S/PV.666 Security Council

Permit me briefly to remind the Security CounciJ. what took place at our last meeting, and to define Council's present position towards the question before us, which we unfortunately failed to settle on 8 April. 2. No member of the Security Coundl put forward, as a result of the discussions at our last meeting, observation upon or objection ta the adoption of provisional age!lda of the Council as submitted April in dcument SIAgenda/665. 3. The debate raised a second question: the order in which ta discuss item 2 (O!) and item 2 (b) if provisional agenda was adopteJ. The divergencies opinion expressed on this matter are naturally fresh in our minds; and l suggest, to save time, . thel is no need to remind you, however brîefly, of various opinions expressed by members of the Council on this matter. 4. I shouJ.d like at this point ta ask the Council question. Would it not be advisable to refrain henœ- forth from discussing jointly these two questionsthe adoption of the agenda and the order of discussion of these items of the agénda which will eventually adopted? 5. It seems to me that the arder of discussion should be discussed separately, as was done - if I am not taken - when we consiclered the complaint by Israel against the action taken by Egypt in the Suez Canal. 6. l should like to ask the Council Whether it would be possible, in order :to save time, ta decide to adopt the provisionai agenda. appearing today in document SIAgenda/666, and. thereafter to consider the in which to discuss the two items of the agenda indicated in this document. 7. l consider that to adopt the agenda in this wottld not only not prejudge the question of the arder in which to discuss these two items, but would no general significance at aIl, since the question of ordèr of discussion will subsequently be considered separately by the Security. Couneil. 8. Mr. HOPPENOT (France) (trœnsla~ed French) : In reply ta the question which the President 10. The representative of BrRZiI made certain suggestions, and l wonder whether 1 could ask him to help me ta clear my mind by explaining his îdeas regarding our procedure.

Before caUing on other speakers, 1 should like to c1arify the point raised by the Danish representative. 12. While it is true that the ward "arder" W!l.S used in the translation, 1 did not have in mind only the sequence of consideration, i.e. whether we should first consider item 2 (a) of the provisional agenda and then take up item 2 (b), or whether we should take them in the opposite arder. As l see it, this is not the same question as we discussed at our last meeting. 1 have however, ventured to sum up what was said on the last occasion and to define the situation confronting the Council today in resuming discussion of a question which was not decided at our last meeting. · 13. · débats. savoir · tanément tion crois · question deux jour "Adoption Palestine", pour Ensuite thode à la faut · conjointetn..~nt! 3' 13. What l had in mind was the method of discussion, since at that meeting we debated whether to considet' these two questions, item 2 (al) and item 2 (b), together or separately. The question i5 primarily one of method; and to avoid any misunderstandings l should like the Council ta note that 1 propose that we should at this p,oint. disregard the question of the method of consldermg the first and second items, and should now ~dopt the agenda as it is set out, that iS,item 1, "Adopt!on of the agenda"; item 2, "The Palestine question", subitem (a), and then sub-item (b). We should merely adopt this agenda, and should then proceed ta discuss the. guestion dealt with at our last meeting.- the question of method: whether to consider item ~ (al) ~eparately from item 2 (b) or together with it. There IS yet another possibility: while considering item 2 (a) and then item 2 (b) we should a.llQW ourselves an 15.. That is why 1 purpose that in arder ta solve our difficulty - we are now holding a second lueeting without an agenda - we should make it our ~usiness to adopt the agenda. We could then consider what method to use in discussing the questions \ which constitute items 2 (a) and 2 (b) of the provisional agenda. 16. That is what 1 wished to say in clarification of the point raised, with every jastification, moreover, by the Danish representative, to the effect that in English and French the ward "order" has a meaning different from its meaning in Russian. That, of course, possible. 17. Mr. GOUTHIER (Brazil): At its last meeting, the Security Couneil was made aware of the opinion expressed by the various delegations concerning the procedure ta be followed in dealing with the issues we have before us. None of the suggestions put forward provided any acceptable comnlon ground. My delegation had the opportunity to assert its views as to the inter-relation of the it~ms listed on the agenda. I also pointed out that [665th meeting] : " ... it would perhaps he desirable if no member of the Couneil or representative of the parties involved were precluded from referring in their explar.ations ta sorne aspects of the whole Palestine question." 1.8. It was made clear that in one way or another the majority (,~ the members of the Couneil favoured general debate on the agenda. The representative Lebanon, had himself stated at the same meeting: "The only thing tha.t continues ta emerge is the fact that the Palestine issue is one general question which cannot be broken' up into pieces; and with this I am in complete agreement." Mr. Malik, however, did not agree with the views sorne of the members of this Council as to the way proceeding with the discussion. Unfortunately, it has not been possible, even after our lengthy debate, to reconcile the opposing opinions. 19. My delegation, after a careful examination of the records of the Palestine question, is inclined ta believe that our present difficulties could perhaps be overcome if the Security Couneil held a general discussion on the agenda as a whole, without committing itself ta embodying its conclusions in one, two or several draft resolutions. ZO. Indeed, my delegation considers that the final action to he taken on the complaints should be decided as a result of the general debate and at its conclusion. This seems ta us to be the logical course of action to follow under the eircumstances. 21. In arder ta avoid further discussions and what thretens to he deadlock, we should not at this early 22. 1 do not insist that we decide on my pr~vious proposai because 1 want to avoid a discussion which, in my opinion, will not lead ta a common accepted solutiln. If we follow the procedure we are now suggesting aud begin with a general discussion of aIl the items on the agenda, no one can prevent Mr. Malik, at the end of the debate - that means, at the proper stagefrom demonstrating to us, with aIl his eloquence, that an individual item on the agenda must he the object of a specifie resolntion. No )ne can prevent my Lebanese friend from moving a proposaI to that effectregarding for instance, the Nahhalin incident. For my r-art, 1 can assure the representative of Lebanon that 1 will then vote in favour of such a move, if 1 am convinr l 'that it is the proper step to be taken, in accordance with the best judgment of my delegation. 23. 1 am happy ta say that my viewson this subject are fully shared by my colleague from Co!ombia, Mr. Echeverri Cortes. 24. Having a conciliatory aim in view, 1 ventured to embody aIl these considerations in a suggestion, which the Brazilian and Colombian delegations have carefully studied, and 1 submit this to the Council as a new approach to the problem. 25. On ~ehalf of 0 olr two delegations, 1 suggest the following, which is not a formaI proposai: first, that the provisional agenda be adopted; second, that a generai discussion he held in which reference may he made to any or ail of the items of the agenda; and third, that the Security Counicl Council should not commit itself at this stage as to the separate or joint character of its eventual resolution or resolutions. 26. Mr. ECHEVERRI CORTES (Colombia) (tramsla~ed from Spanish): My delegation has listened with great interest to the masterly statement made by Mr. Gauthier, the representative of Brazil. 27. Both the delegations of Brazil and Colombia, which represent the Latin-American regional bloc on this Couneil and are therefore not directly concerned with the problems which have reœntly arisen in the Middle East, are of the opinion that for that very reason we are in an excellent position to make a suggestion which, we think, combines ·the points of view expressed by the representatives of the various countries members of the S<;:çurity ÇQ\lucil • sentant~

1 should like to speak now, not as President of the Security Couneil, but as replesentative of the Union of Soviet SoeiaIist Republics, since 1 promised at the meeting to state my point of view on this question today. 1 hope 1 shaH not take long. 31. The United States, United Kingdom, French, Turkish and New Zealand representatives,and now the Brazilian and Colombian representatives - although with certain reservations, as 1 understand their position - have expressed themselves in favour of a joint discussion of the two items of the provisional agenda, if it is adopted as the agenda of the Security Couneil. In this conne:.ICion Mr. Hoppenot pointed out tbat at the time of the discussion of Israel's complaint again;;t Egypt on 4 February 1954 [657th meeting] the USSR representative favoured a joint discussion of the two items. That was in fact the case. 32. At that time the USSR representative had advocated - and I hope to convince you that the attitude of the Soviet delegation has not changed - the simultaneous considération of the Israel and Egyptian complaints; our delegation felt that that method was more normal than a separate consideration of the two complaints. The reason for that position was that bath complaints, in our opinion, had to do with violations of the General Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel of 24 February 1949. 1 33. Actually, if you examine document S/3168 containing Israel's complaint against Egypt, which was based, according to Israel, on a violation of the Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel, you may arrive at the conviction that this is the crux of the matter - that is to say, that Egypt has violated the Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel. 34. On the other hand, if you examine document S/3172, you may arrive at the conviction that Egypt's complaint against Israel was based, as Egypt held, on a violation by Israel of the same General Armistice Agreement. The crux of Egypt's complaint, which was supported by Lebanon and Jordan [5/3195], lay in the appraisal of the facts, which should he examined independently. 35. That being the case, it was c1early much more correct to consider the two complaints jointly, and the USSR then considered the question accordingly. 36. In the Israel complaint now hefore us [5/3196], the centre of gravity is shifted to the repudiation by Jordan of its obligations under the Israel- Jordan General Armistice Agreement. 2 The Israel complaint 37. Thus, in the Israel ccmplaint the centre of gravi'i:y is shifted to the generai approach of the Government of Jordan towards its obligations under the Armistice Agreement, the .general policy of Jordan towards Israel, and the Jordan Govemment's refusaI to review that Agreetnent. 38. In these circumstances it may b~ asked, with ~eference now to the complaints by Egypt and Israel, what grounds there were for considering these corn plaints separate1y. In these circumstances there were, of course, no grounds for doing so· We were therefore at that tirne in hvour of considering those complaints simultaneously. That does not mean that aU ccmplaints which may at any time arise or be submitted to the Security Council concerning relations beLween Israel and the Arab States should in aU cases be considered together, without exception, irrespective of their substance - as is the case at present with regard, on the one hand, to the complaint by Lebanc!1, Jordan and t.~e other Arab States associated with them concerning certain acts by Israel, an.d on the other hand to Israel's complaint designed to evoke discussion of the general approach of Jordan to L'i.e Armistice Agreement, Jordan's refusal to rey{ew that Agreement, Jordan's general policy towards Israel, and so forth. 39. In our view tbis does not by any meanS signify that, in a11 cases where we have before us a complaint by Israel and a complaint, even if a con~rary one, by any Arab State, we must consider these complaints together irrespective of their substance. 40. That is why, considering that the substance of these complaints was one thing on one occasion and may he, and in fact is, another thing on another occasion, it is necessary to examine the question of what method to use in eXanlining complaints, depending upon what those complaints represent. 41. To the Soviet Union it appears that the simultaneous examinatî.on of complaints such as those which we are examining today - on the one hand the complaillt by Jordan and Leballon against Israel, and on the other hand the complaint by Israel against Jordan - is not necessary and is not even desirable, inasmuch as to <:ombine different questions, such as are raised by these two complaints, must inevitably complicate and obstruct the examination of the questions which make up the substance of those complaillts. 42. In February, when the Council was discussing a question or a series of questions arising out of complaints by Egypt, Israel and Lebanon,' we argued that theyshould be considered simultaneously. That was o?r logical position. At our last meeting Mr Hoppenot dld me the honour of recalling that fact, and he indicated that the representative of France would now bow to the logic of the Soviet Union. That, of course, is a vc;ry significant statement. l welcome MI'. Hoppenot's stat.ement that France bowed to the logic of the Soviet UnlOn, a statement he made here with full authority. 39. d'Israël ventionnell.:, ces quel 40. plaintes selon der en 41. même dont part, Israël Jordanie; deux différentes - l'examen 42. une découlant Liban, simultané. fait l'heure à la du, par officiel logique 43. confirme adoptée adoptée 43. A special feature of that statement is that it serves to confirm the soundness of the position we took at that time and the unsoundness of the position then taken by Mr. Hoppenot and the other representatives 45. In the record of that same meeting there is another'statement by Ml'. Hoppenot or the same statement expressed differently. His words were: "1 think should make it quite clear today that we have intention of combining these two types of questionthought admittedly they are part of a certain context... - in a single agenda." 46. Why on that occasion was Ml' Hoppenot opposed to combining those questions, although he now insists on doing so? He said that would cause confusion, would create a link between the two questions and would certainly contribute neither to impartial and objective consideration by the Conneil nor to a settlement of the question. 47. That was the logic Ml'. Hoppenot supported that time. We su,pported' a contrar}' logic. Now admits that our logic on that occasion was more correct. ';Yhy then does be now insist on repeating his past mistakes with regard to the matcer before today? If he admits our logic, he should really logical. He should follow consistently the path which we then proposed and which he now approves in retrospect. On the contrary, however, he is taking a diametrically opposite stand today in the teeth of aU logic. 48. In order to show Mt. Hoppenot how mistaken the position was which he adopted at that time and which he wishes to adopt now, let me point out that he is repeating what we proposed at that time for certain set of circumstances and he wishes, on theoretical grounds, to apply the same procedure to a different set of circumstances, while we now hold the opposite view. Speaking as the USSR representative, consider it more correct to consider these items not jointly but separately, since they relate to different matters of substance. 49. To show how wrong that position was, l should remind the French representative that the complaints did not relate to different '5Ubjeds at aIl, in spite 51. Thus, Mr. Lodge also felt that the two questions should not be reduced to one, that they should not be discussed simultaneously, but separately. Now, somehow, with God's help, there has been an abrupt swicth ta the opposite point of view. 52. You may say: "You also have changed your point of view. At that time you insisted on a joint discussion, whereas you now insist on separate discussions." 53. Let me explain: l insisted on joint discussion because those complaints dealt with the same subject matter. Now l propose separate discussion because the subjects are now different. The crux of Israel's complaint has to do with Jorda11's general attitude towards its obligations under the Armistice Agreement, its general policy, its refusaI to review the Agreement, and the like. To what did the Egyptian complaint refer? The crux· of that complaint was not at all the same, but had to do rather with the appraisal of evidence relating ta concrete incidents which called for ind.epenâent decisions; it had nothing to do with general policy, the need to modify or review the Armistice Agreement, or the need to compel the other sicle to abandon aggressive methods. ~aisis revanche, c'est différentes. de Convention pays, Convention, en traitait; certains décisions tique vention reviser actes partie. 54. n de tions leur faut compte 54. It dealt with entirely different matters. It did not charge that the other side had "attacked", "kiUed", or "plundered" - charges which require the most serious examination. This was an entirely different question, and the reasons underlying it were entirely different. 1 do not believe we should throw everything iuto one pile, ignoring the <'.ctual subject matter of either complaint. 55. l repeat: this is my point of view as the USSR representative. 56. If Mr. Hoppenot, Mr. Lodge, Sir Pierson Dixon and my other colleagues on the Security Council feel that the joint discussion of these two complaints is possible and even adyisable, why did they abject ta it so strenuously on 4 February? 1 do not know. 55. en 56. Pierson sécurité ces opposés février? 57. déclaration 57. l cannot, moreover, pass over Sir Pierson's statement that the United Kingdom Government - if l 58. But if the United Kingdom Government intends to propose a meeting of the Security Council for special consideration of the Palestine question as whole, then what logical ground can there be for taking up the discussion of this question of incidents, not as a special question, not in aIl due seriousness, but so to speak "en passant" as an incidental matter? 1 believe that to do so would be not only pointless but incorrect. 59. Indeed, to aIl 1 hav~ already said 1 should add yet another consideration, which, it seems to me, is of some and even of considerable significance. It is proposed tha" we should have an opportunity to discuss any and aIl matters connected with the Palestine question under one item, "the Palestine question". Please, in that case, explain what it is you mean to discuss - the Armistice Agreement, Jordan's refusal to attend a joint meeting, or its refusal to review the Armistice Agreement, on the one hand, or Israel's refusal to pay compensation for the damage suffered by the Arabs, for which they are claiming compensation, on the other hand? What precisely is meant at the present time by a discussion of "the Palestine question" as a whole? 60. l fail to understand this. No proposaI in this regard has bem drafted and submitted to the Council. Sir Pierson Dixon has said: "We intend to raiee such an,d such a matter." l hope, however, that when the United Kingdom Government does raise this question, the Council will be told clearly and explicitly what precisely it is to discuss. VVhat, howevel~, can we say about this at the present time? As for the references to "the Palestine question" general:y, of what exactly does this question consist? 61. A specifie proposaI forthe consideration of this question has not been submitted to the CounciI. The Council has received no proposal to include in the agenda the whole "Palestine question". Dn the other hand, we have the individual episode& referred to in our agenda. Sorne parties accuse one side, others the other side. 62. Our agenda, however, also includes other questions. The Israel complaînt [5/3196], for example contains the following passage: "The specific violations enumerated above iIIustrate the general approach of the Government of Jordan towards its obligations under the Armistice Agreement. They are part and parcel of a general policy of hostility towards Israel which is maintained and aggravated by a campaign of hate and incitement to war. "These actions and policies of the Government of Jordan constitute a virtual repudiation of the General Armistice Agreement in both letter and spirit ..." 65. cinq sures le de dégâts la a 66. d'examiner. ces que quel Cette banditisme, rien reste dans Conseil pourra-t-il après qu'il d'ailleurs prendra le 67. laquelle de 68. dont ces sons? précédents l'examen verrions me nable. 69. décide Cela écarter une de points jour: faut ne tionner plus des tuent 66. Here are concrete facts that call for discussion, and you say: let us discuss these concrete faets in conne..xion wi:th Jordan's general policy against Israel. But what do these hets have to do with a general policy? A general policy may be a good one; bandit raids are very, bad, and may have nothing to do with general policy, but the responsibility for them must he deterrnined in each case. Tha:t is what must be considered first. Perhaps aftel' preliminary consideration of these concrete facts it will he possible to draw certain general conclusions, and that will be the time ta discuss general policy, which time, in myopinion, will come when the United Kingdom proposes consideration of the general question by the Security Council. 67. Consequently another question arises, which l should like to expléÙn from the point of view of the USSR. 6K How can we discuss this question if we allow these two items to he discussed separately, as was suggested by us? l recall that one of the speakers on this question proposed that we should proceed ta discuss items 2(a) and 2(b), after which it would be clear what further steps shol.lld be taken with respect to the nature of the resolutions. l believe that is a very sound point of view. 69. Let us assume that the Security Couneil agrees to conduct the discussion by individual items. Does that mean that not a word can be uttered which does not relate to these items? t consider that this would be wrong. As the representative of the Soviet Union, 1 hold that these two items should be examined just as they appear in the agenda - first item 2 ((li) and then 2 (b); but memheïs of the Couneil could not he prevented from mentioning, in the course of the debate, broader political issues, provided they were kept within reasonable limits in order to avoid substitutivO' one question for another. 71. Thus, speaking as ilie USSR representative, believe that it would he advisable ta consider these two complaints in the arder in which they appear b. the provisional agenda, but, in our discussion of these complaints, there should be nothing to prevent our referring, ,vithin certain reasonable limits and ta certain reasonable degree, to other more general questions, in so far as they relate ta ~he complaints in question and ta the facts set forth in the complaints, which we must correctly evaluate. 72. Sir Pierson DIXON (United Kingdom): We are still debating the adoption of the agenda. l recall that, when l was speaking on this item at our last meeting, the President called me ta arder and asked me to confine myself more closely to procedural questions. l then indicated that the borderline between procedure and substance is a shadowy one. l think that Mr. Vyshinsky's speec~l has shown that it is nonexistent. 73. Let me try first to deal with this point of procedure. l take it that what we all want is ta get forward withthe discussion of our business. It will obviously be best if we can take one ,bite at the cherry instead of two and deeide in one bath ta ·adopt the agenda and the method of discussing it. l believe that this suggestion of the representative of Brazil, which was supported by the representative of Colombia, enables us ta do this. listened attentively to what Mr. Gouthier said. 74. At the beginning of the last meeting l suggested - although l did not make any formal proposalthat the Couneil should consider the two items on the draft agenda as a whole. It seems to me that the essential requirements of my delegation are met by the suggestion put forward by Brazil and Colombia; in the hope that it will prove a generally acceptable compromise to the Couneil, l am prepared to accept 75. Now ta come, as l feel l may with confidence, the main Issue faeing us. l found myself agreeing prehy fully with what Mr. Vyshinsky said in his analysis, but l Was astounded by his conclusion. Mr. Vyshinsky, in his allalysis, laid stress, and rightly, on the contention that the ~ecurity Couneil must not bind itself .rigidly to follow precedent in deciding whether te. take related items separately or together. "It depènds on circumstances" is what he $ilid, :a~ then 76. My Government and the' Govermnent of the Soviet Union may well take a different view of what the circumstances demand; there is' no dispute about that, and we evidently do in the present circumstances. My Government thinks that the circumstances surrounding the troubled border of Israel and Jordan demands a general treatment of the complaints hefore us. 1 will explain in a moment more precise1y what we have in mind, but evidently Mr. Vyshinsky thinks differently. It is not for me, as 1 have said, ta question his point of view. He did not show any awareness that a serious state of affairs exists on this border. 1 am very much aware of that, and 1 think that l cannat, in holding that view, he accused of any lad<: of logic in arguing as 1 have been arguing. It seems tu me, if 1 may say so, that the representative of the Soviet Union has some strange ideas as to the meaning of my remarks at our last meeting. 1 thought I then made it c1ear that, in the view of my Government, since the two items are inter-related the Council should consider them as a whole. I will elaborate a little on what 1 had in mind. ren~.. situation et plaintes j'expliquerai évidemment, Comme opinion attitude, qui côté, peut présentation cette l'Union conceptions observations Je de liens examiner 77. d'engager comme définitive c'est drait une cas convoquer rité. que, détaillée et pour 78. cette ce discussion blème quelque en Conseil comme mixte selon dent vention gation de signalant ï7. It was not my intention to ask the Coundl ta embark on any discussion which might be regarded as an attempt to work out a final solution of the Palestine problem. This goal, unfortunately, seems a long \Vay off, and a greater degree of confidence than at present exists between the parties concerned must first be established. Nor did I suggest a special meeting of the Security Council. What 1 made <:Iear, 1 hope, was that it does not seem to me that a piecemeal discussion of individual incidents, however serious and deplorable they are in themselves, will he the best procedure for the Coundl to follow. 78. Let. me make it quite clear that in s~)'Ïng this 1 do not mean, as the representative of Lebanon seemed to fear, that his item which standsfirst on the provisional agenda should be smothered or in any way obscured by a general debate on the whole border problem. An incident such as the Nahhalin attack, for which the Mixed Armistice Commission found Israel guilty and which appears on the face of it to have the c10sest resemblance to the Qibya incident, is certainly a matter for the consideration of the Council. As 7 said in my intervention at our last meeting, my del-. gation believes: "... that the Jordan Government has acted with a due sense of its international responsibilities in bringing this attack to the notice of the Sectlrity .Council." 79. The Council, 1 submit, must shoulder its responsibilities for maintaining peace and security in this tr-oubled area, but the Council as a whole will, 1 am sure, wish to consider what the most dangerous features are in the present situation and how it can help to reduce the existing state of tension betW'een Jordan and Israel. If it is to do this, it must he allowed to review the existing state of tension on either side of the armistice demarcation lines, with particular reference to the Israel-Jordan border areas, and to do this in as calm and as objective a manner as possible. 80. ,Finally, ta my mind, the two complaints before us provide the Council with an adequate starting point for such a full review. It is hecause 1 hope and helieve that such a review W'ould enable the Council ta reach helpful and practical conclusions and thus to open way for an improvement of the border situation that 1 support the suggestion of Brazil and Colombia.

The French delegation fully supports the proposaI submitted ta the Security Council by the representative of Brazil and seconded by the representative of Colombia. 82. That proposal seems ta me ta provide a just and honourable conclusion to this protracted argument and, if 1 may venture to do so, l am bound ta congratulate Mr. Gouthier on his submission of it. 83. 1 really think that this line of procedure, explained by the representative of Brazil, should also meet aU the legitimate demands of the Arab States explained to us by Mr. Malik, and 1 should like that connexion ta join with the representative of the United Kingdom in assuring him that, as he seemed ta fear at our last meeting, it 1S certainly not the intention of the French delegation to lose sight of sucb incidents as that of Nahhalin in a general debate. 84. The French delegation attributes no less importance to an incident such as that W'hich occurred at the village of "Nahhalin than that which it attributed the incident at the village of Qibya some months ago. It is certainly not our intention to connive at a procedure which would mean that that reprisaI incident would be censured less severely by the Council than that of Qibya. 85. Once ·that has been sa~d, 1 sincerely hope that the representative of Lebanon will be inspire4 br the "Today's agenda includes "The Palestine question". l ask you, does not Egypt's complaint against Israel, the details of which are given in the two letters of 2 and 6 October and in the present request for inclusion of the question in the agenda, in fact form part of this same Palestine question of which Israel's complaint is another part?" 89. l sha11 read out one more quotation from the statement made by the representative of the Soviet Union: "I agree with the opinion expressed here by another speaker, that simu1taneous consideration of bath these complaints will ensure far greater objec- ,tivity and freedom of action in their evaluation; Will ensure that we weigh not only such circumstances, facts and data as may be relevant or may be adduced during consideration of the complaint brought by one side, but also those connected with the complaint submitted by the other side." 90. l do not cite these quotations in any spirit of adverse criticism. l do not think there is anything wrong in people or governments changing their minds. 1 am frank to admit that our thinking in the United States Government on this matt,er has indeed evolved. 92. 1 heard the representative of the Soviet Union give one of the ingenious argum~nts he is accustomed to make in which he said that when you give yourself a black eye in walking through a forest at night, it is one tree that gives it to you and not the whole forest. 1 think that is what he said. That reminds me of something that 1 read in the newspaper yesterday which was attributed to a Russian scientist - 1 think his 1lame was Lysenko. He was illustrating the effect of environment on living creatures. According to this newspaper story, he had a trained flea and when he would say "jump" the flea would jump. Then he eut off the flea's hind legs and said "jump", and the flea did not jump. He then tumed to the audience and said: "You see the effect that cutting off the flea's hind legs has on its auditory faculty." 1 think that is the kind or reasoning that has heen indulged in here this afternoon when we try to attach such great importance ta this matter of consistency. 93. The plain fact that we confront - and aIl of us who see it broadly must recognize it - is that the situation has changed; it has evolved, and in order to meet it our thinking must evolve too. 94. Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): The Palestine question is not an easy issue. This is, 1 suppose, somewhat of an understatement. It is reasonable also to say that it is particularly difficult for those of us who are directly involved in it. The other members of the Council can, 1 am sure, give those of us who are thus involved incalculable help. 1 have therefore pondered this question very seriously during the last few days, and 1 have set up for myself a rule of conduct with regard to this difficult problem. It is made up 'of four points: 'first, say nothing provoeative; second, allow yourself to be provoked by nothing; third, let concern for peace and justice govem your thought; fourth, never lose your sense of humour. And that last point includes, among other things, two matters: first, never be sarcasticwhich is important - and, second, try never to he unworthy of the great issues at stake, both political and spiritual. 95. These are roles of conduet for myself. 1 am not qualified ta moralize to anybody else; 1 will he a very lucky persan if 1 can successfully moralize to myself. 1 therefore we1come the tone whieh has appeared in many of the speeches that we have heard this afternoon. 1 believe that such a tone will prove helpful in the long run. 96. Concerning the statement made at our last meeting by the representative of the United Kingdom, 98. The representative of the United States then went on ta say that "this repeated resort to the policy of reprisaI and retaliation must stop". 99. This is really the crux of the matter. Let us be assured that this poliey of alleged retaliation and reprisaI will stop, and the entire pieture in the Near East will be altered. But our whole contention is that you cannot make any progress toward happier conditions there with this policy dominating the minds of some people. 100. Tt follows, as l shall argue at length at the ppropriate time, that any action taken by any government or bythe Security Council which confirms people in the belief that the Near Eastern situation can be resolved only through the means of "a policy of reprisal and retaliation" is inimical to peaceful progress in the Near East. 101. This is a most important point and we ought aIl to think about it; indeed,as l have said, let the representative of Israel tell Ils that this policy has come to an end - and that announcement, it seems ta me, will mark the beginning of a new era in the Near East. But, as long as we live under the peril of the unbridled continuance of this poliey, there can, of course, be no peace in that part of the world, and it is hopeless to try to bring the Arabs to any conference or any discussion of these matters. 102. l listened with great care to what the representative of Brazil put before us this afternoon. He quoted a statement that l made at the 665th meeting, whieh went as follows: "The only thing that continues to emerge is the fa~t that the Palestine issue is one general question 1(:)4. I would only beg of them to persist in their sense of detachment, complete detachment, not only with respect to the Arabs and the Israelis, but also with respect to the great Powers. If the Latin-American countries can persist in their impartiality and sense of d~tachment, with respect both to the Arab-Israeli dispute and to the interests· of the great Powers, they are destined to play - and they will play - an important role of reconciliation in our part of the world. 105. As for the specifie proposaI which the representatives of Brazil and Colombia have put before us, I will say a word about that in a moment. First, I want to summarize my position and to beg the members of the Council to show me where I am mistaken in this position. 106. I welcomed the principle which the representative of the United States mentioned today, that it is no sin for anybody to evolve in his ideas and in his opinions when he sees new evidence. I would he quite prepared to change my mind in this case if only the representatives would argue with me about them, if o~ly they would disprove my thesis and if only they would be kind enough to treat us here as colleagues and not as pariahs to be presented with ultimatums. When we are faced with such a situation, then our imttiediate reactiou is to say: "you can have them, we do not want them." Therefore, 1 would invite the representatives to refute the arguments which I shall now very briefly summarize and which constitute our outlook on this problem. f07. The first argument is this: we have presented a complaint in good order, and we want it debated and discussed. We want the Council to take a decision on it..We do not want the Council to change the bases cf our complaint. We be1ieve the com,plaint is an 109. That, then, is our first argument. We have presented an orderly complaint, and we want it debated in an orderly manner. We do not want the hase of the debate to be· enlarged because that will smother the acuteness and the horror of what happened in the incident which gave rise to our complaint. We think that would not he fair, because that would he changing the issue before us. If the representatives want a general debate - l repeat what l have said berore - we have no objection to that debate taking place at the proper time. 1t seems tJ us that it would he unfair for that debate to start just as we submit our complaint, since that complaint is of such a radical nature. That is the first point l wish to make, and l want it discussed. 1lO. The second point l would raise concems the question of precedents. 1t is true, as the representative of the United States told us at our last meeting, that precedents are of a mixed charadel'. There are precedents in which the Security Council has lumped together a whole series of complaints in one general debate, and there is a recent precedent, to which sèveral representatives have referred this aftemoon. Ta reply to the argument presented by the rep:resentative of the Unïted States with regard to such a precedent, l would simply say that in that precedent where six distinct items were lumped together in one general debate, so far as l have been able to ascertain, no objection was raised by any member of the Coundl against having such a general debate. There was no objection to the Council's having a general debate on the matter, and that debate was he1d with the complete agreement of everyone. 111. That, however, is not the case at present. At present, there is the strongest objection ta such a procedure. The precedent that has been cited, therefore, dos not hold good as regards the present case. The only real precedent that holds good here is that of 4 February - and neither Inor the Soviet Union representative, whom l should like to thank for what he has said today, is responsible for what happened on 4 February. At that time, there were two distinct complaints Defore the Council; some representatives 116. The thil"d point - and l have already referred ta it in, passing - is this: After all, we are elected by the General Assembly to memhership of the Security Council for the purpose of representing the interests of the United Nations as a whole. In our particular case, l knowthat every member here helped us to be elected, voted for us in the General Assembly. In those circumstances, it is not becoming for us ta come 'ta the Couîlcil with a position that does not admit of give and take, of compromise. Such a policy cannot succeed in the present instance because, as l ventured to suggest ,at the beginning of my remarks, the issues which are now being considered.are very difficult and complex. The Cauneil therefore cannot try to impose any solution without a thorough debate characterised by flexibility and understanding. 117. l therefore invite representatives to argue with us, ta debate with us, to take counsel with us coneerning the correct procedure to follow in the present instance. This is an inlportant point. Hence, l we1come the tone of the statements this, afternoon, which seemed to indicate that there was sorne sort of tendency t'Jwards accepting the possibility of taking counse1 toge 1er. 118. The fourth point is one ta which both the United Kingdom representative and the· representative of France referred; name1y, our fear - which l honestly helieve .is well-grounded and realthat an attempt is being made in high quarters to smother, 119. If 1 am told that the United Kingdom and France have never had any intention of drowning or hefuddling the Nahhalin incident, I cau only remark in aU humility that the similarity between the policy which the United Kingdom representative and the representative of France are attempting ta. follow as regards the question of procedure anâ Israel's poliey in that respect is a very strange coincidence. Israel has been trying ta do precisely what those representatives are trying to do. And here I must say thatwith, 1 am surez the best intentions in the worldthe representatives of the great Western Powers have fallen in with the execution of Israel's policy. I repeat: the coincidence is very strange. 120. There is another argument which 1 should like to have answered and refuted, namely, the question of the gun to which 1 referred at the Council's last meeting. 1 could quote many passages from books and speeches to prove my argument; 1 could prove it by reca1ling actions. But, I promise the Council, 1 sha1l a1ways restrrJn myself in this connexion, because we are dealing with difficult matters. It cau be demonstrated that there are people who believe that the Arabs will yield only ta force - here, I use only those general terms - and that in order to bring the Arabs ta the conference table, one must e..'Cecute another Qibya; the first one did not succeed, and therefore another must be executed. 121. The United States representative tells us that conditions have changed. I can only say that I wish he nad made that statement before Nahhalin. To make the statement after Nahhalin is precise1y to confirm the opinion of some persans that the Arabs will come ta the conference table only if force is used upon them. In this connexion, 1 can say only what I said at the last meeting: such a policy will not succeed. It is not reasonable to expect the' Arabs either to enter into a general debate or to come to a conference table at the point of a gun, a gun used according te the belief that the Arabs will yield only to force. 122. First, remove the gun - remove the threat of the gun and of what the representatïve of the United States referred to at the last meeting. Let it be ensured first that these policies of reprisaI and reta1iation sha11 stop, and then come to us and test us as to our good will. But to mix the two things together at the present moment seems to me an unfair and irregular mode of procedure and one that will never work. 124. Another point which l should like to have refuted is the one to which l adverted at the last meeting when l asked how members of the Councl: who wished to enlarge th~ basis of our debate knew that we had not a whole series of things that we should like to dump into this basin that they were holding before us. Indeed, l suggested one such item at the last meeting, and l can suggest half a dozen more if members real1y want, as one representative has put it, to open the gates to a general, unlimited debate on this question. l do not believe that that would lead to understanding: and peace at the present moment. 125. Finallx, l come to a remark whicr. 1 made at the last meeting and which has a bearing on the proposaI submitted by the representative' of Brazil. In principle we have no objection to a general debate. l stated at the last meeting - and it m~ be verified by reference to the text of my statement then - that we had no objection to a general debate in principle, provided it came at the right'time and in connexion with the right topie. It seems, therefore, that we are approaching a kind of agreement, and 1 do hope that we may in fact agree. If it is said: "Let us have a general debate", l shall reply, "1 am not opposed in principle to that, provided it takes place at the right ti:nE' and in connexion with the right subject". It seems to me that we ought to narrow down this disagreement hetween ourselves and ta see if we cannot explode it altogether. 126. The representative of Brazil certainly has made an adnùrable attempt, but l shall tell him quite frankly that while l welcome his initiative, and while l want Brazil and Colombia - and the whole o"! the Latin- American worId - to retain and deepen their interest in our affairs, l feel at the same time.that his attempt should be improved upon, and l hope that he will allow 127. What is the position of the representative of Brazil? He feels we should have a general debate without prejudice to the manner in which the Council would act upon the resolutions that might emerge from that general debate. In other words, have the general debate first and leave open the question of specific resolutions or the. order of those resolutions. That is the sequence, that is the procedure which the representative of Brazil has in mind: a general debate first, leaving open the question of specific resolutions. 128. In conformity with the principle which the representative of the United States put to us this afternoon, my mvn thinking has moved a little - but not quite a'l. far as the Brazilian representative's position, because that does not guarantee me anything at aU; it leaves me completely in the air. l concede the general debate without any certainty that l shall have any specific draft resolution afterwards. 129. Could we not do both? If you really want to compromise and to move a little towards a position that could be acceptable to us, l suggest either that we have the general debate now, with the assurance that t~e specifie action for which we caU will be allowed after the general debate, or that we proceed to the specifie action noW, and then follow it immediate1y with the general debate. This shows that, even at the present time, l have admitted the possibility of the general debate, but l daim it should take place only after we have disposed of our specifie complaint. My position has moved, but l have not gone quite so far as the representative of Brazil. If we adopted his method of proceeding there would be no possibility of action upon my complaint after we had finished the general debate. 130. l, therefore, invite representatives to think about my suggestion which is a kind of refinement of the Brazilian representative's position, or a sort of amendment to that position. In other words, we could decide either to open the general debate - provided the Council, when it decides to begin the general debate, decides that we can consider the Nahhalin incident independently after we have finished with the general debate - or to dispose first of the Nahhalin incident and then go on to the general debate.

Could we not continue the meeting until 7 p.m., as the Security Council has frcquent1y done in the past? 135. If at 7 p.m. it becomes dear that aIl the speakers on the list have not conc1uded their speeches, or turther speakers have asked for the floor, we can rise and adjourn the meeting until another day. Vve have taken u.p two meetings in discussing the agenda, and that is quite exceptional. If by making this special effort we could finish this debate this evening, l think that théit procedure would be proper and would meet the wishes of aU memhers of the Council. 136. The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian) : There are two proposaIs: the first is to adjourn today's meeting until anc,.her day, and to fix the day separately; the second, which bas been moved now by Mr. Hoppenot, is to continue the meeting until 7 p.m. 137. l will put those proposaIs to the vote in the order of their submission. 138. Mr. HOPPENOT (France) (translated fro'm French) : l did not quite understand. Which delegation proposed that the meeting should adjourn at once?

Certain delegations have proposed that we adjourn today's meeting and fix another day for our next meeting. The Soviet delegation, in particular, agrees. But 1, as President, am observing the rules laid down tor the work of the Security Council. At 6 p.m. the meeting is usuaUy adjourne~. It is continued beyond 6 p.m. in special c:"cumstances. If Mr. Hoppenot considers that speciaI circumstances exist which do not permit adjournment of the meeting at 6 p.m., perhaps he will be good enough to explain his position. 140. But it seems to me that these disputes are merely taking up time. It Would he better simply to take a vote. 141. Mr. GOUTHIER (Brazil): l formaUy propose that we shouldcontinue with our meeting until 7 p.m. this evening, and that we _-~lOuld then adjourn ~ntil Tuesday) 20 April. l make this proposaI for religious reasons and also to give the members of the Council the possibility of exploring other avenues and other suggestions. 142. Mr. WADSWORTH (United States of America) : As l understand the formai proposaI just made by the representative of Brazil, it is that wc should accept the suggestion of the representative of France that the Council continue its meeting until 7 p.m. this cvening and then adjourn until Tuesday, 20 April, this longer period being occasioned by the unusuaUy long reHgiou~h9lidays j1.1:lt around. the 'corner, as weIl as o~ the time of adjournment of our meeting today and on the date of our next meeting. 144. Furthermore, although 1 have the deepest respect for the religious reasons put forward by the representative of Brazil, 1 must venture ta point out that the Economie and Social Council and the Commission on Huma.Tl Rights are going ta sit throughout the week ~ 1 think that those meetings ",ill he attended by Catholics as devout and as anxious to fulfi1 their religious obligations as those on the Security Coundl. 1 therefore see no imperative reason why we should not meet before next week, particularly since work is a form of prayer.

1 am afraid that we shaH argue about this question until 7 p.m. and shaH not leave ourselves anY time to discuss the substance. 1 therefore propose that we curtail disussion and merely vote on Mr. Gouthier's proposaI to adjourn today's meeting .at 7 p.m. Those in favour, please arise your hands. Who agrees to continue the meeting until 7 p.m.? 146. Mr. Gouthier insists that we should also vote on the other part of this proposal, to hold the next meeting on Tuesday, 20 April. 147. Mro HOPPENOT (France) (translated jrom French): My proposaI was submitted first, and 1 ask that it shaH be voted upon first, separately, and without additions. 148. Mr. GOUTHIER (Brazil) : 1 have no objection to having the French representative's proposaI put to the vote first, but after a vote has been taken on this preliminary issue, 1 would request a vote on the second question, namely that the Security Coundl should meet on 20 April in order to give the Coundl more time to explore the possibilities of the suggestions put forward by us, and also ror religious reasons, which 1 beg the members to consider.

1 therefore ask the Security Council whether members desire to continue today's work until 7 p.m. If there is no objection, we shaH continue until 7 p.m. . It was so decided. 150. The PRESIDENT (traMSlated fram Russian): The second questionis whether the date of the next meeting shaH be Tuesday, 20 April. 151. Sir Pierson DIXON (United Kingdom): 1 shollid prefer ta keep an open mind about that until we see how far we get between 6.15 and 7 p.m. 1 suggest that we spend the extra three-quarters of an hour which we have left to see whether we can make progress. Let us wait until we reach the hour of 7 p.m. of five minutes before, to decide on the dat~ Qf our next meeting. Against: China, France, New Zealand. Abstaining: Denmark, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The resz/lt of the vote was 5 in favour, 3 against, with 3 abstentions. The proposaI was not a:dO'pted, having failed to obtain the affirnUEtive votes of seven members. 155. The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): VVe will now continue our debate on the substance. 156. Mr. TSIANG (China): 1 shaH be extreme1y brief. 1"have asked ta intervene again in this debate partly because 1 find from the verbatim record that 1 did not make myself c1ear at the 665th meeting and partly because 1 find that the Brazilian proposaI is not completely c1ear to me. 1 should like to say at once that the Brazilian proposaI is, on the whole, acceptable to my de1egation. Therefore, 1 should like ta have that proposaI c1arified. 157. In order to make my point clear beyond any question of doubt, 1 shall soon move an amendment to the Brazilian proposaI. 1 think that my amendment is in the nature of a clarification. However that may be, l shall leave it to the representative of Brazil to decide. 158. The Brazilian proposaI contains three propositions, the first of which is that the provisional agenda should he adopted. 1 fully support that provision. It is only natural that that should be the first item of our procedure. 159. 1 find that 1 have some difficulty with the second proposition; 1 do not quite understand what it means. It reads : "A general discussion shall be held in which reference ma}' be made to any or all of the items of the agenda." My, difficulty is with the expression "general discu5~ion". When we have complaints of this kind, the genèral discussion usually starts with the presentation oi the substance of the complaint. That in fact, is the beginning of the general discussion. 1s that what this proposition means? Or does it mean that this time we shall proceed without the presentation of the substance of the complaints? 1 think not. 1 cannot believe that it is the intention of the representative of Brazil to move that in this case the discussion should be general, without having the stage of the presentation, 161. Therefore, we must first of aU find the facts, and we must deal with the facts in relation to particular incidents. \Ve have complaints of incidents that have occurred in various places - people killed and a bus overturned - and we must find out who killed whom, 'where, with what weapons and what were the consequences. Those are the types of particularized facts that we must obtain in the first instance. 162. 1 would suppose that the phrase "general discussion" means that we shall start the general discussion by having the substance of the complaints presented to us. In this particular case, 1 suppose that we shall start with item 2 (a) and ask the representative of Lebanon or the representative of Jordan to present the case to us and to give us aIl the facts. Then we must naturally give the representative of Israel the right to reply, to tell us whether or not he accepts those faets and to tell us 1i'hether he has any additional facts. Tt may be that W'~ shall want to have supplementary information from the Mixed Armistice Commission. Members of the Council may have additional facts or information to place at our disposaI. We may wish ta ask questions of one party or the other relating to the facts. That would be the normal procedure. . 163. When we have conc1uded with item 2 (a), we can consider item 2 (b) and follow the same procedure. The representative of Israel would undoubtedly be the first speaker in order to present his case, and the representative of Lebanon or the representative of Jordan would reply. We would try to secure additional facts and we might put questions. After that, we might then usefully discuss the question in general terms. 164. Therefore, in arder to make this point dear beyond a question of doubt, 1 move an amendment to insert after the first point, namely that the provisional agenda be adopted, a new second.point to read something like this: "2. The substance of the complaints shall be presented in the order of the agenda." 1 believe that the order must be observed. The complaint of Lebanon came to us a few days before the other complaint. That much we must do. 1 personally feel that when the representative of Brazil used the term "general discussion", he did have in mind that the general discussion should begin with the presentation of the substance. Since that is a point of considerable importance, 1 would like te see it written into the proposaI. 168. On the other hand, 1 am not sure that my amendment will meet the desires of my other colleagues here. From the speeches that 1 have heard, 1 am not sure exactly where many of the members of the Council stand. To those who have advocated from the very beginning a general discussion, 1 would say that after all, Lebanon put its complaint before the Council ahead of the other romplaint. That priority must be given sorne measure of recognition. In the second place, the incident complained of is a serious incident and an important incident, and it deserves the exclusive and devoted attention of the Security Council for a time. 1 cannot specify how much time we should devate to discussing it and trying to find out the facts. But the Security Council should give that complaint exclusive attention for a tfme. Otherwise, we shalllay the Council open ta the obvious accusation that we are again indulging in a manœuvre, that we are trying ta dilute the complaint, ta drown it, ta overshadow it, to throw :'t away by the back door. 1 am sure that that is not the intention of even thase who advocate general discussion right away. 169. l therefore know the limitations of my amendment - if it is an amendment. 1 know in what \vay it may disappoint the representative of Lebanon ; 1 know in what way it may disappoint those who advocate general discussion right off. Nevertheless, 1 hope that the r,~presentative of Brazil will accept that amendment and 1 hiJpe that most of my colleagues will accept it, because 1 think that the procedure it proposes is the natural procedure and also the only fair and just procedure. 170. Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): The idea of compromise is an ambiguous one. It is not, 1 am certain - all of us know this - a univocal notion. Or let me P1.!t it this way: If compromise is agenus, it has several species. And 1 suggest two simple species be10nging ta the notion of compromise: apparent compromise and real compromise. Now we are obviously not children. Therefore we cannat be taken by apparent compromise; we can accept only a real move in the direction of compromise. 1 am certain that the ideas put forward by the representative of China were intended ta achieve a position that would be considered as real compromise. And yet, at the same time, 1 heard him o trer, je indépendamment d'autres tater de qui - de à en n'est 172. ne rapports Président l'alinéa de suspens vrai, latitude ment sau:",ions des décision sion, non résolution. bien point, de même, gâteau, faudra d'assurances Nahhalin, 173. nous qu'un duire l'alinéa 2, tion figure raître avoir c'est-à-dire Conseil sur j'auraia vue positif. nous atteindre l'humble gâteau - 29 172. The representative of China has said' that we cannot discuss item 2 (a) without seeing what bearing item 2 (b) has upon it. That is what the President also said; he said that while'discussing item 2 (a) we might discuss the effect of item 2 (b) upon it. But we should not leave a decision on 2 (a) in suspense. l suggest that while discussing 2 (a) we couId discuss whatever has a strict relevance ta the point at issue, but we cannot discuss 2 (œ), bring out aIl the facts, move on to 2 (b) , bring out aIl the facts there, and then be left at that stage in our deliberations completely undecided concerning the central point - whether the Nahhalin incident will be the subject of a resolution. The Nahhalin incident stands in a class by itself. To leave us in doubt about that point - which is the real issue behind all our debates at our previous meeting and today - and to have at the same time your other cake - your cake of a general debate sooner or later - and to eat it tao - which in this case means giving us no assurance whatever about the Nahhalin incident - is not a real compromise. 173. If the representative of China had gone on to suggest that we shou1d discuss item 2 (a) in detail, and someone else had suggested that we should bring in whatever we know about item 2 (b), so that after we had discussed 2 (a) we cou1d move on ta 2 (b) and bring in every possible matter bearing upon 2 (b), general and particular, from (a) ta (c) or even to (q) that might turn up later on; if he had said that after we had dea1t with (a) and (b) in this manner, without at that stage taking a decision on either of them, the Counci1 shou1d go back and take decisions on them in arder, or at least on (a), then l would have understood that to be an effort in the direction of real compromise, of substantive and positive compromise. 174. But we should all, l suggest, avoid the sembl~nce of things and if possible get at the heart of thl11gs. Therefore, l again very humbly say that' you cannat have your cake - the general debate, the general problem, all these things that the representatives of the

The Security Council is dealing with an important matter, but 1 do '1ot think that by prolonging the discussion at this hour we are advancing towards a decision. 177. We have had the advantage of listening to important observations by the representatives of China and Lebanon. 1 de not wish to prejudge what we should do, but 1 repeat that 1 do not think that, in the dying hours of what is our normal period of debate, we caD usefully prolong this discussion. 178. This is, hmvever, obviously an urgent matter, and, with the greatest respect for the representative of Brazil, 1 think that an adjournment until Tuesday 20 April is too long. No doubt sorne members will wish to consult among themselves, and 1 therefore propose that the meeting sohuld now he adjourned and that the next meeting should be held on Thursday, 15 April at 3 p.m. 179. The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian) : In accordance with rule 33, 1 must put the question to the vote. Mr. Munro proposed to adjourn the meeting until Thursday, 15 April, if 1 understood him correctly. 180. Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): 1 should like to ask the President to put the pI;oposal to the vote, in line with a similar request made by the representative of France. Any positive motion must have seven affirmative votes, and, thereforé, seven votes for the present proposaI must be "scraped up".

As it has been moved that the proposaI of Mr. Munro should be put to the vote, 1 put it to the vote. A vote was taken by show of lwmds. In favour: China, Denmark, France, New Zealand, Turkey, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Against: Lebanon. Abstaining: Bràzil, Colombia, United States of America. The proposal was adopted by 7 votes to 1, with 3 abstentions. 182. The PRESIDENT (tram'SlaJted from Russian) : The next meeting will be held on 15 April at 3 p.m. The meeting ro'Se at 6.55 p.m.