S/PV.640 Security Council

At the 63Sth meeting, l ex,plained my Government's views on the question before ,the Couneil, and in particular our views on the tragic and shocking incident at Qibya. Today l want only to speak quite briefly about the draft resolution which l have joined with the French and United States representatives in sponsoring and which i5 now 'before us. The United States representative has just explained to the Council the main purposes which the draft resolution seeks to attain, and for my part l entirely agree with what he has said. 9. It seems to us quite right that the draft resolution should deal in the first place with the Qibya incident itself. This is, after all, the central point of our discussions. It has, l thin.1<:, been established fmm what General Bennike has to1d us that the action at Qihya was undertaken by armed ;forces of Israel, and l think th:J.t my coHeagues will agree that the Council should place clearly oe record its very strong disapproval of that action. 10. There are really two reasons why we suggest that the Council should feel very deeply about this. First, the action taken at Qibya was reprehensib1e in itselfr and, second, such actions - and it is our earnest hope that there will be no repetition of them - must inevitably create new obstacles ta the cause which the Council has at heart, namely, the return of peace in the Middle East as a whole. 11. The draft resolution, as will be seen, then dea'ls with the problem of what has come ta be called "infiltration" into Israel from Jordan. At our 637th meeting, the representative of Israel spoke of a "guerrilla warfare conducted with full governmental acquiesCênce" a:gainst Israel from Jordan, and in this connexion he even spoke, l fear, of what he called the "influence" of the United Kingdom. l need not, l think, defend my Government on this particular point. Its desire for peace and,.indeed, its interest in peace, is very weIl known to all of us. But l should, perhaps, make it entirely c1ear for ]3urposes of record that l am quite una:ble to accept the account that Mr. Eban gave us cif this problem. 12. The representa:tive of Jordan has told us [638th meeting] that his Government regards itas its dutY to co-operate in preventing infiltration, because of the international agreements to which it has suDscribed. Tt has taken measur~~ to prevent unauthorized crossings of the frontier, and it will, l am sure, continue to do so. But, particularly since such crossings have in the past resulted in acts of violence of a very regrettable kind, it seems to me at 'least to be reasonable that we should ask 14. 1 should like to make one final point. My Government feels that this draft resolution should be voted upon at the earliest possible moment, so that those who are chiefly called upon to take èertain measures to relieve the tension along the Israel-Jordan b(lrder, and who are now sitting with us, may he released for that esSt:ntial purpose. My Government hopes that contacts betweenthe authorities on either side can continue and, indeed, hecome more frequent on questions arising out of the armistice. It seems to me that there is a great deal to he said for the view e..xpressed the other day [638th meeting] by the representative of Jordan, that the most suitable place for such talks would be in Jerusalem. 15. For aU these reasons we hope that the Council will be able to approve the draft resolution ·as soon as possible, and preferably, indeed, this aftemoon.

On behalf of the delegation of FRANCE, 1 should like to say that it fully agrees with the reasons which have just been explained by the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom and which have prompted the three delegations to co-operate in presenting the draft resolution which we are n'ow examining. 17. In our opmlOn, this draft resolution faUs very clearly, within the general framework of the responsibilities conferred upon the Security Council by the Charter, and in particular of the Council's responsibilities with regard to the observance of. the armistice agreements signed between Israel and the neighbouring countries, and with regard to the desired evolution of the system laid down by these agreements towards the establishment of a lasting peace in the Middle East. 18; Basing their conclusions on the facts gathered by the Truce Supervision Organization, the three Powers, in the draft resolut~on which they have submitted to the Council, have formed a judgment on the Qibya incident which T personà.lly consider moderate and impartial; Tf the two parties were sincerely to accept this judgment, it would contribute towards the restoration of ca:lm in the minds of those ûl1 either side of the demarcation Hne, and would make possible a real improvement in the relations hetween the neiglibouring' 'States of Israel and Jordan. 19. We a1so believe that observance ibyboth governments of the agreements they have signed is the essential condition for such an improvement. In my l 21. Whet General Bennike's report reaches us, we can perha s resume the examination of the general conditions in the area in a more detached manner, since we shaIl he further removed from the events which have so much aroused public opinion, and may hope th~t our deliberations will give rise to more permane.u :'\1', l hope, more constructive proposaIs. 22. In conclusion, l emphasize that l fuUy associate myself with the desire expressed by the United Kingdom representative that the present debate should be corrcluded as soon as possible. l think that -bath parties have had ample opportunity to express their views and that it would have been difficult for the Council to be more fully errlig'htened than it has been by the long and interesting statements of Mr. Eban, of the representative of the Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan, and of Mr.· Malik. 23. l agree.with Sir Gladwyn Jebb that hardly anything could ·be said now except by way of repetition. l earnestly hope, therefore, that speakers will limit their remarks to the essential, say orrly what they consider absolutely necessary, and refrain altogether from propaganda, so that this debate may shortly be brought to a.n end. l helieve that the Council as a whole 1s anxïous to vote on this draft resolution as soon as possible. l do not know whether it win be able to do so today. l hope, however, that we may in any case take a decision at the beginning of our next meeting, the date of which will he fixed at the end of this one. 24. Mr. ZafruI1a KHAN (Pakistan): I.noted with respect the President's· appeal to the metn'bers of the Council at the close of his observations. While l endorse that appeal and accept it, l am unable to guarantee that my first inte.rvention in the debate at this stage wHI be brief. This is a very serious matter, both the principal incident that prompted the bringing of the matter to the SecurÏty. Coutlcil and the whole bacl~­ ground of the problem with aIl its implications. It is therefore, in my judgment - although l may he wrong -:- very necessary that we should have a correct perspectlve of the situation with which we und ourselves faced, before we, can decide what 1S needed at this stage to 27. First, let us remind ourselves of the salient features of the picture v-hïch the representative of Israel sought ta present to us. He presented to us the picture of a gifted people, oppressed and persecuted for centu::îes, seeking to establish a sanctuary for themselves. He brought into high relief the grand conception, the heroic struggle, the zeal, the effort, the initiative and the enterprise - aU compelling admiration and worthy of encouragement. He dwelt upon the constant threat to serurity and the pursuit of peaceful occupations and purposes on the part of what hedescrihed as hostile and implacable enemies. He referred [637th meeting] to, and indeed set out in detail, a continuous succession of alarums and "murderous incursions", imposing constant vigilance and alertnessand nerve-wracking strain. OccasionaUy, according to him, there is regrettable but quite understandable snapping of control under this strain, resulting in loss of innocent lives on the other side, which is regretted and deplored. But, he stressed, Israel is always ready, indeed it is anxious and eager, to' àiscuss, to make and tolive in peace with its neighbou l's. He expressed his sorrow that these neighbours, most perversely, refu~e to discuss,make and live in peace with the State of 'Israel. 29. For that reason, we must also consider how the picture presents itself to Arab eyes. The gifts of Israel, the oppression and the persecution are conceded. One Calvary has entailed a whole succes"ion of calvarie.<;, and ever since, in one part of the world or another, the Hebrew race has ,been subjected to persecution. An AraD ïeJght, however, ,be tempted ta observe that so far as the humanitarian aspect is concerned. while Christian'Europe took delight in persecuttng that gifted race and the persecution was perhaps all the severer on account of its gifts and their exercise, Ara:b Spain furnisheà a sanctuary. Bn 30. But let us leave the Middle Ages behind and come 'to modern times. Let us get down ta the First World War. Turkey's entry into the First World Vlar on the side ofGermany created a very delicate situation for the Allies in the Middle East. To redress the balance, aroong other steps taken, efforts were made to :persuade the Arabs to throw off their allegiallce ta TUJ:'key :Incl to assist the war effort of the Allies. That effort succeedec1. As' part of the pledges given to the Arabs was the pledge, dearly established during discussions later when the Ir.atter came under discussion, that, at the end of the war, and in case of the victory ai the Allies, Palestine would he independent, along with other Arab countries. The Arnbs put faiih in those pledges. When thetime came for fulfilment, those who had pledged their word and honaur forswore themselves. It has since been contended that they carried out nine-tenths of the pledge. Thatis not a standard which should,be acceptable and which should he applicable to the redemption of pledges among honourable people, whether individuals or States. But let that 'he. 31. Even then the situation could have heen saved and the inconsistent pledges givèn ta both sides could have ?een so interpreted - on occasion it was sought so to mterpret them - as to bring about a reconciliation in their intent and ta eliminate the inconsistencies. But unfortunately then came Hitler, anti-semitism and a periodof another intense Jewish persecution in Europe. When Hitler Was defeated, the Arabs were calkd upon to pay the penalty for his misdeeds so far as Jewish persecution was concerned. It was a strangeand ironie mstance of international justice. • 32. The matter came to the Genéral Assembly. The Assemblyproceeded to do what ithad no authority ta do, what it had no power or jurisdiction to enforee.The methods and manœuvres employed to bring about that result reflect no credit upon those who had recourse to them. It is unnecessary at this stage ta dweU upon them. The resolution of the Assembly was adopted in face of 34. An era of conflict, of hostility, of bitterness and every form, shape and degree of human suffering and ~misery was inaugurated, the responsibility for which does not in the first instance rest upon Israeli cr Arab. It rests upon every one of those who, by design 01"' through over-persuasion' or in consequence of ignorance, gave their support to that which in its conception was inequitable, which in its execution was a horroT and the continuance of which speIls an unending vista of conflict, suffering and misery. 35. The Charter sets up the ideal of the resolving of disput~s and conflicts through peaceful means. Here a dispute was <leliberately created - for that was the effect of the Balfour Declaration-and a solution was ultimately found, 'based on force. The State of Israel was established by force and continues by force. When itexercises force, or force is exercised against it, let us not in fairness'ConL.le our censure to the,instrument alone. Those who fashioned, or assisted in the fashioning of the instrument deserve the censure' ifi the first instance for that which they must he pres11..ttled to have intended. 36. The Assemblyhad no authority to hand over any country or territory to anyone. It -could confer no title. The so-called State :of Israel is, inArah eyes__ and l ==~~~~llmjgiving-"you~-iliepietuî'e as itappears to'fhe Arabs---- a manifestation of force in support of a continuing wrong. That is how it appears to the Arabs. Their reaction is in accord with that concept. When the represefitative of Israel complains that the AraJbs do not hastento make peace with hn,e1, he wishes it forgotten that the Arabs regard Israel as an intruder which has, through guile, force and oppression, possessed' itself of 'Ara:b lands and Arab homes, and has turned near1y, a ,', , 2 38. Then, Israel bases itself on the Assembly resolutions. Has Israel itself kept to tliose resolutions? The Arabs do not accept them. But is Israel willing ta revert to the Assemblv resolutions in the matter of frontiers? With regard to frontiers, the authorized aec1aration on behalf of Israel, quoted to the Council the other day [639th meeting] by the representative of Lebwon, is: our frontiers '.vere established by war; they will be changed only by war. Is thc:l.t an invitation to peace or is that a challenge ta war? 39. What is Israel's positio:'l with regard to Jerusalem, clearly required by the Assembly resolution to he internationalized? Israel has converted it into its capital. 40. The truth is that Israel talks peace and acts war. It steals marches and it confronts the Arabs and the United Nations with faits aGComplis, and then insists that these faits accomplis should he confirmed as part of the peace settlement. And there is yet no end to its ambitions, designs and projects of expansion. 41. These are not the only factors blocking a peace settlement. There is no guarantee that Israe~ would keep a peace that it might make. True, it is a small State in terms of population and area. But it is dynamïc, it is strong, it is weIl equipped and weIl trained, with enormous resources capable of development inside Israel and almost unlimited liquid resources outside. For none of these is it to ,be blamed. These are aU e1ements worthy of appreciation.But they must he taken note of when Israel paints a picture of a weak, small, persecuted, harassed people surroundedby hostile and implacable enemies. l shall not attempt to draw a picture of the surrounding Arab States in respect of their strengtll <.l.fld reSOUf-e.es, lestit offend· their suscep- ·tibilîties. But it is a fact that, by its very needs, the! State of Israel is forced to adopt a policy of expansion - and in support of that expansion,· if need arises, of aggressiOll. It has to provide for a constant stream of immigrants. How is it going to do this? This' feature was stressed during the debates in the Assembly when partition was being discl:tssed. Israel gave assurance after assurance that not only would no harm come to the Arabs within.the State of Israel, but .that under the 1 State of Israel the Arabs would be more prosperous, would ,he happier, than they had ever been before in that land. It was pointed out as an elementary factor in the ~ y WWaa~,:l\~~~'_ O<~, 42. As I have said, the very nature of that need imposes an obligation upon the State of Israel ta e."tpand. Where can it expand? Not into othe Mediterranea..'l. It has been demonstrated that the surrounding Arab States are nQt in a position today ta check and curb these policies, tendencies and activities Qn the part Ql Israel. Until they are strQng enQugh to enforce the pence that they might make, they dare nQt make one. Indeed, not until then could a just and fair peace he made. There is never, never any question Qf a just, fair and e~uitable peace between the strong and the weak. It is only such a peace - a just, fair and equitable peace - that could be acceptable ta the people Qf the Arab States and that would have a chance of enduring. 43. These are some Qf the features of the backgrotmd of the picture, as it appears to Arab eyes, Qn the history and the establishment of the State of Israel during the brief period it has been in being. and on its policies, its activities and their consequences. 44. 1 now come to the present situation, which is more directly the suoject matter Qf discussion hefure the Coundl. The representative of Israel, as part of the pi.cture of the present situation. has stressed the continuation of 'what he has described as "murderous incursions". 1make no objection to the use of that expression. Whatever view the Arabs might take of the State of Israel and its policies, we are emphatically of the view that the armistice agreements must be strictly observed and adhered to. It is true that the State of Jordan has dec1ared its acceptance of thaï responsiobility in full. We appreciate it. It has urged the consideration, as a factor showing how di:flficult the problenl is in the actual situation, that the dem.arcation Hue has resulted in the separation of families from friends and of homes from lands. .J.o. Wc:- endorse aU that the representative of Israel :;aid \Vith regard ta what he described as "murderous incursionsu • Ali human life is sacred. There are divi~ sions of mankind, based upon faith, based upon culture, based upon race and, unfortunately, sometimes - though we do not recognize them - based even upon colour, but that does not make one human life more precious than another nor one less sacred than another. In these areas, whether it is a Jew who is killed or an Ara:b who is killed, each such incident imports equal horror, inasmuch as it constitutcs a trespass against the most sacred human right. Sometimes the question may arise, where does the responsibility rest? That can he worked out on the evidenc~ availa:ble, but, with regard to the character of these dastardly acts, there can he no dif~ ference of opinion. At least, we see none. 47. The incident of 13 October at Yahud was referred to. Now, whoever com1llitted it is worthy of conclemnation and must be punished, provided it can he determined beyond doubt who was gttilty of il. In respect of that incident. ttnfortunately, the 'fesponsibility has not yet been esta:blished. 1 will come back ta it later in connexion with another aspect of the matter. 48. We now come ta the Qibya incident and those which led up to il. What is the Israel version of it? AU that wc have been told a:bout it on ,behalf of Israel is contained in two passages, ta which 1 shall proceed ta draw attention. In his statement on 12 November f637th meeting] before the Council, the representative of Israel said: "The mood and background ot the Qibya incident can only be understood in the light of this atmosphere in which our hard struggle for security and peace is conducted. In Ï11structing me to portray this background as fully as possihle, the Government of Israel directs me, nevertheless, to state that it ,regards the 10ss 'Of innocent life at Qibya with prof'Ound and unreservedregret. This. was a most unfortunate explosion of pent-up feeling and a tragic breakdown of restraint after the provocation of brutal attacks such as the cold~blooded murder of a mother and her children in theit" s.)eep," The second passage is rrom thesame tecord. Itisas follows: . "The attacks on Israel's life, property and communications J.tllder cover of armis~ice agreements are purposeful and deHberate. They have ullfortunately lecl to counter actions, some of which, such as the Qibya incident, cause a luss of innocent life which Israel deeply regrets and unreservedly deplores." 49. At this stage, aIl that l will say by way 0"001- ment is that we »Te 110t toId what happeneq. The repres:ntative of Ist;,;1 expressed disappointment and in- .dlgnation at the lack of emphatic condemnation by the representative of Jordan in 'respect of the loss of Israel 50. But we are not here to compare the degree of condemnation which each side may have expressed of deeds of violence evoh.-ing expressions of horror from aU rightthink-ing people, irrespective of the side by which they are perpetrated. The Qibya incident was of a nature and volume which have deeply shocked the conscience of the Civilized world, Jewish as weU as Gentile, whatever the position may be which the State of Israel takes with regard to it. In fa'Ct, the tragedy of Qrbya is a link in the chain of deliberate Israel design to force its recognition and the acceptance of its terms upon the Arabs through a mounting crescendo of violence and horror. 51. One regrettable feature of one class of these incidents, aU condemnable, is that neither Government has been able to control its armed forces and to prevent them from committing a breach of the Armistice Agreement. . 52. It has been elicited by questions put to General Bennike that, on three occasions sincc the armistice agreements were entered into in 1949- or perhaps in the course of this year, 1 forget which - Jordan armed forces were concerned in these incidents and were condemned for them, though it was explained.that the Arab Legion was not involved - but that, ta our mind, makes no difference. On the other hand, out of twenty-one incursions for which Israel was condemn.ed by the, Armistice Commission, sixteen were carÎ'ied out by .Israel military forces. For purposes of the record, I draw the attention of the Security Council to that portian of the statement of General Bennike which is contained in the' record of the meeting of the Security Council of 9 November 1953 [635th meeting, annex, seCNcn VII]. Question 3 "Can General Bennike state how many Israeli attacks were carried out by Israeli military forces in relation to the total violations by Israelis?" After anana1y~is of the different resolutions, the General summed up by saying: "The answer to your question is sixteen:' That is to say, sixteen out of twentyone. That is a very discou·raging and a very significant feature of these incursions: regular forces acting regu- ~arly in that manner. When, out of twenty-one incursions of th~ kind, sixteen are by the armed forces of a State, they must 'be actingur.der orders..There is no other conclusion that is reasonably possible. 53. But there is a further disquieting feature. The tempo of S11ch incidents is mounting, which again conrfirms one's conclusion that -enere is a design. 1 draw the attention of the Sècurity Council again to an answer of General Bennike. At the same meeting, the question is asked: . .·Questian1 "Does General Bennike consider that attacks carried oUJ by regular Œsraeli forces are becoming more frequent? Are they becoming moreserious in relation to Jordanian loss of lives and material dam- "1 am not in possession of information which would enable me to answer this question, sinee neither the Truce Supervision Organization nor the Mixed Annistice Commission is required to measure or assess damage." 54. Thus during the course of the current year, attacks carried out by regular Israeli forces are becoming more irequent, attacks carried out by Israeli forces are hecoming more serious in terms of loss ol Jordanian lives and attacks carried out by regular Israeli forces are being participated in by increasingly larger numbers of those forces. That again c1early establishes design and a mounting crescendo. 55. These are the methods through which Israel is seeking to make, or to enforce, as it appears tO the Arabs, peace. Tt is then made a grievance that the Arabs do not accept the invitation to the peace tea-party in the Israeli parlour! 56. Let us get down to the background of the current tension and the 'commencement of aggression during this ye;u-. In this connexion, l shall draw the attention of the Council to the report of General Bennike [630th meeting]. In that report, the General thus deseribes the situation as it stood at the end of last year and as i~ developed in the heginning of this year: «At the end of December 1952, the situation was quiet. On 29 December, an 'Agreement to reduce border incidents', valid for one month, was signed. The conclusion of that agreement could be interpreted as indicating a desire to settle current problems in a more co-operative spirit. Its provisions could he considered as greatly improving the'Agreement on measbres to curb infiltration' which had been in force sinee May 1952" [para. 29]. l shall leave out the details of the agreement and shall continue to quote from the General's report as follows: HA few days after that new agreement had come i1100 force' the Jordanians .capture<!. an..Israel driving- .sdioôl veli.ide wliich had made an apparent1y strange mistake in leaving the Jerusalem-Tel Aviv highway and crossing the demarcation line in very difficult terrain in the Latrun area" [para. 31]. The very difficult terraincould not have been mistaken for the highway, in any case. l continue the quotation: "Thus, on 22 January," - and we are getting nearer now to the commencement ~ this series of tragedies - "the local commanders agre~n\ffJ: for the prevention and settlement of minor h.cidents, particularly the crossing of the line bv Î'l1filtrators or by Bocks, came to an end. On that dd.Y, an Israeli soldier vas killed when an IsraeH p!'èrol crossetl the demarca!~\j11 :iiü~ ànd exchanged fire with the inhabitants of Falameh village" [para. 32]. 57. In respect of this incident - it was not very important in itself ·but was a symptom or an indication of what was about ta commence - sorne doubt \Vas cast, or was sought ta be cast, on the question whether it was an Israeli soldier or not. With regard ta that a question was put to General Bennike by the representative of Israel [63Sth meeting, an'ne;t", section VI]. l shall 'read -but that question and the answer. Q~eestion 16 . "In paragraph 32 of General Bennike's report, it tS stated that an Israeli soldier \Vas killed when an Israeli patrol crossed the demarcation Hne and exchanged fire with the inha:bitants of Falameh village. Would the general tell us whether the body had any identification disc which would have identiiied him as an Israeli soldier; whether the number on the disc was communicated ta the Israeli authorities, and whether the body was handed over ta Israel?" The object of the question, obviously, was ta show that though the persan kiUed may have been dressed, per- .haps, in sorne sort of a uniform or clothes resembling a unijorm, it may not have been an Israeli soldier. The answer to the question was : "The body had an Israeli identi'fication dise marked with the number 232046 and the name Yehuda Kadm, in Hebrew. This information was communicated ta the Israeli authoritie~. On 23 January" - that is to say, th(: next day - "the body was handed over to twoomcers of the Israeli Army, who accepted it as that of an Israeli soldier without any reservations on this point." 58. Now that was the atmosphere created in the beginning of the year. Once these agreements were got ridof, incidents 'began to happen, 'Sorne of them so grave 59. The first one in the report of General Bennike [630tlt meeting] reads: <tan 28-29 January 1953, Israeli military forces estimated at 120 to 150 men, using two-inch mortars, three-inch mortars, P.I.A.T. (projector, infantry, anti-tank) weapons, bangalore torpedoes (long metal tubes containing an explosive charge), machine-guns, grenades and small arms, crossed the demarcation Hne and attacked the Arab villages of Falameh and Rantis. At Falameh the mukhtar was killed, seven other villagers were wounded, and three houses were demolished. The attack lasted four and a half hours. Israel \Vas condemned for this act by the Mixed Armistice Commission" [para.. 13]. 60. Consider the charader of this eÀ"'{>edition. No weIl organized State - and the State of Israel, by its very existence in the circumstances, by its background, which the representative of Israel himself sketched for us, is an extremely weIl organized State - can daim that 120 to 150 men of its regular forces, a:rmed with those weapons, could aet merely, if 1 may say so, on the sly. This \Vas exactlyone weel\: after they had denounced the first agreement, which should have automatically come into force on denunciation of the second. 61. The second incident appears in paragraph 17 of the same report, whichlquote: "On the nightof 11 August 1953, Israel military forces using demolition mines, bangaloretorpedoes, two-inch mortars, machine-guns and small a'rms, attacked the villages of Idna, Surif and \:Vadi Fukin, inflicting casualties among the inhabitants and destroying dwellings. The Mixed Armistice Commission condemned Israel for these attacks." 62. vVe now come to the c~lminationof these incidents, the one which the COUncil is now considering. We do not know yet whether even this constitutes the culmination of this tragedy. General Bennike reported in the following terms othis incident at Qihya, paragraphs 18 and 19: ' "The information 1 am going to submit on the Qibya incident is based on reports received from Un~ted Nations observers,in particular from the selllordfficer who is the acting chairman· Df the Mixed Armistice Commission. . "Following the receipt of a Jordan complaint that a raid on the village of Qibya had heen carried out by Israel milita:ry forces during the night of 14-15 October, between 9.30 p.m. and 4.30 a.m., a United Nations investigation team· departed from Jerusalem for Qibya at abOlit 6.30 a.m. on 15 October" -that is, abouf two hours after the termination of this raid. <lThea:ctingchairmanalso leftfor Qihyaon the same morning. On reaching the village, he found that between thirty and fortY buildings had been completely "Bullet:riddled bodies near the doorways" - and this is very important-- "and multiple bullet hits on the doors of the demolishetl houses indicated that the inhabitants had been iorced to remain inside until their homes were blo\V'n up over them. "There were several smaU craters along the western perimeter of the village, and the tails of twa-inch mortar shells were found. Four gaps, approximately 3 metres in width, had been blasted in the barbedwire protective fence surrounding the village. Fragments, easily identifi'able as pa'rts of bangalore torpedoes, were found near these gaps. "By the ttme the acting chairman left Qibya, twenty-seven bodies had been dug from the rubble." Information submitted to the Council since then indicates that the number of killed has been more than fifty. "The villagers were digging for others who they claimed were stî11 buried beneath the building stones. They 'believed that the number of dead might reach sixty. Six wounded persans were seen in the village, and the acting chairman was told that there were other wounded persons in the hospital. . "\lVitnesses were uniform in describing their ex-' perience as a night ofhorror,during which Israel soldiers moved about in their village, b!lowing up buildings, firing into doorways and windows with automatic weapons and throwing band grenades. A number of unexploded hand grenades, marked with Hebrew letters indicating recent Israel manufacture, and three bags of TNT were found in and about the village" [para. 18-24J. 63. Thereupon an emergency meeting of the Mixed Armistice Commission was held· on the same aftemoon, that is ta say, the aftemoon of 15 October, and the following 'resOlution was adopted: "Part one "(a) The crossing of the demartation line by a force approximating one half of a battalion from the Israel regular army, fully equipped, into Qi'bya village on the night of 14-15 October 1953 to attack the inhabitants by firing from automatic weapons and throwing grenades and using bangalore torpedoes together with TNT e..xplosive, by' which forty-one dweIIing houses and a schoolbuilding were completely blown up, resu1ting in the cold~blooded murder of forty-two lives, including men, women [andJ children, and the wounding of fifteen persons and the damage of a police car, [andJ at the same time, the crossing of a part of the same group into Shuqba village, [areJ a breach of article lIT, paragraph 2 of the General Armistice Agreement. "(b) The shelIing by a supporting unit to that force by three-inch m:ortarguns from across the "Part two "The Mixed Arm.<>.:,ce Commission decides that it is extremely important that the Israel authorities should take immediately the most vigorous measures to prevent the recurrence of such aggressions against Jordan and its citizens" [para. 25]. 64. The number of dead mentioned here, it will be observed, is forty-two, but this was on the aftemoon of the moming on which these occurrences took place in Qibya; apparently more dead were discovered thereafter. 65. This resolution was adopted, with the Israel representative voting against it. Can we have. any clue from these proceedings of why the JsraelTepresentative voted against it? The action was obviously a breach of the Armistice Agreement. No objection could 1le-taken ta that sta.tement. But one finds two reasonsfor the opposing vote cast by the Israel representative. One is that the responsibility in this resolution is laid upon the Israel regular army - and that is still the position of the State of Israel. We shall ,be able to show'- indeed it appears already to be the view of the Security Couneil and it was the view of the Commission - that there can be no doubt on the qu.estitln that this ex:pedition was carried out by the Israel regular army, and therefore the Israel representative must have known it. What does he.object to in the resolution? Apparently he objects ta part two. So fnr as the Israel representative was concemed, he was not prepared to endorse the iltatement that they would talœ immediately the most vigorous measures to stop such raids, incursions, or whatever one may call them. 66. With regard to this incident, the Prime Minister of Israel stated: "The Govemment of Israel rejects with aIl vigour the absurd and fantastic allegation that 600 men of the Israel defence forces took part in. the action against the village of Qibya. We have carried out a searching investigation and it is clear beyond doubt that not a single .army unit was a:bsent from its base on the night of the attack on Q\bya." The Prime Minister describes this allegation that 600 men of the defence forces took part in the action against this village as "absurd and fantastic". It is i:nherently neither absurd nor fantastic. The damage done and the activities carried out might well have been the doing of 600 members of the regular armed forces. He apparently rejected the idea that, whoever they wer.e, they were . members of the regular armed forces of Israel. And in support of that contention he makes the statement that "a-searching investigation" had shown that "not a single army unit was absent from its ,base on that night". 67. The represetlt:itiveof ·the United Kingdom, when he spoke the other day [635th meeting], thoughtJle could reconcile this statement with or, at any rate, he· described it as not being contradictory of the finding of ~e Commission. He did not analyse it further, but posslbly he meant that it might he that the number of 17 68. If thaUsthe ,best that can be said for this statement, then on .that construction - it is a force'd construction in any case......,. the statement may he true in the letter, but is false in the intent. 69. It is important. to determine the question whether this miIitary e..xpedition was or was not of the nature described by the Commission. We start with this, that although it is claimed by the Prime Minister of Israel that a searching investigation has been camed out, Israel has not chosento tell the Coûndl-- at least l am not aware that it has told theCouncilthe result of such investigation or to furnish it with an account of what happened and who did it. If Israel has made a searching investigation, why does it not tell us: "Your Commission goes on saying that this was done by regular Israel armed forces. It is utterly wrong. This is the investigation we have made, these are the conclusions to which we have 'Come, this is the evidence upon which they are based:' But Israel does not dothat; at least l have not 'been able· to discover it in the record. 'tllere appears fu be no account in the l"ecord of what acttially happened; therefore. the inference is absolute1y clear and conclusive, namely,· that there' is nothing which would contradict the finding of the Commission. l would put it this way, that the most "searching investigation"has not 'revealed that there is any ground for c:ontesting thè' conclusion to whic4 .t.1J.e Commission came. 70. A suggestion, or perhaps an insinuation, has been introduced that Israel armed forces were not concerned, but that this.expe'dition was carried out by Israel citizens along the border as part of their security arrangements. Let us see first what is the material on which the Commission based its conclusion. Gèneral Bennike's report says [630th meeting, para. 26] : "The following evidence led to my conviction that Israel rtIilitary forces planned and carried out this attack: "1. Witnesses to the attack described the attackers a, Israelis in military uniform with full equipment. "I discussed with the acting chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission the reasons why he .had supported the resolution condemning the Israel army for having carried out this attack and, after listening to 'his explanations, l asked him to state them in writing. l shall now read out his memorandum." l do not apologize for reading out these extracts from documents already On 'record because we must have present to our.mirtds the different features of this case to ena:ble us to determine what is the correct account. Here is the memorandum : "s. The use of bangalore torpedoes to blast openings in the barbed wire fences, concertina type, surrounding the village of Qibya. The bangalore torpedo is normally use'd by military forces during an offensive action to blast a pathway through barbed wire entanglements and mine fields. On 28-29 January 1955, Israel militari" forces raided the village of :!'alameh inside Jordan. In this instance 8I-mITI. mortars, P.LA.T. and bangalore torpe'does were among the weapons used. Israel was condemned for this action and it was brought out, not only in the discussion of the Falameh inCident but in the discussion Df the Israel rounter~omplaints, that Israel military forces had carrie'd out this raid. In August 1953, Israel was condemned for attacking the villages of Wadi Fukin, Idna and Surif in Jordan territory on the night of 11-12 August. In Wadi Fukin the attackers used bangalore torpe'does, demolition bombs and automatic weapons. The resolution pàssed by the Mixed Armistice Commission condemned Israel regular forces for having carried out this raid. Substantiating the contention that regular tn:litary forces took part in these raids is the faet that the body of an I~rael soldier in full uniform with.idenHficationtag was found in the village of Idna after the attack. Again, 'We have discussed Tl'!) complaint that would indicate that the bangalore torpe'do is used by other than military forces. "4. The use .of TNTdemolition bonibs in such quantity and wit.~.such expertresults•. One United .Nations observer, a demolition expert, present at the investigation pointed out the heavy construction of the eut stone 'buildings and the fact that many of them had overhea'cls reinforcedby steel rails. He estimated that at least seventy demolitiop bombs were used to accomplish the complete destruction noted. «s. The use of two-inch mortars against the village of Qibya. This weapon is also standard military equipmcitt, and we have disC'Usse'cl no case that would indicate that ihis weapon is used by other than military forces. "6. The use 6f special1y manufactured incendiary oombsto destroy a lorry inside the village of Qibya. The necks and trigger attac:hments of these bombs were found near the bumed vehicle. .This type. of bomb was used by Israel military forces to bum a field of grain inside Jordan on ~8 May 195\3 in the Dawayima area. This incident was discussed at the hundred and twenty-second Mixed Armistice Commission meeting, and the following resolu,tion was passed: ~~-:-- -_.~- - ~ --- "8. The approach to these villages from inside Israel is through an area protected by Israel military forœs." This is a very significant facto "No group the size of that employed in the Qibya-Budrus-Shuqba attack could move into this area or withdraw from this area undetected. "In my estimation between 250 and 300 well trained Israel soldiers carried out this operation. As a breakdown of -this figure, 1 would say that at least 225 men took part in the actual raid inside Qibya. This figure would account for the men used ta bring the demolitionbombs into the area,the unit handling the twoinch mortars, the infantry units used to proteet the " demolition groups and the units engaging the guards at different points throughout this village of approximately 1,500 inhabitants. The figure of 225 is considered an absolute minimum, as, it must be noted, the statement of the witnes"ses and the e"l1idence found pointed out that the village was simultaneously attacked from three sides. In additionto the force used at Qibya, at least one section of eight or nine menwas used to carry out the raid against Shuqba 1."Ïllage, and it is a1so estimatedthat at least one pla:toon f::om a heaVy weapons company was engaged in the operation against Budrus." 71. . Again it was suggested, in a question put to General Bennike by the representative of'Israel, tha:t aIl this might have been done by private people in pursuit of their security operations, or possibly as the result of prO\Tocation, or as a retaliatory raid. This was also dispased of by General Bennike, in answer to the question of the, representativeof -Israel, at the Security Couneil meeting of 9 November 1953. The representative of Israel put the following que,stion [63Sth meeting, annex, section VI]: Question 4 "My fourth question refers to the report by Com- .mander Hutchison on the Qibya incident, quoted in . ",Ahereport of the 'Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization. In that memorandum.the conclusion is drawn' that, because certain types of weapons were ~mployedbythe atlackers, the attacks therefore111ust have been carried outby Israel -defence forces.•l 'Would appreeiate it., if we could be ·toldwhether, the United Nations observers have exarninedthe defencesystem,of Israel border villages and have conc1nded that the weapons with which these "settlements are armed. to repel attacks fr0m ,across ',the ,hot..der"are of a type and ma:ke differe1.l~ from those emp~oyed by the Israel defence forces." General Bennike replied aS follows: "The record::; of the complaints and investigations of the Mixed Armistice 'Commissions since 1949 con'" tain no evidence to show that ,border villages were ever furnished with bangalore torpedoes, 2-inch and 81 mm. mortars and demolition charges. Nor does the history of incidents show the necessity of border villages being furnished with this type of weapons. The records of the Mixed Arnlistice Commission show that attacks against villages and persons in Israel take the pattern of 1"aids carried out by small armed groups using hit-and-run tactics. For dcfence against this type of action, l can see the usefulness of machine guns, small automatic weapons and even haud grenades, but certainly not of mortars, 'bangalore torpedoes and demolition charges." . 72. That disposes completely of any suggestion or suspici()~ that might be raised that this raid, this e..'<pedition, \Vas liot carried out by the regular army of Israel. What is the situation? Here is a series of three raids which have been mentioned in this report, each increasing in violence, in the number of those who participated, ending in this case of Qibya, by regular armed forces of Ismel. In this case the minimum number of those taking part is put at 250 to 300. They are armed with a certain type of weapon. That type of weapon, as has been explained by the Commission, is not issued to the border villages, as suggested. And l would go further and say that it would not be k ··cd. Why would the border villages, for the purpose of repelling any attack from infiltrators from Jordan, need bangalore torperloes? Would they wish to hlow up their own harbedwire entanglements in order the better to defend themselves against any attacks from Jordan? 'Why would they neerl these demolition bombs? Would they wish to explode their own houses and buildings in order to defend themselves against Jordan infiltrators? Obviously, hy their very nature, these are weapons of offP!1œ. They would not be issued, and particularly on a large scale, along border 1ri1lages. 76. \Vhat have the Israel authorities themselves done? According to them. the army was not concerned. They have made the most searching investigation and, there~ fore, they must have found out who did it. WUI they not take th-:! Security Council into their confidence and tell the Council who did it? Also, will they not tell the Council, though they made it ? grievance, against Jordan that Jordan does not punish infiltrators from that side - Jordan did say that a large number of people had been sentenced to vanous terms of imprisonment for infiltration - what their o'Wn record is in respect of an incident so far-reaching in its consequences, in the misery inflic't:ed, in the suffering, in the people killed? "Vhat is their record after having carried out the most searching investigation, aiter having discovered who did it if it \Vas not the army? They must know who Vias the gui1ty party. What is their record in respect of punishment 'Of the people who carried this out? It goes without saying that any State that issues any kind of w~apons, particularly weapons of the kind that, according to the represent'a.tive of Israel, have been issued to border villages, takes a heavy responsibility tlpon itself to control the use of those arms and to prevent their misuse. 77. Even General Bennike says in answer to aquestion [635ih meeting, amle.t", sectioll V, question 7] : 79 There is another feature ta which '! should also lii{~ ta advert. 1 have said something \Vith regard to the responsibility of those who are originally responsible for bdnging about this state of affairs in that part of the worlel. 1have said something with regard to the responsibility of bath sides concerning theseincidents. 1 have said something with regard ta the responsibility of the State of Israel, the Govermnent of Israel as such, with regard ta these particular incidents. 1 do wish ta say a few words with regard ta the State of Jordan also. 1 am puzzled, 1 am ,bewildered, 'but 1 am not asldng for an explanation as it owes me none; 1 do not know th~t it even owes any ta the Security Council. 80. Anyway, this is what happened. The incident contÎl1ued from 9.30 p.m. until 4.30 a.m. - for seven hours. i wi1lnot describe it; the members of the Council can employ such expressions for its description as they consider appropriate; but men, women and children \Vere Idlled. They were prevented from escaping, houses were demolished j we still have iresh in our minds the picture presented by General Bennike of what happened. 81. Knowing the area where this kind of thing was likely ta happen, where it was probable that it might happen, and knowing the history and the drcmnstances, one is puzzled that Jordan took no action whatsoever to stop this horror from proceeding. Its responsibility is to i.ts o\Vn people. But there appears to be a gap in the facts. Perhaps it e:'\:ercised restraint, perhaps it exercised patience, perseverance, forbearance and endurance. These are admirable qualities - but in their own proper sphere. True, we have been taught to be patient and to forbear and incttlcate patience and fOl:'bearance, but we have also been taught: t/Guard your frontiers." If Jordan :had been provoked by this act into a counterattack against Israel, that would have been wrong; it would have been as 1lluch a breach of the Armistice Agreement as this action was j it would have been as much an atrocity and a horror as this action was. It would have been Cûntrary to' the counsel to be patient and forbear. Whether it might have been descri'bed as an act of aggression or an act of retaliation, it would have been lack of restraint. But, in defence of one's own people against something of that kind, another State lllight have taken quite a different view of its duties and responsibilitiesand obligations towards its own people in such circumstances. The State of Jordan may also feel differently about it if this kind of thing does not cease and if it finds that its forbearance has been mis- 't1l1derstood or is being abused. ' 82. Now 1 should like to say a few words with regard to the.draft resolution [S/ 3139] that has been presented. . l:n bl;"Ief, my comment at this stqge on the draft resolu- !lOn IS that we find the first paragraph of part A. wholly ~na?equate and therefore tmaccepta'ble. It describes' the lllcldent as a retaliatory action. Retaliation against wh~t? The only reference to any kind of incident against ~hlCh this may have been a retaliation is the Yahud in- CIdent. I havealready expressed my own feelings -and I am.sure tliey represent the feelings ofmy Government - wIth regard to any incident of that kind happening on 83. Also, there is this: is it right for a State as such, for a government, to undertake and embark upon retaliut<lry expeditions while proc1aiming all the time its eagerness for peace - or even if not sa proc1aiming its eagerness for peace? Vve object to the use of the expression "retaliatory action", first, because what happened cannot correctly 'he described as retaliatory, and, second, because the use of the expression imports an element of justi'fication or (l.t least an element of eÀ"'Cuse. There was none in this case. The resolution of the Commission adopted on the afternoon of 15 October, which l have already read out, descrihes this action, in its second part, as "aggression" - which, at the very least, it was. An~ we think it should be so described in thè draft resolution. 84. Then, there is no provision in this draft resolution that the depeildents of those who lost their lives and that those who were wound.ed shall be compensated, or that the properties that were destroyed shall he restored. 85. Here is a strange spectacle: Israel has, through various means, devices, actions, expelled close upon a million Arabs from within its State, and those Arabs are in the condition in neighbouring Arab lands which I have earlier described. ~srael then carries out raids, through its regular army, ta kill perhaps sorne of those very refugees - this may be a village of refugees or may 1l0tbe -:-but, at any rate, to kill more Arabs and ta destroy their properties within their own State. It is a planned cainpaign ta km and to destroy homes, and possibly, having softened the position 'by this kind of thing, later ta take those areas over. 86. We consider the resolution unsatisfactory in those of its features that we have pointed out and for the lack of those things that we have suggested. We shall later make our own suggestions with regard to its strengthening.

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