S/PV.661 Security Council

Before taking up the agenda of our meeting, I consider it a very pleasant duty ta express to our distinguished colleague and friend, Mr. Munro, the representative of New Zealand, our deep a.dmiration for the way in which he has discharged the duties of the President during the previous month when he held the chair. During his term as President of the Security Council, his humane approach to the problems in hand, his competence and authority, and his high sense of principle, have certainly won the respect and gratitude of an of us around this table" Mr. Munro has not only brought a high standard to the conduct of the discussions, but has also guided us with an infinite degree of tact and impartiality. 2. In taking over the chair for this month, 1 wish to assure my colleagues that I will endeavour to do my best to maintain the same standa.rd and to preserve the same spirit. 3. Mr. MUNRO (New Zealand): 1 am greatly honoured by the most generous remarks which the President has made about me in connexion with the discharge of my duties as President of the Security Council during the preceding month. l need hardly assure him that 1 regarded my office as both a privilege and an honour. 1 cannot thank him enough for the very warm terms in which he has addressed me. 2. voudrais efforts mon 3. glais): que cerne de de février. déré honneur. très 4. pa.sser Tribute to Sir Gladwyn Jebb

Before pa.ssing to the consideration of the agenda, I have another pleasant duty

1 shall at once transmit to Sir Gladwyn Jebb the kind remarks just made about him by th President. 1 am sure that he will he deeply toucher' and gratified. 6. Per:laps 1 may be allowed to say h')w deeply the United Kingdom delegation appredates what the President said about our recent master. Adopûon of the age~ma The Palestine question (a) Complaint by Israel against Egypt concerning (i) enforeement by Egypt of restrictions on th., passage of ships wading with Israel through the 8uez Canal, (li) interference hy Egypt with shippin~ proceeding to the Israeli port of Elath on the Gulf of Aqaba (8/3168 aPd Add.l, 8/3179) (continued) At the invitation of the President, Mt'. A3mi, repre- sentative of Egypt, and Mr. Eban, representative of Israel, took places at the Council table. 7. Mr. AZMI (Egypt) (translated f"om French): The dispute which the Israel representative is asking the Couneil ta settle and which constitues item a of the agenda is a most complex matter. It consists of several different but closely-interrelated elements: historical and psychological elements on the one hand, legal, technical and political elements on the other. 8. The resolution adopted by the Security COlincil on 1 September 1951 [S/2322J shows clearly that some of these essential e.lements of the dispute have not been given the full attention which the dispute itself and its important implications deserve. 1 should therefore like to enlighten the Conneil with the knowledge 1 possess not only as a representative of my country but also as an expert in the matter. 1 have been interested in the Palestine question since 1921, and have at aIl times concerned r.lyself with it through aIl its vicissitudes, good and had, as a scholar in :search of truth, as a humanitarian idealist wishing to see peace reign throughout the world and using the measure of politica1 and intellectual prestige 1 enjoyed in the Arab world to make my views known. It is the fruits of this experience as a servant of peace that 1 wish to submit to the Coundl. 9. 1 should like to begin with the psychologîcal and historica1 origins, for without returnW~ t9 them the .cole 11. When the coastal states were conquered by the Arabs, the Jews were very weH treated by the con- querors, no matter where they had taken up residence. On his entry into Jerusalem the second Khalifa, Omar, had signed a protocol conferring upon the Jews all due honours, rights and possessions. Islam considers Moses and Jesus as prophets like Mohammed and places all three on an equal footing. The Bible, the Gospel and the Koran are the three holy books of the three recognized religions. In Andalusia thele was the closest collaboration between Jews and Arabs. That can be proved by manuscripts existing in the various libraries of the world. Jewish authors wrote in Arabie, and Arabie authors in Hebrew. Is it possible to find in the history of mankind an example of a c::mqueror so respectful of the culture of the Jewish people? 12. When the Inquisition was estabHshed in Spain, Bajazet, Sultan of Constantinople and sovereign of the Moslems, flung wide the doors of the Ottoman Empire; the Jews were admitted and took up their residence in full enjoyment of all rights. 13. Then Zionism arose. It represented itself as folIowing two aims: to shelter the poor and persecuted, and ta re-establish the homeland of Israel. Moslems and Arabs were deeply sensible of the atrocities com- mitted against the Jews, but greeted with anxiety the idea of the homeland of Israel, whieh must obviously he established at the priee of the dismemberment of Arab lands. Patriotic feeling was aroused and the will ta preserve the national territory stiffened. The first World War broke up the Ottoman Empire. The Treaty of Versailles established tbe mandates system. Syria and Lebanon were placed under French mandate; Palestine, Transjordan and Iraq under British. Since the mandate was nothing but a modern form of coloniza- tian, ~he non-self-governing countries joined together in the battle. Egypt, which had till that time considered itself a Mediterranean country looking to the north-east, felt for the sufferings of its brothers of the east. The new orientation in the Near East gave rise to liberation and independence. 14. The British Mandate for Palestine was complicated by the Balfour Declaration on the Jewish "National Home". Although drafted in equivocal terms, the fact that it was calIed after a British minister made it suspect in every way. AlI the Arab countries regarded it as the second sign of the plan of attack against the Arabs, the first having been the emergence of Zionism. 15. Sorne time later the Zionist leader, Dr. Weizmann, though a moderate, made a statement in which he announced that the Zionists were in Palestine to protect the Suez Canal against its recovery by Egypt. That was the last straw. To the tW0 attributes of Zionism- asylum for the persecuted and re-establishment of the happ~ned - the British soldiers, who had been harassed by the Stern gang and the Haganah, surrendered Haifa to them and left them arms and ammunition. 18. Then began the advance on the Arab villagesl in which the worst atrocities were committed. The exodus took place and the refugees increased in number. A campaign of reprisaI to restore order was started by Egypt and the.other Arab countries. The campaign of liberation would'have been successful if the truce had not been imposed by the Security Council. On the con- clusion of that truce a real war broke out and was followed by the Armistice Agreements signed at Rhodes and elsewhere. Hardly had the Armistice been signed before violations startedl and they have continued to the present day. In order not to waste the Councills time l shall refer only to a few of these violationsl committed since 19511 the year in which the Council's resolution was adoptedl as they have been noted and reported by United Nations observers in Palestine. Since they have no connexion with the item b on the agendal l shall arrange for distribution to Council mem- bers of a detailed list of these violations, illustrated with photographs. I would ask the President to arrangel if possiblel for the inclusion of this document in the records of t..~e Security CounciI. 1 19. On 19 September 1951 Israel forces subjected four, points in the Gaza area to mortar fire; on· 19 October 1951 Israel forces blew up the only ice plant <w"cLiIable to all the hospitals in the area; on 7 January 1952 the Israel forces crossed the demarcation line in the Maghazi area and committed atrocities agaiust the Bedouins at Hanagra; on 30 March 1952 Israel forces crossed the demarcation line in the Khan Yunis area and brutally slew two young boys under their father's very eyes; on 12 April 1952 Israel forces crossed the demarcation line in the Beit Hanun areal where they committed atrocities, in particular kiIling an Arab and then savagely mutilating the body; on 12 August 1952 Israel forces crossed the demarcation line near Gaza and killed an Egyptian soldier on patroI duty; on 23 January 1953 Israel soldiers crossed the demarcatio:il line in the Maghazi area and brutally murdered in their sleep a whole family of five persons and then blew up the house; on 29 August 1953 a party of 30 Israel soldiers crossed the demarcation Hne and attacked a refugee camp at El Boreig, killing 20 people and injuring 29. The Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, protested to the Secretary-General and to the Government of Israel against that attack. 20. As 1 have said, this Hst of facts is but a short abstract from the more detailed document which 1 have 1 This document was later distributed under the symbol 8/3186. 22. Need 1 iay, after this statement, that the poHtical situé.tion in the Near East is in no way confused? !ts psychological and historical elements show clearly and unmistakably that the spirit of ag~ression is on the side of Israel, and that Egypt, by resorting to the measures which it is applying in the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba, is only exercising its right of self-defence. Egypt resorted to those measures only when disquieted by the numerous violations committed by Israel and by me aggressive spirit dominating Israel's private and public life. If discontinuance of those measures is desired, those violations and attacks by Israel will have to be stopped and formaI guarantees will have to be provided against a return to them. That is one of the tasks to which the Security Council will have to attend if it wishes to get to grips with the events which are threatening peace and stability in that part of the Middle East. 23. That, however, will be a difficult task, and the difficulty is due to the behaviour of Israel. Have we not jU&t read in The New York Times of 27 February last that the Israel newspaper Ma'ariv is asking the Israel Government to occupy the Gaza sector, which is under Egyptian administration, and advance inta the heart of Egypt as far as the Suez Canal, right across the Sinai Peninsula? Did not the same issue of the same news- paper report that the right wing of the Freedom Party in Israel- formerly the Jrgun Zvai Leumi terrorist movement - was appealing to the Israel people to seize an historie opportunity to liberate the occupied 25. The height of megalomania \Vas the statement made - according to The New York Times of 4 March 1954 - actually in the Israel Parliament by a deputy who used ta be a terrorist commander, advocating that the Israel air forces should intervene ta c!estroy the Egyptian military forces controlling the two islands in the Gulf of _\qaba. It is also true, as l read recently, that the Israel President of the Couneil and Minister of Foreign Affairs stated in the Chamber itself that that advke given by a number of deputies would not be followed; but the incident is nevertheless a proof of the state of mind which prevails in the Israel Parliament. 26. After aIl that, it is absurd ta claim that the Egyptians are the aggressors and that Israel is the guardian of a cherished peace! 27. . We are told, however, that these measures, though necessary for legitimate self-defence, are contrary to the rules of internationallaw. They are called a blockade, and blockades are prohibited. 28. What is the nature of these measures? The Israel representative has circulated among members oÏ the Council the text of the Egyptian decrees in which the measures are enumerated. WeIl, those decrees speak only of visits, searches and possibly, where appropriate, of captures. There has never been any confusion in international law of the distinction between blockade and the right of visit, search and capture. 29. Blockade is siege of the enemy's coasts, a fact confirmed in the following definition of blockade according to the doctrine and practice of international law: "Blockade is the interception by sea of the approaches to the coasts or ports of an enemy with the purpose of cutting off aIl his overseas communications. Its object is not only to stop the importation of supplies but to prevent export as weIl" (page 539, The Inter- national Law of the Sea, by C. John Colombos, Queen's Counsel, Professor at The Hague Academy of Inter- national Law, Chairman of the Admiralty and Prize Law Section of the Internati.:>nal Law Association, and Associate of the lnstitute of International Law). .> 30. For the meaning of the right of visit and search, two great judges, one the English judge, Lord Stowell, and the other the American, Chief Justice Marshall, 31. These two statements, which epitomize United States and British doctrine and jurisprudence, and which formulate more generaay the principles of inter- national law on this question, show that the right of visit and search, though based on the more general right of capture, is an independent procedure whereby a belligerent defends himself by preventing any increase in his enemy's military resources: the right of visit and search is itself based on the legitimate principle stated by the American author Kent, who sums up the matter in the words: "The dutY of self-preservation gives to belligerent nations this right". 32. The right of visit and search may be exercised by warships or by customs authorities. It may be exercised on the high seas or in the territorial waters of the enemy and, of course, in the territorial waters and ports of the State exercislng the rîght. 33. The foregoing definitions, which are based on un- chaIIengeable prindples and customs of international law, bring out the evident differences between blockade and the right of visit and search, the former being the siege of the enemy's shores by a sufficient nurnber of warships to make the blockade effective, the latter merely a measure of conservation designed to prevent the smuggling of certain goods, which may be applied even by the customs authorities in the territorial waters of the country exercising the rights. 34. International law has always maintained a distinc- tion between contraband and blockade. In this connexion C. John Colombos states: "In the case of contraband, only such goods as are incIuded on the contraband lists and intended to be imported iuto the enemy territory are liable to seizure and condemnation, but when once a blockade of any portion of the enemy's coast, or of any of his ports, has been declared, aIl merchant ships and cargoes, of whatever description and of whatever nationality they may be, which are attempting. to enter or to leave the blockaded area, are subject tG confiscation. The nature of the cargo on board such ships is .irrelevant; it is solely the fact that the. ship is endeavouring to enter or leave a blockaded port or coast that is material. Access to the blockaded area is prohibited to aIl warships and merchant vessels." 35. The procedure followed by the Egyptian author- ities is one regarded in internationallaw as appropriate for the exercise of the right of visit and search. Respon- sibility for its enforcement is entrusted to the customs authorities in Egyptian ports1 to ensure that Israel's 38. To reply to these arguments it is approprlate to invoke certain principles of law and to elucidate certain facts. An armed conflict had taken place hl Palestine between Egypt, which was defending the legit!::.iate cause of the Palestine Arabs, and Israel, which was invading a territory belonging to the Arab people. No one has ever denied the existence of military operations between organized armies; the belligerents have acted as nations at war. The two sides have taken the steps appropriate to a state of war by promulgating laws which could not be justified in peace time. Ever since its resolution of 29 May 1948 [Sj801] the Security Council itself has been speaking of an armed conflict and warfare, and it has acted on that footing in accordwct:' with Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Moreover, the late Count Folke Bernadotte clearly indicated in his report to the Security Council of 10 July 1948 [Sj888] that there existed astate of war. 39. Does this armed conflict become something different because no specific declaration of war· has been made? Anglo-Saxon doctrine has long held that the formality of dedaring war was purely optional. In this connexion it is useful to cite a decision of the High Court of England (King's Bench Division) of 26 May 1938, confirmed by the Court of Appeal on 2 March 1939, concerning the existence in 1937 of a state of war between Japan and China, a war which was never declared and did not even result in a breach of diplomatie relations between the two countries. The court had even received a letter from the office of the British Prime Minister stating: "1 am directed by Mr. Neville Chamberlain to inform you that the current situation in China is indeterminate and anomalous, and His Majesty's Govertlment are not at present prepared to say that in their view a state of war exists". Despite this letter, and although Sir Stafford Cripps had argued for the appellants that the Court should not place the British Government in an embarrassing position, Sir Wilfred Greene, a judge of the Court of Appeal, said without hesitation: "If the English Courts had endeavoured in ancient days to lay down such a defini- tion (of war), no doubt one of the things which in those days they would have regarded as essential to war was a d@claration of war. Nobody would have the temerity to suggest in these days that war cannot exist without a declaration of war". Anglo-Saxon case law has constantly affirmed this principle of the existence of a state of war even in the absence of any declaration by one of the belligerents. Similarly, in Kotzias v. Tyser the King's Bench Division held as foUows: "The authorities show that, in the absence of any specifie statutory or contractual provision to the contrary, the general rule of internationallaw is that, between civilized Powers who have been at war, peace is not concluded until a treaty of peace is finaUy binding upon the belligerents, and that stage is not 45. It is clear from the foregoing that an armistice does not end a war, since it is recognizen that astate of \Var does not end until a peace treaty has been ratified. The judicial decisions which I have just men- tioned constitute incontestable authority in support of what I have just put fOl·ward. 46. I think, however, that ta dispose of this point completely it might be helpflll if I said a little more on this problem of the armistice, which is one of the basic questions of this debate. 47. An armistice is a provisional, suspension of hostilities formally agreed upon between belligerènts. Usually it represents a stage in ending the war, and is therefore in the nature of a mixed act, the complexity of which has been constantly recognized by international law bath in doctrine and in jurisprudence. An armistice, an agreement between belligerents, has never been .l:Onsidered as putting an end to a state of war or as creating a state of peace, even that type of armistice agreements which have come '~o be known as "capit- ulation armistices", where obviously no likelihood of further recourse to arms exists, for example the 1871 and 1918 armistices with Germany.· 48. In dealing \Vith the legal aspects of our problem, 1 do not wish to refer here to the statements of military men like Marshal Foch or men of peace like President Wjlson; I shaH simply have recourse to the precepts of international jurisprudence and doctrine. 49. An armistice does not put an end to a state of war; that has always been recognized in international law. The Supreme Court of Michigan in the case of Palmer v. Pokorny ruled in 1922 "that armistice does not end war but merely terminates hostilities". These principles have been stated repeatedly by the courts of the United States. In the case of Patrick T. Dooley v. James Harvey, the District Court of Appeal of California ruled in 1933 as follo\Vs: "We are of the opinion that the weight of authority upholds the contention that the s; id war did not terminate at the date of the armistice, but continued uritil peace was declared on July 2, 1?21." 50. These judicial decisions provide incontestable proof that an armistice does not establish a state of peace, does not conclude a state of war, and that con- sequently aIl acts permitted to belligerents continue to he permitted during the armistice, save in the excep- tional cases covcred by a specific provision of the armistice agreement. These decisions indicate also that the countries signatories to an armistice agreement retain the right of visit, search and confiscation until they have by common consent declared the exercise of this right illegal during the armistice period. Never- theless, we consider it appropriate to refer once more to international doctrine and jurisprudence, to see if the 52. Professor C. John Colombos in this connexion refers to the American writer, Kent, who, with regard to the right of visit and search, says: "The duty of self- preservation gives ta belligerent nations this right." In his book, The I1lternatio1Jal Law of the Sea, Professor Colombos continues, on page 578: "So long as a state of war lasts, 50 long may belligerents continue to exercise the right of search. An armistice does not terminate a war, and during its existence, in the absence of any special provisions ta the contrary, neutrals must continue ta refrain from doing any act which they are not entitled ta do during the continuance of hostilities." 52. The duties of neutrals are 50 clearly defined in internationallaw and in maritime matters that there can be no doubt that it is their dutY not ta oppose the exercise of the right of visit and search by States signatories to an armistice agreement within the limits established by international law. Professor Pearce Higgins of the University of Cambridge, formerly legal adviso!' ta the British Admiralty, writes in the Recueil des cou,rs de l'Aca,démie de droit international (Vol. n, 1926) : "An armistice does not put an end ta a state of war, and while it is in force, and in the absence of any specific provision ta the contrary, neutrals must continue to refrain from doing any act which they were not entiled to do during the continuance of hostilities. Ta argue against this would be ta en- courage neutrals ta furnish assistance to belligerents. It is expressly provided in the German regulations on naval prizes that the right of capture, which implies that of visit, is suspended during the armistice only when there is an express agreement ta that effect. Neutral vessels have been condemned by both French and British prize courts for rendering assistance ta the Germans during the armistice of 11 November 1918." 53. Since the second World War, these principles, whereby belligerents may exercise the right of visit and search after the cessation of active hostilities, have been reaffirmed. Despite the absence of any reference in the German act of capitulation of 7 May 1945 to the exercise of the right of capture, the United Kingdom eaptured many German vessels after that date and the captures were allowed by the prize-courts. 54. We have heard the representative of Israel refer more than once to the special nature of the General Armistice Agreement concluded on 24 February 1949. He has even promised ta make a detailed study of the subject. May 1 point out that that agreement has already been studied by experts on international law, Jho, for ~ot omit aU provisions concerning those essential ques- tions the solution of which is the very backbone of any peace treaty concerning the problems which brought about war in the Near East? However, the replies to all those questions are in no way equivocal and unques- tionably ~ndicate that this Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel is only an armistice agreement, and an agreement which I may venture to describe as an unenterprising one, since it does not provide the pre- liminary basis for a peace. Although aU that is obvious, I am nevertheless inclined to deal firmly with the argu- ment that this Armistice Agreement has a character sui generis. 56. 1t would be a mistake to believe that this Armistice Agreement, becaùse,it was concluded under the pressure of a third party, the United Nations, and in the presence of representatives of that third party, ceases to be a normal armistice and, under the magic wand of the representatives to whom I have referred, becomes a peace treaty in despite of aU the principles established in the course of centuries by the civilized international community. 57. At the beginning of my remarks I pointed out that nv proposition can he so 10gicaUy or firmly established as one established in the light of the teaching of history. The teaching of diplomatic and military history tells us that the intervention of a third party in the preparation and signature of an armistice agreement is a circum- stance which is not only normal but which is also inevitable during periods when an armed conflict con- cerns not the belligerents alone but also neutrals. . 58.' For an example of intervention by an interna- tional organization and the presence of its represen- tatives when an armistice agreement is prepared and signed, it will be enough for me to refer here to the well-known casé of the Sino-Japanese conflict of 1932. The armistice of 5 May 1932 which put an end to that conflict was concluded on the initiative of the League of Nations. On 17 March 1932 the Committee of Fifteen of the League of Nations Assembly issued a statement with a view to putting an end to the conflict. After this declaration, an armistice conference was convened at Shang:':J.ai on 24 March 1932, in which the British consul and a representative of the Minister of France partici- pated together with the Chinese and Japanese military de1egates. The Armistice Agreement was drafted on the basis of a text prepared by the British Minister to China, Sir Miles Lampson, and was signed in the presence of the Ministers of the United States, Great Britain and Haly. 59. Accordingly, the presence or participation of the United Nations in the conclusion of the Armistice between Egypt and Israel is not enough to transform it into an armistice sui generis deserving the publication of weighty tomes. 60. Let us look elsewhere. It may he true that certain speeches have declared that this armistice represents a step towards peace. The history of diplomacy teaches us that the exist~nce in an armistice agreement of certain political or even economic provisions does not deprive if cf its nature as a convention between belligerents governed by the international law relating ta war. 63. 1 should not like to leave this point concerning the Armistice Agreement concluded between Egypt and Israel without drawing the Council's attention to the following facts. During the first truce imposed by the Security Council on 29 May 1948, the United States Embassyat Cairo, in an aide-mémoiru of 12 June 1948 to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, asked whether merchant ships, including United States ships, pro- ceeding to Palestine would continue to be visited in Egyptian ports despite that truce, which entered into force on Friday, 11 June 1948, at 6 a.m. The Egyptian Minister replied without hesitation that the visiting of merchant ships and the seizure of articles considered to be war contraband were to be continued, as they were legitimate acts. 64. The question of the existence of Egypt's right of visit and of search was therefore raised even before the armistice negotiations were started. The fact that the Armistice Agreement is silent on this point, a!though it is fairly common practice to include a provision on this subject in armistice agreements, shows, as indeed the Mixed Armistice commission has confirmed, that the armistice agreement of classical type concluded between Egypt and Israel expressed the joint will of the signatories and left them free to exercise their legitimate right of visit and search. 65. The Israel representative contends that Egypt's attitude is contrary to the provisions of the United Nations Charter. The psychological and historical factors to which 1 referred at the beginning of my "ech show that the Arab nations were threatened and ., ere obliged to defend themselves. The legal :;I.rguments which 1 subsequently put forward prove that the right of visit and search, the aftermath of any armed struggle, is only a legitimate right exercised moderately by Egypt within its own territory and its own territorial waters by virtue of its undeniable rights as a sovereign State. Can it be said that the United Nations Charter forbids Member States to use their right of sovereignty, and de~end Member States against aggression; and the Security Council's jurisdiction has been defined in such a way as ta enable it ta determine who is the aggressor and to intervene in order ta re-establish the peace broken by the aggression. 70. In establishing the collective security system the Charter formulates these two principles: first, member States are entitled to exercise the right of self-defence individually and collectively; and secondly, the indi- vidual or collective right of self-defence may not be overriden in favour of the Security Couneil €Xcept in so far as the States concerned are sa weIl protected by the resources available ta the Security Council that the abandonment of their right of self-defence will not harm them. 71. It will now be useful to consider in the light of these principles the problem which Israel presents for the Council. The Security Council has never described as aggressors the Arabs defending their existence. It has always thought fit ta reiterate that its resolutions can in no way affect the rights in issue. 72. The Covenant of the Arab League concluded in 1945 imposes upon the member States certain obliga- tions with a view to safeguarding peace and collective security in that area. No one has failed to note the similarity between that covenant and the Act of Chapultepec. The records of the preparatory work on the Charter at San Francisco show that at the time when Article 51, recognizing the natural right of self- defence, was being discussed, the right of regional 79. These three articles, indeed, provide more than one application, more than one example,of the unques- tionable right of·Egypt, the territorial sovereign recog- nized by the 1888 Convention, to take aIl necessary measures to secure by its own forces, the defence of its territory and the maintenance of public order and to ensure the observance and implementation of the convention. 80. So as to le~~e no doubts with regard to the rights guaranteed to Egypt by the 1888 Convention, allow me to quote. article X, ta which 1 have just referred.The firstparagraph is worded as follows: "Similarly, the provisions of Articles IV,V, VII, and VIII, shaIl not interfere with the measures which His Majesty the Sultan and His Highness the Khedive, in the name of His Imperial Majesty, and within the limits of the Firmans granted, might find it necessary to take for securing by their own forces the defence of Egypt and the maintenance of public order." 81. But the specific purpose of the inspection measures decreed on 15 May 1948 was precisely to ensure ~e defence of Egypt and the maintenance of public order. This was the purpose, in the full and legitimate exercise of hs es~ential right of conservation recognized by th~ Conventton of 1888, for which the two proclamations Nos. 5 and .13 of 15 and 18 May 1948 were promulgated, together wlth the other measures setting up a system of inspection of ships in Egyptian ports in order to prevent the passage of war contraband intended for Israel and to prevent Egyptian territory from consti- tuting a bridge over which wat material could pass so that Israel might resume it8 armed aggression at any time.· . 82. By virtue of these 'provisions of the 1888 Conven- tion ~gypt, which is a territo"rial Power, therefore has the nght to take all useful measures in the canal to ensure the defence of the country and public order. The measures, as provided by article X, may include the assemblage of troops on either bank of the 'canal not- withstanding article VIII of the convention; the main- tenance in the canal waters of vessels of war, notwith- standing article VII; the· maintenance of troops .and the accumulation of war materiel at any poirit what- soever of the canal and its points of access,. notwith- standing article V; and the exercise in the canal and in itsports of access of certain rights of war,notwith- standing article IV. . 83. These Egyptian rights, expressly mentioned in the 1888 Convention, were bound to increase as Egypt developed its international status after the conclusion of the convention. As the political ties with Turkey have come to an end, there remains but one territorial sovereign to whom aU the rights recognized by the 1888 Convention revert, namely Egypt. 84. The representative of Israel expressed certain doubts the other day [659th meeting] on th~ autbority "In the same cases, the erection of permanent fortifications contrary to the provisions of Article VIII is prohibited." 1 believe he wanted to cite the provisions of the first sentence in order to a11ege that what is conceded to Egypt in article X is denied by article XI; but we can certainly not impute such logic to the eminent draftsmen of the 1888 Convention. It is scarcely conceivable that provisions of an international instrument should he mutua11y contradictory. . 85. The consistent interpre~ation of the 1888 Conven- tion - the sole interpretation, since it is the only one which usefu11y reflects the intentions of the parties- should be based on the historie fact that the 1888 Convention enacts the principle of freedom of passage without in any way proclaiming the neutrality of Egypt or of any part of its territory, and that it concedes to Egypt the full exercise of sovereign rights in the Suez Canal. 86. The measures taken under Egypt's authority in the Suez Canal during the last tw~ world wars merely affirm Egypt's rights as territorial sovereign of the Suez Canal. 87. Article XI indicates that the territorial sovereign must, in exercising his right of t'onservation, respect the right of free passage through the canal. Egypt is conscious of its responsibility and firmly convinced that the visiting by the Egyptian authorities of ships passing through the canal, on arrivaI at Port Said and Suez, in order to haIt contraband traffic cannot be regarded as prejudicing free passage through the canal, and therefore as contrary to the Convention of Constan- tinople of 1888. 88. 1 venture to recall certain very relevant facts. Since the Security Council adopted its resolution of 1 September 1951, no ship or cargo has been confiscated by Egypt. 89. Further, 1 should like to state that since that date, 1 September 1951, only 55 suspected ships have been suhjected to the inspection procedure out of 32,047 ships passing through the Suez Canal. 90. Again, the monthly statistics published by the Suez Maritime Canal Universal Company on the number of ships and the company's income categorically give the lie to any a11egations to the effect that Egypt is preventing free passage through the canal, for they show a continuous increase in the numher of ships passing through the canal and an increase in the company's income. 92. It is appropriate to mention, furthermoret that the Convention of Constantinople, which established the particùlar law governing the matter and confirmed the rights of the territorial State as established by general international law, is one of those international agree- ments and treaties which, although they have their own machinery for correcting any situation, undeniably co-exist. with the United Nations Charter. Egypt has respected this convention and does not agree to sacrifice the attributes of sovereignty or to abandon the rights given to it thereby. 93. The Israel rep!~sentative thinks that he is bringing a new element into the present conflict when he speaks of the Gulf of Aqaba and the measures taken by Egypt at its entrance. These measures were put into force weIl before 1951, when Israel brought the dispute before the Security Council, b'Jt were not mentioned in the complaint which was made at that time. In 1954, how- ever, now that the measures taken by Egypt have been much relaxed, Israel is trying to blacken the situation by complaining about restriction of trade. The Israel representative is therefore giving us an opportunity to clarify the status of this further part of Egyptian terri- tory, which consists of two islands and the straits separating them from ~ or better, joining them to- the Sinai Peninsula. . . 94. The Gulf of Aqaba has two entrances, one formed by the Tiran Straits between Tiran Island and the Sinai coast, and the other, which is less easily navigable, between the Tiran and Sinafir Islands on ~ne side and the Saudi-Arabian coast on the other. 95. On the Sinai coast Egypt has had to set up, beside the customs station, other installations intended chiefly for ordinary duty in connexion not only with the defence of Egypt against the threats cited in my statement, but also withthe necessary prevention ,:)f illegal traffic in narcotics. 96. It is perhaps unnecessary to continue to prove by reference to history and the incontestable principles of international law, that Egypt, in exercising the right of .Jisit and search in the Strait of Tiran, is carrying out those measures in its territorial waters. Since it is not the purpose. of our debate to establish the status of those waters, l shall confine myself to stating very briefly to the Council the principles of internationallaw with respect to territorial waters. 97. The term "territorial waters" is used to designate that part of the sea inc1uded within a line running parallel to the coast and at a certain. distance from it, a distance traditionally f.xed at three nautical miles, the measurements to be taken at low tide. Notwith- standing the principle of freedom of the seas, these terri- torial waters are universa1ly considered as an extension of the territory of the coastal State over which the national jurisdiction of that State i5 unanimously recog- nized. The reasons for that recognition are historical, economic, politica1 and military. The economic interests of the coastal State and its right alone to enjoy the products of the sea and of the economiç f!.n4 pnancial 102. Furthermore, the attitude of Egypt in that con- nexion has been cIearly established by an exchange of letters between the United Kingdom Embassy in Cairo and the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In view of their importance, l hope l shaH be permitted to read the full text of those letters. First, l shall read the letter from the United Kingdom Embassy: "29 July 1951 "1 am authorized to inform Your Excellency that . His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are ready to agree to the following arrangement in regard to British vessels other thall naval or military craft sailing direct from Suez or Adabia to Aqaba. The Egyptian customs authorities at·Suez or Adabia, after searching and issuing clearance for such vessels, will immediate1y inform the Egyptian naval author- ities at Tiran Island so as to preclude any necessity for the latter to make a further visit and search of the vessels in question. On the othE.r hand aIl British vessels will of course comply with normal practice when passing through Egyptian territorial waters. l would be grateful if Your Excellency wouïd be good enough to confirm the acceptance by the Egyptian Government of the above-mentioned arrangement. "Signed: Ralph Skrine STEVENSON" "Signed: Mohamed SALAH ELDIN "Minister of Foreign Affairs" Could, there be a clearer recognition of Egypt's rights of visit and search? Could there be a more formaI acceptance of the correctness of the Egyptian attitude? 103. l now reach my concl.lsion, and l apologize for having spoken at such length. But do l really need to state a conclusion? Is. not my statement sufficiently con- clusive in itself to prove that Egypt, in aIl the measures to which it is resorting in the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba, is only exercising its sovereign rights, which are supported by eminent authorities in doctrine and by final decisions of jurisprudence? 104. Egypt is convinced that it is not pressing nearly to their full extent the measures which it is authorized by law to take. On the contrary, from ti~e to time it pauses in order to relax its measures and ta apply only the strict minimum required for protecting its security. 105. At the meeting held on 15 February last [659th meeting], in my first reply to the Israel represen- tative's observations, l informed the Security Council of a; dedsion made by the Egyptian Government to relax the restrictions applying to vessels proceeding directly to Israel ports without stopping at Arab ports. The Egyptian Government has also decided not to apply these measures to tourist vessels, even if they stop at bath Israel and Arab ports. Finally, the Egyptian Government has announced its readiness to reconsider with the steamship companies concerned its blacklist of "undesirable" vessels. 106. Egypt has resorted to these measures - which, incidentally, it seizes every opportunity to alleviate- merely because it has been forced to do so by the threat of aggression represented by the presence of Israel, and by Israel's persistence in pursuing the dreamt"d-of ex- pansionist policy. Once more, Egypt's present and future position is purely one of self-defence. 107. Israel's aggression complex is the factor to which attention must be directed; and the situation cannot be dealt with by resolutions like that of 1 September 1951. The Council should recover its judgment and find some other means of dealing with the situation in accordance witn an the historical, psychological, legal and political considerations which l have advanced in this' statement. 108. The Israel representative refers to sanctions. He even goes sa far as to assert that the Council ought to take a decision affecting, not essentially the f"~:;lsures adopted by 'Egypt, but especially and above , '1 the competence of the Egyptian legislature to enact legisla- tion. 112. Since Egypt's attitude is an answer to the attitude of ISl.'ae1, you can ask Egypt to stop the measures it has adopted against Israel only after you have appealed ta Israel to remove the grounds for Egypt's fears. 113. You must have observed, in the course of the contacts with which you have honoured othe Egyptian representative, the complete goodwill of Egypt and aU Îts efforts to prepare the ground for a reasonable solu- tion. Egypt will maintain the same attitude throughout the <;ouneil's considerati~m of the questionbefore it, trusting that your resolutlOn will restore matters to their proper situation. 114: Egypt vehemently rejects aIl charges of contra- ventng any of the prineiples of interna,tional law the provisions of the United Nations Charter, the Armistice Agreements with Israel, or the articles of the 1888 Con- vention establishing freedom of navigation in the Suez Canal. Conseious of its sovereign rights, it will use aU means ta see that they are safeguarded and respected.

It will, l think, not be necessary for me to address the Security Couneil at any great length or in any detail. l frankly do not believe that any address that l could make ta the Couneil would strengthen the case which we have submitted to it more convineingly than the long observations to which we have just listened. 116. The Security Councii meets once again in a mood of great expectancy, hoping to hear of Egypt's abandon- ~ent of 'belligerency and of the suspension of illicit maritime restrictions, in compliance with a decision of the Security Couneil pursuant to the Armistice Agreement, o.nly to come and !lear a reiteration, with varying tactical undertones, of the precise position which the Security Council critieized and denounced in 1951. It is impossible ta discem in the address of the representative 121. In point of fact, searching desperately at an earlier stage of our proceedings for sorne material with which to prove alleged Israel violations of the Armistice Agreement their hands fell on nothing at aIl except a complaint so spurious and implausible that no material 119. With those exceptions we have heard a very detailed and learned repetition of the juridical and legal theories of Egyptian sovereignty and of alleged rights of beIIigerency and visit, search and seizure, identical in every respect with those which the Security Council has already rejected. , 120. l should like to summarize the precise situation in which the Security Councilfinds itself in a conflict of policy, not between Egypt and Israel, but between Egyptian national policy and the opinion of mankind as reflected in the Security Council's own resolution, on the. very issue which now lies on the Council table. Before doing so, however, l should like to comment briefly on certain extraneous material of a somewhat vehement and intransigent character which was introduced into the first part of the Egyptian representative's address. l do not believe that it is pràper or relevant for the Security Council now ta examine other armistice complaints than those which now lie upon its table. l cannot, however, let the record ,be silent, and l therefore must comprehensive1y deny both the relevance and the ·truth of the account which the representative of Egypt has given of the recent history of the Egyptian- Israel Armistice Agreement. His account bears no resemblance whatever either to facts of to official records of those facts which the Security Council has received from authentic United Nations sources. l doubt whether the Egyptian delegation can believe that account seriously, or else they theniselves would have brought complaints to the Security Council on the basis of these specifie violations which they now unilaterallyallege. w~atever has been brought forward to justify it, not- ~lthstanding the urgency with which it was original!y 111voked. Similar1y, l do not feel called upon to deny in 122. Then: w'Zre other digressions of a less substantive character. It is apparently true that Dr. Azmi reads our more sensational tabloid newspapers more carefully than l have the time to do. There are countries in which newspapers can write sense or nonsense exactly as they please, and of course the Israel Government's policy in favour of preserving the integrity of the Armistice Agreement is dictated not by the popular Press but by the pronouncements of its Government representatives, and therefore l welcome the tribute which the representative of Egypt appeared to pay to the sagaeity and moderation of my Foreign Minister and Minister of Defence in their capaeity to resist irresponsible counsels. 123. l should, however, like to turn to tlIe more substantive issue which the Security Couneil has upon its table. l believe that the key to an understanding of this problem is ta understand it not in the strict sense as an Egyptian-Israel conflict but as a conflict between the opinion of the Security Couneil and the polieies of hostilït,Y to ,Israel to which the Government of Egypt, unhappily, continues to adhere. The first element in that conflict between the Security Couneil and Egypt is this: on 1 September 1951, after a long and exhaustive political and juridical examination of this question, the Security Couneil, pursuant to its functions in support of the Israel-Egyptian Armistice Agreement, called upon Egypt to terminate the restrictions on the passage of international commereial shipping and goods through the Suez Canal, wherever bound, and to cease aIl interference with such shipping beyond that essential to the safety of shipping in the Canal itself and to the observance of the international conventions in force. 124. What we have today learned from the representative of Egypt is that these restrictions which the Security Couneil called upon his Government to terminate are in force and will remain in force,that Egypt does not agree that the maintenance of those restrictions goes beyond its legitimate international rights, that it will continue to rtlaintain the application of those restrictions and to vary them, if at aIl, at the discretion of Egyptian national policy, sometimes to aggravate, sometimes, for technica:l reasons, ta alleviate, but in no eircumstances at aIl to question the basic legal position upon which these illicit restrictions rest. 125. Secondly, the Security Couneil, in its resolution on 1 September 1951, discussed the question whether the Egyptian Government, in justification of these restrictions, can have legitimate recourse ta the doctrine of belligerent rights. The Security CounCÎ'1 determined that neither party under the armistice regime can reasonably assert that it is actively a belligerent orrequires to exereise the right of visit, search and seizure for any 126. In connexion with the Egyptian intention to maintain the exereise of active belligerency, and especia1ly the exercise of visit, search and seizure, we have heard in an aggravated forro this afternoonmoreassertively, in more detail and with more defiance than ever before - of Egypt's intention to apply its legislation both in the Suez Canal and in the Gulf of Aqaba. We have heard the. extraordinary legal contention that a country possesses exactly the same rights in an international waterway common to many coastal States as it possesses in waters which are uniquely its own territorial waters. 127. l am not an international ,lawyer - and, having heard and read Dr. Azmi's address, l am quite convinced that he is not either - but l believe that anyone who has studied the jurisprudence of this case cannot he ignorant of the responsibilities which coastal States have in aIl cases where a narrow waterway is the only accessible channel looking out onto or joining two parts of the high seas. International law in this respect is quite cl~r, and, even if it were not clear by reference tu previous authorities, it would become dear in our present case by reference to paragraph 5 of the Security Couneil resolution of 1 September 1951. 128. The .Egyptian representative agrees with me in at least one respect. If l understand his address correctly, he asserts that Egypt has precisely the same ·right to exereise visit, search and seizure in the Gulf of Aqaba as it has in ti .~ Suez Ca.'lal. He asserts that the .}egal principles which are valid for one case are valid for another. He states-and, indeed,theEgyptian legislation makes it dear -that the actual practice of visit, search and seizure is carried outby the Govemment of Egypt as a general principle of maritime policy.• based on certain instruments of legislation which have equal and identical effect as regards the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba. Well, l agree with him entirely that Egypt has exactly the same r~~ht to exereice visit, search and seizure in the Gnlf of Aqaba as it has in the Suez Canal. That is to say, if it is true - as it is troe for the Security Couneil- ,that Egypt has no right ta exercise visit, search and seizure in the Suez Canal, then it has no right to exercise visit, search and seizure in the Gulf of Aqaba, or indeed in any waters whatsoever. This, l submit, is the only interpretation of the spedfic provisions of paragraph 5 of the Security Council resolution of 1 September 1951, which is a genera'1 denial to either party of the rights of belligerency - and especially of the rights of visit, search and seizure - in any waters. The language of that paragraph - which the representative of France, at the time of the adoption of the reso- By reason of that statement and of the general character of its formulation, the issue 'before the Councilas I pointed out on a previous occasion - is not the status of any particular waterway, but the status of the Egyptian-Israel Armistice Agreement. 129. There are two doctrines here in conflict: one which says that the Armistice Agreement is compatible with belligerent rights and the exercice of visit, search and seizure, and another - to which the Security Council has already given its support - which asserts that the Armistice Agreement, by its specifie provisions, is not compatible with the exercice by either party of the right of visit, search and seizure. Sucb a generallegal doctrine as the second is indivisible: either Egypt has the right of visit, search and seizure in aU waters, or it has that right in no waters. It was therefore disturbing for us to hear such an emphatic and specifie announcement by the Government of Egypt that it will exercise the right of visit, search and seizure in the Gulf of Aqaba. The Government of Israel, as a coastal State, enjoys and will continue to exercise, as regards the Gulf of Aqaba, full maritime rights of ingress into and egress from the Red Sea. 130. 1 must state that my Government, basing itse1f on paragraph 5 of the Security Council resolution of 1 September 1951, does 110t intend either now or in future to recognize Egypt's right ta control either its commercial or its maritime relations with other Powers. We are comforted to know that that, tao, is the attitude of the other Powers with which !ISrael maintains maritime and commercial relations through the waterway in question. 132. We therefore should like the Security Council ta pronounce itself on whether we are correct in assuming that the littoral States on the Gulf of Aqaba, those States bound by the General Armistice Agreement, lack the rights of active belligerency and do not possess the right of visit, search and seizure, or whether we are acting somewhat quixotically and in a self-denial of legitimate rights in assuming that we do not possess those rights and that Egypt does not possess them either. 133. We are quite certain - absolute1y certain - that the injunction in paragraph 5 of the resolution of 1 September 1951 is binding upon Egypt and Israel as an authoritative and final verdict withinthe framework of the Armistice Agreement. \Vhat should happen, therefore, is not that we should adapt ourselves to the Egyptian practice 'by extending interference with the maritime and commercial relations of other States, but that Egypt should adapt itself ta the Security Councirs finding, abstain from the exerdse of active belligerency and visit, search and seizure, and ensure that shipping and commerce shall flow freely and constructive1y through that waterway which is common to Israel and a number of its Arab neighbours. 134. As l have said, the Security Council did not in 1951 confine itself to a discussion of the regulations in the Suez Canal. It found that the practice of visit, search and seizure undertaken by Egypt on the basis of. its existing legislation was an abuse of the exercise of the right of visit, search and seizure, and also that that practice could not be justified on the grounds that it was necessary for self-defence. In other words, the two concepts which are here in confliet are the concept of international right, on the one hand, and the concept of arbitrary national sovereignty, on the other. Instead of the previous position, in which it was undel"stood to be the right of all nations to navigate upon and between the high seas, we now have the theory presented by the representative of Egypt that Egypt, as the coastal State physically commanding access to certain parts of the high seas, shall decide who shall and who shall not trade freely, who shall and who shall not navigate freely. There is no longer, therefore, an unconditional right of the maritime world to navigate upon and between the high seas. It is now a matter for Egyptian legislation to decide whether any country is sufficiently or insufficiently well-behaved, from the viewpoint of Egyptian national or international policy, to enjoy that which has until now been the unconditional right of the governments and peoples of the entire world. 135. There are sorne countries in Europe which depend upon free passage through the Suez Canal for the fuel and material upon which their entire economic life depends. They are now told they will enjoy that right, if at all, not as an unconditional international right, but ta the degree that Egypt shall suffer ·them ta enjoy that right. There are countries which depend upon freedom 136. Therefore, this is an extremely important discussion. It is one of the classical debates upon the freedom of the seas. The issues are not drawn between Egypt and Israel alone, but between some of the most indispensable rights of the international community, on the one hand, and the doctrines of unilateral, arbitrary national sovereignty, on the other hand, exercised in defiance of international agreements and without any sanction by the world community. 137. Another issue in this conflict, the fourth to which l would refer, is the question of the Armistice Agreement. It is aIl very weIl for the representative of Egypt to come here and assert, quite unilaterally and arbitrarily that the existing maritime restrictions in the canal and in the gulf are compatible with the Armistice Agreement, but what value is there in such a unilateral assertion by one party to an armistice agreement, ""hen it is completely denied by the other two parties to that agreement, namely, the other signatory Israel, and the United Nations? What value does this Egyptian theory of the compatibility between the Armistice Agreement and these restrictions have in the light of the clear statements by aIl United Nations authorities that the Egyptian-Israeli Armistice Agreement is totally incompatible with the assertion of a state of war, the exercise of active belligerency or of the practice of visit, search and seizure? 138. Bere, again, in its resolution of 1 September 1951, the Security Council, to which this issue was submitted for arbitration and which both our Governments recognized as entitled to interpret moot points in the Armistice Agreement, determined that the maintenance of the practice mentioned in paragraph 4 is inconsistent with the objectives of a peaceful settlement between the parties, as set forth in the Armistice Agreement. In other words, the Security Council has determined that the Egyptian practices are inconsistent with the purposes, the intent, and the essence of the General Armistice Agreement. 139. The question as to whether belligerent practices can or cannot co-exist with the Armistice Agreement was considered by the Security Council in its discussions in 1951. One aftel" the other, members of the Security Couneil asserted that they could find no degree whatever of reconciliation between the provisions of the Armistice Agreement and the maintenance of the Egyptian restrictions, which then were applied to the S1,1ez Canal and which are now applied to the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba, which were then applied to six categories of commodities, and which have now been ,"... l must say that the Councilshould not allow the thesis of the existence of a state of war between Israel and the other signatories of the General Armistice Agreements of 1949 ta justify the resort to hostile acts byany of the parties." ... "Should we accept the Egyptian thesis, we would be bound to recognize any measures of reprisaI adopted by the Israel Government. It is obvious that in the exchange of hostile acts that would follow, we could hardly expect to lay the foundations of a definite solution to the Palestine question." 141. In the same spirit, on behalf of the sponsors of the 1951 resolution, the representative of the United States said, two and a half years ago, at the same meeting: "The United States is firmly of the opinion that the restrictions which Egypt is exercising over ships passing through the Suez Canal are inconsistent with the spirit and intent of the Armistice Agreement ... The result of this hostile act is the engendering of hostility hl return, which places in jeopardy the peace and stability of that area." 142. Let it therefore he clearly understood that the Egyptian assertion that Egypt is acting within its rights under the Armistice Agreement is a completely unilateral and isolated assertion, and l do not believe that any one party ta the Armistice Agreement is empowered ta be the final and exclusive authority on its rights under that agreement. 143. The great part of the addreSIS to which we have just listened referred not to the Armistice Agreement which Egypt and Israel signed at Rhodes, but to aU the other armistice agreements of past and recent history. l pointed out last time, but l should like to reiterate it, that there is no value whatsoever in what any other armistice agreement does or does not contain. There is no relevance in that whatsoever or in the statements of text.;books about the generic character of armistice agreements before the establishment of the United Nations and the institution of the Charter regime. The responsibilities and obligations of Egypt and Israel towards each other under this Armistice Agreement can only he deduced from the specific terms of that agreement and by authentic interpretations thereof, and not by reference to any other armistice agreements in past and present history. Therefore, although l was naturaUy entertained by the wide scope of the historical analysis ta which Mr. Azmi treated us, l must state with aIl respect that '1 am not interested, when l come to this question, in what has ever happened in China, Japan or Korea, in the respective views of the late Marshal Foch or 'President Wilson, in the courts of California or of Michigan, in the King's Bench Division, in Professor Colombos, Professor Higgins, Mr. Oppenheim, or in Professor Lauterpacht, or even in the memory of 144. What slightest ounce of relevance does aIl this massive jurisprudence have in he1ping us ta interpret the Armistice Agreement signed at Rhodes on 24 February 1949 between the Government of Israel and the Government of Egypt? Only the provisions of that agreement govern our obligations, the provisions of that agreement supplemented, of course, by authentic interpretations thereof. The provisions of that agreement, the interpretation of the United Nations representative, Doctor Bunche, who helped us to reach it,the opinion of the Chief of Staff who was present at Rhodes and who has testified. to the intent of the parties in 3igning the agreenlent, the opinion of the majority of the members of the Security Council, the institutional formaI opinion of the Security Council itself, aIl these are unanimous in asserting that whatever may be the characrer of other armistice agreements, this Armistice Agreement is not compatible with active belligerency or with the exercise by either party of visit, search or seizure. This is not only the most chronie, the most serious, in principle, the most comprehensive violation.of the Armistice Agreement, and certainly the most long-lived, in respect of Egyptian-Israeli relations, this is also the only gapbut it is a vast and gaping gap - in the structure of our mutual relationships as we contractoo them to be in 1951. 145. There is not a single provision of the Armistice Agreement under which Egypt is not enjoying its full rights under that agreement, not one at aIl. If there were, then Egypt would have won its case ·before the Security CounciI. Therefore, Israel is the uniquely aggrieved party and has been l'50 for five years in respect of a major provision of the Armistice Agreement affecting not any legal tactical issue, but the very concept of peace or of war, the concept of the armistice as a transition to peace, the entirely retrograde and reactionary concept of that agreement as a mere operation in the legal regulation of war. 146. 1 think it is sombre to record that the Security Council has heard expounded today, with great ability, a fervent defence of war, of the state of war, and the theoryof war and the rights of war. The Council has been implored not to deprive Egypt or Israel of their rights to exerdse a modified form of warfare against each other. 147. These, then, are the main issues before the Security Counci1: the compatibility of these practices with the Armistice Agreement; the sombre fact that the Egyptian legislation applies now not only ta the Suez Canal but to other international waterways; the insistence by Egypt on rights of visit, search and seizure which the Security Council has already rejected; and the assertion by Egypt today, in a very strong and assertive manner, of the doctrine of active belligerency and of visit, search and seizure, again notwithstanding the Security Council's own jurisprudence. 149. Let me give a few statistics which are relevant because they bear not upon the general theme of passage through the Suez Canal, which is not the issue here, but upon the issue of access to Israel through the Suez Canal. In any normal year before the Egyptian restrictions were applied, that is to say, in any year immediately preceding the institution of these Egyptian restrictions, cargoes amounting to between 176,000 and 200,000 tons, exclusive of oil, which is a subject apart, would have reached - in fact, used to reach - Israel, at the port of Haifa, through the Suez Canal. In a typical year, since these restrictions were applied - 1 take the year 1953 -15,000 tons of cargo reached Israel through the Suez Canal. Now, the difference, of course, in Israel's commercial &ctivity as a whole during thaï period was one of vast acceleration and enlargement. Therefore, when 1 said that about 90 per cent of Israeli trade which should legitimately come through the Suez Canal is prevented by these restrictions from arriving, 1 was not indulging in any rhetorical generalization, although 1 did not have the figures before me at the time. The posltion is actually more vivid: about 93 per cent the trade which would have passed through the Suez canal in the trade volumes to which we were accustomed in 1945, 1946 and 1947 - sorne 95 per cent of that traffic has been throttled by this legislation, which, the Security Council agrees, has been an illicit injury upon Israel for the past five. years. p~troliers des vrions résolution 151. n'est pour 'au impose nous liste nombre les prouve de sont par 151. It is not a fact, as has sometimes been stated, that Israel objectively, for political reasons, lacks the possibility of access to that oil traffic. But for the Egyptian restrictions, we would enjoy - and we have enjoyedthat accessibility. Indeed, the fact that somethinglike 70 or 80 tankers - 1 fûrget the exact number - have been placed on the Egyptian blacklist for having visited Israel since the establishment of the State proves condusively that there are sources of supply and that there are oil -: \mpanies which are in prineiple prepared to exereise normal free passage through the canal. 152. Therefore, without the oil income, the picture is that about 95 pel' cent of Israel's normal trade in products other than· oil has been throttled through these restrictions, and, in the case of oil, 100 pel' cent of that aspect of Israel's import trade has been completely set at nought. 152. pétrole, 100 période d'Israël, 153. mage droit, pays maritimes rectement justifie tional monde, périté touchées 153. This, then, is the character of the unilateral and iIlegal injury which the Government of Egypt has inflicted upon the State of Israel, upon the shipping countries concerned, upon the maritime world, and upon other countries whose economies are indirectly affected by restrictions for which there is not the slightest e1ement of justification in any instrument of international law and the suspension of which would be the easiest thing in the world, involving not the slightest threat or prejudice to Egypt's sovereignty, to Egypt's dignity or to Egypt's economic prosperity. 154. de affaire, tional souveraineté, mique l'Egypte, tives bien-être 154. As 1 have already .'laid, perhaps the worst feature of these restrictions is that here is a case in which Egypt eould accept the international verdict without the slightest sacrifice of sovereignty, of security, of economic prosperity or of dignity. Indeed, 1 am certain that, in eaeh one of these respects, Egypt's welfare and repute would be exalted if that country accepted international policy affecting this important waterway. 155. This, then, is the position which the Security Couneil has reached some two and a half years after its past resolution, during which we have patiently and hopefully abstained from raising the issue, and something like six or seven weeks 1 think, after the complaint of the existence of these restrictions, their extension and their aggravation was brought before the Security çouneil. .Egypt has .'laid that it i8 true that these restrictions exist, it is true that they have been extended, it is true that they have been aggravated - "Well, they are going to exist, they are .going to be extended, and their aggravation i8 a matter of unique Egyptian national diseretion." That is the Egyptian doctrine. It has been explained very c1early and frankly, and for that c1arity and frankness 1 think we all owe a debt of gratitude to the spokesm::m of Egypt today. But scarcely could 155. trouve après pendant ment environ que relative aggravation. restrictions qu'elles en vigueur, dépend raine On .. a dette th~ Council hrve a c1earer picture of such a head-on 157. These, then, apart from the broader issues international rights challenged by unilateral domination of national sovereignty, are the issues which the Security Council is called upon to confront. And 1 cannot believe that it confronts them without a direct knowledge bath of the validity of the complaint and of the unfortunate refusaI of the Egyptian Government so far accept the l11W and the justice which the Security Council has already adopted. 158. Surely, then, the reaffirmation in far stronger form, complemented by action, for following the implementation of its decision is the minimal duty of the Security Council if it wishes to maintain the principles of international co-c")eration and to save the Egyptian- Israel Armistice Agreement from deadly hazard. 159. Ml'. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): 1 should like ta make a few remarks at this stage. 1 am obviously interested in this problem from many points of view. This is net the final and definitive statement that propose ta make before the Council, but 1 should like to make a few observations on what we have heard from the rel-reseutative of Israel. 160. If 1 heard him corredy, he said that if these restrictions had not existed with respect to the canal, his country wou'-\. have bought literally millions upon millions of tons of crude oil. 1 thought 1 heard him say that. 1 think it is fair ta ask mm where he would have bought it. t hope that the next time he car. tell us the place. Obviously Borneo is very far away. As far as the Western hemisphere is cl:mcerned, he could get the ail more quickly through th!': Medi1:errant.< ..1. Large quantities of crude oil are being brought through the Mediterranean. As for Saudi Arabia, to my knowledge it is not permitted. The same thing applies to Iraq. So far as 1 know, Abadan has n0t been in operation since 1951. There remain, of course, Kuwait and Bahrein. 1 would certainly be interested to know if the regulations of Kuwait and Bahrein would have permitted Israel ta import from these places the millions upon millions of tons of crude ail to which Ml'. Eban referred. In that 161. At more than one point in his remarks, Ml'. Eban said that the basic issue here was not really between Israel and Egypt but between the international community and Egypt. He said that Egypt was violating important international laws and practices and that, therefore, Egypt at the present time was the international outlaw, so to speak, sa far as these things are concerned. He painted to us the picture of a far more fundamental conflict than the one between Israel and Egypt; namely, a conflict between Egypt and the Couneil, the United Nations, the international community and the world at large. 162. Of course, a person at this table may exaggerate at times, in the heat QI an argument. However, I do not think it is allowable to exaggerate to that extent. If things were as bad as Ml'. ?ainted them, why did not somebody eIse bring this complaint before the Seeurity Couneil? Why was Israel the nation chosen to represent humanity here and accuse Egypt of outlawry? Now, that is an important point. Obviously, it is Israel that has arrogated to itself the task of bringing this point to the attention of the Security Council. It cannot therefore be what the representative of Israel suggested it was, a fundamental, radicalwhat shall l eall it - aImost metaphysical conflict between Egypt and the l'est of the world. Later, I will show how much we really learned, from Ml'. Eban's speech of 5 February [658th meeting], of the extent of Egyptian interference alleged by Israel. We shaH see that it is not so widespread as the representative of Israel has indicated. 162. parfois, exagérer permis mal le autre chargée stigmatiser d'un s'est assigné lui-même au saisi d'Israël prétend: ment dirais-je? - l'Egypte en 5 février vention tion 163. part pour et n'accepterons iei tant de des respectueusement - 164. Conseil l'Assemblée Unies Toutes viennent et Nations nouveau et résolu devant peut Conseil de d'autres Nations 163. There has been and there certainly is now an attempt on the part of Israel and its representatives to confine Israeli-Arab situations to the Security Couneil. This will never do, and I hope that nobody around this table will encourage Israel in that attempt. For the representative of Israel to come here and tell us that the important aspects of Israeli-Arab conflicts are only those coming under the Security Couneil and Securrty Couneil resolutions, I say with aIl due respect, is nonsense. 164. The basic issues are not those related ta the Seeurity Couneil but preeisely the opposite. The basic issues are those that have been discussed and deeided upon politiC?Jly in the General Assembly and in· the other organs of the TJnited Nations. The difficulties whieh confront the Security Council result from the faet that tbe members of the Security Couneil and the other States Members of the United Nations have not debated, examined and reaffirmed other relevant issues which have come before other organs of the United Nations. So it was very weIl for a member of the Seeurity Couneil to say sorne time ago that other decisions by other organs of the United Nations with respect to Palestine should not even be mentioned in sorne of our resolutions here and for sorne delegations 166. 1 think that it is really clear in the minds of aIl of us around this table why Israel has decided at this moment to bring this issue to the attention of the Security Council. Those of us who were members at the time remember what Mr. Eban said - 1 think some of us who were present but who were not members will also remember. 1 think Mr. Munro was present when Mr. Eban made his memorable speech of 12 November 1953 [637th meeting], and when he distributed what 1 calI the blue book, a very interesting àocument that 1 have read time and again - 1 refer to what he said concerning Egypt. 1 thought that what he said was an arresting thing. He was talking about the status of the various Armistice Agreements between Israel and the Ar.ab countries; and he was discussing the status of the Egypt-Israel Armistice Agreement. This is what he said and 1 want to quote it because it bears on this issue. He said: "1 have referred once already to the maritime blockade practised by Egypt in violation of the Security Council resolution of 1 September 1951 ... AlI other incidents to which we have" referred in the whole of this discussion affect the work of the Mixed Armistice Commissions established by Israel and the Arab States themselves. This violation", - namely, this blockade - "however, undermines the authority of the Security Council in the preservation of peace and security in the Middle East. Indeed, one reason why we have not brought our security problems to the Security Council in recent months has been the marked reluctance of the Council" - you must remember that this was during the days of Qibya, days which were very interesting ones but not very favourable to Israel - "and of the Powers which have inscribed the present item" - namely, France, the United Kingdom and the United States - "to take any action in support of the Security Council's resolution of 1 September 1951, which has remained completely inoperative, with the result that the blockade is in full effect in aIl vital respects." 167. AlI of this, you see, is a preview of what has been happening during the last two or three weeks here. Mr. Eban was giving us notice then that the time 168, The interesting thing, however, as regards what Mr. Eban told us then, was not the passage 1 have just cited; it was the last sentence of that paragraph and 1shall read it to the Coun::il. He said: "... Egypt's national aspirations, which we in no way wish to impede, would... be considerably enhanced" - 1 want the representative of Egypt to listen to what the representati ve of Israel told him five months ago - "by bringing this situation" - this matter about which he is now arguing with you- "into conformity with internationallaw." What does this mean? He was telling Egypt as early as 12 November 1953 that "if only you will help us with this Suez Canal business, we will help you with your quarrel with the United Kingdom. We will help you with your quarrel with the United Kingdom so far as the Suez Canal is concerned". Of course, this is called "refined diplomacy". The meaning is perfectly clear. He was telling the Egyptians: "Honly you will relinquish your restrictions, then we will reward you with some intervention with our friends elsewhere". Of course he had in mind the United Kingdom Governnient because that is the real basic issue so far as the national aspirations of Egypt are concerned at the moment. . 169. Five months have now passed and,' so far as 1know, Egypt has not responded to this appeal or to this offer of help that Israel made in that important speech. Therefore, 1 suppose that the Israeli authorities felt that since they had been refused any co-operation on the part of Egypt, they themselves could bring pressure to bear upon Egypt. 1 do not pretend to know how much connection there is between the Israeli action and the recent complications in Anglo-Egyptian negotiations; however, all these things ought to be kept in mind when we examine this issue. The problem of the Suez Canal is not a minor, simple, direct problem hetween Israel and Egypt. Israel has greater ambitions. We all know what is at the backof the Israel representative's mind. In addition, he ~ants to efface, if possible, theeffects of the Security Council resolution on Qibya. 170. And this may not' be aIl. 1 am trying to probe beneath all this legalistic language that is heard around this table. There are more serious things atstake in this affair; Israel may have a third motive at the present moment, namely, to take advantage through interna.. tiQnai action and through the manipulation of international machil1ery of some of the difficulties that certain A,rab States have faced in recent weeI<s and to score a tain~s 35 171. In one of his summaries Mr. Eban enumerated about seven or eight issues, which he said were the main issues in the question before us. As 1 said sometime ago, 1 have been dealing withthis question for many a year now and 1 know - at least 1 did know the past - whatsometimes happens. 1 happen to know, as ail of us do, that sorne representatives are thinking of presenting a draft resolution soon; 1 do not know when. I hope a text will be put into our hands soon. But 1 also hope that Mr. Eban's able summation of the stiuation will not find its reflection in that draft resolution. 1 hope, in other words, that Mr. Eban is not going to influence directly or indirectly whatever agencies goodwill are at work in so far as the production any positive text is concerned. 172. In the past thi~ was precisely the method used to inject certain ideas into texts that were to be introduced before the Security Council. 1 hope it will foiled this time and that, while representatives who are thinking in terms of texts will certainly read with interest what Mr. Eban toId us, they will also not unduly influenced by it. 173. If the Security Council wants peace in the Near 'East, as 1 know it does, then it is not of the first importance to adopt a resolution about that situationeven about this situation of which Mr. Eban has made sa much at the present moment. The important thing not primarily to adopt a resolution, nor, certainly, please Israel or to please the Arabs. It is easy to adopt a resolution, although in recent weeks we have had experience which shows that it is not so easy after ail. But let us assume that it is easy to adopt a resolution. That is not the important thing, nor is it the important thing to please eithet Israel or the Arabs. 174. What then must be done about the present situation? Mr. Eban talked a great deal about the duties of the Security Council, and 1 will not comment on the propriety of that language. But, what are the requisites of peace and security in the Near East? 175. The important points,which ought ta guide in forming our policy are: first, ta keep the deeper and larger implications of the who1e issue in mind aU the time, and not be 10st in a morass of its narrow aspects; second, to he honestly and abso1utely just and impartial in the treatment of these issues; and third, to conceive a real states"11anlike system within the framework W~l~"+ peace and concord can be reasonably promoted. 177. If the members of the Security Couneil do these things, they will, in the end, he rewarded. But anything else - I repeat, anything else - will, I assure you, prov~ futile.

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