S/PV.659 Security Council

The Council will continue with the discussion of that part of the item appearing under (a), "Complaint by Israel against Egypt concerning (i) enforcement by Egypt of restrictions on the passage of ships trading with Israel through the Suez Canal, (ii) interference by Egypt with shipping proceeding to the Israeli port of Elath on the Gulf of Aqaba". At the invitation of the President, Mr. Ghaleb and Mr. Azmï, representatives of Egypt, and Mr. Ebaml, representative of Israel, took places at the CO'uncil table. 2. :Mr. GHALEB (Egypt): The Egyptian delegation proved by facts and figures, in its preliminary intervention in this debate, the lack of seriousness in the Israel complaint. If at that time we refrained from embarking upon all the judicial issues concerning the 1. seil jour, sujet au commerce d'entraves port représenltants d'Israël, 2. Au débat, faits fondée. 3. No one who had followed the debates in th~ Security Council on the question now before' it could have failed to notice that the representative of Israel, at the last meeting of the Council, repeated almost exactly the 'same set of arguments he had made in July 1951. His reputation in the sphere of polemics and his command of the Engolish language could not, however, serve to camouflage Israel's motive in reactivating a case which is more than two years old. We are not in any manner denying the right of a Member State to bring a legitim;J.te complaint to the Security CoundI; but we maintain t..~~ c Israel should not have attempted to utilize the tir. . of the Council for propaganda purposes. 4. Ta avoid a further discussion about the definition of "abnormnl" or "unusual", pt-nnit me to observe that it is unrealistic for the Government of Israel to come back to the table of this Council to seek the immediate cessatîon by Egypt of visiting or searching less than two of every thousand ships passing through the Suez Canal. It is unrealistic, if not fantastic, to require Egypt to stop confisc~ting what it has not ~onfiscated. Undoubtedly it is no compliment to the intelligence of all org-ans of the Unhed Nations to cause an "s" document œferring to a "Gulf of Eilat" to he circulated. 5. \Ve a;~ not denying the very reasonable measures pràctised il! our own territorial waters under established mIes of international law; but we most œrtainly and vigorously deny Israe~'s right ta challenge the legal basis of these measures, or ta dispute the inhercnt right of self-preservation. 6. The Israel armed forces having âdvanced to the Gulf of Aqaba only two weeks after the signing of the Egyptian-Israe1 General Armistice Agreement 1; having thereby, according ta an official Israel statement, "completed the control of the Negeb"; having established a beachhead that deve10ped into a military a..'l.d naval base; having enveloped the Egyptian right flank - now, which unsurpassed audacity, the Israel representative cornes to the Security Council to enlist the co-operation of Egypt in maintaining, consolidating and victualling the Israel armed forces that advanced to the Red Sea a few days after the signature of the Armistice Agreement with Egypt. 7. Such an imposition could he made under the law of the jungle, but certainly not under international Ïaw or under the law of the United Nations. Aftc:r more than two years, the same remarks still applies. It will for years to come. 9. To judge whether Egypt is entitled ta practise the right of visit, search and confiscation of war contraband, reference must be made to the rules of international law. A state of war gives the belligerents certain rights. Foremost amonsgt these rights is tHe incontestable right of visit and search of tihips in terri·· torial wathers, in ports, in mid-ocean and in en~my waters, with a view to the confiscation of what is legally considered war ccntraband. Such preventive measures are practised under the judicial control of appropriate courts. 10. Another incontestable iule of internatioùal law is that the conclusion of a partial or general annistice agreement does not in any way diminish the right of vi'Sit, search and confiscation, unless the agreement itself clearly provides for such restriction. 11. Nowhere in the Charter of the United N~iions can a provision be found modifying these rules. Sinœ the adoption of the Charter, international practice in large areas has gone a long way to confinn these established rules. 12. For the Security Council to consider the case in a iU'S~ and equitable manner, it might perhaps be useful, to clarify the various issues, to find just and equitable answers to a few relevant questions. 13. The first question that cornes to mind is whether there has been an armed conflict or struggle between the anned forces of Egypt and Israel. The obviousness of this fact renders any controversy about it mere sophistry, with no relevance whatsoever to the clarity of the issue or to its hard facts. World public opinion has not been unaware of the stark realities of the war in Palestine. 14. \Vhen dealing with the situation in 1948, the Security Council addressed its resolutions to the sté'.te of war that had existed. The Security Council's resolutions since that of 29 May 1948 2, establishing the tmce in Palestine, have always considered the situation in Palestine as an al.-med conflict between belligerents, and, consequently, action was taken under Chapter VII of the Charter. Furthermore, if there had been no state of war, naturally there could have been no armistice. 15. At a time when a departure from the orthodox, restrietive definition of war bas been made, at a time when the world has come to know of hot and cold wars, at a tii1;e when even the temperature is regulated , 1 2 Ibid., Third Year, Supplement for May 1948, document S/801. 3 16. This might be the second question: Has the Egyptian-Israel General Annistice Agreement put an end to the legal state of war between the two parties? 17. In his statement [658th meeting] before the Security Council the representative of Israel, in an effort to p!'ove .that the Agreement established a condition tat'ltamount to peace, alleged that Egypt was building its theory of the existence of a legal state of war on the basis of the occurrence, somewhere in the Agreement, of the word "armistice". Did he expect anyone at this table to he that credulous? Was he unaware of the fact that he was referring to an official United Nations document, available to the Council. to the Press and to the public? If the Egyptian- Israel Armistice Agreement differed from any other known armistice, it might be due to the fact that the nature and intent of that Agreement are repeated so many times in its articles and clauses. The Agreement persistently repe:J.ted that it was only a step from truce to peace; that it was not peace. 18. l should like ta refresh the Israel representative's memory, which must now be overcrcwded with many matœrs, such as that involving the recent shouting of certain crowds. l should like ta refer ta the Agreement which, the Israel representative alIeges, has the word "armistice" unwittingly scribbled somewhere on the' paper on which it is written. 19. In article l, the Agreement speaks of itself as "an indispensahle step toward the liquidation of. armet!. conflict and the restoration of peace in Palestine". Paragraph 3 of article IV further clarifies the nature and intent of the Agreement as folIows: "The provisions of this Agreement are dictated exc1usively by military considerations ... ". If that does not mean at least that astate other than peace lega1ly exists, l beg ta ask: What is the reason for the repetition in the Agreement that it is only a step to peace, that it is dictated only by military considerations? 20. In this respect, l find that it is also incumbent on me ta invite the Council's attention to its own discussions on the purposes of the armistice. 21. At the Council's 380th meeting on 15 November 1948, during the debate that immediately preceded the adoption of its resolution calling for an annistice, a very important and significant discussion took place on the question of what the Council should caU for: should it caU for ..ln armistice, or should it calI for peace? 22. In introducing the draft resolution, General Mc- Naughton of Canada said that it was an advance from the conception of a truce to that of an armistice. 23. In explaining the meaning of the armistice [380th meeting], Mr. Bunche held the sound view that the "For our part, we do not feel that it is practicable ta move immediately into that state ... " l\1r. Jessup added [380th meeting, p. 27]: " ... we do think that the intermediate state of armistice is a feasible and necessary step on the way towards the final goal." 25. The Security Couneil resolution of 16 November 1948 3 establishing the armistice coulel not, therefore, have been hastily written. It was the specifie result of a specifie discussion. Rence, it meant exactly what it said when it dec1ared: " ... in orde..... to . .. facilitate the transition from the present truce to permanent peacc in Palestine, an armistice shaH be established in all sectors of Palestine". 26. With the provisions of the Armistice Agree1I1ent as they stand, and with the records of the Security Cauneil as they are, can it be denied that a legal state of war doe.<; exist between Egypt and Israel? The provisions of the Arn1istice Agreement and the Security Couneil's records would have to be scrapped if the assertion were to be made that a state of peace exists today between the two parties. 27. The representative of Israel described the Armistice Agreement as a unique instrument. Re quoted sorne sources which predicted that volumes would be written on such a unique armistice. Pending the publication of that material and the termination of the extravagant studies by the Israel authorities, I wish to make a few observations on the unique character of the armistice. This is perhaps the first time that we find ourselves in agreement with the represe!i~ative of Israel-- at least as regards a certain adjective. 28. The Egyptian-Israel General Armistice Agreement is indeed unique. It is unique in that it allotted an entire, independent paragraph - to what? To the right ta freedom from fear. It could not have listed all the freedoms; it could not have specified freedom from want; but it ·specifically insisted on freedom from fear. 29. Paragraph 3 of article I - which everyone can look up, right here and now - says : "The right of each Party to its security and freedom from fear of attack by the armed forces of the other shall be fully respected." 32. l have so far been addressing myself to the intent of the provisions of the Egyptian-Israel General Armistice Agreement, to the clear eut statements made in the Security Cound by the authors of the resolut::m establishing that armistice, and irtdeed to the resolution itseli. 33. Let me now turn to ISr"cœl's real interpretation of the scope and intent of a1l the Armistice Agreements signed between it and other Arab States. 34. Let me quote the words of Mr. Shabtai Rosenne, legal adviser to the Israel Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the legal brain of the Israel delegation during its negotiations with the Egyptian delegation at Rhodes. 35. In his book entitled Israet's Armistice Agreemen.ts with the Arab States 4, MT. Rosenne had this to say about the Security Council's debate preceding its resolution of 16 November 1948 establishing the Armistice: "What the Security Coun-:il was anxious to do, and what it did do, was to replace its peremptory truce by a regulation to which the parties had specifically agreed, as the next and indispensable step in the restoration of pennanent peace in Palestine." 4 Shabtai Rosenne, Israel's Armistice Agreements with the Arab States, Tel-Aviv, International Law Association, 1951, p.26. 38. The third question may he whether the. Armistice Agreement concluded between the tV/o parties and endorsed by the Security Council is so intended, or so worded, as ·to debar one or bath parties from exercising the r1ght of visit and search. . 39. Since it is established in international law that, unless an armistice agreement expressly provides for such a restriction, the rights of both parties in this regard must he fully respccted, l would ask members of the Council who have the text of the EgypJan- Israel General Armistice Agreement at their disposaI or in their brief-cases, kindly to go throug:l it. The text is so self-evident, so self~sufficient; and it has no acte préparatoire. The intent of the contracting parties was to leave aside the right of visit, search and confiscation of war contraband. The pUl-pose - the only purpose - was to put an end to the fighting in Palestine. The members of the Council need not he referred to clauses inserted in different well-known armistice 'agreements where the rights of visit, search 4lld confiscation are expressly dealt with. 40. In the light of such rules and practices in international law, the Egyptian-Israel General Armistice Agreement cannot he considered as in any manner depriving the contracting parties of these rights. The measures of visit, search and confiscation were heing practised by Egypt hefore and during the negotiations at Rhodes. Israel and, indeed, the whole world were in possession of full kn0wledge of these measures. 41. Until astate of peace is established, and as long as our very existence is threatened by aggressive and hostile Zionism, we shall maintain the protection of the ruies and principles -long established by the civilized international community - expressed in Oppenheim's worcls: 6 "Armistices or truces ... are all agreements between belligerent forces for a temporary cessation 5 David Ben-Gurion, Rebirth and Destiny of Israel, ed. and tr. M. Nurock. New York, Philosophica1 Library, 1954. traduit 1954. H. 1 1948, 7 6 L. Oppenheim, International Law, a Treatise, ed. H. Lauterpacht, 7th ed. London, Longmans, Green and Co., 1948, Vol. II, pp. 546-547. 42. Our adherence to such rights of international law may also he viewed in the light of the following news item published on 28 January 1954 by the daily news bulletin of .the Jewish Telegraphie Agenc)': "Tel Aviv, 27 January 1954. The newspaper H ooo-r asserted today that Israel-manufactured arms and ammunition to the value of one million dollars had been sold to a country in western Europe. The first shipment has already been delivered and found ta be satisfactory, the paper said.u 43. The fourth relevant question could be whether the Convention respecting the free navigation of the Suez Maritime Canal signed at Constantinople on 29 October 1888 7 deprives Egypt of the right of visit, search and confiscation of war contraband passing, in its own territory, through the Suez Canal. 44. The 1888 Convention is not made up only of one article assuring the free passage of all 'ships in peace or war. It goes further, to make specifie reference ta the rights of Egypt. 45. It is true that article 1 safeguards the free use of the Canal in peace and war, without distinction of fiag, and declares that it should never be subjected ta the right of blockade. It is true that article IV of the Convention deals with the agreement of the contracting powers that no right of war, no act of hostility, nor any aet having for its object the obstruotion of the free navigation of the Canal should be committed in the Canal, its ports of access, or within three miles from these ports. It is also true that articles V, VU and VIn deal with the rights of passage of belligerents, with the presence of warships in the Canal and its ports, and with the measures to be taken, by the contracting Powers relative to the security of the Canal and the executioll of the Convention. 46. But it is equall.y true that articles IX and X of the same Convention reserve the full rights of Egypt vis-à-vis the provisions of articles IV, V, VII and VIII with regard ta the fol1ùwing: (1) To the measures which Egypt may find necessary for ensuring, by its own forces, the defence of its territory and the maintenance of public arder; (2) To the mea:sures which Egypt may take for ensuring the execution of the Convention. 7 Georg Friedrich von Martens, Nouveau recueil général de traités et autres actes relatifs au:ç rapports de droit international, G6ttingen, Librairie Dieteric·l. 1891, 2nd ser., Vol. XV, p. 557. For an Engii~h translation, Sèe Sir Edward Hertstet, ed., A Complete Collection of the Treaties and Convention·s... Between Great Britain and Foreign Powers..., London, Butterworths, 1893, Vol. XVIII, p. 369. "Similarly, the provisions of articles IV, V, VII and VIII shall not interfere with the measures which His Majesty the Sultan and His Highness the Khedive, in the name of His Imperial Majesty, and within the limits of the Firmans granted, might find it necessary to take for securing by their O\''ln forces the defence of Egypt and the maiI"tenance of public order." 49. In view of such .c1arity of e.."{pression, Egypt couId in no way he considered aS contravening the 1888 Convention in relation to any aspect of the question now before the Couneil. 50. Allow me here to observe that hItherto little attention has heen paid by the Couneil to the risks to its safety which Egypt is incurring. With Zionist expansion growing from a nightmare into an ugly daylight fact; with the threats of Israel to force its ships through the Suez Canal and Egyptian territorial waters, could the United Nations organ established for the preservation of peace deny Egypt its right to self-preservation? 49. l'Egypte quel question 50. jusqu'à risques exposée. simple qu'Israël par égyptiennes, Unies 1'2gypte 51. certaines en sances l'humanité pager milieux 51. The representative of Israel, overlooking certain limitations, came to ,the table of this Cauncil wearing the cloak of a self-appointed attorney for aIl maritime Powers, and of a defender of the interests of a11 mankind. He sought, on the one hand, to propagate in sorne quarters the misconception that Egypt has no rights in the Suez Canal, and to cause, on the other hand, serious injury to relations between Egypt and a few other countries. Ctl11 attaché et 52. jôlement", dépeindre tous qui pecter que mement 53. choisi a de d'un par Nations droit que tienne. aussi navires ne légitime 54. du été déclaration 52. In what could he termed "Operation Beguilement", the Israel representative went so far as t.o picture Egypt as a colonial Power, and a11 the maritime nations as oppressed colonies, reluctantly compelled to respect the very restrictions to which they and the United Nations are totally opposed. 53. Apart from its timing, "Operation Beguilement" \Vas mischievously planned. In referring to the Suez Canal, the representative of Israel, who knows his EngIish, went so far as to use the ward "propinquity", thereby implying before an organ of the United Nations that the Egyptians have no right in the Suez Canal, that the Canal just happened accidentally to run somewhere near the Egyptian border. In the light of such a fantastic and audacious theory, the threat to force Israel ships through Egyptian territorial waters' could not but positively confirm our legitimate concern for our safety. 54. Our misgivings were doubled in this respect by the distortion of the geographic name of the Gulf of Aqaba, a distortion that the representative of Israel insisted upon in his statement before the Couneil. 55. Going back to the series of questions, the fifth may he whether Egypt has abused its right of visit, sem'ch and confiscation of war contraband. 56. We have shown in our previous statement that, since Septemher 1951, less than .17 per cent of the ships passing through the Suez Canal have been subjected to the procedure of visit and search by Egyptian ch>ilian customs authorities. We have further shown that no cargo has been confiscated since thaJt date. 57. To this, let me now add the facts and figures relative to the measures taken by Egypt in its territorial waters in the Red Sea at the Gulf of Aqaba. 58. Since October 1951, 267 ships have passed through the Gulf of Aqaba. Of these, 214 were British, 3S German, 5 American, 3 Norwegian, 3 Greek, 2 Syrian, 1 Turkish, 1 Panamanian, 1 Pakistani, 1 Italia'll and 1 Danish. Although a great number of these ships carried cargos destined for Israel, only three were actually visited and searched; and here I declare again that out of the 267 ships not one single ship, not one single consignment of cargo was confiscated, whether destined for Israel or not. 59. With regard to the enumeration by the represènta:tive of Israel of certain cases of visit and search in that area, l do not deem it necessary, because of the faets and figures 1 have just presented, to utilize the tinte of the Council at ,this juneture with details correcting the distorted Israel information in this r~spect.. 1 am, however, prepared to do so if the occa- SIon anses. 60. A disparaging reference has been made in this Council ta Egyptians being on the two is1ands of Tiran and Sinafir on the Red Sea, islands which had been occupied by Egyptians long hefore the l'srael armed forces advanced ta the Gulf of Aqaba a few days after the signature of the Egyptian-Israe1 General·Armistice Agreement. Rere 1 feel bound to smte H'lt the records of the Second World War contain official evidence that Egyptian units had been using these two· islands as part of the Egyptian defensive system during that war. Egyptian detachments on these two islands cooperated with the Egyptian air force and the naval units entrusted at the time with the task of protecting AlIied shipping in the Red Sea against submarine attack. While Egyptian air force units were covering the. coast for A1lied shipping in the Mediterranean, force of 8,000 Egyptian troops undertook the defence of the entire length of the Suez Canal and its ports against continuous, hostile air attacks throughout the Second World War. "The passage of merch3ndise set a new record figure of 83,448,000 tons, an increase of 8.7 per cent in comparison with the 1951 figure". 63. The representative of Israel, however, h~ving overbearingly termed the visit or search of tw~ of every thousand ships as comprehensive and comple~~ defiance of the Security Council's authority; having classified as "condescension" the total absence of confiscation of any cargo whatsoever; having on such grounds placed "in deadly hazard" the authority of the Security Council and the integrity of the Armistice Agreement, proceeded to caIl on the Council ta establish machineries and procedures to enable it ta follow the fulfilment or non-fulfihnent of its behest [658th 1lUJetÏrllg] • 64. Does the representative of Israel need to be reminded of the long-standing behests of the Security Council and of the General Assembly? Is there no machinery needed 010 check the steady and premeditated aets of aggression by Israel armed forces? Is there no procedure required to put an end ta the killing of Arabs? Is there no machinery needed to repatriate the one nùllion Arabs who, in the words of The New y o,-k Times} are "still sitting around the battlefie1d, ragged, suIlen and resentful". 65. We are aware of the faet that the Security Council adopted a resolution on 1 September 1951 8• 'vVe are equally aware that the Couneil, in adopting that resolution, had based it on considerations other than the essentially legal aspects of the case. The records of the Security Council c1early indicate that the aim was to take sorne politica1 step towards the final ,settlement of the Palestine question, the step whose consequences experience bas shawn. Conrsidering the facts and figures we have presented ta the Couneil, the step of 1 September 1951 did not fail to accelerate the tempo of Israel aggression and Zionist expansion. 66. The Egyptian Government trusts that the attitude of the Couneil ~'ill he determined by the faets bearing on the issue, the facts that we have tried ta present in an objective manner. In its wisdom, the Council, we believe, will not be led to pass judgment on the rights of sovereign governments exercised within the scope of their own j urisdiction and in conformity with inte,rnational law. In its wide vision, the Couneil will, we hope, refrain from re-creating problems which the Council itself has been established to solve. 68. A very grave turn has now occurred in what was already a serious situation; for the speech that we have just heard from the representative of Egypt entirely dispels any impression that might have arisen recently that Egypt was moving towards respeot of international law and interest in the Suez Canal. vVe have heard a firm and defiallt insistence upon tbe blockade restrictions which the Security Council has vigorously denounced~ Egypt has again come before this, the highest body of international security, to seek its recognition of a right of unilateral war to be waged at sea by Egypt against Israel five years after the signatux:e of the Armistice Agreement, four years after the adoption by the Security Council of resolutions forbidding any further hostile acts, and two and one-half years after the Security Council itself criticized and condemned the very practices which the representative of Egypt has now defended. 69. The representative of Egypt accused me of repeating the arguments which 1 invoked in support of our contention when this discussion first arose in 1951. 1 freely admit the charge of repetition; for none of the basic legal, political or moral facts which prevailed at that time have undergone any transfOI'mation in the two and ~ne-half years which have since ensued. 70. But the representative of Egypt, in accusing me of repetition, haiS surely ignored one central circumstance. These contentions, which were put forward in 1951 and which were, to sorne extent, repeated at the 658th meeting, have been substantively upheld by the Security Council. The Security Council adopted a resolution on 1 September 1951 which is, in itself, and anticipatory refutation of a1most every single expression of thought or sentiment which has just fallen from the lips of the Egyptian representative. 71. The Egyptian representative has argued in favour of the right of belligerent acts; but the Security Council has itself rejected this concept of active belligerent rights. The Egyptian representative has agaiu invoked the concept of self-preservation; but the Security Council bas stated that these Egyptian restrictions cannot be justified on any legitimate grounds of selfdefence. The Egyptian representative has stated that this Armistice Agreement must be equivalent to aIl other armistice agreements in being compatible with the continuation of belligerent rights; but the Security Council has three times rejected the concept that this particular Armistice Agreement is compatible, or can in any sense sense co-exist, with the active exercise of beIIigerent rights or of any hostile acts. Similarly, the Security Council has already rejected the concept that th", Egyptian invasion of Israel in 1948 has somehow endowed Egypt for five years thereafter with 73. 1 failed to hear anything in the speech of the Eg)rptian representative which did not arouse in my memory the echoes of previous contentions which a representative of Egypt, no less eloquent - now indeed its Minister for Foreign Affairs -- put forward to the Security Council ; argulI11ents the comprehensive rejection of which is embodied and enshrined in the Security Council's resolutiotl of 1 September 1951. 74. The iss'-te, therefore, should not he drawn merely between Israel and Egypt. The interpretation of the Armistice Agreement as forbidding all hostile aets is not our interpretation, but is that of the Security Council. 75. The doctrine that, notwithstanding the character and content of other armistice agreements, this Agreement means a permanent end of hostilities - this again is not an Israel thesis, but it is the authentic and authoritative United Nations interpretation of the attributes of this Armistice Agreement; an interpretation made by United Nations representatives who took part in the negotiation of the armistice, and confirmed on three or four occasions by the Security Counciî itself. 76. l do not wish to spend time on the question of the Constantinople Convention. 1 referred to that important instntment of international law in a purely historie sense in my first observations to the Security Coundl. 1 stated as a point of historie faet that, at the meetings of the Security Council in 1951, certain maritime governments there represented who are signatories of the Constantinople Convention stated their opinion, which 1 think is difficult to deny, that the Egyptian restrictions are, amongst other things, incompatible with that instrument of international law. 77. But even if the Constantinople Convention could be adduced in full defence of the Egyptian restrictions, it would not help the Egyptian case to any degree whatsoever, because the Security Council must 10 - at this problem from the viewpoint, not of pre-Uniteu ~ations international law, but from the viewpoint of lts own Charter, of the Armistice Agreeme'nt and of the Security Council's resolutions. Here l would recall Article 103 of our Charter, which establishes the supremacy of obligations under the Charter over all other international obligations of Member States. Not that 1 believe that the text of the Constantinople Convention does offer justification for Egypt'srestric- 78. He quoted article IX and the article X of that Convention as though in 'Support of Egypt's sovereign right to practise these restrictions. But somehow, in the great mass of rhetoric, article XI was inadvertently lost from sight. Article XI says only this: "The measures which shaH he taken in the cases provided for my Articles IX and X of the present Treaty shall not interfere with the free use of the Canal .... JI . To the normal t1Ùnd, this sounds like a somewhat substantive qualification of articles IX and X. 79. However, l pass over that matter in arder ta focus the attention of the Security Council, if l may, upon the hasis of this discussion, which is not the Constantinople Convention of 1888, but the Charter of the United Nations, the Egyptian-Israel Armistice Agreement and the Security Council's resolution ûf 1 September 1951 interpreting the Charter and the Armistice Agreement with reference to the very restrictions which are the subject of my Government's complaint. 80. We heard in the recent speeches of the representatives of Egypt a most astonishing attempt to t1Ùnimize the effects of this blockade and to underestimate its dimensions and gravity. Thus, there is an attempt to minimize what is, in our view, a successfuI assault by Egypt upon the maritime interests of Israel and of other nations. The basis of that misrepresentation is an effort to ignore the main theme, the deterrent effects of the blockade regulations, which is really primary; and to focus attention on the steps taken against those re1atively few ships which do not respect the illegal blockade and which therefore become the objects of active intervention. I attempted last weck [658th meeting] to emphasize the primary importance which we attach to the deterrent effects of the regulations themselves and the relatively secondary character of the actual deeds of intervention and of confiscation which are applied against that smal1 margin of shipping which slips through the loopholes in that effective blockade procedure. In order to make this mast important point dear, especially against the background of the statistics which we have had here, I should like to explain precisely how the blockade operates. l should, however, like to preface my observations by doubting the relevance of the quantitative aspect of this problem. 81. If these restrictions are illegitimate, as they are in the mind and in the policy of the Security Council, l cannot see that it is much mitigation to say that these illegal restrictions are only practised against a few ships, and that that is perfectly all right because Egypt could have practised these illegal restrictions against hundreds of other ships. The subject of our complaint is the practice of these restrictions against those ships against which they are practised, and, 8+. Article 1 States that the inspection of ships with the object of confiscating contraband articles of war shall conform with the following dispositions. Article 2 lays down sorne of those dispositions. Article 3 tells what will happen to any ship which does not surrender its maritime freedom and subnùt to these procedures of search. It says that recourse cau always he had to force against any ship which attempts to avoid inspection, forcibly opening fire if necessary in order to compel the ship to stop to undergo the process of visit. Article 4 tells what would happen to the crew or to the ship if the exercise of this force were to be resisted. 85. After further procedur<ù articles, we come to what is perhaps the most important definition of the scope of these restrictions, article 10. It says that the following articles, when destined for the enemy - that is the way the State of Israel is envisaged in these regulations - are contraband of war and must be confiscated. There follows a list of seven categories of items, including fuel of aIl kinds, airplanes, ships, automobiles and vehicles - aIl this as weIl as arms, munitions and war material. 86. The following article goes on to define the conditions under which the ship's destination shall qualify its cargo for confiscation. In general, any relationship of this vesse! to the State of Israel in the past or in the future is considered as establishing its enemy destination and as justifying the imposition of these rigorous articles upon it. 87. These, then, are the restrictions which the Security Council has been considering for some years and which have remained an active part of Egyptian legislation. Here we have laws enaCted by Egypt for intrucling against the ships the flags, the cargoes and the maritime rights of other sovereign countries passing through the Suez Canal in its capacity as an international artery joining two parts of the high seas. 88. Tt is the existence of these regulations which is the main element in the blockade. It would require very special courage or daring for any country. however convinced of its international rectitude. ta place its ships and its personnel at the peril of such humiliation and interference. 89. It is because, (ff the existence of this decree and its public promulgation that much more than 90 per cent of the ships which would nonnally reach Israel do not even attempt to do so at all. It is really a mockery of all fact and of aIl honesty ta draw attention ta the alleged tiny proportion of ships which become involved in specifie incidents. The fact is that the maritime Powers do disappli"ove of these regulations, but they have no means whatever of overcoming the force which is their ultimate sanction and which, in the area under discussion, lies at the disposaI of Egypt and of no other Sate. The position then 15 that 90 per cent or more of the trade wrJch should flow ta and from Israel through the Suez Canal has been driven off the Suez highway. That is what 1 meant when 1 said at the 658th meeting that the fewer the ships which are concerned in actual incidents, the worse the position, the graver the praof of offence, the more total the blockade. 90.. If 1 were to say that I will use force and violence and every kind of molestation against anybody pa:ssing alotig a certain road, and that if my will is not obeyed I ~;hall use a gun against him, I am scarcely in a moral position to turn in astonishment two and one-half years later and say: "Gentlemen, very few people appear to be passing along this road; we hardly ever have to tise our right of molestation or intervention." 91. I would, then, ask the Security Council, whatever it chooses ultimately to do, not to allow the position ta be misrepresented and to focus its eyes firmly upon the regulations themselves, which are the primary source of guilt, and, secondarily. upon those marginal efforts which are made to close up the few gaps in the blockade restrictions. 92. Therefore, all that the representative of Egypt was telling the Council in this context could, 1 think, he put in these words. He came to the Council and said: "Our regulations, which the Security Council has condemned, have become so effective as to be nearly absolute; and you will he glad to hear that fewer .and fewer ships now attempt to exerdse their freedom and thus come within the scope of our regulations. Such incidents as those in which the ships of many nations have been involved are oruy the marginal efforts to close the remaining gap." So we are asked ta be comforted because the gap is small and is growing smaller. 94. The two aggravations are these. First, I have referred to the decree of 6 February 1950, which is the basic legal document upon which the blockade restrictions are based, and I said that article 10 was a very important article in defermining the scope and the dimensions of these restrictive practices. As document B (S/3179) 1 have submitted the latest enactment as published in the Egyptian press: an announcement by the Council of Ministers of the new Egyptian regime, not merely accepting the decree of 6 February 1950, but actuaIly extending its scope further. This docunlent reads: "The Council of Ministers decided at its last meeting to modify certain provisions of the 'Decree on the Procedure of Ships and Aeroplane Searches and of Seizure of Contraband Goods in Connexion with the Palestine War', in the foIlowing manner:" This refers to a modification of the decree which the Security Council critieized in 1951, and the Council, therefore, would probably Iike to listen in hopeful suspense to see whether the modification 1S in the direction of eliminating these restrictions. Here, then, are the· two modifications: " (1) A seventh paragraph shaII be added to Article 10 of the above-mentioned Decree (enacted on 6 February 1950), to read as follows: " 'Foodstuifs and aIl other commodities which are likely to strengthen the war potential of the Zionists in Palestine in any way whatever.''' There, then, is a seventh and most comprehensive addition to the already fairly exhaustive list of articles enumerated in article 10 of this Egyptian decree as containing what tS caIIed "contraband of war". 95. The document goes on: "(2) A second clause shaIl he added to the same article, to read as follows: " 'AIl the commodities heretofore enumerated shall he regarded as war contraband even when pa:ssing Egypt's territory or territorial waters in transit.''' In other words, as soon as a ship containing any of these goods - and under this new enactment that means pretty weIl any goods at all - comes within the scope of Egyptian governmental power, it shaIl, at 97. The second extension tS in space, and 1 should like to say a few words to summarize our case once a",aain about the application of these restrictions to the Gulf of Aqaba. 98. 1 very much regret it if the representative of Egypt sees anything sinister in our terminology when we calI this the Gulf of Eilat, and he should certainly not read any intention of a politica1 character into 'such terminology. It is a matter of a link which is particularly traditional. The term "Aqaba" is a rather newfang1ed term, probab1y not more than a single mil1ennium, old, whereas this partieular place and gulf have heen called "Eilat" for something like four thousand years and have to that extent become traditional with us. However, 1 will, out of deference ta him, refer ,to it as the Gulf of Aqaba. 99. Now, it is clear that the Gulf of Aqaba is an international waterway in the sense that the territorial waters of at least four countries overlap within that Gulf; so that, if any one country were to assert the application of its sovereign rights in the territorial waters, we would, as 1 have said before, achieve a maritime jungle in the sense that any one of the four govemments could use armed force against any l"hipping proceeding to any of the other three. 100. In brief, where a narrow waterway is the only junction between two parts of the high seas, or the only outlet to a part of the high seas, then its international character has to he preserved, and no sovereign rights based upon the doctrine of territorial waters is inherent in any country from the viewpoint of holding up free maritime traffic. 101.. What is new in the situation today is to find that the Govemment of Egypt doubts that truth concerning the legitimacy of commerce with Israel through the Gulf of Eilat; because this matter has a history. When the islands of Tiran and Sinafir were occupied, the Govemment of Israel was naturally concerned to attempt to'elicit the reasous for this sudden occupation by Egypt of two islands, previously uninhabited, which bisected an already narrow maritime channel 102. We received a reply on 21 February, stating that at the very end of January the Egyptian Foreign Minister handed to Ambassador Caffery and aideménwire dated 28 January 1950. l have here the text, and shall submit it as a document to the Security Council, because it does not, l think, express a very sound legal doctrine concerning the rights and duties of the parties at the head of the Gulf of Aqaba. The Egyptian Government, in this œide-mémoire, states that these two islands have been occupied in perfect agreement with the Government of Saudi Arabia. The second pa~"Taph states that, in so occupying these islands, Egypt has merely tried to confirm its rights on the said islands which, by their geographical position, are less than three sea miles from the Egyptian coa:st of Sinai and some four miles from the opposite coast of Saudi Arabia. 103. But the third paragraph of this Egyptian aidemémoire, submitted in writting through the good offices of a friendly government, is, l think, of the utmost importance, and l should like to read it in its original text: "This occupation being in no sense intended to interfere in any way whatever with innocent traffic through the stretch of sea separating these two islands from the Sinai Coast of Egypt, it goes without 'saying that this passage, the only practicable one, will remain free, as in the past; which is in conformity with international practice and with the recognized principles of international law." Il 104. Therefore, in a more moderate and conciliat~ry moment sorne three or four years ago, Egypt was prepared to commit itself to the correct legal doctrine that respect for international law and the rights of nations prevents Egypt and, of course, prevents Israel, or Jordan, or Saucli Arabia, as the four littoral States on the Gulf of Aqaba, from using their territorial position in order to interfere with free passage through that Gulf. lOS. This enables me to summarize my case, reserving ouly our right of intervention at a later stage. l would oilly say in conclusion that the Security Council would, 1 think, find great interest in comparing the arguments which have been heard from th~ Egyptian representative today with the categorica1 tenn:s of its own resolutian. Again we have heard the assertion of belligerent rights arising from a state of war, an assertion already most authoritative1y rejected. Again we have heard an interpretation of the Armistice Agreement as enabling the continuation of hostile acts - again, a 9 Translated from French. 106. At stake is the Armistice Agreement, which has here heen violated for five years, in the judgment of aU the authoritative sources on its interpretation. At stake is the Security Council's resolution, correctIy described by the first Egyptian speaker as a decision of the Security Council. And herL l would draw attention to Article 2S of the Charter, under which we have all undertaken with respect to the Security Council, as we have not undertaken with respect to any other international organ, to accept the decisions of the Security Council. 107. Another issue is the peace of the Middle East, as it falls hetween these two doctrines of transition ta peace, which is our concept, and the state of war which has again been declared at the Security Council's table in a speech which claimed the Council's recognition for the concepts and the alleged ideals of helligerency. 108. At stake is the grave 1055 to the interests of many countries and, above all, the great maritime principles which will here suffer according to the character and the direction of the S!=Curity Council's decision. Can a territorial Power, by reason of the geographical fortune which puts it athwart the communications of the wodd, exercise that power arbitrarily in the interests of its own national policy and without international consent; or does there continue to exist in the modern wodd a free and unconditional right of peaceful navigation ta he enjoyed by aH countries upon and between the high seas? 109. Israel happens, for certain political reasons, to be the target today of the doctrine which enthrones the rights of the coastal State against the rights of the wodd maritime community. But we might not always he the victim or the target of such an abuse. If, by allowing this precedent to become firm1y established, the Council determines that a coastal State does possess that right, then indeed we elevate countries such as Egypt really to the colossal arbitrary:} )wer of being allowed, as a function of their friendsh. ) or lacl< of friendship with any State, cause, or pôlicy, to decide which countries shall and which countries shall not exercise what has traditionally been one of

The representatives of Israel and Egypt have each made two statements on the issue now before the Coundl, namely, "The Palestine question: complaint by Israel against Egypt ...... My delegation will have a good deal to say about what these two representatives have said. For the time being, I should like to make a few general remarks about what the Israel representative told us at our last meeting. 112. Mr. Eban has spoken. Once again, his voice has roared and echoed within and far beyond the four wans of this Council chamber - and, once again, the walls of Jerkho have not fallen down under the impact of his oratorical blasts. The representative of Israel has been so loqu?..cious these past few days, he and his colleagues have recently made so many statements in Press conferences and through other media of diffusion, they have issued so many Press releases and addressed so many lette1"'s to the President and to the members of this Council, that 1 should have thought, and hoped, that they had little left to tell us. 1 should have throught that Ml"'. Eban would be content to make a concise and sober presentation of his case to ,the Councilthat is, of course, if he has a case at aIl. 113. But such are not the ways of the Israelis. Every occasion is, in the view of the Israelis, an appropriate occasion to let loose the floods of their propaganda machine. Their tactics are weIl known by nOw. These tactics consist of painting sa dark a pichire of their victim as ta make the latter appear as the culprit, tlle aggressor, the lawless and rebellious party. 114. True ta his habits of the past few months, habits for which he 'seems to have acquired a particular liking, Ml"'. Eban has once again used this Council table as a platfonn for the diffusion of his propaganda. 113. Ils cher bien image apparaît rebelle 114. tudes M. comme propagande. 115. on avait le partie habituel vérité, faits. ce sur d'examiner. ration séance, 115. 1 listened to Ml"'. Eban very carefully. As was to he expected, a good deat of what he had to say was irrelevant to the issue before the Couneil. Of course, a considerable portion of his speech contained -- and this, 1 may point out, is customary for Zionist propaganda - distortions, twistings and even concealment of facts. Finally, part of what he said, and this 1 must admit in an fairness to Ml"'. Eban, had a direct bearing on the specific item now before us. In other words, the statement we heard at our 65Sth meeting on 5 Fehruary 1954 from the representative of IsraeJ couId be described as a diatribe consisting of a mixture of truths, half-truths and untruths, so ably enmeshed 117. At ,the 658th meeting of the Security Council, l listened very carefully ta what the Israel representative had ta say. Since that meeting, l have read and re-read Mr. Eban's long dissertation on the Suez Canal. l did sa not in an effort ta find reason and arguments to refute his thesis. This will be a very easy thing ta do; in fact, this has already been done in a most adequate, scholarly and irrefutable manner by Mahmoud Fawzi Bey, the representative of Egypt who so ably presented the Egyptian point of view when the Security Couneil debated this item in the summer of 1951. If l did sa, it was out of cU1"Îosity ta discover the reasons which have prompted the members of this Council ta inscribe this new Israel comp~aint on its agenda. 118. In his long dissertation on international hw and on ,the United Nations Charter, and on ghosts and spirits of armistice agreements, the Israel representative told us nothing new. He repeated the same old arguments, threadbare by now, about the Israel-Egyptian Armistice Agreement and its spirit-the text ta which Egypt affixed her signature being of little importance, it seems, in Ml'. Eban's view; it is the spirit which fascinates him. Ml'. Eban also spoke about the Constantinople Convention of 1888, deliberately omitting any reference ta those articles thereof, particularly' articles X and XII, which furnish irrefutable justification and a sound legal basis for the measures which Egypt has been forced ta adopt in the Suez Canal for its selfpreservation and as a precaution against Israel aggression. 119. The Israel representative aiso submitted ta the Council his views about the Charter of the United Nations and the obligations of the Member States, omitting, of course, aIl l'eference ta those Articles of the Charter which deal with respect for United Nations resolutions. This omission is very understandable. If he had not made it, the representative of Israel would have been indicting himself and his authorities for defiance of the resolutions which the United Nations has passed with respect ta the nearly one million Arab refugees, victims of Israel aggression; with respect to partition; and with respect ta the internationalization 120. In this preliminary statement, my delegation has no intention of entering into the substance of the matter. Our sole purpose in speaking at tms juncture is merely to draw the attention of the members of the Council to the very thin thread on which Israeli acrobaties have placed Israel's case against Egypt. At a later stage in this debate, my delegation will attempt. we hope convineingly and with success, to dissect the Israel thesis and to prove that it does not rest on solid ground. My delegation wi.ll endeavour to disintangle the facts - the true facts, that is - from the web of distortion which Mr. Eban has so artfully spun round them. For ·the time being, suffice it to say that this v. eb, far from stifling the truth, has slùelded it from the mighty onslaught of the Zionist propaganda machine. 121. My delegation will seek in due course to bring this truth out into the open and to put it before the members of this Council in order that the Council may be in a position to become apprised of the full facts of the case and to draw the appropriate conclusion from them. 1 reserve, therefore, the right of my delegation to make a more extensive and comprehensive statement on tlùs subject at a later date. 122. Mr. AZMI (Egypt) (trœnslated frO'l1Z, Frelld~) : It is not my intention to submit a detailed. reply to the Israel representative's statement to the Security Council at the present meeting. That statement was in reality a mere repetition of what the Israel representative has said in earlier speeches, not only at this, but at previous meetings. 1 shall instead limit myself to a few observations on certain ideas which Mr. Eban has just put forward. 122. de taillée à qu'une dit durant antérieures. se d'énoncer 123. qu'il auparavant, déclaration vention pour rien signée - signature 124. sentant suite ,aux le V, emploie confiscation, l'inspection, navires la 125. XI, et canal. Convention qui ne Mais effectuée 123. 1 should like, for example, to comment on ms conception of the 1888 Convention; but first let me note with satisfaction ms statement that he was referring to the 1888 Convention solely from the mstorical point of view. For 50 far as the Egyptian Government is concerne<!, the State of Israel has nothing to do with the 1888 Convention. It was not a signatory to the Convention; at the time when the Convention was signed. it was not yet in existence. 124. The Israel representative referred to article XI of the 1888 Convention. That article follows articles IX and X, which give Egypt the right to make certain exceptions to articles IV, V, VII and VIII, of the Convention, a right wmch Egypt is exercising in making seizures (1 do notsay confiscations, because there have been none), inspections and searches on certain ships passing through the Canal when they arouse the Egyptian Government's suspicions. 125. The representative of Israel quoted article XI, which provided that articles IX and X should not be applied so as to hamper free navigation of the Canal. We do not dispute the fact that under article XI of the Convention of Constantinople the measures taken in the cases specified in article X must not impede the free use of the Canal. But we are firmly convinced that the inspections of ships in transit through the Canal, on their arrivaI at Port Said and Suez. carried out 129. The Israel representative bas told u's that the situation is deteriorating, and in this connexion has suba lrtitted another document, document B, which is also included in document S/3179. I venture to ask why the Israel representative, although he is perfectly well acquainted with the progress of Egyptian legislation and the measures enacted by Egypt with a view to seizure - 1 shall not use the word confiscation, though it is on the tip of my tongue, since that word is not mentioned - did not pursue his resèarches as far as the last few days; fpor the New York press bas pubHshed the most reœnt measure enacted on this subject by the Egyptian Govemment, a measure which in faet constitutes a relaxation of the former restrictions. 130. I am referring to a dispatch from Cairo which reads as follows: "The Egyptian Govemment today announced relaxation of its 'black Hst' regulations on foreïgIl ships sailing ta ports in Isn~l. The Boycott Bureau informed shipping cOlnpanies that merchant vessels would not he blacklisted hereafter for caIHng at Israel ports if they did not touch Arab ports during the same voyage. The restrictions will not apply to cruise and toudst ships, which will he permitted to calI at Israel ar..d Arab ports on the 'same trip. The Bureau also announced it was willing to consider requests to clear ships placed on the black list. The restrictions were imposed as the result of the Palestine war .•. " 132. The Israel representative spoke to us of the isiauds situated at the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba. He alleged that these islands had been suddenly occupied by Egypt. He read out a dec1aration of the Egyptian Government transmitted in a letter addressed to the United States Embassy at Cairo. Those islands were not suddenly occupied; they were occupied, may l point out, in 1906. At that time it had been found necessary to delimit the frontiers between Egypt and the Ottoman Empire. With a view to this delimitation, Egypt, for technical reasons, proceeded to occupy the two islands. The occupation was the subject of discussions, exchanges of views and even letters between the Ottoman Empire and the Khedivial Government of Egypt. Consequently, there was no surprise. The islands have in fact been occupied since 1906, and it is an established fact that from that time on they have been under Egyptian administration. 133. While it is true thaï after relations between Egypt and the Ottoman Empire were broken off these islands became exclusive1y Egyptian, and that another State was able to initiate discussions concerning the occupation of the two islands; the fact is that that State was Saudi Arabia. An agreement was conc1uded between Egypt and Saudi Arabia, confirn1JÎng what l would caU, not the annexation, but the occupation of these islands and, what is more important, the recognition that they form an integral part of the territory of Egypt. 134. The third paragraph of the letter transmitted by the Egyptian Government to the United States Embassy at Cairo ~ the letter which the Israel representative read to us in support of his assertion that Egypt has changed its mind, that its present acts entire1y contrary to its former definite commitmentrefers to international law. But the situation will in fact be dealt with with due respect for the rules of international law. These rules permit seizures and inspections without any qualification - and that is all Egypt is now doing. 135. By dint of insistence and repetition the Israel representative is attempti'ng to give the Security Council the impression that Egypt is abso1utely refusing to respect the Council's decisions. He keeps mentioning measures taken by Egypt which are entire1y contrary to the Security Council's deci'Sion of 1 September 1951. This is, I believe, a misunderstanding which should he cleared. up. Egypt is taking action which is perhaps not in conformity with the Security Council's decision of 1 September 1951; I am prepared to recognize that. But at the same time, I would like to point outand this is the misunderstanding I want to clear up - that when the Security Council's decision was taken, Egypt received it in a certain spirit. That spirit is illustrated in the statement made by the Egyptian repr~sentative who attended the meeting of he Security Council of 1 September 1951, at which this decision "Obviousty it is of no use for me to comment in any further detail upon these various matters, or upon any other points. 1 would simply subnùt that my statements still stand. 1 have tried in them, to the best of my modest ability, ta outline position of my Government, and 1 have fully resen"ed its rights in connexion with the present debate. Apart from that, 1 am going to exercise my freedom of silence." 136. Thus, Egypt accepted the Security Council's decision of 1 September 1951 within the limits of that statement, which made it cIear that Egypt was convinced that the discussion was ended, that in view the question was not cIosed and that the decision did not rest on fixed and final foundations. That was our conviction in Septemher 1951. That is still our conviction, and we accordingly maintain the same viewpoint and the same position. It is therefore beside . the point to state now that Egypt is acting in a manner incompatible with the decision taken by the Security Council on 1 September 1951. Egypt will continue maintain the same position because it is convinced, its representative said at the very moment the decision was, taken, that that decision was not based on exhaustive studies or on clear opinions. 137. MI'. SARPER (Turkey): We have head several important statements this afternoon which thight have sorne bearing on the decision that my delegation will talœ in the future. We might also have to communicate these statements to our Governments. As far 1 am concerned, 1 think that 1 shall have to do this, and ask for instructions. 138. 1 therefore mave that we adjour!1 today's meeting and meet again on Wednesday, 24 February, at 3 p.m. 139. The PRESIDENT: As there is no opposition ta the proposal of the representative of Turkey, shaH take it that the Council agrees with his proposaI. 140. The Council will meet again next Wednesday, 24 February, at 3 p.m. The 'meeting rose at 5.10 p.m.