S/PV.654 Security Council

l am quite sure that all my colleaguts will share my disappointment at this report from the re";resentative of Denmark. l know perfectly weIl that he tried his best, and l fee1 that he ha:; perhaps made an understatement. l shaU continue to hope that· the talks which have been going on for so many days will not remain without any result. . Of course, there is bound to be a sense of frustration among us in view of the fact that although some fourteen meetings have been devoted to this question the Council is not in a position to take a decision. Nevertheless, l do not think that those meetings have been in vain. The whole question has been aired; the points of view of the parties have been made k:nown 1 3. l should like now ta ask what d_'; the wishes of the members of the Council. May l remind xepresentatives that at our last meeting, on 22 December, we had before us a proposaI by the representative of Colombia that the Council should adjourn unti! 11 January 1954. l do not know if that proposaI still stands. To be more e..xplicit, l would point out that we pttt the proposaI to a vote hefore voting upon another motion calling for an adjournment for a more Iimited period. l should like now ta receive suggestions from representatives. 4. Mr. BüKHARI (Pakistan): As you have said, Mr. President, we have aIl waited with great interest for the outcome of thE: negotiations· that have been going on between certain of the parties concerned in connexion with the draft resolutions submitted [S/ 3151/Rev.l œml S/3152], and we join with you in expressing our great disappointment that, after so many postponements, we should, apparently, not he anY nearer the goal. In the circamstances l think that it woulel he ....t:ry useful to revive the proposaI of the Colombian represt'ntative in spirit. l think that there is a general feelin,l? that if a !ittIe more latitude were albwed to the' pcrrties concérned, as well as ta th~ fr~endIy powers on the Security Council which are ver; deeply interested in a solution, and if the date for the next meeting were not fixed - at least at the present moment - that would better serve the interests of an agreem~nt. Perhaps you would like to consider, or at least invite the "\riews of the Council upon, a suggestion that we should adjourn sine die on this questiùn. It would then, of course, be vpèn to any member of the Council or to the President for next month to e<Jl another meeting of the Council on this question whenever the occasion is thought to he ripe.

l do not know whether the representative of Pakistan has formaily moved an adjournment sine die, but in any case the proposaI is open to discussion uniler mIe 33 of the rules of procedure. 6. Sir Gladwyn JEBB (United Kingdom): l share your disappointment,Mr. President, that after so many meetings - l believe that you said that there had been fourteen - we have sa far failed to arrive at a pointat which it wouIrl. he e',ident that the necessary majority in this Council would be available in favour of anydraft resnlution like1y ta help in this important and difficult dispute. As l say, we share your disappointment, and we are sure.hat ü--r colleagues do 150 too. However, that is. regrettably, the position. We have made a certain advance. l believe that we are not, perhaps, as far removed as some might think from the p!}int at which a majority wiII be available in favour of a constructive draft resolution. However, at the moment it is quite evident that we shall. make no progress if we pursue the matter now and try ta obtain agreement on any formula which ï. l quite see that sorne people might argue that the situation is difficult and slightly cOl1fused and that it nùght he a good thing ta adjourn sine die, as proposed - l understand formally - by the representative of Pakistan. l, myself, however, would not he in favour of an adjournment sine die. l suggest, with al1 deference to Ml'. Bokhari's views, that it would he better ta adjourn until a definite date. 8. l think that the dispute which we are now considering is not altogther lacking in urgency. l should have thought that 'sorne people would certainly agree \Vith that as a statement of princip1e. For my part, l think that we should intel1sively pursue, behind the scenes, our search for sorne formula which would he like1y ta obtain a majority in the Cauncil. l do nat think it woald be impossible for us to ârrive atsuch an agreement within, let us say, the next week or ten days. We are 50 near ta agreement now that l shou1d have thought thaï the possibility wlùch l have. just mentioned was quIte conceivab1e. 9. Moreover, if the Council were merely ta adjourn sine die, l tlùnkwith al1 due respectthat that would place our next President, the representative of Lebanon, in a slightly invidicus position. He would have ta calI a meeting of the Council whenever he thought fit; he wou1d have to take the necessary soundings; and, in the general circum:stances, it would perhaps not be very easy for him to do that. l should have thought, therefore, that it wou1d be far Jetter, in everyone's interest, for the Cauncil ta fi..-x: a definite date for its next meeting. Sorne date must he scggested, and l, personally, tlùnk that Thursday, 7 January 1954, would he a very suitable one. It is true that, if we met then, we might not be able ta obtain an agree'- ment; no one can say with certainty that we shall. It seems to me, however, that 7 January wodd be quite a suit-able date; the Council" could meet then ta try to reach an"agreement and register such progress' as might have been made behind the scenes during the interval of ten days. 10. Renee, l take it upon myself to move formaily that the Security Council should not adjourn sine die, but should adjoum until Thursday, 7 January. 11. Ml'. ROPPENOT (France) (translated fro'm . French): l shall content myself with saying th2: l e~prely agree with the representative of the United ~ngdom and that l support his proposal. l agree wlth him that it is useless to prolong our meeting today, since it has not been possible to reach an ~<JTee­ ment in the course of the unofficial conversations; l also agree with him (ln the inconvenience of an adjournment sine die - which could almost seem to be a confession of impotence or defeat on our part. Finally, l think that the date 7 }anuary 1954 is excellent. Consequently, l support Sir Gladwyn Jebb's proposaI. 3 13. As early as 21 December [651st meetùlg]. as my colle~oues will perhaps remember, l proposed that the Couneil should adjourn sine die, not because l had already foreseen defeat, but because l saw no prospect of our being able ta meet here on 29 Decemher and achieve anything as a result of the intensive negotiations which had taken place without any success prior to that date. 14. An identical situation confronts us today. l am prepared ta attend a meeting tomorrow, or 0::1 5 January, 7 January or on any other date. If, however, it is proposed that we should adjourn in ot:der to reconvene on a date which calmot be fixed today, it would be wrong to regard this as something in the nature of a defeat. In my view, such a proposal is quite clear. It means that we have failed to attain any results today and that we do not know whether we sha1l get results tomorrow or the day after. 15. \\t'hat do we mean when we speak of adjourning sin.e die? We mean that the date of our next meeting will he determined according ta eircurnstances; this we shall have to leave to our future President, since Mr. Kyrou is now approaching the end of his term of office. While we great1y regret his departure, our welcome to the future President will he no less WarUl. That future President will fix a date for a meeting when circurnstances S~.;DW that when we meet we shall not waste our time 16. Wnatever we may -say, we should consider how many people have g-athered here in the hOpe thqt they will hear sorne eXplanation of questions which undoubtedly interest them, but we are again confusing thern by fixing a meeting for 7 January without heing certain that on 7 January we shall again have before us the question which is now on our agenda. 17. Why cau we not adjo~rn sine die, on the understanding that the date .Qf the meeting will he fixed in accordance with the circumstances? This may be before 7 January. It may he in three days, or in five days. Why must we insist on 7 January? 18. Is Sir Gladwyn Jebb sa perspicacious that he cau ,prophesy results on 7 January? Those results may be achieved by 5 January. Of course, l shall not try to compete with Sir Gladwyn or _Mr. Hoppenot in perspicacity. Pethaps they have sorne more accurate omens. l have no such omens. But while to meet every five or six days simply to see each other is very pleasant indeed and l shall by no means deny myself that pleasure, it hardly constitlltes the purpose and aim of the Security' CounciI. l understand that the Security Councilis convened for otlier _purposes•.... l shall therefore willingly support the proposal of my distinguishedcolleague, Mr. Bokhari, who' suggested 19. I t'lerefore retum te. the proposaI which I submitted 01, 21 December that the meeting should he postponed sine die. 20. With your permission, I should like to adJ a iew words on the substance of the question. 21. Why did 1 propose on 21 December that the Couneil should postpone the meeting \vithout fixing a definite day for the ne.."rt meeting and. should meet again only when the circumstances made this possible? And why have we not yet been able to achieve any results? I am deeply convinced that the reason for t.1-Jis is that we are not proceeding in the right direction, that the path is not open for progress and that the reason is that it is blocked by the three-Power draft resolution [Sj3151jRev.l], which bears no relation to the question we have to solve. I would he abusing your patience if I were to r..etum to that question again, but I should like to take this opportunity to 'Say that, in the opinion of the USSR delegation, the three-Power draft resolution is inappropriate. We can reach no agreement on the basis of this draft resolution and we can continue for a year postponing meetings from one day to the next and from one week ta the next ,vithout reaching agreement, because the very basis of the drait is fallacious. It does not answer the questions which constitute the very substance of the dispute between Syria. on the one hanC'. and Israel, on the other. 22. That is why I would suggest that it might he better if the authors of the three-Power draft resolution were to withdraw their text altogether and were to try to submit a new draft resolution which would answer the questions with which we are concerned, that is, the building of a hydro-electric station, the henefit or harm that project might bring to either party or to both of them, and a way out of a situation causing tension hetween two States which we want to achieve peace, tranquillity and constructive cooperation, as neighbouring countries. 23. The draft resolution to which I have just referred does not, in the opinion of the 'GSSR' delegation, meet any of the conditions which are indispensable to the eff~ctive solution of this problem. 24. If the meeting is postponed until 7 J anuary, on that date we are likely to be confronted with the SaIne obstacles as those which we are faeing today. ~S. We should give up this three-PO\ver draft resalutIon altogether. We must take another course, seek new paths. We must try to find solutions other than those contained in this notarious three-Power draft resollltian, which the United States of America, the United Kingàom and France do not wish to abandon and on which they stubbornly insist, despite the fact 5 26. As l have already said, paragraph 9 is particularly unacceptable to the USSR delegation. l therefore consider that ta adjourn the meeting now until a certain fixed day, without being able to foresee any more favourable results than those wlùch we have had lùtherto, would be extremely unwise. 27. In these circumstances, would it not he better to postpone the meeting? The USSR delegation, for its part, is deeply convinced that with goodwill we cau achieve an acceptable draft and enable the two parties to reach a solution on which they will agree and that only when the prospects of such ~OTeement are more or less real should a meeting of the Security Council he convened. This can very well be doné by the President. If it is possible to do this before 1 January, l amsnre that Mr. Kyrou is perfectly capable of doing sa and if this cannot be done before 1 January, any President can do so after 1 Jànuary- 28. That is \vhy I support Mr. Bokhari's proposal and should like to renûnd you once again that l said on 21 December [651st nz.eetùlg, para. 73]: "If it is essential that I should here fonnally confinn my wish that the matter should not be put ta a vote, then l shall submit a proposal to the effect that a vote on the drait resolution should he postponed sine die, giving the parties involved an opportunity ta reach an agreement in the meantime, _unless a resolution ta that effect is adopted" - that is to say, to the effect which l had the honour ta expound as the position of the Soviet Union in the Security Council. l cOQtinue to hold that view. l therefore support Mr. Bokhari's proposal to postpone the meeting sine die, for the reasons wlùch l have had the honour to give. 29.Mr. BOKHARI (Pakistan),: As the Council knows, my country is one of the three whose term of membership of the Council will expire at the end of tlùs month. Therefore, my delegatiop cannat possibly be interested directly in the date of the next meeting on this issue, if that meeting is to be held in January. The reasons why we are taking - an interest in the date of the next meeting are to he found only in the merits of the situation itself. 30. Why is it that we are seeking to postpone the - matter at all? The reason for postponement is that, as my United Kingdom colleague has made c1ear, sufficient 'Suppnrt ~s not availa,ble at the present moment for any const:..Gü,,/e drait resolution. Webath the members of the Security Council and L'le Presidenthave spent many anxious days in trying ta see whether, if the necessary adjustments can be achieved such support could he available before the end of this year. In that, we have unfortunately failed. Now we wish -that further time should e1apse 50 that all those 32. Sir Gladwyn Jebb referred to the difficulties that would face the President of the Security Council next month - who will be our Lebanese colleague - and the embarrassment that he !1Ùght have in calling a meeting. This was, if l may say so, a red herring. The calling of a meeting is not entirely in the President's hands. The President is the custodian of the rules of procedure. 33. He is in a certain sense the servant of the Council and l am perfectly sure that 'sir Gladwyn Jebb knows that he or his colleagues could request the ?resident to caU the meeting, and that the President, under the circumstances, would have no alternative but to calI the meeting. Therefore, to refer to the President's difficulties might perhaps be misunderstood to mean that somehow or other the Lebanese colleague could prevent a meeting from being held, which, as all of us around this table know, is simply not correct. 34. If the meeting of the Security Council is adjoumed sine aie) either the United Kingdom delegation or the United States delegation, or the French delegation, could calI a meeting on 4 January, if by 4 January they think they have sufficient support for a constructive draft resolution. If not, the best thing would be to go on until they can find such support. We also had one further circumstance in mind. Mter tbis long éUld tortuous debate, which has .arisen hecausc of the complaint which the Government of Syria, brought to the Security Council, l am perfectly sure that the Government of Syria would like to give the best thought to the matter. l am not in the confid~nce of the Syrian de1egation, but l would he surprised if the Syrian delegation would not like to pay a visit to their capital at this stage of the discussion, to receiV"e further instl uctions and to discuss the matter at greater length. 35. v,,·e aH know that offices in capitals a,re more or less dosed until 3 or 4 Janm:ry. Would it not be just and eqvitable to give the Syrian delegation a chance toconsu1t its government if theyfind it necessary? If in the meantime the sponsors fi'.1d that in spite of the obst~.cles they have sufficient support for a resolution, there is nothing to 'Stop them from calling the meeting. 36. l would therefore urge my United Kingdom colleague not to press his suggestion that the meeting should he adjourned until 7 January, because for one

l do not consider myself endowed with the gift of prophecy, as Mr. Vyshinsky assumes, any more than Sir Gladwyn Jebb. What the United Kingdom rc:'presentative has said, and what l have supported him in saying, is that the negotiations which have gone on hehind the scenes for several weeks have not heen complete1y use1ess and that, while we do not think we can reach a result today, we have solid grotlnds for hoping that the position may change in ten or fifteen days. That Ï'S why we thought it reasonable to fix the date for resumption of the debate at 7 January 1954, when there should he every chance , that a majority of the Couneil would he ready to vote for a reaSonable and fair draft re5Olution. 38. Mr. Bokhari has just said that by fixing a date we should he plaeing undue pressure on the parties. That seems to me a rather exaggerated way of ptlttïng it. l do not think that to fix a date for the resumption of a debate means exerting morally unwarranted pressure on the parties. On the contrary, it seems to me that to do 50 may spur them to reach an understanding. It is perfectly normal to 5x a date for resuming discussion of a question, whereas the indefinite suspension of a debate cannot but favour one of the parties which may. stand to gain if the debate is not resumed. 39. In Sir Gladwyn Jebb's proposaI, therefore, l see nothing which is not perfectly normal and in accordance with Couneil procedure. It is merely a matter of fixing a date which is neither too near nor too remote. 40. Lastly, Mr. Vyshinsky appeared· to think that there was a solution to all our problems, namely the withdrawal of the three-Power draft resolution. Personally, l am far from consideringthis draft rèsolution perfecto If a better one is put before us l shall he perfectly ready to support it and in this Mr. Vyshinsky - who has been rather on the fringe of the debate 50 far - could perhaps make an effective contribution. l have the greatest admiration for his talents. If, by the time the debate is resumed, Mr. Vyshinsky could provide ~s with a draft resolution satisfactory bath to Syrîa and to Israel, my admiration for mm would he unbounded. 41 The PRESIDENT: Ishould like tospeaknow as the representê-tiveo(OR:EECE. Greece, Ilke Pakistan, will notsit on the Security Cauneil after 31 December 1953. Therefore, the question that l wish to put to the representative of Pakistan is not inspired by ar'V direct intfrest. 1 should like t() recall to Mr. Bokha... the resolution [S/3128] which was adopted unanim- OUSly by the Security Couneil at its 631st meeting on 27 Octobet 1953. Paragraph 1 of that resolution -reads as follows: "[The Secwrity Councill Deems itdesitable to thatend that the works started in .the demîlitarized 43. By this time 1 think that every one of us must have applied the pragmatic test to the two proposais before us - one for adjournment until 7 January, and the other for adjournment sine die. Every one of us must ask the question: "What is the practicaI difference one way or the other?" And, upon close analysis, 1 think that we must aIl have come to the conclusion that the practical, substantial difference is not large. Thosein favour of adjourrunent sine die realize only too weIl that any one memher of this Conneil could obtain a meeting on or before 7 January. On the other hand,' thase in favour of adjournment until 7 January certainly do not wish to confront the Security Couneil with a situation similar to that with whièh it is faced today - namely, to get us together only 10 tell us that nothing has heen achieved and that we have to consider anather adjoumment. 1 am surè that that is not what they have in mind. 44. Thus, applying this pragmatic test ta the two proposaIs before us 1 do not find the difference to be substantial. There is, 1 admit, a psychological difference -one might even say a spiritual differcnce. You, Mr. President, speaking as the representative of Greece, called our attention to our eartier resolution [S/3128] and to the fact that the examination of the qüestion is suppose<! to he "urgent". We bave ta he more or less consistent in our use of that word <'urgent". Then, of course, adjoumment sin-e die leaves the impression that the Seeurity Couneil is totally hopeless and helpless. It might aIso leave the impression that the two parties, or the parties interested, may take their lelsure about this business and protract it as long as they desire. That kind of impression, l think, would he tinfortunate. This is an urgent matter and we must keep sorne sense of time in connexion with the dispute. 45. Then there is another consideration. The representative of Pakistan has called our attention to the fact that the delegation of Syria, after ail the debates .here, may. wish ta go back to Syria to consult its Goverritnent, and we should make it possible and convenient for our colleagues from Syria. to consult tOOr Government. 50. If the proposaI were adopted, it would be open to any memlber who wished. the Security Council to have a meeting at any time from 7 January to 15 January to make such a ;equest to the President, who would then, presumably, calI a meeting. 51. For those reasons, l should like to second the proposaI make by the.representative of China and to withdraw my .oW11. .52. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). (tra.nslated fram Russi.am): l shaH only say a few words, in order not to prolong the debate. Ivlr: Hop~not sa:ys Ltmt l a..-n holding aloof from the discussion of this question. That is incorrect. It is enough to say that l have spoken exactly twelve times on this question. Even Mr. Hoppenot, who is cne of the sponsors of the draft resolution, has spoken far less often than 1. This fact alone complete1y refutes Mr. Hoppenot's remark, which was probably made on the assUI11iption that 1· do not count the number of times l take the fIoor in the Security CounciI. In the second place, he says that l could make sorne contribution to tbis debate. That is precisely what l try to do by making my statements. But Mr. Hoppenot seems to think iliat to make a contribution it is necessary to submit sorne kind of a draft resolution. 53. l would say to Mr. Hoppenot that suchdr~..f', resolutions as the one he has submitted jointly with the United States and the United Killgdom cau he submitted without much difficulty and by the dozen. A dozen such draft resolutions C&11 be submitted, but 54. The main contribution which the Security Council must make to the task on which we are now engaged is, in my opinion, to see to it that a settlemeI!t of the question of the canal and of the dispute between Syria and Israel is reached On the basis of their mutual ~OTeement, with the assistance of the Security Council, whether within the framework of the Armistice Agreement or outside it - since that will depend in practice on what course one or other party takes to secu.!ê agreement. 55. If the Security Council were to succeed in bringing about a situation whereby the rèpresentatives of Syria and Israel would agree o~ the matter, that would truly constitute a practical and valuable contribution to the cause of peace which the Security Council is called upon to serve. It is not difficult to draft resolutions and if Ml'. Hoppenot wishes to open a contest in the matter, 1 am willing to take up his challenge. r am sure that 1 could draft just as many resolutions of thè kind drafted by Ml'. HDppenot or any-one whose signature he would endorse. 56. Sir Gladwyn Jebb's statement ~hat he is prepared to accept a proposaI ta adjourn until some time between 7 January and 15 January means that he does not foresee any possibility of convening a meeting of the Security Council before:- }anuary. vVhy is that so? 57. I would remind you that from the very outset, when we first began to discuss ·the proposaI submitted by the three de1egations, there were days when we \Vere askrd to suspend the meeting for half an hour in -order ta·consult among ourselves and reach a decision. At fint, the request was for half an hour. That gave no results. Then it ,,;ras for half a day, but that tao gave ·no results. The ne:.'tt request was for a few days, but mat too proved fruitless. Now we are told to choose a time between 7 and 15 January. Why not 4 or 5 January? 1 cannot understand this. 58. Thus, when we are told: "Not earlier than 7 January, but 110t later than 15 January" and are further told, as we were by Sir Gladwyn Jebb, that if we are to meet earlier, the decision may be left to the President, aU this merely means in the final allalysis that the whole matter is one of convening the Council when the President considers this to be expedient in view of the circumstances. It also means adjourning the meeting sine die. 59. 1 think that this whole dispute is utterly pointless. But in order to put an end to the dispute on this question, 1 shaH say in advance that 1 am prepared to agree on any date or to abstain from voting on any ~peating now, it is not to the point, but by passes the problem with which we are concerned. It· does not reIate directly to the question we are discussing here, but constitutes an attempt ta substitute for this question the-problem of how the United States monopolies can obtain mastery over the economy of the Middle and Near East, using the, 50 to speak, Godgiven opportunity provided by the dispute between Syria and Israel regarding the building of the canal and the hydro-electric station. 60. Therefore, from the point of view of the principles on the basis of which the Security Council approaches this whole dispute and this drait resolution, it is in the final analysis quite immaterial to us whether the draft resolution is discussed in seven days or in twentyseven days. In the form in which it has been submitted, the draIt resolution isinappropriate and does not serve the ends it is supposed to serve. As l have already said, therefore, our position on the three-Power draft resolution is determined primarily by. these grounds of principle. q1. The PRESIDENT: Sharing my Chinese colleague's abhorrence for procedural debates, l am happy ta he in a position to inform the ~mbers of the Council that the procedural situation facing us is much simpleT than might have been thought. The representative of the United Kingdom bas withdrawn his proposaI that the Security Council be reconvened on 7 January in favour of the suggestion of the representative of China, which, as l understood his formulation, was that the Council he reconvened on this matter no earlier than 7 January and no later than 15 January. Following the withdrawal oi the propôsal of the United Kingdom representative, l have been informed by the representative of Pakistan that he is withdrawing his proposaI that the Council be adjourned sim: die. Under the circumstances, the only proposaI before us is the sugge~tion made by the representative of China. Is there any opposition to that suggestion? 62. Mi". VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): For the reasons which l have already ID<'ltioned l shaH abstain in the vote on the date of the next meeting. 63. Mr. HOPPENOT (France) (tnmslated tram French): l fully agree with the spirit of Mr. Tsiang's proposaI but l am not entire1y in agreement with his wording. l wonder whether the Council can take a firm .decision not to meet before 7 January next. Somethingmight happen - something unforeseen at the moment-as Mr. Vyshinsky suggested. That is ta say, an agreement between the parties might fall from heaven and cause us to meet before the proposed date. l think it would be better either to say tha:t the Security Coundl will meet between 7 January and 15 January, without forma1ly exduding the possibility of a meetingbefore 7 January, or to say that the 67. Mr. ORTEGA MASSON (Chile) Uranslated f. :m'/. Spanish) : It is not very often that my de1egation has asked for the floor in the Security Council's debates. This position has been based on an elementary sense of proportion. In this organ Qf the United Nations - the most important when the General Assembly is not in session - problems which concem the entire world are solved. The Council's main task is the safeguarding of peace and of the harmonious co-existence of the peoples, and in the perfmmance Qf this task the small countries, Chile amoÎig them, have but few suggestions ta put forward. Hence on many occasions l have asked to speak for a few minutes only in order to explain my vote. l think l must do sa again now. 68. 'vVe shall abstain from voting on the proposal, whatever it may he, because the next session of the Council is ta take place in January and my delegation ceases to be a member of this organ on 31 December. It ,,!,ould be improper for our vote to influence the decision which othe Council is to take. 69. l asked for the flaor in arder toexpla;n why we shan abstain from voting on the proposal which the President is ta submit for the Council's consideration; but Iwish to take this opportunity to thank each of the members of the Council for the courtesy with which they have listened ta the opinions expressed by my delegation on the few occasions when we have felt called upon to speak, and ta express a sincere wish that the New Year will be propitious for the Security Council's work and for the prestige of the United Nations, on which the well-being of the world depends.

Then the S'ecurity Council decides, wi:th the delegations of Chile and the Union oi Soviet SocialistRepublics abstaining, that it will reconvene on this .question between 7 January· and 15 January. l should like to wish the President of the Security Council for January, Mr. Charles Malik, better luck with this question than l have had. 71. l caU upon the representative of France on a point of arder.

This is doubtless the last time the Security Couneil will meet this year. l should not like ta usurp the prerogatives of Mr Malik, one of whose most agree- 13 73. For two years the Council has had the henefit of your wisdom, your wide experience, your political 'sense and your sense of humour. You have guided many of ûar labours, and in partkular ma..,:}" of those procedural discussjons which are at once so fOfu1.!Ïdable and 50 delir to us, towards happy solutions. Your departure will certainly leave a gap in the Security Cauncil which will not easily he filled, anl our only consolation in seeing you. go il> the thour,nt that you are ID OCCllPY a high post in your cour.cry, and one whi.;h will certainly.enable you to cor..tinue your good work for peace and international understanding. 74. In addition - and here again l am sure 1 am speakiIig on behalf of my colleagues - 1 should like ~ express ta the hvo other members of the Council who are going to leave us at the sanIe time as yourse1f how we feel about their ( ~re. 75. We. shall deeply reg.et the absence of Mr. Bokhari. His speeches - flowery' as they have been though not, on occasion, without a few. thorns -have always made a deep impression on us and on the public; a1.1d his charm and intelligence h'We e...'Cercised the happÏt\St possible spiritual influence upo~ us. 76. Jwould also express our deep regret at the departure of the Chilean representative, whoS'e interventions, always .so. well-weighed and so predse, could not but make us regret their rarity and tl:.eir brevity. 77. Mr. ECHEVERRI CORTES (CoIOlnbia) (translatea fram Spanish): l should like. to associate Ir:," Jwith the words of Mr. Hoppenot, the distin- .gu.ished representative of France, The Presidênt's departure is a great blow to the memhers PÎ the Security COlîncil. We considet that he hasbeen an excellent Presidwt, impartial and cxtraordinarily skilfut in the conauct of the debates. We should like to .tb~ hiroand assure him how much we regret his leaving us. He has invited us to the farewell lunch which will take pl~ce t.he day after tomorrow.· In my view, it is we who should he offering him the farewdi lunch. 78. l shmtld also like to tell Mr. Bokhari, the distinguished representative of Pakistan, that we deeply regret· his departure, tao. He. bas been an excellent memher of the Security Council, contributing to our debates wifh great ~tel1igence. . -79. The same applies to my distinguished friend, Mr. Ortega.Masson, who contributed so much to the discussions .and \I"ho, moreover, has interpreted the American sel ·timent inall his speeçhes. . . . 80. }.IIr. Cb;irles MALIK (Lehat(vn) : Mr. President, .1·. vou wish~d. me more· successnext .month in· this ;;'ery important matter. For that 1 thank you very much. _. 81. 1 wish also k' ':Ïate myself and my delegation with all that has b .-ud by the preceding speakers about you, Mr. President, and about our distinguished colleagùes, the rep-resentatives of Pakistan and Chile. We wish them well and we shall follow their career with the deeepest interest, in the certainty that they will 'continue to cQntribute ta the peace of the w0rld as brilliantly as they have done here. 82. Mr. BOKHARI (Pakistan) My delegation fully associates itself with the tribute that has been paid ta Mr. Kyrou for his great work as President of our deliberations. It has been a very happy occasion for us to have served under lùm for two months during the period that we have been members of the Security Council. 1 think that he richly deserves the tribute that has been paid to him by our French colleague. 83. For my owu part, 1 also thank our colleagues from Chile, Colombia, Lebanon and France for the extremely kind words that they have b~en gracious enough to utter on tIûs occasion when speaking of me and t)f my country. 1 2.J.'TIl particularly grateful to our French' colleague, because l know that during these two years, if there is any one delegation whose graciousness 1 have strained ta the fuIlest, it has been the French delegation. 1 cannot but pay a tribute ta our French colleague for ·the extraordinary facility with which he has ~naintained this graciousness throughout and right to the last. moment. 1 thank him very heartily for it. 1 must say that 1 shan remember Hiese two years that 1 have spent sa ilappily with my colleagues, whom 1 shall see from time ta time wlthin these walls agai1lI. 84. 1 was tempted ta say more of the departing memhers, of Mr. Ortega Masson, the representative of Chile, and of Mr. Kyrou, the representative of Greeœ, but since all three of us will have our duties considerably lightened in the next three or four days, we ·shall have many oppon:unities of sharing a common nostalgia. 85. Mr. 'WADSWORTH (UrJted States of America): In looking around the table, 1 find that the representative of the United States is the only one who has mao.e no intervention at aIl so far today, and far he it from such a representative to have that said about him! 86. As representative of the host country, l merely ~ish to say, at this last meeting of the current year, that 1 wish for the President and for the other two fepresentatives who are leaving our Council but not our c011lplete cirde, and for aIl the other members of the Security Council, a very happy New Ycar and the OOst of success to aIl. of uS for the year ;to come. 87. Ml". VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (trœnslated from Russian) : .Like some other memJ:ers of the Seeurity Council, 1 do not aIways ass~clate my~elf with Ml". Hoppenot.'s remarks on vanous questions. In tb.i;s case, however, 1 am ready 88. May I, too, in the name of the USSR de1egation, render thanks to you for the calm, patient, truly wise, and - what is most importanta1ways ,-bjective manner in which YOll have discharged your duties as President·· of the Security Coullci1.

1 should like to extend my heartfelt thanks to the representatives of France, Colombia, Lebanon, Pakistan, th~ United States and the Soviet Union for their very kind words. I know that ,L.'lOse words are addressed much more to my country than to myself. I lmow also that the kindness of the words addressed to me were prompted by the friendly spirit of the speakers. 1 am deeply grateful to them for these most friendly feelings. 90. May I thank them, as well as the other members of the Security Council, for the generous spirit of cooperation which tbey have shown to my delc;"aation during the two-year term of Greece on the Security CounciI. May I also extend to them and to the members of the Secretariat before us, visible and invisible, my best wishes fOl a happy and lucky New Year. May 1954 see the WOi'1< of the Securlty Council progress and may it see a mULQ more stable and just peace. f -"