S/PV.663 Security Council

The issue before us is the compliance of a valued Member of the United Nations with a decision taken two and one-half years ago by the highest body of this Organization charged with the maintenance of international peace and security. After examining the facts and the arguments presented by both sides, this Council adopted a resolution on 1 September 1951 [558th meeting] which continues to apply to the facts as we have heard them relating to the complaint now under consideration. The resolution of 1951 was adopted after the parties themselves had entered into a General Arn1istice Agreement which had as one of its principal purposes the promotion of permanent peace in Palestine. The resolution stems from that agreement. The basic issues are the same as 2. Throughout the history of the Palestine question, the United Nations has sought a peaceful, a just and an. equitable settlement of the many complicated problems arising out of the Palestine conflicl:. The decisions of the various organs of the United Nations have not always satisfied our own views 100 per cent. But we have consistently sought to respect and to give effect to the combined judgment which those decisions represent. 3. We, for our part, feel that the parties directly concerned in these questions have an equal duty to respect and to make every reasonable effort to give effect to the combined judgment of the United Nations, whether expressed in the Security Council or in the General Assembly, or other competent organs. We must ',ay frankly that the desire of the interested parties te do so has not always been apparent. If, disregarding the collective efforts of the United Nations, the parties bring the house down upon themselves, it is they who will suffer the most. This may seem like a strong statement, but candour compels it. 4. \Vhen the United Nations was established, such situations as these were the reason why we combined' together to pool some of our resources and to subject some of our interests to the judgment of the majority. It seems to us that the parties to the Palestine question are losing sight of the immense value .to themselves which this process represents. None of us can stand alone; disregard of the Council's views in one instance encourages recalcitrance in another. The whole fabric of international co-operation inevitably suffers. 5. Thus, to repeat, the question before us is one compliance with a decision of the United Nations. That decision was based on severàl important considerations, one of which was that "neither party can reasonably assert that ii is actively a belligerent or requires exercise the right of visit, search and seizure for any legitimate purpose of self-defence". [5/2322, para. 6. In our opinion, this principle is equally applicable to the Suez Canal and to any waters outside the Canal. This principle and the decision of the Council in resolution of 1951 should be applied by the parties themselves through the Mixed Armistice Commission which they themselves set up. Differences arising between the parties under the Armistice Agreement should always, in our opinion, be handled as fully as possi'ble in the first instance by the mixed armistice machinery. An exception to this rule could weaken the effectiveness of this machinery. We believe that the Mixed Armistice Commission, in considering the specific complaint with respect to actions in the Gulf of Aqaba, must be bound not only by the provisions of the General Armistice Agreement but should act also in the light of paragraph 5 of the resolution of 1 September 1951. d'I~raël pouvons sommes traduire la décision Nous autres sujet espérons les Membres responsabilités, sécurité. le projet Nouvelle-Zélande. 8. M. Les séance] vention, j'aurais pris tition; que j'aimerais 9. Tout mark, importance du droit elles sances pas à la raison du droit. 10. est de présente article sécurité protection Le représentant raison de nous rappeler que, conformément . de la les Etats 8. Mr. BORBERG (Denmark).: The representatives of New Zealand [662nd meeting] and the United States, in their lucid observations, have expressed much of what l might have tried to say if they had not spoken before me. l shall avoid repetition, but there are a few elements of the problems involved which l should like to stress. 9. First of aIl, smaller nations, like Denmark, Egypt or Israel, must take a particular interest in the development and maintenance of international law, for we cannot to the same extent as can the great Powers rely "pon our military strength to safeguard our interests. l am not even speaking of a common ethnical approach; no, our interest in law can be motivated even by politieal IVisdom alone. 10. Among the rules of international law that we are interested in maintaining, none can here be considered more important than the Charter. And, of the articles of the Charter, those concerning the Security Council are the Charter's cornerstone of our protection against IVar. It was, therefore, perfectly legitimate when the representative of Egypt reminded us aIl that the Security Council acts on behalf of aIl the Member States, according to Article 24 of the Charter. 11. As a matter of fact, the Council, if and whl':!l a decision is taken by it in conformity with the relevant rules of the Charter and not vetoed, is acting on behalf of even such members of the Council as cast their votes against such decisions; yes, acting on behalf of aIl Members of the United Nations, even on behalf of the 11. qui se cette nom no!'cent agIt au Nations décision tant du qui recueille tant d'Israël. ~ne against wlùch such a decision is taken. When voting IOr. ~l draft resolution that is adopted, l, the representative of Denmark, am performing my fraction of the COU11Cil's action on behalf of Egypt or Israel. . 12. Now why is so much power given to the Council? 12. pouvoir? mence efficace lh~t is .plainly stated in the same Article 24, for it egm~ with the words: "In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations". But the Charter 13. AlI Member States in ratifying the Charter agreed to a limitation of their sovereignty. If the Council accepted that a Member State that disagreed with of its decisions, by calling such decision illegal was bound by the decision, the work of the Council would become chaotic. For any State ready to shoulder responsibility for aggression surely would be only willing to accuse the Council of acting illegally. might then foresee an entire technique of evasion develop. The sma1ler .nations cannot possibly want such developments to take place. 14. As to principles of international law other than those established by the Charter, there can hardly any doubt that aU seafaring nations, and for that màtter all nations, must, as a matter of principle, be very greatly concerned in the maintenance of the freedom .international shipping - not least through the Suez Canal. 15. The complaint of Israel with regard to restrictions imposed by Egypt on the passage of ships through Suez Canal and sanctions against certain ships visiting Israel ports was exhaustively discussed by the Security Council in 1951, and there seems to be no reason the Council now to modifv its stand. On the other hand, it is most regrettable that Egypt, as its representative has himself stated, has not complied with the Council's resolution of 1 September 1951, as every Member State is in dutv bound to do unde~ Article 25 of the Charter, which 1 "have just quoted. 16. In 1951, Denmark was not a member of Security Council. However, havtng considered very carefully and in an impartial spirit the arguments advanced by Egypt, my Government cannot subscribe to the criticism of the Council's findings which those arguments imply.' In the view of my Government, assertion that Egypt is a belligerent and that, as such, it has a right of visit, search and seizure, cannot sustained. In this respect 1 would refer particularly article II, paragraph 2, of the Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel, and to the fact that fewer than five years have now passed since termination of hostilities. 17. In the view of my Government the measures decided upon by the Egyptian Government and practice applied by it cannot be reconciled with Armistice Agreement, with the general rules of international law concerning the freedom of navigation commerce, with the Convention of 1888 respecting freenavigation of the Suez Mar:itime Canal, with Security Council resolution of 1 September 1951, finally, with the Charter. 18. Sir Pierson DIXON (United Kingdom): delegation supports the draft resolution [S/3l88/ Corr.l] presented so ably by the representative of New Zealand at the Council's last meeting, and will 20. What has happened since then? The facts are really not in dispute. Another two and a h..If years have passed, and the Egyptian Government has not terminated the restrictions. Indeed, at the end of last year a decree was issued which permitteà of their intensification. It seems to me that this is a situation which must cause the Couneilin the words of the draft resolution - grave concern. And for several reasons. 21. In the first place, of course, the restrictions interfere with normal trade on what is one ofthe main international waterways of the world: The repr'esentative of Egypt argued at our last meeting that this aspect of the issue was not one which should be discussed in the Security Couneil. 1 hope he will forgive me if 1 say that 1think that he oversimplified the question. I should, however, like to assure him that this aspect of the issue, important though it is for my country as a maritime nation, is not what causes my Government the most anxiety. 21. obstacle au navigables séance, aspect Conseil quer façon quelle Puissa!'ce maritime, ce n'est gouvernement. 22. ressent première c'est einq ans après l'une droits 23. les observations sentées j'ai York, ont prononcés ici. argument 1951, dépit quence,· mesure penser dérer, . maintien de la Conseil et . demi, aujourd'hui. 24. certains Conseil: affaire? bataille. une Conseil dans 5 22. There are two other reasons which most certainly affect the Secuïity Council very directly. The first is tbis, that, not two and one-half years now, but five years after the signing of the Armistice Agreenlent, one of the parties to it should claim unfettered use, at its own discretion alone, of belligerent rights. 23. I listened with great care to the remarks made by the representative of Egypt on this point at our last meeting, and I have read the speeches which his predecessor arid he made before I came to New York. l have, however, found no argument in them which the Council did not reject, either specificaIly or by implication, in 1951, without a single dissenting vote. With ail their ability and with aIl their eloquence, the representatives of Egypt have not produced a single tenable reason for thinking that the Security Council was wrong in holding, as it did two and one-haH years ago, that the continuance of these restrictions was unjustified after the signing of the Armistice Agreement. And if the Couneil was right in holding that two and one-haH years ago,this is a fortiori a view which it must reaffirm now. 24. This brings me on to what, in sorne respects, l regard as the most essential reason for the concern which the Council must feel at the present situation, n~me1y, the respect for its own authority in the matter. SIX years ago, the Holy Land was a battlefield. If there was first a truce and then an armistice régime, this was due in very large part to the unceasing efforts of the Security Couneil. AIl that is written in the history of 26. l, myself, can scarcely believe that the Egyptian Government will fail on this second occasion to respond to the Council's caU, which, if l may say so, is couched in very moderate terms. In other resolutions which the Couneil has adopted on Palestine questions, a clause has been included providing for further consideration by the Couneil within a limited period - say, ninety days. It seems to me that a similar provision in the present case would have been entirely appropriate, and, for my part, l should prefer that a paragraph to this effect should be added to the present draft resolution. l do not wish to press for this, if other members of t.~e Council think it unnecessary. But, in any case, this question of compliance with the Couneil's resolution seems to me so important that, in my view, the Couneil should be prepared to return to the matter in a reasonable time, if that proves necessary. 27. The second part of the Israel complaint concerns interference with shipping in the Gulf of Aqaba. l have already referred to paragraph 5 of the 1951 resolutioll, which laid down that "since the armistice régime... is of a permanent character, neither party can reasonably assert that it is. . . a belligerent or requires to exereise the right of visit, search and seizure for any legitimate purpose of self-defence". That is a general prineiple which applies not only in the Suez Canal, but also in the Gulf of Aqaba, and indeed anywhere else. 28. But the complaint in regard to the Gult o~ Aqaba has not ·been examined by the Mixed Armistice Commission, and it would undermine the whole machinery established by the parties themse1ves in the Armistice Agreement if the Couneil were to make a practice of dealing with complaints in the first instance. l am not saying that that might not be justified in certain cÏrcumstances. l agree, however, with the representative of New Zealand that in the present case the normal procedure should be foUowed. l also agree with the wording suggested in paragraph 6 of his draft resolunon, which . i 32. débat marquer international des délégation affirmation. 33. témoignons nement inspiré le 7 ~o express its adherence to the great principles of International law and, in particular, to the principle of the freedom of the seas and the international shipping lan:s. My delegation supports that statement as firmly as In the pasto 3~. Similarly, we bore witness then - and we bear wltness again today - to the desire of the French Gove~ent that the principles which lay behind the sIgnature of the Suez Canal Convention of 28 October 1888 should be rt..,,;pected. When, almost a century ago, 34. The French Government is certainlv not of the opinion that the 1888 Convention is today a+! obsolete instrument, although its representatives on the Council recognize that, in the case with which we are now dealing, we should not be primarily concerned with the validity of any particular article of the Convention. The Security Couneil has not, under the Charter, any special competence to examine alleged infringements of obligations assumed under a particular treaty. The Council is 110t necessarily competent to deal with a case merely by virtue of the fact that an international treaty is involved. Its essential function is to remove threats to the.peace. Its competence becomes operative only such threats exist in the circumstances and under the conditions referred to in Articles 33 et seq. of the Charter. 35. Those are the provisions on which is based the Council's right to intervene in the dispute which has arisen between Egypt and Israel in connexion with freedom of navigation in the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba. The present dispute concerns the application of the Armistice Agreement signed between the two States in 1950, of which the Council is the guardian. It is because the terms of the agreement are not being respected and because the violation of an armistice agreement obviously involves a danger to peace that the -matter_ has legitimately been brought before us. 36. Through its spokesman, Mr. Azmi, the Egyptian delëgation has affirmed that, despite the armistice, Egypt possesses in relation to Israel geL..~ral rights of belligerency, and, more particularly, the rights of visit and seLure. On that point much that is relevant could probably be said on both sides. But however this may be, even if the armistice does not constitute a peace, there is nothing in traditional or conventional law encourage aState to continue warlike acts. That point might have been open to discussion in 1951; it is no longer so in 1954. My delegatirn regards all discussion on that point as dosed. 37. Three years ago, the Council noted the special nature of the Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel, the preamble to which, as !las already been said, expressly states that the object of the agreement is "to facilitate the transitkï from the present truce to permanent peace in Palestine". Similarly, article l of the agreement notes that the part~es agree to certain principles, the objp.ct of which is "promoting the r ~turn permanent peace in Palestine". Accordingly, the Couneil adopted, as part of its resolution of 1 September 1951, a paragraph 5 which is still of cm ial imf)ortanl.- . The paragraph states: "Consideri:1g that since the armistice régime, which has been in existence for nearly two and a half y~ars, is of a permanent character, neither party can reasonably assert that it is actively a belligerent requires to exercise the right of visit, search and seizure for any legitimate purpose of self-defence." 38. In view of the incidents which were brought to the Counci1's notice at the time, this paragraph 5 clearly referred, as Mr. Azmi has stated, to the conditions 39. That being sa, is there any reason ta apply different legal principles ta the two parts of the Israel complaint? Surely the resolution and the principles it embodies prevail with respect ta bath matters. And surely the reference in paragraph 6 of the New Zealand draft resolution [S/3188/Corr.1] ta the Council's previous resolution is based on this consideration and gives the Mixed Armistice Commission valuable guidance in this respect. 40. The rules of law applicable in this case are clear and, as it \Vere, predetermined. The facts are equally clear, for the facts at least are acknowledged by bath parties, although the legal conclusions they draw from them differ. 41. In this situation of fact and of law, the Council cannot do otherwise than note that the 1951 resolution has not been implemented, and it is in duty bound to draw the inescapable concil The first paragraph of the operative part of the New Zealand draft resolution "notes with grave concern that Egypt has not complied with that resolution". In our opinion, that is a moderate statement. The resolution notes the existing situation, but it also. looks to the future. It expresses the Çouncil's grave ccncern at the fact that the Suez Canal remains a cause of friction. The logical consequence of this expression of concern is a fresh appeal, in which the Council, placing its trust in the wisdom of Egypt's rulel~s, "calls upon Egypt, in accordance with its obligations under the Charter, to comply with" the 1951 resolution. This paragraph of the draft is manifestly based on Article 25 of the Charter. 42. The moderation of the New Zealand draft resolution must be fully appreciated. It is the Council's dutY to draw attention to its previûus resolutions and to make an earnest appeal ta the parties to act in the spirit of those resolutions, in order to ensure that this matter should not be brought before the Council a third time. 43. Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): l wish to make a few remarks about what we have heard today, because l think that sorne of the things that have been said are of interest and perhaps even of importance. 44. The representative of the United States, in his speech, enlarged the basis of the problem and l, for my part, welcomed such an enlargement. l believe that the Council would be acting properly in the attempt to promote peace and security in the Near East if it saw this issue within its proper context, which is not just the narrow, juridic~l Security Council context to which it has been unfairly cf'l1fined, in my opinion. l therefore welcome the enlargement of the basis of the discussion which the representative of the United States introduced into this debate this afternoon. 45. One thing that-he said struck me as of importance, and it should be underlined by us all. He said that the United Nations had sought from the very beginning, in this complicated and thorny question of Palestine, to effect a peaceful, a just, and an equitable settlement. l welcome this assertion of principle and of ideal under which the United Nations is acting. l very much hope 46. It should follow from this that when one can humbly, but properly and truthfully, point to matters, whether of action or of wording, which do not quite confonu to this threefold ideal of peace, justice and equity - when such matters are pointed out objectively and demonstrated fully - then those who seek this ideaI will, equally humbly, admit the facts and also alter their course of action to conform more fully with this ideal. 47. 1 assure the Council that nothing can be more conducive to peace and security in the Near East than an honest attempt, honestly followed and scrupulously observed, to work always under this thredold banner of a peaceful settlement, a just settlement and an equitable settlement. 1 suggest that these norms are such that they admit of an objective testing, for it is obvious what is meant by breaking the peace; it is also obvious, 1 hope, in certain instances, what is meant by an unjust act or an unjust wording; it is, 1 think, aIso obvious - it can be show to be obvious - that certain settlements or certain attèmpts at settlement are or are not objectively equitable. Consequently, 1 could not welcome anything more than the holding up before us of this .magnificent ideal of a settlement that is to be effected peacefully, justly and equitably in this complicated issue of Palestine. 48. There is another matter to which 1 wish ta calI attention in the statement of the representative of the United States. He said: "The decisions of the various organs of the United Nations have not always satisfied our own views 100 pel' cent. But we have consistently sought to respect and ta give effect ta the combined judgment which those decisions represent." 49. The reference by the representative of the United States to the decisions of the various organs of the United Nations in connexion with Palestine is a welcome reference.· 1 should like to have it underlined by the ~ecurity Council, and 1 should also like the outside world, and especially the Arab world, ta realize that the representative of the United States this afternoon made explicit reference to these matters in language that seems to me, in certain parts of it, to be very significant. 50. .It is true that, when he says that "the decisions of the various organs of the United Nations have not always satisfied our own views one 100 pe!' cent", there is a lSort of leeway, whereby he can later say that such amt such a. decision is not fully in accordance with his ownor his Government's views. But, despite the presence of.this leeway, it is important ta note that he goes on immediately ta say that "we have consistently sought to respect and ta give effect to the combined jud~ent which those decisions represent". 51. 1 shall not enter into any debate with the representative of the United States on the accuracy of this assertion. 1 shall only say very simply that it can be shawn that the degree of enthusiasm evidenced by the 52. He went on ta say: "We, for our part, feel that the parties directly concerned in these questions have an equal duty ta respect and ta make every reasonable effort ta give effect ta the combined judgment of the United Nations, whether expresserl in the Security Council or in the General Assembly, or other competent organs." I am very glad ta read this ar.d l want it ta be espeèially noted, because the Egyptian representative made it plain now in 1951, and every Arab representative has made it quite plain, that the source of the trouble in Palestine is not these ad hoc problems that arise here and there in connexion with this or that relatively secondary aspect of the issue. 53. The real source of the trouble which everybody around this table knows, but which for political reasons we do not expressly want ta face, 1S that there were solemn decisions taken in each instance by more than two-thirds of the United Nations, decisions taken and solemnly reaffirmed, which have been flouted and not respected by one party to this great issue. That is the source of an trouble; correct it, and aIl of you gentlemen could be playing golf this afternoon rather than attending to this issue. That is the real source of the trouble. Consequently, I think that the representative of the United States has made a real contribution in calling attention to this larger aspect, in having the courage to calI attention ta this larger aspect for the first time in the Security Council of the United Nations. l am not going to analyse aIl of his speech now, and I certainly do not agree with everything he says, but I regard his statement about this particular aspect, the enlargement of the basis of discussion of this issue which he embarked upon this afternoon, as being the most forthright and constructive suggestion which this Couneil has heard in many a month, if not in many a year. I do hope that others wîll fol1ow in his footsteps. 54. Referring to what the representative of Egypt had told us of the "complete good will of Egypt" and "its efforts to prepare the ground for a reasonable solution" - and these are very moderate and conciliatory words - and referring further to the just and equitable request or hope expressed by the representative of Egypt that similar efforts would be forthcoming irom the Government of Israel, the representative of the United States said that "we could not fail ta endorse such sentiments". This means, I take it, that he is as much asking Israel ta come forth with "similar conciliatory efforts", to quote the words of the represen- Then he said - and this was perhaps the most important sentence in his speech: "We ·hold similar views with respect to the various other decisions of the United Nations on this difficult question of Palestine." 55. He was not, in other words, only enjoining Egypt or asserting before the world that the best way of maintaining peace and promoting security and understanding in that part of. the world was to reaffirm the decision of 1 September 1951, but he was also calling upon everybody and enjoining everybody - because he said "we hold similar views with respect to the various other decisions of the United Nations on this difficult question of Palestine" - strictly to observe and to give effect to the decisions of the United Nations in this entire field of the Palestine question. l could not welcome more a statement made by an important member of the Security Council, by a permanent member of the Security Council, than l welcome this affirmation by the representative of the United States. 56. l do not daim to be as wise as members around this table who have been in diplomacy all their lives, but my own feeling is that it is hopeless and useless to try to pulverize and chop up the sole issue of Palestine into all these abstract aspects df it and not to go straight to the central issue of this whole problem. The central issue of the problem of Palestine, which was slightly opened pefore us this afternoon by the representative of the United States, is how to make. Israel acceptable to that part of the world, how to introduce conditions of undC'ntanding and mutuality of trust and confidence among the various parties to this tremendous conflict. l suggest that we can only start this process. We cannot achieve it overnight, and l suggest that the only available starting point apart from force - and force by definition does not bring about relations of understanding and mutuality of confidence, for force is a last resort - apart from that forcdul settlement, apart from the great Powers sending in armies and aeroplanes and forcing a given settlement upon the Near East, is to begin with the juridically given decisions of the United Nations. We all know what they are; they relate to the boundaries of Israel. 57. The representative of New Zealand referred at the last meeting to incidents occurring on the borders between Israel and the Arab States. or words to that effect. l do not quite know what he-means by "border" there. AlI that there is, internationally speaking, is not a border· but an armistice demarcation line. l am sure thàt that.is what the representative of New Zealand had in mind, because if ::.e wants ta tell us that in New Zealand's "t~( .~ition of Israel there was also a recognition that the armistice demarcation lines are Israel's borders, that is an important point that we shoultl like to ascertairi from him. That would mean, to our way of thinking, that if these borders are contested, and they are, and that if the demarcation line is contested as the borderline of Israel, the representative of New Zealand is telling us that his Government would then place itself on the side of Israel in such a contest. However, l am 58. Therefore the only starting point is the juridically" given decisi~ns of the Unite~ ;Nations. These ~nclude, in the first mstance, the declsl0ns on boundanes. To confuse the Armistice Agreement, which establishes only the armistice demarcation lines, with the boundaries or borders of Israel, is completely and absolutely unacceptable. This will never bring about peace in the Near East. 59. There is another decision which the United Nations has taken three or four times. It is true that this decision was opposed by some of the Powers represented around this table. However, if we speak of respecting and observing the combined wisdom of the United Nations, we must keep these decisions in mind. 1 am referring to the decision relating to the internationalization of Jerusalem. This subject is one of the untouchable ones in the United Nations. Hardly any member will even mention it, and 1 do not understand why, if there is a real desire to promote peace in the Near East. This is a juridically given, salemn United Nations decision, and it has been reaffirmed three times by the United Nations [General Assembly resolutions 181 (II), 194 (III) and 303 (IV)]. 60. Since the representative of the United States has referred to these other decisions, there is still a third one, which, in a sense, is the most urgent and the one most pregnant with danger to the entire area, namely, the one relating to the million Arab refugees who are strewn about the borders. 1t is true that these people have been kept alive. However, as 1 said previously, these men and women have left behind them property with an estimated value of $12,000 million.

1 dislike interrupting the representative of Lebanon, but 1 want to be helpful to him by reading out the tide of the agenda item under discussion: "Enforcement by Egypt of restrictions on the passage of ships trading with Israel through the Suez Canal!' ~ ~as merely commenting on that enlargement. 1 believe Jt Is.a constructive and helpful approach. 1 assure the PreSIdent that 1 have not strayed, and 1 do not intend 63. 1 refer ta aIl these decisions, which were referred to by the representative of the United States. 1 want to assure the Council, the United Nations, the Powers and the world, that unless adequate attention is paid to these juridicaIly given starting points of the whole problem, it will be hopeless, exc~pt by mere force, ta effect any real permanent peace 10 that area. 64. In the statement made by the representative of the United Kingdom, 1 thought he said something different from what 1 see in the Press release before me. However, 1 shaIl ascertain this point later, when 1 read the verbatim record. At any rate, 1 shaIl only comment on the language as 1 have it before me in the Press release. He stated, according to the release, that if the authority of the Council "in regard to Palestine is undennined, either by the action of the parties, or for some other reason, how can one doubt that conditions in the area would deteriorate witb. unforeseeable consequences". 1 thought that he had said at this point - perhaps it was elsewhere, but 1 do not find it before me - something of the possibility of the Council becoming impotent. 1 though he had used the word "impotent", but 1 may be wrong. At any rate, 1 wish to comment on the word "undermined" - "in regard to Palestine is undermined, either by the action of the parties, or for some other reason". 65. My only comment is that it can be shown ·that if that should happen, it would not be the fault of the Couneil; and that it is possible not to cause the Couneil ta become impotent or ta have its authority undermined either by the action of the parties or for some other reason. The representative of the United Kingdom himself stated later on in his speech that we ought to put before us the fairest and the most impartial nonns of conduct. 1 want to assure him that if we adhere ta the fairest and the most impartial manner of handling this question, the Couneil will not be impotent and the Council will not be undermined, either by the actions of at least one party or for some other reason. This matter is reaIly in the hands of the Council, in the hands of those members of the Councillike the United Kingdom. It is up ta them ta see ta it that the Council is not made impotent and that its authority is not undermined in tbis instance. 66. Finally, bath the representative of the United Kingdom and the representative of France stated that they had not heard any new arguments on this question. The representative of France even said that no new argument ~ould be given. l believe that there is still much to he said on this question. Since bath the representative of France and the representative of the United Kingdom still seem ta have an open mind on this question, 1 hope that, as the matter unfolds itself more fully, they will hear new arguments and will become more convinced than they are at present. 67. l would only say, in passing, that if everyone at this table would do bis best to remain faithful ta the ideals which aIl the representatives who spoke this afternoon had in mind and which were explieitly 68. de notre , sommes et aboutirons, FlANCE Edilions A. Poris V. UEEeE - GlECE "Eleflheroudo!:i.," tion. Athènes. liUATElULA Gouboud 2B, Guotemolo. HAITI Übroirie' "A 111·B, Port·ou.Prince. HONDUW Libror!o Ponomericono. 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