S/PV.643 Security Council

The representative of Israel has expressed the desire to make a short statement to the Council. If there is no objection, l shall invite him to do so and to take a seat at the Council table. It goes without saying that if the representative of Jordan should also wish to make a short statement, he will be granted the same privilege. 2. lcal1 on the representative of Pakistan on a point of order.

l have no desire. to debar the representative of Israel from placing ~nything ~or~ that he wishes toplace before the Securlty C~uncll. 1 merely want to •. recall to the Security Councll an occasion when the question of Kashmir was under discussion. Mter a resolution had been adopted, r, as the representative of Pakistan, who had been called t? the table during the discussion of the Kashmir ques- ~on-- Pakistan not being then a member of the Securlty Councildesired to make a submission to the 11. If the Council is going ta hear the representative of Israel, and not the representative of Jordan; and JSince it is a fact that 1 have never been given a real opportunity to present some of my views at any length~ and that the Couneil has been to some extent monopolized hy the representative of Israel, Lshould be gratefuI if, after we have heard the representative of Israel, the President will be good enough, and courteous enough, to permit me to make my statement without being interrupted. 12. Ml'. ZAFRULLA KHAN (Pakistan): As 1 said when 1 spoke first, 1 had no wish to restrict in any way the representative of Israel in making any further presentation to the Security Coulleil that he might desire to make. 1 a!nstill of the same view. If 1 may say so without impertinence, .J endorse in every' respect the President's observation, that, altogether apart from the rules, courtesy requires that if any of the parties place 14. remercie occasion supplémentaires déclarer cette seil des Articles de Membre Conseil discussion Membre et périodes d'accéder a je Nations au de 15. parce quelques tout Le modification, gouvernement, pour de entre ront 16. par nécessaire j'ai vations l'opinion 17. pour hardie, d'exprimer' notre. satisfaction en à tives favorables rait 19. This grave deficiency has now been repaired within the fram(;work of the provisions of article XII of Armistice Agreement, and my Government wishes to express the hope that this will mark a very substantial turlling point in the relations between Israel and neighbours. Tt will mark the end of the period of silence and ostracism. It will mark the final termination of that far too long period during which Israel and its p.eigh- bours were not able to submit their common interests and differences to the arbitraments of direct and padfic settlement. 20. It would therefore, l think, notbe appropriate for the .security Council's discussions to end in any atmo- sphere other than one in which this departure welcomed, in which the prospects of direct and pacific seulement of these disputes are endorsed. From that viewpoint we wish to say - notwithstanding our views on the resolution as a whole, which are precisely those which l have already expressed - mat we consider that it is ,positive step to note that· the Security Council envisages an agreement under articie XII of the Armi- stice Agreement, and requests its own representatives in the field to take accourit of that process and of eventual outcome. 21. The PRESIDENT (tral1slated from French): We shall now proceed to the explanations of vote. 22. l urg~ thosespeakers who wish to explain the vote they cast yesterday to confine themselves, so far possible, to explaining that vote, and not to reopen debate now. on the substance of. questions on which they have had every opportunity to state their views in full in the past month. 23. The Councilis not unaware that· in the General Assembly e..~I'~anations of vote are limited to seven .minutes. l have no intention of lmposing such a time limit on the statements about to be made, but l earnestly nope that the men1bers who explain their votes will so in that spirit, and l leave it to their discretion. 24. The representative of Lebanon has the fleor. 25. Mr. Charles 'MALIK (Lebanon): IfPalestinian affairs ever proceeded regularly and normally at the United Nations - which they do not - there would greater leisure and freedom in this debate than we have seen. Tt is a met, which can bedemonstrated by refer- ence to the Council's verbatim records, that l have never been given the opportunity to expound my sub- stantive views systematically; and yesterday evening [642n.d meef~ng], when there was a choice between several alternatives - my speaking and the Council not takïng the vote; or adjourning the meeting and post- poning my statement and the vote uutil today; or my not speaking and· the Council proceeding to the vote- the last alternative was obviously the right one. But one cannot be said to be given a genuine choice when one is placed before such impossible alternatives. 27. Now that 1 am prevented from giving my system- atic exposition of these five parts, it i5 not possible for me to explain my vote without saying a word about eaeh of these five parts. . 28. 1 have elaborated i.fl full the truth of Qibya in a systematic treatise entitled "The Qibya System". The method used is that of Spinoza, whom 1 admire very much, althollgh 1 do not follow bis philosophy. Aceording to this method one proves his propositions in the strictest and most rigorous manner. The term "The Qibya System" is ta be understood not in the sense that this total body of truth applies to Qibya alone, but in the sense that it was the Qibya incident which released this truth to the light of day. 1 shall ask that this study be circulated as a document or appended to the record of our proceedings as an annex. An honest examination of this study will reveal that the con- demnation which we passed upon Israel yesterday [642nd m:eeting], was very mild, and that, in fact, a much stronger condemnation is fully justifiable by the objective evidence. 29. ·1 shall not review this treatise, because 1 shaH abide by whRt the President has said; but since it will be circulated either as a document or as an annex, I shall only bring to your attention the method which Iused in this treatise by citing just one exàmple. . . 30. First of aIl, 1 havè here fourteenpropositions which 1 have proved by the strictest possible method. Iwili only read the propositions; l wili not read their proois. 31. First, on 14-15 October 1953, the Israel regular ~rmy committed an act of aggression "against Jordan at Qibya. 32. Second, the. act of aggression at Qibya Is only the most outstanding of a class of s.inlilar acts of aggression committed Dy Israel. . 33. Third, the majority of· the twenty-one violations of the. Ge!i.eral Armistice A(7,reement - sixteen, in fact ~ for which Israel was condemned by the Mixed Armistice Commission, betweenl Januaryand 15 October 1953, were carried outby Israel military forces. 34. Fourth, during 1953 .the attacks carried outby Israel regular forces have become more frcquent and more serious so far as the loss of Tordanianlives is eoncerned, and increasingly largerlsrael forces have been participating in·them. ' . 35. Fifth, the scale of operations in the three cases in 1953 in which Jordan was condemned by the Mixed ArmisticeCûmmission for the violation by Jordan's ar1!led r?rces of the General Armistice Agreement, is q?lte lIDnor compared to-the scaleof operations in the slXteen cases in ·1953. for which Israel was condemned by the Mixed Armistice Commission for the violatiQn 39. Ninth, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization has no evidence either that Arab infil- tration is an organized movement, or that it is directed by the Jordan authorities. 40. Tenth, when tension increases betweea Israel and Jordan, Jerusalem is a dangerous powder keg. 41. E1eventh, the Chief cf Staff of the Truce Super- vision Organization attaches special importance to the procedure of local commanders' meetings,- 50 far as sohing theproblem of infiltration is concerned. 42.. , Twelfth, Israel alleges that, from June 1949, the beginning of the armistice, to 15 October 1953, as a result of Jordanian ~ttacks, eighty-nine Israelis and sixty-eight Jordanians were killed irtside· Israel, and 101 IsraeJis and eighteen JOl'danians were wounded inside Israel. Regarding these ap.egations, the Mixed Armistice Commission has verified that ouly twenty- four Israe1is •and two Jordanians were killed inside Israel, andthat orny thirty Israelis and one Jordanian were wounded inside Israd. If you make your cal- culations, you will·find that the degree of re1iability of the daims of Israel as to what actually happened is very low. . 43... Thirteenth; Jordan alleges that, from June 1949 to 15 October 1953, as a result of Israeli attacks, 175 Jordatlians and nineteen Israelis were killed inside Jordan, and 129 Jordanians and seven·Israelis wounded inside Jordan. Regarding these allegations, the Mixed Armistice Commission has verified that· orny sev~nty- . seven J Q!'danians and sevênlsl'aelis were killed inside Jordan, and that. orny forty-eight Jordanians and one Israeli were wounded inside Jordan. If YOll make your computations, you will find that Jordan also exaggerated, but not quite to the same extent. 44. Fourteenth, slllce the beginning of the armistice in .1949, Israel has been condemned sixty-three times by the Mb>:ed Armistice Commission for· breaches of the Jordan-Israel Armistice·· Agrel,ment, and..Jordan fifty times.· for breaches of the same Armistfte Agree- ment. Of the sixty-'three violations by Israel, 58.7 per cent were violations of article III, paragraph 2, which speaks of the commission of warlike or hostile acts by military or para-military forces. The corresponding figure for Jordan is 38 percent. Of the sixty-three violations by Israel, 95.2 per cent were violations of article III, paragraphs 2 and 3, (paragraph 3 deals with warlike acts or ar.tJJ of hostility conducted from the territpry. of one party against the other- party). The corresponding figure for Jordanis 76 per cent 45. These propositions, fourteen in number, are proved with the utmost and strictest mathematical 47. In tbis connexion, l will only mention the anger of the ·press - Jewish and Gentile; Jewish and Arab; J<:wish, Christian and Moslem - the official staternent 'by the United States Government of 19 October 1953, the dec1arations of Mr. Eden in the House of Commons, the statement of the Archbishop of York, the comments of the Christian press, and the truly great state'J.lent that the President made as the representative of France at the beginning of tbis debate [635th meeting]. Here again, the objective world situation. was such that the Couneil could have, with perfect justifiCation and with the support of world public opinion, acted much· more strongly. 48. One neéd not dwell long on the frenzied man- œuvrings of Israel. There was no trick in the game to wmch they dïd not resort, and indeed thl.~y invented a few new theatrical tricks themselves, snch as spreading rumours thatthe Prime Minister of Israel was going to resign, andthat the Secretary-General of the United Nations had asked General Bemrikf' to resign, as weIl as indulging in the ordinary fuming and threatening of a cornered man. As for the speeches ofMr. Eban, I car. pr0ve - and Iam prepared to be chaUenged to prove in public - that they. are pathetic in three respects. First, 80 per cent of them can be refuted by absolutely obj~tive evidence. Second, the remainder shows either an unusual degree of confusion of mind, or tbird, a spirit of bitternèss, cynicism, sarcasm. and arrogance that can never make for peace in the Near East. 49.. 'Th~..._PRESIDENT .(translated .from. French): I .Iiiust aSK .the speaker to refrain from personal attacks on someone who will be uriable to reply to. them .here.. I.would point out to the representative of Lebanon that l have been very patient with bim; he is very far from the exp1anation of bis vote. I would ask him not to attack a representative who, I repeat, will not be entitled to speak again at tbis meeting and who will therefore be unable to reply to bim today.· 50. Ml'. Char.1es MALIK (Lebanon): I am not making a personal attack on anyone.. l am only making remarks about certain speeches' that we have heard here; and I have every right, as I am going to conclude here, to bring this into direct relationship with the manner in which l voted. 5i.The fact that tbisspirit, which the Couneil cer- ±ainly knows can neverpromote peace and concord in the Near East, was not strongly and directly rebuked by the Council, but was instead allowed to roam about quite .freély and unregenerately in aIl arrogance and .;; See Annex below. 54. Second, the representative of Israel said [642nd meeting] with some derision that the notions that "the Arab States have a sovereign right to maintain the Armistice Agreements in perpett.ùty" .and mat they have the' "sovereign right ... never ta talk ta .•. Israel" are both false. 55. Does he mean that he is going to force the Arabs to talk to Israel, that he is going to break the Armistice Agreements in order to force the Arabs to change them? Does he mean that I:;rael has the sovereign right to force France, the United Kingdom and the United States, in their turn, to force the Arabs to talk to Israel? There will be no talks with Israel, regardless of Israel or Western pressure, ,except after Israel has undergone a profound modification- in spirit and outlook. 56. Third, the representative of Israel warned that the adoption of the three-Power resolution would be prejudicial \to peace and would adversely affect the .entire atmosphere and effort for peace. The truth is the exact opposÏlLe. There is no hope for peace as .long as Israel can get away with everything. There will be some hope for peace when Israel is kept in its place, when the Arab world realizes that the United Nations and the great Powers intend to be just to it. The resolut,ion adopted yesterday is the first gleam of nope in years that the Arabs are not going to be wronged again. 57. Fo~rth, Israel seems to clamour for peace, for what the representative of Israel called "a negotiated peace settlement" and, again,. "a transition to a peace settlement". We have seen that Israel cannot crash its way to peace. But, more positively, the conditions of any possible negotiated peace seti:lement have been stated by me twice this year, once in the General Assembly and once in this Council. They are: (a) that' Israel scrupulously. respect the Armistice Agreements; (b) that there be a real determination to implement the standing decisions of the United NationG with respect to Palestine, namely, the decision with respect to boundaries, the decisio~ with respect to the inter- nationalization of Jerusalem, and the decision with re§pect to the Arab refugees, (c) that the Arabs be strengthened sa that they do not feel they are at the mercy of Israel, and that no artificial barrier'" be placed in the way of the Arabs' developing natural ties as close as· possible among themselves. One must add that (c) Because it is now strong, Israel can fume and threaten, but the Arabs are not going to remain eternally weak; and sinee time seems ta he on the Arab side, this fuming and threatening will, as time goes on, have less and less effect on them and on the world. 60. l suggest that these three facts govern the situation absolutely, historically, and metaphysica11y. 61. Sixth, peace is the fruit of justice, firmness and trqth: justice, firmness and truth with re1:ipect both to Israel and to the Arabs. Let there he honest, impartial justice, honest, unwavering firmness, and a genuine love of truth, and peace will inevitably supervene. Thus, the pe2ce of the Near East is a function of the moral crisis of the world. 62. l shall now summarize in just two minutes my critique and evaluation of the resolution we adopted yesterday. . 63. The resolution has the following defidencies: (1) It does not request Israel ta bring to justice those responsible for the Qibya massacre. (2) It does not ask Israel to pay compensation for the loss of life and the damage to property caused by that aggression. (3) It does not contain a warning to Israel that if such attacks are repeated in the future the Counci1 will have to deal with the matter under Chapter VII of the Charter. (4) It does not refer to compliance with the General Assembly resolutions on Palestine as one condition for the peaceful and lasting settlement of the issues out- standing between the parties, although the represen- tative of the United States in introducing the draft resolution [640th meeting], referred to the General Assembly resolutions, and the representatives of the United Kingdom and France completely endorsed his statement. (5) It does not emphasize the fact that it is only the Government of Israel which is not co-operating fully with the Qnef of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization. (2) It calls upon Israel, and upon Israel alone, "to take effective measures to prevent aIl such actions in the future» - which seems to show that only Israel is able and willing to repeat such actions. (3) It recognizes that the Government of Jordan has already taken measures to prevent border crossings. (4) It adopts the thesis of Jordan and of General Bennike on the usefu1ness of the co-operation of local security forces to curb infiltration. (5) It emphasizes the faet that re~pect for and com- pliance .with the General Armistice Agreement is the only condition for a peaceful and lasting settlement of the issues outstanding between the parties. (6) It provides for the strengthening of the Truce Supervision Organization. 65. AIl these are good and great merits, and therefore l did not vote against the resolution. 66. Mr. KYROU (Greece) ~ .My delegation cast its vote yesterday in favour of the draft resolution sponsored by the delegations of France, the United Kingdom and the United States. However, l would be lacking in frankness were l not to add that this positive vote of mine was given with lÎ1i.1ited entbusiasm.. Indeed the resolution we have adopted does not, l am afraid, belong to that category of resolutions which usually elicit a feeling of relief as ta the past and of hope as to the future. To be more precise, l refer to that set of resolutions which enjoy at least the full endorsement of all the parties concerned, and which open up new and more favourable vistas. 67. The three sponsors have, however, endeavotÎred :.- and fDr that they are entitled ta our gratitude- to make the best of a bad situation. The delegations of France, the United Kingdom and the United States have tried to be impartial and fair, and if l am correct, it is out of this feeling that they adde:d in eztremis the amendment which now appears in the last paragraph of the resolution which the Council has adopted. It is an axiom - and repetition does not detract from it: impelling truth - that the Security Council is an instru- ment for the promotion of the cause of peace; but not the kind of peace of the old paz Romana, nor a paz Israelica, nor a paz Arabica - that is, a peacebased on the prevalence of the interest of this or that party. What we in Greece refer to as peace is a peace that will begin in the minds and in the souls of the peoples involved before manifesting· itself in the more com- plicated game of diplomacy. 68. The attainment of this happy stage presupposes, however, an evolution in the mentality and in the senti- ments of the peoples, on which time, the common healer, will have a telHng influence. In. order ta reach this S See Official R~cords of the Security Council, Third Year, Supplement for lu/y 1948, document S/902. 72. Colombia has no particular political or econorriic ties with either of the countries involved and has con- sidered the matter with complete impartiality. 73. It trusts that it will be possible in the near future for a treaty of peace to be signed between Israel and Jordan, in accordance with article XII of the Armistice Agreement, which will bring to an end the present anomalous and disturbing situation and will provide a permanent solution to all the probleins which now impair good relations between those two countrie.'.i. 74. Ml'. TSIA1,[G (China): Yesterday, my delegation voted in favour of the three-Power draft resolution. Now 1 wish to explain our reasons. 75. The debate which we are about to conclude has been, in fact, devoted primarily to the Qibya incident, and secondarily to the other incidents along the Jordan- Israel border. The Security Council has been fortunate in having before it the two reports 4 of the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organi- iation. 1 have great confidence in the competence and impartiality of General Bennike and his colleagues. The factual information on the Qibya incident available to us, though incomplete, is considerable and reliable. That information in my opinion justifies section· A of the resolution which we adopted yesterday. 76. . Of course, there have been other incidents on that border - unfortunately, aU tao many. They have all been dealt with in one way or another by the Mixed Armistice Commission. Qibya stands.by itself, botJ:t in 79. l have stated this VlC10US circle in very simple terms. There is no doubt that sucb a viciot's circ1e exists. However, at bottom, there are other factors at work. In his speech [640t.lt -meeting] the representative of Pakistan pointed out some of the other factors. It was, in my opinion, a sincere and moving speech. The Security Cotlncil has good rèason to ponder the con- siderations which Mr. Zafrulla Khan put before us. If the Government of Israel should itself investigat,e the circumstances of the Qibya incident, find out those who ~c~_ere responsible, mete out due punishtuent to the guilty aru101ter-dtte;eompensaûon.to.. t~:victims, that would, in my opinion, be a step towards creatïng atfâlinosphere . conducive to a peace settlement. A peace settlement, l am convinced, would be to the benefit of aU the parties concerned. Israel would no doubt gain by it; so would the Ar~b States. It is time tIlat we forgot the past and worked together for a better future. The Security Council and the other organs of the United Nations have a;:ontribution to make. While the present moment may be inopportune, we must be on the alert to seize any opportunity that may offer itself. . 80. l should like to comment briefly on the question of procedure which arose at the beginning of tbis meeting. The step which. the President took in inviting the representative of Israel to make a statement after the resolution had beenadopted was, in my opinion, a very unusual one. Itwas, however, justified by the nature of the statement which Mr. Eban made to us. Before the vote was taken, Mr.Eban had not had a chance tocomment on the amendment to the three- Power draft resolution. His statement this afternoon was devoted ta an elucidation of the attitude of his delegationoand ·ofhis Government ta that amendment, -and 1 think the President was justified' in asking Mr. Eban to make that additional stater-'J'.nt.

Before Iproceed to an explanation of our vote on the resolution, l would ask the President's permission to say a few words with reference to what the representative of China has said on the question of procedure. l have already said that. l was very happy with the. decision of the President. It may be that the course he tDok ~nding of th~ir investigation, carried out this expedition If it was not the regular army. That information is in their possession: they have chosen not to disclose ft to the Council. 86. It is a legititnate presumption made under most !egal systems that if a party does not choose to disclcise mformation that is within its possession and which would be relevant to the issue which has to be determined, such disclosure would prejudice the contention of the party which fails to dfsclose the information. 87• Bere is.a matter in which the good name - not to ~se any stronger expression - of the State of Israf:l is ln question. Israel has carried out, according to its own assertion, an intensive investigationinto the matter. Itsconclusions have not been communicated to the Council:.the Oll.1ncil has not been taken inte its confidence. Ido not want to start another debate on this matter, but of aIl the factors that have been placed did not proceed to fecommend punishment for the per- .... petrators of the incident or compensation for thos.e who . suffered under it. After the adoption of the resolution Q11rselves to the language' of the resolution as it stood and voted in favour of it because, on the main question, the resolution did express the views that we held with regard to this incident. 93. Mr. BORBERG (Denmark): The initiative taken by France, the United Kingdom and the United States ID asking for an urgent meeting of the COlmcil as a consequence qf the terrible action at Qibya was a proper step to take. The resolution now adopted seems to me its logical conclusion. 94. As no right of retaliation is reserved in the General Armistice Agreeme!!t between Jordan and iJ'Srael, condemnation of the action was bound to take a strong form. The ?-"esolution, while referring to Qibya, correctly dec1ares that all such actions - that means in the past as well as in the future, and by whatever side might comtnit them - constitute a violation of the Security Council tesolution of 15 July 1948, as well as of the General Armistice Agreement. The Government of Jordan therefore acted in conformity with its obligations by not reacting with retaliatory measures in its turn. 95. It was after the said event that the Council decided not to let the action pass without censure. World opinion \Vould not have understood sucll negligence on our part. 96. In so far as section B is concerned, l find it correct that the Council turned to Jordan to ask it to continue and to strengthen the measures which they have already taken to prevent these crossings of the demarcation Hne. l take it that the strengthehing of measures already taken does not exc1ude the fact that other measures should be examined with a view to contributing to further strengthening. 9? In the last paragraph of that section, the resolution nghtly calls upon both Governments to abide by their obligations and to augment the co-operation of local security forces. This is desirable as a conservative measure. 98. However, the dynamic part of the resolution is contained in section C. l hope that the additional personnel who, will be placed at the disposaI of the 'Chief 106. Mr.CROSTHWAITE (United Kin,gdom): With the President'spermission, l should likè to add just a few words on the point which he has wst raised. When,on 20 _November 1953 [640th meeting], Sir Gladwyn _Jebb said that he agreed with the statement which the representative of the United States had 16 .-_~101C"c'rhef~RESIDENT_(translated from French): No other meni6ëf -of -tlië--Cbuncii chas -"asked -for the floor to explain his vote. 102. -Before closing the meeting, l should like ta make a persona! remark concerning one passage in the statement of the representative of.Lebanon. 103. Wnen criticizing the provisions of the three- Power draft resolution adopted yesterday, Mr. Malik said,among other things, that the draft resolution did not refer to compliance with the General Assembly resolutions on Palestine as one of the prerequisites _for a peaceful artd lasting settlement between the parties" even though, he added, the United States representative, in introdudng the draft resolution, had referred to the General Assembly resolutions, and the representatives of the United Klngdom and France had completely -endorsed his statement. 104. So far as the representative of France is concerned, Mr. Malik's assertion. is wholly inaccurate. At no. timeduringmy interventions did l refer, even by implication, --to the General Assembly resolutions. My delegationhas always felt that reference to those resolutions did not come within the scope of the drait resolutiol'l submitted by the three Powers. 10r; l shoitld like this correction to appear in the -verbatim record and, as Mr. Malik's statement - which l translated freely - appears in a press release put out by the· Department of Public Information, l ask that my correction should be reproduced in the same form in the release covering the last part of the meeting. 1 1 198. As l have said. the discs are available and can he played hack. Tt càn bè shown that the representatives of the United Kingdom and France said thaf they either associated themselves with or en.dorsed the statement made by the representative of the United States. 109. However, l do not want to go into any detail in this matter. I am certain that whatever the viewsof the representative of France may be on the General Assembly resolutions, they certainly cannot be that theseresolutions wiUnotserve_thecause of peace. l am sure that that is not bis position. 110. The PRESIDENT (translated fram French): l do not know whether we have discs, but in any event we have the texts before us. ln the statement he made a short while ago, Mr.. Malik singled out from the entire statement m~de hy the United States representative the three words· he used with reference to the previous resolutions of the General Assembly. Hethen wenton to say that the United Kingdom and French representatives - l quote bis very words - "completely endorsed this statement". The word "statement" used by Mr. Malik related to the General Assembly resolutions, and the impression he sought to give both the Council and the public was that, on this particular point of referring to the General Assembly resolutions, we were entirely in agreement with the United States representative. 111. I should like to make it quite clear to Mr. Malik that l did not say - and indeed it would have been ridiculous todo so - that l agreed completely with every word,comma and paragraph in the statement made by one of the three co-sponsors. l do not remember exactly what the .United Kingdom representative said, but this is what I inyself said [640th meeting] : "On hehalf of the French delegation l should like to say that it fully agrees with the reasons wbich have just been explained by the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom and which have prompted the three delegations to co-operate in placing before·.the Cbuncil the diaft· resolution wmch youare nowexamining." 112. l thus indicated that I was in complete agreement with the reasons wbich had prompted the three cosponsors to submit thedraft resolution, but not that l was in agreement with every word, sentence, reference or allusionwmch the United States representative may have made in bis statement. ' 113. I therefore consider thatMr. Malik has distorted the meaning of one sentence in my statement hy 11- .. 115. At the sametime, it seems to me that there is no foundationat all for the President's singling out the particular statement l made and representing it to the Council and the public as a distortion. In the first place, îI Îsaiact:iliatthe wotdsin qUt:stiûîi were 5poken by the representative of the United States, and that the Presidentdid not object to them at the time they were spoken. He 110W objectstothem only because l have referred ta them myself. Certainly, when one hears a person say that he endorses a statement generally, one is entitled tD believe that that person really endorses the entire statement. 116. As l have said, the President did not object to ····the~wol'ds.usedby-the United States representative at the time those words were used.We therefore thought that Ile hadagreed with them. Now he says he did not agree. That is perfectly' all right; the correction can be made. 117. Furthermore, l must note that the statement to .~ -~--which i:he-Presidenb--ha~"''-.dï-a\vrr~tt-entierLc\Va&--iF" the fourth of my objections to the resolution. Myebjection was that the'resolution did not contain the reference in question, although, as l said, it had been mentioned in the statement of the United States representative. Tt therefore cannot· he said that· l disto.rted anything in making that objection tothe resolution, for which, as îs known, my de1egation did nof cast an affirmative vote yesterday. 118. For all these reasons, l am sorry that the'President used the word "distorted". . 119. The PRESIDENT (translated from French): l am obliged to make a statement which l should have preferred not to make. On several occasions in the last few days the Lebanesedelegatian approached the French delegation and pressed it to inc1udea reference to the General Assembly decisionsin the draft resolution. We dec1inedtû do 50, as Mr. Malik is perfectly well awaLe. He also knows that .we were opposed to making any reference to the General Assembly resolutions in the three-Power draft resolution. He has nevertheless tried· to give the impression that we endorsed the refereIice to those resolutions which the United States representative· had made, as he was perfectly entitled todo. Tt is not for me tocomment on 1:his action. 120. Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): As l have said, it is precisely for the reason just given by the President that l made my fourth objection to the resolution, namely, that the texts in question were not included in the body of the resolution. The President has now said that l should not have added the latter part of îîTyfourth objection, thaï l ·should have been satisfied withthe objection expressed in the first part:

l do not propose to pralong. this discussion with Ml'. Malik, nor do l wish to thank him for the attempt he has made to distort my views. 122. The debate is closed and, with the adoption of the resolution yesterday aftemoon, the item relating to the Qibya incident is no longer on our agenda. 123. The Council's next meeting will bf.: heidnext Friday at 10.30 a.m. Its agenda will inclu.de only one itern- Election I)f a me.tnber of the International C-ourt of Justice. 124. l would request memhers of the Council to be very punctual, since the election is to be held simultaneously in the Council and in the General Assembly, and we must therefore let the Assembly have the results of our vote in good time. The meeting rose at 5.50 p..m. AN"riEX Supplementary Statement by Charles Malik, rt.wresentative of Lebanon THE QIBYA SYSTEM, PRELIMINARIES . me-Uni 1. On 20 October 1953 [627th meeting], the Security Council of the United Nations adopted an agenda itementitled: "The Palestine question: cl>IDpliance with and enforcement of the General Armistice Agreenlents, with special reference to recent acts of violence, and in particdar to the incident at Qibya on 14-15 October 1953: report by th;: Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization." Connec'led with this item, the Council had before it identical letters to the President of the Council from the representatives of France [Sj3109], the United Kingdom [Sj3110] and the United States [Sj3111]; and two complamts, one by the State of Israel [S/3116],.and one [Sj3119] from the six Arab Member States of the United Nations: Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen. 2. On 19 October 1953 [626th meeting], the Couricil had unanimously asked the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, Major General Vagn Bennike, to proceed immediate1y to New York a.,') to report inperson on the item with, which the Council wasseÏzed. The General gave his report to the Couneil on 27 October 1953. Tbis report appears m the verbatim records of the Council's 630th meeting. 1 l shall hereafter refer to this document as "A". 3. At the 632nd meetmg of theCouncil, on 29 October 1953, the representatives of the United Kingdom, France, the United States, Greece, Lebanon and Israel orally put certain questions to General Bennike on bis report; and lat<er the representatives of Lebanon, Israeî, and Jordan sent in further written questions. To these oral and written questions (63 m all: seven by the representative of the United Kingdom, five by the representative of France, four by the xepresentative of the United States, 4. Numbers fO,'lowing refetences to document A indicate the paragraph referred to in the verbatim record of the 630th meeting. In the case of document B, the roman number indicates the section, the arabic number the question to which reference is made. The abbreviation "App." fol1owed by a roman number inclicates the relevant Appendbc in either A or B. 5. A careful study of docunients A and B will reveal that this material is admirably suited for systematization. Certain llropositions can be disengaged and mathematically proved. 6. So far as the grounds of proof are concemed, there is no higher authority for the Council than the material in A and B, since this material constltutes the findings of the Council's own competent organ, name~r, the Truce Supervision Organization. Consequently, the only rigorous prooi open ta the Coundl is proof based upon A and B. The following propositions are strictly proved upon the exclusive ground of A and B. The body of the proof makes use of no material taken from outside A and B. For conciseness and rigour, l have used the method of Spinoza: a proposition is formulated, then rigorously proved, with a "Q.E.D." at the end, then followed, where appropriate, by a brief discussion, and where possible, by the formulation of corollari.:s. 7... l entitle the body of truth in the totality of the following propositions, togtther with the discussion and corollades, the Qibya SYI;+em. This phrase is to be understood not in the sense thRt this total body of truth applies to Qibya alone, but in the sense that it was the Qibya incident which reIeased this total truth ta the light of day. 8. The claim is here quietly made that the Qibya System is the objective truth before the Council, and that this System is absolutely fair and adequate in relation to the only authoritative matericl Ïlefore the Council. PROPOSITION l On 14-15 October 1953, tf./! Israel regular army cpmmitted an act of aggression against lordan at Qibya. PROOF (1) The proof of this proposition i2 set forth fully in A 18-27.' The terms "Israel regular army" and "aggression" are taken from the text of the resolution adopted by a majority vote by the Mixed Armistice Commission at its meeting in the aftemoon ai 15 Octoher 1953 (A 25). Note als'J the fol1owing phrases in connexioiï with tliis attack (A 26) : "The Israel army'!; "Israel military forces planned and carried O'.tt this attack"; "offénsive action".' Note further the following two judgments of which the Chir-f of Staff was convinced: (a) "The evidence noted indicated that this raid was well planned and carrit:d out by men· expertly trained in the fundamentals of sudden and sustained ~ttack. It seems highly improbable that other than active military forces could have carried out this raid without suffering heayy casualties from their own fire, or from the explosions of their demolition charges" (A 26); (b) "In my estimation between 250 and 300 well-trained Israel soldiers carried out this operation" (A 26). (2) A 42 asserts that "the attack on Qibya '" resulted in the death of 53 Arab inhabitants and me destruction of more than 40 dwellings." "The records of the complaints and investigations of the Mixed Armistice Commissions since 1949 contain no evidence to show that border villages were ever iurnished with bangalore torpedoes, 2-inch and 81 mm. mortars and demolitioll charges. Nor does the history of incidents show the necessity of border villages being furnished with these i:'.fpes of weapons. The records of the Mixed Armistice Commission show that attacks against villages and persons in Israel take the pattern of raids carried out by small armed groups using hit-a:>.d-run tactics. For defence against fuis type of action, l can see the usefulness of machine guns, small automatic weapon;; and even hand grenades, but certainly not of mortars, bangabre torpedoes and demolition charges." The conclusion from this quotation bv the Chief of Smff is obvious. " n would seem, therefore, from ail this that nothing is more certain than that on 14-15 Oetooor 1953 the Israel regular al.my committed an act of aggTession against Jordan at Qlbya. Q.E.D. DISCUSSION The answer ta the first question put by the repn" i':ntative of France :B II 1) throws much light on how the ,in-v-estigation of the Qibya incident was carried out. That the Israel army is used in operations against Jordan is ab~olutely and mat<~ially proven in General Banike's answer to the sixteenth questioll of the representative of Israel (B VI 16). PROPOSITION II The act of aggression at Qibya is only the most outstanding of a class of similar acts of aggression com11litted by Israel. PROOF To the question (B V 11) : "From his analysis of the Qibya incident and the knowledgll of the Truce Supervision Organization of the bOLder incidents during the last five years, can General Bemlike conclude with good reason that the Qibya incident stands in a class by itself so far as its 3cope, its plan of execution and the acts of violence committed dl1ring'it ar~ ~on~er.ned?", General Bennike answers: "The Qibya incident 1S slmI1arto the Falameh-Rantis bcident (28-29 January 1953) and the Wadi Fukin, Sur'~ and Idna indclpnts (11 August 1953). However, because of the number of peLùns kille<!, and because of the number of men, the amount of military equipment, and the degree of organization involved, it stands out from other border incidents," From this it sc."ms fair to conclude that the act of aggxession at Qibya is only the most outstanding of a class of similar aets of aggression committed by Israel. Q.E.D. DISCUSSION I~ this connexion, see ''the iml.latience ùf Israel'; (A 61, 66), which leads Israel to resort to force and to prefer; instinctively ~lJere calTied out by Israel tllilitary forces. PROOF The e...act number is 16 out of 21, i.e., 76.2 per cent of Israel's violations of the General Armistice Agreement between January Md 15 October 1953 were carried out by Israel mmtary forces (B V 9). See also B VII 3. Proposition III is therefore perfectly proven. Q.E.D. DISCUSSlON It is interesting to note th<ct: since the conclusion of the General Armistice Agreement in 1949, Israel has complained of 58 crossings of the demarcation tine by Jordanian military units, whereas Jordan has complained of .212 crossings of the demarcatioll tine by Israel military units. On the other hand, Israel has complained of 101 cases of firing across the denlarcation tine from Jordan and of 23 Jordanian overflights; whereas Jordan has complained,of 173 cases of firing across the demarcation tine from Israel and of 65 Israel overflights. The crossing of the demarcation tine by unarmed individuals or groups from the other sicle has œen complained of 422 times by Israel and only 15 times by Jordan (B App. 1). The conclusion of aIl this seems to be that Israel action in breaking the General Armistice Agreement is largely military, whereas Jordanian action in breaking the General Armistice Agreement is l;u-gely civilian. PROPOSITION IV During 1953 the attacks carried 01lt by Israeli regillar forces have beell growing more frequent and more seriollS sr far as the Joss of Jorda,~i(11l livps is conce-r'lled, and increasing,y IQl'ger Israel armed forces hatl! been participatilJg ill them. PROOF This proposition is categorically proven by the General's answer to the first question of the representative of Jordan, B.vII 1. Q.E.D. DISCUSSION The discussionunder Proposition II above applies here. One may fairly draw the corollary that the Qih13 incident is but the culminating point of a mounting crescendo of aggressive ads by Israel. PROPOSITION V The scale of ope-ratiolls in the three cases .n··1953 in ~(lhich Jo-rdall was conde1r.lled by the Mi:red Armistice Commission for violation by Jordan's armed forces of the General Arntistice Agreement is qllite millor compared ta the scale of operations of the si~teen cases in 1953- ~lIhet"e-r taken collectively or wïth special reference ta thetllree cases of Falameh-Rantis of 28-29 Ja1Juary, of Wad; Fnkin, S1erif and Una of 11 A~lgflSt, and of Qibya of 14-15 Dctober - in which Israel was con:- From aU this it seems that the present proposition as stated above 10gicaUy foUows. Q.E.D. DISCUSSION The same applies to Israel operations e1sewhere than in Jordan, e.g. in the Gaza Strip on 28 August 1953 (A 46), when "the casualties were twenty kiUed, twenty-seven seriously wounded, thirty-five less seriously wounded." See also A 48. Concerning the' qualitative difference between the "hit-andrun tactics" of Arab attacks and the plannerl "military" attacks by Israel, see especia!ly B VI 4. PROPOSITION VI Israel does not respect its obligatiolt..r ltllder tlle General Armistice Agreements with respect to tlle demilitarised sones betwecl/o Israel and Syria, betwecn Israel and Egypt, and at MOllllt Sco}nts. PROOF (1) On 2 October 1953, the Egyptian-Israel Mixed Armistice Cominission adopted a resolution condemning Israel for violations of the provisions of the General Armistice Agreement with respect ta the demilitarized zone, esP"ecial1y the entry of "an armed ,Israeli force" severa! tirnes into the Zone, and the stationing of "an Israeti armed force and regular Israeli police" in it (A 50). (2) A 57-58. sets forth Israel's violal:Ïons of her obligations in the demilitarized zone between her '".ad Syria. (3) Israel' went bac1c on her ac(~eptance of the Acting Mediator's authoritative statement of 1949 with respect to .the demilitarized zone between her and· Syria (A 62.63). On how the Secudty Council in May 195i caUed upon the parties to give effect ta this authoritative statement, and how "total adhesion" to it "has Ilot bee11 forthcoming on the Israeli side", see:B V 16. (4) A 66 asserts: "There is in Israel an impatience with the General Armistice Agreements which is due to the fact that they have not yet been replaced byfinal sèttlements. Thisimpatience extends to the, personnel of.the Truce Supervision Organization, especially when it tries to 'exercise supervisory pcwers in a demilitarized zone." (5) The Ilo~-fulfilment by Israel ofher obligations in the demititarized .zones, in particular her refusa! ta allow freedom of movementto the United Nations observers and her ilIegal From aU this, one is irresistibly led to condude that Israel does not respect its obligations under the Galeral Armistice Agreements with respect to the demilitarized zones between Israel and Syria, between Israel and Egypt, and at Mount Scopus. Q.E.D. PROPOSITION VII Obstruction ta the work of the United Nations Trflce Sflpervision Organisation appears ta have come ollly [rom Israel. PROOF (1) In the Wadi Fukin incident of 18 April 1953, when charges and countercharges were made by Israel and Jordan, and when the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission abstained:froill yoting because he considered that the evidence was conflicting, "the Israel delegation then refused to vote and the officer in charge of the Israel' delegation to the Mixed Armistice Commission stated that he saw no useful purpose in the working of the Mixed Armistice Commission" (A 35). (2) Israel dœs not permit the. Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Orgapization to perform his functions'· under the General Armistice Agreements with respect to the demilitarized zones (see Proposition VI above). (3) A 66 asserts: "There is in Israel an impatience with the General Armistice Agreements which is due to the fact that they have not yet been replaced by final settlements. This impatience extends to the personnel of the Truce Supervision Organization, especial1y when it tries tb exercise supervisol"Y powers in a demilitarized zone." (4) To the direct question: "Have Gener-l Bennikeand his organizationbeen prevented from, performing their functions? If so, when, how and by whom?", the General answers (B V 2) : "... United Nations military observers have met with some obstruction on the part of Israeli civilians and some overzealous Israeli officiaIs in the two demilitarized zones created by the Israel-Egyptian and Israel-Syrian Armistice Agreements and in the Mount Scopus demilitarized zone. In'the first two demilitarized zones, an appeal to higher authorities has removed the obstruction. The situation, however, has not been improved on Mount Scopus ..." After narrating the amazing story of obstruction at Mount Scopus, the General concludes with these strong words: "1 'must emphasize that the government concerned should take aU necessary steps to ensure that aU its officials who come in contàct with United Nations military observers are properly instructed as to the privileges, immunities and authority of the observers incarrying out their functions. Should anY government in the area place any obstacles in the, way of military observers carrying out their lawful duties, or should a government endor~~ any obstructive action by a subordil)ate official, 1 shall feel boundto place the matter before the Security Council." There is no hint, direct or indirect, whetber in this answer to this direct question, or anywhere elese in A or B, that any obstruction has come from the side of Jordan. Q.E.D. PROPOSITION VIII Jordal~ seems to be co-operative. PROOF (1) Note Jordan's complete cooperatiàn in the investigation of the incident in the Israel village Qf Yahud (B I 2). (2) Jordan stresses the necessity of close. co-operation between "local police officers" on both sides of the demarcation line "all along the border" (B 1 6). Since the Chief of Staff himself attaches "great importance" to "improved contacts between the police on either side of the border" (R l 6), Tordan's stress in this regard seems to express a co-opei"stive ~pirit. (3) B II 3 asserts: "The Jordanian authorities have taken both preventive and punitive measures to comply with recommendations to curb infiltration". B II 3 asserts that since Oetober 1952 Jordan has "increased the number of guards along the demarcation line", and that "as regards punitive measures, known infiltrators have been imprisoned or removed from the border villages, and local authorities have been replaced where a laxness of control was suspected." (4) In B V 6 we are told that the Cliairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission in a formaI meeting of the Commission voted against a motion moved by the Israel delegation in the absence of the Jordan delegation censuring the latter for its absènce from the meeting. The Chairman must therefore have had his reasons for believing that even in this apparent act of non-co-operation Jordan was, not un-co-operative. (5) With respect to at least 191 complaints against Jordan, Jordan regretted the crossing of the demarcation line by civilians and reaffirmed that it was "taking aU possible measures to prevent all such illegal crossings ... in the future" (B VII). This regret and reaffirmation certainly il1dicate a co-operanve spirit. ' (6) The contrast between the abstention of the Jordanian delegation on the motion condemning Jordan for the Yahud incident of 12-13 October i953 even before the investigation of this incident was completed (B VI 3), and the r.egative vote cast by the Israel delegation with regard to the motion about Qibya even after the investigation was completed (A 25), certainly bespealcs a co-operative spirit on the part of Jordan. (7) In summing up the results of the meeting of the senior military commanders of the two parties held on 29 June 1953, the Chief of Staff says "Jordan is taldng measures against infiltration and will continue to do sa" (A 39). See also E VI 8. As a result of these measures we are told that there was "a decrease in the numb~r of complaints regarding infiltration submitted . " by Israel" B VI 8. From all this it seems quite reasonable ,to conclude that Jordan seems to be co-operative. 'Q.E.D. DISCUSSION It would be irlteresting to find out who "faiIed to appear for the meeting" in the "recent cases" of local commanders' meetings to which. General Bennike refers in B VIlS. Q.E.D. DISCUSSION If, out of a total of 344 complaints of all kinds, 191 complaints concerning civilian crossing of the demarcation line were settled in 1952 without investigation or discussion - both parties agreeing that these' cases were merely "inconsistent ,vith" article IV, paragraph 3, rather than that they constituted "a hreach of" that articlethe presumption is strong that infiltration ;~ ;argely an individual matter (A App. III, B VII 10 and E ADP. 1). PROPOSITION X Whell tension illcreases between Israel alld Jordan, Jerusalem is a dangerous powder keg. PROOF (1) A37 asserts: "Jerusalem, when tension increases between Israel and Jordan, is a dangerous powder keg. 1 have been told in particular by the Israeli authorities that criminal activities by infiltrators in the Israel part of Jerusalem would create a very grave situation." (2) A, 43 asserts that the situation in Jerusalem continues to he "dangerous and should he watched closely." (3) General Bennike asserts in B V 12 that "during a conversation with memhers of the Israel general staff, 1 was told that Jerusalem was the capital city of the State of' Israel, in which the Knesset and the government offices are located; and that security in Jerusalem was accordingly of the greatest importance." From all this it seems fair' to' concIude that when tension increases hetween Israel and Jordan, Jerusalem is a dangerous powder keg; Q.E.D. DISCÙSSION It is Dot out of the question that Israel. may want sooner or later to annex the whole City of Jerusalem, PROPOSITION XI The Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organizatioll attaches special importance· to the procedure of local commanders' meeti,lgs so far assolving the problem of infiltration is concemed; , PROOF (1) A 41 asserts: "From a practical point of view, local commanders' meetings have continued to be more usefu1 than fônital meetings of the' Mixed Armistice Commission. My predecessor, iD his report on the Jerusalem incident, has in,.. dicated. .. that the machinery of the, Mixed Armistice Commission 'did not... funètion properly, since delegates. tended to act as lawyers deferiding a case in a court .. .'· Meetings of local commanders and police officers are freer from politics and can be More effiCient." .See also A'60, B II' 2 and B IV. See further A 29-30 and A 38 on the "Agreement on measures to ctirb infiltration" 'of :May '1952, and the "Agreement to reduce border 'incidents'" of Dccember 1952. , (2) GeneraI Bertnike's answet tri the questions put to him by the representative of the United Kingdom in B 1 3-6 :is very important with regard' to this question. (3) Inanswer to the first question put by the representative of the United States (concerhing the local commanders' agreement), the. Chief of Staff says (B III t), "1 am' confident that (5) Concerning local commanders' meetings, B VI 13 asserts: "Some of the incidents which have been handled are small in themselves, but many of these could weil have erupted ioto major incidents if they had not been checked at the outset. 1 am convinced that if local commanders were care:fully selected, if they were given proper instructions and some latitude in taking speedy action, there is practically no limit to the good they could do in reducing tension and improving the spirit of co-operation in their sectors." From all fuis it seems correct to deduce that the Chief of Staff attaches special importance to the procedure of local commanders' meetings so far as solving the problem of infiltration is concerned. Q.E.D. DISCUSSION Jordan seems to agree with the Chief of Staff in his views on this question (B, 1 3). On the strengthening of the procedure of local commanders' meetings by the resumption of high level talks, see B VI 8. PROPOSITION XII Israel aUeges that from hme 1949 to 15 Dctober 1953, as a remIt of Jordanian attacks, 89 Israelis and 68 Jordanians were killed inside Isr!Jel, and 101 Israelis alld 18 Jordallians were wounded inside Israel. Of these allegatiolls the Mi~ed Armistice Commission has verified that only, 24 Israelis and 2 Jordanians were killed inside Israel, and that OIlly 30 Israelis (lnd 1 Jordanian were wOlmded inside Israel. PROOF These figures are readily computed from the tables in B App. I. Q.E.D. DISCUSSION If the ratio of what is verified ta what is c1aimed is defined as the apparent reliability of the party that makes the c1aim, then Israel's apparent reliability with respect to its daims regarding Israelis killed inside Israel as. a result of Jordanian action is 27 per cent; with respect to its c1aims regarding Jordanians killed inside Israel as a result of Jordanian action, 2.9 per cent; with respect to. its c1aims regarding Israelis w01111ded inside Israel as a result of Jordanian action, 29.7 per cent; and with respect to its daims regarding Jordanians wouhded inside Israel as a result of Jordanian action, 5.6 per cent. PROPOSITION XIII Jordan aUeges that from June 1949 to 15 Dctober 1953, as a result of Israeli attacks, 175 Jordania~ anà 19 Israelis were PROOF These figures are readily computed from the tables in B App. I. Q.E.D. DISCUSSION If the ratio of what is verified to what is claimed is defined as the apparent re1iability of the party that Jakes the c1aim, then Jordan's apparent re1iability with ;,~spect to its c1a·.À:> regarding Jardanians killed insidc Jordan as a result of Israeli action is 44 per C('.nt; with respect to its daims regarding Israe1is killed inside Jordan as a result of Israeli action, 36.8 per cent; with respect to its daims regarding Jordanians wounded inside Jordan as a result of Israe1i action, 37.2 per cent; and with respect to its daims regarding Israelis wounded inside Jordan as a result of Israeli action, 14.3 per cent. A clear coroll~ of Protlositions XII and XIII is that the apparent reliability of Jordan is considerably greater than the apparent re1iability of Israel. PROPOSITION XIV Since the beginning of the armistice in 1949, Israel has been condemned 63 timea by the Mi:red Armistice Commission for breaches of the Jordan-Israel Armistice Agt'eement, Jordan 50 times for breaches of the same Armistice ",4.greem(mt. Of the 63 moianons by Israel 58.7 per cent were violations of article III, Paragraph 2, which speaks of the commission of warlike or hostile (lets by military or para-military forces. The corresponding figure for Jordan is 38 Per cent. Of the 63 i>iolations by Israel 95.2 per cent were molations of article III, paragraphs Z and 3 (paragraph 3 dealing with warlike acts or acts of hostility conducted from tlle terr-itory of one party' against the othet· party). The corresponding figure for Jordan is 76 per cent. PROOF These figures can be readily computed from the tables in B App. I. Q.E.D. SALES AGENTS FOR UNITED DEPOSI1AIRES DES PU811CAflONS FIMICE Editions A. Paris V~ UEECE- GlEeE "Elefthero'ld.kis," tion. 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