S/PV.641 Security Council

l propose that, in accordance with existing precedents, the application submitted by ]apan [Sj3126] should be referred '10 the Council's Committee of Experts for study. qui présentée

In the case of the Republic of San Marino also l propose that, in accordance with precedents, the application [5/3137] should be refèrred to the Council's Committee of Experts for study. l t was so decided. 3. The PRESIDENT (translated from French): As it is most desirable that first the Security Council and then the General Assemb-ly would take a decision on these applications before the close of the General Assembly's current session, which is scheduled for 8 December, I shaH request the Committee of Experts ta examine these two applications as saon as possible. Appointment of a governor of the Free Territory of Trieste (continued)

caU upon the representative of the United States of America on a point of arder. 5. Mi. LODGE (United States of Amèrica) : Three weeks aga [634th meeting], and ten days before that [628th meetingl, the Security Council decided ta postpone the consideration "of this item. "These decisions were taken because of the efforts being made to 'bring about an equitable solution. Since then consultations have been continuing. We very much hope that definite arrangements will be completed in the near future which111ay point the way to a solution. Recent developments offer sorne encouragement. 6. I therefore move that the Security Council should postpone consideration of this question until the week of 8 to 15 December, the exact date ta be fixed by the President. A 7. The PRESIDENT (translated front French): The Cofincil has before it a request for the postponement of the discussion of the item on today's agenda ta another more or less fixed date, submitted by the United States representative in accordance.with rule 33, paragraph 3, of our provisional rules of procedure. S. As a fixed time limit has beenset for this adjournment, the matter may now be discussed. Does anyone wish to speak on the United States representative's . proposa.!? . 9. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of "Soviet Socialist . Republics) (translated" from Russian) : Unfortunately, 1 am again unable to accept the proposaI just made by Mr. 'Lodge. The ," United States representative contended that œrtain consultations regarding the fate. of the Free Territory of Trieste were in progress and that recent events gave ground for hope that these consultations would yield definite results. 10. Even if that were the case - and the consultations referredto did produce definite results - that would not in our view alter the position in any way, since the consultations in question have no other purpose than the attainment of agreement on a final partition of the 13. In my opinion, after the repeated postponement of the consideration by· the Security Council bf the proposaI concerning the appointment of a governor for the Free Territoryof Trieste which the .Soviet Union submitted over a month aga [625th mee#ng], we are now confronted with the difficulties resulting froin that postponement, from the persistent and systematic deferment of the consideration of this question by the Security Council, from the procrastination, and l might even say, the obstruction, of the question in the Security Council. 14.· The events we are now witnessing and to whioh Ml'. Lodge has already referred merely go to show that an exceptionally dangerous situation has now arisen in this matter. . 15. The three Powers are stGl exerting every effort to postpone consideration of this question in the Security Council, not merely to avoid discussion in the COl:Dcil, but to avoid taking the first step, which we should take, to carry the Treaty of Peace with Italy into effect, albeit after an inadmissible delay. Theil' position not only fails to contribute to any easing of the tension which has arisen in the Free Territory ofTrieste, much less of the acute tension which is 'IlOW in evidence and which augurs i11 for the future, but - as events, particnlarly those of the last few .t.:lays, show - is resulting in 1 iurther exacerbation of that tension. 16. More than a month has now passed since the Soviet Union proposed that the Security Council should consider the question of appointing a govemor for the Free Territory of Trieste. What was the purpose and significance of that proposai? l think that its purpose and significance are self-evident. It·would have been the first step towards a genuinely peaceful settlement of the Triestequestion. It could have been the first step towards converting Trieste into a genuinely free and democratic territory with ri .régime whkh would ha'Ve safeguarded peace and security in this most jmportant area of southern·Europe. . 17. We have already pointed out that the policy of the three Western Powers towards the Free Territory of Trieste, which found expression inter. <dia in the ZOo We have pointed out that upon a peaceful settleri'i,~t of the Trieste question in eonformity with the Treaty of Peace hinges the hope that the national eenfiicts which have broken out in the area and which have had à strong impact upon us, can be eliminated and resolved and that, \Vith the elimination tif these confliets, the aggressive and unscrupulous elements and ~gents prpvocateurs in this area will he deprived of any pfè.~e.""{t fot' kind1ing ehauvinism and national hostility tht.1s cre&ting athreat ta peace and international security insouthern Europe. _ 21. We have drawn attention to all these faets and l must no less empbatically reiterate that 'the decl~.ration of 8 Odober 1953, had an extremely unfortunate effeet in this connexion. It added fuel to the fiames. It was an act of incitement to dîsregard the Treaty of Peace and the important political provisions it contains. . 22. The~dec1aration of 8 October 1953 was an injunctiàn to leave the Treaty of Peace out of aecount, ta act as though it clid not exist. It was also a promise of support for the e1ements waging a campaigJl1 against the Treaty ofPeaceand hem:~against.,the"peaceful and democratie principles whichthc Treaty of Peace prescribed. as the, basis upon whk.h the Trieste question should be settled. 23. Sum was the efteet of the dec1aration of 8 Octobër" by the United Kingdomand the United States of Ai~1eriç::i.. Tt. could not -be, otherwise, representing as it1:Üdagruss contravention of the Treatyof Peace with ltaly a1!d of theoblïgatlon,,which weaU assumed under t1lat treaty, to seeka sO~.ltion.of the Trieste question in accordance \Vith the provisions of that treaty. Several other stateme-nts iolIoweddeaIing with measures to c()cnvert Trieste into'amilitary base. 24:~ The' United States of America has been at ,,0 littlepains to 'convert the Fre3Terri1.~ry of'~rieste intQ a military base: That would Lè agross violation of the l'reflty of 'Peace and ,\Vou1d .• arouseaggressive sentime:nts, still ftlrther. Tt would encourage those circ1es whichJ~av~b~l~seeking toseCl.lre the abrogation of the relevatttpartof the Treaty ofPeaçeand whet thedesire forr~venge of: the reactionary,nationaIistçoups 'which .. ><lSeeOffici.aI.!f.eco~às orthe Securlît Counell,.' ThirdYear, SupplefMiit 'for August 1948, d~t.Il11ent S/70'1. , .'. '" ' aSee pepartment olState Bulleti~ (UnitëdStates' of Ame.- cita), V9f. UIX" Nq.747, 19 Octoberl953, p. 529', -- -- ' - 29. This is quite natura1 if we retnember what has been very aptly referred .to in one of the American newspapers as "Pandora's box" - the box in which she kept her famous gifts. That treasured gift is the cam.. paign against the principles of democracy; in the place of democracy the Anglo-American Pandora has generously presented the territory with militarism, the pmvoC'ltion of conflicts between Yugoslavia and Italy, intensification of national bitterness and a feeling of discont~nt ,andhatred on bath sides. What wou1d have been the alternative? The .promotion of good'will and. co-operation between' the peoples •inhabiting the Free Territory of Trieste, which would have been a practical policy if based on strict compliance with the Treaty of Peace with Italy. Such,at aU events, \vas the objective which the twenty-one States that signed the Treaty of Peace had in view. 30. The nature of the polièy of the three Western Powers regardittg Trieste isshown in that part of Eu'" rope by the faét that it is systematically and persistently undermining the broadly-conceived, peace-loving and democratic plan to set up agenuîne1y democratic Free Territory of Trieste. 33. Now the study of the question is being postponed undl the meeting of the five-Power conference) which likewis~~ illegal. The conference is postponing the question till an agreement i8 reached between the five- Powers - and that too is illegalin the hope that somehow or other they will succeed in coming to an agreement on something. But they are not reaching any agreement on anything. What has actually hëen happening in Trieste during the past two weeks) period characterized by regrettable e"cnts not only in Trieste but throughout Italy and Yl1goslavia? 34. On 6 November a whole wave of disorders swept over Trieste, Rome, Belgrade) Milan, Turin, Genoa, PalermQ, Bari and other areas. THe peacefttl population was fired ou and people were killed and wottnded. That happened while \the Secl1rity Councîl \Vas cabnly sitting . here (or not sitting, as the case may ,be) and hoping that o\ltside the Secl1rity Cotmcil aU disagreements would be successfully settled, aIl unpleasantness eliminatecl and a peaceful solution of the question ensured. The fine phrases uttered here were revealed in their true light by the events of 6 November in those towns and countries of which l harve just spoken. 35. The report from Yugoslavia which was published in Tbe N nu Ym'k Ti'mes points to Italy as ha'VÏng organi:?:ed those disturbances in the hope of putting pressure on the conference. Preparations are being mad~ for the conference in different ways; some contrive disturbances and others wait ta see how these disturbances will end. 36, It is no tnere chance that in connexion with those events the British newspaper Th8 Timesl referring to thesimilitarity between the riots in Trieste and in Italy, says $at they leave the suspicion of a recrudescence of the old passions of the days of fascism and that they evoko memory of the war year~ when Italy was an enemy•. 38 The events in Italy, Yugo~lavia and Trieste on 6 November 1953, although they have lost their ol~:"inal acute fortu, have not vanh;hed without a trace. The crux of the matter is still the attempt of the Uuited Kit\gdolU and the United States of America to carry out the partition of Trieste. This is the main reason for the disorders and unrest in that ak'ea. 39. AIl sorts of compromises are being soug'ht to carry out the plan for the partition of Trieste: hopes are placed in the five~Power conference. which is supposed-: ly intended to satisfy the requirements of public opinion, if any. 40. In the meantime, measures are being taken to train the police in sniping at the civiHaa population. In order to justify the utterly unjustifiable shootings of civilians in Trieste, in ordtlr to find some excnse for barbarous acts on the part of the police. snch as fil'ing upon worshippers nt a church service or on student de1l10nstrn~ tions. lying reports were is~;ued to the effect that the demonstrntors threw stones and even hand~grenades and home-made bombs at the United Kingdo1l1 and United States troops. 41. Even if this is truc. it ouly shows the complete failure of the United Kingdolll .:md United States occupation trMps tQ establish their uuthority in a territory they have been holding for eight years. 42. What is the intention behind aIl this? Is not the intention, by use of armcd force against the population, ta silence the objectors, to silence aIl those who protest against the unlawful attempts to carve up the Free Territory of Trieste to suit the plans of Western reactionaries, to shelve the Treaty of Peace with Italy and thereby to prevent the formation of what would indeed be a Free Territory of Trieste? Instead of facilitating the continued existence and development of the terl'Îtory, every effort is made to facilitate its development as an Anglo~American military basc, as one more bastion of the North Atlantic bloc. 43. This then is the intention ltlVolved. It is a plot against the Free Territoryof Trieste and consequently against the consolidation of pence and security in south~ ern Europe. This ois the objective which the three Western ~owers - the authors Qf this plot - are makingoeYet'3Lwrt-to achi<we - and. speaking for my Govern1l1ent, l lUust say that the game they played in Trieste is a dangerous one, and one which threatens the interests of an peace~loving peoples, and, first and fore~ most. of the peoples of Trieste, Yugoslavia and Italy. 44. Sir Winstol1 Churchill said, at the Lord Mayor's banquet in the Guildhall on 10 November 1953, that he was50rry that the ItaUans and the Yugoslavs were so annoyed at each other. That is something all friends of 'peacemust regret and undoubtedly do regret. But one 47. At the same time, according to reports in the United States Press, Ml'. Eden, using stronger terms than usua.l in the House of Commons, spoke of the disorders and emphasized that order had to be restored with a strang hand. Vve know what the restaratian of arder with a strong hand means. Ml'. Eden stressed at the same time that the students' strike of 5 November 1953 and the disorders of 6 November were organized by the more adult members of the neo..fascist party. The Fascists are again on the scene. Consequently the position is such that the events have Lpened up a field of activity' and provided an arena for fascist elements instead of providing a field of activity for democratic elements. But for that we would have to have a democratie régime, which does not exist in Trieste, and democratic solutions, which are not proposed in the case of Trieste, for the solutions proposed there are anything but denlOcratic. In connexion with the events of 6 November 1953, Ml'. Dulles, in his turn, hastened to express his full confidence in General Winterton, the Commander of the United Kingdom and United States forces, declaringthat he did not sympathize with the proposaI to remove him from the post of Allied Commander in Trieste. 48. Naturally l shall not enter into a discussion of the substance of this question. l am mentioning only facts which show what is now happening in Trieste and which allow me to state, not for mere effect, but for the sake of the truth, that Trieste has now been transformed into a cauldron seething witli political passions as result of the policy of the three Western Powers, whièh are 110t respecting a treaty designed ta ensurepeace but are ,.1:..;-:::ng declarations which are undermining the situatlolt in Trieste; that is what they did on 20 March 1948 and 8 October 1953 and what they are doing again now with their so-called conf~rence. l mention only facts and happenings which are evidence that l):ieste is in fact a cauldron seething with political passions. . , .. 4Ç1:Recenf evenfs show even more convincingly how dangerous the situation created in Trieste - a situation 51. The Soviet Union appeals for such action. It proposes that as the first step a governor should be appointed for the Free Territory of Trieste. You aIl perfectly weIl understand the importance and significanee of such a measure and I do not consider it in the least Jlecessary to explain it. It is c1ear to aIl. \Vhy not take the first step On this road? Why not appoint a governor at once as proposed in the peace treaty? Why not bring into effect the provisions of the peace treaty re1ating to its provisional régime and its subsequent permanent statute, which call!:or the cOll'vening of a constituent assembly on the hsis of universal suffrage, the formation of a permanent council as a legislative organ, the withdrawal of foreign troops from the Territory of Trieste and the liquidation of foreign bases on that Territory? Those are the measures which could really immediately solve the question of the extremists and the partisans and the shooting on the streets of Italy and perhaps of other countries and towns, which could in fact ensure for us a peaceful solution of this question. 52. It is incomprehensible that such pertinacity has been shown in burying the peace treaty at any cost, for that treaty represents - and no one can deny this - a really peaceful solution of the Trieste problem, and in replacing it by what is, at best, a solution which is contrary to the interests of Trieste and which will satisfy neither side, neither the population of Slav origin nor the population of Italia.'·l origin - which will in fact satisfy nobody. 53. This cannot be explained except as a policy directed against the very aim we ought to pursue, ~amely to strengthen international peace i:!ld security tnstead of obstructing and undermining them. 54. These are the ideas which cause me as the Soviet repre~e.ntative t'! oppos~ any further postponement of a deC1~lOn on thIs' question and to urge and entreat the Secunty .Council to follow tlle constitutional and only constructIve procedure and discuss thequestioll which was placed on its agenda on 15 Oetober 1953 [.625th meetingl at the request of the Soviet delegation.

1 have only a few remarks to make. on the speech we h3.ve just heard. 1 will explain the position of my delegation briefly. 56. .In my opinion, the difficulties we are facing in the appo11ltment of a governor for Trieste are not due ta th~ fà~ t?a.t t~e Council has postponed consideration of thequestl0n, as the Soviet Union representative said, '9 "r do not need to remind you that without preliminary agreement hetween the representatives of the four Powers who took part in the decision of the Council of Foreign Ministers of 12 December 1946, it would naturally be a waste of time for the Security Council to discuss this question, since no decision can be taken unless there is agreement hetween the representatives of the four Powers.U Indeed, our discussions tend to give the impression that as long as the four permanent members of the Council are not in agreement, it is a waste of time consider the question of the appointment of a governor of Trieste. 58. The second factor is that under. the terms article .JI of the Permanent Statute of, the Free Territory of Trieste, contained in annex YI to the Treaty of Peace, the appointment of a governor must subject to the prior approval of Italy and Yugoslavia. When the question was raised in 1947, that was precisely the conclusion reached and a committee of experts was set up which, after meeting for several' months, finally took the decision of consulting the Italian and Yugoslav GOvernments. Early in 1948, possibly January - l do not recall the exact date _.- we received a letter from the Italian Government, and several days later, one from the Yugoslav Government, informing us that the two Governments had been unable to agree on the choice of the governor. For that reasoti it was decided in 1948 to postpone consideration of the question untila member of the Council requested that the item should again be included in the agenda. 59. In these circumstances, it seemS that we are going round in circles. In fact, we cannot appoint a governor by virtue of the Treaty of Peace with Italy" which makes if a condition of thatappointment that the four Powers should he in agreement, and also by virtue article Il of the Permanent .Statute. of Trieste, which constitutes a second condition for tI, t appointment. We·cannot act as if that treaty andthat article did not oost, but when Ml'. Vyshinsky tells us that it is unnecessary ta seek a solutionbecause it is already contained in the Tl'eatyof Peace wit~ Italy, we cannot butfeel that that is a strange way of solving the problem. It is precisely the Treaty of Peace with Italy and article 11 of the Statute which l'equire, first, that the four 'Powers should he agreed,and secondly, that Italy and Yugoslavia shouldbeagreed, on the appoint- 61. We should use a litt!e common sense. The first step is ta obtain agreement between Italy and Yugoslavia. Perhaps in the next two weeks the two countries may be able to reach agreement on the name of a governor. Such agréement could only give us cause for satisfaction for there would then be nothing in the way of implementing the Permanent Statute of Trieste. But if that solution is not forthcoming, then another will have to he sought. The four permanent members of the Council concerned in the matter only signed the Treaty of Peace as mediators; they signed the Statute, which requires prior agreement between the Ita.1ian and Yugoslav Governments on the appointment of a governor. 62. I am certain that the permanent members of the Security Council will be the first to express satisfaction at any solution which may be reached 'now, for the question of Trieste has been weighing upon the Coundl for several years and an agreement between Italy and Yugoslavia would be a great relief to us. 63. At the moment the question may ·be summed up as follows: the Permanent 'Statute of Trieste and the Treaty of Peace with Italy prevent us from appointing a governor hecause they require, first, agreemen-l; between the four Powers and, secondly, agreement between Italy and Yugoslavia. It would therefore be logical, in my opinion, ta work for an agreement between the Italian and Yugoslav Governments. In my delegation's opinion, the Couneil would be acting reasonably if it postponed 'consideration of the question for several days in order ta obtain that agreement. If we do not succeed, the situation will remain exact1y the same as it was in· January 1948 and as it is today, and for that reason my delegation will vote in fatour of the proposaI for postponing the debate. t.. 64. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (tran$1Jated fram Russian): Mr. Urrutia's argumentsseemed strange to us: Ta begin with, his statement might have led one to conclude that a conference was being organized for the specifie .purpose of reaching an agreement. on the appointment of a governor for the Free Territory of Trieste. If this is so, it is something new and l shouJd like to ask him who . the candidate is, on whom ·the five Powers are proposing. to reach agreement in violation of article 11· of the Permanent Statute. Who is this candidate? Where and by whom W!l.S he nominated?Who was eonsulted in advance on the subjeet? Mr. UrI"Utia said that the four Powers had to reach agreement in advance. What are· these fourPowers which have already reaehed agreement on a candidate and who is the candidate in question? 65. If this is in fact· the purpose of the conference for the sake of which consideration of the question in the 68. If we look at article 11 of the Permanent Statute, we may alsofind it surprising that Mr. Urrutia could have taken such liberties with articles and provisions which have the force of laws. Article Il of the Statute states that "the 'Governor shall be appointed by the Security Council after consultation with the Governments of Yugoslavia and Italy", from which Mr. Urrutia concluded that no action was to be taken by the Security Council until an agreement had been reached with Yugoslavia and Italy on the question of candidate. In fact he 1started out by saying that the difficulties connected with the appointment of a governor w~re not really the result ofde1ay on the Security Council's part but of the need {or the four Powers reach agreement on a candidate. But in arder to reach agreement on a candidate, it is surely also necessary for the Security CounciUo discuss the matter. 69. l would draw the attention of Mr. Urrutia and any legal a.dv~sors he may have consulted to the fact that what article 11 envisages is that the Security Council-not the four Powers - will first nominate and then, after consultation, appoint a governor. In other words, the Security Council must first propose candidate and then reach agreement on the candidate; it must next consult the Governments of Yùgoslavia and Italy and only after that appoint the goveruor. That is the only possible interpretation of the <7,tticle, although Mr. Urrutia has placed a different meaning upon it. He takes it ta mean that the Four Powers should reach agreement on a governor by some separate process, then consult Yugoslavia and Italy and only after tha~, submit the matter ta the Security Council for its consideration. In my humble submission, the distinguished representative of Colombia is making a serious error. Such a procedure is not at all what article 11 envisages. Ta conciude, what course of action do we propose? Perhaps MT. Urrutiawill make comm9P cause with me on this issue. What we propose is that the Security Council should proceed ta consider the question of the appointmènt of a governor. 70. . This means that Mr. Lodge, Sir Gladwyn Jebb, Mr. Hoppenot and theother distinguished members of the Security Council will reach agreement on a candidate. Whoever he is, .once he has been agreed on as possible candidate for the post. of. govemor of the Free 'Territoryof Trieste, he will be appointed by a decision of the Security Cound! after consultation with Yugoslavia and Italy. Unless the Security Council agrëes on a candidate in advance, beforeconsulting Italy and 72. Consequently, Ml'. Urrutia - l trust he will' allow me ta read this into his statement - if he attaches great importance ta the appointment of a governor and if he considers the nomination of a candidate by the Security Council to be so important, will not obje~t to its being discussed here. Let us then join in voting to that effect instead of postponing the question and let us proceed to our discussion. Such a procedure may perhaps enable us to reach agreement on the appointment of a governor. We have a candidate to put forward. If you haveanother, please say so and we can consider him with the care and attention he deseryes. Is there any other possible interpretation of article Il of the Permanent Statute? Can it really be interpreted to meati that we can discuss the question of the appointment of a governor only after we have reached agreement and consulted Italy and Yugoslavia? Is that the interpretation placed on the article by my colleagues? Sucb an interpretation would be an entirely new one, and one whicb l have never heam before, although l personally took part in the drafting of the articles as far back as 1946, when we were working on the draft of the Treatyof Peace with Italy. No one placed that interpretation on the article then and it is not justified by the tex:t. 73.. l therefore considerthat Ml'. Urrutia's objections are devoid of foundation. Ta say, as Ml'. Urrutia does, that the difficulties connected with discussing this question in the Security Council are due to the fact that the four Powers have'not reached agreement on a candidate for the governor of the FreeTerritory, is to formulate, the question in a completely arbitrary fashion and to put the cart before the horse.We must:fi.rst reach agreement on a candidate and, in order ta do so, must discuss the matter here. When we harve discussed it here and·reached agreement about a candidate, we can consuIt Italy and Yugoslavia in the Security Council's name. Only after that will we forinally. appoint. the governor in the Security Council's name, in complete conformity with article Il of the Permanent Statute. 7~.. This .is aIl that we propose. In arder to consult wlth ltaly and Yugoslavia, weniust have a candidate. arder to have a candidate, we. must reach agrèén:l§J.t.

Before calling upon the Colombian representative, who has asked to speak again, l should like to point out to him, and perhaps also to Mr. Vyshinsky, that we are now discussing a proposaI for postponing discussion of item 4 of the Couneil's agenda and notthe legal interpretation of article 11. If the discussion is to be prolonged on the latter point, l shall request that it should bear as closely as possible on the actual subject we are discussing: 78. Mr. URRUTIA (Colombia) (translated fram French): My additional remarks will be as brief as possible. 79. Of course, l do not have the legal advisers whom Mr. Vyshinsky has at his disposaI but in an:r case. have had time to study the documents and l -wish to point out that the interpretation 1·ha.ve given of article 11 is not my personal one. Tt is the Security Couneil's interpretation. In 1947, the Security Council decided [223rd meeting] that the first measure to he taken was to consult with Italyand'Yugoslavia. 80. In thàt respe~t, l have invented nothing and Mr. Vyshinsky can consult the documents. My memory not infallible, ·but l believe that the Couneil took that decision in December 1947 or January 1948. The reply of the Italian Government [5/647] was received, believe, in February or March 1948. 81. In any case" by its decision, the Council gave this interpretation that preliminary consultations were necessary. But l do not intend to question that interpretation, particularly since l now realize that article H was drafted by Mr. Vyshinsky. l merely regret that he did not draft it more clearly so as ta prevent Mr. Gromyko ;from making a mistake two years later il1 the Security 'Council, 'by maintaining an argument completely. differenit f1"om that of Mr. Vyshinsky., Indeed, it is not my fault if in 1947 Mr. Gromyko decided that the Couucilcould not appoint a governor as long as there was'rio agreementbetween the four Powers. ., 82. But that is not the question. What is important is that Mr. Vyshinsky stated a mqment aga, in oppositi<m to our argum.ents, that Sir Gladwyn Jebb, Mr. Hoppenot, Mt. J....odge, Mr. Vyshinsky - and l will add thi;:· representative of China - should first agree upon 'a. candidate, that that ,candidate should then be endorsed by the Security' Council and that fhen the Council S-hould consult Italy and Yugosla'Via. 83. In my opinion, the order of events is'not important. It does uot matter greatly whether agreement is firstreached between the four Powers or between 85. Nor did 1 say that what we are discussing at the moment is the name of a gove,rnor. 1 do not know what we are discussing. 1 said that possibly we are discussing this question. 1 suppose that if these conversations take place, they will be heM in complete freedom. If it is decided ta accept a candidate, to appoint a governor, that wûuld be perfect. If other solutions are proposed, we should take CiJgnizance of them and we cannot express an opinion before we are informed of them. The first step is to await the result of these discussions. 86. MI'. VYSHINSKY (Union of So....,iet Socialist Republics) (f:ranslated from Russian): Mr. President, I realize of course that this is not the moment to embark upon a legal analysis, but since Mr. Urrutia wellt sorne way in .that direction and you, as President, allowed him to do so, l assume yûu have no objection ta my answering Mr. Urrutia in kind. l have done 50 and hope to go on doing so, provided you do not ohject. 87. In tbis partîcuhr instance, since Mr. Urrutia has 'raisedthe question of the Procedure for the appointment of governor, 1 must make that question absolutely clear. 88. I must first thank Mr. Urrutia for bis readiness ta depart from bis original categûrical attitude and for his statement that, after hea'Ting my explanation, he would not press his views. If he does press bis views, we must .consider the matter c1osed. But l still rear that Mr. Urrutia is taking an incorrect line as a result of his desire to please. . . 89. The line he is takillgjs. incorJ."~çt,A'Tsi:, because he ascribes ta my cdlleague, Mr. Gromyko, a mistake which he did not make.' And secondly - 1 am bound to rep.eat this --< he places an incûrrect. interpretation on artlcIe 11 of the Permanent Statute. But the President will not permit me ta discuss the latter· point and 1 shall therefore confine myself te the former. 90. What actually hrppened in regard to Ml". Gromyko? It must first be borne in mind that the question of candidates for govemor of the Free Territory of Trieste was discussed on 10 July 1947 at the 15'5th meeting of the Security Council. Many names were put forward - one, two" three, fûur.,.. twelve candidates, ù.duding Colonel FlilcIdger, whol.U we are now putting forward again.Amongst the candidates put forward were sorne distinguished people. In fact they ,were aIl distinguishild people. There was Ml": Femandez from Çolombia '~T'hO was, 1 believe, proposed by Ml". Urru~a (if l ,,,,1 not mistaken and if my mernory does..not fad me). Tl1en there wasMr.Padilla r s'agissait Territoire veau. i-espectables. t~ose proposaIs remained in force. At that meeting Ml'. Gromyko saia thaï at the discussions of the five pe.rmatlent members of the Council. the Soviet Union had expressed its readiness to agree to the candidature of Ml'. Buisseret, the Belgian. candidat~,who hail at one time received the süpporbof aU the members of the'· Security Council with the exception of the United Kingdom representative~ , ,'9.2. the UnltedKingdom representative. Sir Alexander Cadoganh had then expressed the view that the French .proposa~ ..ta commumeate the list of candidates ~or the post of gbvernor of l'rieste to the Italian.and YugoslavGovernment and, re'quest theiropiriion should be accepted. Th.....: was in complete confonnity with article 11 of th~ Permanent St{ltute and with t."Ie logic which Ml'. Urrutia has invoked. admittedly in vain. . 93.'Thê-Frèrtch repre.~entative, :Ml'. Parodi, indicated that· the proposaI ha;d."' be~ made on his· personal initiative.: $" 94: The United States l'epresentative, Ml'. Austin, said [223rd meeting] he considered it inadvisàble to commuIÛcatethe list of candidates for the post of govemor to the Governments of Jtaly and Yugosla'Via; it would be ~.refeJ'ableJf.l l'aise the question of the governor, "without naming any candidates and.soon. 95. FoUowing the statement by Ml'. Austin, Mr. Parodj.suggested the te.'tt·of'a draft telegram.Ï:n which the Security Council was tocan upon the ltall~ GoveI1l1l,\~t tQenter into negotiations with the Ytlgoslav G~)Vel'f'lP1ent,regllrding the appointn1ent ofa govemor :for ,TfiesteanG. 'to inform tpe Counci1 by 10 January 1948 whet~ertheyagree4 to submitoneor more candidates..If "the two .coun!rîes .did not 50 agree•. they w~re<to notifj~~eUnited Nations of the;;wn,es of .the calldidat,es theY'~j$hed to.submit tp th~ Security Cotincil~ ..••The. Securily"Couucil· was to. communicate .t1}.e n,a~~ ofcall<lidat~S1puttoI',\vardin tbeCotlncil{o the ... Y~goslavt:\rid lWi.an Gùve~ents .. 'AfterdiscuS$ing the qQ,estion.theSecurit',f Çoundlapproved a modifiedc,~tt~question, t~!ota; telegran;t'which was t() have heen sent ta the 25pvernments of Italyanq 'Yt1gos1avia.~ 96rMr:Urrutiaw~l1 th~sse~ that ~ver,aperiod of fivembnth~ the Counéil bas disct1ssed flctual. candidate$, nominaiedsome of themt and, cOïnmunicated tbelr names to the 'Italian"and YugQslav GQv~rnments. invCiil}g fhose Çio1\ernments tl) give their opinion : f the càtldîaal:es ptoposed or'to.na;me.oth~J:s. 0;haf was the.. p:r~~~r~)ïPich wa$fq;low,~, which~should bave~'I,;~%~~~~9:~~9$etd:aittres ~~lo~Yt:q~d;whicl1,was,~~down il\."article1tlof thel): ,~Perifl~J.ent Stafute ~ ~ ~,'.' '''~:" '. _ ~a: ~OW. wnat was Mr.·Gromyko'~mistak~:,He mâd'~ ,:.. n,Qrmi~W<e beca.use he supported the propasà1 to cotn- 100. Just'one ward more. Mr. Urrutia said that the procedure was llot of importance fur him, that the procedure fo11owed was of no, importance. That. of course, is CQmplete anarchy. There must be a procedure, the procedure laid down by article 11 of the Permanent Statute. Mr. Urrutia should not press his view that the procedure fo11owed is unimportant. The procedur~ must he determined and it has in fact been Hxed by a legal instrument, by the peace treaty, by article 11 of the Permanent Statute. . 101. The PRESIDENT (translated from French): If no other representative wishts to speak, l sha11 put to a vote the United States proposaI to pqstpone the discussion of this ltem until another meeting, tobe held between 8 and 15 December, the exact date to be decided at the ?resident's discretion. A vot'e was taken by sh(lW of hands. In favour: Chile, China, Colombia, Denmark, France, Greece, Pakistan, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Unite:d Sbtes of America. Against: Union' of Soviet·Socialist Republics. Absiaîning: Lehanon; The proposal wfisaàopt~d}y 9 votes to1 'lmlfh 1 abstention. 102. The PRESIDENT (translated [rom French.): Refore closing thîs, meeting, l should like to state that, ta suit the personal cohvenience,oE01i~~fthe representatives who wishesto speaktomorrow, the meeting of !he. ,Secur~ty C<?unci1 to be',devQted to .th~, Qibya ffiCldent WIn begm at 4,p.m. and not.at 3,p.Ul.'as had been decideêt SALIS AIlIHIS fOR UNIRD DlPOSI1'AII!S DIS PUIUCATIONS AHElltllli-atMliE fWlCI Eclilorill .Sudlmlrlclnl SA. Alllni 5('0. Edltlons JUlnos Aires. pUÎJ v,. AlSTiAllA-AlSTUUE IlUCl-ClUE H. A. Goddlrd. 2SSI Glri"'l' St., Sydney. "etlfth.roud.ki,," and W QII\\l.n St•• M.lbouth.. tion, AthinlS. Mllbourn. Univ.rslty Pres" C6rllon N,3. ..."WU Viclorla. GOlIbaud IEU'IM-IR""E 28. GUltemll Aglnc••t MIsslglries d. la Prou. SA. Il.llll 14-22 ru. du Persil. BruxIIl... lIb...irlo' "A W. H. Smith " Son. 7i.75, boul.vard III.B, Port-.u.Prlnc.. Adolph••Max, Brllxell.,. ....w IOU".-IOl"'E . lIbrert. P.n.mlrlc.no, Librlrt. Slilecciones,' Cesma 9n. 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