S/PV.651 Security Council

I just want to calI attentiotl to a point which-is purely a 1'n~tter of drafting. This draft resolution starts out witll : t'The Security Cound1. ., Recalling... Endorses... Notes". We cannot have One paragraph saying nothing, so l submit to the sponsorsthat, when handing in the revised amendment, they put in a verb that wouldfollow the words ttThe Security Council" and state wha" is stated now in their· proposai. _ - ~n the demilitarized zone, and in particular with the construction by Israel of a canal in that zone. 18. As regards the draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom, the United States of America and France (Sj3151], l am bound to say that, after careful consideration of the text, it is impossible net to agree with the criticism which has already been levelled at,"ainst it in the Security Council, in particular by the representative of Pakistan. 19. The draft resolution indeed contains a number of points with which it seems to me impossible to agree. 20. 1\lmost half of the ,preamble consîsts of references to other material and consequently has no independent significance. 21. As for the operative part, we find in it such unsatisfactory paragraphs as, for example, paragraph 9, and paragraph 10 wruch proceedd from it. 22. The Soviet Union considers that paragraph 9 cannot beadoptedin its present form. l do not see how it can be improved, because the drafting is completely urisatisfactory from beginning to end. 23. Paragraph 9 of the draft resolution completely ignores what in our opinion is.an exceedingly important condition for the settlement of any question connected with the aims and purposes of the demilitarized zone - the condition that· any particular measures can be carried out only with the agreement of both parties. No reference is made to the necessity for the agreement of both parties either in paragraph 9 or in any other paragraph of the 'whole draft, as if there were no parties t? this dispu~eat all. Nowhere is any r.eference made elther to Syna or to Israel, or to the dispute which has caused the whole question to be considered in the Security CounciI. There is· not even 'an allusion to· the parties concerned, yet all the time it is primarily the mterests of these parties wruch are involved, since the who~e. s~bject is connected with the position in the denlllitanzed zone and the significance of the latter. 24. Paragraph 9 does make a sufficiently clear reference to the need for adopting measures calculated to re~oncile the "interests involyed in this dispute". That 1S a. very vague phrase, a formula the meaning of which is quite. obscure. What in fact are the interests nation~l co-operation in general, then perhaps it might be possible to say what is said in paragraph 9. Since, however, we are dealing here with a specifie question, specifie faets, and specifie relations between two States with regard to the canal, a vagué··reference to the "general welfare", to considerations of "general we1- fare", to the reconciliation of the interests involved in the dispute, the interests, perhaps, of States thousands of 'miles away from Syr.ia aL;.d Israel, can in no circumstances take the place of a formula which would supply an answer to the question of how to settle the relations in question and remove the misunderstandings and frictions between those two States. It must frankly be said that this paragraph 9 has absolute1y no connexion with the question we have been discussing all this time. 27. l believe that this consideration alone shows that the whole of this three-Power draft resoJ.ution will, in effect, not bear criticism. Paragraph 9, indeed, is the 28. The Soviet Union considers that this paragraph is completely unsatisfactQry. l must add that the reference in it tQ what is described as "the general welfare" seems to me tQ be calculated, like the whole of the three- Power draft resolution, merely to evade the really important questiQn of the need for settling the situation that has arisen in the den'lilitarized zone by agreement between the parties concern",J - Israel and Syria - and by no other means. 29. The Soviet Union considers that in view of these serious defects in the three-Power draft resolution, which dQes not provide for an agreement between the two sides on the disputed points, the adoption of the resolution could lead only to a further deterioration in the relations between these States, and that of course would be contrary tQ the interests of the maintenance of peace in this area. 30. In view of the above, I urge, on behalf of my Government, that a decision on the draft resolution submitted by the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France should - since the draft resQlution has nQ immediate cQnnexion with the complaint by Syria and concerns matters that have nothing ta do withthat complaint - be postponed, so that the parties and countries really concerned in this affair may be given ah opportunity to devote some additional study to the matters referred to in this draft, and so that Israel and Syria ma)' have a chance to achieve agreement on the present question, for without such agreement it seems to us that it will be impossible to settle this question which has given rise to the dispute between these two States. 30. que les rée, la rien et question l'objet et moyen de 31. Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): 1 should like to make a few observations on the three-Power draft resolution [5/3151] now before the Security Council. 1 shaH deal with the draft resolution paragraph by paragraph, indicating the parts which I find unsatisfactory and, therefore, the reasons why, in the end, 1 shaH und myself compelled to vote against the text. 31. glais) le dont paragraphe, satisfaisantes: lesquelles VQter 32. rappeler Palestine le convenaient ges répQndre - juste paragraphe pelle de de miné, choisis intervention, 33. paragraphe suis le 32. The first paragraph of the preamble merely r ~calls previous resolütions on the Palestine question and is the.refore unexceptionable. The other day, the representatlve of Israel picked out those resolutions which ple~sed him, and only those parts of those resolutions w~lch emphasized - or seemed to emphasize - his pomt of view. It is therefore only right to remind the Security Council thaï the first paragraph of the present drait resolution recalls aIl the previous resolutions on !he Palestine question, including those in which Israel lts.elf was asked 'by the Security Council to do definite thlngs ~ and not only those chosen portions which the representative of Israel wished to bring out in his remarks. . 33. There is also nothing at aIl objectionable in the s~cond paragraph of the pream.ble to the drait resolution. 1 am glad that the sponsors refer to the report of the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organiza- 34. In general, therefore, 1 have nothing against the first and second paragraphs of the draft resolution. 35. 1 come 'now to paragraph 1 of the operative part, wruch reads: "Notes that the Cruef of Staff requested the Governn1ent 'of Israel on 23 September 1953", and then the request is quoted. We find no reason whatsoever why the three Powers or the Security Council should choose to quote only from paragraph 9' of General Bennike's decision [S/3122, annex I] without indicating the basis on which he founded the particular request involved. Hence, we should prefer - if the three Powerswould ever accept what we suggest, wruch they do not do and have not done - to have the sponsors note that this request is based on certain findings wruch the Chief of' Staff indicated in paragraph 8 of his decision. Some such language as this could be added to the paragraph: "and that the Chief of Staff basedrus request'upon the protection of normal civilian life in the area of the demilitarized zone and upon the value of the zone to both parties for the separation of their armed forces!' Those words are taken verbatim from the report of the Chief of Staff. It wiU be noticed that in the draft resolution [S/3152] wruch we submitted to the Security Council the other day [650th meeting], we took account of trus fact in the third paragraph of the preamble, where we quote not only from paragraph 9 of General Bennike's decision, but aiso from paragraph 8, wruch ta us is of the utmost importance. . 36. l come noV! to paragraph 2 of the three'-Power draftresolution [S/3151], which states: "Endorses this action of the Cruef of Staff." Trus is certainly unexceptionable. However, it seems to me that there would be no objection at aU if the three Powers could add: "and caUs upon the party concemed - or the parties concerned - to comply with this request" or "with this action". 1 see no reason why we shouldnotmake this addition. 38. l come now to paragraph 4, which reads: "Declares that, in order ta promote the return of oermanent peace in Palestine, it is essential that the General Armistice Agreement of 20 July 1949 between Syria and Israel be strictly and faithfully observed by the parties." Again, we have no objection at aU to this language, except that it is one thing tD make a declaration, which is very important especia11y when it comes from the Security Council, and another thing to calI upon the parties to comply with the declared aim. Consequently, we would have wishes that the three Powers could have added to tbis paragraph the perfectly innocuous and cansequential wording: "and calls upon the parties to refrain from any unilateral action in contravention of the Armistice Agreement". This language seems to us ta be perfectly acceptable. In fact, in :h~ explanatory statements of the representatives of the three sponsoring Pawers, each of them expressed the absolute inadmissibility of any unilateral acti<:5n undertaken either by Israel oJ:' by Syria.. Therefore, VITe find no reason why this addition should not have been made: 39. I come now to paragraph 5, which in its present form reads: . . "Reminds the parties that, under article VII, paragraph 8, of the Armistice Agreement, where the interpretation of the meaning of a particu1ar provision of the Agreement other than the preamble and articles I and II is at issue, the Mbœd Armistice Cammission's interpretation sha11 prevaiI." We have no objection to this, but we shouid like·to see the following addition made: "and reminds the parties af their obligations to co-operate in and with the ML'{ed Armistice Commission for these ends". I think it· is cIear from the records of the Council on this question and on other questions connected with Palestine that th.ere have beendelinquencies as regards co-operation WIth .the Mixed Armistice Commission. We are quite certain that there can never be any real peace in the N~ar East unless the parties concerned co-operate fully WIth the Mixed Armistice Commission. We see no reason ,:,hy the Council should not at thîs point remind th~ parties that they are obligated to co-operate in the Mueed Armistice Commission, and witk-t!le- Mixed Armistice Commission once it has reached a decision. 40.. I. come now to paragraph 6, to which we have no objection at aIl, as far as itgoes. Paragraph 6 reads : "Notes that article V of the General Amlistice Agreement between Syria. Rnd Israel gives to the 41. l can assure the Council that everytlring that have saidso far, and everything that l shaU say with regard to the text up to aml indudi~g p~1"3.g1"~ph 8, appears to me to be entirely acceptable, if there is the initial will to accept it without any arrière pensée. 42. l come now to paragraph 7, which reads: "CaUs upon the Chief of Staff to maintain the demilitarized character of the zone as defined in paragraph 5 of article V of the Armistice Agreement." This is completely unacceptable. We believc that this is in a sense far more dangerous than paragraph 9, to which we take very strong exception. In the light of what the representative of Israel has. been preaching to us during the past month about the character of the demilitarized zone, stressing the facts that it has no character other than its demilitarization, and maintaining that Israel has made a great concession to the WQrld and to.Syria in accepting its demilitarization, and in the light'of the actual history of this question, we believe that the wording oUhis paragraph, which speaks only of the demilitarized character of the zone, is very unfortunate. Therefore,. if oruy the three Powe];'s can be moved td see our point of view - but unfortunately, it seems that they cannot be so moved - we should like to see paragraph 7 read as fol1ows: • "CaUs upon the Chief of Staff to maintain the status of the demilitarizedzone as defined in the Armistice Agreement, and particularly in article V thereof, and to take such steps as he deems appropriate to this end." _ We say "and particularly in article V thereof" because, as a matter of fact, the demilitarized zone is'defined in places other than article V ; there is an indirect reference JO it in article II, which reads : "It is also recognized that no provIsIon of this Agreement shaU in any way prejudice the rights, daims and positions of either Party heretoin the ultimate peaceful settlement of the Palestine question .. :' 43. Syria has rights, obligations and claims to the demilitarized zone. Therefore, to speak oruy of the .demi1itarized character of the zone is to forget all these other matters that are left in abevance until·the final peaceful settlementis arrived at 'by the parties concernec1~ There are other places where the demilitarized zone cornes into play in this whole agreement. To speak of its character, inthis most important resolution, as 44. Of course, paragraph 8 is fine; we have no objection to that at all. In this conne.xion, 1 might only saY one word about what the Foreign Minister of Israel and the representative of Israel here in the Council. have said about the powers of the Chief of Staff. It will be recalled that Mr. Sharett, in his letter ta the Chief of Staff [S/3122, annex II], quoted from what Mr. Eban had said about the powers of the Chief of Staff sorne two years previously. It will also be recalled that the Chief of Staff very tactfuIly and very politely took exception to the unilateral Interpretation of his powers which both Mr. Eban and Mr. Sharett ha<Ï suggested. AlI these things are found in the reports which we have been reading. It is certainly refreshing and good and, 1 think, conducive to peaceful development in the Near East that the three Powers have come out very strongly and very unambiguously in refutation of the position of Mr. Sharett and Mr. Eban; namely, that the Chief of Staff is fully entitled to make requests ta the parties concerned, that he has the power and that that power must be respected by the parties concerned. This, 1 say, is very refreshing and very good, and 1 think it is a real move in the right direction. It certainly refutes the position that was taken by both Mr. Eban and Mr. Sharett. 45. 1 now come to paragraph 9. For many reasons, this paragraph is not acceptable, and we would like.to see it - together wiili paragraphs 10 and 11 - completely omitted. \Ve see no reason why paragraphs 9, 10 and 11, at tois stage -let me repeat that phrase: at this stage - should be ineÏuded at aIl. In fact, as the representative of Pakistan said the other day [6S0th meeting] and as is perfectly obvious, 1 think, at this stage, an that is required is, às the three Powers have been saying, to reinforce the authority of the Chief of Staff, to ask Israel to comply with his request, and to ask him to go back to the field and to try, if he can, ta reconcile the various interests involved in tbis question, including, of·course, the interests of both Syria and Israel. 46. To dilate further on this matter, to make hints and suggestions and offer positive guidance to biman that can he done later. But, at this stage, he should he ~v~n another chance to try bis hand, under the ArmIstice Agreement, within the Mixed Armistice Co~ission, at bringing about a solution to tbis Ughly complicated and many-sided problem which will be acceptable to both parties. 47. ~herefore, as 1 have said, this paragraph should be ~mlttedcompletely. But if it is going to be retainea, or ~f anything like it is going to he retained, it is ?bVlOU~, as the representative of the Soviet Union has Just sald, that you cannot leave the word "interests" hangîng.in the air. You must ~tate whose interests you . are talking about. Of course, lt will be answered that what i~ meant is ail the "interests involved". "Vell, again foll?w1l1g the dictum that the representative of France reclt~d to us a few minutes ago, if you have in mind the l11terests of A, B, C, D and :E, why dQ yon not 49. As l have said, however, we should like to see the whole paragraph omitted, from beginning to end, because we do not think the rime is opportune now to enter into these details. After.aIl, we have gone into this matter at length here, and the General can certainly have the benefit of the guidance provided by the debate that has been going on for the last t'No months. He knows what he should do and what he should not do. Why suggest aIl of these things to mm at this stage? This can wait until there are further developments. But, if this kind of language is to remain, it should certainly be stressed that the reference is to the interests of the two parties to this dispute. 50. l might also add that, when you speak of the "natural resources affected", the question arises: affected where? This may extend, for aU l know, to my own country, to Lebanon. Nobody has said anything to the contrary. But we completely repudiate anynotion that the Chief of Staff, under this resolution or under any resolution pertaining to the Armistice Agreement between Syria and Israel, can extend his investigations or explorations to include any matters appertaining to my o'WU country. Therefore, the phràse "the natural resources affected" is.so general that it is completely unacceptable in its present form. . 51. We have no objection to "a just and orderly manner for the general welfare", except that the term "general we1fare" is really very general. l should have said that we have no objection to "a just'and orderly manner of development". It would be far better if any development could be Just and if it could take place in -an orderly manner. However, as far as the phrase about "the general welfare" is concerned,. if it said "for the general welfare of the two parties to the dispute" or "of Israelis and Arabs", or some such language, it would certainly be more forcible than it is at present. At present, it seems to us to beso general that we cannot accept it, and it has these very dangerous implications, of which we are genuinely afrfud. 52. As to paragraph 10, l said that my preference would be to have it completely omitted. However, if some such language as we have suggested could be accepted, then, of course, paragraph 10 would not be objectionable. But we cannot accept it when it is tacked on to paragraph 9 in the manner in which it now is, and when.it speaks of "these ends" and "any unilateral action whichwould prejudice" these ends. 53. There is the danger that the Chief of Staff might come forward with a blue-print of a plan which would involve the "natural resources affected", which would have a· beginning and a middle but God knows what end - and everybody would he prevented froni doillg 54. l come nowto paragraph 11. In our opinion, there are two objections ta this paragraph - and here again, as l have said, we should like ta see it comp1etely omitted. The first objection we have ta the paragraph is that, when you speak of "a complete appreciation of the project in question", it is as though you were te1ling the Chief of Staff: "your report, which we have read, is incomplete. Won't you please go ahead and complete îtbymakïilg fm·ther inquiries?" VVe do not think this is proper. We think it ought ta be left ta the Chief of Staff himself ta decide how ta complete his report and how ta arrive at his own appreciation of the matter. That is the first objection we have. The second objection is that there is no indicaron whether the appointment of these experts, who are going ta be very important experts, advising the Chief of· Staff on the technical level, would. receive the consent of the two parties ta the dispute. 55. l was very happy the other day when the representative of France mentioned this point in his speech [648th meeting]. H;e said ..that the Secretary-General would certainly take that into account and would appoint experts who would be fully acceptable to the two parties to the dispute. However, it is one thing to say these things in a statement and another thing to put them down in the text. It would have been far better to say something like this: "... a sufficient number of experts, in particu1ar hydraulic engineers, provided the two parties ta the dispute have consented ta their appointment." Something like that would have' been preferable. The ~onsent of the two parties ta the appointment of the Important experts who would guide the Chief of Staff in his further appreciation of this matter seems ta us to be of the utmost importance. l say this with aIl respect ta the Seçretary-General and knowing his own responsibilities and duties under the Charter of the United Nations and towards us aIl, and fully trusting mm in his own ,ppointments. However, as l always say, the Palestir._ issue belongs in a world of its own and follows a logic of its own; therefore, you'cannat approach it'as you would approach any other issue under the United Nations. You cannat take enough preca.utions in connexion with the Palestine affair. 56. We have no objection ta the last paragraph, the p~ra~rap~ stating that the Chief of Staff should report :"Ithm mnety days to the Security Council, although It would have seemed ta us that there was no need for it at aIl because he can report any time he likes. He has reported any time he felt the sitUation required i1. The refere.."lce to the demilitarized zone here is certainly we1come, as is the reference to the "legal status of the demiE-:<rized zone" because, as l said, in a sense this whole issue - l said once in connexion with the Qibya affair, that the Qibya affair was something far deeper than itself, that it represented the whole problem of Jordan and the fate of Jordan - before us now is something much deeper than itself: it represents the whole problem of the fate of the demilitarized zone. We are at the beginning of the battle of the demilitarized zone just as in Qiby-a we were at the beginning of the baille of Jordan. Thishas been recognized here in this new paragraph that the three Powers have suggested to us tbis afternoon. In my opinion, however, the recognition is not strong enough. l cannot in all sincerity vote for this dr..ft resolntion purely on the strength of this language. It wonld have been much bètter if they had stated something a bit more definite, somethini;' more forcible, concerning this affair. The text l have in mind to take care of 'this point would he something like this: . "Nothing in·this resolution may be construed or interpreted as authorizing any unilateral action in contravention of the Armistice Agreement between Syria and Israel, nor any violation or unilateral alteration ofthe status of the demilitarized zone under the Armistice Agreement.':' This langm:.o~ seems to me to be preferable to, and far more significant in its meanin~than, the language which the sponsors of this draft resolution have just suggested to us. l am not urging this at all as an amendment; l am only stating how my rnind is working and in what direction it is leaning with regard to thismatter: \Nording such as 1 have just given would be far more acceptable than the text which was read to us this afternoon. 58. These are my remari.-Œ about the text before us. l still urge my own text upon the CO"neil for ccnsider<!.tion and adoption. l am afraid that l shall have to vote against the revised draft resolution sUDmitted by the tllree Powers [S/3151/Rev.1] for the reasons l have just stated to the Council. 59. l shall not at the present moment discuss tl!::: speechesl11ade by the representatives of the three Powers who introduced· this draft resolution e:x:cept to -say that of the three l liked most the speech of the t'êpresentative of the United States of America, which seemed to me to be far less objectionable than the speeches of the representatives of the United Kingdom and France. HQwever~ there were very important state- 61. I started ta sav that it could be shawn that there is a great deal of pà'sitive value in the statements of the three sponsors of this text and that a great deal of positive content could be cu11ed out of these statements, particularly the stat-ements of the representative of the United States of America. I should like to ca11 the attention of the Council ta certain pregnant phrases he used, for instance about the first result of that investigation. He stated [648th meeting, para. 3] : "As a resutt, we have come to the fo11owing conclusions. First, strict compliance with the Armistice Agreement entered into between Israel and Syria is of vital importance to the peace of the area - and this question is intimately involved in the present case." 62. The whole contention of Israel is that there is no connexion between the Armistice Agreement and what theyare doing in this project. But the representative of the United States says: "... and this question is intimately involved in the present case." The representative of the United States furî:her stated: "... development projects which are consistent" - and he gives three conditions ta which they must be subjected - "with the undertakings of the parties under the Armistice Agreement and which are in the general interest and do not infringe established rights and obligations" - only these. subject ta these threc conditions - "should be encouraged." l Snd that to be most important because here he is admitting that all these three criteria must be applied ti:> any project that Isr!lel may think of within the de.militarized zone. 63. Then there is the phrase also stated by Mr. Lodge [648th meeting, para. 4] : "Any uni1ateralaction, from œDr~sentative of the United States, "... threatens the effêctive operation and enforcement of the Armistice Agreement". 64. Finally, l would call the attention of the Security Council ta one other point which the representative of the United States made in bis analysis of the import of the three-Power draft resolution. In his statement of 16 December he said [648th meeting, para. 5] : "... in these and other questions concerning the status" - he uses the phrase "status of the demilitarized zone"; he does not say "the demilitarized character of the zone" - "in these and other questions concerning the status of the demilitarized zone, an important consideration should he the just and orderly development of the natural resources affected, with due regard for the general .welfare and the interests of the parties and individuals concerned." Apparently he is admitting that there are parties ta this whole affair and not only individual rights here and there, in this or that form. 65. l want only to add this word, that if we pay attention to some of these positive, constructice and really impartial elements in the statements of the representatives of aU three Powers, l think we can arrive at a satisfactory te..xt which the Council will be able to adopt and which certainly sorne of us would be able to vote for.

Ihave no other names on my list. Does any representative wish to speak? If not, may l take it fOï granted that the Counci1 is now ready to pass to the vote? Of côurse, in his intervention Mi". Vyshïnsky suggested that we should postpone the voting on the three-Power dmft resolution, but that was only a suggestion and l cannot find in our rules of procedure any provision referring to the postponement of voting. . 67.' Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated fram Russian) : .l have already in my first speech drawn attention ta the fact that the task of the Security Council is to acbieve the agreem.ent of the interested parties on disputed questions or points. In tbis cot1Ilexion l referred to the advisability of postponing a dedsion on the draft resolution submitted by the thre~ ;Weste,rn. Powers, in order to providl: an oppornullty for further study of the. questi:ons refened totherein an~ !Ùso. to afford the interested parties a chanCe of reachmg agreement on the substance of the disputed. quéstions~ 68. . r mustagain draw attentionto the fact that paragraph 9. of the operative part of the draft resolution has _absolutely no connexion with the question before the SecurityCouncil as originally,raised. Surely it is obvious that the question of the canal which Israel is pla111Ûng to. construct in the demilitarized zone has tIothing whateve1." to do with the general question of certain interests, of. the general welfare, and of the ordedy develop111ent of the natural resources of the area in·accQrdance witheertain conditions. Those are 72. If, therefore, we are interested in the matter, if we are striving to achieve a positive resuIt of sorne kind - and l am sure we are - what justification. can there be for voting now on the three-Power draft, which, in the first place, has nothing ta do with the question under discussion, and, in the second· place, is ridcUed with defects? Sorne of these defects l myself pointed out, others were pointed out by the representative of Pakistan, and they were today reviewedby the representative of Lebanon, who enumerated and expounded in detail all the defects'in the various paragraphs of the draft resolution, which in such circumstances cau scarcely be expected to obtain a majority. 73. If it is essential that l should here formally confirm my wish that the matter should not be put to the vote, th._;1 -r shall Eubmit a proposaI to the effect that a vote on the draft resolution should be postponed sine die, giving the· parties involved anopportunity. to reach an agreement in the meantime, unless a resolution to that effect is adopted. 74. That is aIl l wish to sayat present. 77. If, of course, the parties do not wish to come to an agreement, l do not think that any course of action can he imposed upon them. But that is precîsely what the three-Power draft resolution attempts to do - ta impose upon the parties certain decisions, decisions which, as l have said, have nothing ta do with the question under consideration. 78. It seems to me that Mr. Hoppenot can scarcely fail ta agree with me in thinkîng that it would be difficult for any outside party to tell the parties concerned in any particular question how they should act in order to settle that question. The settlement of such a question is their own sovereign right and their own affair. 79. Mr. ORTEGA MASSON (Chile) (transla.ted fram Spa,nish): Our de1egation wishes ta state that it considers it advisable to accept the proposaI put forward by the representative of the USSR, Mr. Vyshînky, since it would give us an opporttmity ta consult our governments on new aspects of the problem which have emerged in the course of this aftemoon's meeting. 80. .The Chilean delegation would not be in a position to pass judgment on the question as a whole without fresh consultation with its C'wernment, and for thàt reason we consider it advisaiJle to postpone the vote. We do not favouT the idea, however, of postponing the vote sine die} until the parties reach an agreement. The purpose of my remarks is simply tO inform the President that the Chilean delegation would like time for consultation with its Government. 81. The PRESIDENT: BeÏore callîng on the next speaker, the representative of France, l should like to point out to the representative of Chile that the representative of the Soviet Union proposed in his last statement - at least as l understood it-- that the Security Council should not vote tonight. The Councîl agreed at its last meeting, on Friday, that two meetings should be held tomorrow. l would therefore myself propose that the COUl 1C:' hould hold those two meetings tomorrow and try to orne to a vote then.

l merely. want to point out to Mr. Vychinsky that the debate whlch we have been hearing for the past two months has not left us with the impression that the ~~,,~~~,., 84~ In' reply to what the President has just said, name1y that Ml'. Vyshinsky asked us not to vote today, in actual fact, Ml'. Vyshinsky's idea goes much further and he is asking us not to take a vote for several days or several weeks. Ml'. Vyshinsky certainly cannot be assuming that in a single night, after twelve or eighteen hours, the two parties will be able to announce that they have reached agreement. 85. Ml'. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): l should like to make one or two observations. 86. The representative of France has asked how Syrîa and Israel could possibly face this matter together and either come to an agreement or not come to an agreement. l would only say this : The representative of Israel is sitting at one end of the Security Council table,.the representative of Syria is sitting at the other, and General Bennike is sitting between them. It is true that there is a very '\Vide chasm between the representative of Syria and the representative of Israel here, but that chasm is bridged by General Bennike, and the organism in which that bridge functions is obviously the Mixed Armistice Commission. 87. The simplest answer to the question put by the representative of France is therefore this: no recourse has yet been had ta the Mixed Armistice Commission with regard to the preséut issue. Sucb recourse 1S obviously indicated. Israel, Syria and General Bennike have been meeting in the Mixed Armistice Commission on a multitude of questions, and there isno reason why they could not now meet on the question before us and determine whether it would not be posûble to reach an agreement. It is only if they cannot reacb an agreement through the medium already provided - that is, the Mixed Armistice Commission - tha.t the Security Council may consider other measures. 89. l have made these general remarks because l think they are relevant at this point. 90. With regard ta the Council's subsequent procedure. it seems to me that, since so many new elements have arisen this afternoon, since the amendment which the three Powers themselves wish to make to their ciraft resolution has b~en presented only this afternoon and since there may be further consultations on this whole matter, the natural course would be for the Council to be adjourned until tomorrow. We shall see what tomorrow will bring. Obviously, we cannot take a decision on this item tonight. It would therefore be preferable to allow these consultations to take their course until the Couneil meets again tomorrow. We may all hope and pray that it will be possible to come to on agreement and that the Couneil will take a deeision tomorrow, as the President suggested. Certainly, we cannot take a decision today. 91.' l therefore suggest - and if a proceduralmotion is required, l am prepared to move that the Couneil should be adjourned itnmediate1y, but l do not think that is necessary since, having seen the deve10pment of the whole situation, the President can himself adjourn the>meeting-that the obvious course would be for this meeting ta be adjourned now and for the Council to wait. >and see whether an agreement can be reached tomorrow. In my opinion, it is only if such an agreement is not reached tomorrow that the Soviet Union rcpresentative's motion should he put to the vote. l think: it would be> well for aU 0: us to have another opportunity to reflect on this whole matter and to confer . with one another - or, in the case of the representative of ChUe, and perhaps other representatives, with our governments - about these deve1opments. It is only fair, l think, to wait until tomorrow and therefore to give us all that opportunity.

May l draw the attention of t.he representative of Lebanon to the great difference . between his merely suggesting.the adjournment of the meeting and his formally moving such a proposaI. If he makes a formaI proposaI for adjournment, it must be put to the vote at once. If he does not, however, there are three speakers still on my list. 93. Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): l am absolutely certain that, if l leaye this matter entirely in the President'shands, his wisdom will take perfect care of it. l madeno formaI proposalandl am sure tha~, when the. l'1ght moment comes, the President himself will adjou1"11 the meeting. 18 96. Like my colleagues, l very well recall articles VII and VIII of the .Ll.rmistice Agreement, which provide for the possibility of resorting to the assistance of the Mixed Armistice Commission, where necessary. What Mr. Malik, the representative of Lebanon, said is completely in accordance with my view of the position. l do not think there is any contradiction between bis understanding of the position and my OVI'11. The parties may possibly select the method referred ta in article VII. That is their affair. That is what my reply in substance amounts ta. 97. 50 far as concerns the question of postponing the vote on the revised draft resolution [S/3151/Rev.l] , l put the question in a somewbat broader form than that of a mere proposal that the vote should be post:- poned from today till tomorrow. l also support a postponement of the vote, but l go further. In the first place, l affinn that the three-Power draft resolution bas nothing whatever ta do~with the question under discussion. The key paragraph of the draft i5 paragraph 9, in which it is proposed that the Chief of Staff should ".. ; take such steps as he may deem appropri~te ta 98. l affirm that any impartialview of this matter must suggest that what is stated here implies a serious and important undertaking planned on a large scale and having a wide scope, for it is not simplya matter of settHng a disagreement and reconciling the two parties on the question of the canal, but of taking some sort of action ta develop, for the g~neral weltare, the natura! resources that are affected. 99. The President and members of the Conncil will agree that tlùs is a very great and important undertaking. If. such an undertaking is prcposed here, then l say that it is impossible to vote on the draft resolution now. Such a draft resolution cannot be put ta the. vote now,. because nohady can say that he is against any kind of measures for the development of natural rl"'1ource5, in areal1y just and orderly manner, and for th€:: general welfare. Ta say that, 011 the other band, i5 tantamount ta sayingnothing on the question with which we are concemed and on which we are atpresent warking here. Consequently, this quer;;tion does not have the slighe'Jt relation ta the dispute which has arisen in conne:ll:ion with the c()1'Uplaint by Syria which is now before us. 100. Apart from paragraph 9, and paragraph 10 which is linked with paragraph 9, and a number of other considerably less important·points, the draft resolution has, generally speaking, nothing to say. 101. l therefore .say that it is impossible to vote on such a draft resolution. If we have ta lake a decision 19 effe~.t a reconciliation, having in view thedevelopment of tlle natural resources affected in a just and orderly manner for the general welfare". i02. So far as concerns the reconciliation to which reference is made here, I propose that that should be left to the parties. If the parties so desire, recourse may also be had to the assistance of the Mixed Armistice Commission. 103. My proposàl, therefore, is not that the vote on this draft resolution should be postponed til1 tomorrow or the day after tomorrow, but that it should be postponed altogether, on the ground that it is irrelevant. If other draft resolutions are submitted - there is the Leba.nese resolution [Sj3152]. and there will perh?ps be others - then we shal1 vote on them. If there are amendments to them, w~ sha1! di:;cuss the amendments also, but the three-Power draft resolution which has been s'.1bmitted to us has nothing to do with the question under discussion. 104. As Mr. Malik has aJ"eady pointed out, the first paragraph of the preamble reca1ls", the second paragraph "takes into consideration", paragraph 1 of the operative part "notes" the resolution of 23 September 1953, and tlle following paragraphs "endorse this action", "recal1", "declare", '''note'', "cal1 upon", again "call upon H and last1y "authorize" the competent quarters to devote attention to matters which concern nut only reconciliation, but also. the development of the natural resources affected throughout the area "for the general welfare". lOS. Frantdy,. l must abstain from such a task. l do. not think: that anyone who approaches the matterconscientiously could vote ior such a proposaI. Obviously, the purpose of this paragraph is merely to say something,·and something which has, in my opinion, nothing to do with the question we are discussing - the questionoI the canal, the hydro-electric power-station, and the demilital'ized zone. The paragraph raises problems -of quite a dllterent nature, in which are, moreover, of world-wide scope and importance. 106. l therefore suggest that no vote should be taken on this draft resolution. Isuggest that the vote should be postponed in order, in thefirst place, to provide an opportunity for the further consideration of the very important'matters contained in paragraph 9, matters the importance of which, as you see, I do not deny, and, in the'second place, to afford. the parties anopportunity to come toan agreement ~irectly or through the Mixed Armistice Commi.ssion with the help of General Bennike, or by making use, perhaps, of stin another possibility- ~hat of coriIing to an agreement ç>n the method of settling this dispute which we now have before us. That is my modest.proposaI. 107. Mr. BOKHARI (Pakistan): This meeting has been very fruitful and has given us a crop of new .considerations which we wot1ld like to ponder over. I propose Jormal1y, under rule 33 of the 'rules of prqcedure, that the meeting be adjourned until 11 a.m. _tomorl"ow. 108. The PRESIDENT: Dnder rule 33 of the rules of procedure, any motion for the 'adJournment -of ~:he I ~ EC/itionl A Petis V. SlmE-am "Elafth.lIllltleiis." tion, Ath.~... '''JWU\ Gou6aucl li CI•• 28. Gulf.mal•• AI'IIIT1I1A-.AI'....1IE ~torld Sudamtrle.n. S.ïtI.. AI"n. 500. Bu.nos Aire.. U~tULlA-AlIStI!L11 "H. A. Godd.rd. 255. Georg. St.• Sydn.y. •nd 90 Queen St.• Malboum•• Melboum. Uni~enlty Press. C.rlton N.3. Victorie. ln,...-1EL'IGUI Asene••t MesSegeril.$ de le Press. S.A.. 1-4022 rue du Peni~ Bruxell.s. W. H. Smith & Sqn. 7Î.'5. boul.verd Adolph..Mex. Bruxelles. toLIYla - JOllVlE Ubre.le Seleeeion.s. Cesme 972, Le P~ IW;lL-IIESIl ... Uv,""e Agi., Rio de Jen.iro. Seo Paulo end Belo Rorlzont•• CWIA Ryanon Pr.sl. 299 Qu.en St. West, Toront.o. ..' P.rlodje., Ine•• 4234 d. 1. Roch. Mon. t_L 34. 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