S/PV.642 Security Council

Before beginning our discussions, 1 would like, on hehalf of the Security Council, to express to Mr. Sourdis, Minister of Foreign Affairs' for Colombia, the pleasure we all feel at seeing him here. We have already several times had the privilegeof having him V/ith us, but today he comes backto the Couneil vested with the authority of the high post he occupies in the Colombian Government. 1 am happy tobe able to tell him again how pleased we are to have him here and to extend to him a friendly we1come.

In reply to the kind words which have just been spoken, I should like respectfully to convey to the Security Council the sincere good wishes of my country and myself. 3. Although I am only passing through New York, 1 was unwilling to miss ihis brief opportunity of being present atthe United Nations, to which I feel myse1f c10sely linked and in which my country has great confidence. 4. Iam therefore deeply grateful to the President for his generous words and on my own and Colombia's behalf extend ta the Council 111Y cor·dial wishes for the success of its labours, S/3119~ 8/3139, 8/3139/Rev.2, 8/3140) (continued) REPORT BY THE CHl'E'F OF STAFF OF THE TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION (continued) At the invitation of the PresidentJ Mr. EbanJ representative of IsraelJ Mr. HaikalJ representative of the Hashc'11tite Kingd01n of the JordanJand Major General BennikeJ Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Su,pc1"ltÎsion Organization in PalestineJ took places at the Council table. 5. The PRESIDENT (trGnslated front French): At the moment there are no speakers on my iist, but l am ready to call on any member who wishes to speak. 6. Mr. :IDBAN (Israel): I must apok )ze to the Security Council for any lack of system in the organization of my words, owing to the expeditious treatment of this subject which has not enabled me to prepare these reflections with due deHberation. 7. Since r last addressed the Security Council, two important steps have been taken in the Council's deliberations on tbis matter. In the first place, a draft resolution [S/3139] has been 'submitted in the name of FranceJ the United Kingdom and the United States, which took the initiative for raising this question for discussion in the Security Council. Yesterday, on behalf . of the Government of Israel, I invoked [S/3140] article XII, of the Israel-Jordan General Armistice Agreement,! with its provision of obligatory attendance at a conference for the purpose of revit~wing, revising or mèxlif:ying that Agreenlent. 8. These, then, are the two policies which now lie before the Security Council for its consideration. The. Council is caUed upon, in effect, to decide between the two' schools of thought, the two systems of political action, represented, on the one hand, by the three-Power draft resolution and, on the other, by the 'CaU for pacifie seulement within the terms of article XII of the Armistice Agreement. In arder to facilitate the work of the Council in consideringthat choice, l should like to analyse the main elements of these two policies which now lie before it for decision,. 9. The diaft resolution [S/3139] submitted by the three Powers enters primarily into the violent and turbulent events of the recent past, and discusses othose events, as l hope to show, with a marked ~ack of a proper sense either of balance or equity. 10. It is a second feature of the draft resolution that it offers no proposaIs whatsoever, of any kind at aU, beyond those which have pl'oved notably ineffective in the past, and whose very ineffectiveness is illustrated in the tragic events which have brought the Security Council into such l,lrgent session. It is, therefore, our case that the draft resolution is loud.in worods but not in deeds. It seems to us bold and intemperate in denun- . ci~tion, but highly timid and 'Conservative in action. 11. Third1y, the draft resolution, to our surprise and regret, marks a notable retreat from the policy which the Security Council has in the past invariably upheld wl-:~h takes this question out of the realm of public p nical discussion into the channels of pacific bilateral s"L.1ement. 14. The fact that these two pollcies now stand before world opinion for its judgment is not fortmtous. There is a direct relaiionship of cause and effect between the three-Power ,draft resolution [S/3139), which now lies hefore the Security Council, and the invocation, for the lirst 'ne in the history of the armistice system, of article XII of the Armistice Agreer.J.ent. 15. It seemed, and it seems, to my Govérnment that the adoption by the Security Council of the draft resolution [5/3139], and the consequent dispersai of the Security Counci1 in the mood and the spirit which that draft reflects, wou1d place a heavy strain on a secuTÏty situation already imperilled - imperilled by the effect of live years withotit progress to peace, imperilled by grow:ing and relentless hostility against Israel, organized and concerted by neighbouring States, and imperilled, it must be admitted, by such ~austion of Israel's resources of patience and restraint as has been illustrated in recent dire events. 16. Thisdraft resolution, with its lugubriùus concentration' on the tragedy of the past, with its selective oscillation between a stringent attitude towards Israel's defence and a marked indulgence ta the Ara:b siege, and, above a11, with its unpromising equivocation on peace - a11 this, together with a marked lack of substantive and concrete proposaIs fnr an advance towards an a11eviation of this situation, would seem to my Government to be the prelude, not merely to the main-, tenance of the existing para:lysis, ·but even ta the aggravation of a crisis already acute. 17. In discussing the draft resolution in detail, as l sha11, l must explain to the Council that this drait was presented to us in a somewhat unusual andultimative form, and that my ·delegation was notgranted any opportunity to make its detailed views on that formulation available before the draft was accepted. This, therefore, represents our lirst opportunity to analyse this draft resolution from the point ofview of our special intimate experience of the scene and responsibility for the future, In the light of this draft reso1ution, the Government of Israel, in consultation with us, has taken our tota.'l security position under urgent review. 18. These are the main elements of the situation as they present t:hemselves to our mind. The Armistice Agreements have lasted five years, much beyond the expectation of their authors. The fact that sueh an extreme duration of a provisional system is bound to caUse a loss of its eifectivene§§ hg§ been thç \lmmimous 19. But the armistice structure is not merely old; it is also broken. Great gaps have appeared in its structure, and l speak here especially of the Jordan- Israel General Armistice Agreement. Its main objective of transition ta peace is repudiated. by one side. Article VIII, dealing with an important and sensitive area in the relations betweenthe two countries, is totally without application. Paragraph 3 of article IV, whkh establishes for Israel a demarcation line to constitTlte a. lrontier of recognized integrity against any " ..lauthorized crossing whatsoever, has been held up, hi effect, to such derisionthat it is the subject, not of hundreds, .but of thousands of i1licit crossings each year. Am6ngst these thousands of illicit crossings, there are hundreds involving violence, and many dozens involving fatal conse<luenœs to life. 20. These, then, are some of the main defects of this armistice system, in addition to its growing obsolescence mving to the lack of any'progress towards a final settlement. 21. The position becomes furtl1er aggravated by the recent intensification of belligerence and hostility. The effect of this draft resolution in:the operative paragraph which deals with infiltration is, to imply a condonation (lf present policies in'respect' to such infiltration, and thus to turn .the back on the concept of any radical reform in'the frontier defence polides of the Kingdom of Jordan. Another feature of this darkening security sitUation is the effect on the minds of the peoples of the Middle East Qf this flight by the Security Council from its previouslye.xpressed andrepeatedly affirmed policy in favour of a negotiated peace sett1ement. 22. This retieat frûmt.~e concepts of peace occurs at a time when the very events' which have brought. the Council into session tragically illustrate the urgency of . that transition to a peace settlement. It was in order to meet the situation. which would arise-in our judgment perilous both ta the mood and to the prospect of peâcethat we acted yesterday to invoke artic1e XII of the General Armistice Agreement. The basis of that action is the belief which we have always upheld h'l the effica~y of.direct settlement. Ourexperience has shown us that we have never fiat down with an Arab State without reachii:J.g an agreement, andthatwe have never' .reached. an agreement with an Arab State without having sat down with it. It is through the lack of application of the .processes of directsettlement to this dispute. that international <liplomacy has r.eached its. present deadlock. 23. We therefore obserVe· that section ofartic1e XII which emphasizes that we have a right, an obligatory right, to call for à conference of the twoparties. The emphasis is on a bilate'ral ~pproach. Our experience.has provecl to us that when we talk to our neighbours in the absence of third parties, then and only then, do we talk to each other; whereas in the preset:lce of third parties, each of us talkstotb-e thircl party. in an effort to gain 28. r should like to say a few words about the underlying concepts whjch motivated the adoption of article XII of the General. Armistice Agreement. Why is that article there? What does it seek to prave or to attain? The existence 'of that article in our Armistice Agreements with all the neighbouring'Ar8lb countries has a direct effect on two assumptions which have Ïallaeiously gained currency in the world. 29. First, it is assumedand wrCIngly assumedthat the Arab States have a sovereign îight to maintain the Armistice Agreements in perpetuity without review or modification; that should they desire not to make a transition towards a permane!lt peace settlement, they are empowered ta give sovereign effect to that negative desire. 31. rdo Dot think that 1 should be inaccuratt: if 1 were to say that the diplomatic life of the Middle East has been dominated for the past 10U? or five years by these two assumptions: that there is a right to main- -tain the Armistice Agreements in perpetuity; and that the Aràb States do possess a right not to negotiate directly with Israel for a". settlement of outstanding questions. 31. The text of article XII of the· Israel-Jordan General Armistice Agreement rompletely refutes eaclI of these theses. Tt is c1ear fuat it was never the intention of those who si~ed the Armistice Agreement Or those who helped us negotiate it - it never entered their heads - that the Agreement should survive beyond a brief period of time. Thus the article states: "This Agreement, having ibeennegotiated and conduded in pursuance of theresolution of the Security Council of 16 November 1948 calling for the establishmf.nt of an armistice in order to elirninate the threat to the peace in Palestine and to facilitate the transition frorrl the present truce to permanent peace . . . shaH remain in force until a peace1ul settlementbetween the Parties isacl1ieved ... " . Then it continues: "The Parties to this Agreement may, ,/)y mutual 'Consent, revise this Agreement or anyof its provisions, or may suspend its application, oth~r than articles l and III, at any time. [Artides 1 and III "te the nonaggression clauses of the Armistice Agreement.] In the absence, of mutuaI agreement and after .this Agreement has been in effect for one year from the date of its signing, either of the Parties may call upon the Secretary-General of the United Nations to convoke a conference of representatives of the two Parties for the purpose of reviewing, revising or suspending any of the provisions of this Agreement other than articles l and nI. Participation in such conference shall be obligatory upon the Parties." 33. Tt was c1early envisaged, therefore, that after the J'..,-mistice AgreemeD:t had been in existence for a J.2riod oi a year, a situation would arise in which it would be reasonable and logical to construct a more stable system of international relations in our area. The doctrine that the armistice, with itsexdusively military relationships, without any surrounding background of normal political, economic··· and cultural intercourse, could last year after year, is conclusively refutl~d by the very existence of this provision. . 34. Similarly, and perhaps more important, article XIT of the Armistice Agreement solves a question which has agitated'the United Nations in many diseussions: the questio:l whether the Ara!b States possess a sovereign right tp refuse direct contact with the representatives of Israel for the purpose of considering matters of· mutual concern out of· a se'1se of cornmon responsibility for the security of the arf;a. The statement that participation in such a conference shall he 39. The two questions to which, l am sure, all St0vernments concerned and the opinion of the world, In sa far as it is interestOO in this problem, wish ta hear an answer are, first of all, whether the Governments ~o?~e~ned in the Security CouncU collectively' wish this InItIatIve to succeed or to fail; whether they regard it as relevant to the tasks which they have undertaken for 40. It is against this background that l should like to attempt for the first time at this table an analysis of the draft resolution [S/3139] which now stands before the Security CounciI. I shall frankly ask the Security Council to reach the determination that this draft resolution, by its essence 'and in respect of its most essential provisions" would signify a, departure from the norma1ly accepted standards of international equity; would mark a tetrogression from the concept of pacifie settlement; and would, in its effect, not alleviate, but aggravate, the . _a.k~~dy _savage 'tensions. which prevail in- ûUï region, conserving in that area all the existing causes of tension and unrest, whilst tumingits back OU ::l't1y of the principles whereby that tension might .be alleviated. 41. My nrst obsewation is not of a substantive character in respect to thegeneral importance of the draft resolution, but I think it might have some significance in the light of what.J, shalLsay Jilter~Qn~ts main ~-c'eletlleIits.-'Theâfaffre-scilufionrecalls the previous resolutions of the SecUrit)T Council on the iPalestine question, particularly those of 15 July 1948, 11 August 1949, and 18 May 1951, concerning methods for maintaining the armistice and resolving disputes through the Mixed , Armistice Commissions. 42. The question might be asked, and 1 herewith ask it: why is it that these three resolutions are the subject of particuJar reference; or, more particularIy, what th~ nature of the other resolutions of t'he Security Council which are not singled out for special reference? 43. When we follow up that line of inquiry, the answer increases our disquiet. There is no pat:;ticula" reference to the Security Council resolution of 17 November 1950, 3 or to its resolution of 1 September 195,l,4 What is there that is characteristic of those two resolutions which does not apply to theothers which are here recalled? The only characteristic of those resolutions which -does not belong to ,those' which are rec-alled ist'hat theylay csp~cific obliga.tions upon the Arab Governments; that is to say, the preamble of the draft resolution begins by drawing attention only to those resolutions which do not lay specifie obligations on any Arab Government and thereby, by implied omission, undermines the equal authority of those resolutions which do lay such obligations upon t'hem. 44.· Let me read, for'êxample, one or two paragraphs of the omitted resolution of 17 November 1950. 1 do so because the item. on the agenda concerns compliance with, and enforçement·of aIl the Armistice Agreements, and there is nothing in the item on which theSecurity Council is now holding its debates which restricts us to the purview of the Israel-Jordan Armistice Agree- 3See OfficioJ Records of theSecurity Councit, Fi/th Year, ~_S'lJj1plement ,fol' September, througrr1Jecembe-r195û'; docufuerit .~' .'~,S/1907. 4 Ibid., Sixth Year, 5S8t!t meeting, para. 5. 45. In a previous address [637th meeting] l calied to the attention of. the Security Council the statement by the United Nations Chief of Staff to the effect that the Government of Jordan had refused to operate the Special Committee.wbich ithad -been· caIled upon ta operate under this resolution. Such, then, is the effeet of the first resolution to whicb particular reference is omitted. 46. The second resolution to which reference is omitted is that of 1 September 1951 which was adopted by the ,Security Council in reference ta relations between Israel and Egypt, but although that resolution dealt with the specifie matters of the right of hlockade and the seizure of ships, it developed into a discussion of the general principles of the juridica1 relationship between Israel and the Arab Governments under the Armistice Agreements. This resolution was a judgment on a very important matter: whether the Armistice Agreements are a phase of peace or a phase of war; whether they are a continuance of war by other means - and thereby whether they authorize the continuance oE belligerent practices - or whether the '.Armistice Agreements signify a permanent end to the military phase of'the conflict, and therefore must be considered as a provisional peace settlement. 47. This resolution of the Security Council, therefore, has application t-o everyfield of relations between Israel and the Arab States, for it cantains the only and the most recent authoritative definition of the juridical identity of the Armistice Agreè!Ilents in their relation to war on the one hand or to peace on the other; and the day-to-day implementation of the Armistice Agreements is powerfully affected by whether we look at them as classical armistice treaties in the sense of limitation of the right of war, or whether we look upon them as treaties in a special category falling outside the category of the classical armistices in respect to their complete repudiation of any doctrÏ11e of belligerency. 48. The resolution of 1 September 1951 is not a resolutio!i about Egyptian blockade; it is a resolution about the nature, character, essence and purpose of the armistice system. It ~ontains such phrases of a general cl;a~.acter ~s: "Considering that since the armistice reglme, WhlCh has been inexistence for nearly two and a half years, is of a perman.ent charact€;f: ueither party 49. This document also records that the particular violation there under discussionwhich, incidentally, is still in full progress - constitutes a violation of one of the Arn1istice Agreements, the enforcement of which is now upon the agenda of the Security Council. 50. 1 will, therefore, leave this question of the preamble of the draft resolution with the impression that I have proved the point that the only significance of the omission of particular reference to these two resolutions is that, unlike the other three which have a general effect, the two which have been omitted affeci: the two most chronic and outstanding violations of the armistice system which bave been conterminous with it - namely, blockade practices in the Suez Canal and non-implementation of article VIII of the Israel-Jordan Armistice Agreement. 51. My records and recolIection both prove that on 4 August 1949 [4331·a meeting], in my delegation's first appearance in the Security Council. to discuss the armistice system, 1 drew attention to the existence of these two violations of the Armistice Agreements from the. 1!'ery moment that they were born. The armistice system was born, as it were, with these two deficiencies in its structure, and they have lasted ever since. 52. It wQuld therefore he of the utmost inî:erest a.lld concern ta 'hear from the sponsors of this draft resolution why it is that they omit ;from the list of those resolutions reca1led for particular reference precisely those two which have such direct etÎect on the two most outstanding and' chronic armistice violations which have existed for the past four years. 54. I did uot intend to embark again upon a discussion of the action at. Qibya for which I have repeatedly expressed my Government's profound and unreserved regret. It is, howèver, a fact - and continues to be a fact notwithstanding the statement to the contrary - that it is not accurate to describe this retaliatory action as one taken by the armed forces of Israel on 14-15 Octobe:r 1953. The statement of the Prime Minister of Israel on 19 October 1953 is accurate in every respect. If it is stated that there are grounds on general hypothesis for doubting t.he accuracy of that statement and 53. I come now to the first section of the draft resolu- 'tion under the heading <tA". This refers to the retaliatory action at Qibya. It deals with that action in two paragraphs: one in: which it is found that <tsuch actions constitute a violation of the cease-fire provisions of the Security Council resolution of 15 Jl.1ly 1948 and are inconsistentwith the Parties' obligations under the General Armistice Agreement and t'he Charter"; and the second which "expresses the strongest censure of that action" and goes on to say that that action "can only prejudice the chances of that peaceful settlemen(' which both Parties in accoroance with the Charter are bound to seek, arid caUs upon Israel to téike effective measures to prevent aU such actions in the future". 55. But when we come from the realm of general hypothesis ta the specifie issue which has been disctlssed in the Security Council, l would only say that the reply [635th meeting, annex, section VI, question 4] of General Bennike ta the question which l put ta him on this point of fact fully confirms the motive which animated me in asking my question. For the entire definition of this grievous aet as having been carried out by the armed forces of Israel, which would of course mean by its regular military forces under central governmental command, the chief evidence was said ta l'eside in the vamc and the character of the weapons used. But when l asked the q~estion whether the armaments held in Israel's frontier settlements ta withstand the brutal incursions which were 50 vividly portrayed by the representative of Pakistan at the 640th meeting were of a category and type different from those used in the action at Qibya, the answer was virtually "no", and that the Chief of Staff was not in a position to say, never having ,been able either ta inspect or to certify the character of the armaments in Israel's frontier villages. He did e~ress the opinion that if he were in charge of defending those frontier villages, then there were certain weapons used at Qibya which he would not deem as relevan~ ta such a defence. He would advise such villages ta have certain armal11ents, including machine guns, but he did not see ""hat Bangalore torpedoes or other weapons would be doing in the pattern of that defence. 56. AIl this, however, is an expression of military opinion, and the fact is that it does not constitute any finding that there is any distinction whatever between the armaments of an Israel defence unit and the armaments of an Israel village on the frontier zone; and, in point of faet, there are no such distinctions at aIl. Therefore, ottr first objection is ta a matter of fact: namely, the attribution to the armed forces of Israel of the action which did take place at Qibya, and by such attribution ta deny without cause, justification or accuracy the statement to the contrary made hy Ml'. David Ben..,Gurion to which l have referred. 57. l p~ss from the factual aspects of the mat~er ta its political definition. It might be said that sinee the Government of Israel itseH has stated that the action at Qibya, irrespeetive of that context of tragedy and prov""{)cation out of which it arose, was essential1y a reg'rettable and deplorable act, why shou1d it take" objection to the Security Council's saying that very thing? The answer must lie not in the Sec;urity Council's expression of whatever views it has on this subject, but in the character of the language used. It is my knowledge and experience that the language used has no precedent in the history of the SecurJty Council or of the United Nations; in other words, that the action at Qibya, with its tragic lQ§~ more than nfty lives, is 58. In other words. there is something utterly disproportionate in the nature of this formulation. In respect of the common pra'Ctice anè in the jurisprudence of the Security Council. quite apart from the general isolation of this event from its context and the lack of any words either of sympathy or criticism re1ating to the hundreds of Israe1is who have lost their lives throùgh Arab violence. quite apart from tbat original and essential discrimination. there is l think something disproportionate in' this language, not sa much from the absolute viewpoint as from the viewpoint of its relationship to the practice and the terminology which have 'characterized the statements of the Security Council in aU other international disputes. 59. To this l must add an expression of disappointment and astonishment at finding that the drafters of this draft resolution' have not found any means whatever of expressing anything - either strongest censure, strong censure, weak censure or any censure at aU, or reproach, disapproval or regretfor the death of a single one of the hundreds of our countrymen who have fallen under the onslaught of Arab aggression. either in the war of independence or during the armistice régime. They are completely unsung and unhonoured..And fuis silence, which frankly strikes our people as being both discriminatory andirreverent, finds an especiaUy sensitive chord in our hearts when it is contrasted with the tone and the nature of this expression of censure. How am l or the CCluncil to explain to our people, a norma1ly reasonablé people, that the killingof our neighbours is reprehensible and censurable, but that their killing of our people day by day and week by week in their hundreds ovel the cuurse of months is not a matter which invites the slightest expression either of disapproval or of sympathy by the 'highest tribunal of international security in the world? Are such matters of criticism, sympathy and respect ror loss of life concerns in which we can afford to he selective or expedient? Do they not appeal to something which is common in our total'human solidarity? And are not the draftsmen of this draft resolution [S/3139] thereby caUed upon to look at the semblance of this resolution which, l am sure,.has inadvertently arisen through concentration on a recent event without due regard having been paid ta its surrounding or preceding circumsta..,.ces? 60. My delégation, knowing the general motives and impulses which moved those three Governlnents and peoples, has no doubt whatever that, now that the matter hasbeen drawn ta their attention, they will und the means and the skill to remedy their lack of equity in this sombre and mournful context of which the draft resolution .grave1y speaks. 62. In other words, the tragic event at Qibya, which should sure1y be regarded as a most vivid and shocking signal of the urgency of a peace settlement, is instead described here as a matter which makes a peace settlement less urgent, or at least less likely and less possible. The turbulent events on both sides of our frontier, ~ which constitute ~the h10st overwhelming argument in favour of a peace settlement, tend to be described in the language of this drait resoluHon as something which defers the prospect or the need of a peace settlement. 63. It seems to me, then, that the vision of peace is not fairly treated by the reference to it in this context. And here again l anl quite certain that there is an inadvertent use of language which is liable to the interpretation that events at Qibya would justify or excuse, or at least explain, more delay in the·process of achieving a peace settlement; whereas l aln certain that it is the general, perhaps the universal, view that this context of events which we have come together here to discuss underlines with alarming emphasis the supreme and .paramount urgency of progress from the rancour of the present toward the peace and the harmony of the future. 64. l come now to section B of the draft resolution, and here we have objections of a similarly substantive charader. Section B purports to deal with what is sometirries called infiltration, the movement of murderous incursions across the Israel-Jordan armistice line in violation of article IV, paragraph 3, of the Armistice Agreement. Tt is, l think, acknowledged by everybody that this movementsometimes called infiltration but, l think, capable of less neutral and less aseptic descriptions - is the primary cause of border tensions.' It is admitted that such actions as have been taken from the Israel side have been taken in response to, or in retaliationfor, or in defensive reaction to, this infiltration. Tt is sometimes urged, and in the name of our common imperfection l aln not prepared to deny, that sorne of the actions taken in reaction to this infiltration are themselves not prudent, or themselvés lead to results which every man of humanity should strive to avÈlid. But that these adions from Israel aré taken as a response, as an answer, as a reaction, to something else - this, l think, has not been doubted in any of the utterances to which we have listened or in the Chief of Staff's written report. 65. How, then, does the draft resolution treat that particular phenomenon, hostile to the sC'Curity of the area, which is the source and the origin of the present tension? It "takes note of thefact that there is substantial evidence of crossing of the dematcation line "Sorne armed individuals crossed the demareation line for illicit operations ... and when they clash with guardsmen or troops, investigations of United Nations Observerslead ta condemnation of Jordan for illegal infiltration." 67. In ohis impressive utterance of last week [640th meetingJ, the representative of Pakistan spoke of these incursions or infiltrations in terms far more accurate and far more stringent than those which are to be found in this draft resolution. 1 71. If they exist, the present measures taken by the Government of Jordan result in sorne thousands of illicit crossings of this line every year, of which a lesser, but still very grave number are accompanied hy acts of violence. And, as the reports and documents indicate, the proportion of violence within the general context of illicit crossings is tending ta increase. The present rate of murders is something like sixtY or seventy a year, with hundreds of maimed and wounded and inestimable damage to property. 72. That, then, is the present situatiorr, and aU the draft resolution can say of it is .that the Government of Jordan should continue ta do whatever it is doing, "continue and strengthen the measures which they are already taking"; thé present situation to he a little improved: not thousands of crossings, but a few less than thousands. That seems to me to be the only meaning which this language is capable of communicating in the reading of the text itself. There is absolutely no call in this draft resolution, no suggestion or request, that the Government of Jordan embark upon a totally new policy, and concede measures which it has not yet adopted - sorne of wmch have heen proposed and refused, such as the concrete demarcation of the frontier line, or the active use of regular military forces. Such new devices-a:nd there may he others-are, as it were, ruled out by this draft resolution, which merelyasks the Government of Jordan ta "continue and strengtl en the measures which they have. already taken", and which, as the death toll unhappily proves, have been remarkably ineffective in the prevention of such crossings. 73. l am .quite certain that if we were still in our interrogatory period, and if we were to ask the Chief of Staff or an)"body else directly whether the measures which the Government of Jordan is now taking ta prevent such crossings were likely to bring about their prevention, no one could give a positive answer. And again, l recall a speech on behalf of the United Kingdom in which it. was stated that this is something inevitable, and that sorne infiltrations are bound to happen. In other words, the existence of the infiltration movement is again becoming a lawof natun: which is not ta be radically uprooted, but to which we must resign oUl'selves as a phenomenon belonging either ta our terrain. or, to the·political atmosphere ·which 5urrounds us. 74. The Government and people of Israel are not prepared ta resign themselves to a continuation of this movement which has cast them so heavily in life and limb in such cruel and savage tension, and which has 78. l have· spoken at length onprevious occasions about the absence from tbis draft· resolution of a c1ear caU for a peaceful settlement,:and l would only add one ,,,,ordon that subjectnow. If there is any lessOn: in recent frontier events, it is that the absence of I,eace is the source and origin both of Ara:b incursions and of action· taken from Israel in reaction to those incursions. 79. It is also a fact thatthe Security Couneil has never beforeInetto consicier aproblem relating to the securitj of our areawithout making its centralcondusion the need for a transition to peace. -We are not, on our-side, sufficiently nalve· to imagine-thât the mere reitèrt'tlon by the Security Council of a-desire for a peace negotiation would bring our Arab ndghbours to the negotia~ng table. It is true that there have been such repeated caUs and that they have not been answered. But we do believe that the demonstrative absence from such a· draft resolution of a caU to peace would le interpretedin our -area=m-unly=oneway: nam:ely, asmeaning that the three Powets who present this draft resolution and who·have assumed a spécial responsibility for security in our area are either less convinced in their own minds of the urgency afa peace seUlement, or else that,being convinced of its urgency, they see sorne virtue in not 80. The ciraft resolution, without this strong assertion of the need for a negotiated peace settlement, tears itself away completelyfrom the entire family of previous decisions and formulations which have emanated from the Security Council in the pasto And the matter becomes all the more sombre and disquieting if it is a fact, as we must imagine, that the reason for the omission of this call for a peace settlement is not that the three Powers believe any less in a peace seulementwe are certain that they believe in it now as beforebut if there is any reason, it is that our Arab neighbours do not Hke ta hear uttered the call for a negotiated peace settlement and, in deference to that sensitivity, the draft resolution omits the plain darion caU for peace wmch should reverberate out of this room as the centra:l conclusion of the Security Council's discussion. 81. Theretore, l would draw the attention of the three . Governments which have sponsored this draft resolutian to the deep-seated psychological, and there{ure politicaI, effects upon the people of Israel and, l have no doubt, upon the' people of the Arab world, of tbis mast crucial and decisive omission. In Israel it is int~rpreted as a yielding by the three Governments most directly concerned to this lack of Aral? wiU ta hear the concept of peace frankly prodJ.imed. h the Ara:b world l have no doubt that it will be correspondingly interpreted as the first success which. Arab palicy has had in inhibiting the freedom of the Powers concerned, not merely in acting forpeac~, which. may be beyond their power, but even in speaking for peace, in uttering that which is in their minds. . '\ . 82. There is a greatdeal to be said if ~t is true, as l believe it· tobe, that the three Powers concerned ardently believe that Israel and the Arab States should negotiate a peace settlement. Then our question is, why do they not say so? Why is this'desire uat articulaJed and uttered in tbis· momentous discussion upon peace . and security in the Middle East? 83. l have referred here ta three fundamental defects in respect of sections A and· B, and the "bsence of a clear and decisive reiteration of the urgent need for a negotiated peace settlement. But in addition, and perhaps above aU, l would invite theSecurityCouncil to consider its entire course whenit confronts this draft resoltltion on the one hand, and the imminence of an effort at pacific seulement on the other. l believe that ~ere ~~. ~o precedent in the experience of the Security l;0uncil iIiWhich ithàs riotjldapfeà its public discus:: SlOns to the· exigencies of a serious effort at pacifie settlement. IbeHeve that in every single case which has come before: the Counciland l refer especially to precedents relating to Ira.n, Indonesia, Kashmir, and ta previous phases oftbis problem and to other matters M. This becomes ail the more important because it is necessary, apart from anything else, ta discuss the draft .resolutionin the light of the new fact, namely the imminence of an Israel-Jordan conference. The first law that shouM affect any public body wishes, as 1 am certain the Security Couneil wishes, 10 see the success of a venture, is not to prejudice the venture by any determination of such matters as must arise in the course of that discusslDn. 85. It is my view, and œrtainly l think a natural view, that this 'draft resolution would adversely affect the entire atmosphereand purport of the discussions which are now imminent between Israel and Jordan; that 1:here could be no worse prelude ta a serious effort at bilateral agreement, than the adoption of a draft resnlution which contl'J-ins the inequita:ble features ta which 1 have referred and w):J.ich 1 commend ta the attention of the sponsors of the draft resolution. 86. Jn addition, and on a lower but quite important plane, there are matters here which are prejudicial.to the substance of such a discussion as might arise. There isa caTI upon the Governments of Israel and Jordan to ensure the effective co~operation of local se-eurity forces. -rt nlay bel al11 notgoing to say that it will be, but it may be - a thesis which we shall present that cooperation between security forces can only'be effective if conducted not on a local, but on a high and decisive level of resp0Il;sibility. 87. l have already referred 10 the discussion and definition of infiltration in section B. It will most certainly be our case that agreements should be' reached which are not based upon the continuation of existing procedures in an effort to prevent infiltration, but·that completely new and radical changes should be intro- .duced into the policies of the Government of Jordan in this 'regard. Here, the negotiators at the conference' could say that the Security Council is quite satisfied with the existing system of action for the prevention of infiltration, and· that thereforethere is international support for rejecting any proposaIs which would go beyond existing policies into more decisive and effective action for the prevention of infiltrations. 88. In summing up my conclusions, l should therefore like to say that quite irrespective of the action which was taken on my GovernmeIlt's behalf yesterday, the ·draft resolution before us [S13139] is inaccurate in certain respects, notahly in its finding in section A ; and that it is selective in other respects, notably in the omission of any special reference in its preamhle to those resolutions which lay gbligations upon the Arab ~~GoYernments. 'thus it opens, as it were,. in a· selective and unobjective spirit. 89: .Secondly, we believe that the description in section A of the action at Qibya fails outside the framework of Security Couneil practice and tradition; deals, 91. Apart from these major imperfections, there are others which reside in more marginal aspects of the text. We believe that the very propriety of any Sec urity Council action, certainly along these lines, must now be measured in the light of the imminence of the first ad and situation of pacifie settlement which .\t; ta occur in the Middle East since the Armistice. Agreements were signed in Rhodes and then on our northern frontiers, and embodied in international treaties now deposited withtheUnited Nations. 92. It is our conviction that these submissions, whic.b. are made on behalf of the only Governrnent· which has to live within aIl four of these frontiers, whose daily life and pursuits are overshadowed by these tensions, deserve ta be taken into account in the formulation of the policies of the Security Council; that these views and submissions were not and have flOt been·taken into account in any previous drafting process; and that the Council should therefore re-examine its course both in the light of the proposaIs and criticisms whioh l have made and against the background of the overriding necessity of avoiding any collective international action which would be prejudicial to the prospects of bilateral pacifie settlement which now open up before us for the first time. 93. l have concluded, except ta state that a revised draft [S/3139/Rev.2] has now been put before us, which l have not seen befQTe. l should like to have the opportunity ta comment on this new dOCUillent at a later stage. 94. The PRBSIDENT (translated f;-f'm French): Do any other members of the Council intend to speak eithernow or at a later stage in the debate? If not, we could consider the discussion of the current item c10sed and proceed ta a vote on the draft resolution before the Council. . 95. As no one 'has asked ta speak, l s4all follow the usual practice for the President and give my views last as the respresel.1tative of Friltlce.. 96. At the beginning of the debate, l indicated the French de1egation's reactions to ·the serious incident at Qibya. .At this closing' stage of the debate, l shaH not revert to the past It·was undoubtedly hicumbent upon the Council to take note of a.· violation of the cease-fire 99. The purpose of my statement now that thedebate is drawing to a close is to calI attention to those provisions, which look towards the future. l must frankly admit that some of Mr. Eban's criticisms of the three- Power draft resolution produced a painful impression on me, not because the Israeli representative criticized sorne of its provisions, which he is perfectly ent.itled to do, but because he appeared to be casting doubt upon the motives of the sponsors of the draft resolution. As l have already had occasion to point out a few days ago, 1 can assure him that, in drawing up the proposaI, all that every one of us wanted to do was to aet impartially and exert a moderating influence. None of us has ever sought to coerce, or cater to the resentment of, either of the parties. 100. The three-Power draft resolution contains, first, a section Acensuring any actions similar to that at Qibya wmch may be taken in future by either of the parties. In àdopting section A, .the Security Council will, we hope, give advance notice that.any future actions similar to that at Qibya constitute, like tbat action itself, a violation of the cease-fire provisions and are incompatible with the parties' obligations under the General Armistice Agreement and the Charter. luI. The Council further explicitly recognizes that such actions, Even if the party taking them regards them in the light of reprisa.1s, are no less open ta censure. A retaliatory action in the situation arising out of the Armistice Agreements cannot be permiited, justified or excused. This is a second provisiŒ1, which constitutes a ruling by the Council on a point of the highest importance; 102. After making that point clear, the draft resolution goes on to consid.er the means available to the United Nations to secure compliance with the Truce and the Armistice Agreements-' the fundamental purpose of thé Council's present endeavours. Respect for the Armistice Agreèments and the cease~fire provisions primarily depends upon the attitude of the parties towards them. 103. In the draft resolution submitted to it the Council recalls its previous resolutions on the subject and reaffirms "that it is essential in order to achieve progress by peaceful means towards a lasting settlement of 105. The first of these two paragraphs should be ùnderstood as referring to the administrative situation. The Chief of Staff may need men to strengthen control along the demarcation line; he may need material or credits. In this paragraph the Council requests the Secretary-General to provide him with them, after considering with hi111 the best ways of strengthening the Trnce Supervision Organization. 106. There remains the last paragraph of the draft resolution. This paragraph first e..-..:presses the Council's constant and permanent concern with the problem of maintaining peace in the Middle East. This concern, contrary to what the Israel representative appeared to suppose, is neither less strong, nor less decisive, nor less sincere today than it was in the past. The Council requests the Chief of Staff of the' Truce Supervision Organization lO report to it within three 1110nths on complii'tlce with and enforcement of the Gel raI Armistice Agreement. Thus, within afixedtime limit of three months, but within that time limit at a date considered appropriate by the Chief of Staff, the Council will re-examine the problem. By then, General Bennike will have been able, we hope, to study carefully the situation along the truce Hnes. 107. It is possible that sucha study will help him find means of removing or attenuating sorne of the basic causes of the recurrent disputes which regularly affect certain points in these lines. Experience may show that certain adjustments or modifications are desirable. Certain demarcation measures and the creation of certain obstructions will make illegal crossings from one territory ta another more difficult. In tbis respect, we cannot make any forecasts, but it is important that everything possible should be done. Thus, by the draft resolution before it, the Cr'mcil requests the Chief of Staff ta make anv constructive recommendations which he may considë'r appropriate. 108. The recent Israel proposaI, which requested the 'convening of the conference provided for in article XII of the General Armistice Agreement, may lead to satisfactory results in the same direction. Thus we have found it impossible to avoid mentioning that conference - our amendment,of the last paragraph of the original draft resolution has that specifie abject. 110. 1 shaH put ta the vote the draft resolution on the Palestine qttes~ion, submitted by France, the United Kingdom and the United States [S/3139/Rev.2]. 111. Does the representativlO: of Lebanon wish ta speak on a point of arder? 112. Mr. Charles MALIK (L~banon): No, Mr. President. These mattersare moving so fast that 1 would be the last persan ta stand in the way of their speedy conclusion. 113. But 1 have not had the opportunity ta make any substantive statement on this whole affair. exccpt such as l was able ta extemporize at certain moments. Therefore, 1 should like ta speak on the substance of this subject for about half an hour. 1 shaH be as brief as possible, and 'if it will help matters at aU, 1 am quite willing, as the President and ev~rybody seems to be, to arrive at a decision on this matter this evenîng. 114. If it will help matters, 1 shaH now present to the Security Council a procedurr 1 motion that we stay in session this evening until ""ve dispose of this item. 115. My substantive talk will certainly not take more than forty minutes. 1 shaH look at my watch and can condense my talk if necessary. If the Council wishes to dispose of this item this evening, 1 would certainly be prepared ta remain here until we do sa. 116. Therefore, 1 formally submit a motion that the Coundl remain here until it disposes of this item. This means that the President may not adjourn the meeting unless he consults the wishes of the CounciI. If the Council should desire to adjourn, then it will adjourn; but if the Couneil wishes ta dispose of this matter this evening, it can remain here and do so. 117. 1 think it is only!ight that Imake a simple substantive statement after the disquisitions we have been hearing from the representative of Israel, since the President has made his statement, and inasmuch as we have a new text be(ore us. Certainly the Security Council will not deny me this right. 118. At the same time, if the Council wishes to arrive at a decision on this matter· this evening, 1 would, as 1 have said, be willing to remain here as long as the Council pleases .and until we dispose of the item. 1 think the two can be. reconeiled: my making a brief statement - 1 promise it will he as brief as possibleand our coming to a decision after my statement. 50. J22. l personally consider that the Council deemed the general debate c:losed and, if Ml'. Malik wishes to speak again, as is his right, he should dq so only in explallation of his vote, aftel' the vote l have just mentioned has taken place. 123. After this explanation, 1 would ask the representative of China whether l should interpret his remarks as a formaI motion for adjournment, which must be put ta the vote without debate. 124.. Ml'. TSIANG (China): l intended my remarks ta constitute a motion for adjournment, but l made that motion on the premise that the representative of Lebanon was going ta make a speech lasting thirty minutes. If that premise is incorrect, th<".u I would withdraw my motion. If my premiseis cO'rrect, then l would iosist upon my motion for adjournment. 125. Ml'. ECHEVERRI CORTES (Colombia) (translated Jrom Spanish) : l am in full agreement with the Chinese representative. If the representative of Lebanon is going to speak for forty minutes, and assuming that most of us will wish to explain our votes, I think that this meeting will be unduly prolonged. 125. duit le représentant minutes, d'autant donner 126. glais): le expliquer volontiers au alors sentant cette diatement. prendrai je m'accorde 127. d'expliquer Il M. cependant vote, M. 126. Ml'. Charles MALIK (Lebanon) : l take it that the President will caU on me to speak after the vote if I wish to speak, and that I can then speak in explanation of my vote. If my understanding as just stated is correct, I shaU be very happy to have the matter put to the vote. Then the representative of China need not mOve adjournment and the representative of Colombia need not support him; the Coundl can decide this matter immediately; then, after the vote, I will speak. It ll1akes no difference to me when I speak, pTOvided the President does caU on me.

The right of any representative ta e~plain his vote is clear and must be respected. I can obviously not refuse ta allow Ml'. Malik to explain his vote. I hope, howe~er, tl~at he l'eally will explain his vote and not reopen diSCUSSion of the substance of the matter. Abstaining: Lebanon, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The draft resohetion was adopted by 9 votes none, with 2 abstentions. 129. The PRESIDENT (translated front French): l -call upon the representative of China on a point order. 130. Mr. TSIANG (China): l move that the Council adjourn. l suggest that the explanations of vote reserved for a subsequent meeting. Tt might he possible for the President to arrange a meeting which will begin with the explanations of vote on this item. Then, if we have time, we. can continue with the Syrian complaint against Israel concerning work On the west bank 'Gf the River Jordan in the demilitarized zone.

In accordance with rule 33 of the mIes of procedure, 1 shall put to the vote the proposal for adjournment submitted by Mr. Tsiang. . A vote was taken l,y show of hands. In favO'lw: Chile, China, Colombia, Denmark, France, Greece, Pakistan, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Against: United States of America. Abstaining: Lebanon. The mo#on was adopted by 8 votes ta l, with 1 abstention. 132. The PRESIDENT (translated from French): If there are no objections, we shaH meet tomorrow afternoon at 3· p.m. to hear explanations of votes. 1t was sa decided~ The meeting rose at 6.30 p.m. Al$EHTlNA - UGEHfoINE Edilorial Sudamoricana S.A.. Ailin. 500, Buenos Aires. RANCE Editions Peris V. GIEEtE - "El.fth.roudakis," tion. Alhônes. SUATEMALA Goub.ud 28, Gu.t.mal.. AUSTRAlIA- AUSTRALIE 'Ho A. Goddard. 2SSa Gaorge St.. Sydney, end 90 Queon SI., Melbourne. Melbourne University Press, Cerllon N.3, Viclorie. JUGIUII_ JELGIQUE Agenco et Messag.ries de le' Presse S.A.. 14-22 rue du Persil. Bruxelles. W. H. Smilh & Son. il.7S, bouleverd Adolph••Mex. Bruxelles. JOllYIA -BOllYIE librerre S.leccionos. Cesilla 972, Le Poz. JUIlL -BRESIL livrerie Agir. Rio de Jeneiro, S.o Peulo end B.lo Horilonte. HAITI librairi.· III·B, Porl·eu·Prince. HDNDURAS librerie Tegucigelpe. HONG·KONG The Swindon Kowloon. ICElAND.., BokeverIlun CAIlADA Ryerson Press, 299 Queen St. West. Toronlo. Periodice. Inc.. 042304 de la Roche: Mon. treel.304. • CEYLON - CEYLAN The Associaled Newspapers of Ceylan Ltd.. la~e House. Colombo. tHIlE - CHILI librerra Ivens. Moneda 822, Senliago. Editorial dei PacHico. Ahumede 57. Sanliago. Ausl~rstreeli INDIA-INDE Oxford B60k House. N.w Celcutle. P. Veredech.ry St.. Medres INDONESIA -INDONESIE Jejesen P.mbangunan, Dj.karle. IUN Kelab.Kh.n.h nus, Tehran. IRAQ-IRAI Madenlie's ISUEL Blumsl.in's Reed, Tel·Aviv. ITAIJ -ITALIE Colibri S.A., CHINA- CHINE The World Boo~ Co. Ltd.. 99 Chung King Raad. Isi Section, Tai"eh. Taiwan. Commercial Press. 211 Honan Rd.• Shang. hai. COLOMBIA - COLOMBIE librerre lelina. Carrera 6a., 13-05, Bogol•• librerla Américe, Medeliln. librerra Nacional lIda.. Barranquilla. COSTA IICA - COSTA·IICA Trejos Hermanos, Aparlado 1313, San José. CUlA • La Casa O.lga, O'Reilly 0455, la Habana. LEBANON - libreirie LIBERIA J. Momolu LUXEMBOURG libreirie MEXICO - MEXIQUE Edilorial 41, México, UECHOSLOYAKIA - TCHECOSLOYAQUIE Ceskoslovensky Spisovalel, N.rodnl Trlda 9. Praha 1. DENMARK - DANEMARK Einar Munksgaard. ltd.. Nerregade 6, Kebenhavn. K. NETHERtANDS N.V. Merlinus ·s·Grevenhage. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC -IEPUBLIQUE DOMINICAINE librerfll Dominic~nll, Mercedes 49, Ciu. dad Trujillo. ECUAOOI- EQUATEUR libreria CienlHica, Guayaquil and Quito. HEW mUND - Uniled Netions lend. C.P.O. NDIWAY - NOYEGE Johan Grundt guslsgt. 7A, PAKISTAN Thomas & Rood, Kerechi, Publishers lahore. The Pekislen Chittegong PANAMA José Menénd.z, PARAGUAY Moreno He(m.nos. EGYPT - EGVPTE librairie "La Renaissance d'Egypte,f1 9 Sh. Adly Pasha. Cairo. EL SALYADOR-SALYADOR Manuel Navas y CIa., la. Avenid. sur 37. San Salvador. ETHIOPIA - EiHIOPIE Agence Ethiopienne de Publicité. Box 128. Addis.Abeba. FINLAND - FINLANDE Akaleeminen Kirjakauppe. 2. Keskusk.tu, H.lsin~i. Orders and inquiries from countries where sales have not yet been appointed moy be sent to: Sales Circulation Sedion, United Nations, New York, or liales Section. United Nations Office, Palais l;oIati0'lS, Geneva, Switzerland. Printed in Canada Priee: $U.S. 0.25; (or equivalent in