by a Mixed Armistice Commission according to its rules and ta its practice, which vary in tlle different commissions. In my reply to the second question by the representative of France, 1 have already indicated thedifferences between the rules of procedure and practice of the Israel-Jordan and those of the Israel-Egyptian Mixed Armistice Commission. In the Israel-Lebanese Mixed Armistice Commission, formal meetings of the commission are provided for by the rules of procedure to arder an investigation on the spot, b'at in practice, when an investigation is t:equested by a party,. the other party has .always given its consent and a mixed investigation has been made. Since 1951, the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission has ceased to hold any formal meetings except emergency meetings, as indicated in General Riley's report to the Security Council dated 30 October 1952 [Sj2833,.para. 45]. At the present time, as statt;d .in. my answer to a preVious question, 1 have nineteen military observers at my disposal. The active measures which they may take and how soon after the occurrence of an .incident they are able to intervene depend on wllether they are acting with respect to the cease-fire or tothe Armistice Agreements, and if the latter, on the particu1ar rules· and practice of the commission concerned. For the most part, the cooperation and assistance received from the local authoritiés has been satisfactory. 5. The statistics which General Bennike has provided in his report cover orny the period from 1 January ta 15 October 1953. 1 think it would certainly.be in the Council's interest to have in a shorter and lessdetailed form statistics relating to the truce violations which have occurred during the preceding years to which we must more or less dosely relate the events which have been described to us. In particular, could Generâl Bennike tell us the number of truce violations which have been reported to the commission since it started to function, the number of such Cases on which ,t has been able to pass a verdict, and also the number in which Israel or one of its neighbouring countries was found to' have committed the violation? Ânswer. The answer is ta he found in appenf1bç 1 of this report. 2. Can General Bennike supply information indicating the extent of the material .damage Israel has suffered from infiltration? Answer. The Truce Supervision Organization is not in a position to compile or check si:atistics of material damage resulting from infiltration. The Israel Government compiles and, from ti~f to time, publishes statistics on the question. 3. Does the Truce Supervision Organization have information as to the extent of the organization of infiltration? Answer. Apart from statements made by the parties, the Truce Supervision Organization has no information on the subjec.t. 4. What material damage was there to the village and its inhabitants as a result of the Qibya incident? Altswer. The Truce Supervision Organization has never been required to make an estimate of the material damage resulting from incidents on the Israel-Jordan demarcation line. IV. Questio;~ put by the representative of Greece Would General Bennike find it advisable to strengthen the observer corps in such a way as to permit it to play a preventive role? In other words, 1 wonder whether the presence of observers at certain psychologically dangerous points along the frontier might not preventpossible frontier incidents. Answer. 1 cannot reply in a definitive forro to this question, although the experience of the Truce Supervision Organization in its early years, in 1948 and 1949, as well as the experience of the United Nations Military Observer' Group in Kashmir, would tend to support the view that the presence of observers at certain points along the cease-fire line is helpful in preventing possible incidents. As l have indicated, it is my intention to station a small numbe-r of observers along bath sides of the Israel-Jordan demarcation line. Naturally, the extent to which theycan be of assistance in preventing frontier incidents would dellend on the increased effectiveness of the local commanders' meetings and the cooDeratio~ which is extended to them by the authorities on both sides of the line. It is my hope that dellloying observers as 1 have indicated may serve to assist the parties in preventing incidents. . V. Questions put by the representative of Lebanon 1. Has the life of General Bennike or any of bis collaborators been threatened? A~swer. As Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization, l am adhering strictly tothe position thE.t the personnel of the organization and 1 are in Palestine by virtue of resolu~ 2. Have General Bennike and his organization been prevented from performing their functions? If so, when, how and by whom? Atlswer. In the course of their duties, United Nations military observers have met with some obstruction on the part of Israeli . -clvilians and some over-zealous Israeli officiaIs in the two demilitarized zones created by the Israel-Egyptian and Israel- Syrian Armistice Agreements and in the Mount Scopus demilitarized zone. In the first tw6 demilitarized zones, an appeal to higher authorities has removed the obstruction. The situation, however, has not been improved on Mount Scopus, which 1 attempted to inspect on 25 September 1953, in discharge of the responsibility for the security of this area placed upon the United Nations by the agreement dated 7 July 1948 (S/30l5, annex). 1 On 23 September, two days prior to the intended inspection, a letter was sent tothe general staff officer in charge of the Israeli delegations to the Mixed Armistice Commissions and to the officer in charge of the Jor'dan delegation, informing them of my intentions. . ... At approximately 6.30 a.m., 1 arrived at the area with severa! United Nations observers. The senior Israeli police inspector in charge informed me that he had received specifie orders not to allow anyone to enter the buildings in the Jewish sector. 1 inquired as to who had issued this order and was told that his superiors in Jerusalem were responsible. He refused to divulge the name of the superior who had issued the order. At about 11.20 a.m., after many difficulties and after an Israeli police inspector·had been brought to the spot from the Israeli section· of Jerusalem, we were allowed to start the inspection, but the observers. met with minimum co-operation. Keys to locked doors could not be found, and the operation of mine detectors. was not allowed. At approXÏIilately 12.40, the Israeli policeinspector announced that he had received orders to stop the insnection. 1 then withdrew from the area. Subsequently, 1 received a letter dated 26 September from the general staff officer in charge of the Israeli delegations to the Mixed Armistice Commissions, explaining that he had received my letter of 23 September only after the time set for the inspection, and objecting to searches by the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in the Jewish sector of Mount Scopus demilitarized area. Before the receipt of this communication, 1 had addressed a letter, on 27 September, to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel, drawing his attentipn to the difficulties 1 had encountered in connexion with the On the night of 1 November 1953, a water line in Jordanwntrolled territory north-east of Jerusa1e..m was destroyed by explosives. Jordan entered a complaillt a.'"1d an investigating team was sent to the scene on the moming of 2 November. A United Nations observer, three Jordanian officers and an experienced tracker followed trac!cs from the scene of the incident to within seven metres of the fence around the Jewish sector of Mount Scopus. Here the investigating party was stopped by an Israeli police inspector. Even though the United Nations observer was satisfied that the tracks he saw at the point near the Scopus fence were the same as those seen at the site of the explosion, the Israeli inspector refused to let the tracker or the United Nations observer come nearer the fence. The United Nations observer, who is my representative for Mount Scopus, was at that time with the Israeli inspector inside the Mount Scopus area and was not allowed to continue the investigation inside the area. On the morning of 2 November, my representatïve for Mount Scopus wanted to investigate another explosion alleged to have taken place a few hours earlier in the Jewish sector of the demilitarized zone, in the vicinity· of the amphitheatre. The Israeli inspector stated that his instructions were to prohibit United Nations personnel from inspecting the Jewish sector unless they had permission from Israeli police headquat"ters in Jerusalem. My representative was, however, allowed to visit the grouna neal' t..'le amphitheatre. On returning the same aftemoon, he was told by the Israeli inspector that, according to instructions just received, he could not be permitted to inspect anywhere without permission from police headquarters. On 3 November,. however, the general staff officer in charge of the Israeli delegations to the Mixed Armistice Commissions informed the headquarters of the Truce Supervision Organization in Jerusalem that the police inspector on Mount Scopus would be immediately instructed to permit my representative freedom of movement. l must emphasize that the govermnent concemed should take all necessary steps to ensure that aIl its officiais who come in contact with United Nations military observers are properly instructed as to the privileges, immunities and authority of the observers in carrying out their furictions. Should any Govemment in the area place any obstacles in the way of military observers carrying out their lawful duties, or should a government endorse any obstructive action by a subordinate officia!, l shaIl feel bound to place the matter before the Security Council. 3. How many· Arabs have been expelled from Israel since 1948? Ans1.!Jer. (a) According to the complaints handed in to the Israel-Jordan Mixed Armistice Commission since June 1949, Jordan has alleged that 5,415 persons plus two families (the number. of persons involved was not mentioned in this complaint) have been expelled from Israel. In most of these cases, Israel has claimed that the persons expelled did not hold Israeli identification cards and had been living in Israel illegally. Sorne suchcases have been·settled by resolutions, such as the following: "The Mixed Armistice Commission refers this case to the Reunion of Broken Families Committees, if these women wish toapply to return to Israel." or: "The Jordan delegation agreed to withdraw complaint #64 and the Israe1i~ delegation stated that it was prepared to consider the application for the return of this family favourably, if it was îound that it had been expelled illega11y." l ha.ve no figures showing the number of persons who have been ret1.1rned to Israel. (b) The records of the Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Cotrurlission show that twenty-six Arabs have been expelled from Israel to Lebanon. (c) On 15 October 1953, the Security Council was informed by the permanent representative of Syria of the recent expulsion of e1even Arab inhabitants of the village of Rihaniya in the Safad district (S/3107). The number of Arabs expelled from the demilitarized zone created by the Israel-Syrian Armistice Agreement is indicated in my answer to question 4 from the representanve of Lebanon. (d) Two '.:l.ecisions taken by the Israel-Egyptian Mixed Armistice Commission on 30 May 1951 deal with the expulsion of Arabe. The mst refers to the expulsion by the.Israeli authorities of about 2,000 Arabs from El Ma.jda1 to the Egyptian-controlled Gaza Strip. The second deals with the expulsion of 6,000 to 7,000 Bedouins of the Azazme tribe from the area under Israel control and from the El Auja demilitarized zone into Egyptian territory. The Israel Government has appealed against the two decisions of the Mixed Armistice Commission to the Special Committee provided for under article X, paragraph 4, of the Israel-Egyptian General Armistice Agreement 8. The appeals are still pending before the Special Committee. 4. With reference to the third question above, how many Arabs in particùlar have been expelled by Israel from their homes in the demititarized zone? Answer. (a) With regard to the demilitarized zone created by the Israel-Syrian Armistice Agreement, about 785 Arabs were on the night of 30-31 March 1951 removed from their homes in the Baqqara-Ghanname-Khoury Farm area, in the central sector of the Zone. They were transferred to Sha'ab in Israel-controlled territory. Following interviews of 117heads of families at Sha'ab by the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission on 2 and 3 July 1951, 212 Arabs, belonging to families whoseheads had expressed by signature their desire to return to their homes, were sent back to the demilitarized zone on 5 July; 142 other Arabs were returned on 5 and 9 July. without having been questioned by· the chairman. Of the approximately 409 Arabs who remained in Sha'ab, after expressing the -desire not to return to the demilitarized zone, 70 were, at their own request arid by agreement between the parties, permitted to enter Syria on 22 January 1952. My predecessor has further reported to. the Security Council on 30 October 1952 (S/2833, para. 50) that approxîmately 35 of the other Arabs tr6tlsferred to Sha'ab had fled to Syria. About 300 inhabitants of another Arab village, Es Samra, in the southern sector of the demilitarized zone, fled from that village during the incidents of March-April 1951. They have taken refuge in the vicinity of Kahn and El Hamma, in the southern sector of the demilitarized zone. (b) With regard to the El Auja demilitarized zone created by the Israel-Egyptian Armistice Agreement, l have referred, in my answer to the preceding question, to the decision taken by the Israel-Egyptian Mixed Armistice Commission, and appealed against by Israel, concerning the 6,000 to 7,000 Bedouins of the Azazme tribe, which, according to the decision AllS'wer. 1 must give the same· answer to this question as that given to the question of the representative of the United States. 1 &m not in possession of information which would enable me to state the extent of material damage suffered, as neither the Mixed Armistice Commissions nor the Truce Supervision Organization are required to measure or assess damage. 6. Does the General have any evidence supporting the contention .that. _.<\rab infiltrators are directed by the official authorities of Jordan or by organizations knûw'Il to these official authorities? Allswer. 1 have no such evidence, nor is the contention to which this question refers supported by any decision of the 1fJxed Armistice Commission other than the following: The Commission, at an emergency meeting (99th meeting) held on 26 and 27 November and 8 December 1952, which the Jordanian representatives did not attend, voted on' the following resolution submitted by Israel, as follows: "1. The Mixed Armistice Commission is alarmed by the planned sending of armed criminals from Jordan to Israel by an officer of the Arab Legion. It is an hostile act bearing the character of subversive warfare which constitutes a breach of the General Armistice Agreement, article III, para. 3." Two votes for (Israeli delegation) Chairman - no vote. "2. The crossing of the demarcation line by an armed gang of Jordanians controlled by a Jordanian Armyofficer who attacked Israel security forces, constitutes a breach of the General Armistice Agreement, article III, para; 2." Two votes for (Israeli de1egation) Chairman - no vote. "3. The Mixed Armistice Commission emphasizes the gravity of the situation to which such activities lead and calls on Jordan to stop them immediately." Two votes for (Israeli delegation) Chairman - no vote. "4. The Mixed Armistice Commission considers the failw:e of the Jordanian delegation to attend three consecutive emergency meetings as a lack of respect to the Mixed Armistice Commission and condemns it as an improper attempt to avoid decisions.': Two votes for (Israeli delegation) One vote against (Châirman). 7. Does the General consider that private citizens of Israel armed by the government constitute militàry or para-military forceûlLthe-anSl..,er is in the affirmative, would the General consider the Government of Israel responsible for the actions ofthese armed citizens? Allswer. It· is difficult to answer any questions of this kind in the abstracto Such questions have to be answered in concrete cases by the Mixed Armistice Commissions every time a party aIIeges that responsibility for such and such an action rests not with an "armed group" of indefinite organization and composition, but with an element of the military or para- Answer; One of the causes of civilian crossing of the demarcation line is for illegal cultivation. My predecessoi", in his report to the Security Cùuncil of 30 October 1952 (Sj2833, para. 17), pointed out that "another cause of frequent incidents along the demarcation line is the cultivation of land by residents of one party in the territory controlled by the other or in no-man's-:.land". In my l'éport to the Security Council on 27 October 1953, I noted that the Mixed Armistice Commission had found that the origin of the Dawayima incident (25-27 May 1953) had been the ille~d1 cultivation by Jordanians of land in Israel territory (630th meeting, para. 15). AImost aIl cases of·.illq;.J.cultivati(ll!.with which the Mixed Armistice Commission has had to deafarécàsesùt cultivationhyAra.bl; of lands which have been separated from Arab villages by the Armistice demarcation line. 9. At no point in his report does General Bennike refer to the. Jordanian armed forces as having 'l'iolated the General Armistice' Agreement by crossing or fi ring across the demarcation line, whereas at eleven points he assertstl1at Israeli armed forces crossed or fired across the demarcation line (in one instance, the demilitarized zone) in violation of the General Armistice Agreements. (These ele' Ten places are listed in annex V.) Would General Berinike care to go more deeply and more critically into this qualitative difference between the acts of violaâon of the General Armistice Agreeménts attributable to Jordan or Jordanians and the acts of violation attributable to Israel or Israelis? Answer. . During the period 1 January through 15 October 1953, action by Jordan forces resulted in Jordan being condemned for three violations. of the General Armistice Agreement The text of the resolutions, condemning Jordan, canbe found in appendbc II of this report. Other resolutions condemning Jordan, adopted during this period, refer to actions by armed groups or armed Jordanians. During the same period, 1 Januarythrough 15 October 1953, action by Istaeli forces resulted in' Israel being condemned for sixteen violations of the General Armistice Agreement. 10. In severalplaces General Bennike speaks of "retaliation", "retaliatory action'~, "cycle of reprisaIs", "reprisaI raids"" "chain reaction>pf retaliatùl'Y measures", etc. If we compare the list of rep!!isals or retaliatory actions committed by Arabs withthe listof reprisaIs or retaliatory actions committed by Israelis, would General Bennike care to comment on whether there is a qualitative difference between them, namely, a difference as to their scope, intensity, method used and the relative casualties caused or the comparative extent of the damage inflicted? Answer. The answer to' the ëart of this question referring to casualties will be found in appendix I to this report. Neither tue Israel-Jordan Mixed Armistice Commission nor the Truce Supervision.Organization have been required to assess damage. 11. From his.analysis of the Qibya incident and the knowledge of .the Truce. Supervision Organizâtion of the border AlIswer. The Qibya incident is sirilliar to the Falameh-Rantis incident (28-29 January 1953) and the Wadi Fukin, Surif·and Idna incidents (11 August 1953). However, because of the number of persons killed, and because of. the number of men, the amount of military equipment, and the degree of organization involved, it stands out from other border incidents. 12. In paragraph 37 (see also para. 43), General Bennike says, "Jerusalem, whentension increases between Israel and Jordan, is a dangerous powder keg. l have been told in particular by the Israeli authorities that criminal activitiesby infiltrators in the Israel part of Jerusalem would create a very grave situation". Would the General care t.o go more deeply iuto this matter, and in particular, would he elucidate what is intended by the phrase "a very grave situation"? AlIswer. To elucidatethe phrase "a very grave situation", l shallrefer to the preceding sentence in which l have described Jerusalem asa "dangerous powder keg, when tension increases between Israel and Jordan".· During à conversation with members of the Israeli general staff, l was told that Jerusalem was the capital city of the State of Israel, in which the Knesset ~ anà~the~g.·weffi-m~L()ffices are located, and.that security in Jerusalem was accordùiglyof the grea1:estcÏ!nllQrt@c~~ 13. What detailed recommendations would General Bennike make for strengtheningthe United Nations machinery'which will guarantee the observance of the General Armistice Agreements? Answer. l have. endeavoured to reply to this question in my answer to question 2 ftom the representative of France. 14. In paragraph 58 of his report,General Bennike speaks of "Israel opposition to the fuIfilment by the Chairman' and United Nations observers of their responsibility for ensuring the implementation of article V of the General Armistice Agreement". This opposition is further hintedat in paragraph 66. Since this is not an unimportant matter, especially in view of the teXt of the present item with which the Seéurity CouDcil is seized, adetailed report on this question seems necessary. Would General Bemùke supply. the Council ,vith such a report? Answer. In paragraph 6 of hisreport to the Security Council, dated 6 November 1951 (S/2389), my predecessor wrote as follows: "6. During the conversation heldatthe Ministry .for Foreign Affairs on 6 September, it was reaffirmed to me that the policy of the Government of Israel was to allow full freedom of movement to the United Nations observers in the demilitarized zone, and .that nothing would be done by anybody to obstruct the observers or hamper them in the execution of their duty. l, for my part, agreed that normal identity checking at the entrance to the demilitarized zone did not constitute a curtailmènt of the freedom of movement of the United Nations observers ,in the zone." The assurance thus given to my predecessor has not always been fully observed. One year later, in his report to the Security Council of 3~ O~tober 1?52 (S/2833), Lt. General Riley described thé Situation as It then existed in the demilitarized zone. For example, he stated in paragraph 58 of his report: "With the exception of Nuqeib, El' Hamma and Shamalne Isra:l police, acting under orders from police headquarter~ outslde.the detD:il.itar.ized zone, exercise control over practically the entire demthtanzed zone. The Chairman has maintained that the provisions of article V of the General Armistice There has been no change in the situation - described by my predecessor. 15. In paragraph 61 of bis report, General Bennike says: "If military forces carry out punitive raids across :the demarcation Hne, the Armistice Agreement must be considered as having been dellberate1y broken in full knowledge of possibie consequences, including the possibility of a clash with the military forces of the other party. The dangers implied in such a resort to force should persuade the responsible authorities ta abstain from it and adhere closely to peacefu1 means." Tbis is a statement of the utmost importance. W ould the General care to c.'Cpound bis thoughts further and to recommend what must 00_ done in the circumstances to prevent this "deliberate breaking" of 'the Armistice Agreement? Answer. I can only repeat what I have said in my report of Zl October (630th meeting, paras. 60 and 61). Two methods are possible: co-operation or resort to force. The dangers of the latter should he clear to everyone. The parties must bonour their undertaking to observe the cease-fire ordered by the Security Council and not takematters Ïnto their own bands in violation of the Armistice Agreements. 16. In Parllgraph 62 of bis report General Rennike says that the fellowing ruling by Dr. Bunche, the Acting Med,ator, is authoritative ax:ù was accepted by both parties in 1949: "In the nature of the case, therefore, under the provisions of the Armistice Agreement, neither party could validly daim to have a free hand in the demilitarized zone over civilian activity, whil(; milital1" activity was totally excluded." In view of the fact that the present item with wbich the Security Council is seized deals with "compliance with and enforcement of the General Armistice Agr,="..ments", wouldGeneral Bennike care ta 'lXPlain who went back on this authoritative ruling which was accepted by bath parties in 1949, and why? Answer. I should like ta darify the status of the paragraph from t'.~ statement by Dr. Ralph Bunche quoted' in t1ùs question.ine authoritative comment of the Acting Mediator which was accepted by bath parties in 1949, and ta which I referrcd in my report is as follows: "The question of civil administration in vilbgesand settlements in' the demilitarized zone is provided for, within the framework of an Armistice Agreement,' in sub-paragraphs S (b) and 5 (j) of the draft article. Sucb civil administration, including policllig, will be on a local basis, without raising general questions,cf administration, jurisdiction, citizensbip, and"sovereignty. "Where Israel civilians return tà )r remain in an Israel village orsettlement, the civil administration and policing of the village or settlement will bZ' by Israelis.' '3imilarly, where Arab civilians retum ta or rmlain ID an Arab village, a local Arab administration and police unit will he authorized. "As civilian life is gradually restored, administr-;;:ion wiP take •shape on a local, basis under the general supervision of the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission. "The Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission, in consultation. and co-operation with the local communities, will be in a position toauthorize aIl IlecessaTyarrangements for the re~toration and protection of civilian, life. He will not assume responsib~!ity for direct administration of the zone." 17. "Vith respect to appendix l of the General's report, would the General supply details of the nature and eJP:ent of damage of each of the 20 violations of the General Armistice Agreement for which Jordan was cendemned, and each of the 21 violations of the General Armistice Agreement for which Israel was' condemned? Answer. As l have stated eartier, l am unable to give the details of the damage in these cases, since l am not in Vossession of the necessary information. Neither the Mixed Armistice Commission nor the Truce Supervision Organization has measured or assessed the damage involved. 18. With respect to appendix II of General Bennike's report, would the General complete the tabulation in part two of this appendix to read like part two of appendix l, so as to obtain the same sort of information for the period June 1949 through December 1952 that was tabulateù in appendix l for the period 1 January b 15 Odober 1953, namely, the verification by the Mixed Armistice Commission of the relative casualties alleged by Jordan and by Israel? Answer. The information requested ,vill be found in appendix 1 of this report. 19. Could the General supply a detailed tabulation of ail the violations for which Jordan and Israel were condemned by the Mixed Armistice Commission since the onset of the Armistice, including in each case the nature of the violation and the extent of the damage inflicted? Allswer. The part of appendix l which outlines the articles and paragraphs of the General Armistice Agreement that have been violated will give sorne indication as to the nature of the 'liolation. The Mixed Armistice Commission has made no attempt to estimate the extent of the damage inflicted. VI. Qllestions put by the represeatative of Israel 1. My first question relates to appendix III, sub-paragraph 3 of the report [630th meelÎng]. In listing complaints in the Hashemite Jordan Kingdom-Israel Mixed Armistice Comnlission, the report states: "And in addition, 191 complaints against Jordan were settled without discussion by a resolution that included the following: "'The crossing of the line by civilians is inconsistent with article IV, paragraph 3, of the General Armistice Agreement.' " The paragraph which I have quoted sounds as if the resolutiongave no indication of whether the 191 complaints against Jordan were valid or not. 1 therefore ask whether the Chief of Staff can cônfiim that the aforesaid resolution included sorne acknowledgnient by'Jordan of the validity of Israel's complaints, by saying in its principal dause: "The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan delegation regrets the crossing of the demarcation tine bycivilians as reported Auswer. During the period between 1 January and 28 January 1953, ten complaints were submitted by Jordan and six complaints by Israel. In May 1953, Israel submitted cight more complaints, concerning infiltration that had allegedly taken place during January. 1 have listed aIl the complaints in separate memorandum which 1 shall transmit to the President of the Council ,vith the request it be added to the record of my a."1swers as appendix IV. 1 would draw attention to the incident listed as number 7 under Jordan's complaints in this annex appendix, namely the cœnplaint by Jordan that, on 4 January, three Israeli soldiers and one civilian driving instructor Wf.re found by a Jordan patrol in the Latrun area. This case resulted in the cancellation by Israel on 8 January of the agreement to reduce and solve incidents. The previous agreement measures to curb infiltration, which thereupon automatically went into effect, was also terminated by Israel. The cancellation of bath these agreements added to the rapid1y developing tt;nsion. 1 may add that tension caunot be gauged by the number incidents alone. An even more important factor is the weight given to the incidents by official spokesmen of the governments of the parties and by the Press. J. My third question refers to paragraph 42 of th,~ report in which it .is stated that the attack on the Israel village Yahud on 12-13 October which caused the death of twô small children and their mother may have provoked the attack Qibya. Tt is my understanding that the Mixed Armistice Commission, in condemning Jordan for the attack, defined that situation as "intolerable aggression". 1 wonder whether, order to clear up this point, we could simply have transmitted to us the full text of the resolution on Yahud? AlIswer. Following is the :full text of the resolutionadopted by the Israel-Jordan Mixed Armistice Commission concerning the Yahud incident: Part 1. "The deep armed Jordanian penetration into Israel to perpetrate the.brutal attackon a house in Yahud village the night of 12-13 October 1953, which resulted in the murder of two small children and their mother is a violation article III, paragraph 2, of the General Armistice Agreement" Part 2. ''The Mixed Armistice Commission considers it vital importance that the Jordanian authorities shouldtake immediately the most vigorous measures to prevent· the récurrence of such i.·üolerable aggression." Both parts of the resolution were adopted by the Commission by three votes in favour, noneopposed, and two abstentions (Jord<tI1·delegation). In reply to thesecond question by the representative France, 1 have drawn attention to the fact that under procedures followed in.the ~ed Armistic~ Commissions, the wording 4. My fourth qu~stion refers to the report by Commander Hutchison on the Qibya incident, quoted in the report of the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization. In that memorandum the conclusion is drawn that, because certain types of weapons were employed by the attackers, the attacks therefore must have been carried out by Israel defence forces. l would appreciate it if we could be toId whether the United Nations observers have examined the defence system of Israel border villages and have concluded that the weapons with which these settlements are armed to repel attacks from across the border are of a type and make different from thase employed by the Israel defence forces. i Answer. United Nations observers, who have visited many border villages, have never reported seeing weapons other than machine guns, grenades, rifles, automatic wearons such as Bren-gun, Sten-gun and Thompson sub-machine guns, and side arms. The records of the complaints and investigations of the Mixed Armistice Commissions since 1949 comai."l no evidence to show that border villages weœ ever furnished with bangalore torpedoes, 2-inch and 81 mm. mortars and demolition charges. Nor does the history of incidents show the necessity of border villages being furnished with thÏs type of weapons. The records of the Mixed Armistice Commission show that attacks against villages and persons in Israel take the pattern of raids carried out by small armed groups using hit-and-run tactir.s. For defence against thistype of action, l can see the usefulness of machine guns, small automatic weapons and even hand grenades, but certainly not of mortars, bangalore torpedoes and demolition charges. 5. l have a question of fact relating to parz~raph 48, where General Bennike states that Israel airplanes attacked Arabs and their herds of camels and goats. l believe the reference is to the south of the country. Neither Inor any of my collcagues have heard anything of this. Therefore, could we plcase have the full text of the Mixed Armistice Commission's resolution on this matter? Amwer. The statement referred to in this question was based on reports of investigations carried out by United Nations observers. The incidents occurred in particular in the area of the demilitarized zone created by the Israel-Egyptian Armistice Agreement. Under the Armistice Agreement the United Nations observers have greater authority in the demilitarized zone than they have elsewhere, and l attach special importance to the reports of observers concerning incidents in the area of the zone. My statement· was intended to illustrate the general situation leading up to the events in the demilitarized zone referred to in the decision of the Mixed Armistice Commissibn of 2 October 1953, which l quoted Ï1~ extmso (630th meeting, para. 50). The following is a summary of reports of investigations by United Nations observers in July and August 1953. 1 ~ ~=~~::~:::~~::.~:=:::,:~:::=::r "3) The demilitarized zone being an integral part of Israel, the term 'Palestinian Bedouin' does not exist. Every Arab including Bedouins in the demilitarized zone without an Israeli identity cardis an infiltrator. . "4) Any Israeli activity in the demilitarized zone (beside the penelxation of military forces) is an internal Israeli affair and of no concern to anybody, including Egypt." 6. 1 refer again to the Israe1-Egyptian armistice situation, in which connexion the Chief of Staff in his report quotes a resolution adopted by the Israeli-Egyptian Mixed Armistice Conmlission on 2 October 1953, regarding alleged military activities in the demilitarized zone of El Auja. In accordance with artièle X of the Israeli-Egyptian Armistice Agreement, 1 nnderstand that a decision of the commi:.:sion is not final, if it is appealed, until ·the Special Committee has taken a decision on the appeal. Am 1 right in stating that there is an appeal which was submitted on 2 October, and would it he correct· to deduce that tlûs resolution' is therefore still sub j1tdice and btlat a meeting of the Special Committee will be convened as requested by Israel in order. to examine this appea1? Answer. I have mentioned in my report (63Oth meeting, pa,ra. 51) that the Israeli representative has submitted an appeal against' the .resolution of the Mixed Armistice Commiss'on, t"equesting that tl1e case he brought before the Special Committee, in accordance with artièle X, paragraph 4, of the . General Armistice Agreement. This paragraph reads, inter alia, as follows: . "On .questions of principle, appeal shall lie to a Special Committee, composed of the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization and one member each of the Egyptian and Israeli delegations to the armistice conference at Rhodes or sorne other senior officer, whose decisions on all such questions shall he final." In view of Israel's appeal to the Special Committee, the decision of the Israeli-Egyptian Mixed Armistice Commission of 2 October 1953 is not final. The situation with regard to the convening of the Special Committee has not .changed since my predecessor wrote in lÎis' report to the Security Council dated 4 Novemher 1952 (S/2833, para. 10): "Repeated efforts have been made toconvene a meeting of the SpecialCommittee toconsiderthese appeals [seven by Egypt andthtee by Israel] which .are from decisions taken by the Mixed Armistice'Commission between May and October 1951, but no date has been found mutually acaet r.,.~k .to the parties". l intend, when 1 return to the middle East, to approach the parties with a view to.convening the Special. Committee. •7. Paragr~Plt34 of the report polnts out that thetalks - ~tw~en high-ranking military commanders proposed by Israel 8. In paragraph 39, there is a description of the differences between the responsibilities of the Israel Government and the Jordan Government in respect of infiltration. The report states: "Jordan is taking measures against infiltration and will continue to do so. Israel.will co-operate by supplying information to Jordan on infiltration." Have the measures which the Jordan Government maintains it has taken resulted in fact in any reduction in the number of infiltration cases or in their grave nature? A1lswer. The quotation in this question is taken from the summing up of the results of the meeting. between senior military commanders held on 29 June 1953. The third sentence in the summing up reads as follows: "Israel will seek to improve methods of transmitting such information quick1y, so that Jordan can make effective use of it." l described the results of this meeting as successful, because each party recognized the special problems which faced the other and because each party undertook certain obligations. It was a good beginning and l regret that it was not followed up by detailed arrangements between the high-ranking police officers in the two meetings they held in July. As l stated in my report, existing arrangements for implementing the local commanders' agreement remained unaltered. l believe, however, that the procedure of local commanders' meetings, which should not be confused with the high level talks between senior military commanders, would be greatly strengiliened by the resumption of such high level talks and the conclusion of the detailed arrangements which were envisaged in the meeting of 29 June. As regards the effectiveness of the measures which the Jordàll Government is taking, it is impossible to give a definite answer, there being no fixed criterion to calculatethe effectiveness of the measures as such, in isolation from omer factors. There Ms been, generally, a decrease in the number of complaints regarding infiltration submitted to the Mixed Armistice Commission by Israel. During the first nine months of 1952, Israel submitted 233 complaints. During the same period in 1953, it submitted 172 complaints. This figure might have been still lower if·the detailed arrangements envisaged in the high level talks of 29 June had been made. 9. l now have a question on the geography. of the situation. Is it correct to say that the grell.test number of·armistice violationsascrihed to Jordan, in accordance withthe findings of the Mixed Armistice Commission, have come from the area Tulkarm-Qalqiliya-Jerusalem,contiguous ta thearea of Israel's greatest population·· concentration and most vulnerable lines of . comm~ication? Would that he an accurate description of the colicentration in space of the infiltration movements? 19. My next question refers to the local commanders' meetings. 1 should like ta ask whether the Chief of Staff can give us his experienced opinion on whether these meetings of junior officers could do more than they have until now, namely deal in a limited way with sorne of the technical matters that arise after incidents have occurred, such as the return of cows, flocks and small parts of stolen property. Does he believe that the local commanders' meetings or agreements could go very much beyond the scope of those operations? AtJSWet'. My answers ta the fourth and sixth questions by the representative of the United Kingdom and to the first question by the representa~ve of the United States answer this question in part. 1 can only add that it is my belief that regularly scheduled meetings between local commanders can do more than arrange for technical matters that arise after incidents have occurred, such as the ret1~m of cows, flocks and small parts of stolen property. These meetings can do much to prevent infiltration. Their effectiveness depends, of course, on the degree of support given to the local commanders by the governments and on the scope of the authority which the parties are willing to extend to these officiaIs within the framework of an agreement providing for such meetings. Their value in preventing incidents could be even greater than their value in settling matters after incidents have occurred. 11. The Security Council, in its resCllution of 1 September 1951 [Sj2322l, bas confirmed that since the armistice regime is of a permanent character, the parties to it cannot assert that they are actively helligerent. 1 wonder whether the Chief of Staff shares the view that a helief by any party in its rights ta consider itself .a helligerent might have an adverse effect on the operation of the armistice system? Answer. The question refers to paragraph 5 of the preamble of the resolution· of the Security Council of 1 Septemher 1951 which reads as follows: "5. Considering that sincethe armistice régime, which bas been in existence 10r nearly two and a half years, is of a· permanent character, neither party can reasonably assert that it is. actively a helligerent or requires to exercise the right of visit, search, an seizure for any legitimate purpose of self-defence," In the light of the General Armistice Agreements, 1 understand this paragraph ta mean that the General Armistice Agreements concluded between Israel and her Arab neighbours are permanent in the sense that they cannot he. terminated under the. terms of these Agreements except by' the restoration of peace. If my understanding is correct, this means that, until apeaceful settlement between the parties to an Armistice Agreement is achieved, they are obliged to comply with the terms of this Agreement. My functions andresponsibilities are therefore concerned with the execution of the General Armistice Agreements and the maintenance of .the cease-fire in accordance with the Security Council's resolution of 11. AUgt1st 1949.. In other words, 1 am concemed with the actual violations by the parties of the provisiv.J.s ànd terms of these instruments. In my opinion no violation of the cease-fire or of the Gèneral Armistice Agreements is permissible. 12. On the sübject of the meaning of the Armistice Agreements, we note thatthe Armistice Agreements are described in their own texts and in Security Council resolutions as a transition to. a permanent peace.. May Iask whether the Chief of Staff would like to say whether he regards this as a very fundamental part of the armistiCe system? Would he regard the acceptance of this concept as something which would alter 13. Could General Bennike present to the Security Council a summary of the agendas of local commanders' meetings since the beginning of theiroperation, of proposaIs made during these meetings and decisions adopted at them? Answer. Many local commanders' meetings are held without a United Nations observer befugpresent.When a United Nations observer is present, he' makes a brief record of the proceedings. There is no pattern in the agendas, the proposals and the decisions of the meetings. No two meetings are alike. In general, information is exchanged concerning infiltration and known infiltrators; captured infiltrators are returned, as weIl as stolen property and animaIs. Decisions are made on establishing better means of communication between the authorities on both sides. Special meetings have oftenresulted in prompt action to stop firing across the line. Some of the incidents which have been handled are small in themselves, but many of these could well have erupted into major incidents if they had not been checked at the outset. Iam convinced that if local commanders' were carefully selected, if they were given proper instructions and some latitude intaking speedy action, there is practically no limit to the good they could do in r~ducing tension andimproving the spirit of co-operation in their sectors. 14. General Bennike mentions several .incidents where allegedly Israeli armed forces crossed the demarcatiol:' line. Could the .General confirm thatthefollowing resolutions condemning attacks by regular and irregular Jordan forces against Israel territory have been adopted since 1 January 1953? (I.'hese resolJltions are enumerated in appendix II,. a.) .AnSWér. The Israeli representative has quoted as part of his question the decisions of twelve meetings of the Jordan- Israel Mixed Armistice Commission heldbetween 30 January and 14 October 1953. The listof decisions appears in appendix !I(a) to my aIiswers.To complete the record,additional decisions taken at two of the meetings referred to in the question appear in appendix II (b). 15. In paragraph 39 of the report, General Bennike stated that "Jordan is taking measures against infiltration and will continue to do so". In order to assist us in the evaluation of the undertakings of the Government of the Hashemite Jordan Kingdom, could General Bennike tell us whether that Government brought to trial, and what were the sentences iInposed upon, the perpetrators of the following murders, which occurred during the last six months and were condemned by Mixed Armistice Commission resolutions, or the perpetrators of any other murder not on this list which was committed at any time since the signing of the Armistice Agreement by Jordanians against Israelis? Answer. In this question the Israeli representative listed ten incidents; the list appears in appendix III to my answers. We have no information concerning the sentences imposed on perpetrators of crimes from either side. The work of the Mixed Armistice Commission has been limited to investigating the facts and determining whether a violation of the General Armistice Agreement has occurred. The apprehe.tlsion and punishment of those who maY,be guilty is a matter withinthe jurisdiction of each State. 1 tmderstand that at the local commanders' meetings sorne information on this matter has been exchanged. 16. In paragraph 32 of General Bennike's report, it is stated that an Israeli soldier was killed when an Israeli patrol crossed the demarcation line and exchanged fire with the inhabitants of Falamel1 village. Woùld .the General tell us whether the body had any identification dîsc which would have identified him as an Israeli soldier; whether the number on ·the dîsc was commtmicated to the Israeli authorities, and whether the body,was handed over to Israel? Answer. The body had an Israeli identification dise marked with the number 232046 and the name Yel1ud~ Kacim, in Hebrew. This information was commtmicated to the Israeli authorities. On 23 January, the body was handed over to two officers of the Israeli Army who accepted it as that of an Israeli soldier without any reservations on this point. VII. Questions put by the representatlve of the HashemUe Jordan Klnr;dom 1. Does General Bennike consider that attacks carried out by regular Israeli forces are becoming more frequent? Are they becoming more serious in relation to Jordanian loss of lives and materialdamage? Do increasingly larger Israeli armed forces participate in such attacks on Jordan territory? Answer. In thelighf of events since the beginning of this yenr, l' must answer yes to the' three parts of this question, with the exception of the part relating todamages. 2. What is.the extent of material damage suffered by Jordan from Israéli.· infiltration and aggression since the beginning of . the present truc€: in April 1949? . Answer. 1 am notin possession of information wbich would enablêine ta answer this question, since neïtller the Trttce Supervision Organization nor the Mixed Armistice Commission is required to measure or assess damage. 4. We note that the Israeli Press, in describing a crime committed inside Israel, usually ends the article with "the tracks led ta the border". General Bennike, do you have any information that would indicate that terroristgroups are active inside Israel? Is it not true that many cases attributed to . Jordanians by the Israeli Press are found ta be crimes committed by Israelis against Israelis? Answer. The Truce Supervision Organisation has no special information on these two questions. 5. Would Major General Vagn Bennike compare the degree of co-operation of Jordan and Israel with the Truce Organization since the 10"-al commanders' agreement was. signed? Answer. The degree of co-operation of the parties under the Local Commanders' Agreement is difficult to compare. There have been recent cases where one of the parties failed to appear for the meeting. A higher degree 9f co-operation is certainly possible. 6. We note that in appendix 1· and III of his report, General Bennike gives :ligures concerning the number of resolutions ·passed against the parties for the years 1952 and 1953. Could the General furnish a breakdown of the· resolutions passed against the parties for the years 1949, 1950 and 1951? Answer. The answer ta this question may he found in appendix l, which 1 have submitted ta the President of the Security Council with the request tha/: it be inc1uded in the retord of this meeting. 7. Has General Bennike or his staff beenthreatened or prevented from inspecting demilitarized zones under his control? When, where and under which circumstances? Answer. 1 have already answered this question in my reply to question 2 from the representative of Lebanon. 8. How many times were the United Nations observers fired at by Israelis in the course of their investigations? Answer. United Nations observers have found themselves under fire on numerous occasions. In most cases they have been caught under an exchange of fire. As 1 have pointed out before, 1 am convinced that the parties are aware of their responsibilities for the safety of observers engaged in the performance of their functions. 1 have no evidence that they have ever been shot at directly when the firing party was aware· of the fact that they were United Nations observers. 9. Did ariy organized attack by· the Arab Legion take place against Israeli settlements Or villages? Did the Arab Legion engage during the truce in any mass murders or mass destl"'Jctions? Answer. As 1 have stated in my reply to question 9 from the representative of Lebanon, Jordan regular forces were condemned by the Mixed Armistice Commission for. thrée 10. In relation to 191 complaints against Jordan for simple crossing of the line by Jordanian civilians, can the Chief of Staff confirm that these were settled without.discussion because the Armistice Commission was satisfied that they had inadvertently occurred without any real intent to violate the General Armistice Agreement? Ans'Wer. As stated in appendix III to my report to the Security Council, the 191 complaints concerning civilian crossing of the demarcation line referred to in the above question were settled without investigation or discussion of the individual cOmpl<lints_ and cleared from an overloaded agenda. For example, the decision on 57 of these complaints was ratified at the 80J}l meeting of the Israel-Jordan Mixed Armistice Commission on 24 January 1952, following a report of the sub-conudttee which merely listed the complaints by number followed by the agreed resolution. The representative of Jordan pointed out that the cases had not been investigated on the spot. He added: "1 do not say that in certain of these cases infiltrators did not commit them, but l doubt very much if in every case infiltrators are responsible." There was a general discussion on the j)racticability of conducting an investigation. The Chairman recalled attention to the wording of the subcommittee's declsion which used the term "incollsistent with article IV, paragraph 3," rather than "constitute a breach of article IV, paragraph 3". There was even less consideration of the remaining complaints in this category and it is impossible for me to state categorically the motivation of the parties in agreeing to these decisions other than their desire to have them cleared from the agenda. 11. How cano the Truce Supervision Organization be reinforced' to e!lsure the respect of the Armistice Agreements? Ans'Wer. No reinforcement of tlte Truce Supervision Organization can in itself ensure respect of the Annistice Agreements. Such respect must come from the parties themselves. However, it is my opinion that the present tense situation might he intproved, particularly with regard to the observat'..:e of the cease-fire, if the observer group were strengthene1 to enable the Truce Supervision Organization to rnr.intain observers at critical points along the armistice demdrcation lines. The presence of these observers, as l pointed out in an answer to a preceding question, would probably have a daIIlPening effect on potential violators of the Armistice Agreements. APPENDIX l STATISTICS TAKEN FROM: THE OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE JORDAN- ISRAEL MIXED }...RMISTICE COMMISSION 1949 15 1950 112 1951 167· 1952 344 1953 (ta 15 October)............. 178.- TOTÂLS 816 Ornn.plaintB frmn IlJ1'ael 42 79 116 138 167 Type oomplOJint 1. Crossing of the demarcation line by military unîts . 4. ~irin~ across the demarca- tion line 101 5. Overflights 23 6. Expulsions . 173 65 44 (5,415 persons) 16 ~ 542 42-- 816 TOTALS 7. Ali others ftllle 1949 th"ough 1952: Israelis lsraelis Jurdanians Jurdanians killed w01Lnded killed W01Lnàed Israel alleges the following casualties inside Israel were caused by Jordan attacks.. 57 64 43 13 Condemnation of Jordan by the Mixed Armistice Com- mi~\sion verified the follow- ing casualties caused by Jordanian action 14 17 2 1 Jordan alleges the following casualties inside Jordan were caused by Israeli at- tacks 8 1 89 70 Condemnation of Israel by the Mixed Armistice Com- mission verified the follow- ing casualties caused by Israeli action 5 1 22 25 1 January through 15 October 1953: Israel alleges the following casualties inside Israel re- sulted from Jordanian at- tacks.................... 32 25 5 Condelunation of Jordan by the Mixed Armistice Com- mission verified the follow- ing casualties caused by Jordanian action. . ..... ... 10 13 Jordan alleges the follow- ing casualties inside Jordan resulted from Israeli at- tacks Il 6 86 59 Condemnation of Israel by the Mixed Armistice Com- mission verified the follow- ing casualtiescaused by Israeli action . 2 55*. 23 The Mixed Armistice Commission, by resolutions Iiassed, condemned the parties for the following breaches of the General Armistice Agreement. A.rticle III, paragraph 2 __ilN~c~lement of the land, sea or air military or para-military *To be in accordance with the resolution of the Mixed Arki ••1mistice Commission, ihis figure (55) inc1udes 42 of those led at Qibya. Article III, paragraph 3 "No warlike act or act of hostility shall be conducted from territory controHed by one of the Parties to fuis Agreement against the other party." Article IV, paragraph 3 "Rules and regulations of the armed forces of the Pa.rties, wmch vrombit civilia11s from crossing thf n5hting Hnes or entering the area between the lines, shall remain in .effect after the signing of this Agreement with application tothe armistice demarcation lroes defined in articles V and VI." Article VII, paragrapl~1 (annex II, article 2) "The follo\ving are excluded from the term ;defeîlsive forces': (a) Armonr, suCb as tanks of all types, armoured cars, Bren gun carriers, half-traCks, armoured vehicles or load carriers, or any ather armoured vehicles; (b) AH support arms and units other than _those specified in paragraph 1 (a) i and ii, and 1 (b) ahove; (c) Service units to be agreed upon." Breach of Breach of 1>, .. lch of art. m, art. Ill, art. W, para.! para. 3 para. S 1949 Jorcbincondemned... - Israel condemned.... 1950 Jordan condemned.... 1 Israel condemned.... 1 1 1951 Jordan condemned.... 1 7 2 Israel condemned.... 14 14 1952 J0rdan >ndeml1led.... 4 10 5 ., Israel condetnned.... 5 6 1 1953 Jordan condemned... 14 1 5 '-"~u,::,::-::-1, ~:~ Israel condemned.... 17 3 1 ....- ......,...--, ......--. 'J.'OO'.AUi: Jordan condemned, . UL~~~c. ~ -~l9 . -îZ-~-~ Israel conderünea.. 37 23 2 1 . . Complaints not settled br a Mixed Armistice Commission "~i'esolution condemning one of.the parties for a breach of the Gen<:ral Armistice Agreement wereeither withdrawn, settled .by indecisive vot\::, settled withoutvote, settled by a joint /statement calling on the parties to take measures to reduce the ,L",,, ,'l"'number .of : lcio"'CltS, or.by a statement byone of the parties , promising corrective action. Mall<Y .of the complaints from Israel alleging infiltration, wer~ settied in' tIie latter manner by statements made by the Iielegate of theH'\shemite Jordan Kingdom one .of wmchreads as. follow!';: ;cTheHashemit7KingdoI1l of the Jord~ deleganon regi·ets 'thE! ~[I)ssingofi1tê.c=éf~ar~ationJineby civilia,ls as reported .•.....•••.... :·'. FULL TEXT OF WRI'ITE.~ ("~"l'10N 12 PUT BY THE REPRESENTA- :>F ISRAEL "General Benni1<:e mentions several incidents where allegedly Israe1i armed forces crossed the demarcation line. Could the Ge.'1eral confirm that the following resoiutions conrlemning attacks by regular and irregular Jordan forces against Israel territory have been adopted since 1 January 1953: 108 MAC (30 January) HJK breached III/2 (4 February) HJK breached III/2 (Attack on Israel patrol across demarcation line at Kh. Yattir, 28 January 1953) 1. The crossing of the demarcation line by armed Bedouins from Jordan and their subsequent attack on Israel security forces is a violation of article III, paragraph 2 of the G. A A 2. The de1iberate penetration into Israel territory by a Jordanian security force or para-military forces, and a planned armed attaclc on an Israel patrol is a serious and flagrant violation of article III, paragraph 2 of the G. A. A 110 MAC (5 February) HJK breached IV/3 (Ayat railway sabotage, 2 February 1953) 1. The crossing of men in the night of February 2·,3, 1953 from Jordan controlled territory, who committed an attack .by explosives against Israel rai1ways constitutes a flagrant violation of thft G. A. A, article IV, paragraph 3. 2. The MAC calls on Jordan delegation to ta1ce every measure to prevent a recurrence of such aggressive actions that could lead to extremely dangerous deterioratioll of the situation. 119 MAC (26 May-1 June) RJK breached Ill/2 HJK breacherl.III/2 HJK breached III/2 (Beit' Arifattack, 26 May 1953) 1. In the night of 25/26 May 1953 the deep penetration by armed grOl:pS of. Jordanians into Israel territory who blew up the house belonging to Solak Yahish Zadek in Beit'Arif-B, is a hreach of the G. A A. article III, paragraph 2. 2. The attack by hand grenades and automatic weapons fire on the house of Yehudi Omessi in the same village and on the same night ,perpetrated by .other men who pre- viously crossed the line is 'a breach of the G. A. A. article III, paragraph 2. 3. The crossing of the demarcation'line by armed Jordanians who attacked the house of Miriam Nagar in Beit'Arif-B village in the night of 25126)yfa~' 1953 is a breach of the General Armistice Agredmei~t, article III, paragraph 2. 4. The MAC calls on the Jordanian delegation toprevent the recurrênce of such incidents which led to the wounding of a woman. and small childten. 120 MAC , (26 May-l JuD:e) HJK breached Ill/2 ' (Beit Nabala attack, oL26 May 1953) 1. The crossing of the line by an armedgroupwho attacked with· hand grenades and:stenguncfire a .house ..m Beit 1. The MAC expressed its deep regrets for the casualties suffered by bath parties. 2. The MAC decides that the illegal cultivation by Jordanian citizens of lands in Israel territory is the source of these regrettable incidents. 3. The MAC decides that the penetration of armed Jordanians for harvesting crops in Israel territory is a breach of article III, paragraph 2 of the G. A A. 4; The MAC decides that the firing by the Jordanians across the Demarcation Line to protect the 'harvesting is a breach of the G. A A, article III, paragr~ph 3. 5. The MAC calls on the Jordanian delegation to take effective measures to stop all illegal cultivation in order to prevent the recurrence of such incidents in the future. 124 MAC (8 June) HJK breached III/2 (Jordanian regular soldiers (Arab Legionnaires) fired in Matha, southem Jerusa1em, wounding two Israeli civilians, 7 June 1953) 1. The crossing of the demarcation line by Jordanian regular soldiers in the morning of 7 June and the attack carried out by them on two Israeli civilians which resulted in the wounding of bath is a serious breach of the G. A A, article III, parag!'aph 2. 2. The MAC ca1ls on the Jordanian delegation to take all the measures to stop the Jordanian soldiers from crossing the· demarcation Hne and attacking Israeli citizens in Israel territory. 126 MAC (10 June) HJK breached 1II/2 (Murder of Israeli by armed Jordanians at Tirat Yehuda, BJune 1953) 1. Thé crossing. of the. Demarcation Line by a group of armed .Jordanians who attacked on· 8 June 1953 by explosives and hand grenades two houses in Tirat Yehuda village killing a man in one of the houses is a breach of the G. A A., article III,paragraph 2. . 2. TheMA-Ç ca1ls on the. Jordanian delegation to ta,ke iœmedinter,,, effective measures te prevent the recurrence 2. CMA (23 (Des 1. 2. CMA (2 (Des 1. 2. CMA 1. 2. 131 MAC (23 June) HJK breached III/2 (Armed Jordanians murdered one vill:ige guard and wounded another at Beit Nekufa on 19 June 1953) 1. The murderous attack by armed Jordanians on the village guards of Beit Nekufa on 19 June 1953 which resulted in the killing of one guard and the wounding of another is a breach of the G. A. A., article III, paragraph 2. 2. The MAC calls on the Jordanian authorities to put an end to these murderous aggressions. 141 MAC (2 August) HJK breached IV/3 HJK breached III/3 (Firing by Jordanian regular soldiers a~ross the demarca- tion line in Wadi Namus-Ma'ale ha Hamisha area 2 August 1953) 1. The continuous penetration of Jordanian civilians into No Man's Land and in Israel territory near Qatanna Village is a breach of the G. A. A., article IV, para- graph 3. 2. The firing by Jordanian forces from Jordan controlled territory, into Isra~1 is a breach of the G. A. A., article III, paragraph 3. 150 MAC (14.0ctober) HJK breached IV/2 (Murder of Israeli woman and two children in their sleep at Yahud village by Jordanians, 13 October 1953) 1. The deep armed Jordanian penetration into Israel to perpetrate the brutal attack on a house in Yahud village in the night of 12-13 October 1953, which resulted in the murder of two small children and their mother is a violation of article III, paragraph 2, of the G. A. A. 2. The MAC considers it of vital importance that the . Jordani&"l authorities should take immediate1y the most vigorous measures to prevent the recurrence of sucb intolerable aggression. (Note: In this case, unlike aIl the others, the Jordanian delegation did not vote against the condemnation of Jordan, but abstaîned.) ,ApPENDB:: II (b) AUTRES MISTICE AnnrrIONAL DECISIONS ADOPTlID BY THE JO~AN-ISRAEL MIXED . A1!MrSTICE COMMISSION AT TWO 'OF THE MEETINGS LISTED IN QUESTION 14 PUT BY THE REPRli:SENTATIVE OF ISRAEL la L Add to the resolutions adopted at thp. 122nd meeting of the Mixed Armistice Commission: 1. The Mixed Armistice Commission deci<i~sthat the firing by Israeli troops across the. Demarcation Line at the Jordan citizens in Jordan territory is a breach of the General Armistice Agreement, article' III, para- graph 3. 2. The Mixed Armistice ConmriSSÎôrf-decides that the burning of crops by Israel soldiers in Jordan territory Agreem~t. 2. Add to the resolutions adopted. at the 141st meeting of the Mixed Armistice Commission: . 1. The crossing of an officer commanding a section of the Israe1i security forces into no-man's land on 2 July 1953, the laying of an ambush, the killmg of a woman and the wounding of a child, 9 years old, is a breach of article III, paragraph 2 of the General Armistice Agreement. 2. The firing by Israe1i security forces at Qatanna village whicb resulted in the wounding of a girl, 7 years old, is a breacb of article III, paragraph 2 ol the General Armistice Agreement. 3. The Mixed Armistice Commission calls on Israe1i authorities to issue strict orders to Israe1i secu~ty forces to stop the recurrence of sucb attacks on Jordan citizens in fue future. ,ApPENDIX III FULL TEXT OF WRITTEN QUESTION 15 l'UT BY THE REPRESENTA- TIVE OF IsRAEL In paragraph 39 of the repor~, General Bennike stated that "Jordan is takillg measures against infiltration and will continue to do so". In order to assist "JS in the evaluation of the ul1der- takings of the Government (Ji the Hashemite Jordan Kingdom, could General Bemùke tell us whether that Government brought to trhl, anû wbat were the sentences imposed upon the perpetrators of the following' murders, which occurred during the last six months and were condenmed by Mixed Armistice Commission resolutions, or the perpetrators of any other murder not on this li!lt which was committed at any ~me since the signing of the Armistice Agreement by Jordanians against Israelis? A. 25~26 May 1953, Attack on Beit'Arif-B village, and the blowing, up of the house of S. Y. Zodek. B. 25-26 May 1953. Attack using hand':grenades and automatic weapons on thehouse of S. Omessi. C. 25"-26 May 1953. Attack on the house of Miriam Najar and the wounding of a woman and ber children. D. 25-26' May 1953. The murder of a woman and the wourtding ofher husband and two children during an attack with.hand-grehad.~ ;md automatic weapons on their house at Beit Nabala. _.. E. 25-26 May 1953. Thewounding of Mrs. Sarah Sayek during an attack o~ her house ,at Beit'Arif~A village. 1i',25-26 May 1953. The wounding of a woman during an attack on the h()use of Mr. Gvarni at Beit'Arif-A village. G. ,7 Jnne 19.53. }l'he,wounding oftwo Israeli civilians by regular lardai{ s'oldiers who crossed the demarcation lineand attacked tîiëfu'":c:cccc', . H. 8 Jûne 1953. The murder of a man durlng anattack on Tirat Yehuda village with explosives and band-grenades. f;, 11 June4953. The murder of a woman and the wounding ofher husband in an attack on Kfar,Hess, with use of 'land- , grenades an~. automatic weapons.. J. 13 October 1953. Themurder,. ,ai a womanand two cbildren and the wounding of another woman and a child 2.. Overflight by Jordan military aircraft on 11 January. 3. Overflight by Jordan aireraft on 12 January. 4. Overflight by two Jordan military aireraft on 23 January. 5. Overflight by Jordan military aircraft on 23 January. 6. Crossing the demarcàtion line by a gang of armed Jordanians on 15 January. The fol1owing complaints from Israel concerning infiltration during January were handed in during the month of May: 7. Crossing of the deD1~rcation Hne by infiltrator on 6 January. 8. Crossillg of the demarcanon line by infiltrator on 9 January. 9. Crossing of the demarcation line by infiltrator on 10 ,. January. 10. Crossing of the demarcation line by infiltrator on 10 January. 11. Crossing of the demarcation line by infiltrator on 18 January. 12. Crossing of the demarcation line by infiltrator on 18 January. 13. Crossing of the demarcation line by infiltrator on 19 January. 14. Crossing of the demarcation line by infiltrator on 27 ]anuary. Complaints by Jorda,~ 1. Crossing of the demarcation line on 1 January by an Israeli armed unit of 40 men. Firing on· inhabitants of Budrus area. 2. Crossing of the demarcation Hne on 6 January by an braeli. patroI. Fire opened.on Beit Surik village. 1 3. Crossing of the demarcation line on 7 Janllary by an armed . Israeli patroI. Fire opened in Zeita area. 4. Overflight by Israeli airerait on 19 January. 5. Crossing of the demarcation Hne on nightof 22-23 January by an Israeli patroI. Exchange of fire with Falameh village guanls. . 6. Overflight by Israeli aircraft on 23 January. 7. Crossing of the demarcation line on 4 January by three Israeli soldiers and one·civiiian driving instructor ÎJ:l the Latrun area. 8. Overflight by Israeli aircraft on -22 January. 9. Overflight by Israeliaircraft on 22 JanuarY. 10. Overflight by Israeli aircraft on 25 January. ApPENDIX V FULL TEXT OF WRITTEN QUESTION 9 PUT DY THE REPRESENTA- TIVE OF LEBANON TEXTE At no point in his report does General Bennike refel'to the tiomie venti6n J~rdanian armed forces as having violated the General Arroi';· ~~ce Agreement by crossing or firing across the demarcation me, whereas at eleven points' heasserts that Israeli armed ca~on qu israéliennes ~orces crossedor fired àcro;s the demarcation line (in one lIlstance, the demilitarized zone) in violation of the General The crossing of the demar.:ation line in the Latrun area by an Israeli driving school vehicle carry- ing 3 soldiers . The cr _ssing of the demarcation line by an Israeli patrol near Falameh village . para. 31 para. 32 Firing by Israe1i forces across the dentarcation line on the village of Qalqiliya . para. 33 Israe1i motor patrols crossirig the demarcation line and shooting at Arabs working on their lands in the Gaza strip . para.4S Israe1i aeroplanes attacking Arabs and their herds of carne1s and goats on both sides of :the frontier near El Auja demi1itarized zone . para. 48 Armed Israe1i force entering demilitarized zone near El Auja and killing men and livestock..... para. 48 Would General Bennike care to go more deeply and more critically into this qualitative difference between the acts of violation of the General Armistice Agreements attributable to Jordan or Jordanians and the acts of violation attributable to Israel or Israelis?