S/PV.649 Security Council

At this stage of our deliberations, l feel myself calbd upon to fulfi1 a twofold duty to the Security Council. 72. In the first place, l should like to sum up the case as we see it, and, while doing so, to refer in particular to the three statemen:'a made by the sponsors of the draft resolution [Sj3151] submitted yesterday [648th meeting]. These statements are an element of the discussion, a part of it. They are not by any means to be interpreted as a juridical basls for the explanation of the resolution to be adopted by the Council, except in sa far as the general discussion usually serves as such a basis. They are net going to be the subject of a vote and should not be unduly influential in explaining the resolution t4at may be adopted. Furthermore, these three, statements are at marked variar>.ce, in some respects, wirh one another, and in Gue course we shall try ta refer to sl1ch :ariances or, in fact, discrepancies. 73. While trying to deal with the three statements made before the Council yesterday, l shall also take the opportunity to deal with the statement made by Mr. Eban on 18 No-vember [639th meeting] and the one that he has made today. From what we have heard from him today, he feels himself. it seems, to be, by and large, in agreement with the draft resolution as it has been explained by the three statements made yesterday. Certainly, here and there he referred to the need for speed and, said that the uinety days allowed for the report of the Chief of Staff was too long a period alld might somehow be reduced. Yet, the way he explained these statements allows us to go along with him to the extent of saying that we are faced with a point of view which is largely in agreement with that of Israel. From now on, it might nl,' '"Je inappropriate to say that we are faced with a view which is that of Israel and also of the three Powers. 74. The second duty l have to perform is to present ta the Council some suggestions which, in our view, might serve as material for a proposaI to be submitted to the Council or. for amendments to the present draft resolution. 75. In looking at the question at, this stage of our deliberations, we see clearly that there are four main factors under cOl:1sideration. . 76. The first factor is· the effect of the works on the rights of Syria in Syria-. whether these rights are the existing established rights for the use of the waters of 79. Lastly, there is a fourth factor with which l should like to deal in particular today, namely, the action of Israel as seen in the light of the general trends of developments in the Near East-an action which, when viewed in conjtmction with many other actions, constitutes a danger ta peace in the area and diminishes greatly the possibilities of any future peaceful development for the general w~:rre of the Near Eastern region. 80. l shall speak now about the first factor: the rights of Syria in Syria. We have often hearcl Ml'. Eban state that Syria's attit!lde concerning the water project is an (J-Jsttuctive Gne, that Syria has no rights and has no real possibility of utilizing these waters, and that therefore Syria should allow Israel to use them in their entirety. This is unfounded. If l were to ex.pect from Ml'. Eban the same good spirit which was ex.pressed the other day by Ml'. Charles Malik, that is, a readiness to recant unfounded statements, l should indeed be offering him a great opportunity to recant again and again, this being orny the first point amongmany. 81. Syria already uses the waters of the Jordan in Syria. The existence of the established rights of Syria ta these waters is not contested. These rights date from time immemorial, and did not await the coming of , Zionism. Such projects were made in the past and are no' serving a large area of the southern part of Syria. Ta take the waters away from Syria and ta prejudice or control the rights of Syria without Syria's agreement and over Syria's objections, amounts indeed ta a clear act of aggression against Syria itself. Armistice' or no armistice, these rights should be upheld. They ex.isted long before the armistice, and the armistice has merely affirmed that they should be safegua:rded. 82. Secondly, we come ta a situation in which one party to the Armistice Agreement, Israel, asks another party, Syria, to try torelinquish its rights or ta have them placed under the control of Israelin other words, ta have those rights prejudiced in one way or another - without the consent of Syria, even though that party, .. Israel, has no existing rights whatsoever with regard ta the Jordan at the present time. Not a single drop of the waters of the Jordan has ever been used to the west of the Jordan in Israel-held territory. These waters have been used in Syria an(~ continue ta be used there. That is why the international agreements which were entered into between the United 84. There is no doubt whatever that in this case a mutual prior agreement for the use of the waters is necessary before any project can be started in connexion with them. 85. But we are not at this time apportioning the waters. The representative of France and the representative of Israel have referred 1.0 the partition of the waters. The quantity of the waters now used is immaterial. What is important is that these rights do exist and that they are not contested. The Israel project, if realized, would result in two consequences. First, as has been stated by General Bennike, little or no water would be left to flow in the Jordan rivC'!r-bed after the completion of that project. Whether or not water is left, certainly the intake canals which now carry the waters to Syria would not then be at a level, in relation to that of the river, that would allow the flow of thp waters to the canals. But supposing that the amoullt of water that is to be used by Israel leaves the river flow Ilot substantially diminished, and that it would produce onlya minor decrease in the amount of tbe water, still the intake canals are at a level which would not allow the waters to flow into them even if the decrease were less. 'T'his has been proved by the trial that ')ok place in connexion with the flood-gates. The use of the floodgates of the drainage project resulted in a decrease of about 70 pel' cent in the flow of the waters of the canal, as stated by the reports of the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization. 86. l conclude on this point, that the Israel project in and of itself is incompatible with the safeguarding of the established rights of Syria. Even if it reany want.ed to, Israel could not at one and the same time carry out its projects and still keep Syria's tights to the use of the waters as they were previously. This consideration i5 one which needs ta be retained. So much for the existing and established rights. 87. But ther~ is something much more important than these established rights, which exist in the case of Syria and which do not exist at aIl in the case of Israel. There is the possibility of the potential use of these waters of the Jordan to the eo. i: of the Jordan as well as to the ,,:est. Syria,.as well as Israel! can physically; at least, d~vert the RIver Jordan from ItS present bed. Syria can divert it ta the east and Israel can divert it to the west. Syria can use all the waters of the Jordan in Syria for purposes beneficial t9 Syria, and it 1S oùr intention to make these purposes benefichl, in particular to the Arab refugees who are the victims of Israel and who are now in other Arab countries. . 8~. Concerning the possibility of the diversion of the l'lver, both Syria and Israel have equal possibilities. What one party can do the other can do also. Legally, 89. Looking' at the situation from the practical point of view, allow me to say that if - and perhaps the possibility is not far away - one party tu the agreement, Israel, goes into the demilitarized zone to divert the river or resumes its work with the intention of diverting th~ river, th.:n the other party, Syria, in a11 probability, will seek to do the same unless the first party, Israel, h ordered to abide by the Armistice Agreement and refrain from unilateral action and unti1 the first party complies with an order to that effect and a mutual, prior agreement is reached through the Mixed Armistice Commission between the two sides. The action of one party to divert the river necessarily invites the same action from the second party to the agreement. If Israel refrains, we will refrain. If it does not, we will then be justified in seeking and carrying out a diversioa of the river to Syria. . 90. Both Syria and Israel are obligated ta refrain from unilateral action so as te.' avoid trouble and maintain peace. Our complaint was indeed brought to the Security Council in a.t'l. effort to maintain peace and to maintain it through eliminating unilateral action that would disturb peace by undermining the Armistice Agreement, that bulwark of peace. 91. Mr. Eban, in his statement of 18 November [639th meeting]; made a mistake, to say the least. And if it was a mistake, this is another opportunity for him to recant. Ii it was not merely a mistake but a conscious one, we do not expect him to recant because such a mist:ake would have been deliberate1y made. He said that what was meant was that Syria could not avail itself of the potentialities of the Jordan, beyond its existing established rights. This statement needs to "be corrected. He cited· what he called two facts, which were only half.-truths, l may sa}', used to conceal the truth. He said that the River Jordan flows southwards and not northwards and therefore it could not be used in Syria. That it flows southward is a weIl known geographicai îact, but that is only half the truth. He conclt\ded that Syria could not use the Jordan on that account. The fact is that Syria ext€I1ds in a southeTly direction to the east of the Jordan, far further to the snuth than the present place in the demilitarized zone ô..."ld eve!1 to the south of Lake Tiberias, into which the River Jordan flows. In that case, there is Syrian territory in which the waters of the Jordan can be used. 92. Then Mr. Eban rèverted to anothet argument. He said, and l am going to quote him in this case [639th meeting, para. 71] : "As one stands on thebanks of the Jordan on its Israel side and· tooks into Syria, one sees a steep incline rising into mountainous territory. It would take a far m.ore athletic current than the River Jordan to flow upwards .along thase hills." 93. As regards the possibilities of exploiting the hydro-electric power, they are practicaIly the same both to the east and to the west. If we were to consider, therefore, whether a project is beneficial to one country, we should at the same time consider whether the diversion could be beneficial to another country, since both countries are under the same restrictions and the same limitations as regards the use of stich possibilities at the present time under the Armistice Agreement. Let us keep this basic differe..t1ç~ b mind, that whereas Israel has no existing' right~ whatsoever on the Jorel.an at thê p...esent time, Syr.ia has. We are not discussing the question whether a project is beneficial or not. On that point I can agree fully with what the United Kingdom representative said yesterday. The gist of his argument was that what we are trying to see is whether a given project is admissible under the terms of the Armistice Agreement as it now stands. I only mentioned the facts concerning the possible use of the waters in Syria in order to correct Ml'. Eban's erroneous conception: he implied that Syria had no potential use for· the river and that its stand was merely one of obstruction. 94. Israel is fully aware of all the facts to which I have referred. Therefore, in order to substantiate its argument, it turned to an allegatinn that it had sovereignty over the Jordan and the ~rea through which the Jordan flows. Such a conception of Isra~l sovereignty, I should like topoint out to the Council, negates Syria's ,established rights, the rights of the inhabitants of the demilitarized zone, and it also negates the possibility of· any regional arrangenlent concerning the Jordan for the benefit of aIl the parties concerned. From the engineering point of view, a variety of regional arrangements is conceivable. But what is the use of considering regional arrangements when Israel's claim to sovereignty over the Jordan makes all regional arrangements subject to Israel's agreement and renders them academic and futile, since Israel maintains that it should use the river solely in its own interests? 95. If the idea of Israel's absolute sovereignty over that area were to be admitted, there would still remain the fact that, as long as the Armistice Agreement is in existence, such sovereignty could not be exercised in the present circumstances. %. Speaking in the 542nd meeting of the Council, Mr. Eban said [para. 15] : "It is true, however,that the Armistice Agreement prevails over all previous con~eptions of jurisdiction." This is correct. There, 98. We a11 know that this idea of Israel's sovereignty over the Jordan and the demilitarized zone is mere imagination on the part of Israel. The Armistice Agreement was not a final peace settlement. It did not fix international frontiers, and the Agreement mentions this specifica11y. Nor did it dispose of Palestine territory. The Palestine question is not a settled question. The resolutions of the United Nations regarding the Palestine question did not settle that question because those resolutions have all been fionted by Israel, wJIether they concern the partition scheme, the Armistice Agreement, the internationalization of Jerusalem, or the return and compensation of Arab rèfugees. 99. The question ~f sovereignty in the demilitarized zone is now in·abeyance. It does not belong to Israel, nor does it, at the present moment, belong to Syria. No international frontiers were fixed, and Israel's authority is exercised behind armistke Hnes and not behind frontiers: Without the Armistice Agreement, Isra~ authorities would have no text whatever to justify their action within the demarcation Hnes set up by the armistice. Furthermore, in· the whole Middle Easfern area there is not a single country which recognizes Israel, with or without frontiers. There is no country in the world, east or west, which has •ecognized any fixed frontiers for Israel. Israel itself realizes that it has no frontiers. What it has is only an armistice demarcation line. That is the reason why it strives somehow. although in vain, to transform the present demarcation lines into definite frontiers. , 100. But even if the present demarcation lines established by.the armistice were to be considered as frontiers, Israel's actions with regard tothe division e.'l:tend beyond these demarcation lines. Therefore, there is no reason whatsoever to claim the existence of Israel's sovereignty or its exercise of the attributes of public powers. 101. The so-called sovereignty of Israel is not only a fallacious assertion, but.a very reckless and dangerous one because it does not. ascribe any real value to the demarcation lines indicated in the Armistice Agreement, on which the peace in that area is based. Since Israel ?ases .~ts ,actions on ~uch a conception of sovereignty, !ts actIons are, l must state, at the present moment a -repudiation of the Armistice Agreement and constitute 104. Sa much for the e.'(isting rights and potential uses of the Jordan to the east as weIl as to the west of its present bed. 105. l should like to turn now ta the military aspects of the situation. l should like to prove that the unilateral actions resulting from the work do alter the very objects of the Armistice Agreement and the value of the demilitarized zone. The military considerations in the Armistice Agreement obviouS'ly surpass in importance the non-military considerations. The cease-fire and the armistice in Palestine brought hestilities ta an end. They did not, however, fix any frolltiers and they left numerous outstanding questions without a solution. Such outstanding questions do not come within the purview of the armistice except ta the extent that the armistice safeguards them until a final settlement has been reached. 106. Therefore, the present Chief of Staff and his predecessor have bath had to look attentively to the military aspects in implementing the Armistice Agreement. General Riley did so and General Bennike is also doing sa. In looking into this aspect of the present question of the diversion of the·Jordan, General Bennike dwelt upon. article V of the Armistice Agreement dealing with military questions and with the value and function of the demilitarized zone in the armistice system. Using his authorityunder article V the Chief of Staff established in his report some findings resulting from careful study and discussion with both parties to the Agreement. He asked himself the question which he has formulated i11 annex l of his report of 23 October 1953 in the following terms [S/3122, anne% l, para. 5] "Whether the first object of the definitlon of the demilitarized zone according to article V, paragraph 2, of the General Armistice Agreement, viz., 'separating the armed forces of the two Parties in such manner as ta minimize the possibility of friction and incident', would be affected by work aiming at diverting a con- 109. Secondly, the Jordan, in its deep valley, is a serious obstacle for any troops - and l calI to the attention of the representative of France in particular tins finding of General Bennike - particuiarly motorized troops, which might attempt to cross it. 110. Thirdly, looking to the projected canal and its miIitary factors, General Bennike said (S/3122) annex III, para. 7 (e)] : "1 agree that respect for the demilitarization provisions relating to the zone îs essential so long as they exist. However, the value of the demilitarized zone as a buffer zone would be different if one party controI1ed the flow of the Jordan in the zone by meaqs of a canal. l have only considered the question of the altered military value of the flow of the Jordan in the demiIitarized zone, resulting from the construction of such a canaI." And General Bennike continues, m answering the Foreign Minister of Israel: "You have considered another question, that of the militarv value of the canal in which the water derived from the river would flow. The canal, in your opinion, wouId only constitute an obstacle for a party bent upon aggression. You add that 'for its part, the Government of Israel has consistentIy abjured aggression. Were it nursing aggressive designs, it wouId be thwarting its own purpose' by digging the canal. From a purely technical point of view, it is not quite c1ear to me how the Govemment of Israel 'were it nUI;sing aggressive designs, ... would be.thwarting its own purpose' by digging, in an area not affected by the demilitarization provisions of article V, a canal running paraI1el to the Jordan river-bed. From a pure1y military point of view, the existence of such a canal would permit the party controlling_it to economize its forces in the area and increase them . elsewhere." " 111. AlI through his findings he was basing himself on article V of the Armistice Agreement. He based himself on that same article in·reaching his authoritative conclusions and decisions, which may be stImmedup as follows: first, that the work would, from the military point of view, alter the object, value and function of the demilitarized zone and would remove the obstacles, separating the two sides and minimizing-the possibility of friction and incident; secondly, that a canal in Israelheld territory, outside the demilitarized zone, is no substitute for the river flowing within the zone; thirdly, that such a canal, held by Israel, would not thwart Israel's aggressive designs, if and when Israel nursed . them, and in the event of military action such a canal would be of service to Israel, allowing it to alter the water course at will a'ld thus to reduce its forces in that 112. If the action of one side was, as is the case with the action in question, of such a nature as to alter the objects of the Armistice Agreement and the very value of the demilitarized zone to both sides, that action would represent a substantial modification of the Armistice Agreement. l cal1 the attention of the representative of the United Kingdom to the fact that it would be a modification of the agreement and not an implementation thereof, and for a modification we need the mutual consent of both parties. 113. Yet today, inparticular, MI'. Eban has tried to base his argument on another provision of the Armistice Agreement - paragraph 1 of a,rticle II. He did this also at a previous meeting. In a previous statement he embarked upon an attempt to minimize the importance of the Joriai. in that area. He said that, most of us, in our younger days, could have jumped over the River Jordan at many points in the zone. No matter how athletic MI'. Eban's mind or his feet may be we would notwish him to try that jump for it would plunge him 'into the Jordan's current. It is preferable that we should correct him before he undertakes such a jump. The Jordan is not a very big river, but it is not possible to jm;np over it. MI'. Hoppenot told us yesterday that that river of rivers, in view of the development of military art and military science, would not now offer a serious obstacle to a modern trained army. But everything is relative. Sorne armies which are better equipped could probably cross the Jordan with far greater ease than the armies which exist in the Near East and which are not yet as wel1 equipped as those of other countries. To cross this river is a big military action. To say the least, it has, in its present bed, served as an effective hindrance to infiltration and other happenings of the kind whiCh go on in other areas of Palestine where no such river exists to form a' separation between the two sides. No matter how much attention' we are bound to give to the observations which have been made by the representative of France, there remains the c1eai observation and decision of General Bennike in which he has appreciated the factors and concluded bysaying that the Jordan does in fact constitute a serious obstacle. This is an authoritative and. objective view. 114. With regard particularly to article II, paragraph 1, and its interpretatiofl and possible implications, we have the fol1owing to state. To begin with, that article was not the one on which General Bennike based his findings. Therefore claiming' authority uuder article II does not in the least diminish the ,,-alue of those findings, which are based on article V. 115. MI'. Eban, however, would have us be1ieve that the truce established by the Security Coundl decision of 15 July 1948 [S/902] was abrogated. Let us examine that matter; it deserves particular attention. What does article II, paragraph 1, of the Armistice Agreement say? It states: "The'principle that no military or political advantage should be gained under the truce Il du aujourd'hui cette qu'elle 118. pouvait-elle adoption? la ne peut tions Convention principe tage de 119, l'attention considérations 121. The present situation with regard tci the demilitarized zone and the military aspects of the matter is such that one cou1d safely say that the demilitarized zone is to a large extent occupied by Israel forces and is under Israel control. That situation was recently referred ta by the Chief of Staff. In ;,1s report of 20 October 1953 [5/3122, anne:t" III], he said that Israel police guarding the site had used an old mill as a bivouac. Rence, Isr?êl poiice were in the demilitarized zone. In his state.œènt of 27 October [630th meeting], also, General B(;nnike stated that Israel police were in the zone. He referred, too, tn previous reports by General Riley in which there was reference to the presence of Israel police and other Israel para-military formations in the demilitarized zone. General Bennike concluded that the situation had not changed since his predecessor had reported to the Council on 30 October 1952. 122. A further observation must be made in this resoect. The United Nations authorities in the zone 'JOhght to implement that provision of article V of the Armistice Agreement which empowers the Chief of Staff to employ locally recruited police in the demilitarized zone. The United Nations authorities established regulations for the recruitment and functioIÙ!1g of such local police. Syria accepted the regulations suggested by the United Nations authorities; Israel refused. Again, in a:nother instance, Syria, faithful to the Armistice Agreement, a:ccepted such a proposaI and Israel again refused it, wartting to COnf~ll1e to control the zone by the Israel police and by the so-called "agricultural comruand" which is attached to the army of Israel and which is, in all probability, responsible for the incidents that have taken place at Qibya and at other places on the Israel de.marcation lines. 123. When the United Nations observers come to the demilitarized zone and try to fulfil their mission of observation, the reports also indicate that they are constantly hampered by the Israel authorities. In one instance back in 1951, such observers were turned out at gun-point from certain localities. Today, they are 124.. The second. mission of the forces of Israel in that zone is to establish a de fa,cto control by Israel of the zone so as to prejudice the final settlement. Indeed, the continuation of sucb actions would tend to create a fait accompli and make a final settlement on the basis of right and justice a forlorn hope. 125. The third mission that these forces are trying to fulfil and the purpose of the action to control the demilitarized zone are to apply to that zone Israel's interpretation of the restoration of normal civilian life to it. The intelpretation of Israel with respect to normal civiliah life in that zone is one which we shaIl see in a moment. 126. Ml". Eban has contested our statement that over 99 pel" cent of the demilitarized zone to the south of Qasr'Atra is Arab.We have here an official Government of Palestine map, which we are ready to present to the Council, which substantiates our statement beyond doubt. General Bennike, in a recent report, in answer to the questions of the representative of Pakistan, affirmed that about half of the land in the demilitarized zone W,.:lS owned by Syrian nationals. The remaining half, however, is owned by Palestinians of the zone, of whom more than 99 pel" cent are Arabs. 127. 1 shouldlike to take a few minutes to discuss the ~tatus of the demilitarized zone asit Is at present. When the Armistice Agreement· was being negotiated in 1949, it was made clear by the two sides in the minutes of the negotiations that an armistice was being negotiated and not a final peace settlement. This situation was described by General Riley, who attended these nego- ;tiations, when he said before the Security Council [542nd meeting, para. 97] : . ".. , it was a1ways kept uppermost in mind that it was an armistice agreement and not a peace treaty or other final settlement that was being negotiated. The question of territorial sovereignty, therefore, was scrupulouslyavoided." 128. Presenting further information on the same matter, General Bennike also said [542nd meeting, para. 96]: ".. ; what mustbe made emphaticaIly clear is that the Armistice Agreement did not in any way deal with the question of territorial sovereignty artd that this question, generally and particularly in so far as the demilitarized zone is concerned, must rest in abeyance while the Armistice Agreement is1n effect "The provision for the demilitarized zone in the light of all circumstances is the most that can be reasonably expected in an armistice agreement by either party. Questions of permanent boundaries, territorial sovereignty, customs, trade relations and the like must be dealt witn in the ultimate peace settlement ..." 130. That answers very fully the statement made today by Ml". Eban thaï the withdrawal of ,Syria from the demilitarized zone was unconditional. On the contrary, it was conditional upon the establishment of a S'tatus in the zone whereby it would be kept separate from the two sicles' and notbe under the influence or control of either one of them. That status of the zone, which places the administration of the zone on a local basis, does not allow the intervention of Syria or of Israel in matters within the internaI jurisdiction of that zone or in its administration. Within the zone as an entity, the administration will be of a local pattern from village to village and settlement to settlement. Whenever there are questions of general intetest, they will be solved with the guidance of the Chief of Staff. 131. That administration on a local basis continued from the armistice until the beginning of 1951. Then came the Israel projects andwith these projects came a series of incidents which have continually disturbed the peace of the demilitarized zone:· raids on villages, usurpation of lands, dispersion of the people from their homes and refusaI of those people that had been dispersed to return. They have cotne to the demilitarized zone in order to create a different status in that zone from the one which it had with its Arab population.. 132. In the et',rly months and up to 1951, the Mixed Armistice Commission used to meet whenever a difficulty arase concerning the interpretation of the provisions relating to the return of normal civilian life. At those meetings, many difficulties were solved. The precedents esta:blished by the decisions of the Mixed Armistice Commission do form a good basis for a correct interpret<. ,:'m of the status of the zone. In tbis case, such an intelJetation would not at all permit the United Kingdom delegation, for example, to say that the present conditions in the demilitarized zone were a matter 'of interpretation of the Armistice Agreement. They are rather a matter of modifièation of the status of the zone in· its most fundamental aspects. 133. l haveh~re an example.oi' the attitudetaken by the Israel authorities towardsthe exeJ;cise by Arab owners of their rights in the demilitarized zone. It is in the form of a letter addressed by the Israel authnrities te the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission. It is.dated 25 December 1952. The Israel representative said: 134. In other words, Israel would consider the return of an ..<\rab owner to his own land, the exercise of his right of ,t>roperty, as being opposed to t..lte security of Israel in the demilitarized zone, in a zone where Israel has no jurisdiction and no right of control whatsoever and where Israel police should never have been allowed to enter. 135. Sv.ch are the actions of Israel in the demilitarized zone, actions which are substantiaIly moilifying its status and making it incumbent upon us aIl to try to look ioto a situation which is being aggravated from month to monh~ and which may bring about serious dh4iculties and troubles. AlI those actions of control, of policing, of para-military occupation are concomitant and intertwined with the Israel prajects which, in t.tUs case, are aIl directed towards prejudicing the final settlement and realizb:g a mainmise of Israel in that area. 136. l should like to take a few minutes to refer to an important matter to which Mr. Eban has referred today and 011 which he placed sorne importance: the question of the so-caUed private rights of Israelis in the demiIitarized zone und~r a so-ealled concession to do the work. The facts are the following. 13ï. The authority which is undertaking the work in the demilitarized zone is not a private one, but an Israel agency working under the Israel Department of Works for the purposes and advantage of Israel and not for any private advantage or purpose. 135. litarisée; cette situation peut Toutes i:ontrôle, avec associées pèce, mainmise d'Israël 136. important insistant; nant à des d'une les 137. vaux privée, sous d'Israël et 138. jamais compagnie L'allégation travaux une droits 139. tine acte ment international. jamais faire, 1923 des Tibériade, ment de la Paiestine avait national, le duction dée exploii:ée. 138. Secondly, the Palestine Government at no time gave any concession to any company to divert the River Jordan. The assumption that there is sorne kind of ':oncession todivert the River Jordan is a false assumption pütforwardby Israel in order to create an actually non-existent private daim. 1 139. Thirdly, if the Palestine Government had given a concession to divert the river, that act would have been an internaI act of the Government of Palestine andcould not be opposed ta Syria internàtionally. The Palestine Government did no1 give any such concessbn and could nothave given it, because that Government was hound byinternational treaties of 1923 and 1926, which provided that the Palestine Government could only authoriz~ thedamming of Lakes Huleh and Tiberias in order to have e1ectric power generated in that manner. The Palestïne Government was internationallv authoriz~d to -dû Sv ""id, in fact,it did: Tiberias waS dammed and electric power was generated. That concession which the Gov~rnment of Palestine gave has already been exploited.• Moreover, the reasoil why the Palestine Government acted, and was bound to act, in tha.t manner 141. Fifthly, supposirig that ,Israel were sovereign over the zone, it could not exercise its sovereignty over that zone in the present citcumstances - and, if the Israel authorities had given such authority to a so-called company in order to undertake worl\ in the demilitarized zone, the action of Israel would he unfounded in the same way in which the action of the Palestine Government would have been unfounded. 142. Tt is therefore evident that no private right exists at aIl, that the right to divert the Jordan under a concession was not given by the Palestine administration. No concession was given by the Palestine administra- , tian to divert the River Jordan. Israel, if it ·gives such authority, would be acknowledging that right for itself, based on so-called sovereignty and disregarding international agreements as weIl as established rights. 143. But supposing, for the sake of argument, that there were private rights, such an internal right in !srael could not be made ta prevailand this is very Importantover the status of the zone, which was established by an international agreement made with the consent of Israel. Israel cannot use a private right ta prevail over an international agreement to which Israel ltself was a party and to which it has given its consent. 144. In .view of tboe limited time at our disposal, l should hke ta pass on to the last f~ctor ta be considered, a factor to which l have referred, namely, the ge~eral tren~ o~ deve!op~ent of the Palestine question. :rhis should mdl~ate our Idea as to what roight be done m the present crrcumstances in order to ensure peace and tranquillity and peaceful deve10pment ifi û'ï.at area. 145. No matter how we look at the Palestine question, no matter how controversial the issues concerning it ma! be,. th~re remains ?ne fundamental and basic point which IS mcontrovertible. Tt was Israel - Zionism, rather - which created the Palestine question. The Arabs of Palestine, living in their homes fur century after century, were subjected to Zionist intru$ion, whicb grew with time ·and in the last few years grew to such dimensions that it turned out of Palestine about one million Arab refugees. In order to pursue this policy of replacing the Arabs in ·Palestine by Jewish immigration: for the purpose of establishing a Jewish State, Syria was dismembered and a Palestine Mandate was created. The philosophy and strategy of Zionism, which has; worked up to the present time, continues to affect anq influence the pn~sent situation to a great extent. That philosophy is based upon a distinction as to religion and race~ It considers the Jews in various countries as exiles, as a Dia~pora, which should be ingathered into Palestine. And there lurks the possibility of future expansion, because immigration would necessarily cause J:srael eventu-ally to burst at the seams or expand. 149~ We have witnessed another manifestation of the same policy, in the case of reparations to he paid by Germany to Israel. There are sorne countries which now support Israel and which have supported Israel 1n th~ past that have helped Israel to obtain such reparations from Germany and to delay the reparations to others to whom they were due in order that Israel might re- ,ceive more and more help. And we are witnessing some- ~tning more. We are witnessing the levying of taxes by Israel in foreign couotries, even in this very city of New York. 150. The PRESIDENT: MayI interrupt the speaker for just one minute. 1 must say that one of the happiest recollections of my service at the United Nations will be the friendly collaboration that 1 have always had with Ambassador Zeineddine. 1 know that there has never been an appeal made to him which, in his spirit of cooperation, he has failed to heed. That is why 1 am quite sure that he will '110W heed my appeal to keep to th, item before the Council.

. 1 intend to keep ta the item before the. CounciI. 1 certainly shall give the fullest consideration to the kind appeal just made by the President. However, I do not at all feel that 1 have digressed from the stihject before us. Mystatement bears directIy on the present situatjon. 153. Then we come to another position. We are told that the Armistice Agreements, the purpose of which is ta maintain peace, should not result in prevention of the development of so-called beneficial projects. Israel states that it is impatient with the Armistice Agreements and that it seeks their modification. Th~ question arises: why does Israel not try to utilize the machinery set out in the Armistice Agreements for their modification? Israel states that the Syrians and the . other Arabs are not willing to sit down with Israel to discuss this matter. But we have the Mixed Armistice Commission, where a Syrian and an Israel de1egate sit and talk together. It is precisely there, in that Commission, where the two sides sit, that Israel refuses to participate and co-operate with the Commission. The only place where something practical might be done is the very place where Israel attempts, hy lack of cooperation, to destroy t,he machinery which has been set up to hring the two parties together. 154. There is something even more c1ear. Israel pretends that it would like to have an dgreeme.n.t with Syria. Then it states that on the question :.efore us Syria does not have the right <to agree or to object. What would he the purpose of these negotiations betWt:.en .Israel and Syria when, according to the Israel thesis, Syria has no rights except to agree to what the other party wants? Such negotiations would be of no value at aIl. They would just be a propaganda act in which one party would state that it wanted to negotiate but first would like definitely to prejudice the final rest!lts of the negotiations. 155. From that position, Israel goes on to unilateral interpretations and aets. In his statement, Mr. Charles Malik mentioned the boldness of Israel in that direction. We heard today from Mr. Eban that hé daes not not consider that such boundless amhition exists. However, the facts are there. They have been moving, during the past thirty years,-from one stage to another. There has heen continuaI Zionist expansion. Now when we are faced with the application of the Armistice Agreements, we are presented with statements about the so-called immobility of these agreements. By·this . pœtext, an attempt is made to facilitate the development hy Israel of projects which would ensure its mai,.mise in a zone that has been demilitarized. 156. Such boldness is due in particular to the condoning of Israel's actions in the pasto This has only encoul'aged Israel ta take further actions and to fiout the decisions of the United Nations. 157. Coming to the draft resolution [S/3151] before II,S, we view it in the light of these general developments. 35 15S. It was possible for the Armistice Agreement to remain without any substantial violations for over a year and a half after its coming into force. But with the Israel projects came the violations of the armistice and the theory of immobility. VVe are not opposed to mobility and development, but we' should like ta see it carried out in an orderly manner, in a manner which would ensure that the r:èsources of the region are used for the henefit of its \}>eople, and the people of that region are primarily Arab refugees. . 159. It is the intention of my Government ta try to do everything possible in order to ensure that the waters of the Jordan shall he used in an area where the Arab refugees cano find relief, and that these waters will not be used by Israel ta the exclusion of the Arab refugees. Israel should not use these waters in addition to what it has already acquired by confiscath:m of the land of Arab refugees, land which in Palestine constitutes about g\) pel' cent of the total area of Israel. Sorne thought was certainly given, especia1ly by the French delegation, to the possibility of the partition of the water. l do not think in the least that the Security Council, with its authority under the Cl:arter, is empowered or equipped to try to partition waters. It can conciliate, it can mediate; it cannot act for the parties nor take decisions of such a nature. 160. As to the possible guarantees that may be given by the Security Council to the parties, that guarantee also, as far as we can see, has no foundation in tJ'le authority of the Security Council under the Charter. 161. In conclusion, thereiore, 1 should like to mention some suggestions which may serve as a basis for a proposaI that may be submitted and which, at the same .time, may serve as obs~rvations concerning the draft resolution before us. ~ 162. First, the Armistice Agreement concluded at the request of the Security Council is an agreement between two sides and cannot be modified or altered except with the consent of both sides, a consent freely given. The Armistice Agreern~t was not endorsed by the Security GOÜî1dl The-Security .Council has always· 8'tated that the··Armistice Agreement had full effect whether it was endorsed by the Security Council or not, and that that authotitycoutci. not he diminished through an attempt in the Security Council to alter the provisions or the rights and obligations which exist under the Armistice Agreement. . 164. We think that the draft resolution to be adopted by the Security Council should be one that would uphold General Bennike's au~hority in full, nothing more or less. The draft resolution before the Council does not uphold that authority; on the contrary, we be1ieve that it alters it substantially. Further, we should like to see the draft resolution to be adopted by the Security Council provide for definite prohibition of unilateral action on the part of Israel, so as to create confidence and ensure peaceful development. We should also like the draft resolution to take into account a matter of primary importance in the present circumstances: the strengthening of United Nations observation machinery in the area by the addition of observers as weIl as other personnel, so that the Armistice Agreement could not be defied without having that defiance of the agrèement known at once and reported to the Chief of St:-ff and, perhaps through him, to the Stc1lrity Council. Th~ addition of observers te e..'1SUTe implementation of the Armistice Agreement is far more important than the addition of hydraulic engineers, espe:cially in view of ,the fad ,that the Security Council is primarily responsible for dealing with security matters and that its primary duty, l thïnk we aIl agree, is to try to ensure that the implementation of the Armistice Agreemènt is carried out. 115. In our opinion, the resolution should state specifically that the continuation of the work, whether in the zone or beyond the zone, should not influence the decisions of the Council because the meaning of the words "in the zone and beyond it" is the same, whether a part of the work is carried out within the zone or outside of it, the purpose being the diversion of the River Jordan, with aIl the civil and military consequences that result with regard to Syria and with regard to the contravention of the Armistice Agreement. 166. Our purpose would be to try to create sorne kind of international co-operation sa as ta develop the waters of the Jordan basin with a view to ensuring that the Arab refugees would find relief. We will try to do sa in co-operation with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East. 167. We shall in due course try to formulate further remarks on the text of the draft resolution that has been submitted to the Council, and we may in due course also submit some amendments to that draft resolution. 168. .Finally,allow me to say that we seek pea,ce and peaceful development and are ready to co-operate ina way that can lead to that end on the basis of ,the strict appliance of the Armistice Agreement, appliance of the Armistice Agreement as it really is, and not as Israel would like it to become through the various tendentious

There are three more speakers on the list, of whom the representative of Colombia is the first. However, due to the lateness of the hour, 1 think it would he better if they did not speak today. 170. 13efore adjourning the meeting yesterday, 1 announced my intention - within the limits of possibility -' of completing co.nsideration of this question this week. It seems ,that 1 was a little too optimistic. On the other hand, when 1 made that statement 1 had in mind inter alia the members of the Secretariat who, after the strenuous work of the last three months, have every right to a little more time during the next week for ' themselves and their familles. With this in mind, 1 should like to ask representatives whether they would accept my suggestion to make a falr try - that is to say, to have two meetings tomorrow, one in the moming and one in the afternoon. Of course, if there is the slightest objection ta my suggestion, we shan meet only in the afternoon. 171. de reux réùnissions midi question nous

Speaking for t...'J.t: United States delegation, 1 am glad to say that 1 would he willing to meet bath tomorrow morning and tomorrow afternoon and, if necessary, on Saturday, in order to expedite this bu~iness and to show the President every co-operation in his desire to complete the programme. 172. d'accord midi, demain, 7 aucun samedi. bien riat, sident, chaine Bethléem, de

1 am quite in agreement with the idea of meeting tomorrow morning and afternoon, provided. only.tuat we can finish the business tomorrow, if necessary by continuing the meeting until 7 or 8 in the evening. If necessary 1 should not even object to the Council's meeting on Saturday. It seems to me extremely desirable, however, both for us all and for the staff of the Secretariat, to whom you referred, Mr. President, that the discussion should not continue into next week and that, despite the proximity of the Jordan to Bethlehem, we should not be obliged ta meet on ~ .chri~tm~s pal'. 173. Mr~ Charles MALIK (Lebanon): Th(( sponsors of the draft resolution [S/3151] before us have every right, of course, to express ,their views rega1"ding speed in this matter, but 1 should like to point out - with all respect, but also fran..ldy - to the Council and to the sponsors that the text was put in our hands only yesterday, twenty-four hours ago:We have communicated with our governments in regard to the draft resolutian, but l have not the vagul:'st idea what my Government's views are. If l find myself in the same position tomorrow when the three Powers are going to press for a vote - if they do - l do not know what 1 shan do. 173. glais) sommes entendu, cette respel' Conseil, donc consulté résolution, mais, de dans sances ment, 175. It is obvious that the three western Powers which have. taken the initiative in this matter have every right to carry it through as they please, hut they are not so intimately af!ected in this situation, and therefore l would request them. very earnestly ta reconsider their pressing request ta finish the matter be- . fore we have had sufficient time to think it over and to receive full instructions trom our governments. l do hope that thissimple procedural request will not be refused. l have much to say about the substance of the matter, and once l have said it l think it will be c1ear why we ought to consider the matter il1 a somewhat less hurried manner than in the pasto Therefore, l request, and plead with, the l"~presentatives of the United States and France, and you, Mr. President -"since you did say that you had hoped t:) finish the matter but had been a Httle over-optimistic and l was grateful for your sensitivity concerning the situation - ta allow sorne further time. l do hope that the sponsors of the dra# resolution will understand that it is an extremely delicate matter and that it is obvious that if they are going to press for an immediate decision it will produce bad feeling all round. Let us give it at least another day of-careful, thoughtful consideration. The initiative is in the hands of the three sponsoring Powers and they need have rro fear of losing it, but please give us this proceduralleeway for another day or two. 176. The PRBSI'DENT: Before calling upon the representative of the USSR .l would assure my Lebanese colleague that, as President, l shall never put the draft resolution to the vote uutil aIl members of the Council are readyfor me to do so.

î for -my part quite understand your humane feelings, Mr. President, towards the staff servicing the Secul"ity Council and towardsall the other members of the Council, who are of course anxious ta rest, and l quite as "much as any 'of them. When a serious matter is being discussed, however, rest 1S the last thingto be thought of. That is quite plain. f78. The situation is this. Today Mr. E1;>an made som~ remarks on the substance of the matter whichseem to meworthyof attention. For example, teferringto the draft resolution [S/3151] he observed that paragraph 9 of the operative part shou1d be more precisely worded 39 179. l must say that in these circumstances the delegation of the Soviet Union is of the 'Opinion that theo question with which we are now dealing should be given additional study, and l hope that it will be possible to do this within a reasonable space of time - if not perhaps as quicldy as might be desired by the optimists, whose viewpoint l am always ready ta share. 180. Tt seems to me that it will he necessary to devote further study to this question for the purpose of reaching agreement between the two sides. For we now see that hetween Israel and Syria there is a serious disagreement which can he merely prushed aside or ignored only if we approach. t>~e mattèr from the purely formaI point of view, without really providing any basis for the normal, good-neighbourly relations which each of us individually and the Security Council as a whole must strive to promote. 181. l submit that it is necessary ta make every effort to obtain a resolution which would form a hasis for .agreement between the two parties on the disputed points. Otherwise, it~eems to me, the relations hetween the parties may become still further embittered. That would be in the highest degree undesirable and would obviously prejudice the maintenance of peace in this region, and he in complete éonflict with the aims which the Security Council ought to pursue. In arder to eliminate and exclude undesirable consequences of that kind and instead to produce positive results, l think that we should not rush our discussion of this matter and arrive at a formaI decision such as could be reached 'Ooly by failing ta go deeply into the matter and by confining our attention to the materialwhich'has not yet been sufficiently analysed -now available on the subject. 182. For that reason l support most earnestly the posi- __ tion setout by Mr.Malik, the representative of Lebanon, and Tsubmit Hiat tliiSecurity-COundî oughf not to he in a hurry in this matter. That is not to say tb_'tt l objc.:t to meeting two or three times tomorrow. If necessary, let us have two or four meetings, if we have time.for them. l am sure that this would be within our powers, but l am against imposing any kind of limit at this early stage or imposing any term for the purpose ofpassing a resolution at any cost and dispersing for the Christmas holiday. A had resolution will not give us a good Christmas. For that reason, l repeat, l am againstrushing 'Our discussion of this question. 186. l agree with what the President has just said. The Security Council could hold a meeting tomorrow afternoon, on the understanding - and l want to assure Mr. Lodge and Mr. Hoppenot that there is no consideration of politics involved in what l am now saying -that we may not be able to vote tomorrow. l may not he in a position to vote tomorrow. Of course, sorne representatives may wish to vote without me. They are perf.ectly free ta do sa. In fad, they can do quite a number of things with or without my will. It does seem to me, however, that it would certainly be conducive to a tolerably good ending of this matter - at least proceduraIly 'speaking - if there was no insistence on a vote tomorrow. As l have said, I may not be in a position to vote tomorrow. 187. l think we should meet tomorrow' afternoon on the c1ear understanding - arrived at now, sa that we may makearrangements now - that it may he necessary to ho1d another meeting on Monday afternoon. l do not think that it is unreasonable to suggest that, in connexion with EO important an item, the Council should meet tomorrow aHemoon and, again, on Monday afternoon, in the hope that we may aIl be in a position to complete consideration of the matier on Monday afternoon. Ida not think it is asking too much of the members of the Council to suggest that they should put up with two days of further deliberation on this matter. 188. The PRESI>DENT:. l recognize the representa- ·tive of the United States on a point of arder.

l think I unG;,;rstand some of the motivations for the remarks made by the representative of the Soviet UniOn. While l do not shan: them aIl, l can certainly agree that there should be no foicedmarch. l am not in favour of a forced march. In fad, l am always willing to extend the courtesy of a delay when avalid reason is given.

May l interrupt you? That is not a.point of arder.

l was saying that l'agree with the representative of the Soviet Union that we do not want to have a forced march. l think that would be very unfortunate. l am always willing to extend the courtesy of a delay whenever a valid reason is given for delay. 197. l will say to the representative of Lebanon that l do not care whether ît is politics or not. That.,is bis business. If he has a political motive, that is up· ta mm. But l have listened very carefully to bis argument in favour of delay. The only argument he made is that the text has only been available since yesterday morning. l think that is a very technical argument. Not only has thesubject been before us since 27 Octoberbut the text in essence became available to the parties last Friday night. A few little words may have been changed here and there but the essence of the text, which we as reasonable men and not as quibblers or as pettifoggers should realize, ,became available last Fridaynight. Very few changes·were made•.and those were made available to the parties the night before last, that is, Tuesday night. 198. In viewof the length oCtime that this has been in his possession, it is hard to believe that a gentleman as distinguished and as erudite as the representative.of Lebanon reaHy needs much more. time. Now, l have no desire to preclude him from speakingas. long as he wants ta, However, l do agree with the representanve of the.Soyiet Union in my willingness ta hold continUOtlS sessions - even four times a day, as l think he said. -It would be setting an example to the world of expedition and efficient action. if we were to meet to- 204. On the other hand, it is not true that we were told then that that text was like the law of the Medes and Persians and that it could not he altered in any essential sense. On the contrary, we were told that the whole idea of putting this text into our hands in time for us to consider it was that we might be able to confer with the sponsors about it, which we took the liberty and the pleasure of doing over the week-end and during the first two days of this week - and l am very sure that Mr. Eban a.,d his friends did the same thing. 205. Therefore, it cannot be said that either we or our governments had the slightest inkling, until the night before last, at exactly 6.17 p.m., when a gentleman now seated at this table rang me up and toId me 50, that the text was to be substantially as we had seen it on Friday last. That was the first time l knew about the finality of the tex:t. As l have said, thaï was the night before last. Will the Government of the United States, which hat! given this matter days and weeks of consideration before making up its mind about it, begrudge us at least .two or three days to consider it before we reallycome ta a decision as ta whether we accept it or not? 206. It is not true that, if we were given ·fuis text last week - and it is quite true thaï we were given it at that time - our governments had thè final word abGut it before yesterday. Our goverrnrents knew nothing until yesterday about the final text to he voted on. Therefore, my request tS perfectly reasonable, and l am very sure that the reasonable representative of the United States will admit - politics or no politicsthat my motives are 'luite weIl founded and will grant me the possibility of not üeing able to act on the matter before Monday. 207. l had made sorne kind of suggestion berore that we meet tomorrow afternoon. l will· be very frank with Al&EHTIlIA-Al&EHllNE . Editorial Sudamericana S.it... Alsina 500. 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