S/PV.637 Security Council

1 welcome this opportunity of adûressing the Security Council on peace and security in the Middle East. The item inscribed on the Council's ,agenda by France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America (Sj3109, S/3110, S/31111jnvites attention to the operation of the General Armistice Agreements conc1uded .in 1949between Israel and its four Arab neighbours. FornearIyfive years these agreements have been the basis of SUell securlty as our region hasenjoyed. Today the Security Council cannot fa!l to confront the grave question whether the J\.rrnistice Agreements, in their present incomplete and static application, offer a sufficient prospect of security in the future. 3. My Government assumes that in bringing these matters before the Security Council the three sponsoring Powers have it as their main and urgent purpose to promote the permanent peace which they have advocated so constantly in the pasto For the subject before ·the Cauncil is an international security problem of the widest s{.l)pe. If it were not such a broad issue of international relations, it would not qualify for discussion in this, the highest fort11p. of international security. The Security Council is not a police court of lower instance which convenes oo1y ta analyse and record turbulent incidents. 1t' is a .political organ, charged with' strengthening peace and security in any region where they are impaired. 4. Thus, while l shaU have much to sayon the specific incidents of the recentpast, ine1uding those wmch. have araused the Security Council's active concem, l cannot approach this question inany perspective narrower than that of Arab-1sraeI relations as a whole. My Government is convinced that in no way other than by a peace negotiation can the security.· situation in our region become substantially better than it is, although there may be devices which we should anxiously seek for slowingdown an othenvise inevitable deterioration. For as," General Bennike's report [630th meeting] clearly indicates, the Armistice .Agreements by their very nature lose their effectiveness in proportion ta the time wmch goes by with6ut a transition ta permanent peace. 5. The Armistice Agree.mentsnowunder review by the Security Council have thei1" origin inrecent military and politica1 history. They terminated' the violent warfare which the Arab world launched against our people on 1 December 1947 and which extended over the grèater part of 1948. 'Whën. the establishment of independence in Palestine, includinga sovèreign State of Israel, was first recommended by the United Nations, cO~lvulsed in paralysis and chaos, while behind the shetter of the initial assault the afmies of the Arab States prepared for the decisive blow. 6. On 15 May 1948, the artnies of the Arab States officlally moved acr?ss their frontiers \vit~ t1:~ ~eclared objective of destroymg the State of Israel lU ltS lUfancy. In the f'.nsuing weeks three cease-fire resolutions by the Secudty Council and its representatives were C3ntemptuously rejected by Arab deleg2,tes at the Council table and trampled underfoot on the battlefield. Arab aireraft bombed.our cities, which had no single fighter plane nOf·any anti-airerait guns for their aefence. The Syrïao. tanks smashed into our farming villages on the upper Jordao.. Lebanese troops and irregulars convergedupon Galilee. Iraqi and Jordanian forces,· with the weapons acquired by a military alliance with a great Power, pushed vigorously towards the coastal plain and pressed us with our backs against the sea. A ring of fire enclrcled us at Jerusalem and imposed upon our people the worst horrors of bombardment aggravated by slow agony of death through the deprivation of water and food. Settlements in the Negeb were overrun and laid waste. The thl'eat of physical extinction hcvered lXTh-ninently over. every man, woman and child in our country, and threw its stark shadow across every home. 7. Here then was the first attempt, less than three yt:ars aiter the foundation of the United Nations, to overthrow a legitimate international situation by armed forc~. The United Nations had not yet developed its capacity for collective action sttfficiently to offer our be1eaguered people any assistance in their solitary battle against aggression. But our people, inspired by the prospect of free nationhood after centuries of unparalleled anguish, rose to the zenith of its capacity and moral power. The invading armies with their overwhelming numbers and armament were flung back in rig~~01J.s wrath. The institutions of Israel's statehood, .conceived in democracy, were established in the very heat of war. The siege was broken, and a citizen army arose· from the very heart of the people to become the shield of its hard-won independence. Thus Israel returned from the pursuit of the aggressor, to contemplate the hai-sh priee which the victory had exacted : m~ny thousands .killed out .of a small population. of 650,000; many more thousands maimed and wounded; villages .laid waste; property destroyed ; sources of e1ectric power paralysed;. fields and graves devastated b~ neglect; economic productivity brought to a standsttll;al1d everywhere the pain of be'i'eavement mingling strangely with the ul1ique elation '.Ji ·dctorious· defence. 8. TJnder the surprise of. ,tlt~ir. repulse .the. Arab govenunents, led by Egypt, everitually acceded to a caU of the Security Council on 16 November 1948 [Sjl080], a calI which they h.~d originally opposed, to negotiate armistice agreements with a view to pennanent peace. This calI by the Security Council arose from the conviction that the uneasy truce established in May 1948 and reaffirmed on 15 July 1948, when the Arab governments were defined ashaving caused a threat to international peaceand security within the terms of Chapter VII of the Charter, had lasted too long and had lost its effectiveness. A new and more stable system of relations, resting oncontractual agreemet,lt, was now required. The Security Council did not then lack the c::ourage.toexpress its convictions accordingly, notwîthstanding :tier.ce opposition by the Arab States at that time to any development in Arab-Israel relations beyond the precarious truce. 9. This courage by the Security Cot.mcil was well rewarded, ior, Quce the Council had called for a bold adV'atlce in Arab-Israel relations, the Arab governments overcame their hesitations and entered into direct, intimate and free negotiations with Israel which resulted in the four agteements which now constitute the annistÎCe system. 10. The annistice treaties stated that all their provislons, territorial, military or technical, were subject to alteration only by a l!leW act of formaI consent between the parties, either in a peace, settlement or in'agreed . modification of the armistice treaties. ,. 11. Israel, which tQok part in these four negotiations, had done much to ~lponsor these agreements and had consecrated themall with the best of its bl06d. But; while we welcoined thisas a major achievement of international statesmanship, we entertained no illusion that an agreement depending on miIitary considerations, with no background of normal diplomatic and economic re1ationship, eouIdassure more than a temporary stabiIity. .. 12. Thus, in August 1949, when the'Security Council met, in a mood of justified celebration, to endQTse the Armistice Agreements, we stressed the provisional character of the ,settlement and the urgent need ta secure its transition to permanent peace. An urgent expression to this effect was embodied in the resolution adopted by the .Security Council on 11 August 1949 [Sj1376, II] . Thus, Qver four years have passed since the Security Council first recorded its view that the provisional stage of armistice should, within the briefest possible 'time,. be followed by. the establishment of normal andpeaceful relations between ISrael and the Arab States. 15. I have clrculated a map which shows. the frontiers of the State of Isràel in relation to the territories of the neighbouring>Arab States. Here we have a visual impression oLth~<Arab Stat7s.which ~ave, comp~ed to General Be11111ke that armIstice treaties ' do not gtve them security", and an impression of the State of Israel, which presumably should, .in the Arab view, have a sentiment of. being secure and"s~rene. I will not dwell long on the disparity of size and resources,although Israel's physical smallness is of the utmost·political and psychologicalimportance for any serio.us discussion of the position in the Middle East. At any rate,here we see in graphic terms this great "aggressive", "expansionist" colossus caUed Israel, surrounding its smaU defenceless and innocent victims on every side. 'pour examiner sérieusement la situation dans Je $'agressif" de défense. 16. d'Israël quables invisibles ph:ysique. n'iadique tatIve, d'affection fournissent n'est graphie, par puissance, 16. I do not âeny, of course, that Israel's power is extended by the particula:r vitality and cohesion ofits population as weIl as by invisible dimensions of world sympathy. The, physical map does not portray the elements of qu~1itative strength; nordoes it show the great strearns of love and confidence which flow towards Israeland sttstaîn it in its ordeal. The worldis govemed not only by history and geography, but also by facts, of sentiment which have their due and legitimate weight in the issues of power. But such spiritual fa.cts, while they may modify the impact of unfavourable geography, dl? not alter any maps. In terms of security, in tenns of the simple and elementary business of remaining alive, the only conditions which govem oùr existence, our destiny, our hopes and a..'1Xieties, are these physical facts . of geography. And in tL0se terms we are a smaU territory extending along a part of the shore of the eastern Mediterranean, flanked by a slender strip of desert to the Red Sea, nourished by a solecollcentration of fresh water. in the nor..n and surrounded on every sideby large, powerful and hostile terdtories. tu~ls, phiques carte. simples ditions nos la qu'un de par nord presque ét~!1duset 17. l draw sp~cial attention, on the map, to the 17.-rat(tr~particulièrement bres carte, .. s'étend 5 coas~al plain - that is, the strip of territory along the Mediterranean extendingfrom Haïfa to Tel Aviv and thence southwards. This is Israel's densest centre of 18. At no single point in the coastal area can a citizen of Israel be more than a few miles away from the Jordan border. Indeed, there are few places in that ,coastal area .which 00 not have the Jordan border directly within view. An Arab newspaper, K uU ShaYJ publisheo in Beirut,. accurately describes in its edition of 8 August 1951, this as Israel's centre of vulnerability: "The Syrians are watchingwith anxiety the triangle Nablus-Jenin-Tulkann, because Nathanya is close ta the triangle"- Nathanya is a town in the middle .of the coastai plain on the coast - "and is one of the most important strategie: bases of Israel. Nathanya divides the country into two parts: the northem part, including the port of Haïfa - the artery of cQmmercial life; and the southempart, including Tel Aviv-the. brains of Israel. If Nathanyafalls into the hands of the Jordanians or the Iraqis, and this is not a difficult thing, there will be no connexion between these two parts of Isr:ael." 19. But there is not really a single centre of population anywherF. in Israel which is remote from a hostile 'frontier. Tel Aviv-Jaffa, with its population of 400,000, is within fourteen miles of the Jordan frontier; Jerusalem, with a population of 160,000 Israelis, is less than half a mile from the Jordan border. From Mount Carmel, on whose slopes the cit» of Haïfa lies, the .Lebanese frontier can be easilyseen, and the Jordan frontier is but twenty:"four miles away. Our growing enterprises at Elath on the SuIf of Aqaba on the Red Seaare populated and maintained by pioneers who have three Arab States within visual range. Our centres of rural activity are 50 placed that an Israel farmer can rarely .till his fields remote from the shadow of a hostile threat. 20. The Security Council niay therefore understand why we regard the very concept of what are called "frontier pr")1Jlems" as entirely inaccurate. The whole of Israel is a frontier. Vigilance for the preservation of life isthe personal duty ofevery citizen who feels any responsibility to his Jamily,"his community, an<i his nation. ' 21. With all thesegeographîcal deficiencies we would not, of course, exchange these few thoqsand square miles for any other strip of territory on earth. It has been said of some peoples in Africa and Asia that they 22. But Israel's security problem is not unenviably unique by the facts of physical geography alone. There are grim facts .ofpolitical geography as well. l have said that there i5 no modem precedent for the political attitude of this great Arab 'land mass to the small neighbour which it surrotinds and seeks ta engulf. Here we find a picture even more eccentricand unusual than the tortuousge()graphiëal relationships which the map portrays. We must ihink not only of Israel in statk proxiniity to Arab'borders ;we must think also of the kinds of sentiments, impulses and attitudes which flow ,towards Israel from across those narrow frontier Hnes. 23. These attitudes can be brieHy described. The Arab governmentsrefuse to live in pèace with Israel;' and . theyalso refuse to let Israel live in peace. 24., J'here is a double refusaI here. On the one hand there i5 a Right from any positive, constructive relationship with Israel, from any concept of co~operation or trust.Thereis thus no vision of a peace for .thearea whichwould •develop its full potentiaIities for material progress and spiritual achievement. But, in addition, they will not let us have peacein the negative sense of mere abstention fr.o~n political, economic, psychological and.paramilitary warfare. Now. this absence of peace is not an issue separate from that of compliance with the Armistice Agreements. For the obligation to effect a transition to permanent peace is theessenti~d -andertclring ta whic..h Israel and the Arab States have bound themselves in the Armistice. Agreements themse1ves. There is no such thing as maintaining the'armistice and refusing a' transition to, permanent peace. To uphold the fonner'.and ne siIent on the latter istoadv'ocate noncomp1ianc~; with the texts of the agreements in their most speci1\\cand urgent provisions. non-ob~'I:~rvation plus 25. 25. ! ami not 'sure that world opinion is always conSClaus of the purposeful,' assertive manner in which Arab .governments ensure that the frontiers which l h~~e desGrîbed in terms of their geographieal in~ stabthty shaH also be a line of blood and fire. There is a stubhorn refusaI to comply with any of the caUs of the ~oujol;1rs energlquement, œuvre l'instabilité feu. 7 ~~.",~-- ...;. again~ the present sterile rancours and antagonisms. 26.' This unique campaign of political warfare includes the pressure by Arai> League States to prevent the establishment of diplomatie relations between Israel and other States. It is refiected in the adoption by the hab League Council of a resolution forbidding its members td attend any middle-eastem regional conferences under any auspices, if Israel is invited. This offence against international decency has thwarted the attempts of the United Nations and its specialized agencies to establish representative middle east brganizations on the lines of those set up in other parts of the world. There is refusai by Arab States to allow the access of Israel representatives to any office of the United Nations situated in an Arab country. This ostracistr~ extends even into matters of he:ùth and weliare, in which elementary human solidarities might have been expected ta prevail. An·· Arab State will withhold information from Israel on the trend or movement of plaguesor ÎiIl.fectious diseases. It is the practice of Arab govemments to refuse information on flight and meteorèllôgical cohditions to airerait bound to 01' from Israel. In short, there is Îlo element of human brotherhood, ao overriding reverence for the human personality which has ever ye! prevailed in the policies of Arabgovernments over this te1Îacious political hatred. No framework of human relatlonships in other spheres has arisen to .. offset the cold, bleak, .barren contacts of the Mixed :&:mistice Commissions. The security relationships of our countries have nothing.warmer or deeper on which to fa.ll back in times of stress. c2Z,,--;A~L~Ri11~~tLaÊ!?I!,the1\rabNews Agency reported from Caïro 'last weeK-ffiafmgn~clals~bfihec'A:rah League were setting out fur the United Nations "'7""" and 1 quote 'the report - to take part in this debate in arder to frustrate any move to inipose peace between the Arabs and-Israel. The spectacle of a political representative solemnly buying)înaii ticket and setting out for the United Nationsin ·order to prevent peacewau1d be' <:<>mical if it did not reflect a tragedy of thought and sentiment. This vision of the United Nations, i).1 cùrrent Arab poliey, as a ~rt of society for the preventianof peaœ deserves the most saleron reflection in this huilding. . 28. P()litical hatred on ourfrontiers is .reinforced bya violent economic. war. The Council.of the Arab League maintains -a·· specialsection··forcerltralizïng ._. econamic warfare against Israel. Boycott committees exist everywhere under the auspices of the ArahLeague. At every Illeeting of the Arabr...eague Council stepsa1"e taken ta 29. There is â purposeful attempt to impose the anti- Israel eeonomic siege upon other countries as weIl. The outstandingexample was the intrusion of Arab States fortunately rebuffed, into the economic ao-reement between Israel and the Federal Republic of Germany. Efforts are made to force other countries and industrial con~c"ns tD adapt th~~elves. ta the Arab polic:y of reglOnal economlc hostility -lU .other words to join the siege on Israel's frontiers. ' 30. mique, exposés et 1951 vention cependant les de le nation 30. At the peak of this economic warfare' which threatens the sovereignty of aIl States exposed toits pressure, stand the Egyptian blockade regulations ruled by this Sect!rity:Council on l September 1951 [SÎ2322] ta be a VIOlation of the Egyptian-Israel Armistice Agreement. 1 These regulations continue in full force ex:ercising aIl the deterrent errects of~ablodëide with respect to, shipments throughthe Suez Canal and imposing such risks of illicit intervention as to make the transportatio~ of cargoes to or from Israel through the Canalprecanous and therefore rare. 31. simple droit .aspects liques fois part historique, politique ou géographique à moins au-delà sont devant ment ...on nationaux s'opposent tout C'est ainsi deux tent de Israël, dont nous relations d'Etats l'objectif Etats 31.. This economic siege goesbeyonddefiance of intern.ational law or bl?ckade and pervades every manifestation of Arab policy. The water sources essential for I~el's economy have twice within four years been the subJect of obs~ruc~ve Syrian. ~omplaints, although these water~ are hlston~ally, pO'htlcally and geographically . unav~lIable ~o Synaexcept on the assumption of ag- ~esslve Synanexpansionbeyond its recognized frontiers. The. sup~rficia1ity of these complai.nts u~ually assures .thelr ultimate collapse, but in the meantime vital economlC development is delayed. Together with this a~temp!~()denyIsrael the ability to car·ry out its national deveI~p.mefit schemes, theregoesacomprehensiv.e~Ara.b Opposltlon to every project of rt:gional economic deve~ l?pment. Thus, any inter-state process involving irriga- . tion and power is subjecteû to a double veto. The Arab States wiIl~either agree to regionalco-operation with Israelnor WIll they leave l:>rae1 alone toutilize its available resources within.· national limits. In ,brief we have the only instance.in contemporary internationaÎ relations of a g!ouP. of States making the ecollomîc strangttlâtion of ~elr l!elghbo:tr an active objective,of their policy and seeking mternatlO11al support for that objective. SpI S.ce Official Rec01'1s of the Secu1"ity Cou1Zcil, Fmwtlz Year, eC1(J1 Suppleme1Zt No. 3. . 1 .quatrième 9 36. It is significant in a melancholy way thatthe Arab members of the Mix"d Armistice Cùmmissions, who have, l think,· a special responsibility for the ope~ation of the armil>tice provisions according to their text and their spirit .are loudest in their threats ta terminate the armistice in that way. On 10 February 1953, Colonel Jedid, then Chairman of the Syrian delegation, stated: "This land cannot hold bothArabs and Jews. There exists only one solution to which we shan get: that this land shan be p6ssessed either only by the Jews or only by the Arabs." < 37. On 18 April 1953, his '5uccessor, Colonel Shatila, who is supposed now to be in charge of observing the Syrian-Israel armistice, speaking of "the enemy at our borders'" went on to say: "The Arabs have ta put end ta Israel's dreams and îts terror and ta ensure that Palestine is forever Arab." 38. Also on 18 April 1953, the King of Jordan an- ......... 1lqunced: "With the help of God we. still shaH take back wna"twas~lost··tocUs.and.~w.~.§.hllI1 prove to the world that we are a strong nation." .- .... -_.. Only a few days aga the same· monarch, opening his Parliament, said: "The question of Palestine will continueto he theprimaryone.ta occupy our :interest until justice will hé n:storedand the dear. fatherland will. be 1i~erated from those who robbed it. Ourforeign policy is 'no peace with I.srael':~ 39. This may not be a very inspiring international ideal for aState requesting membership in the United Nations, but at least it is frankly and honestly stated. The King of Jordan, in that speech, quîte openly threatened Israel's destruction hy armed force. 41. It is easy enough - perhaps too easy - to dismiss this as mere verbiage; it is nothing of the kind. These are the voices which come across Israel's beleaguered frontiers from Arab governments and armies but a few miles away. The Press and radio of Israel are constantIy bombarded with this evil flamboyant menace. The stream of invective and threat is so constant and comes from so close at hand that it evokes the most poignant and vivià memories of actual military aggression which foI1owed identical. threats but a short time ago. vVe cannat fail to record this menacing propaganda as an important element in Israel's security sihtation. ~t has a mo~t potent effect upon our public mind. It IS safer to assume that these people mean what they say than to assume otherwise and be wrong, and my Government's policies toward Arab.States will rest austerely upon theasstunptionthat these are sincere and official decIarations of Arab poIicy and sentiment. If there are any other cotmtries heJ;'e which have the experience of hearing their violent overthrow threatened by countries250·times asla.rge and fifty times as populo.us, aU a few miles away, we should like to compare notes with them to see whether our reactiQns are unduly sensitive or drastic. These Arab t~reats, apart from violating every precept of international decency, are specifie violations of the Armistiee Agreements, in which the sîgnatory governments have undertaken not only to abjure force' but also to refrain from the threatof the use of force or from any attempt to alter the Armistice Agreements e.xcept by their transformation inte peace settlements by negotiation and consent. 42. In short, t.here is no doubt whatever that the Armistice Agreements are envisagêd by the Arab aov- •• 0 ern~el1ts not as a transItIon· ta peace, but as a continuatIon of war by other means. The acts of violenceof physical violence - of which l shall now speak are merely the sharp spearheads of a fierce and total hostility. They would be alarming enough in themselves; but theyshould not be seen in isolation. ~3. VVhy have l traced this general background? It ·43. lS ~e~au~e no portrayal of Israel's security situation or ~ ~1JOhcles~lsaccurateo,r~C9IJ:lpletewhich does not portray the background of political~ econ01fik"aîld propaaanda. .d'I§I=3:~l~ warfare,accompanied by memories of recent.bl()odshed and. ~ll.envisage~ against this map of smallness, vulnerablht~ and enclrclement~ Even without the organized . récentes campalgn of m1,lrder, plunder and bloodshed which l shaH now describe, this picture of aIl acute andwellconcerted .hostility by several States against one - by .l!!any agamst few -- would .stand out as an extraordmary process of international lawlessness. Theinfliction of constant murder and terror upon Israel citizens from .the careful immunity of armistice frontiers is simply 44. .. ln November 1952 the Arab representatives on the Armistice Commissions formulated the following {kllicies: First, the limitation of the scope of the present Armistice Agreements with Israel; secondly, the refusaI to make new agreements; thirdly, the exploitation of border incidents in order to nuIIify the present agreements; fourthly, the reduction of the activities of the Mixed Armistice.Commissions to a minimum. ··=~~~"Tiutt"'?.c.attgmptdly4h~.Qo.:vernU1ent of the Lebanon to dissociateitselffrom the-mTh.tary-'as'p-ectsc~f.ArahLea-:c gue policy towards Israel. The procedures ·followed atthis {rontier, if carried out on the Jordan and Egyptian frontiers;· would produce the SalUe ·relative tranquillity as exists in the JSrortll.TheLebanese-Israel frontier on its northern side _ that is on itsLebanese 49. With reference to General 'Bennike's :remarks about the authorityexercised by Israel police in' the demilitarized zone, l would only point out that the Mixed Armistice Agreement between Syria and Israel 2 and Dr; Bunche's explanatory memorandum require that Israel villages shall be policed in the zone by Israel police and that the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice· Commission shall nothave administrative responsibilities .in the zone. This admittêdly is more obscure than adefinition of administrative authority should ~__,,~ormally be,and the difficulties of those who ,do have ---aâIln-iiîs:tratiye~esponsibilitiesjIJ,-th~.~ol1e ..arising from 51. . ~VVith reference to El Auja, the Security Council will observe that the two Egyptian complaints which are reproduced in full in the part of the Chief of St~'s report which concerned Egypt now. have the following status: 52. First, a complaint of alleged illêgitimate civilian settlement was not accepted by the Mixed Armistice Commission; and under the Armistice Agreement this rejection is final since no appeal has been made within the allotted time. Irefer to article X of the Egypt- Israel Arrnistice Agreement, and General Bennike's statèment in repl}"' to my question on this procedure [635th mee#ng, anne.t', section 6, question 6] confirms what I have just said. ~-~~.s3~~~()ndly, there is a complaint about policeactivity agaliiSl:-Bêdbtlin~inthe zmt~,~'Yhich has been upheld at the lower level ofthe Mixed ArmiStiœ--Cotl1.... ~ mission; but an appeal has been made against it in accordance with article X within the,allotted time, and therefore under the terms of the armistice the decision is not finaI.General Bennike's reply to a question which l put confirms this as weIl. This section of the Chief of Staff's first report, therefore" consists of t'Wo ~~ptiancomplaints, orie of which has been rejected, and theother has not won its'way to official confirmation. The problemin the Egypt-Israel Armistice Agreement is not El Auja but it is the frequency of infiltrafion 'ftomthe Gaza zone. 54. 1 have referred once already t6 the maritime blockade practised by Egypt in violation of the' Security Council resolution ,of 1 September 1951. .This ~ matter has a specia.l.aspect for the Secur~ty ,Counci!. AU other incidents, to, which we .have referred in the whDIe '6f'i:î:tis~tliseassion~affect the ,work of the mixed armistice commissions established- Dy-'Isra~ëi:'-and--the 55. Nevertheless, everything that I have s~id about these three Armistice Agreements with Lebanon, Syria and Egypt throws a grim Iight of contrast on the armistice policies of the Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan. Here is the main trouble. There is ne doubt that, white other Arab States bear the brunt in the conduet of political and economic seige,. the military role faIls principally on Jordan. Here we have nothing less than guerrilla warfare conducted with full governmental acquiescènce. What is politely called infiltration is actually a campaign of murder, robbery, theft and sabotage which has increased in intensity since the latter part of 1952. This campaign is organized by smaIl groups with the support of the Jordan National Guard, the police and the Arab Legion. Its abject is ta undermine Israel's morale and ta paralyse its economy,while inflicting as many casualties as possible. The direct econdmic loss caused in 1952 is estimated at over $2.5 million. Miles 'of irrigation pipes, thousands of young olive and fruit trees, masses of fertîlizer and seeds have been pltmdered in an effort to sabotage our agricultural development. Miles of telephone wires and telephone poles have been destroyed iîl an attempt ta cause the cessation of normal activity. The eIectric ppwersystel!lis constantly sabotaged so that the irrigation of farms andgroves:is ·sometimesstopped and industry silenced. --. 55. cation de ces trois la le p~r CIpale les poids la militaire. guérilla que en vols s'accroître pagne. est l'appui et pop~lation mfllgeantleplus ont 1952 kilomètres de oliviers d'engrais le développement ..:1.. w..1o~es~ graphiques male 4aêllt champs que 56. But aH this theft and pillage is itself overshadowed 56. encore qu'Israël à au venaIent mises 1953, a échauffourées ~y, ~ most fearful ton of life and human suffering re- ~ulttngfrom the 1,208 certified ilIegal border crossings ln the first nine moriths of 1953, following the 3,742 1Iiegal crossings from Jordan in the year 1952. Between ~ay 1950 and August 1953, we have llad 421 Israelis ktlled and wounded; 128 cases of sabot~ge or mining; 866. çl11.shes with armed marauders in our territory; 122 armed. robberies; and 3,263 thefts and burglaries. These terrtble figures prove that the main provision 57. Sin.ce it is universally admitten that this violent marauding from Jordan is the origin of the sequence of bloodshed - and this is stated in the Chief of Staff's report andeven in statements by leaders of Jordan's military forces - it is_fi1;ting that the Security Council should have sorne picture of the,terror and chaos which this campaign" ereates. 58. I will not a;elliong upon the hundreds of victims who have increased the grim toll of the thousands lost in Israel's war against invasion. Little has been sàid their memory in the documents now before us on the table or in statements so far made: Their slaughter has been referred to, if at all, in,recent months with a little too much nonchalance. Whether or not their lives and ,deaths are of concern to anybody, they are assuredly of the most deep and passionate interest to us. The fierce indignation -left behind in Israel by this wave of murder and bereavement is not a matter to be taken lightly in terms of internàtional security, let alone in higher humanitarian terms. There is somethirig gravely wrong about the international treatment of this question which has'50 far surrounded these monstrous murders with chilly silence. The absence of any formaI expressions of sympathy or indignation cQntrasts painfully with 'St1ch expressions, on tragedies in which Israel life is .not involved. 1l10ntns~without acts of murder and pillage in the same 60. The most brutal of. these attacks arecondemned, of course, by the Mixed Armistice Commission. In no single instanceis anybody known to have been brought ta trial or held to account. On 10 June the Mixed Armistice Commission called in vain on the Jordan delegation "to take· immediately effective ineasures ta prevent the recurrence of such incidents". There is another attack. The following day the Mixed· Armistice Commission states that "this series of attacks carried out lately against Israel villages creates a very grave tension and [the Mixed Armistice Commisslon] calls on the Jordanian delegation to take immediately most effective measures to stop the.recurrence of such incidents". The situation worsens. Twelve days later the Mixed Armistice Commission condemns what it calls "the murderous attack by armed Jordanians on the village guards at Beit Nekufa" in violation of article III, paragraph 2, of the Armistice Agreement. The Commission 'goes on to "calI on the Jordanian authorities ta put an end to these mùrderous aggressions". On 14 October, after the brutal attack on Yahud village, the Mixed Armistice Commission resolves that the commission "considers it of vital importance that the Jordanian authorities should take immediately the most vigorous measures to prevl~nt the recurrence of such intolerable aggressions". 61. AlI these incidents - and, indeed, the greater number of the assaults upon our life, our property and our peace - have been launched in the small sector of which Qibya is the centre, together with scores of others with less tragic results but with great effect on tension in the area. It is the·sector extending for no more than forty miles between Tulkarm and the Jerusalem corridor, precisely the area which faces Israel's greatest concentration both of population and of industrial,~OTicultural and national activity. General Bennike's reply to another of my questions confinns that the major onslaught is directed against the country's most crucial and sensitive areas of population and com- =~~tion. l have circulated a map which shows the area in which this intense violence takes place and the nU.n:ber ofactiv:e, violent process of marauding which ongl11ate from ·lt. 62. Does it requifl~ muchll:r1aginati6n toenvisagethe. maddening rage of such a precariousexistence - the so!?bre succession of bereavement and funeral, the angUlshedtorment of afflicted homes, the dark fear which ?roods.over every nightfall, the anger whichswells up lU these frontier, villages again.st those across the line who have solemnly undertaken ta respect the integrity .of Our frontier and who treat that frontier with "con- 62,"F'a?~-iIbeaucoup sombre aussi funérailles, gées, colère contre cation, 17 63. Sir Gladwyn Jebb's speech the other day [635th meeting] approached but never achie;vedan understanding of what these numerol.1S ctosSings mean to us in. our daily life. Could l venture to. at.tempt. a hypothetical comparison? Could thousands of people from another country enter the Unit,ed Kingdom every y~ar without permission of its" Govemment, commit theft and plunder and thousands of murders - l am speaking proportiona11y..:.- and .retire to whence they came, ·leaving behind an air of restrained consolation because only one out, of fiftyactually left death in its train? Would not relationsbetween the United Kingdom and sucb an imaginary country reach the very summit of acute tension? Would not the public sentiment be enraged beyond normal attributes of patience and find expression in unfortunate retaliatory acts? We rea11y cannoi acceptadvice to ,sit back. and get killed and think Ca1mly and dispassionately about the territory from' whieh this stream of violence is' allowed, if not encouraged, to come. If the Israel-Jordan Armistice Agreement ~s tobe taken seriously, then. article IV, paragraph 3, must 1;>e taken ,very seriously indeed. It is as illegitimate to cross that international frontier without permission of my Government for. any purpos.e at aIl as it is to parachute lawlessly into the British Isles or to swarm over the frontiers betweep the United States and Mexico, or ta w~lk in and out of Greece or Fràttce or any country, with an accompanying percentage of murder which in terms of those populations would amount to thousands each year~ l am deeply disturbed at an this forbearance for the idea th31 thousands of crossings of Israel's frontier should take place as a matter of course as thôugh dictated by compulsion of geography or what is ca11ed the "history of recent years". l am sorry to say that there has definitely been an element'ofdiscrimination in the world's reactions to our sacrifices on the one hand and those of our neighbours on the other. 65. The m00d and backgroun{of the Qibya incident can only be understood in the lig~t of this atmosphere in which our hard struggle for secùrity and peace is.conducted. In instructing me to portray this background as fully as possible the Government of Israel directs' me, nevertheless, to state that it regards the loss of innocent me. at Qibya with profound' ·and unreserved regret. ThIS was a most unfortunate explosion of pent-:upfeeling and a tragic breakdown of restraint after the provocation of brutalattacks such as the cold-blooded murder of a mother and her children in their sleep. 66. The circumstances of the incident are precisely those outlined in Mr. Ben-Gurion's statemerit of 19 October 1953.. The, Government of Israel, of course, has a responsibility to enStlre the integrity of its borders and to protect the life and, property of its citizens. But a~Mr. Ben-Gurion has said, my Government does not wlsh to see the relations between neighbours based on acts of reprisaI. We' wish for nothing more sincerelythan that the conditions in which such a sequence of b}90dshed •can occuE ...shaH he rootedout. The cooperation of my Govei"nmentis assuredforanypurpose- 68. Each' one of us grieves the shedding of blood wherever it oceurs. We do notwish that a single person .in neighbouring countries should be ~eedlessly harmed; but neither dowewant citizens of Israel to be murdered, as they havé been, in scores and hundreds. Above aIl, wewish to eliminate circumstances in which relations between our'neighbouring peoples should rest on fo~ee br on the use of arms. My Government feels certam that the Seeurity Council too shares its feelings of regret at the killing of any innocent people on the borders and, of·course, that in such expression it will never give any impression of differentiation between vietim:s belonging to different skIes. .4}l'-Wtue."-cWe·aFecn,ot~only"disturbed'-=by=-an-occasionafc" ~reprisa.I, 'which we r€gret, involving 10ss 01 imiocent life. We are also astonished at our people's g~neral record ofpatienceunderunparalleled tension. Tt is perhaps t4e first case in history of a siege voluntarily endured. It is also a rare case of instruments designed for transition to peace being used to maintain a policy of active hostility. 70. The Seeudty Council is charged with the maintenanc~ of international peace and security. It is surely in no position and has na .desire to isolate single events ;Œom .their context, It should and, we,hope, will criti.,. cize aHacts of violence. If it.wishes to finda cure, then it will, we hope, seek a cure forthe basicdisease,namely, the original belligerencyand hostility, and not ouly for the symptoms,of the disease. It would be neither true nol' just, ta record conclusions on the basis of transient events without,a.steady lookat the ma.p 'of Israel's .frontiers, and ~. contemplation' of the, gfea.t streams of hatred ami hostility which come across. those frontiers from north, east"and south; 71. lturn from a description of the threat ta the prospect of a solution., It. is vital thaï l P,ut ,on record the many ~ttemptswhichmyG?vernment'has made, so.far 72. With reference to attempts at local improvements on the Egyptian frontier, in order to prevent persistent infiltration from the Gaza area, the Israel delegation to the Mixed Armistice Commission has proposed that a demarcation line be marked on the ground by ploughing a deep furrow. This was done in 1950 with good results, but parts of that line have since been obliterated by weather. We proposed a suniIar arrangement on 16 September 1952. The Egyptiân side agreed " in principle but on 11 December 1952 refused to cooperate. The Chainnan of the Mixed Armistice Commission stated that it was not a function of the United Nations to supervise the marking, but when the senior Israel representative .said that the demarcation !ine wouId in that case be marked inside Israel territory paraUel to the line, the Chairman agreed to send an observer on 3 March 1953. Sixty kilometres of the line was marked between Dimra and Rafah. While the work proceeded as much as three to four kilometres were ploughed daily. Egyptian co-operation with this work would have had a very di&ouraging e..ffect on infiltration, but here co-operation has bèen wi@1eld. 73. A simiiar effort was made on our initiative on the Jordan side. On 15 June 1950, it was agreed upon the initiative of Israel to mark the border on the ground. The work was commenced in co-operation \Vith the Jordanians on 1 July 1950 near Umm Burj and good progress was made. However, due to delays caused by the Jorda:tlÎans the \Vork was slowed down more and more in 1951, until it was disTttpted éompletely in April 1952. Thus the border was never marked. 74.. T;heimportance of this· question of frontier demarcation ~s.very great. One of the reasons for comparative tranqudhty In the north - on our frontiers with Lebanon, ~or exanlpleis that our countries are divided by frontiers long'established and recognized. Thus the processes of Arab life flo\V naturally northward from the Lebanese frontier,eastward and northward of our Syri~n f~ontier. On the other hand, the Israel-Jordan frOJltier .•,lS .new, and· there are·· still pulls and tensions ~f Arab life in the frontier villages in a westerly direction. If we are to have an effective frontierand thus pres~rv~ the most essential part of the Israel:"Jordan ArmIstice, we must inculcate a consciousness of this frontier, a recognition of its existence and integrity, a "Another cause of frequent incid("..nts &long the demarcation line is the cultivation of land hy residents of one party in the territory controlled by the other or in no-man's land. As in previous years, the grain harvest months, April through July, were marked by numerous clashes which resulted in the loss of life in méh"lY instances. During this period, joint surveying teams accompanied by United Nations observers determined the exact location of the demarcation line on the ground in certain difficult areas, and pointed it out to village officiais and local cultivators in an effort to minimize accidentaI encroachments. Only plough furrows in certain critical, highly-cultivated areBS have beèn used to mark the line, since Jordan authorities have been unwilling ta agree te any "permanent' scheme for the marking of the demarcation line. Clashes also occurred during the first weeks of the olive harvest in September. Observers with joint surveying teams again pointed out the demarcation line to local officiaIs and cultiva·· tors, and in ùne a,rea in the vicinity of Qaffi.n-Baqa el Gharbiya the line was more permanently marked with white markers. 75. l should add that this policy of opposing every effort to mark the demarcation line has been endorsed forma1ly by the fourth meeting of the Arab delegations to the Mixed Armistice Commissions, held in Beirut in August 1953. It was officially decided tnere that the demarcation line shoukl remain imaginary and that there should be no signs whatever of it on the ground. 76. In studying General Bennike's report, the Security Council will notice how often serious incidents inv(llving loss of life have arisen through Arabs proeeeding from Jordan territory to cultivate land illegally on the Israel side of the armistice frontier. From time to time we have attempted to deal with this situation by land exchanges which would overcome some of the anomalies in the armistice frontier when it passes between villages and the lands which they have been wont to cultivate. Thus in January 1951 we suggested such an exchange in the QalqiHya area. On 9 May 1952 the Jordan.representatiV'eciPJor.med usthat-'Oursuggestiou" was rejected. 77. On 30 January 1952, negotiations took place for the division of the Latrun no-man's-land.· Under this transaction Israel would have gained some 20,210 dunams 4. and Jordan 25,320 dunams. This plan was worked out in the Mixed Armistice Commission. On 29 May 1952, however, we wèfêinformed that' Jordan had rejected the agreement. 78. Again, an arrangement for the exchange of land ln the Zeita area,suggested by Israel, was worked out as a combined plan in,the Mixed Armistice Commission by Israel, and Jordan representatives in the presence of United Nations observers. In November 1952, the Jordanians withdrew their agreement to the suggestedexchange. Here, then, is a second Israel initiative to deal with infiltration. Clear demarcation is opposed by Jordan, and sa also is the agreed removal of a frontier barrier between farmers and their lands. ~ Onedunam is equivalentto 025 acres. 80. On 14 February 1952, we made a proposaI to enable Jordan inbabitants of the border villages to utilize wells on the Israel side in exchange. for water supplies from El Huan to the potash works. On 29 May 1952, we were lnformed by the Jordan representative that General Glubb objected to the scheme. 81. Israers suggestions to devise a legal means for Arabs to trave1 between Jordan and the Egyptian-controlled Gaza strip were rejected because Jordan was unwilling to sanction any form of legal arrangements for crossing Israel territory. 82. Each of these were expedients of limited scope. 1 should not want to exaggerate their importance. They would, however, have had their effect in the reduction of violence: and there is no doubt that if these efforts to hnpose agreater consciousness of the existence of the armistice line had been accepted by the ether side, somp-~imprriv;emetlt.w9uld .1l<tve.•ta}(en-nptac:e..-Faithful, however, to a declared policy of making no agree~ ments with Israel, even if clear advantage accrued to Jordan and to the cause of reW":lnal peace, the Hashelaite Kingdom of the Jordan has rejected a11 of these overtures. Non-agreement appears in itself to be an article of policy. 83. Much has been said in the course of this debate about local commanders' agreements. It is important, 1 .think, to realize that meetings at this level cannot. solve a question which requires the closest and most active co-operation of the central governments. The problem is to get the central sector of the Jordan frontier c1early identified, recognized, understood, respected and controlled on its Jordan side. If we achieve thiswe have solveda good part of our immediate security problem. Ifwe do not achieve this we have reallysolved nothing of substantial hnportance. 84. Israel is the author and initiator of the local commanders' agreements..We have therefore been gratefuI to hear somany kind words spoken around this table about them. We sha11 not repudiate our own ideas: but our parenthood of these agreements gives us the. right to criticize our offspring when it fails' to live tip to expectations. This has been the case here; The local 85. l should like to address the Security Council for another period of sorne forty to fifty minutes and should greatly appreciate the iprrdlgence of a brief respite. 86. Ml'. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): Ido TInt wish to intrude at tIlls point, but l can easily show that about 98 per cent of what the representative of Israel has said is really out of order. l do not begrudge the representative of Israel his l'est; l think that if he feels tired, he should l'est a bit. l am, however, telling the Council that l wish to address it after Mr. Eban has completed bis stateroent, and l wish to address it at this meeting - if necessary, tonight. That was the agreement with the President and other members of the Council. l inseribed my name on the list of speakers. In fact, l was given tlle choice of speaking either before or after the representative of Israel, and l said: UN0, let bim speak first, provided l am given the opportunity to speak after he has finished." néc~ssaii'e. d'autres la la et donne 87. observer ce aU suspension pour 88. conduira que à réponse chain M. tiendra 89. pris avant séance, premier ou 90. glais): ,Comme d'Israël reposer

l want first to say that l do not tbink we can deny to Mr. ~ban what we granted to the representative of Syria at the 636th meeting, that is, a short recess for /ive or ten minutes, to enable him to catch bis breath. 88. On the other hand,· 1 do not know how late we shall have to sit to hear Mr. Eban's entire statement. l suppose it will be somewhere around six o'clock. Therefore l can not promise that we shall. hear Mr. Malik's reply today. Mr. Maîik is on my list as the next speaker. The Council will have to decide whether he will speak today after Mr. Eban, or at the next meeting. 89. Lastly, l am not aware that any promise was made or that Mr. Malik was given the choice of speaking before or aftel' Mr. Eban. At the close of our last meeting 'Ne decided that Mr. Eban would be thefirst speaker today. That decision or promise was carried out. 90. Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): l do not want ta prolong this wrangle. As l have said, l weIeome the opportunity to 1"est for five or ten minutes, bothfor the representative of Israel and for ourselves. But l can bring .this brief interlude to a close immediately by addressing a request in person to the representatives of Chile,· China, Colombia, Denmark, Greece, Pakistan, the USSR, theUnited Kingdom and the United States, and, of course, to the President as representative of France, to give me the opportunity to speak tonight. Thaï ~s certainly in order and l hereby present the Counet! with the formai motion that it should permit tne to speak tonight, no matter what may be the hour . when Mr. Eban finishes. l hope that Mr. Eban will support that. mett~e instamment là. de bien de parole ment, tendant soit aura cette

The question of whether the representative of Lebanon is to speak this evening will, if necessary, be put to th~{:~unci1 wh~nthe represen:tative of Israel has compIeted his statemenCThereisnoneed to raise it at this stage. 95. Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): I shall be quite satisfied if, before the meeting is adjourned, my formaI motion is put to the decision of the Council.

That is precisely what I have been saying since we began to discuss ~e matter. 97. Mr. EBAN (Israel): I am grateful to the President and to the Council for their courtesy. 98. i should like to deal with the question of infiltration and marauding. 99. Tt has always been our contention that border violence cano only be curbed by a radical solution of, what is called the infiltration problem. Early in 1953 Israel initiated attempts to broaden the' Armistice Agreements by additional regulations relating to the prevention of marauding, inc1uding high-Ievel' meetings betweel1 ...artnY .. officers .Ott .botl!side§, .ill. ,addition. to meetings betweenloeit:commatiaerS.' In Fèbruary 1953 Israel proposed a meeting of Chiefs of Staffs of the two sides. This was reJected. The Jordanians, however, did agrce to meet on the police level, and to this Israel consented on 2 March 1953. On 25 March 1953 Israel submitted to the Jordanians a memoratidum containing detailed proposaIs for meetings and regulations whereby, in our opinion, the Jordan authorities could help in preventing marauding, which was the basic reason for most of the border incidents. On 1 June 1953 Israel was informed that the memorandumhad been .rejected without having been considered, since the measures it proposed involved.action in internaI Jordanian affairs. It should he obvious, howèver, that the crux of the whole issue is the failure.of the Jordan.Government to control its border from the inside, and no solutions which do not. involve the directassumption by Jordan of military responsibility for g~arding its frontiers have any real or lasting value. 100. .' After additional efforts and. meetings a new special agreement for the prevention of border incidents was signed oh 8 June 1953 (S/3030]. Meetings between local cotnmanders have beencontinuously held. Owing, •••.•••!mIli._~~••œ~.c_I ••~.,=!!!!.",~,-!l'.L!!1!,.!r ...;,-~.=~._!i"~~CZ~,~,,~ -::::~i'I!lie,·~~~!!!~~ 101. l cannot leave this problem of border incidents without saying another ward about the Jordan Governmeut's resoonsibilitv. There is no foundation for the ass~~ptiorÎ that thé Jordan Government, if it desires, is less able to haIt this vast movement of violent incursion than the Governments of Lebanon and Syria have been. Nor is it relevant to refer, as the representative of the United Kingdom has done, to theparticular length of the Jordan-Israel frontier. That is not the issue at aU. 1 have pointed OUC that .more than 80 per cent of the incursions involving loss Qf .life have come from a sector of some fifty miles between the Tulkarm area and the Jerusalem corridor faeing Israel's main population concentration. l have circulated a map to illustrate the geography of border raids. There is certainly no value whatever, either moral or political, in the assertion that these guerrilla killings of peaceful Israel citizens have some extenuation on the ethical pl~ne because the Jordan Government disclaims official responsibi1ity.~'\iVe.ar.e confidentt.~at no suchinsensitive theory, which plaées a premium on guerrilla warfare, would be upheJd in the Security Council. Indeed the fact that Jordan violations of the armistice, as General· Bennike's report shows, refer more frequently to irregulars than to regular security forces is the most damaging point against Jordan which the debate.ànd -GeneïCtlBennike's report have revèaÎèd. Fofit iiidicates the basic source of the whole trouble - the refusaI of Jordan to assume official responsibility for the main articles of the Armistice Agreement, especially article IV, paragraph 3 relating to the integrity of the armistice frontier Hnes. Sa far from being an act of virtue, Jordan's official dissociation from frontier control is the very origin of the tension which we are now discussing. 103. Thus, while admitting that Jordanians illegally cross into Israel and that, in General Glubb's words, "Arab infiltration to Israel is the cause of tension in the bordf".r area" he has constantly turned aside from grasping the realities of this problem. In an interview on 9 February 1953 with a correspondent of The Times of London, the commander of the Arab Legion stated that most of these crossings were without criminal intent. They were, he said, innocent people visiting their friends and relatives or attempting to cultivate their own gardens. Sorne of them, he admitted, went to Israel to stea1. This was "regrettable" in his view, but it was to be explained, he thought, by economic destitution. 104. In The New York Times of 18 June 1953, the commander of the Arab Legion philosophized on the alleged background of this border tension. He ascribed ta the Jewish people "the psychological release of the urge to bully athers after having suffered the same thing for centuries". He expressed the opinion that our popu..,. lation benefited from being killed because that stimulated .._ --finJ!rrcial support .from the United States, and also becausesÜclf tensiOils"silencedor reduèed criticism by the political opposition withinîsraèrduringa~period of financialcrisis or internaI unrest". From these profound observations on Israel's internaI affairs, General Glubb went on to imply either that our hundreds of dead killed each other for the financial purposesalready enumerated; [J:. that the Israel people murdered each other for the purpose of casting a shadow on Jordan's international reputation. He also spoke, and 1 quote his words, of "criminal immigrants from the ghettos of Europe" and e!J1!>~rky4uJlon...other reflections in the .-~spiriranâ lariguage ôf prejudice. 105. General Glubb'simplication that we wrongly ascribe .the murders of Israelis to Jordan instead of to ourselves is especially remarkable when we consider the proved Jordanian record in the falsification of evidence. Here let me simply quote the decision of the Mixed Armistice Commission on 8 June 1952, condemning Jordan: "The Mixed Armistice Commission deplores the attempt to mislead the Mixed Armistice Commission inquiry by dragging the body of the murdered Israel soldier for a distance of approximately one kilometre towards the armistice lines." l 110W quote the decision of the Mixed Armistice Commission on 24 September 1952: "The Mixed Armistice Commission condemns the attempt to mislead the Mixed Armistice Commission inquiry by the Jordan witnesses." 106. We cannot fail to feel disquiet at the approach of the commander of the Arab Legion to his responsibilities. In another interview on 18 October 1953, General Glubb confirmed that infiltration to Israel was carried out by "small numbers of persons", which is not a consoling thought to those murdered and plundered 107 . Thil?pringsme ta anothet reason why the exceptional degree of tensIon originatiüg· fl'Qm the Jm'dall frontier evokes our disappointment. The Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan is bound by amilltary alliance with the United Kingdûm,a permanent member of the Security Counci!. The armed forces of Jordan depend upon that. alliance for their _financial support,. th€ir military equipment, their training and their leadership. It might have reasonably been expected that the Arab country whose armed forces are under the most direct and intimate influence of one of the Great Powers would be the one from which the least trouble arose on its frontier with Israelyet the precise opposite is true. It is here that the violent incursions are most numerous and that the proper restraints of regular military authority are least energetically applied. 108. The people of Israel, who attach the utmost value and importance ta their friendly relations with the United Kingdom, are quite sincerely puzzled and confused by this anomaly. The influe;nce of this Treaty of Alliance with Jordan was, to say the least, not a very active factor in. preventing the original invasion of Israel in 1948. Today the same Treaty of Alliance cbes not appear to help increase effective military control on the Jordan side of the arUlistice frontier. It does not seem unreasonable for my Government to hope that governments with' special influence in our region will use that influence, not only for their own policy and strategy, but also for international purp~es, such as encouraging the effective discharge by regular armed forces of Jordan of their responsibility for preserving the absolute iï1tJ~,grity of the Israel frontier against illicit C •••-"··~t;lo~~nsmgc:thal..•..lll1d(l;t~!:;,lL ~~~tll1:;~s ..py JS1"~~l almmg at the relief of tenSIon, wlthout a reclprocal demand on the Arab States,havebeen thrown juto a ,:acuum, .le~ving no impress.ion behi?d. We have .s0!Uetimes been mformed by UmtedNations representatlves that some gesture implying goodwill, not linked to any corresponding Arab actionjwouldhelp to improve the atmosphere. In point of· fact, aIl these unconditional moves have been contemptuously rejected. 111. In 1950, the United Nations E-elief and Works Agency,pursuant to Genera! Assembly resolutions, requested aU governments in which Arab refugee camps existed to do their best to integrate those refugees into their own economy, society and culture, without prejudice to a final political settlement of the refugee question. Israel, heavily burdened by efforts ta find homes for 740,000 refugee immigrants in four years, 300,000 of them from Arab coimtries, proceeded to integrate. the. 45,000 refugees on its soil. and to take them off the shoulders of the international community. This act is generously praised on the first page of the current report of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency 5, but it has not had the slightest effect in persuading any Arab Government to show similar efforts in integrating refugees or to allow their spontaneous merging into the so.cial and economic life of their kindred countries. If the reintegration programme pro- . fi ~ee Official 'Records of the General Assembl;V, Eîghth 112. Notwithstanding the fact thatthe Arab countries are for all purpases hostile territories, about 28,000 infLtrators who entered Israel without authority after the end of fig'hting, and· who could have been legally expelled under the Armistice Agreement, have been legalized and have become citizens of Israel. Furthermore, the Israel Government hasallowed more than 3·000 individuals ta enter Israel directly from hostile Arab countries· under a scheme for the reunion of families. 113. In December 1952, the Israd Gavernment offered to release unconditionally bank accounts owned by Arab refugees in Israel banks and blocked under the law of abandoned property. The scheme is now'operating after intense opposition at first by the Government of Jordan, whicl1 barred refugees from filing applications. My Gavernment appreciates the tribute to' this gesture in the 1952 report of the United Nations Palestine Conciliation Commission 6. 114. On 28 September 1951, Israel made an offer through the Palestine Conciliation Commission in Paris ta exchangenon-aggressioll pacts 7 with the Arab States iIi order to supplement the existing Armistice Agreements. AIl the Arab· governments refused to respond, on the grounds that the present situation was satisfactory to them and that they did not wish ta go beyond it. The Security Council has now had an opportunity to see how satisfactory the. present situation is. The Arabgovernments,then,do not hesitate tn reJecfnon.: "---a.ggressr.ot1 pacts withiater.nationaLbacking" and..at tll.fl same time, in complete contradiction, to assert that they fear Israel expansion. 115. During recent years, we have attempted ta make sorne progress on preparation for compensation for abandoned refugee property. The Arab reply has been to intensify thé boycott, the organized attack upan our economic and financialstructure, and thus to ensure our inability to make the financial effort required for carrying out our undertaking. llQ. These proposed agreements and gestures would nqt have brought about final peace. In their accumulation, however, they show a purposeful attempt to seek such avenues of conciliation, limited as they are, as are available within the static provisions of the Armistice ~g~e~ments. AlI of them together, and each of them mdlV1dually, have had no effect. They have raised no echo, they have elicited no response. They have kindled not a single spark of humanity across these fierce and turbulent frontiers.. Partial progress toward peace 6, Ibid.,. Seventh Session,. Anne~es, agenda item 67, document A/2216. •7 Ibid., Si~th Session, Supplement No. 18, anne~ B, appen- 119. l heard a tentative echo earlier ,to the effect that a discussion'of Arab-Israel peace is' not within. th~ framewO!'k of this agenda. But the notion of compliance (j with the Armistice Agreements includes compliance with articles l,and XII of the Egypt-Israel Agreement aad the other ~ficles that l have mentioned. Th~ con- - -~.c.ept,DLtransiti~ermanenLpeaceoj&~t~me!'elyc.A' part, but the central part,purpose ancLo!>Jecthz~ofth(}:I General.hrmistiœA~etIlent:'"~~c -.-. C 120.>In its resolution§ of 16 November 1948, 11 Augyst 1949, 17 November 1950, 18 May 1951 and l Sepœmber 1951-that is to say, at five meeûngs, .. folU' of thcem, rather like the present one, ,J"9nyened upon thé. impulse ofaspecific incident --,.the Securi~ Councy. rel('infied the parties. that the object of the, Armistice Agréements .is to effect a~ transition to permanen~~eace.~Theie seems to be an impression among some ~t,ions'that it is possible for a signatory. of ,?neof these Armistice Agreementsto refuse peace ~~tiations and yetto.remaW' ~ confo~ity with" ~e ~sticeAgreementsJ)yobsèrvmg thelr pther proVlsions., Nothing of the sort is true. RefusaI to concIude pert11iment peace is initself ~yiolati()nof the Armistice Agrfj:ettl,ent, both of its cent~atpuryoseand ofits most "specifie pr()visio~.,3t!1.lay appear tobe aparadox, -Qut°itis nevertlleleSi.tItfu,e"that the very maintenance of the At'lllistice Agreementstoday iS.,a violation ofthose agreem~ts. F<n',thël\tmistice Agx;eementsthemselves ~9nstantly enjom us torecognizetheirprovisional and frà.nsient,character, Even ifthf;\ Charter ofthe United N1!-ÛQns werenot regarded.as sufJjcient authority for ireqtJ~i~~, ~tatesto negotiatea peace s(!~l~i11ent,the' .: Annlstice. 'Agreements. themscJves .would nnpose. that cl~~ duty ilpon,those. who have signeçl tbem. Tlif':duty ofpeace-making 1S ~o centt~linctheArwistice Agree:- me~s andin the, Security CDuncil's resolùtions relating thëretothatr.efusaItomake peace~ which is thedyna,mic D '~~t~. of the Armistice· Agreements, cani:>~ndno atonement even in the'ùbsetvancewhich there .should certa1rdy he - of their ~tic .provisions which define the èxisting relationship between the signatory govem- -tn,ents. Any Aré\h. g,?ver~ent.which says.that it -will '~tàn4 hy the arnnstke mdefinitely, but will refuse to 122. Notwithstanding their pledged word to the contrary, the Arab States alone amongst the Members of the United Nations, have made continuation of hostility to a neighbour a central and avowed objective of their national policy, to be proclaimed at every tum and to be communicated, if possible, by contagious pressure to the rest of the international community.. 123. The Government of Isr<.lel does not beIieve that the present tension in the Middle East will improve unless the Arab States wJ1 join us in reaffirming a permanent peace settlement to be the objective of their nationalandc regÏeüaipolicy.. 124. My Government bas developed intensive diplomatic' activity in an attempt to secure this objective of the Armistice Agreements, in addition to the collective efforts for peace to which we have given our support in the United Nations. Thus, between 1948 and the end of 1950, we had several meetings with the heads of the Jordan Govemment and reached agreement on aIl outstanding questions, only to' find that the pressures of oilier Arab States prevented ratification. Other such contacts of more limited scope have been maintained evt'I since. Whenever such negotiations were in progress the frontier was almost totclly quiet. There is no basis for saying that disorder is a natural feature of·this frontier. Contacts with leading personalities of other Arab countries have similarly been initiated..It is not in the international·interest that l describe them in specifie detail. 1 will say, however, that the difficu1ties which have prevetited an agreement have not been those stated by Arab representatives in· public debates..Indeed, specifie issues have rarely obstructed the prospect of agree- ~ent: We.haye been frankly confronted with an objecbon m prmC1ple to the very concept or idea of peace between the Arab States and Israel, rather than with anyspecific questions ori which agreement could not he reached. The issue has not been the basis of negotiations, orits juridical starting point, but the absence of an act of will· or courage necessary··to envisagea peace negotiation at a11. 125.. Afthe seventh session of the General Assembly the Israel Government instructed me to ouiline the. full 126. This initiative was praised by allnajorlty of the Members of the United Nations. It wa~ in no way or quarter represel.ted as one-sided. 127. This concept of a directly negotiated settlement was seen ta he in conformity with the general trend of intemanonal relations in our ume. A direct settlement was strongly recommended from aU cornel~s of the Assembly. The French representative said: Il. "The primary responsibility of finding a solution to theit disputes lay with the parties) not only in law but in fuct. A treaty which was not freely accepted by the ~ties would have to he imposed by force. As .the Umted Nauons had neither the power nor the _ .•= •.~.~.:wis1Lt!buse.foree, it.was .ab-'lclutely. essential that the parties should accept the treaty and the most simple way to achieve that was. for them to negotiate·it themselves.n 128. The United. Kingdom representative said 10 that his delegation "would support any proposalleading to the negotiation'Of an agreement between the parties but would oppose any amendment which would tie the hands of the negotiators even before the negotiations begro.t". 129. The United States representative said: 11 "The Cornmittee would agree that there \Vas no substitu'èe)in the regulation of international differences, for direct negotiation between. the. parties.') 130. Referring to a statement by MI'. John Foster Dulles, hewent on to saythat u ••• the primary respon~ sibilit), devolved upon the parties directly concerned, since the General Assembly did not have the power to command them or to lay upon them precise injunctions. 131. The United States representative conc1uded: 12 '''Ve belie\l'e that. direct negotiations should be .. direct and unconditiona1, that the parties on the one band and on· the other should enter into these direct negotiations uncontrolled by any prior assertion or prior condition, that it should he a free and open negotiati6n:' . . 132. . The Danish representative, amongst· the eight ctluntries sponsoringa resolution for a direct settlement) slbid.. .Seventh Session, Ad Hoc Politiéal Committee; 29th,meeting•. 9lJ;ù4 34th meeting~ lOlbid.• 33rd meeting. 11Fbid., 2&th meêting. 1%IfJid., Plenary Meetings, 406th meeting; 136. These declarations, made but ten months ago by governments now represented on the Security Couneil, are fully refiected in the jurisprudence of the Security Coundl itself. The Security CoUhcil has never assembled to discuss any_phase of the security situation in the Near East without drawing urgent attention to the obligation' of the parties under the Armistice Agreements to proceed to permanent peace. This objective was stated by the Security Couneil as early as in its resolution of 16 November 1948 [S/1080]. It was repeated in the resolution of 11 August 1949 [S/1376]. 137. On 17 November 1950 [S/1907], the Security Couneil urged the parties to extend the scope of the armistice negotiations and to achieve agreement on the final settlement of aU outstanding questions. 1t especial1y reminded Egypt, Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan "that the Armistice Agreements ta which they are parties contemplate 'the return of permanent peace in Palestine', and, therefore,urged them ami the other States in the, area to take aU such steps as will lead' to the settlément of the issues between them". 138. In its resolution of 18 May 1951, [S/2157], the Security'Council, with mounting anxiety, expressed its concern at the faiture of the Governments of Isrâel and Syria. to achieve progresspursuant to their commitmentsunder the Armistice Agreementstopromote the r~turn to permanent peace to Palestine, and further dlrected the Chief of Staff, of the Truce .Supervision Organizationto take the necessary steps to give effect ~8 I~!d., Ad, Hoc !:plitical Committee,31st meeting. 4]liJd., 30th meeting: 15Ibid., ,33rd 'meêtîng. 16 Ibid., Si~th' Session, Ad Hoc PoliticalCommittee, 36th meeting. ' 36ème 35 t'The fourteenth paragraph of the resolution now before the Couilcil reminds the parties of their obligations to promote the return of permanent peace to Palestine, and we hope that members of the Council, by giving their emphatic approval to this, will show the two Governments how earnestly the United Nations hopes that progress can now be made towards the completion of final peace treaties between Israel and the neighbouring Arabstates." That was the mood sorne three years ago. At the same meeting Mr. Lacoste of France said: "An armistice is, by definition, a. prov.isional and transitory arrangement: an arrangement at once too rigid and too vague" - 1 think that that is a very brilliant formulation- 'tin which it is difficult to live. No one who is familiar with Palestine affairs will, 1 think, dispute the fact that this provisional arrangement has already lasted too long" - in 1951, this arrangement had lasted toC' long - "This, undoubtedly, is tlie root cause of the evil, and aU States sincerely interest~d in peace in the Middle East ought not only to desire, but to hasten by every means within their power a final stabilization of relations between the State of Israehmdits neighbours." 139. On 1 September 1951 [558th meetmg], in the historic discussion .on belligerency and blockade, the Security Counci1 firmly rejected aU concepts..)f continued belligerency and reminded the parties of their obligationto proceed to permanent peace. ·140. To aU this the Arab representatives have reacted with vehemence, as though the very concept of a<peace settlement was hostile to the Arab interest. Their d9ctrine that a peace setHement would have to be bound by prior conditions, inc1uding especially .the United Nations proposaIs which the Arab States had violently rejected in the past, was dismissed by the General Assembly at the seventh session 17 whenput to the test of a vote. üm there be.any doubt that it is the elear will of the international community that the normal processes, of peaceful relationships which.apply over most of the world, even in areas of greatest tension, should now l;>e instituted in the relationship between Israel and the Arab States? 141. It seems to us ofthe utmostimportance that the Security Council. ~hould make >ifs position c1ear on this issue. The pat.:c:i,··rtension under discussion is nothing but the tragic<tesult of an abnormalsystem of relationships whichfails far short of peace. The Se,,:urity Council would be faithful to absolute'truth, to its own.functions, to its collective opinion in the past, and-to-the ideals .which nearlyaU its membersha1(e" recently stated .l'l-Jbitl:, Seventh Session, Plenar:v Meetings,406th m~tin~. 142. The situation in the Middle East, grave as it is, would suffer' still further deterioration if there were !J1"ounds for believing that the highest organ of inter- ~ational security was inhibited, not merely from acting on behalf of peace, but now even from asserting its own views in obedience to its conscience and to the high respousibility which it bears for international security. There is no such thing as security without peace, and in our Charter these concepts are never divided. If this Couneil wants security, it must enunciate the need for peace. The limits of its own powers, and the sovereignty of the States concerned, preclude the Council from dictating a peace settlement in specific terms; but the c1ear enunciation of the need for a peace settlement, in tones of greater urgency than those which the Security Couneil has used in the past, is the minimal duty which the Security Council owes ta the destiny of the Mi4dle East and to the memory of those who have falleu on bath sides as a direct consequence of the absence'of peace. 143. While it would be wrong ta promise that a calI for peace by the Security Council wauld im..,lediately improve the situ:r:ion, the absence of such a caU would assuredly have ~he gravest repercussions. For it would indicate that the Security Council itself no longer wishes ta see ftilfi.lled the main purpose of the Armistice Agreements, namely, an urgent transition to permanent peace settlements. This is no time to lose faith in that vision, remote as it may seem from immediate attainment. There are two alternatives at the best: the present siege and tension or a negotiated peace settlement. Can the Security Council be netitral or impartial between these twoconcepts? . 144. While our main objective is pr()gress by negotiation towards permanent peace, it is urgently necessary in the meantime toimprove the current operation of the Israel-]ordan Armistice Agreement., " i45. 1)1e Government of Israel has repeatedly dedared its willingtless to finda solution to the deteriorating security situation along the Israel-Jordan border, and for that purpose has e.xpressed willingness on ~everal occasions. ta enter into discussions with representatives of the Jordan Government. These proposaIs have been made because the established channels of contact and procedure have not proved effective or sufficient in the light of the growing,complexity of the situation. 146. ,It is clear fromthe debate intheSecurity Council that other governments alsû deem the existing situation highly' unsatisfactory. 147.' Consequent1y, the, Governm~nt of Israel proposes that senior political and Ill,H!tary representatives' of Israel and Jordan should meet at United Nations Headquarters without. delay to, discuss armistice problems, and especially the prevetiti0n of border incidents an~ th.e.co-operationof t.lte respective authoritiesin mamtammg border security. 149. r wish in conclusion tb summarize our main contentions and our proposaIs for Security Council action: 150. The tensions on Israel's frontiers are due to an unexampled policy of political, economÏrc and military siege, conducted by the vast' and populous Arab ,States against a neighbouring country whose destruction they have once attempted and still pursue. 151. The military phase of this hostility is represented by the pressure' of murderous incursions from Jordan directed against Israel's coastal plain and Jerusalem sector. 152. Israel's small area and adverse geographical conditions render its security problem extremely acute especially in the general context of Arab hostility. On . the other hand, no such threat to their total security is incurred by Arab States with their hinterlands remote from the frontier ·zone. Israel sustains this $avage siege with general restraint but with growingand justified resentment. In these circumstances moral weight cannat he attached to one-sided'criticisms of violence which ignore the aggressions wh~reby hundreds of Israelis have b~en killed and maimed. If anything, the weight of responsibility lies on those who insist, on maintaining hostile policies of which all frontier tensions are the inevitable result. 153. The attacks on Israel's ,life, property and communications under, cover of Armistice Agreements are purposeful and deliberate. They have unfortunately led to counter actions, sorne of,which, such as the Qibya incidetlt, cause a loss of innocent life which Israel deeply regrets and u\1reservedly deplores. 154..The continuation of incursions is bound to cause constant deterioration of frontiersecurity, since Israel cannot suffer the constatlt murder of its citizens. The solution lies, in the first place, in the conclusion of permanentpeace agreements which would eliminate these tensions at their source. 155. Until such time as ~is objective is achieved, the mosturgent need, is for the observance by Jordan of article IV, paragraph 3,Which has been virtually inoperative and for which General Glubb has disclaimed his due responsibility.This involves the asst1Inptiotl by Jordan of active responsibility on the pa.rt ofits regular military forces for guarding its frontiers from within, especially in areas where refugees are concentrated; Syria'and Lebanon do exercise ~uch control on frontiers no longer than the main centre of Jordan-Israel tension. This control would save life and avoid tension and confliet affecting both Jordanians and Israelis. Unless tms frontier is broughtunder such direct military control and responsibility '. with the mm ofpreventing illegal CTOSSingS of the frontier, allother subsidiary expedients, 156. The Armistice Agreements have been inoperative for four vears in two further vital respects. Article VIII of the Israel-Jordan Armistice Agreement referring to Mount Scopus is denied implementation by Jordan. Blockade practices at the Suez Canal continue despite the Armistice Agreement and the Security Council resolution of 1 September 1951 [S/2322]. In addition, Israel's efforts to achieve local improvements, especially by emphasizing the presence of the armistice frontier, have been rebuffed. 157. The Armistice Agreements, envisaged as provislonal arrangements, have existed tao long and, in General Bennike's words, have lost their effectiveness. Theîr main purpose of effecting a swift transition ta permanent peace is unilateraUy repudiated by .Arab signatories. The absence of any normal or positive relations, political or economic or cultural, between Israel and its neighbours, together with.Arab opposition to regional co-operation in any fotm, is hound to expedite the further decline of security. This is the only area of the world in which governments refuse as a matter of principle to seek agreements \Vith a neighbouring State. The Security Council has an established policy of strongly and urgently requiring the transition to permanent peace as required by the Armistice Agreements themselves. It is also the policy of the Council so far - and l hope it will always be - to advocate the complete, and not the partial and selective observance, of the Armistice Agreements. 158. The Israel-Jordan Armistice Agreement is in a specially imperfect condition, .. and for that reason. my Government has suggested the consultations to which l have just referred. The preamble and article XII, calling for a transition to· peace, are repudiâted by Jordan. The second most important· element of the agreement, the respect for th~.demarcation Hne, is also repudiated in effect by Jordan, as is shawn by the amazing fact that there have beensome 5,000 unauthorized crossings within a pcriod of two years. There could hardIy have been any more if the armietice line had never existed. This meaus that article IV,I paragraph 3 establishing'the armistice line as a civilian fr~tier is n~w set asi~e. Article VIII, affecting the po!nts of partlcular tenslOn on Mount Scopus, does not e:elS~ as Jordan refuses to recognize it. Article l, forbldd11lg the threat or use of force, has been viola,ted by hundreds of armed incursions and verbal threats. This" m~ns that there is scarcely any essential elemént of thlS Armistice Agreement which Jordan actively e:cecutes. For an Armistice Agreement without a transitto~ to peace as in the preambIe and article XII, without article V~II, without article IV, paragraph 3, forbidding the 'crossmg of the frontierthis is not the Armistice ~greement which we signed at Rhodes in 1949. To this kind o~ travesty we shouldnot resign ourselves. If we must ltve for any time within the Armistice, then let these provisions be fully restored. Israel is willing to ppt;;rate the Israel-Jordan Armistice Agreement - but tnItS full and.complete integrity. 159. Accordingly, we believe that the Security Council should take the foIlowing measures : 160. First, the tension should be diagnosed in truthful terms as a threat to security arising from the absence of peaceful relations between Israel and the Arab States. To this primary cause, the Security Council should justly ascribethe whole sequence of violence which has come to its notice; and it should remind the parties of their duty under the Charter to harmonize their efforts for the establishment of peaœ. 161. Secondly, attention should be drawn to the fact that the main objectiv.e of the Armistice Agreements, namely, the transition to permanent peace, has not been complied with, and that tl:e fulfilment of this armistice provision has a clear priority and urgency over all other subsidiary provisions which, however, should still be maintained. 162. Thirdly, attention should be drawn ta the fact that the Security Council's own past resolutions on peace and security; including especially the resolution on blockade and be1ligerency adopted on 1 September 1951, have not been implemented. The Council should also refer to the absencé of any effort to .implement article VIII of the Israel-Jordan General Armistice Agreement, notwithstanding the text of that agreement itself, and of the Security Council's injunction of 17 November 1950.. 163. Fourthly, We suggest that the Security Council could take note of the only conclusion agreed ta by Israel and Arab authorities, and indicated very clearly hl qeneral Bennike's report, namely, that the mûst specifie source of current tension is marauding, infiltrationinto Israel territory, especially from the. Hashemite Kingd011l of the Jordan. In expressing its deep concent at allacts of violence which have been committed, the Security Council would surely be entitled to express special concern about that movement of infiltration whicll is the source of the original bloodshed and of reactions which, as I have said, have sometirrJes gonebeyond aIl due and proper limits and which are regre~ble and deplorable in thenlselves. But it should urge special attention ta article IV, paragraph 3, requiring the restraint of illegal border crossings. If article IV, paragraph 3, were implemented there would he a quiet frontier. 164. Fifthly,· the Chief of Staff and the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commissions should be asked to 1 pUt·sue their high objectives for international peace in assistingthe operation of the Armistice Agreements, but the CounciJ, I think, could appropriately request the United Nations representatives in our area ta dèvote their special attention to those provisions·of the Armistice Agreements and Security CounciJ resolutions which have 'not yet been implemented,and especially the provisions for a transition to permanent peace. 167. Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon) : 1 have listened as rnuch as l could to this book that has been put into our hands. Of. course, it is a1ways a pleasure tohear the representative of Israel. However, l, confess that 1 gleaned from him; for the most part, more English oratory than any fundamental edification or any information relevant ta our discussion. 168. He began tl-Js volume byannouneing quite frankly and quite boldly - heis always emboldened ta <li'111ounce what he pleases here and elsewhere, and npbody checks him - in the fust sentence 'chat he was not talking about the item on the agenda, but about peace and security in the Middle East. 1 was at that moment tempted ta rise ta a point of order and caIl'the attention of the Council ta the fact that that was not the item that we had' adopted at the beginning of the meeting, because every time we come ta a meeting the President asks if there is any objection to the adoption of the .agenda which is before us; then we look at it and if there is no objection it is adopted. If 1 may read out today's agenda to the Couneil, it states: "The Palestine question "Compliance with and enforcement of the General Armistice A~:r;eements,. with special reference to recent acts ot violence, andin particular to the incident.at Qibya on 14-15 October 1953: rèport by the e:me~ of Staff of the. Truce Supervision OrgamzatlOn." 169.. It ~ouldbean interesting exercise in sophomoric exammation to place Mr.•Eba,n's document in the hands of a student and ask himhow much material relevant ta the.specific item before us it contains. r do not doubt that sorne.of it is relevant; but there is. no question but that a dehberate attempt was made ta drown the basic reason for·. our meeting in a flood of words, which is undoubtedly interesting in itself but which is not in keeping with th~ a~enda before us. 171. This always happens with respect to Palestine. 1 have a list of some forty incidènts 'like this, froni the beginning of the United Nations, in connexion with the Palestine question, incidents which happer-ed either. with the Secretariat or with the regular delegations who are accredited to the United Nations. The ordinary rulesof objective debate and discussion break down when it comes ti:> Palestine. There is some reasan behind that. They do break down, and aIl of us know it. One can hardly c~unt on'rules working objectively all the time. Something must turn up to upset them and l regret'that. 1 happen to be a studentof both philosophy and theology and l, try to ascribe a great deal of this not to politics but to something much deeper than politics, into which 1 need not enter. 172. We have been treated this afternoon to a dissertation 011 Israel, past, present and future. 1 shaIlread if with great care, 1 assure the representative of Israel. That is exactly what 1 am going to do. 1 shall read if; l shall mark it; 1 shan UJ.ï.derline it and probably, 1 shall answer it with a treatise of some 250 pages. l do not know how long it will be. 173. But suppose 1 had prepared a treatise on the Arab world,' past, present and future. Suppose l had indulged myself in the very enticing luxury - l wguld not caIl it a luxury, but for you it would be a luxuryin the very enticing temptation of speaking about the situation in Palestine prior to 1947, and about how these inhabitants had been living there literaIly for tb.ousands of years. The representative of Israel ta1ked about two yeaK'S, three years, four years, five years, ;l11d. then in speaking of the history of bis nation ~ l'mean of the JewisJ,l people, whom l hold in thehighest esteem - he 'spoke about thousands of years. But suppose 1 caine here and described to you, for hours, how these people have been living in Palestine since Adam, and how in 1917 certain events happened which were bolsterf~d by certain othe!" events,until we come to 1947, andiilso the great massacres, the great atrocities and the gre:ât international conspiracies that had taken place durin~t these years. 174. ObvijJusly 1 can ta1k for about fifty hours and it will allbe t'elevant to the situation. But of course 1 do ',lot want tp abuse thetime of the members of the Security C(~unciI \Vith such irrelevancies. 1 paid special attenilon, i11( the statement of the representative ofIsrael, to his Iangu\age. It will be an especially fascinating task for me, an4 1 promise the representative of Isra~l to discharge i1',.to the full, to cull from hisdissertation (luch phrases and; turns of language, which objectively describe and tlefitiêhis spirit. 1 will then leave it to the Cou~cil to jttdge whether this sort of spirit - which aIl of you gentl~men around this table have for the last thirty years ;helped bring to us in the Near East - is in itself going to create any peace in that area for the indefinite future. It will be an especially interesting task 175. The representative of Israel told us the other day that he was going to speak with moderation. 1 have before me his language in the verbatim records of the Security Council. He said that he was going to speak this time with moderation. l do not know whether you would caU what you heard "moderation". but again it will bemy task td show40w immoderate he was and ho"w,unfortunately, he has not been more successful in this attempt to induce what he is craving for sincerely, 1 hope- 1 have no doubt that it is sincer.ely - name1y, peace in the Near East. 1 will show that he has been most unsuccessful in inducing that peaceful reaction that he says he wante brought about in the Near East. No, Mr. Eban, this is not the way to live in peace with the rest of the Near East Certainly this is not the language to be usai to induce any sort of· reaction of a peaceful nature from our part of the world. 176. 1 will give one example. In Mr. Eban's statement [para. 64 above] we find the followingsentence: "We are besieged, we are blockaded, abused, threatened, encircled, ambushed, harried. and subjected to murderous onslaught at every turn." 177. 1 assure you that 1 pray for peace day and night. In fact, one of many prayers is always a prayer for peace. But 1 tell Mr. Eban that this is not the way to peace at aH. This false pleading is not the way to peace. It maybring a temporary 'but very cheap victory. I should not say "very cheap" because he has been succeeding in the past and gaaning victories, especially in the Press. But this is not the way to treat this situation in our part of the world. Yau have been pleading and moaning and calling the rest of the world ta come to your resCUe in a very oheap and false manner. 1!8. 1 wish to.calI the attention of the Security CouncIl to a very strange-circumstance upon which Ithink , nous . Cette seil France, vernemeat question me w~ ought to reflect. As 1 said,'we have been meeting for a Iew weeks now and at every meeting we have adopted an ag~nda. T~is item was put on the agenda of the Secunty CouncIl at the behest of the Governmentof France, the Government of the United States, and the ~overnment of the United Kingdom. Then, immedlat~1y upon its being put on the agenda,.if I remember correctly, the representative of Israel himself was moved by what he caHed wrath - righteous .wrath. 1 shall cuU aU these phrases and 1 shaH make a goad collection of them for future reference. He was moved at once to place hi~ own item on the agenda. Then, obvioïlsly, we put our Item on the agenda. Of course he withdrew his. !le did it in a roundabout way and said "1 do not want It to be a separate item" and it did not becomea separate item; and then we didthe same ourselves. We had our first meeting an4 everybody was amcious to caU General .BenniRe frord Palestine. \ a~u colère, expressions éilquestion- à notre tiré a tincte"; distincte, semblable: tout néral 180. Now, some of us were not sa quick-witted as Mr. Eban: we said ~hat we preferred ta. reflect before putting questions ta General Bennike. In a moment, sballdemonstrate totheCotll1.cil justllow much Mr. Eban's:' quick wit has costus - tut that is another matter; in fa~\ it will he the:nost impmant part of my statement this aftemoon. 181. 0 At any rate,·wecarefulo/J prepared·our, questions. l t1:rlnl~.that, in a11, about fifty or sixty questions were asked. Gene~al Bennikeanswere<i them~ and at the 635:tho meeting we ci.ecided that those answers .shouldhe ànnexed ta the verbatim record of the meeting. 1'8? Durirfg a11 our meetings on this subject:"'- and 'o. thôse meetings were.held in arder that General Bennik~ .,could come from Palestine and give us an objective report.'on the..situationthe only statement which went in:t()~the •substance of the. Gen~~rCjreport was that delivèredbY"Sir.Gladwyn Jel'p1~$ ,~meeting]..Ail of us~eptsilenton the substance ---:- anèl.even Sir Gladwyn J~çl.>:tbu;ch.ed. upon tlie substance, orny in a minor way; ~.statemeùt represented. 'as it wer~., anextemal skir.,. ~h~a' h~ried approach; it <1id not place before the Coun~aIl of the substance oUhe repo;t. 183': Atld towhat are we treatedtoday~TheCoiincil h~s .beforeitaco~plaintagainst' Israel, but Wy. have Iil1lQ~le(i,Israel---the party against whom t1(t~.complaint îsmade. Trepea:l"",~t{)cpresentits case before theCoun- çill;1aS,been fully, substantive'ly. and 101"1'1Wly seized vf. the uattireof the çomplaint. Thatis another one of those ";" iu'e~ritiéS \Vhkh~ alw~ys o~r in connexion wi~ ~,' ~-.a')tineF"-.and. Israel, 1il~pamcula~,' The accused .15, .aIréwed .to Ûlake. bis statement, before the fulf-fledged t~ ()!, H bs..tanee. of fIje aceusationis reallycom:id- .~f~~Mf;i,,< 'r ~y' theoCouncil. I~ .anyone.ca11s·that a' '.' j', .~QJ'In~J,â#!lt:'egtJ1aJ;pf()Ççdurefor Jnternationalgather-, ,~~i;lh~J.gUl ()l1lysay that 1 do nDt un<ierst~d .the ;.mearilir'ofW'ords~'· ' ,"', er}r:'~::'(:':··--~f!~:'"(,. "(. " ,,_ ,", . ~~8$j I)vish totellthe .Security ,coullcit,. in aIl sim- '0" ~,·'p:Uci.:tjfj:t!latthere,:wil1neverbe peacr, in the Near East ,j "'; ~i~'ço'trse,tliere mayhe s(une who enjoythe spectaûe ':?';"~-'~:~~~4~tt~y~mplettMms~~e ..of.'J>.eace..jrio-"the..R~a,r.E~t ..·_ .••._§() .' ...~@~g"rais~cli jrrêgù}arities.atld;4is~nation,. pro- "" <;eP:p.17;41Y$peaking, i~ tlûs highèstinternational council 5> ,~.a~e;~g~ndbned.';F'()rj:hedirstprereqtAsiteof1?eacein the ';i!S!~~t>Eastj~ta instir III the~eartsofthepe-yple ron-' ";;c'~~ed som,e senseofconfidenceÎ11 thejustice;' objecti- •..... oo',~~dabst1l~tei1l1Eartiality oNheinternationaLQrgans {,;,o~",,·!":tii1*~l'i:iÇhthey belop.g.Ap.dI m~stsay{in a11 fran1mess '~O~:f" 'J~pI~jillthe A,ràlj wodd d();not>belieyethatj1.lstiœ, ,0,< '" "ftj(a;t1claD§olute h,Llpartlalityexist. $vety day ;/téc~Jve,,?ewi~yidencet05,,st.lpriOrt their 'attitude.. ,;I,-: ,<, 8,"",' 'U.') , /i,':M.T.'"~ban'sst~fêjnJ~~;C1esenrescdn-'; .,. _.dci,'fsh~1tgi~e-'~t,that studYJa~r . conspiré J86. That was a passing 'i-emark on the authenticity aml.truthfulness of this map which Ml'. Eban has placed before us. 187. My. second remark on Mr.Eban's observations is this: 188.. Obviously, the first six orseven pages of Mr. Eban's statement have notrung to do withthe subject. They contain a tale of woe, they give the historica1 background. As Ihave said,.I cO'lld also iùdulge in such r~arksconcerning the,Arab world, and 1 could keep thlS Cound! entranced with stories of' occurrences in Palestine immediately. before Israel's.advent.. ~1~9:~-Wu7~7Eban came to /the su'bjectbefore us, .He talked about It at length. He saiâthatIsrael·had been attacked ;" he. s~id thatt4er~ wereçonspiracies' against ISf<ae!; he séUdthat people had stat,ç:.1 iliis and thatapout the sItuation. But when he cameto facts it turne<! out tha~,those people. who, he said,had b~{lnconspiring agamst Israel had notaIl:tackedbraeL Thefactsare as 1. sh~llprove inamoment,that all the attacksof ~ny slgmficance have come from Israel rather thanfrom the ~ol!ntri~s surroundi~g Israel. Mr. Eban also spoke of , M"R§~trations and the.threflts.to Israel's life. But :when he + . <l'l~lvedat the point ofteallyspecifyingwhat hehadin ~ll1.d, JJtz5poke"of penetrations into bis country for .the g~kè'C'of 11lega~cultivation__ or heattributed tb.ewhole SItuation ~n ·that ~€1s;pect t(}-~irregularities in the/'troï1tiers. 190.. Ymtwant to know the tru~h, Ml'. President; the Coundl',V'ants to know the truth; and I will state the truth bluntly. l will stateit asbluntly as l know how, but also politely, because it is possible to do both. And 1 hope that when one i5 blunt and polite one does not .' offend anyone's susceptibilities. At any rate, the real . truth behind aU this situation is that for sorne reasona reason that l cannot fathom for the moment but'whioh will certainly disclose itself with the passage of days and months befor~ us, and a reason which t.he Security Councilmust take care ta watôh ---: Israel is l'estive. There seem to betwoaims of that restiveness, and I hope that everyone will near them. 191. The urst aimis to liq1.Iidate Jordan. I.say that, and l turn to my friends from, Jordan 50 that they may hè~lt.The first aim is to liqt,iâate Jordan, and I.shaH prove thatto the Couneil when l speak next time. l shall prove it by quotations from statements made bytheir C'--, ._.m",!! officiaIs. and bytheii own Government. The real ~-'~-'aimcis-ta do'away '\Vith the Jôrdanian frontier and to enlarge present-day Israel to what they caU Eretz ~srael-the original Israel which extended from the Euphrates to the Nile. Their real aim in the present situation is to bring about an 'Unfreezing of the situation ~n,the l\;fiddle East sa that they can set about freezing ,1t,t,n thetr own wayand for their ownadvantage.. /192. The second aim, which l shan also demonstrate :when T come ta deal with these things at le~gth: is the '~n~ation of Jerusalem.· . '. ~ 1~3. Thus, there are these two aims behind the present .problem. There.may be other aims concerning Lebanon,. hutI am not talki~g about that now. The immédiate aimsare, as •l have .said. the liquipation.of Jordan and the annexation of Jerusalern. Ia~saying this in, public so,that everyonewill hear it. ~hopethat l may he ptovèd wI;ong in thefuture. l ho,pe thatthe very tense situa,tio~ which the General ta~s aboutin regard to Jerusalem will not lead toacts foi whidl,jm.the long iun~I atn. surethat :rsrael would be,sorry. But l holdl and be1ieve that the aim"f aIl this-disturhanceis to. ])ring~bouta.finalliq'llidation of Jor(:1an a,ncl. a de~nite 'inn6cationi~fthe.o!~,city of JerJ-l~além.· 194." Itwill'bemy-tasklater on, when Ih~i"~ had time tQ~ne tuis disquisition. ta .point oùt all.thernisrepr~sentatiqhl;,. aU the falsehoods, a:ll the irrelevancies~ous and'all. thehalf-truthswith which, this document abounds...I#shaJl alsocstrêss ând underline Mr. Eban's subtle, 'ofhumour, which at timesa,ppealsl:o ~ .butwhi . atothertimes israther crude,..,..ascl:'..se;zo'f ·196.. l hadreally thought and hoped that Mr. Eban-'-"- after aIlthat has happened and after 'the appeal or suggestion that was made almost directly to him hy the representative of the United Kingdom - would come here and say a little more a:bout Qibya in a less 1bold and ~~Ji-assured manner. But if representat.ives read his statêment they, yom find that in twoor three places'he says that he deeply regrets the events which took place '~t Qibyaand ,that he has been asked by his Government to exPress his regret to us. But if onethen reads his six proposaIs at the end of his statement one finds no mentionof Qibya. 1t is drowned in this whole mass of itrelevancy and rhetoric and a general desire toimpose ttponus the peace of Israel. ~DT{},=tne.lsra..Ëll~ .can, go. about ·theÎ1: own plans un- In?lested, with a-Coolplete"Sense.Qfiwpunity. 1 say thesela thmgs, and. the Arab. world must Qe warned of them. l.~. Ido hope t1~at the Presidentan1the representatlvlls of the United States and the United Kingd01n, who placed this item before us at the outset, will confer with their Gov~nmentSccg":'cas to rid me of this illusion - whichmay be! an illusion __ oratleast conYince me ofthe ;non~e~stence of the possibility~lJrwhiulrlllfil-,gp·'ea.Rlng;'~vaincrt;4~ ,. namely,that.thewhole thing'hasbeenspeeiaUyprepared r that we should meet here and 'SO that the At:abs·should afr~d that L might, but before thîs matter is finished, every single shred of meaning, significance, and reality in these answers .and in the report of the General as well as in the accusations they contain will be brought te light hefore the Council. To prove a few of nly points l "vish torefer to the questiqns which :the representative of Israel himse1f asked of General Bennike. At the 635th meeting - to confess to the Council what 1 had in mind but <lid not dol was going to say to the Council, "1 forgo all right to have my questions and the answers to them read out, but 1 am sure.that the) . representative of Israel will want us to have his own questions and answers read out". 2OO.It happens that he asked sixteen questions [635th meeting, annex, se~tion VI], and I am sure every one" d us has read them with great interest. But 1 dahu that never in the annals of the United Nations has a representative been less. fortunilte, less successful, more confused in his own presentation of his own questions than . wasthe representative of Israel. Something must have . gone. wrong. 1 am· completely at a loss tel undetstand what reaUyhappened, but it is rematkable that every single otte of the sixteen questions,without exception, is· turned against .the. representative· of .Israe1. It could not he a coincidence. Either the Israel authorlties are in such a state of.confusionthat their right harid does not . know what their left hand is doing, orand this is the more likely ~planation'-the tepresentative.of Israel takesthis whole affair so lightly, is 50 bold with the Cotincil andwith the United Nations, that he feels he can ~skany question he likes becausehe Isnot afraicL of.fue answer and because, when the answer ..comes, ways and means· wiUbe foun,d of shelving itor of nat bringing it to thelight of day. 201. .. I~han caU the attention of the Council,to only a. few .of. his. questions. at thistimebecause l mustleave something'Of interest to tell theCbWldlon future occa- .sions.My daim is that the representative of ISI,'ael asked -"stxt~nquestions everysingle one of whichi has be~n turned agains~ mm, :.and ·,that .ihis ·is the,strangest phenonienonin .thea.nnals of the United Nations ~ When a. represetitative •.asks questions. to eluddate ms 9wn·.point of view and the 'result .is. this sort of·rout in which ~the.represe.!ltative of Israel finds himse1f. 202. 1 sha11 begill with Mr. Eban's sccc:md quesponuot Jhat hisfirst is' not intèresting.but 1 am ke~ping 'hlat for ânother'9ccasion. The iollowing is his second question: ,\,..~"The .report ... undet discussion 'by. the Security y>uncil refers to the. period sinçe,~hebegi11-ningof.the year, whkh l wouldunderstand to~elrom1 Janu~ry 203. l ask ~he Council: when you hear a representa- 'tive putting such a questionl what do you ~pect? You expect, of coursel that he is asking for information which will prove thatl prior to the Falameh-Rantis incident, things had happened on the Arab side which so aggravated the situation as ta force the Israelis to retaliate by what happened at Falameh-Rantis. ObviouslYl he wouldnat 'he asking 9. question in arder to incriminate himself through the answer that wO'llld be given. Obviously, he must have had some information which would cause him to ask the Chief of Staff ta bring forlh all the preceding incidents which, 1ed ta the Falameh-Rantis disaster. Here i5 the answèr given by General BeIUiike : I~During the period betweel1 1 January and 28 January 1953, ten {:omplaints were submitted by Jordan and six complaints by Israel. In May 19531> - that is to 5aYl five months after these events -'- "Israel submitted eight more complaints, concerning infiltration that had a.llegedly taken place during January. l have listed aU the complaints in a separate memorandum which l shan transmit to the President of the ,Council with the request it beadded to the record of my answers as appendix IV. H 204. If we turn to appendix IV we nnd these cornplaints listedl and it will be observed that practically an the complaints by Israel concern {:fOssings of the demarcationline by a,n "infiltrator H -'in the singular - on 6, 9, 101 18, 19 and 27 January; whereasl most of the eomplaints by Jordan are of crossings of the demarcatioJ;lline hy Israeli armed uuits. Butthatis not the point l wanted ta taise in the answer to the briniant qu~stion put by the representative of Israel. The General goes on t<;. say: "1 would draw attention to the iricident listed as number 7under Jordan's complaÎi1t~'inthi~ appendîx, na.mely the complaint by Jordan thatl on 4 January" __the beginning ,of the series which Mr. Ebanwants us to look into more caref1,1.lly..,..... "three Isra,e]sO'ldiers and one civiliandriving instructor were found by a Jordan patroI'in the Latrun area. This case resulted .in the cancellation by Israel" -and this is the important point- "on 8 JanuàrY,of the agreement to reduce and solve incidents. Theprevious agreement on measu.res to .curb infiltration, which thereupon automatically went into effect, was also terminated by Israel. Thecancellation, of both theseagreements added ta therapidly deve10ping tension." 205. ,'The queition pùtb~ Mr. Eban leads,us to believe that General Bennike woul<i have revealed to us a series of .:ver.\ts leading fil? to the Falameh~Rantis incident, a senes,begun by J orâan, soprovocative in natu~e as to lead Israel toretaliate. We 1earn the oppos~e. We 206. ' In his first report, which l have read very carefully, Genera:! Bennike said: "This vehicle, with these three soldiers, was foune! strangely astray in Arab territory". He uses the word "strangely". It begins, theref.à..'e, to look - Iam not saying this is the last word about it -..,.on the face of it as if Israel provoked that incident precisely in order to lead to the Falameh- Rantis incident at the very end of the month. This is the first example of the way in which the representative of Israel put questions to General Bennike and of the General's answer. 207.' The PRESIDENT (translated from French): 1 should like to'point out to the representative of Lebanon that we have a1readyexceeded by half an hour the usua:1 daration oI our meepngs. May 1 ask mm if he intends to continue to engage our attention and interest for a long time, so that I may if necessary consult the Security CouncHabout what is a fairly unusuàl prolongation of our meeting? ' ,. 2Q8.Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): 1 can finish :', ,--what I still want to say before seven p.m. 1 am certain that the representâtives, at the Counciltable, as .'\Vell as the PresidenI, will not. prevent me irom completinginy statement. I sha.H notspeak later than seven p.m.

Then I call upon the representative of Lebanon to continue his statemer.t, subject to a "gentlemen's agreemene' betweetlus that we shal1 he able to cl6se the meeting byseven p.m.. 210. Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebatlon)': Iwish to assure the President that I have never 'broken a "gentlemen'sagree<nent" orany.other kind of agreement, 211. Now Ideal with another,example of the brilliant manner in which the representative of Israel has put bis questions to General Bennike. I refer to the thirdquestion put by the representative of.Israel, in wbich he stateck . "'My third question, refers to paragraph 4?gf/the report [63()th meeting] ,~in:whiçh it is stated triàt the élttack on the Israel 'village of Yahuêll)n 12-13 October which caused the death of two smal1 children " and their mothc~r may have provoked the attack on '.' Qibya. It is my' understanding' that the Mixed Ar- '\ ntistice Commission, in condemnirtg Jordan for., the latta&. defined th~t situation a.s. 'intoleralble aggres- ~ion·.. IW011dêrwhe:ther, 'inor4er to .clear ·1.1P this pizlint, .we-ecoùld sîmply have trànsmitted'to U$ thefuU. te~t of the resoltttion on Yahud?" Th~, ci~swen&ivenby General Bennike js as follows : , ."F{)l1owing i5 the full'text of the resolutio!1a.jlopted by ,th\ Isi'ael-Jordan Mixed.Arnlistice Commission concer~ng the Yahu4 incident: "par}). The deep armed Jordanian penetration îl1to c,J:sra(d to perpetrate the brutal attack on a house in Yàhud villag$\in th~ night of 12-13 October 1953, whichresulted"în .,fP.é' munier.of two. sma.l1 children and theirmot,her 1s i violation of,:. artic1eIII, pa.ragraphi"?, of tte General Armistice Agreement. ,.. "';:.. ·t:i"' 214. Let us turn nowto what happened with regard to the Qibya incident. This wiUgive an illustration of the contrast in spirit between the two countries.With regard to the Qibya incident, the investigation was complete and there was absolute evidence as to what had happened, as can be seen from General Bennike's account În his report. The.resolution that wasread to us by SirGladwyn Jebb [63Sth me"f'tingJPara. 44] in the Security Conncil was put tothe vote of the five representatives present, t'NO representatives ifrom .Israel, fwo from Jordan, .and,.of c'Ourse, thë'Chairman. Theresolution was adopted, with the Israeli delegation voting against. The Israel delegation arrogantly voted against the resolution regarding the Qibya incident, about which the evidence was unmistakable and the investigation ~on1P'leted. In the incident which immediately preceded it,. in which only two or three people were killed - a horrible matter - and about which the investigation was not compl~ted, the Jordanian delegation humbly· abstained ( .1 voting. 215. This is a simple illustration - I shall giveotht".1's - which pr'Oves the contrast, in the spirit and approach to these matters, 'between Israel and Jordan, in fact, between Israel and.all the Arab countries. l shaU read mor~ of these in the friture, with the permission of the PreSId~nt andwith the indU'lgence of ,the Cauneil, because It seetns to me it is most impOrtantthat the fuU substance and the fulUmpact of what Genera.l Bennike - whom we called before the Couneil especiallyforthe pU~se__ has .told; us tobe brought to '1ight before the Co~ncil. . . 216.. ~his .atternJ>t,by the representative of Israel to drown lt out and to put it aside and shelve itby talking aboutother irrelevant mattel'S should not prevent.us 216. pour traitant 217. The most surprising thing to me is that, in the statement by the. representative of Israel today, Qibya occupied such a minor pl~ce, while in bis suggestions at the end,thereis no mention of anycondemnation orany confession. of guÎ'lt by him or by his country about what actua1ly happened at Qibya. 21& The Securi.ty Counci1 called the United Nations Chief of Staff in Palestine to give it a full report .on the situation t.~2re with respect ta compliancewith, and enforcement of, the Ar1TI~sticeAgreements, with special reference ta recent acts ofviolence, and in particuIar to the Qibya incident. t,Two .documente; have 50 far been s~bmitted bythe Chief of Staff. The full import and significance, of these documents mustbe brought to the altention of the CounciI. T1}ey hilve not yet been brought ..tothe,attention.of the Coul!tcil.The.ver-dict that,emerg'es from thet11 isthat Israel has committed aggressioJ,1 and thatlsrae1.is·the chief -cause of unrest in the Near East. It will.be'my dut)" atasùbsequeht.meeting to bring out this verdîet and this impor.t. 219. When adequate consideration bas been givenJO the indubitable. facts, then the Council may findit eXpedient ·to .rpl>ke certain findings. And l shaU prove to the Counct! that 'tbere are about twentyor twenty-five basisproposîtions-,thatcan .be lllathema;tically proved aboutthe situation in the Near East~provednot from documents written by my Government orhy the Jordanian Government or by the.Israel Governm~t"but prove<!. f"Qm documents. written by the .agent .of"the Unite~~à.tions wbom we called [rom Palestineto i11- forro us about the situation. On the basis"'()fthese indubitable facts, which l,shall demonstrate mathel.natical:1y, l believe that the Council may find it expedient to make certain findings. 1t can ibe shawn- ànd l shal1 try to show it in detail-thatthe followingfindings are f,,~l1y ju~tified by these facts: 220. The first finding is that Israel ~lit&ryforces plannedand carried out l:l.11 attack on'Qibya, in Jordan, on 14-15 October 1953.. TlUs is a finding. Do not take my word for it. But the CouncH ought to tl>ke the word ofits own impartial agents. .' . 221. The second finding is that thÏs attack consfitutes an act of aggression against Jordan. Sir Gladwyn Jebb quoted that finding in the text of the resolution which the ·ë1elegation of Israel voted against. 222. , The third fiIiding is that this aot o~ aggression is not an isolated incident·but the cuhnination of a planned and calculaj.ed policy of violation of the General Arnustice. Agreements. carried out by the Israèl armed rorees. . 223. The fm.tith finding is that this policy and'this. act . ofaggressionhave dist]lrbed the peace in the Near "3:ast. 225. The sixthflnding is that the recUlerenceof such acts of aggression by Israel will certainly lead toa breach of the peàce in the Near East. 226. These six iindings, based on the twenty or twenty-flve indubitable propositions that l shall demonstrate to the CouncH, are findingsthat cannot he denied DY any rational human being. 227. Once these flndings are made ~ and that should he the first task of ,the Councilthen th~· Council may find it necessary to pronounce a condemnation. For it is obvious that this act of aggression, which we have now found, .has ·been committed is a violation (a) of·the cease-nre ordeted by the Security Council, (h)of the General Armistice·Agreements, (c) of the purposes and , ,principles of the Charter, and (d) of Israel's: obligations ullder the Charter. 228. But afinding and a condemnation are not enough. They must lead to action. And l am going to suggest the mi1dest form of action - because, when. l said last time thatI,wottld be very moderaote, I meant lyVh1it l said, and Icertainly can=controi my language "1hen l want to be moderate. Mr. Roban tald us that his statement today· was going tobe the quintessence of moderation, orsomething tothateffect. We haveheard hisÈtâtement. But now l am going to suggest lines of action thatseemto me tù be the minimum reqUired~in the circumstances - the mildest form of aétion - i l order to redress.justice andre-establish to sorne e..'Cten t.he sense of security in the Near East. . 229. The tnildest formof action is to mal~b certain requests. and deniands. 'Thus. the Council may. flnd it appropnate, l suggest, to ask Israel to do three things. Th~ fi~st.is to take aU the necessary measures· ta ·bring tOJustice the perpetrators of this act. We did not hear a word in Mr. Eban's statetnent about what'I might almest caU the heart-rending appeal which the repre- ?entative of the United Kingdom made to him concernmg thematter of hringing ta j ustiee the ol)l"..,~le who c~itted this act. Atanyrate, l repeat tU',n (,h~Coun-; CIl mtght find it necessary .to ask Israel te. '_';:e ,,11. the neces.sary measures to bông ta justice the pe.rpetrators of.thls act. The Council tuight also fllid it appropriate toask Israel to takeall the necessary measures to ensure adequ~te compensation. for loss of life and dama~e ta prf!pert~"~ansegbythis act. Aù(1 thep. theCoundl mlgh~ al~o,askIsra.elta refrain from suchacts of aggresslon III the future. 2$0. .The· Council· 1111ght also· make a ,igeneral "request ..~ tb/Jt no military. or .economie. assi,stance be given to 53' Isr~el without· proper guaranteesth~t Israel wilLr.eframfrom such acts, for it is obvious that whoever assists, Israel militarily or .economically while she pUrsues this poliey is indirect1y h,elping het to pursueit:·· 232. It would appear, then, that the structure of the Council's action on this item is fourfold: finding, condemning, asking and warning. 233. It can be shown that the four parts which 1 am suggesting for tbis structure, both on the grounds of the facts and from consideration of the deeper aspects of the situation, have two salient characteristics, First, they are completely justified by ·the facts, and, secondly' they are phrased in the mildest possible terms. 234. After this action is taken, then certaill'ly the Council has every right - and perhaps even the duty - togo into what must be done to strengthen 'bhe armistice machinery in the Near East. In that regard, the documents before us strbmitted by the agent of the United Nations, who understands the problem and .whose impartiality places him above' Israel andtlïe Arabs, gives us very conCl"ete suggestions. For instance, the harmornzation of the vJ.,,:,ious Arroistice Agreements, the strengthèning ofhisown core of observers, the strengthening of the local agreements, in which he seems to believe, certainly, much more than Mr. Eban does, as 1 shall show 1él:ter on. 235. 1 say that there is room, after this matter ia clearly and firmly' disposed of, there ls certainly rQom. for ,the. Council to aet on these other aspects of strengthening the armistice arrangements in the N~ar East. 236. 1 à.tn grateful to the President and to the Couneil for hearing me, on this matter in this exceedingly preliminary and hurried way. As 1 said, 1 reserve my right in the future ta talk at length and to comment .at length on someof the ideas which havebeen presented to us. by the distinguished representative of Israel and also to bring ta the light of day the full import, the total signifi,cance and the entire substance of what ,the Chief of Staff. qtJh~United Nations in, Palestine hasput before us. ' 237. 'Fh~ PRESIDENT (translated trom French): In agreement with the chief'of the French delegatiou, propose that the French interpretation of Mr. Malik's speech should be given at' the beginningof the next meeting. I also, propose thattl--'e. next meeting on tro.s stibject shouldbe heldon Wc Jsday 18 November, at 3 p.m, unless any 111emberof the Couneil objects. . ' :. 238. Mr. CROSTHWAITE (United !{ingdom) : My delegationis ra:ther concerned at the thought that the Couneil should not be able to have another meeting on this: subjectbefore 18 November. Since the French delegalion joined the United States de1egation and my own delegation in pufting it on the agenda, l need not re- .mind .you it, was ,put on as, an urgent matter..Is .it impossible ta arrange for a meeting earlier next week? fhought there was perhaps some possibility of arranging

l sha:lI follow the suggestion of the representative of Greece, and get in touch with Mr. van Langenhove, to see wherher arrangements can he made for a. meeting on Tuesday, 17 November. 242. Mr. Charles MALIK ·(Lebandn): It will be recalled thatat the last meeting, the Presidentsuggested that "fe might meet on Friday, 13 November, on the Syrian complaint and that it was at niy suggestion that he and the Council agreed to meet on Monday, 16 November. If he and the other sponsors of this item feel, as does the representative of the United Kingdom, that this is a matter of special urgeney, l am empowered· to tell the Couneil that the Syrian delegation will have no objection to its item being postponed so that we may devote the Monday meeting to the further consideration of thisitem. However, l must leave·thaï cbecision to. the President and to the Couneil. But l can certainly tell the Couneil that the Syrian ·d~legation has no objection ta its.item not being taken t1P an Monday, 16 November. ment la que que l'examen de Je En tion ne 243. The PRESIDENT (translated from French): 243.. I[ aIl members of thè-CotincrlagreewithMr.Malik's acceptent proposaI, we shall adopt it and ask him tu trètilSmit our M. thanks to the Syrian delegation for its courtesy in tran:sniettre granting our r.equests in advance. The next mœting on ... pourIaCQurtoisie ,the sul1ject dealtwith today, -therefore, will ·be held"on~·~afusi Monday,..16 November, at 3 p.m. le . question 244 MI'. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): l think it 244. wou1d he only right to give sorne indication to the glais) Syrian delegation as to the nexttime the Syrian corn;" gation plaint will be .discussed. sera examinée 245. The PRESIDENT (translated from French): 245. That is what 1 was going to do. 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