S/PV.639 Security Council

No decision ,vas in fact takenhecause there was no need for one - ta hear the representative of Israel tirst; but hefore the end of the last meeting he did ask ta h<l,ve his name put down as first speaker in reply ta Mr. Zeineddine, and until just now l bad not been informed that'any member of the Couneil wished to make use of his prerogative ta speak before mm. l cannot stop Mr. Malik, as a member of the Couneil, from using what is not in fact a rightbecause it is nowhere written in the roles - but bas become a custom. NevertheJE'ss l very much hope that he will emp!oy greated1~ '..:ction in the future in his use.of the privilege of 'Speaking ,before, after and even dunng the statements of the speakers most directly concemed in the matter. ' 7. Mr. Oiarles MALIK (Lebanon): Before l proceed with my statement, l wish ta state' that when the President spoke about the future, he obviously mu~t have had in llljnd some incid~t in the past wherein l used what he called a custom rather than a right. l do not remelllber ever ha~ng used it in the pasto Consequently, what be said about the future with. respect ta the discussions seems ta me ta be unfounded, at least as fa:' as my past behaviour is concerned. 8. Furthemlo.re, it is a fad; that, in the verbatim record that l have before me, there is nothing to show t.imt the representative of Israell was going to he the first speaker today, m: that he mentioned it ta the Cmmci1. He may have spoken to the President. in private - that is perfectly possible. Therefore, l am grateful to the President for allowing me to speak, and l assure him that there ,vas no need to ask me tQ use discretiou whether in the past, present or future. 9. The report of the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Troce Supervision Organization [S/3122], Ils well as the statements of the representatives of Syria and Israel, have providedthe Coundl with the facts and the differentviews on the case which was .brought by Syria to its attention. From a thorough and objective examination of the report and the statements, the following seven indubitable facts cal1. be established: 10. First, large-scale work was started in the demilitarized zone created by the Syrian-IsraeH Armistice Agreement. 1 This work was sponsored, supported and defended by one party to that Agreement, and the work was started and pursued not oilly without the approval of the other party but evenwithout prior consultation with it. n. Secondly, the work was started and prosecuted in the demiHtarized mne without a prior authorization 13. Fot.rthly, the work which was star~ed in the demilitarized 2:one will bring about a substantial modification 'of the geophysical features of the zone. The least .that could be said about this modification is what v,,'as reported on it by the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in his report [S/3122, atmex III] . "The construction of the projected canal would ... alter the flow [within the demilitarized zone] of the Jordan permanently and ... it would, in a11 likelihood, adversely affect, particularly during the dry season, the lif~ of the people depel1ding on the waters of the river. '.' The present canal project, the execution of which would rcsult in cOll'siderably lowering the waters of the Jordan, affects many . more Arabs" - the comparison here is to the Huleh project - "and many more acres of lands." In another part of the report rS/3122, anne.'\; I] the Cbief of Staff states that " ... the projected ('.anal and power station would sometimes leave the Jordan with very Httle, if any, water. JJ , 14. Fifthly, the work which was started in the demiHtarized zone has military consequences which are aU, according tû the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization who is our only objective and neutra.1, authority on this question, to the advantage of ore party to '/:he Agreement. 15. ·Sixthly, the work which 'was started ·in the zone will -hring "about, if continued, a ddinite integration of thé zone into the economic and hydro-electric, 'System of 'one bf the twoparties to the Armistice Agreement, an integration which Is neither stipulated in the Agreement nor permitted ,by it._.. 16. Seventhly, the work started in the demilitarized zone will'produce, in the demilitarized zone and elsewhere, a total change in the flow of the waters of an international river, the Jordan. 17. It is the contention of my delegation that these facts - which l be1ieve to be incontrovertiblc, and which no amount of oratory can possibly refuteconstitute in their negative aspect a violation of the Syrian-Israeli Armistice Agreement. They amount in their positive consequences to a radical alteration of the conditions in the demilitarized zone, an alteration which, a,ccording to the Armistice Agreement itself, should not take place without the mutual consent of the two parties'to the Agreement. Whether the party responsib1;e for these seven indubitable facts was cas~ and the canal project case. We think that the Chief of Staff, by po;.nting out these differences, has perfectly 1'JOO his rights and fulfilled his duties in confonnity with articles V and VII of the Armistice Agreement, rights and duties which were confinned in the resolutio~ of the Council on the Huleh case. However, it can he 1:oncluc;led from the findings of the Chief of Staff that the case that we are &~aling with goes beyond the mere supervision of the gradual restoration of normal eivilian life to the area of the demilitarized zone - a supervision·that the CHef of Stàff is obliged to assume according to article V, paragraph 5, of the Arnristiœ Agreement - in that the works started aiid contemplatedprejudk\Hhe ultimate settlecrent, .. a prejudice <:ompletely excluded ·by the ter:ns of artJcle V, paragraph 2, of the Armistice Agreement itself. It goes also beyond the.mer€ interpretation vf the articles of the Agreement; for it mises the Yery problem· of -the military objective of creating and maintaining the demilitar.zOO zone; it affe<:ts the question of sovereignty in the zone, and, therefore, it amounts toa unilateral alteration of sorne clauses of the Agreement. an roteration totally unpermitted without ·the consent of the two parties. 20.. Our second reason for going beyond the precedent of the Couneil in the Huleh cise, and for asking the .ço~cil now to go along with us~ is that· the decision of the Counci1· in the Huleh case proved ineffective. For l doubt - and 1 state this very conservatively - whether an objective inquiry into themanner in which Israel impl~ented that ~ecision wîl1 show that Israel implemented it faithfully. 21. Precedents can he argued for only if they worked; if they did not work, then obvîous1y one is justified in .departing from th~m~ However, whether.or not Israelimplemented the Huleh necision properly, it is clear fro;ffi, our presentexperience ~th the canal proje<:t that the foriner action of the Conncil did not prevent 2'2. These are the main reasons which led us to the formulation of the contention I have submitted to the attention of the Council. 1 have presented them in their broad outline; now 1 propose to deal '.'Jith t.lJ.em in furtner detail. 23. I sha11 start with the military aspect. The Chief of Staff dealt with it in unequivoca1 tenns in bis report to the Secretary-General (Sj3122, a.nnex 1] 1 beg the members of the Council to notice the language used by the Chief of Staff. He said: s "As regards the military aspect of the question, the Jorda.:."1, in its deep valley, i'5 a serious obstacle for any troops, particularly motorized t'roops, which would attempt to cross it. A party to the General Armistice f\greement which, by means of a canal, could control the flow of the Jordan in.the <Îe.-:-lilî- tarlzed zone, changing it or possibly even dryiL,,; 1t up af-will, could alter at will the value ta the other party of the demilitarized zone, whichhasheeu , 'defined with a view toward separating the armed forces of the two parties in such manner as to . minimize the possib;lity of friction and incident ... '." 24. According ta a statement given on behalf of Ml'. Bunche at the 54~~nd meeting of the Council: "The purpose of the demilitarized 2:one ... was to 'separate and to keep separated for the duration of the armistice the anned forces of the two parties, 'in order to eliminate as fully as possible friction and troublesome inc'idents between them. This was tobe, in effect, a so!'t of 'buffer zone' pending final peaceful settlement of the dispute." 25. Ml'. Bunche was the initiator of the idea of the (}emilitarized zone. His statement g:. ~ an authoritative confirmation of the value of the zone as a principal part of the system created by the Agref'ment. It must la:st for ~'the dumtion of the armistice" and until "a final peaceful settlement" is reached. Therefore, any alteration of themilitary value of the zone - and ~neral .B~nnikf' bas pr<?yed that such an alteration lG the certain resült of the 'Scheme proposed and unilateraUy begun à'or Israe1- amounts in effect to the • J . ., ., SUspensl011 of article V of the Annistice Agreement. But, under ra.:ticle VIII, paragraph 3, of the Armistice A-greement, tliese terms may not be suspended save by the mutual consent of thetw9 parties. ! 26. W~ come now to the relation of the canal project ro the recognized legal status of t.'le demilitarized zone and ,to its effects upon tltat statUs. The Council is certamly aware of.the developments, which 1~ to the 27. The !srae1is consider the demilitarized zone as a part of Israeli territory. Sovereigntyover it is or ought te he Israeli sovereignty. This was stated tirnes by Israeli officiais (;'Ïther here or .in Isne!. We refer in particular ta the· 'statement of the Acting Foreign Minister of Israel, reported· in the cablegram dated i2 April 1951 from the Acting Olief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization to the President of the Security Council, transmitting a reportcovering the period 11 and 12 April 1951 [SI2088]. The acting Foreign Minister of Israel stated that the Government of Israel considered that the demilitarized zOne "vas in Israel territory. 28. A repre!:ientative of Isr~el gave, at the 542nd meeting of the Security Council, the legal grounds for suchan I;Sr'aeli daim. Accordil'ig ta him, most of the temtf'Jry· of the demilitarized zone was giveu to Israel in the partition resolutiùn of the. general Assembly of 29 November 1947; 2 most of it was within the territory which \VaS proclaimed by the Israelis. on 14 May 1948 as heing Israeli territory; and he said that, latelr on it should be occupied.by Syrian forces during the military operations "... military Occup(l~ion itself Idid] not give rise to legal sovereignty". l have quùted the wQrds of the representative of Israel. 29, Therefore, according to the Israel rep":"~13entative, and l quote him again [542n4 meeting] : . . «.;. The theory t4at Israel's laws, civil jurisdiction or fr~om of development in' the demilitarired zone are inaheyance and may Jegitimately bechaUenged under the Armistice Agreement is contrarytathe estabHshed practice of the Agreement, just as it is without foundation in ·the text of the Agreement itself." 30. From'thîs reasoning it could he deduced that Israell'.aS been acting within the limits of ifs obligations às à 1ega1 heir to the British mandatoty·authorities by authorizing 'the Palestine Land Deve10pment Companyto conduct its drainage work in thè demilitarlzed z6rle~andby authorizing at presènt the Palestine Electric CUlIJOration to -~: on' itswork for the· 2See ·officidz 1?ecords of the Geu"ai As~embij, Second Session, ReSofutions, rêsolûnon 181 (II). - . 34. Syria's conception of the demilitarized zone was presented by the Syrian representative at the 545th meeting of the Security Council as follows: "The territory comprising the demilitarized zone had been for the mast part under Syrian occupation, as l have already stated. When a final peace agreement has been conc1uded,. Syria will certa.inly insist that this territory should he retumed to its control." 3$. The'Syrian representative went to explaIn the reasons fOl' his statement and what he meant by it. He said: , "This allusion was in conne.."'Cion with the Israel daim i~ one of the agenda items that thé <iefuilitarized zone wa.s in Israel territory. 1 never said nor intended it to he understood that· Syria has any desite or wish at the present time to occupy any pprtion of the demilitarized zone. .. Syria considers that during the armistice period aIl claims to any sector in the demilitarized zone are held in abeyance, The destiny of this area is to be established in the provisions of the eventual peace treaty." 36. l now cOmeto the United Nations conception. This conception of the legai status of· the demilitarized zone has 'been stated by several officiaIs of the United Nations who have been involved in the neg-:>tiations, the interpretation and the implementation of the Armisticè Agreement. 37. Ml'. Bunche's opinion on the matter of sovereign1:'j in the zone was reported to the Security Couneil at its 542nd meeting by the Chief of Staf( of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization. General Riley said, qU()i.lng Ml'. Bunche: 38. In another passage of the sarne statement we read: " <The provision for the demilitarized zone in the light of all circumstances is the mpst that can he reasonably expected. in an. armistice agreement by either party. Questions of permanent boundaries, territorial sovereignty, customs, trade relations and the like must he dea1t with in the ultimate peace settIement and not' - 1 repeat not- <in the Armistice Agreement.· " • 1 39. In his report of 12 March 1951 [S/2049] General Riley expressed his own view as Cl-Jef of Staff on the qu~stion of sovereignty: « ••• neither party to the Armistice Agreement ... enjoys rights of sovereignty within the demilitarized zone. Any laws, regulations or ordinances in force prior to .the Armistice Agreement which affected any areas included in the demilitarized zone àre null and void". 40. In a fcotnpte in which the last part of the statement was amended, the Chief of Staff said: «The United Nations Chief of Staff now helieves that his memorandum should have stated tha.t any laws, regulations or ordinances in' force ,mor to the Armistice Agreement which' affected any areas included .in the demilitarized zone <are held in· abeyance' instead of <are nu1l and void'." 41. The representative of the United Kingdom expressed the view of his Government on the same question in t.~e.following terms [546th meeting] : « ... until a final peace treatybetween Syria and Israel has been made, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom regards the question of sovereignty in the demilitarized zone as being perfectly dear. The General Ar,dstice Agreement, together with Mr. Bunche's in{.erpretive note· of 26 June 1949, which was formal!y aCt".pted by bath Governments as an authoritatiy~ commentary on the: Agreement, must he interpreted as meaning that, so long as the atmistice continues in 'force, neither Government exerdses sovereignty in the demilitarized Z .Jne!' 42. The representatives of Turkey, the Netherlands 1 ~__~do:c: ooncurred _rn_the sam< new. The Turkish 43. It is extremely useful to recaU as a final quotation in this subject the paragraph of the Security Cauncil resolution [S/2157] on the Huleh case, in which it was c1early stated that: "The question of civil administration in villages and settlements in the demilitarized zone is provided for, within the framework of an armistice agreement, in sub-paragraphs 5 Cb) and 5 Cf) of the drait article. Such civil administration, including policing" - 1 repeat the ward "policing" , which of course you all know now is done by regular Israel police - "will he on a local basis, without raising general questions of administration, iurisdiction, citizenship, and sovereignty" - and l wish ta emphasize these 1ast words. 44. From aU this, the following four conclusions can he drawn: 45. First, regardless of Israel or Syrian claims ta sovereignty over the demilitarized zone, the interpretations given by United Nations officiaIs and by the Caunci! to the Armistice Agreement stipulations conceming the zone establisù the fact that until a final settlement in reached between Syria and Israel, no State has sovereignty ove. the zone. 46. Secondly, since no State has sovereignty over the zone, there is no single authority at the present time which is entitled to consider itself heir ta the' British mandatory authority, and which cau use its sovereign right to decide whether under the new conditions created in Palestine the concession of the Palestine E1ectric Corporation is or is not still applicable in the zone or whether it is in the interest of the inhabitants of the zone. 47. Thirdly, the United Nations Truce Supervisioh Organization is not exercising in the demilitarized zone the rights of a sovereign State; it is limiting itself to the task of supervision of the implementation of the clauses of the Armistice Agreement relating to the zone. It is probably for this reason that the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Orgal1ization, in his commenfs on the letter of 24 Septemher 1953 of the Foreign Minister of Israel, limited himse1f to the following observation [S/3122) anne.'t"III] : "As indicated in the preceding paragraph, the rights of the Palestine Electric Corporation or the other private rights within the demilitarized zone to which you have referred are not in question. What is in question is the right to 'Start work in the demion~ way or the other the question of sovereignty over the zone and, therefore, the destiny of the zone, must he stopped at the recognized limits of the zone ttnless agreement i5 reached between Syria and Israel. 50. In addition to this legal approach to the pfoblem, we w~te confronted with an extra-Iegal, apparently dynanllc, economic approach. Wc were told that the whole economic picture Qf aState hangs on the canal project and this consideration, it is argued, 5hould justify anything that the interested State might do in the demilitarized zone. This daim is so daring, so dangerous, so full of consequences, not only to one State in the area but ta aU its States and peoples; that 1 propose to deal with it at length once 1 take up the other issues related to the present case. T would ma.1{e now only two remarks about this allegedly dynamic economic daim, a daim that is supposed to drench and drown and complete1y obliterate the legal arguments. 51. First, l would recall a statement made by the representative of France at the 546th meeting of the Sccurity Council in answer to those who attempted at that time to minimize the importance of the individual rights which were endangered by the extension of the Huleh project to the demilitarized zone. That remark of the representative of France is perfectly relevant to the present discussion. He said: Urt has been said too often that it was only a question or a few acres of land. Tt is a150 and above aIl a question of a principle and, when aIl is 'Said and done, of the whole status of the demd1itarized zone." 53. 1 \Vish, in conclusion, to state, as a fundamental maxim for peace in the Near East, that peace can never come about, concord and ttnderstanding can never supel'vene so long as one State takes international law into its own hands, trusting that it has enough influence, in high as well as in low places, to do altnost anything and be able to get away with it. Neither violence, nor injustice, nor ttnilateral action, nor pride, nor boumUess ambition can bring peace. Peace - a genuinel real, lasting peace - will not come to our tonnented part of the world tt11til there' is a spirit of understanding, agreement, humility, respect for law, honest deferences ta the decent opinion of manldnd and, ubove all, a spirit of truth and love. 54. Ml'. EBAN (Israel): l vtish to make a final SUlI)1l1ary of Israel's case in refutation of the Syrian complaint against to B'not Yaacov canal project. l may seek the privilege of reply if new considerations are raised in the further course of this discussion. 55. Every day that has passed since this debate began has increased our astonishment that a project sa legitimate and beneficial should have encountered 50 many obstacles at Syria's behest. The absence in Mr. Malik's speech of any arguments not previously refuted, still further augments our perple..'dty. Here are water sources which do not flow through Syria at any single point j which are unavailable for Syrian use by every consideration of geography, history, topography and law j but which do flow through Israel and constitute Israel's sole source of natural power, The United Nations - the symbol and instrument of international co-operationis requested by Syria to withhold these \Vatel' sources from Israel's peaceful economic development, merely because they pass for a small part of their course through a demilitarized zone, well outside Syria's territory, notwithstanding the fact that the Amùstice Agreement contains ne'!: a single word which has been or can be quoted to justify such an arbitrary impediment. And all this happens three yeats after the Security Council, in a sinùlar case affecting the same are,a, rejected the alleged right of Syrian veto and confirmed its policy of facilitating economic development projects depencling upon work in the demilitarized·zone, To make the paradox even mort' startling, this project, which tS so vital fol' Israel's national economy, has now been lblicly declé.1.rfls1. by extV:>l.ts of universal eminence to tit adnù- 56. 1 have had the privilege of hearing many cases and complaints dÎ'scussed. in the organs of the United Nations; but 1 have never encountered one in which the balance of argument \Vas sa overwhelmingly in one direction, or in which a comp1aint was put forward and maintained with such totallack of adequate motive or justification. In smnmarizing the points at issue 1 wish ta appeal most earnestly ta the Security Council that it aet with HU speed ta help the full resumption of this totally beneficial project. The Israel Govern~ ment and the Palestine Eleetric Corporation have already incurred many needless complications and lasses as a result of this unfounded Syrian complaint. The wark has been suspended since 27 October, and the winter rains are close at hand. The deliberations of the Security Council on this question were twice postponed at the request of the représentative of Lebanon. May 1 not hope that the Security Council, having accepted. with satisfaction my Government's ofter fur a temporary suspension of this work, will now desire to make every effort to expedite its early resumption in conditions which will satisfy aIl legitimate affected interests? 57. In his address to the Seeurity Council on 10 November 1953 [636th meeting] Mr. Zeineddine purported ta summarize my Government's position under five headings, all of which, except one, he formulated in distorted terms. The sole e."'\:ception is his correct attribution ta Israel of the view that Syria does not gain the right of veto over Israel's national development projects simply because such projects involve sorne wom: in an area outside Syria called. the 'demilitarizedzone. That is our view on the Syrian vetoand a correct one. Even here, the Syrian representative is not quite accurate in describing this as an Israel attitude. The absence of a Syrian right of veto is not Israel's assertion, but an established United Nations principle, laid down in the Security Council three years aga on behalf of the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Turkey, EcuadGi and tb~ Netherlands, embadied in a resolution and categorically confirmed by the United Nations Chief of Staff, bath in word and in action: in ward, by his formaI statement in the Security Council that Isareli development projects in the demilitarized zone cannot be legitimately held up .by Syria; and in action, by his ruling infavour of resuming a development projed in the very area now under discussion notwithstanding Syria's opposition. This ruling, in its turn, received full Security Council consent. The doctrine that the existence of a demilitarized zone corners upon Syria a right of intervention in Israel's water development which it would otherwise not possess has already been refuted at the Security Council table. . ·que. 59. The absence of a Syrian right to affect this canal project is established by ge(lgraphy; by history; by topography; by te..'\.ts of the Arnlistice Agreements nnd related documents; by the precedents of 1951; by 0.11 the international treaties and agreements which have ever affected this area; and by the aims and prineiples of regional development. 60. I should like to analyse these aspects one by one. 1 have already spoken fully on the geographical aspect. 1 have e..'\.plained that from the point at wbich it rises in Israel territory north of Lake Huleh, down to the point at which it enters the Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan eight miles south of Lake Tiberias, the River Jordan flows through the territory of only one sovereign State, nanlely, the State of Israel; and conversely, that the territory of the Syrian Republic nowhere comes up to the bank of the River Jordan. 61. 'Under the impact of this fundamental truth, Ml'. Zeineddine has now withdrawn from bis previous written implication that the Jordan is a river common to Israel and Syria. He has retired to the somewhat lame conclusion that the River Jordan is not very far from the territory of Syrla. This, of course, is true, but 'Nlthollt any consequence in limitation of Israel's legal rights. The point is that the Jordan daes not touch Syria and that Syria cannot touch the Jordan without cammitting an act of aggression. On the other band the Jordan does flow through Israel and Israel has exclusive access ta its waters at any number of points outside the demilitarized zonenorth of Lake Huleh and eIsewhere. 62. 1 will say only a few words on what appears ta 'he Afr. Zeineddine's alternative and much weaker contention that the Jordan River,' in 'Sorne sense, "belongs" to the· demilitarized zone. This zone, too, is non-Syrian territory since the Armistice Agreement ca.tegoricallyrequired the withdrawal of Syrian forces to the established frontiers of Syrla. We regard that as a permanent withdrawal. The statement of the Syrian representative, at the 541st meeting of the Syrian Government has always daimed the part where the del11ilitarized zone no;v exists to 'be Syrian territory be-· c~use this territory was under aggressive Syrian occupatIon until the time of the Armistice Agreement was nothing but a statement of the attitude of aggression, . an ilIegitimate territorial daim. Tt is exactly of the sam" standing as if Syria were to daim the territory of any o!her neighbour, if,it were to say that it would like a plece of Lebanol1 or a slice of Turkey or the territory of any other contiguous State. But at any rate the de111Œlitarized zone, whatever it is or is not, is certainly I1On-Syrian Territory because the Armistice Agreement required and secured the withdrawal of Syrian 63. Thus, the Jordan is a river which flows through Israel and never through Syria, passing at some points through the demilitarized zone, which is itself specifically non~Syrian, and in which established civilian rights are subject to the dutY of the United Nations Chief of Staff to protect other valid civilian rights. There is thus. no essential connexion between the course of the River Jordan and the demarcation of the demilitarized zone. There has never been any intention to keep the river hennetically 5ealed within the zone. Indeed, there are various points, even in the course of its flow through the demilitarized zone at which the River Jordan emerges from the zone into nondemilitarized Israel territory. This happens at map reference 208.7-260.0 to map reference 208.5-258.2, apart from the areas north of the Huleh and south of Lake Tiberias where the river flows entirely in Israel outside the demiIitarized zone. 64. l must therefore repeat the emphasis which l laid on 30 October on the paramount importance of these geographieal faets. l doubt if there is any, other instance in the history of internationallitigation i~ which a country through whose territory a river does. flaw has been obstrocted in the use of its water at the behest of a country in whose territory it does not flow for a single inch at any point. 65. Now this fact of geography i5 not accidentaI. It does not merely happen to be the case that the frontier of the Syrian Republic lies beyond the River Jordan without touching that frontier at any point. Facts of history have creatèd these faets of geography. The international frontier of the Syrian Republic, confirmed fi" tue "Ariiûstice Agreement, ,was fuœd with the deli~rate purpose of ensuring that the northem waters of the Jordan, should be unreservedly available for Palestine, and. not subjected to. ?l1'la's control. 66. The discussion which led to this result took place between the Government of Great Britain and France at· the Peace Conference in Paris in 1919. The records were preserved in the minutes of·the Peace Conference and in the memoirs of Ml'. David Lloyd George... The discussion was conducted at a hign 'level of tesporrsibility. The participants were Ml'. David Lloyd George, representiilg Great Britain as the prospective mandatory power fox Palestine, and "The waters of Palestine were essential to its existence. Without· those waters, Palestine would he a wilderness. .• On the other hand, those same waters were of no use to anyone holding Syria. They cauld in effect only be used far the purpose of bargaining ar for the purpose of obtaining concessions from Palestine." 67. The French Government, as might be expected, aceeded to the equity and logic of geography, and the boundary was accordingly drawn in such a way that Syria, already blessed with abundant water, at nu pOint had access to the waters of the River Jordan, which becaIne unreservedly available to Palestine. 68. TUIS the international OOundary of the Syrian Republic, removed from the River Jordan, is embodied in the Fcinco-British Treaty of 1923, all the provisions of which the Syrian representatives if l understand him arlght. apparently still desires to accept. In any case, that same international boundary is recognized in the General Armistice Agreement hetwe..::n Israel ând Syria and in Dr. Bunche's accom~ panying letter, OOth of which make it clear that the only Syrian interest which has ever existed west of that frontier, an interest which arose from the aggressive occu~tion of its armed forces, was to he cancelled by"the withdrawal of Syrian forces back to the established international boundary. It would therefore now require a violation of the Armistice Agreement for any Syrian citizen, military or CÏ:vilian, ta touch the bank of the River Jordan. 69. Thus the hi'Storical experienœ of thirty years, as embodied in aU the negotiations and agreements affeeting this area, has confirmed the completel)' flOn- Syrian characrer of the River Jordan, and. has also refiected the complete and vital dependence of the arid areas of Palestine upon access to those waters for their' very fertilitv and life. . - 70. .l have said that the lessons of history and geography are reinforced by tOpOgraphicai faets. Not only does Syria lack legitimate access to the River Jordan because its boundaries faU short of that river; it is a faet that even if Syria had access to the batiks of the River Jordan it could not physicaUy uti1îze more than 1 or 2 per cent of its waters. The River Jordan happens to fiow southwards and not northwards. 71. The Hebrew word "Jordan" is derived from a ~oot signifying the. river "that goes down".. It drops lU a deep descent from its point of rising, '.IÎrst iuto J:.ake Galileeand then into the Dead Sea. As one stands on the batiks of the Jordan on its Israel side and looks into Syria, one sees a steep incline rising 72. The General Armistice Agreement .between Israel and Syria enacts no modification whatever in Syrîa's international {rontier and therefore brings about changes in the historicat or geographical facts which l have mentioned. It goes without saying that Armistice Agreement cannot change any of the topographical facts which determine the non-availability Jordan water for Syria. . 73. This brings me to discuss the distinction between the effective interests of Israd and of Syria in demilitarized zone under the Armistice Agreement. is true of Israel, as it is not true of Svrla, that certain work in a small area of the demiiitarized zone neèessary for the execution of projects affecting c-_~ntj~J1JJ.tionaleconomy outside the zone. It is true of Israel, as ft is not tme of Syria, tùat there exists an established private right, namely, the concession of the Palestine Electric Corporation, which applies, ina small hut vital part of its total applicatiol::, to area of the deinilitarized zone. It istrue of Israel, as it is not true of Syrîa, that the explanatory note annexed to the Armistice Agreement authorizes Israeli policing and administration in parts of the demilitarized zone, while Syrian policing and administration aut;horized in no parts thereof at aU. 74. Finally on this point,as l have alreadypointed out, it was established in 1951 in the jurisprudence a See Final Report of the United Nations Economie Survey Mission for. the Mid.dleEasl, United Nations ~~Publications Sales No: 1949.IIB.5., Parts l and II. 75. Now each of the seven characteristics ascribed by Mr. Zeineddine to the a:uleh drainage scheme applies to the project now under discussion. He fails to establish any substantive differences whatever between the two projects of which one has deifinitely been ruled to be legitimate and is in fuII operation. Both. projects have involved work in the demilitarized zone of which the major effects and conseqqences lie outside the demilitarized zone. Both projects are' the subject of concessions resting on valid legislation. Both projects reçognize Israel's rights to utilize the Jordan waters for power and irrigation. Both projects have precisely the same international background and implications. Bath projects have been challenged by Syria on precisely the same grounds; yet on one of these projects the' United Nations has given its clear endo,rsement and specifically rejected the very Syrian ~ssertions 110W invoked' against this project in the same area under the same agreement. There is thus no way of acting consistently with the Security Council's policies of 1951 which would not involve the immediate restlmptian of work on tlûs hydro-electric project,' subject only to the 'Satisfaction, which there should be, of other affectecl private rights. /6. Mr. Malik's speech shows thaï' he is acutely embarrassed by this1951 precedent, and he plainly ;Incl TI'ankly invites the Security Coundl to dishonour its own. jurispl'udence and not to be affected 'by it. He does now and again quote the observations of representathrr:3 Qf delegations made in that debate in 1951, hut if he respects the views exptessed in that debate - by, for. example, the representatives of France and the United Kingd0111 --' why does he not respect the conclusions which they reached? .The main t:onclusion which they reached and which they helped the Security Council to implement was that Syria possessed no right to obstruct or deter the execution of Iegitimate economic development projects, even if such projects required work in the demilitarized zone. l shouldsay 77. That is the issue here. Thus, even if Mr. Malik cotild prove the complete absence of Israel sovereignty this would not in any measure advancehis cause. The absence or presence of sovereignty does not affect the absence or presence of the right to undertake leg'itimate, nornml eivilian activity in the demilitarized zone, provided that other private interests are ,not prejudiced. 2'8. There is another point of analogy between the 'tWo projects, In the present case, ~. in 1951, the private rights affected are of inftnitesimal scope' in relation tb the total proportion of the ,project itself. It was this which led the representative of Ecuador to declare.on 18 May 1951 [547th meeting] -following similar statements, which l quoted last nionth, on behalf of France, the United Kingdom, the United States and the .Netherlands - as another' supporter of the majority which adopted the resolution: t'... My de1egation is confident that the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission will shortly ·tind a' formula for a settlement which wiU' enable 'theworK: of drainiiIg the Huleh marshes to proceed without demy and witho~t obstacles, and will compensate the landownersaffected for the damage they have incurred, In the view of my delegation, the. project is benefieial ta the entire area and might produce favourable results which would outweigh the'damage done. Moreover, it would not be right for the project to be held up for an indefinite period. Undoubtedly, private rights must he respected; on the. other hand, a balanced and equitable solution bas to he reached which. would secure such rights and allow the work to proceed. Privateinterests should. not become an obstacle ta the general welfare, and the United Nations cannot oppose human progress," 79. That was the consensus of the Security Council at that time. It would be difficult to nnd any more e10quent or incisive words with which todefine a statesmanlike course of thought and action for the SecurityCàuncil ta embody in resolution form for the settlement of the present complaint. 80. The complete legitimacy of.this prnject is established .not only by history, geography, topography, 82. l referred on 30 October t () the Franco-British treaty of good neighbourly relations and expressed what I thought were legitimate doubts as to whether Syria wished to condude such a treaty of friendsbip and lieighourly relations with Israel. I invited the Syrian representative to make a contràry indication, but my Govemment has still reteived no invitation to give effect to sucb a treaty of friendship and goodneighbourly relations with the Syrian Republic. 83. vVhile the 1926 treaty of good neighbourly relations .aIso deals with certain matters under discussion in the Security Couneil, more attention should begiven to the Franco--British treaty of 1923, which Mr. Zeineddine describ~s as a source of international obligations still.incumbent upon Israel and Syria. He is not, in my view, weIl advised to rely· upon that treaty, for it discredits his· entire case. l have a copy of the treaty here. As a matter of juridica1 prineiple, Israel tannot he deemed bound by treaties or agreements which its own Govemment has not signed. The fact that the United Ringdom signed a treaty with France in 1923 does not constitute a mandatory legal obligation on my Government, which has not signed such a treaty. However, if the representative of Syria has an affection for the actual contents of the 1923 treaty, we are prepared to co-operate with him in bis enthusiasm. If he wishes to. give effect to the Franco-British treaty of 1923, replacing the signatures of Britain and France respectively by those of Israel and Syria, we would he prepared to accept his invitation. To be even more helpful, \.\' 3.re willing, even without signing the treaty or contracting it as a legal obligation, to act voluntarily in every respect as though that treaty were still in legal force. 84. Let us assume, for the sake of Mi.-. Zeineddine's argument, that Israel has all the rights and obligations pertaining to Palestine in that treaty, wbile .Syria has the rights and obligations pertaining to France. This is a hypothesis and it is, of course, not a sound Jegalview.But on that hypothesis, whatwouldthe position he? The answer is simple. The hydro-electric project riow tmder discussion could proceed with perfect freedom and without any impediment or challenge whatever from the Syrian side. For the 1923 treai:y deals with two subjects alone. Its main 85. But of more relevance is the second effect of the 1923 treaty, derived from the frontier demarcation, ,vhich, is ta establish the River Jordan as a completely non-Syrian river, ,,,hile imposing upon Palestineand therefore, according ta his hypothesis, now, upon Israel - the obligation ta maintain unimpaired the "existing rights over the use of the waters of the Jordan by inhabitants of Syria". The righ':s refer to the residents of the Buteiha Farm. At the same time, the Government of Palestine, or persons authorized by the said Government, were awarded the right ta build a dam, to raise the leve1 of the waters of Lake Huleh and Lake Tiberias above .their nonnal level on condition that they pay fair compensation ta the owners and Jccupiers of the lands which 'will thus be fiooded. 86. The picture under the treaty is therefore clear. The River Jordan is an entire1y Palestinian.river and the two lakes are Palestiman lakes, with Syria specifically exdudèd from any access ta or control of the river, and with an explicit reservation in favour of existing water rights, such as are now used by certain inhabitants. The reason for Syrla'g exclusion was the vital relevance of the Jordan to the irrigation of Paléstine and its total irre1evance. to the irrigation of Syiir,L, which, possessed and possesses vast ;water resoutces of its own. 87. .My Government, as l have saîd, strongly doubts its obligation in principle to he bound by the treaty between France and Britain signed at Paris on 7 March 1923, but it is wiiHng, ex gratia, to accept aU the, rights and, obligations which woulel, be incumbent upon it in this resped if the treaty were still valid. 'vVe are ready, both with respect to the frontier and with 'respect to the consequent provisions on water rights, in co-operation with the United Nations, ta express this definite obligation in an appropriate legal instrument which would he binding upon my Government. 88. l shou1d ,like to add a ward on the regional ,aspects of this problem. The Security Council is not seized with any particular scheme for regional water development. However, the Syrian representative, apparently dissatisfied with bis own arguments b'lsed on internationallaw or the Armistice Agreements, 11• .5 endeavoured at great length ta prove that the hydro- 91. l explained to the Secl1rity Councîl on 30 October that the effect of this project is as foUows: The waters of the Jordan which now flow from Lake' Huleh to Lake Tiberias in a single channel, creating no electric po\ver. on the way, will, at the e.nd of two to three years, flow into Lake Til>erias in two channels, namely the original Jordan l>ed and the tributary canal, which will create e1ectric power. That is what this terrible, alarming project is ,about. That is what Mr. Malik caUs boundless ambition. But when that electric power station is created, aU the water which now flows into Lake Tiberias will continue to flow into it, so that the level of the lake will be unaffected. Indeed, the progress now under way in draining the Huleh marshes will shortly augment the volume of water flowing in the northern reaches of the Jordan and thence into Lake Tiberias. 92. There have been no regional water schemes which envisage the use of Jordan water north of Lake Tiberias for uny area outside Israel, with the exception of a very smal1 percentage which has an effect on irrigation canals leading to Buteiha: and there is no difficulty whatever, as we shall see, in maintaining those needs 93. Dcspite our illtimate acquaintance with these established facts we have endeavoured to ascertain whether the hydro-electric project Ott which. we are now embarked would hinder any prospect, slender as it may he, of eventual Arab-Israel co-operation for the joint utilization of these waters. Vie have 'Sought counsel from tluee of the most eminent authorities on \\'ater problems, who also have the distinction of havll1g been in the Middle East and studied its water prohlems. l refer to Messrs. H. W. Bashore, T. L, Sava",o-e ahd Professor Abel Wolman. • 94. Ml". Bashore is rightly cOmlid~red one of the most experienced water engineers the United States has produced. He is now the presidential representative and Chainnan of the Upper Colorado River Basin compact Commission and has acted as a consultant to the Depal'tment of the Interior on irrigation and rec1amation problems. He has worked on most of the major reclamation and irrigation projeds in the United States since 1906. His most recent governmental post in his own country \Vas that of Commissioner of Reclamation. 95. Ml". Savage had had vast experience in foreign fields, having worked in Mexico, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Ceylon, Spain and Puerto Rico. His domestic c:>..-peIience covers engineering services on the TVA, the Hoover and Norris Dams. From 1908 on, Ml". Savage bas been working assiduously on water problerns all over the world, and is now in Japan on a special mission. His latest official post was that of Chief Designing Engineer of the Bureau of Reclamation. %. Ml". Wolman is a Professor of Sanitary Engineering at Johns Hopkins University and is a lecturer at Harvard and the University of Chicago, three of the most important educational institutions in the United States. He is at present a consultant for the United States Public Health Service, the Tennessee Valley Authority and the United States Army and is an adviser to the American Red Cross on sanitary engineering. He alsu served as Chairman of the National Water Resources Commission of the United States of America. 97. These three experts represent a total of experience and background in irrigation, hydro-electric and rec1amation fields that may perhaps be without parallel in the world today. In a scientific opinion, bearing their nanles, which they have conveyed to my Govemment in writing, these experts, after analyzing the 9~. This opinion, based on expert scientific investigation, enables me to add another point to the merit of our project. Apart from being internationally legal, economically progressive, entirely consistent with the l\rmistice Agreement and with the Security CO'lllcil's llwn jurisprudence, this project would also serve admirably as an integral part of any future development of regional water resources. Does it not become increasingly astonishing to think that a. project which possesses such attributes should, at Syria's behest, be hcld up by international action? 99. Thus the discussion brings us back full circle to the three basic considerations which I discussed in my first address: land, water and demilitarization. The Security Council will recaU that these are descri!-.n?:\i by the United Nations Chief of Staff as the only three considerations which have affected his interest in the màtter. . 100. Let us see what remains of the shattered structure of Mr. Zeineddine's complaint. Geography is against him; for it fixes the whole of the River Jordan outside the Syrian border, and nowhere contiguous to it, while over a great part of the Jordan's course Israel has sole access to the river in its non-denùlitarized territory. It is not geographically tme that the present project creates for Israel a capacity, which it would not otherwise possess, of deter1lÙning the course of the Jordan. 101.' So much for geography. History does not help IVlr. Zeineddine, for it proves that the separation between the River Jordan and Syria is not a geographical accident but a conscious design based on fundamental concepts of politieal and economïe equity. Nor can he flud comfort in topography; for this decrees that the Jordan is both available and vital to Israel's very existence and unavailable and irre1evant to Syria's life oreconomy. No consolation for him reposes in the Armistice Agreement or the related documents, which pointedly exc1ude any Syrian authority to obstruct civiliau projects in the demilitarized zone. ~;Oj:c~:~P=~~~qS~~~:~:~~~~~~~~~~~:~~~~:~~~~=.J 103. Finally, he clutches at his last refuge: the doctrine that our hydro-electric project conflicts with regional water schemes. Here Mr. Bashore, Dr. Savage and Professor \Volman put him completely ta l'out by proving that the e,.,act opposite is the case and that this project would fit congenially, or in their words "admirablyU, into any regional water scheme that may come to pass. 104. In view of the flimsy character of this Syrian superstructure, I should lïke ta deal ,vith the three 'Substantial matters whieh, according to General Bennike's report of 20 October, are the only considerations affecting the resumption of this work. 105. I need add little on the military subject because Ml'. Zeineddine has given us no trouble on it at.aU, and Mr. Malik has added nothing new. The Security Council, in its resolution of 11 August 1949 [S/1376, II], decided that the truce referred ta in article II, paragraph 1, of the Syrian-Israel Armistice Agree.;. ment was superseded by the Armistice and was no longer in separate force. There is no contradiction, as Mr. Zeineddine appears to believe, between th~s and the continued titlel the appellation of Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization. When the truce, with its military considerations, was abolished on Il August 1949, and many restrictive circumstances deriving from it were set asicle, I drew attention to the obsolete character of the phrase "Chairman of the Truce Supervision Organization". The Security Council agreed to note the anomaly but to leave the title extant, because it figured in agreements previously concluded, notably the Armistice Agreements signed between February and July 1949, and we would have to meet and modify all those agreements if we were to make a point of changing this obsolete term. This,. however, does not affect the fact stated in the resolution of Il August, 1949, . that the truce reaffirmed on 15 July 1948 had been superseded by the Armistice Agreement; and therefore article II, paragraph 1, with its provision that "... no military . .. advantage should be gained under the truce ...u is not relevant to the present legal situation. The resolution of Il August 1949 which abolished arms and restrictions and repudiated blockades certainly did not seek to perpetuate such lesser vestiges of the truceas the doctrine of military advantage in 'the purely tactica1 local sense. 106. With respect to the general question of demilitarization, no argument wharever has been invoked against the Chief of Staff's decision, given at the ~;;'th the general question of the demilitarized zone from the point of view of its topography, and here the ruling is dear, definite and of general effect. It confirms that the pr~sence or absence of any topo- 2Taphical feature in the demilitarized zone is of no ~elevance te its demilitarized character. The only attribute of the zone which we are pledged to observe is that the armed forces of neither party shaH enter it. On the positive side, we are pledged to encourage normal civilian activity and to recognize, ::lS we freely do .the right and indeed the duty of the Chief of Stur to foster and encourage 'Such nonnal activities. I cau say from my own personal recollection and experieü<:e in negotiating this matter witb. Dr. Bunche that the demilitarized zone was established.without any reference to what Mr. Malik has called "geophysics" and was established Ïn the full knowledge that 01 • agreement to its demilitarization did not affect our deve10pment projects, which were known and discussed freelyat that time. . 107. I would only add here that that view, which was weIl understood at that time by Dr. Bunche, is in any case embodied in General Riley's ruling, which was requested by both parties and which was deemed by him to have legal effect only because both parties requested it. But for that request, the Chief of Staff would have beeti bound by his reservation that it was not legitimate under the Annistice Agreement to invoke 'Such considerations at all, because the Annistice Agreement marked the pennanent end of the military phase of the Palestinian conflict. 108. Thus Ml'. Zeineddine's state1nent that the zone is to be "conserved" - if by that he means frozen in its development - is ms own invention. It is utterly refuted by official declarations given in favour of nonnal development within and from the zone. The Syrian representative has not been able to deny that the tangible effect of the present project would be only to increase the number of obstacles to military rnovement in either direction in the zone, and thus render aggression more difficuIt: 109. But we cannot fail to he a little sardonic about this concept of the River Jordan as a "military obstacle". I think most of us round this table, in our younger days, could have jumped over the River Jordan at many points in the demilitarized zone; and the riverhas such little effect as a ttulitary obstacle that ~yrian anned forces were able aggressively to cross mto Israel in May 1951, at the season of t'he 110. Mr. Zeineddine's only new point is ta inform us that the River Jordan "as an obstacle for the movement of troops" would not be "within the range of the fire of Syrian a-'i:illery and infantry", and that this might not be the case with our newly constructed canal. AIl 1 can say is that the renl0teness of our canal from the "range. of the fire of Syrian artillery and infantry" is an event which aU the United Nations will certainly be able to sustain with equanimity and fûrtitüde. 111. 1 come now to the questions of land and water. In these two matters, Mr. Zeineddine leaves my argument of 30 üctober complete1y intact. 112. His statement that 99 per cent of the land in the demilitarized zone is Arab-owned is simply a direct untruth of such vast and lavish proportions that we find no support for it in three pages of. melodrama about non-existent land titles which are alleged to have been burnt. 'Indeed, the land titles are perfa-tly c1ear. The only Arab-owned land concerned is the area marked in black on the map which 1 have circulated, and this map precisely refiects General Bennike's findings, which Mr. Zeineddine therefore either repudiates or ignores. Incidentally, we have had the map examined and compared, and it is accurate, in aIl respects. General Bennike's report makes nonsense of Mr. Zeineddine's élaim that 99 per cent of the land 1S Arab-owned, because that report narrows the question of land down to four small plots which it is our policy to circumvent in the execution of·this work. 1 should add that a great proportion of the land concerned is on the slopes of a steep canyon on which a human being could hardly stand, that only a small proportion is on a fiat surface and could be utilized for agriculture, and about 99 per cent of that is in the possession of the Jewish National Fund, a public landowning utility corporation. The same is true of the water mills. Mr. Zeineddine quite wrongly stated that the facts shown on my map are in contradiction ta those elicited by General Bennike in his preliminary investigations. In his letter of 20 October, General Bennike confirms that the only mill in operation is Tahunat Naimat es Stibh. This.mill does appear on our map, and th,~ supply of water to it will be cOlnpletely unaffected by the hydro-electric projet. 114. ,It is perhaps rare for a great public utility n"roiect to adapt itself to such a limited private interest; for' nonnally - the limited private interest would be subordinated to the public welfare. However, in view of the administrative obscurity in the demilitarized zone, and the questions of principle which Mr. Malik in his speech ascribed to a previous observation made by the representative of France, we do not wish to :mise th~ acute question of the normal expropriation rights of a concessioriaire, and prefer instead to undertalœ complete non-en~roacliment upon Arab land, whereyer if may be. 115. The final question is that of water. It is a fact of geography, topography and histoff, as illustrated hj the Franco-British Agreement of 1923, thatthe only Arab Jap.d irrigated by the Jordan in its course between Huleh. and Tiberias lies in the Buteiha Farm area: Thesè. farmlands are not themselves strictly contiguous ta the Jordan, because no Syrian farmer can approaeh the Jordan without vio1ating the frontier. But the Buteiha land is irrigated by canal8 whose wate~ level is affected by that of the Jordan close by, although the Jordan furnishes only a part of the waters upou which the Buteiha lands rely for irrigation. 116. But, in any case, .the question is: first, can the satisfaction of these water needs be reconciled with this hydro-e!ectric project? And, second, is Israel ~illing to undertake. a definite obligation to that effect? The answer to both these questions is an unqualified affirmati~: . 117. With respect to the first question, Mr. Zeineddine shows something less than l:.ndour in his speech of 30 October when he portrays the United Nations Chief of Staff as stating that the hydro-electric project is intrinsically inconsistent with the welfare of these farms andmight indeed reduce them ta a "wasteland". General Bennike says something utterly different, namely, that prejudice to certain local interests will arise, and l quote his words: "unless definite obligations are secured". This is really the whole difference between the Syrian case and our own: behveen the veto on this project and its continuation on the basis of satisfying affected rights. Indeeci, this is an intrinsic diffe- ~ence between the Syrian approach and that reflected ln the correspondence of the Chief of Staff because the Syrian approach is to apply a total and permanent 118. l would say that the Syrian record in roatters of water is ramer iess nobie mali Mr. Zeineddine asserts it to he. Whereas Syria is not a riparian State on the Jordan, Israel is a riparian State on the Yarmuk. Nevertheless, the Syrian Government bas agreed with the Jordan Govemment on the diversion of the Yarmuk River in a manner depriving Israel villages of water used by them for the past twenty-five years. This has not prevented. the Syrian representative from now declaring [636tlt l1!.eeting] with greart solemnity but, Iam afraid, not with accuracy that "whenever wateï" course has international implications, we do not proceed to use these \vaters by unilateral action". MOl"eover, SYlia,' despite strong protests from Israei, has deprivcd Israel cultivators of large. quantities water Rowing in the \iVadi Duffila, north of Lake Huleh, by diverting those waters from Israel ta Syrian territory. 119. Howe"er, we do not consider these as valid e.xamples for our own action. We shouJd certainly not expect the Seeurity Council to draw any conclusions from those precedents and, therefore, notwithstanding our lack of legal obligation, we have agreed and hereby undertake to maintain an adequate supply of waterat all seasons for the irrigation of the Buteiha lands, and to contraot a legal obligation to th'at end. 122. The technical devices for storing the water for the dry season offer many alternative solutions. My Government win undertake to .fll1fil whichever. solution is regarded as most effective when the facts relating to land, area and water volume are ascertained. The problem will not arise at all for two years or more because, as l have explained, the construction would require that period and no change whatever in the water configuration and no flow of' walf:er through the newly-constructed canal would take place before then. So that the problem will not arise at aU for more than two years and will be easily and readily soluble when it does arise. Indeed, it is interesting ta note that even by Syrian contentions, which we think are exaggerated, we achieve a confession from Mr. Zeineddine that the relative objective interest of Israel and Syria in these water sources never falls below a proportion of 85 per cent for Israel as against 15 per cent for non-Israeli interests. This together with Israel's legal, political and geographical access to the Jordan waters is 'Surely a fatal blow to his case for impeding the major interest in deference to the m[nor one, whenthe minor interest too cau easily be reconciled with the major one. 123. No interests, international, naJtional, regional or private are prejudiced by the fulfilment of this legitimate project which, both in itself and in respect of its underlying principles, touches the very ess';nce of Israel's political freedom and economic inde'"~dence. For no other State does this matter have the same vital interest or concern. AU' parties affected, Syria, Israel and the Chief of Staff have turned to the Security Coullcil for guidance. Can anybody seriously or honourably doubt that the caU of dutY .and justice is clear : ta facilitate, to promote, to encourage this project, while requiring all appropriate obligations to he concluded for safegnarding the private interests of land and water affected by it? 1~4..1 have no hesitatioîl in'antieipatirig fuat the Security Council will repudiate those Syrian utterances which attempt to intimidate it by dark threats of an alleged right of forcible "se1f-defence" against this p~oject. What on earth has this subject got to do Wlth self-defence? Self-defence against e1ectric power; se!f-defen~e against light and etrergy for quickening thts area lUto the peaceful rhythm of serene rural life; 125. The Security Council has here been given sorne insight into the struggle of a small people to defend its basic interests against the iIlicit pressures of neighbouring siege. There is nothing more challenging in this era of Israel's development than the eruption of .these constructive impulses of peaœful progress out of the very midst of this' sterile neighbouring hostility. 126.. The United Nations has an opportunity here, by dismissing the Syrian complaint, to combine the high concepts of international law with a devotion the stirring challenge of social and economic progress. 127. Mr. ZAFRULLA KHAN {Pakistan): It not my intention at this stage to hazard any view the merits of the case. In spite of the great volume statistics and facts that have been nlaced before the Security· Councilsorne of them unchallenged, some of them agreed upon, and some which are disputedthere are aspects of the case on which we, at least, feel that we need more information if we are to he in po~ition to express a view on the questions in dispute. I do notpropose to ask for information on those points by addressing questions to General Bennike, as I consider that the greater part of th~ information which we need might either not he available to him or not legifimately within the purview of his functions. I shall state the points on which information is needed and shall leave it to the President to S~ whether, through the normal channe1s of the Secretariat, that information can be made availahle to the Security Council. 128. The first point is a .very easy one to determine, as the information is there, and it may even he available on the maps with which we have been supplied.. the maps contain that informa.tion, it would only necessary to draw our attention to the particular map which defines the frontier in that manner. Some reference hasheen made tothe frontier visualized - advisedly do not use any other ten:n in this respect -in the General Assembly resolution oi November 1947 for the State of Israel, then in view. If this {rontier does appear on any map, it would be enough, as I have said, to draw our attention to it. If it does nôt,weshottld~1îketo~seehoW itfiat {rotitier runs through the demilitarized zone. A reference was made to that frontier by the representative of Israel in the course of bis submission.this afternoon, and he said that the greater part of the demilitarized zone was contained within that frontier on the side of the State of Israel. We should like it made quite clear where that frontier runs. 130. It bas been .s~lggested on bebJf ;Jf the State of Israel that the only such advantage or benefit of irrigation enjoyed Is by what is called the Buteiha Faon, part of which, 1 understand, lies within the demilitarized zone, and part of which lies within the State of Syria. 131. The infonnation we desire on .this point is: (1) What is the area of the Buteiha Farm which receives irrigation from the Jordan? (2) What is the total area ,jf the Buteiha Fann, and what part of it could receive irrigation from the Jordan if there were no interference with the flow of the river? (3) Are there any other lands -not merely Arabowned lands in the demilitarized zone, but any other lands within Syria - which. receive irrigation {rom this part of the FJver Jordan Or derive any other advantage from the river? . 132. The third point on which we require information is as follows: 133. This project has been described. as a hydroelectric project. Assuming that it was developed and put into effect, would it he possible at any later stage to convert it into an irrigation project? The point 1 have particularly in mind is this: in a hydro-electric project, pure and simple, it may he possible ta return to the river at.sorne point almost thè same volume of watet".- not appreciably diminished - whiC!h i5 ;taken out of it at a higher point. The information we desire is whether this project could'- 1 do not mean whether it is today visualized or intended but whether, from the engineering point of view, it could - he convertedinto an irrigation project, so as to utilize the whole or any suhstantial portion of the waters that may he diverted into the project. If it couIdhe developed in sucb a way, what is the maximum quantity of water whichmay at anytime he withd.rawn·from the river for that use·? 134:· A further question in that connexion would he : In that event, would the volume of the watèrs in Lake Tiherias he affected to any degree? And, if they would he wouId the degree·of salinity of tlie waters of Lake Ti l{rias and of the River Jordan helow .Lake Tiherias be lU any manner affected? And, if so, in what manner and ta what degree? If any such change were brought about;·hôw would the present uses based on the River Jordan,or·'any advantages at present derived from .the River Jordàn,· by the State of Jordan~ affected? 135.. 'fheré~ is 'one question that 1 would submit ta General Belihike for his consideration: It has appéared to~e~I~y he ""rong; but this is thè impression 1 have':"'" t4at saine cif the conclusions drawn. by him concemi~t the probable consequences of tlùs project, upo~, whi~ he baséd"his request to the State of I$rael, hâve ,peen conteSi:ed by the 'representative of Israel. If Genenll Bennike should' have any comment on tlmt aspect of the submission ~de by. the représentative 140. With regard to the last question which the represetlltative of Pakistan put to General Bennike when hé asked if the General would reply ta sorne of the objections raised by the representative of Israel in connexion with the considèrationsand grounds on which the General's decision was based, 1 feel that we can ooly leave il: to General BeDllike's discretion to provide us. with sorne explanation, if he considers it necessary to do so, eithel" because he thinks his reasons have oot been. weIl enough understood or because, in arder ta cllHghten the members of the Cauncil, he desires ta supply infornIation additional ta that which he bas already given in ms report. 141. :Mr. ZAFRULLA KHAN· (Pakistan): With reference ta the remarks tl>at the President has made, 1 have only one ccmment and one request. 1 have not taken note of what 1 said concerning the observation which 1 addressed to General Bennike, but 1 helieve 1 said·..... and the President and J ~ in ~ccord~ ,that in case General Bennike mmself should wish to make any comment, he would in due cou.rse,no doubt, make that comment available to the Council. l' did Îlot suggest in any manner that he must reply ta the questions. Of course, it is left compleœly ta the General's discretÏon.

I am entirely in agreement with the representative of Pakistan with regard to the statement he bas just made. 144. Mr. ZEINEDDINE (Syria): We listened very attentively indeed to the statement which Mr. Eban made this afternoon and which he called a summary of Israel's case. I have sorne brief and relevant observations to make concerning it., 144. gluJis): la qu'il présenterai sujet. se 145. l should like to start by expressing a word of thanks to Mr. Eban for his 'statement because it does show a rapproche1ne1llt of bis views to ours. This might facilitate a swift decision. In fact, ,in his statement this afternoon, he practica1ly confirmed what we had aIready said in our previous statements and in the mah thesis and arguments on which we based our case. We are therefore in the fortunate position at this stage of having very little to sayon account of the faet that he has implicitly made this confirmation by no longer trying to refute those arguments and the thesis which we have previously made. 146. In the preliminary statement which we made on this subject [633rd nzeeting], 7' took the liberty of warning the Council that we expected that om:' Zionist opponents were apt and ready to inject into the discussion irrelevant motives of Israel and its wishes to tak~ away the waters of ,the Jordan, under sorne preœ;.t, for ifs purposes and its own use. I then referted to the possibility of Israel's trying to bring confusion into this discussion 50 as to diminish its clarity, and to present general views so as to create a foggy abnosphere in which it could then easily sneak out of its international responsibilities. Today, this has been rendered more clear than in the past by the Israel representative. 147. He seems to say, and he has in faet said, that the stirring challenge. before the Council is that of social ~d ecCinomic progress. The challenge is not ~at. It 15 peace as established by the General ArmistIce.Agreement. The wishes of Israel and the benefits ~hat it miJ.Y draw from this or that project are not at Issue. There are. many other constructive projects that could be of use to the area and to the other countries provided they are executt::d under law and discipline and according to the .standards of international behaviour. The issues·are whether international behaviour in 1;his case should or ShbUld not hé subjected·ta international agreements, whether the Armistice Agreement should· be app~ed, whether international treaties.should he respected àrid whether the United Nations authority 149. On the other hand) Israel caUs fo!' negotiations, but what would he the meauing of negotiations with a Syrian side which according to Israel) cannat object ta what is required of it and has ta consent, with no objection, ta what is required according to the Israeli thesis ?Then, the representative of Israel tried to modify and in faot to alter substantiaUy sorne of the stands which we have taken whenever he bas ventured ta touch upon them. He referred ta the military modifications under the truce wbiCh he said do not exist any more. When the truce developed into the armistice the principles of the truce were rt':I.."%'>11ized., in the armistice. These principles were not recognized in arder to he discarded but in arder 'lO he established on a continuing basis. However, even without them, as General Bennikehimself in his report has. remarked) there are other articles of the Armistice Agreement) and particularly article V, wbich do not allow military changes wbich endanger the rights, positions and daims of the other side. 150. Naturally, he sought to explain this by saying that the establishment of canals would create more obstacles. Today he tried ta make us· feel like the great ath1etes of eartier ages who could jump over the River Jordan. I do not know, but it seems ïo me that the flGW of bis oratory was far bigger in his mind than the flow of that River Jordan. The Jordan is not easy to cross and it effects a separation. If we look at the present situation, what do we find? We find that on the Syrian-Israel frontier there are hard1y any incidents of· infiltration or of movement from one side to the other. Why? Because the Jordan is ,there and because the water-line separates the two sicles. Remove that line and you would then have many incidents such as Qibya, and if such incidents took nous confirmés, quelques sujet phique, droits arrangements théoriquement, et comme a et nous élément rité prononcée ·154. et . de avoir A l'appui rait les dans reux naturel mais devrait 155. la Syrie. coule partie en et qui qui longe 153. Ml'. Eban tried to avoid all these issues that we have brought up and, in our view at least, he thus implicitly confirmed them. He tllen turned ta some other .extraneous issues whichwere quite foreign to the subject. He mentioned the geographic aspect, the historical background, the topography, the private rights, the possibility of regional arrangements, et cetera. Even if, for the sake of argument, l tell him that l grant him aIl this, and that aIl these things are again5t us, as he says - though they are not ~ there is one thing tllat is absolutely vdth us, and that 1S the Armistice Agreement, the agreement that we should seek to implement. There is another th.ing that is also definitely on our side in tms case, and that is the United Nations authorityexpressed in the report of the United Nations Chief of Staff. 154. ''''hat has aIl this to do with the geographica1 aspect ar:d the historical background? Is a propaganda effect bemg sought? That may be. Israel might he justified in seeking propaganda effects. In fact there is a steady diminution in the support which Isr~el has been receiving. In our view, that support may have. diminished in the last two or three years hy about 50 pel" cent, especially in countries such as the Œùted State~ .where it was particularly strong and where now It 15 constant1y on the wane. It isvery natural for Israel to seek this propaganda effect but the Security Council is not the place for such p;opaganda. . 155. Then there is the geographiè aspect; and the fact tha~ t~e Jordan ~~es .not touch upon. Syria. The Jordan IS III the dennhtal'lzed zone in that area and the demilitarized zone is not Israel and no on~ has conce~ed the territory. Again, there is the topography of wh1ch he. spoke, and the fact that the Jordan flows down and 1S named by a derivation which is quite dou~tful, a river thatgoes down. Ml'. Eban has forgotten that the Syrian frontier also mns down the valley of the Jordan on one side, and that the R;ver Jordan does t.~at land is within the demilitarized zone and, therefore, subject to its status. 157. Mr. Eban then spoke about extraneous private rights - the private rights of a so-called company having a concession. At no time in history has any government of Palestine given a concession to divert the Jordan. That project is new and was never considered by the Government of Palestine or any other government. But even supposing it had, the decisions of the Government of Palestine do not apply to the demilitarized zone, any more than the decisions of the Gpvernment of Syria. How co~td they apply? But Mr. Eban himself starts hy saying that Israel is not continuing Palestine. If Israel is not continuing Palestine, and if it does not hase itself upon the international treaties, how can he then rely upon an administrative decision in this case? Such an administrative decision, in fact, 11\)t only is not applicable to the zone but, in fact, never existed in the form of a diversion of the River ] ordan. "\That they once o'btaineci from the Government of Palestine was simply the possibility of building dams and of raising the level of the waters of lakes Huleh and Tiberias above their normal levelln order to Qbtain electricity. But l should like to reiterate that in no case can these private rights he considered as an obstacle in the \Vay of the application of an armistice agreement entered into by the two authorities. 158. l would ask the Council to allow me to make one more remark on this particular point concerning private rights. We have said, and we continue to say, that 99 per cent or more of the demilitarized zone Arab-owned. Vve mention that simply in order to demonstrate the impossibility of a statement which was meant to be misleading, in connexion with the contention that the work could becarried on there without affecting the rights which, the Arabs, had acquired by use or by irrigation. 159. Mr. Eban mentioned the National ]ewish Fund, Probably he was referring to sorne government-owned land in· that area which has been given to the National, Jewish Fund. That may he so. But the factremains t~<lt:beownersof that area are those who have heen d. ;'/,::". away from their lands by Israel and who are now either refngees in Syria or prisoners in Israel prisons and concentration carnps. They are those who were driven away and whose homes were. partly burned in· violation of the Armistice Agreement and, furthermore, in contravention of the decision of 1951 i • i 161. There is another argument which has been often repeated. We paid no attention ta it, thinking that it was superfluous and of no consequence whatsoever, but owing to its repetition, l should like to say a ward concerning it. We have often been reminded that beèause Syria possesses other resourœs, it should therefore he generous with its resou!:'ces to the south. This kind of generosity is 'something that we would not like to participatein, especially with Israel, because of its means of action with regard to the problem of Arab refugees and other problems. Our resources are ours, as the resources of ea.ch country belong lo it. The fact that we have other resources in no argument,' except in the mind of Mr. Eban. .•. ' 162. AIl these arguments of geography, topography, and the like, are in fact immaterial in considering the issue, which is based squarely and completely on the Anndstice Agreement. AIl this rhetoric does not, by any means, cover.up the nakedness of the Israeli policy. 163. Without in. the least giving any anti-Semitic conn;>~ation'.to what l anl going to say, or any anti.:. . Semltic feeltng, for we have none, 1 would like to ~e~ll. the merchant of Vçnice. In that story, one mdlV1duaIhaddebts against another, and the creditor was calIed Shylock. He had debts and he wanted a poun~. of flesh. But tha.t pound of flesh would destroy the hfe of somebody else, and it was refused 'him. Israel has no debts to collect from other countries. ~srael cannot take the River Jordan without having ItS ounce of blood, that is, by destroying the life of the area and disturbingits peace. 164. There are tîmes, such' as ,today, when we are asked to try to. come to iom agreement, of some nature. 165. The best thing to do is to close the door definitely to unilateral action, because when this door is unequivocally closed by Security Council resolutions, then the thinking may tum in a different direction. Then fears would be lessened and confidence established, and then we would have the opportunity which, in time, might lead to some kind of change in the situation. . 166. The Security Council must look tQ its duties under the Charter, and its primary duty is to implement international agreements and to keep their sanctity. Today we have the Armistice Agreement. If Israel would like to iRterpret it, let it not seek negotiations heyond it or under it or around it. It is possible to interpret the Annistice Agreement. If Israel wants to modify that Agreement, it is possible to do 50. But to try to paralyse it by unilateral action is somethitig that does not serve peace; it serves ooly expansion and aggression, and naturally prompts ,the necessary actions. ., 167. . The PRESIDENT (translated fram French): It is rather difficult for me at this ume, without previous consultation with the office of the Presi<:lent of the Assembly, to fix, for our next meeting on the 'question we have beendiscussing today, a date which is not in danger of clashing with a plenary meeting of the General .A:ssembly. Consequently, if the C01.1ncil agrees, it rriight allow me to' use my discretion in convening it 'Some clay. next week for the purpose of continuing the discussion of this question. The meeting ro-seat 6.15 p.m.