S/PV.669 Security Council

On assuming my functions as President of the Security Council, 1 should like to pay a tribute ta the outgoing Pres::dent, the represeIltative of the Soviet Union. Perhap~ ncither he nor the mem- bet"s of the Council can der· \Te much satisfaction from the Council's work of the past month, since in four meetings on the Palestine question we failed even to adopt an agenda. 1 do not, of ourse, mean to suggest that this failure is attributable in any way to the presi- dency. On the contrary, 1 should like to say th:9.t l res- pecte<! the patience and impartiality with which the representative of the Soviet Union conducted theee somewhat frustrating procedural meetings, and 1 should like to thal1k him on MY own behalf and on behalf of the Council. 2. It will certainly be my constant preoccupation to live up to the traditions of fairness and impartiality in this office. 3. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated fram Russian) : 1 thank the Pre- sident for .ls kind words. 4. In expressing my gratitude ior his flatterlng opi- nion of me 1 should 1i1<e to say that when 1 presided over the Security Council in April 1 was guided solely by the desire to follow the Security Coundl's tradition and to be objective and impartial in my actions, remem- bering that this is the dutY of the Presiden~ even more than of any other member of the Security Council, and that these qualities in the President are one of the most important prerequisites for success in the work of the Security Council, whose mission is to strengthen inter- national peace and security. 5. 1 tbank the members of the Security Coundl for the support they gave me throughout my presidency of the Security Council. Adoption of the agenda

We turn now ta the question of our agenda. In accordance with the rules of proce- dure, the first item before us is the adoption of the agenda. The same provisional agenda has been before us for the last four meetings. The difficulty, as was brought out very clearly by my predecessor, has been the method in which we should deal with the two items that appear on the provisional agenda. 7. The situation which the Council had reached by the end of its last meeting in its efforts to agree upon the method in which the agenda should be dealt with was, 1 think, very briefly as follows. The Council had before it two alternatives. There was first a formaI proposal "iv) Remerciements au Président sortant 1. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'o.ngtaü): Au mo- ment où j'assume les f0nctions de Président du Conseil de s~curité, je voudrais rendre hommage au président sortant, le représentant de l'Union soviétique. Je crains que ni lui ni les membres du Conseil n'aient lieu de se féliciter des résultats des travaux du Conseil au cours du mois écoulé, puisqu'après quatre séances consacrées à la question de Palestine, nous n'avons p\2. encore adopter un ordre du jour. Il va de so~ que je ne veux pas dire par là que cet échec soit en quoi que ce soit imputable au Président. Tout au contraire, je tiens à rendre hommage à la patience et à l'impartialité ave~ lesquelles le représentant de l'Union soviétique a dirigé ces débats de procédure quelque peu décevants, et .ie voudrais l'en r~mercier en mon nom personnel et au nom du Consei1. 2. Pour ma part, .le n'aurai qu'un souci: me montrer digne de l'équité et de l'impartialité qui sont de règle chez le Président. 3. M. VYCHINSKY (Union des Républiques socia- listes soviétiques) (traduit du. russe): Je remercie le Président des aimables paroles qu'il vient de m'adresser. 4. Tout .en le remerciant, je tiens à faire observer qu'en m'acquittant des fonctions de Président du Con- seil qui m'étaient dévolues durant le mois d'avril, je n'ai fait que suivre la tradition d'objectivité et d'impar- tialité qui est de règle au Conseil. Il incombe en effet au Président plus qu'à tous les autres membres du Conseil de faire preuve d'impartialité et d'objectivité, car ces qualités du Président sont l'une des conditions essentielles du succès des travaux du Conseil de sécuricé, qui a pour rôle de servir la paix et la sécurité inter- nationales. 5. Je tiens aussi à remercier les membres du Conseil de l'appui qu'ils m'ont prêté pendant que J'assumais les fonctions de Président. Adoption de l'orore du jour 6. Le PRESIDENT (trr;,duit de l'anglais): Nous abordons maintenant la question de notre ordre du jour. Conformément au règlement, la première question dont le Conseil est saisi est celle de l'adoption de l'ordre du jour. L'ordre du jour provisoire était le même au cours des quatre dernières séances. Comme mon prédé- cesseur l'a très bien fait ressortir, la difficulté est de trouver la méthode à suivre touchant les deux ques- tions inscrites à l'ordre du jour provisoire. 7. Les membres du Conseil ont essayé de se mettre d'accord sur la méthode à suivre pour l'ordre du jour, et, à la fin de la dernière séance, en un mot, la situation était, me semble-t-il, la suivante. Le Conseil avait Ir. choix entre deux solutions. La première était la propo- 8. Secondly, there was a purely informaI suggestion put fOl'ward at the 668th meeting by me as the repre- sentative of the United Kingdom that a third item should be added to the provisional agenda in the foIlowing words: "Compliance with and enforcement of the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Jordan." 1 Commenting on this informaI suggestion, 1 said, aJ representative of the United Kingdom: "1 do not at this moment make this as a formai motion. 1 should not wish to press it unless it were generaIly acceptable to the Security Couneil." 9. The representatives of France, Lebanon and Tur- key made certain comments on the United Kingdom suggestion. 1 propose that we should now continue our discussions with a view to ascertaining whether the United K,ngdorn suggestion is, in fact, generaIly accept- able to the Couneil. Should it not prove acceptable, 1 shaH, as representative of the United Kingdom, be ready to withdraw it. We could then revert to a discus- sion of the formaI proposaI of the representative of Brazil. 10. Are there any further comments on the United Kingdom suggestion? May 1 ask then whether there are any objections to the suggestion of the United Kingdom? 11. Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): 1 am slightly at a loss as to preeisely what the procedure is at present. Is the President trying to find out whether his text meets with general acceptance on the part of the Coun- cil? 1s he sounding us out? Suppose that no one talks, will he press his text to the vote? Is what was said about it at the last meeting not ta discourage him from doing sa? Does he need further discouragement? 1 am com- pletely at a loss about a11 these things. 10. Les membres du Conseil désirent-ils formuler d'autres observations au sujet de la proposition du Royaume-Uni? Quelqu'un a-t-il des objections contre cette proposition? . 11. M. Charles MALIK (Liban) (traduit de l'an- glais) : Je ne vois pas bien où nous en sommes exacte- ment. Dois-je comprendre que le Président essaie de déterminer si le Conseil est disposé, d'une façon géné- rale, à accepter son texte? Est-il en train de nous sonder pour connaître nos intentions? A supposer que personne ne prenne la parole, va-t-il insister et metire son texte aux voix? Ce qui a été dit à la dernière séance ne l'a-t-il pas détourné de le faire? Lui faut-il de nouvelles objections? Tout cela me déconcerte. 12. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Je suis assez embarrassé - et je suis sûr que le Conseil me comprendra - car je préside le Conseil et, comme je l'ai indiqué clairement en ouvrant la séance, je tiens tout particulièrement à me montrer complètement impar- tial dans la question que n.}us discutons. C'est pourquoi je désirerais parler le moins possible en tant que repré- sentant du Royaume-Uni, mais, évidemment, je n'hésite- rai pas à le faire si besoin en est. Pour répondre à la question de M. Malik, j'essaierai donc d'adopter l'atti- tude qui sied à un président. 13. Si je comprends hien, M. Malik veut savoir - et c'est tout nature1- si la suggestion du Royaume-Uni va être mise aux voix ou non. Cependant, il ressortait nettement des observations que j'ai présentées en tant que représentant du Royaume-Uni - et ici je suis obligé

l am in a slight difficulty 1 here - in which l am sure tht: Council will bear with me - in that l am in the position of President of the Couucil and, as l made dear in my opening remarks, 1 am particularly anxious to preserve a complete impar- tiality in this question. It foIlows from that that 1 should like ta speak as little as possible as representative of the United Kingdom, although, natura11y, 1 shall not hesi- tate to do so when it is necessary. In answer, there- fore, to Mr. Malik's question, l shaH try to give the reply ihat 1 feel should be given from the Chair. 13. If 1 understood Mr. Malik, what he wants to know - and it is very natural that he should - is whet- her this suggestion by the United Kingdom is ta be taken to a vote or not. Now, it was inherent in my remarks as representative of the United Kingdom- 1 Voir Procès-verbau;J; ,officiels du Conseil de sécurité, qua- trième année, S1lpplément spécial No 1. 14. l would remind the Council that, before Ml'. Ma- lik's intervention, l had asked the question whether there were any objections to this United Kingdom sugges- tion, since there appeared to be no comments on it. 15. Ml'. Clarles MALIK (Lebanon): It is precisely because the President asked whether there were any objections that l asked the question: suppClse that nobody objects, what is he going to do? l should like ta know in advance what the procedure is. There were objections to this text at the last meeting. l thought l had made some, but if the President wishes me to repeat them l shaH gladly do so. However, if he is inviting objections from other representatives, that is quite another matter. But one would like to know what we have before us. Up to the present moment, as l understand it, the United Kingdom text is not before the Council for fonnal action, but it is before the Council for informaI exchange of ideas; and after we have finished with this informaI exchan.ge of ideas, l take it that the representative of the United Kingdom will announce that, now that the comments and the objections have been presented informally, the represen- tative of the United Kingdom wishes to place the text formaIly belore the Council. If that is ·the case, l shall certainly have something to say when it is formally before the Council. If, however, the President wishes me to repeat what l said at the last meeting when he was testing out hi" text info!'mally, l can say that it is entirely unacceptable to me. l shall certainly have to vote against it and to speak very strongly against it. 16. In the first place, it is a new item which has been put forward and, so far, we are still dealing with the original problem as to whether this is going to be debated first, or second, or third. l take it from the tenor of the President's approach as representative of the United Kingdom, and from the tenor of the remarks made by the representative of France at the last meeting, that the philosophy behind this third point which sir Pierson is now pressing is that it should replace the other points and be debated first. If that is the case, l would say that l would be totally, absolutely and irrevocably opposed. If the United Kingdom represen- tative is going to test the Council on his particular text, which seems to me to complicate matters more than to simplify them, l shaH then have to urge a text which will modify his considerably, in which case my text, which would be an amendment to the United Kingdom one, would have to be voted upon first. 17. l find the proposaI highly objectionable for the reasons which l explained at the last meeting and for those which l have hinted now. If the United Kingdom representative requires more informaI consultations within the Council before he tells us that this text is a distinct proposaI before the Council- so that we have now two distinct proposaIs, one by the representative of t po~;tion. 18. j;,L HOPPENOT (France): la suggestion qui nous a été faite par le Président au ('0urs de la dernière séance l'a été, je crois, dans un esprit de conciliation et de compromis auquel la grande majorité des membres du Conseil n'ont certainement pas été insensibles. Il s'agissait d'une simple suggestion et, à aucun moment, je n'a~ eu l'impression que - pour reprendre ce que vient de dire le représentant du Liban-le Président essayait Cimposer ce texte au Conseil. A mon avis, il ne "pressait" pas les membres du Conseil de l'accepter, mais le soumettait simplement une fois encore, comme nn te?(te qui pourrait peut-être nous aider à sortir de l'impasse dans laq!lelle nous nous débattons depuis quatre semaines. 19. A c;et effort que vient de réitérer le Président sous une forme extrêmement modérée, il a été répondu dans un esprit et d'une manière qui ne paraîtront certaine- ment pas aux membres du Conseil être dictés par le même désir d'entente et de conciliation. 20. Dans ces conditions, il me paraît inutile de perdre plus de temps encore à discuter cette question: étant donné, comme le président l'a répèté à plusieurs reprises, que sa tentative était faite dans l'espoir.qu'elle recueille- rait l'assentiment général du Conseil, et puisqu'il ressort des paroles que vient de prononcer M. Malik, non seule- ment que cette suggestion n'a aucune chance d'obtenir pareil assentiment, mais encore que le représentant du Lioan - comme c'est du reste parfaitement son droit- est décidé à s'y opposer de la façon la plus ferme et la plus irrévocable, je me demande si la délégation du Royaume-Uni ne pourrait pas nous faire savoi,. qu'elle retire purement et simplement sa suggestion, afin que nous puissions revenir à la proposition soumise par le représentant du Brésil et appuyée par la délégation de la Colombie. 21. M. SARPER (Turquie) (traduit de l'anglais): J'approuve l'idée que vient d'exprimer le représentant de la France. Au début de la séance, le Président a déclaré qu'il n'insisterait pas pour que l'on examine sa proposition si elle ne rencontrait pas l'agrément général du Conseil. Ii semble qu'il y ait quelques divergences quant à la proposition que le Président a formulée en sa qualité de représentant du Royaume-Uni. Je suis convaincu qu'en cette qualité il a fait sa proposition dans un esprit de conciliation et de compromis. Comme le représentant de la France, j'espère que le Président, dans le même esprit de conciliation et de compromis, voudra peut-être env-isager de retirer sa proposition; nous pourrons alors discuter à nouveau la proposition que la délégation brésilienne a présentée avec l'appui 5 18. \11'. HOPPENOT (France) (translated fram French): 1 thinl: that i:he President's suggestion at the last meeting was made in a spirit of unciliation and compromise which was c1early not lm:t on the great majorityof the members of the Council. It was simply a suggestion, and 1 nevel' had the impression that - to quote the represent~tive of Lebanon - the President was "pressing" the text on the Couneil. In my o';>inion he was not pressing the members of the Coundl to accept it, but was merely re-submitting it as a suggestion which might help us to break the deadlock in whict, Ne have been for the past four weeks. 19. This proposaI, which the 'President has jus!.. sub- mitted again in an extreme1y moderate form, has cer- tainly not been received in a spirit or a manner which Couneil members could consider inspired by the same desire for understanding and consideration. 20. In those eircumstances 1 can see no point in wasting any more time in discussing this question. Since, as the President has stated several times, bis attempt was made in the hope of obtaining the general consent of the Council, and since it is clear from the speech which Ml'. Maiik has just made not only that the suggestion has no caance of obtaining that consent, but that the representative of Lebanon - who is quite within his rights - has decided to oppose it firmly and irrevocab!y, 1 wonder whether the United Kingdom delegation would inform us that it will simply withdraw its suggestion, to enable us to take up again the proposaI submitted by the Brazilian representative and sup- ported by the de1egation of Colombia. 21. Ml'. SARPER (Turkey): 1 endorse the idea expressed by our French colleague. The President said at the beginning of the meeting that he would not press his suggestion unless it would be generaHy acceptable to the Couneil. It seems that there are sorne dissenting views as to the proposaI the President made in his capaeity as representative of the United Kingdom. 1 am sure that in that capacity he made that proposaI in a spirit of conciliation and compromise. 1 hope, like my ...Ci'rench colleague, that in the same spirit of conciliation and comt:-romise the President might perhaps be willing to withdraw his suggestion; then we can go back to the proposaI made by the delegation of Brazil, supported by Colombia, and take a vote on tÎlat proposaI. présenté~s à la dernière séance sont toujours valables, et je rappellerai aussi au Conseil que j'ai déclaré qu'à moins que la proposition du Royaume-Uni soit considé- rablement modifiée et contienne une mention spéciale de l'affaire de Nahbalin et de Nahhalb seulement, je considérerai que cette proposition est absolument injuste et nous ramène exactement au point où nous en étions au début de la séance que nous avons tenue il y a quatre semaines - je serai alors dans l'obligation de m'opposer aussi énergiquement que je le pourrai à cette pro- 25. I wish to stress that in my opinion the Lebanese representative'tJ position does not in the least indicate any unwillingness to seek a compromise and an accept- able solution of the question. He mere!y thinks that the particular proposaI submitted by sir Pierson is not cOllducive to a sound solution for the settlement of this question. 26. Actually, we have not yet begun to discuss the question itself; we are still merely talking about the agenda. 27. I would also like to recall that 'when the question of the agenda was last discussed, the question was also raised of the order in which the three items would be considered, assuming that the third item - sir Pierson~s proposaI ~ was induded in the agenda. It was then said that this third item, that entitled "Compliance with and enforcement of the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Jordan", should become the first item and be discussed first. But it is obvious that if this item ls considered first, the two agenda items, that is to say, items 2 (a) and 2 (b), will no longer have an independent significance. 28. Items 2 (a) and 2 (b) deal with specifie issues. One party complains that its rights and interests have been infringed by a number of aets which it considers wrong and unlawful; the other party accuses the first of identical or similar acts, which are contrary to the Agreement. That ought to be the full extent of the question which the Security Council must consider. 29. The third item indicates - and nobody could deny it - that it is advisable to settle the question of how to implement the General Armistice Agreement. That 6 27. Je voulais seulement rappeler au Conseil que, lorsque nous avons examiné, à la &:~rnière séance, la question de l'ordre du jour, nous nous sommes égale- ment demandé dails quel ordre on examinerait les trois points envisagés et si le troisième point -la proposi- tion de sir Pierson Dixon - serait inscrit à l'ordre du jour. On disait alors que ce troisième point, c'est-à-dire le point intitulé "Mise en œuvre et respect de la Con- vention d'armistice général entre Israël et la Jordanie" devrait devenir le premier point et être examiné en premier lieu. Cela est parfaitement clair, mais, si ce point est exami.né en premier lieu, les deux points de l'ordre du jour, c'est-à-dire les points 2, a, et 2, b, perdent l'importance qu'ils présentent pris séparément. 28. Les points 2, a, et 2, b, portent sur des questions concrètes. L'une des parties se plaint qu'une série d'actes qu'elle juge injustifiés et illégaux ont eu pour effet de porter atteinte à ses droits et à ses intérêts; l'autre partie accuse la première partie d'avoir commis des actes semblables ou analogues qui sont incompatibles avec la Convention d'armistice. C'est à cela que doit se ramener la question que le Conseil de sécurité est appelé à examiner. 29. Il découle du troisième point - et personne ne saurait le contester - qu'il convient de s'entendre sur la méthode à suivre pour régler la question de la mise 30. Such, as l understand it, is the position of the Lebanese representative. At any rate, that is also the position of the Soviet representative. l have urged and l continue to urge, that we should not depart so far from the provisional agenda which has not yet been adopted as we undoubtedly would if we were to adopt not mere1y the relevant proposaI by sir Pierson Dixon but also its corollary, the proposaI that we should make this item the first item ror consideration. 31. l believe that the entire perspective of the question would then be changed in a way which would inevitably lead to a general discussion on a generai question- the Palestine question - which cannot be considered en passant, which can only be considered as an inde- pendent question for which appropriate independent preparatiœls must be made. We are entirely unprepared ta discuss this question. Even if such a decision we:..'e ta he taken today, even -if there should be no objections ta the proposed third item and to the R"3.zilian- Colombian proposaI, l repeat that we should need some time ta prepare ourse1ves for the discussion of this question. AIl this is at the instance not of the two contending parties but of a third party, which is inter- vening in the dispute and is trying to turn it in a direction other than that chosen by the contending parties. 32. Another reason why such a course would be aitogether improper is that it would be entirely contrary ta the aim and purpose of what l might term the plaintiff and the defendant - a defendant who becomes the plaintif! and a plaintiff who becomes the defendant. 33. We would thus alter the entire perspective of the question, aad l see absolutely no grounds for so doing. If the Security Council deems it necessary to discuss i~dependep..tly the larger question - the Palestine ques- tion -- to its full extent, then, as sir Pierson said, when speaking of the suppositions and intentions of the United Kingdom Government, that question should be placed on the agenda independently. We shall then see ~hat kind o~ proposaIs a~e put forward on this ques- tion, what kind of matenal is presented, to enaLle us to discuss the matter. 34. It is impossible to discuss any question in this way, whether it be the Palestine question, the Greek question, the Chinese question or the Korean question. We ~ust find out what exactly there is in this so-called qu~shon, what kinJ of materials will be provided to gUlde the Security Council's thought and attention in one direction or another. We have nothing of th~ kind. 32. Si j'estime que ce serait là une manière de pro- céder erronée, c'est aussi parce que cette méthode irait à l'encontre des objectifs que cherchent à atteindre les deux parties au différend, qui sont toutes deux tantôt partie plaignante, tantôt défenderesse. 33. La question changerait complètement d'aspect. Or, il n'y a aucune raison pour qu'il en soit ainsi. Si tant est que le Conseil estime néce'Ssaire d'examiner la question plus vaste, c'est":à-dire l'ensemble de la ques- tion de Palestine dans toute son ampleur, il faut que cette question lui soit soumise en tant que question séparée; sir Pierson Dixon, qui nous a fait part des intentions du Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni, l'a d'ail- leurs suggéré lui-même. Lorsqu'on aura porté cette question devant le Conseil, nous examinerons les pro- positions s'y rapportant et nous étudierons la documen- tation utile. 34. On ne saurait en effet examiner une question dans le vide, qu'il s'agisse de la question de Palestine ou de la question grecque, chinoise ou coréenne. Il faut se rendre compte de la portée exacte de cette question; il faut prendre connaissance de la doc.umentation pour àiguiller ensuite l'attention du Conseil sur tel ou tel problème particulier. Pour le moment, il n'existe rien de tel. s~ntative, there can c1early be no question of adopting SIr Pierson Dixon's proposaI; and in view of the generaI considerations which l have ventured to describe it seems to me also that there can be no question of accepting the proposaI which was submitted jointly by the Brazilian and Colombian representatives. With al! due respect for their initiative, l consider that it cannot lead to success in the consideration of a question like that which is at present before the Security CounciI. 38. Mr. SARPER (Turkey): The representative of the Soviet Union gave an inaccurate, or at least erro- neous, interpretation of my statement. l did not say that Mr. Malik, the representative of Lebanon was unwilling to accept a compromise; I.never interpreted Mr. Malik's objection as a refusaI to accept a compro- mise. But a compromise might or might not be accept- able to. one party or the other, and since the United Kingdom suggestion, at least in our opinion, tends to p!,olong ~e p:ocedur~l deb:;tte l simply expressed the Vlew that tt mIght be m the mterests of our proceedings to withdraw a proposaI with a view ta shortening these discussions. There was not the 3lightest insinuation in .my statement of any refusaI on the part of Mr. Malik to accept a compromise; as a matter of fact at our last meeting l was one of those who opposed or 'objected to the United Kingdom proposaI. 39. l should ~ke to make that point perfectly clear. ~y words can m no way be interpreted as an allega- tton !hat Mr. Malik was unwilling to accept a com- promIse. 40. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian) : l think Mr. Sar- I- per nas completely misinterpreted my interpretation. . 41. l did not quote him as saying that Mr. Malik did 1". not wan~ a compromise. ~ referred to an entirely dif- feret;tt Clrcumstance. l sald that several speakers, in- c1udmg Mr. Sarper, had remarked that Sir Pierson's proposaI was in the nature of a compromise and that l':'lr. Malik's refusaI to accept it might create an impres- 1 4sl20n, Cand so on'tl l 'cl h M S : onsequen y.. ~ever saI t at r. arper had sald that Mr. Mah~ dld not wa!~; a compromise. What l s~id was that that form of words supporting Sir Pier- son.s proposaIs as a. compromise proposaI and not 1 day~n~ tha~ Mr.. Ma}lk was ~lso seeking an agreed ~,--declS.on m.ght !:'ve nse to a m.sunderstanding, Conse- 8 36. Je ne parJ~ même pas d'une résolution d'ordre général dont ce problème devrait alors faire l'objet. Cette résolution sera le résultat de l'indispensable dis- cussion préalable. Mais par où commencera-t-on cette discussion? Il faut commencer par étudier la documen- tation utile si l'on ne veut pas se contenter d'un examen fort superficiel et, à mon sens, superflu. 37. Pour toutes ces raisons, il me semble que, vu les objections que le représentant du Liban vient de for- muler, le Conseil ne peut pas accepter la pro~osition de sir Pierson Dixon; il ressort aussi des considerations que je viens d'exposer que le Conseil ne saurait non plus accepter la proposition commune des représentants du Brésil et de la Colombie. Tout en rendant hommage à l'esprit d'initiative dont ces derniers ont fait preuve, j'estime que cette initiative ne saurait être couronnée de succès lorsqu'il s'agit d'examiner une question comme celle dont le Conseil est actuellement saisi. ;:;g. M. SARPER (Turquie) (traduit de lJanglais): Le représentant de l'Union soviétique a donné une interprétation inexacte, ou tout au moins erronée, de ma déclaration. Je n'ai pas dit que le représentant du Liban n'était pas disposé à accepter un compromis; je n'ai jamais interprété l'objection de M. Malik comme un refus d'accepter un compromis. Mais un compromis peut ou non pouvoir être accepté par l'une ou l'autre des parties. Etant donné que la proposition du Royaume- Uni risque, tout au moins à notre avis, de prolonger le débat de procédure, j'ai simplement exprimé l'opinion qu'il y aurait peut-être intérêt, pour accélérer nos débats, à ce que le représentant du Royaume-Uni retire sa proposition. Je n'ai en aucune façon voulu insinuer que M. Malik refusait d'accepter un compromis; d'au- tant moins qu'en fait, à la dernière séance, j'ai été de ceux qui se sont opposés à la proposition du Royaume- Uni ou qui ont soulevé des objections contre cette proposition. 39. Je voudrais qu'il n'y ait aucun doute à cet égard. Rien dans ma déclaration ne saurait être interprété comme signifiant que M. Malik n'est pas disposé à accepter un compromis. 40. M. VYCHINSKY (Union des Républiques socia- listes soviétiques) (traduit du russe): Je crois que M. Sarper a interprété mon interprétation de façon tout à fait inexacte. 41. Je n'ai en aucune façon dit Que M. Sarper nous avait déclaré que M. MaIik ne voulait pas aboutir à un compromis. J'ai parlé de tout autre chose. J'ai dit que les déclarations que venaient de faire plusieurs orateurs, dont M. Sarper, et suivant lesquelles la proposition de sir Pierson Dixon était un compromis, que M. Malik n'acceptait pas, pouvaient créer l'impression que, etc. 42. Je n'ai donc pas dit que, suivant M. Sarper, M. Malik ne souhaitait pas un compromis; j'ai dit que, lorsqu'on appuyait la suggestion de sir Pierson Dixon en disant qu'elle constituait un compromis et en passant sous silence le fait que M. Malik cherche lui aussi à aboutir à une décision concertée, on risquait de per- 43. :Mr. Sarper is trying to break down an open door. He thinks that 1 have misinterpreted him and mistaken- ly ascribed sorne statement to him. 1 ascribed nothing to him and 1 interpreted nothing. 1 repeat, 1 merely indicated how his remarks might be understood, with- out even saying whether such an understanding would or would not be correct. 1 am very glad that Mr. Sar- per has now explained that his remarks cannot pos- sibly be understood in that sense. He naturally knows the meaning of his own words better than 1 or anyone else. Without his explanation, however, one might have thought either one thing or the other. His explanation has c1arified matters and 1 am grateful ta him. But he need not say that 1 was misinterpreting his thoughts. 44. 1 wish to say once again that - having foIlowed the debate attentively, more attentively, in fact, than ever before, since as President 1 had to listen very care- fully to everything that was said':'- 1 formed the im- pression that every member of the Security Council was anxious to reach an agreed decision. However, various representatives choose various ways to reach such a decision. Sorne of these ways are inacceptable to sorne representatives and acceptable to others, and vice versa. Given the presence of dL .=rent points of view, such a disagreement is natura!. But it gives no indication as to the "trends". 1 would be a poor psycho- logist if 1 tried to read something into other peoplê's minds. 1 do not claim any better qualities for myself, but 1 object to being accused of looking for bad qua- Iities in others. 45. In any case 1 can set Mr. Sarper's mind at peace on that score. 46. Mr. SARPER (Turkey): 1 am sorry if 1 mis- understood Mr. Vyshinsky, and 1 am perfectIy satisfied with the explanation he has given.

1 should now like to say a word as representative of the UNITED KINGDOM. The representative of France rightly interpreted the suggestion 1 made at our last meeting as designed purely ta help the Council out of the difficulty in which it has found itself over the past few weeks. At that meeting, l thought that the representative of Lebanon was ap- proaching the question in very much the same spirit in which 1 was approaching it. It was deat fmm his remarks, as 1 remember them, that he did not like this suggestion of mine very much, but it was agreed that we would resume later, after he had had time to con- sider it fully. The representative of Lebanon has now considered the matter and he has made it clear that the idea embodied in the suggestion is not one that appeals to him, that he does not like it. Well, that seems to me to be not at all an' unreasonable atitude. faço::~énérale, j'essayais de lire quoi que ce soit dans la p~usée d'autrui. Jene prétends pas non plus posséder je ne sais quelles autres qualités transcendantes, mais je proteste lorsque l'on m'attribue l'intention de lire des pensées désobligeantes dans l'esprit d'autrui. 45. Sur ce puint, en tout cas, je puis entièrement rassurer M. Sarper. 46. M. SARPER (Turquie) (traduit de l'anglais): J'avais mal compris M. Vychinsky, et je le regrette, mais je suis parfaitement satisfait de l'explication qu'il a donnée. 47. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'a;nglais): Je vou- drais maintenant vous, dire quelques mots en qualité de représentant du ROYAUME-UNI. Le représentant de la France a bien compris que la suggestion que j'ai faite à la dernière séance avait uniquement pour objet d'aider le Conseil à se dégager de la situation difficile dans laquelle il se trouve depuis plusieurs semaines. A cette séance, j'ai pensé que le représentant du Liban abordait la question dans un esprit tout à fait analogue au mien. Si mes souvenirs sont exacts, il ressûrtait clairement de ses observations qu'il ne voyait pas ma suggestion d'un œil très favorable, mais il a été décidé que nous y reviendrions plus tard, lorsqu'il aurait eu le temps de l'examiner de manière approfondie. Le représentant du Liban l'a fait maintenant, et il a indiqué sans équivoque que l'idée exprimée dans ma suggestion ne lui paraît ni séduisante, ni à retenir. Cette attitude ne me semble en aucune façon déraisonnable. 51. The Brazilian delegation and also the Colombian delegation have always stressed their willingness to support every effort that would conciliate the opposing points of view. At the last meeting we had the happy expectation that during the recess an agreement could be reached which would bring satisfaction to Ml'. Malik. However, the last suggestion of the United Kingdom representative was found unacceptable by Ml'. Malik and by some other members of this Counci!. The fact therefore clearly emerges that the Brazilian-Colombian proposaI is, up to now, the formula wh:ich has gained the greatest support in the Counci!. Since the United Kingdom representative has withdrawn his suggestion, the BrazilJan-Colombian proposaI continues to stand. 52. l feel bound to reply in a few words to the criti- cism that the representative of Lebanon has seen fit to direct against the stand taken by Brazil and Colombia concerning this issue. l hope that Ml'. Malik fully rea- lizes the constructive character of our proposaI and of our intentions. We aU know the vigour with which the representative of Lebanon fights for his ideas, but sometimes, in the heat of the argument, he closes his eyes to other pwple's points of view. 53. l maintain that paragraph 3 of the Brazilian- Colombian proposaI is, in spite of the dialectical efforts to prave the opposite, a considerable improvement, from Ml'. Malik's point of view, over the first Uni~-ed King- dom proposaI. Paragraph 3 clearly establishes that the act of dealing with the agenda as a whole does not necessarily imply a single l'l'solution covering both complaints. l further maintain that this fundamental reservation did not appear even by implication in the first United Kingdom proposaI. The fact that Ml'. Malik has centred his arguments on this point emphasizes the importance that he attaches to it. 54. We tried to meet his wishes to the greatest pos- sible extent when we stated that the Council was not committing itself at this moment as to the character of its eventual resolution or resolutions. We are leaving open the possibility of adopting a separate resolution on the Nahhalin incident which, as we are aIl aware, is the heart of the matter for Ml'. Malik, :he represen- tative of Lebanon. That much, l contend, was not 54. Nous avons essayé de répondre autant que possible à ses désirs lorsque nous avons déciaré que ie Conseii ne pouvait, à l'heure actuelle, prendre une position définie en ce qui concerne la nature de la résolution ou des résolutions qu'il adoptera. Il nous est loisible d'adop- ter une résolution distincte sur J'incident de Nahhalin qui, nous le savons tous, constitue, aux yeux du repré- sentant du Liban, l'aspect essentiel de la question. 56. Let me now SêY a few words with regard to the points raised by the representative of the Soviet Union and try ta c1arify some doubts expressed by Ml'. Vy- shinsky concerning the difficulties that would arise in his mind should the Brazilian-Colombian proposaI be approved. 57. Ml'. Vyshinsky spoke of my first intervention in this debate in which I expressed the opinion that it would pernaps be desirable that no member of the Council or representative of the parties involved should he precluded from referring in their explanations to some aspects of the whole Palestine question. 58. Later, at the 666th meeting, when the Brazilian and Colombian delegations, to prevent a possible stale- mate, made a specific proposaI for the disposaI of the agenda, I clearly said that my delegation, after a care- fuI examination of the records of the Palestine ques- tion, was inclined t::> believe "that our present diffi- culties could perhaps be overcome if the Security Coun- cil held a general discussion on the agenda as a whole, with{)ut committing itself ... " 59. The Brazilian and Colombian proposaI speaks for itself when it specifically says that "a general discus- sion shall be held in which reference may be made to any or all of the items of the agenda". 60. The general discussion we favour should deal with items listed on the agenda, allowances being made f?r pertinent references ta those aspects of the Pales- bne question which are at the root of the incidents now under consideration. This is, I be1ieve, in keeping with the views expressed by Ml'. Vyshinsky, as President, ~hen he said [667th meeting] that "it would be pos- Sible within reasonable limits ta deal with certain gen- eral and broader political questions". Needless ta say, we would not deal with or discuss the whole Palestine question should the Brazilian and Colombian proposaI he adopted. What we propose to do is to consider the two complaints on the agenda. 61. With respect tü the dHHculties mentioneâ by the previous President as to the procedure ta be followed If the Brazilian-Colombian proposaI is adopted, 1 per- sonally understand that in arder ta start with the gen- ,eral debate, the President could invite the rep: _~en­ tatives of Israel and Jordan ta take a seat among us and state their respective cases on bath of the com- 63. For almost one month the Security Council has been seeking a \Vay to proceed with its work. 1 trust that every member of the Council will recognize the impartial stand of the Brazilian and Colombian delega- tians. vVe have done our best. It is up ta the Council ta decide. 64. Ml'. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): It has been remarked that perhaps there was a difference between the spirit in which the President, as representative of the United Kingdom, approached this matter, in his address at the last meeting, and the spirit in which 1 œacted ta his approach. 1 humbly fe"l that there is no such difference. 65. We are aIl prompted by the same spirit in this CounciI. We aIl have the same ends in view. 1 have said that several times and 1 wish ta state it again here this afternoon. We, the President, the representatives of the United States, France, Brazil, China, Colombia, Denmark, the Soviet Union, Turkey, New Zealand- if 1 have forgotten anybody, 1 meant ta indude him- everybody .here intends to serve the cause of peace, concord, understanding and a œttIement of this issue in the Near East. If there is any difference among us, it lies only in the methods and means which we think are fruitful towards those ends. 66. 1 have been very frank in opposing the means that have been suggested for treating this procedural ques- tion before us. 1 have believed and 1 still believe that . this is 110t the right way to approach it, for reasons that 1 have stated several times and that 1 will also have occasion to review very briefly this afternoon. There- fore, any suggestion that there are some of us here who are motivated by other than a spirit of goodwill, ultimate peace, concord and prosperity for aIl con- cerned, Israeli and Arab alike, is not a correct one. 67. The President, speaking in behalf of his delega- tion, said that it appeared that 1 did not like his sug- gestion. He put it in these words: "The representative of Lebanon ... does not like it." Strictly speak-ing it is not true because l was speaking not of the text of the proposai, but of the plan to discuss that proposaI before the other two complaints that are before the CounciI. It ia the order of dealing with the proposaI that I do not like and not the proposaI as such. This was made very plain in what 1 said at the last meeting, and 1 wish ta state it again. 1 have no objection to the examination of the United Kingdom text provided that it takes place at the proper time. But, if that text were to replace :1 ~

l ought perhaps ta point out ta 1'1- Malik that the United Kingdom suggestion has beer . "''1. l merely draw his attention to that fa, 11y, this dC'~s not prevent him from speaking of it if he wishes. Iiowever, as a suggestion, it no longer exîsts. 69. .Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): In point of fact, l did raise my hand before the representative of Brazil spoke and before the President actually with- drew his text. Some people saw me and others did not. But the representative of Brazil did spe?k before me, sa l have no objection to that. Furthermore, l was not speaking of the text; l was only speaking of the ques- tion that was raised about the differenœ of spirit. l wanted to remark only in passing that l objected not to the manner in which the text was pres\~l1ted but only to the order in which it ought to be considered. In fact, that was aIl that l was going ta say about the text and l was going to pass to something else. 70. With "the President's permission l shaH proceed. ~ethods. l said, either go ahead and finish with Nahha- que j'avais suggéré deux méthodes. J'avais dit que nous hn and, then proceed ta the §\:ç9p.d item on the agenda p(mviQ~w~ poit examiner d'abord l'affaire de Nahhalin 73. 1 suggested these two methods to start with, at the end of the 666th meeting. Obviously they consti- tuted a movement beyond zero, a compromise, a non- intransigent position. 74. Later on, when the representative of Brazil put forward his text, 1 suggested another compromise, another moveU)ent beyond zero, which was that he might go back ta his first idea of dividing the material before us not according to the sources of these com- plaints, but according to the subject matter. He had, 1 thought, sorne worthwhile ideas which he urged upon us at the first meeting. 1 suggested that third possi- bility of a compromise whereby one really progressed beyond zero, but again it elidted no response except for the remarks of the representative of Brazil this afternoon. 75. In the fourth place, when we talked about the United Kingdom text at the last meeting, 1 made sorne observations as to how it could be sa improved as to make it acceptable to me. 76. 1 submit that in these four instances there was a genuine, a very simple and direct movement in the direction of a real compromise, and not a fake one, if 1 may use the word. But, of course, none of these pro- posaIs was accepted. 77. Now, if compromise means movement from one side to the other, that is not compromise; it is capitu- lation. If you wanted me to capitulate, you should never have prolonged this debate until now; you could have had it from the beginning. You had the seven or eight votes - whatever the number is going to be- in your poeket from the beginning. Why did you delay this debate until now if you rea11y had no intention of budging from the position you took at the beginning? Whatever can be said about any other person's atti- tude - and 1 am not here to judge others - 1 honestly believe that no student can possibly apply the epithet "intransigent" to my attitude, in view of aIl the efforts which l have made during the last few weeks. 1 sha11 not tell the Council about the enormous difficulties which 1 had to encounter and the tremendous efforts which 1 had to make in order to be able to advance toward a compromise. But now 1 am completely discouraged- no, 1 would not say "completely", but discouraged- when 1 find that, after this attempt, there has been no response whatever from the other side. 78. 1 come now to the Brazilian proposaI which is before us. First of aIl, 1 want to assure the represen- tative of Brazil that 1 deeply appreciate his attitude and what he called the constructive character of his motion and his intentions. 1 have the highest regard for him and for his country, and 1 have welcomed his initiative several times before, as weIl as that of the Latin American world, and the interest in our prob- lems, t~e st~dy of them, and the effort ta go a~ deeply as possible mto them. 1 am sure that they are mspired by the same high motives which guide us all- the creation of conditions in which real peace, real concord ·1 comm~ ;nous tous id,' c'est-à-dire par le désir de créer 79. Tt is significant that the representative of Brazil made all the recommendations of his proposaI depen- tlent upon paragraph 3 of his text; that emphasis was significant. Ml'. Gauthier tells us that paragraph 3 is the step beyond the position taken by Sir Pierson Dixon at the beginning of our debate a month ago ; paragraph 3 says in effect that the possibility is left open ta the Coun- cil to decide later on, in the light of the general debate, how it wants to proceed. 80. 1 shall make three observations about this. The first is that it is significant that that was the only thing that the representative c,i Brazil could find in his text that was really new because he mentioned nothing else which was new in his text. 81. Secondly, 1 admit that there is an apparent depar- ture from the position of the United Kingdom at the beginning of paragraph 3, but it is only an apparent one. Why do 1 say "only an apparent one"? Because the rules of procedure which govern our conduct here already guarantee the very possibilities embodied in paragraph 3 of the Brazilian proposaI. The Brazilian text, therefore, only makes explicit wnat is already implicit in the rules of procedure of the Security Coun- cil. In fact, it is obvious that once a general debate is begun, one, two or more resolutions may finally be adopted at the end. There is nothing in the rules of procedure to prevent that. The novelty, the departure, from zero - if 1 may continue using my mathematical simile - in the Brazilian proposaI is only apparent; it is not real; it only explicates what is already implicit in the rules of procedure of the Security Council. Tt is not substantial enough really to be calleda compromise. 82. There is a third remark 1 have to make which is even more important than the ones 1 have just made, and it is this: the representative of Brazil knows, 1 know and everybody around this table knows that the United Kingdom and others have already made up their minds about one or more resolutions at the end of the general debate. When you say that the Brazilian pro- posaI leaves a door open to us for the adoption of 'One or more resolutions, we already lmQW in Qur hearts frmn 83. The representative of Brazil said that l was 3,loof with respect to his first proposaI. At the time l was, but l have reflected upon it; l have shown that upon reflection l can move From my "zero" position, and no other representative who is really taking the initiative in this matter has shown that he can move at aIl, by comparison. '- ~.·.'.-Ù 85. These are my remarks at this stage of the proce- durai debate. 86. Mr. GOUTHIER (Brazil): l wish to say a few words of thanks to Mr. Malik for his kind references ta my country and to me and to the joint effort made by Brazil and Colombia. l feel that we have moved at least as far from the position of zero as Mr. Malik has, and for that .reason our proposai stands as it was sub- mitted to the Security Council.

l have listened to the discussion on this proce- durai matter for sorne little time, and although l would be the last to deny the opportunity to any member of this Council to make his point clearly so that there can be no doubt whatsoever as to where he stands, l would submit that perhaps to some extent we are forgetting the main purpose of our meeting here. We have before us a provisional agenda up~m which there are two separate points. For five meetings now, the represen- tative of the Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan has come here from Washington hoping that he will be able to present his Government's case before this Coun- cil. He represents aState which is not at the present time a Member of the United Nations, and he makes this trip for the specifie purpose of presenting his case. At the same tirr e, the representative of Israel comes ta these meetings, hoping to be able to place his case before the Security Council. 88. It would seem to me that, regardless of the proce- durai wrangle in which we have found ourselves for five separate meetings, every member of the Council must accept the theory of the representative of Brazil that, upon the acceptance and adoption of the agenda by this Council, the two parties to the dispute will be called to the Council table and, under normal circums- tances, in the order in which the items appear on the agenda, the representative of Jordan will present his case. He will, 1 imagine, if he is ever given a chance to do so, spend a large portion, if not most, of his time .on the agenda item dealing with the complaint of the Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan, which was placed on the provisional agenda by the representative of Leba- non: .To that extent,. the CO:lncil wlU be apprised of the poslÎlOn of Jordan ln relatlOn to the unfortunate inci- dent at Nahhalin. 89. Following the representative of Jordan, the repre- s~ntatiye of I~rael will, if we pursue the usual course, glve hls verSlOn of the question; he will perhaps, as backgr?t1l1d material, refer to many of the matters which he deslres to bring before the Security Council. 90. Then, in the normal course of events, the members of the Council- with the representative of Lebanon leading the other members, perhaps, as regards the arder of speaking - will have an opportunity to say what is in their minds and to state the views Qf their GQvernments. 88. Il me semble qu'en dépit du débat de procédure auquel nous avons déjà consacré cinq séances, tous les membres du Conseil doivent reconnaître avec le repré- sentant du Brésil que, lorsque le Conseil aura adopté son ordre du jour, les deux parties au différend seront invitées à prendre place à la table du Conseil. Normale- ment, et selon l'ordre d'inscription des points à l'ordre du jour, le représentant de la Jordanie présentera sa thèse. J'imagine que, s'il en a jamais l'occasion, il con- sacrera une grande partie, sinon la totalité de son inter- vention au point de l'ordre du jour relatif à la plainte du Royaume hachémite de Jordanie, dont le représen- tant du Liban a demandé l'inscription à l'ordre du jour provisoire. Le Conseil connaîtra ainsi la position de la Jordanie en ce qui concerne le malheureux incident de Nahhalin. 1 Js1 89. Si nous suivons la méthode habituelle, le repré- sentant d'Israël donnera son interprétation des faits après le représentant de la Jordanie; pour étayer ses arguments, il parlera peut-être d'un grand nombre de questions qu'il souhaite porter à la connaissance du Conseil de sécurité. 90. Puis, si les événements suivent leur cours normal, les membres du Conseil auront l'occasion de dire ce qu'ils pensent et d'exprimer les vues de leurs gouverne- ments; le repr~sentant du Liban prendrait peut-être la parQle le premier. . 96. Ml'. Gouthier himself said that these complaints must he considered in such a way that aIl aspects of the Palestine question would be touched upon. 97. At the same meeting of which Ml'. Gouthier just reminded the Couneil [667th meeting], 1 stated that "Ml'. Gouthier said that, in his opinion, it would be necessary to refer to 'sorne aspects of the whole Pales- tine question''', which means all aspects of the Palestine question. That, of course, means opening a geneïal debate. 98. That is the Brazilian representative's position. This position is also stated in his proposaI, since point 2 says clearly: "A general discussion shall be held in which reference may be made to any or aIl of the items of the agenda." If we try to decipher the meaning of the term "general discussion" in this informaI draft (since we still do not have a formaI draft of this Brazi- lian proposaI), we see that it may refer " to sorne as- pects", that is, to aU aspects. That is a general debate. \ 111 I 99. Consequently, what is proposed? It is proposed that we should begin Q1Jf çQns.iq~ration Qf these two 95. En réalité, la question se posait d'une manière entièrement différente. Il s'agissait en effet de savoir comment le Conseil examinerait ces deux plaintes- celle d'Israël d'une part et celle de la Jordanie d'autre part. 96. M. Gouthier a dit pour sa part qu'en examinant ces plaintes, le Conseil devrait envisager tous les aspects du problème de Palestine. 97. J'ai dit, à la séance même que le représentant du Brésil vient de rappeler à l'attention du Conseil [667ème séance], que "M. Gouthier a dit qu'à son avis il serait indispensable de pouvoir mentionner "tel ou tel aspect de la question de Palestine", ce qui veut dire à tous les aspects de la question de Palestine. Cela reviendrait à ouvrir une discussion générale. 98. Voilà donc l'attitude qu'a adoptée le représentant du Brésil. Cette attitude, il l'a définie également dans sa proposition, dont le point 2 prévoit explicitement: "[Le Conseil de sécurité] procédera à une discussion générale, au cours de laquelle les orateurs pourront évoquer l'un quelconque ou tous les points de l'ordre du jour." Si l'on essaie de comprendre le sens exact du terme "discussion générale" qui figure dans ce projet non officiel (en effet, le représentant du Brésil n'a pas encore officiellement déposé le texte), on verra que cette discussion doit porter sur "tel ou tel aspect de l'ensemble", c'est-à-dire sur tous les aspects. Il s'agit donc bien d'une discussion générale. 99. Que nous propose-t-on par conséquent? On nouS propose d~ çomm~m:er l'e4\~men de çes deux plaintes r ll r 1 100. My position, however, is quite different. My posi- tion is this: it is essential to discuss the particular items relating to a particular complaint, while allowing refer- ences to general political questions. 101. In the centre of the Brazilian plan is the general discussion of general political questions connected with the Palestine question, and, as Mr. Gouthier expressed it, it would be possible, or, as he said, it might perhaps be necessary, during that general discussion to touch upon the particular items contained.in the provisional agenda. And the provisional agenda contains those items which represent on the one hand the complaint of Leba- non and Jordan, and on the other hand the complaint of Israel. 102. I propose, on the contrary, that the Security Couneil should conr:ern itseif with the discussion of precisely those complaints. And, during the discussion, I said: "it would be possible to digress" but I added that "within reasonable limits" it would be possible to go beyond the framework of the present debate. 103. Mr. Gouthier quoted certain parts of my state- ment but he did not quote the exact passages which support this idea. 104. My words were: "... in considering the com- plaint of Lebanon, it may be impossible - that will depend on who is speaking and the ideas he is expressing - not to touch upon matters which to some extent go beyond (I mean, within reasonable limits) the framework of that particular complaint and which may perhaps relate even to the questions which are involved in the general Palestine situation and in the complaint of Israel." 105. That is obviously a different formulation of the question. In Mr. Gouthier's opinion it is necessarv to engage in what, in his informaI proposaI, he caiIs a "general discussion", touching upon the individual items in the course of it. 106. There is a difference between "touching upon" -:nd "discussing". I believe that we must discuss rather tha~ touch upon the separate items - these two com- plamts - in the order in which they are listed in the provisional agenda and in which' they reached the Security Council and that when we discuss these con- crete complaints in this order we may touch upon general political questions within reasonabie iimits. 1~7. Therefore Mr. Gouthier's attempt to persuade .107. C'est pourquoi, lorsque M. Gouthier s'efforce de h1mse!f and to convince us that there is, generally s'imaginer et de nous convaincre que, d'une façon géné- ~peakmg, no difference between my position and his raIe, il n'existe pas dt:: différence entre mon attitude et 1S a se1f-deception. There is a difference between us, la sienne, il se trompe. Il existe une différence, une and il. very substantial one. That is why l feel that the diffçr~nçe importante. Voilà pourquoi je pense que, ;19 103. M. Gouth:er a cité certains passages de mon intervention, mais il reste qu'il n'a pas cité ceux qui exposent vraiment mon point de vue. 104. J'ai dit: "... lors de l'examen de la plainte du Liban, il sera peut-être difficile - ceia dépendra évi- demment des arguments et des considérations que feront valoir les orateurs - de ne pas évoquer certaines ques- tions dépassant quelque peu (j'ai bien dit, dans des limites raisonnables) le cadre de la plainte, et de ne pas traiter, dans tine ~ertaille mesure, de questions qui intéressent la situation politique générale, -=t que soulève aussi la plainte d'Israël." lOS. C'est là une manière différente de présènter la questiàn. D'après M. Gauthier, il faut que nous enta- mions une "discussion g~nérale", comme il le dit dans la proposition non formelle, et, en passant, que nous évoquions également des points particuliers. 106. Il Y a une différence entre "évoquer" et "exa- miner". Je pense qu'il faut examiner, et non pas évoquer, les points particuliers - c'est-à-dire les deux plaintes en question - d'après la place qu'elles occupent dans l'ordre du jour provisoire, et selon l'ordre dans lequel eUes sont arrivées au Conseil de sécurité; et je crois qu'en examinant ces plaintes concrètes dans cet ordre on pourra évoquer également les questions politiques générales, dans certaines limites raisonnables. 109. It seems to me altogether wrong to waste so much time - we have done so before, we are doing it today, and l am not even sure that this is the last time we shall be doing it - on discussing these matters. 110. What should be the normal, the regular way of discussing this question? We have a provisional agenda. It consists of two items, 2 (a) and 2 (b). These naturaIly have to be discussed. In discussing these items, may we go beyond them? No one denies that we may; we are aIl agreed on that. How far beyond them may we go? That, l think, is the President's business. We have a President, whose duty it is to regulate the debate. If any member of the Security Coun..;l strays so far beyond the boundaries of the discussion as ta digress from the substance of the question, the President will settle the matter, as is his duty. 111. But certain of us are trying to determine in advance to what extent we may go beyond the limits of these questions, and in so doing we emphasize that, properly speaking, we are concerned not with these complaints - neither the complaint of Lebanon and Jordan nor the complaint of Israel-.but with a general discussion and t..l}e general situation. 112. Neither Lebanon nor Israel asked us to examine the general situation; they asked us to examine their complaints. My question is: why does the Security Council not authorize us to consider these complaints but limit us to touching upon them in the debate? 112. Toutefois, ni le Liban ni Israël n'ont demandé au Conseil d'examiner la situation générale. Ils l'ont saisi de deux plaintes bien précises. Cela étant, pourquoi le Conseil de sécurité ne nous autorise-t-il pas à examiner ces plaintes, au lieu de nous permettre seulemeill de les évoquer au cours du débat? 113. La proposition de M. Gouthier dit explicitement que les orateurs "pourront évoquer" certaines questions. Je crois que cette manière de procéder va à l'encontre de tous les usages établis au Conseil de sécurité. En conséquence, je tiens à réaffirmer ma position qui est diamétralement opposée à celle des délégations brési- lienne et colombienne. 114. Mr. Wadsworth, the United States represen- 114. M. Wadsworth, représentant des Etats-Unis, a tative, appealed to us to finish with this procedural invité le Conseil à régler cette question de procédure question as quickly as possible. 1 welcome this desire aussi rapidement que possible. Je suis tout à fait d'ac- . on his part. We must indeed make a speedy end of cord avec lui pour penser qu'il faut en finir au plus vite this matter. But how are we to do 50? avec cette question. Mais comment faire? 115. In my view we should approve the preliminary 115. J'estime que le Conseil doit approuver l'ordre du agenda in the form in which it is proposed, without jour tel quel, sans préjuger la méthode qu'il suivra prejudging the question of how we will discuss it. Let pour l'examiner. Il faut laisser le soin de trancher cette us leave this to the actual speakers themselves, and question aux orateurs qui voudront bien prendre la let us leave the President, whose duty it is to direct parole et au P!'ésident qui doit diriger le débat de la the proceedings, to do as he sees fit. The order of manière qu'il jugera la meilleure. Dans quel ordre 113. Mr. Gouthier's proposaI clearly says that "refer- ence may be made" to certain questions. It seems to me that this is an infringement of aIl our existing customs and is contrary to aIl our past procedures. Consequently l reaffirm my position, which is in opposition to the proposaI of the Brazilian and Colombian delegations. 20 1 discu~<_ù should be that set out in the document faut-il examiner les points de l'ordre du jour? Dans before us: we should discuss item 2 (a) first and then l'ordre même où ils y figurent: d'abord le point 2, a, item 2 (h). puis le point 2, b. 116. As for the procedure for dealing with resoluh ns, 116. Que faire quant aux résolutions? Nous ne con- we do not as yet know what draft resolutions will be naissons pas encore la teneur des projets de résolution sùbmitted. We shall decide what to do with draft resolu- dont 1<:\ Conseil pourra être saisi. Lorsque nous serons tions when they are actually submitted. There may not saisis de textes précis, nous prendrons des décisions à be any reso!utions1 but already we are quarrelling and leur sujet. Il ~e peut en effet qu'auçun projet de résolu· 117. l therefore consider that we should not adopt any extraordinary procedure for considering this qttes~ tion, any procedure other than the one we usually follow in this Council. l am in favour of the ordinar.y procedure, the procedure which has always heen adopted in the Council hitherto and which l hope will continue ta be adopted in the future. This procedure consists in adopting or rejecting the preliminary agenda in the form in which it is submitted, without prejudging the question of who is to speak or of what he will say or how, or the question of what decision will be taken, how that decision will be taken, and how many different proposaIs will be made on that decision. 1~. J'estime par conséquent qu'il n'y a pas de raison de vouloir examiner cette question dans un ordre inhabituel et selon une procédure différente de la procé- dure normale. J'estime que le Conseil devrait suivre la procédure qu'il a toujours appliquée jusqu'ici. J'espère qu'il la suivra toujours à l'avenir. En quoi consiste cette procédure? Elle consiste, soit à approuver, soit à rejeter l'ordre du jour provisoire tel qu'il est soumis au Conseil, sans préjuger la question de savoir quels seront les orateurs, de quoi ils parleront, ni comment ils parleront, et sans préjuger la question des décisions à prendre, de la méthode à suivre pour adopter ces décisions et du nombre des propositions que le Conseil pourrait avoir à examiner. 118. Toutes ces tentatives que l'on fait pour prévoir dès maintenant ce que le Conseil devra faire et pour prédéterminer l'avenir sont parfaitement inattendues, étranges et même extraordinaires, car, depuis près d'un mois, elles ne font que dérouter le Conseil. Je ne crois pas que, lorsqu'il m'a adressé la parole, le Président ait voulu dire que j'avais essayé moi aussi d'embrouille!' la question lors de ma présidence. Il n'en reste pas moins que nous avons déjà consacré cinq ou six séances à la question de savoir s'il faut ou non adopter l'ordre du jour. Cela devient une véritable plaisanterie. 119. J'estime par conséquent que le Conseil doit éviter de s'écarter de sa procédure normale. Il y a une pre- mière question. Il y en a une deuxième. Examinons-les. 118. AIl these attempts to plan everything in advance, to determine the future, are quite unexpected, unusual and extraordinary, and they have been leading us astray for a whole month now. l did not understand the remark which the President addressed ta me in my capacity as former President as meaning that l too had attempted ta confuse this question throughout t]:le past month. The fact is that this is actually the fifth or sixth meeting which we have devoted to the question of whether ta adopt or to reject the agenda. The situation is becoming farcical. 119. It is therefore my opinion that we should not depart from the acœpted order of debate. This is the first item, this the second. Let us proceed to discuss them. 120. Surely we cannot prescribe to a representative what he may say. We cannot, for example, say: "Mr. Malik, you will say this and that", or : "Mr. Sarper, you will say this and that, do not go beyond these limits." It is wrong ta do that. It is harmful. It is dangerous, inadvisable, unpractical; it is not in accordance with any of the usages we employ in our work, with the rules of procedure, or with the hitherto established order of debate. 121. l fully support Mr. Wadsworth's proposaI that we should close the procedural discussion, and l propose that the agenda should be adopted as set forh"! in document SIAgenda/669. Everything else should be ;eft to take its course, depending on how the various representatives understand their task, with the President helping us to raise and deal with matters in the proper way. If, we raise questions out of order, he will calI us ta arder. 122. That is the gist of my proposaI. l should like us ta finish once and for all this useless discussion on the question of how we should proceed, when we do not yet know in what circumstances any particular decision will have to be made.

After these five meetings on the procedural debate, l am convinced that the best thing to do is to start the debate without bothering with procedure at this stage. Therefore, l am not sure that it is wise for the President ta put the Brazilian proposaI to a vote. . 120. Mais on ne peut donner à un représentant des consignes sur ce qu'il lui est permis de dire. Nous ne pouvons dire à M. Malik, par exemple: "M. Malik, dites ceci ou cela", ou à M. Sarper: "M. Sarper vous pouvez dire ceci, mais n'allez pas plus loin." Une telle manière de procéder serait nuisible, dangereuse, inutile et peu pratique. Elle serait contraire à tous les usages établis, au règlement intérieur et à la méthode de travail que le Conseil a suivie jusqu'ici. 121. J'appuie sans réserve la proposition de M. Wadsworth qui voudrait en finir avec cette question de procédure, et je propose par conséquent au Conseil d'adopter son ordre du jour tel qu'il figure dans le document SIAgenda/669. L'avenir montrera ce qu'il faudra faire ensuite. Cela dépendra de la manière dont chacun d'entre nous s'acquittEra de sa tâche. Quant au Président, il nous aidera à poser les questions et à les résoudre comme il se doit. Si nous posons les questions d'une manière qui n'est pas la bonne, le Président a le moyen de nous rappeler à l'ordre. 122. Voilà donc en quoi consiste ma proposition. Je tiens vraiment à ce que le Conseil mette fin à cette discussion inutile sur la question de savoir ce qu'il lui faudra faire, alors que nous ne savons encore rien. de la situation qui existera au moment où il sera appelé à prendre telle ou telle décision. 123. M. TSIANG (Chine) (traduit de l'anglais): Après ces cinq séances consacrées à un débat de' procé- dure, je suis convaincu que le mieux que nous puissions faire maintenant, c'est commencer la discussion sans nous préoccuper pour.l'instant de procédure. Enconsé- quence, je ne suis pas sûr qu'il soit judicieux pour le Président de mettre la proposition du Brésil aux voix. 1 125. 1 do not see the necessity for any commitment in regard to future procedure or to a future resolution or resolutions to be adopted. Therefore, my idea is that we should start this debate without adopting a pro- cedura1 resolution, without voting.on the Brazilian proposaI. Let us get ahead with our work. Let us start with item 2 (a) and then go on to item 2 (b). If, in the course pf the consideration, any member of the Council shou1d raise a procedural point, you, Mr. President, are in the chair and you can decide. We have the mIes of procedure to guide us. vVe must take a majority decision according to those rules. 126. If we raise procedural questions after sorne sub- stantive debate, all of ua will be in a better position to judge whether the procedural points are correct or incorrect. A prolonged debate on procedure seems so aimless. After a certain amount of substantive debate, a procedural clebate may have sorne point and may get us somewhere. Therefore, 1 humbly submit that the wisest thing for the Council to do is to adopt the agenda, begin discussion on item 2 (a) and wait for future developments. 1 would not push the Brazilian proposaI to a vote.

1 ought to draw the atten- tion of the Council for a moment to the fact that it is approaching our usual time to adjourn, 6 p.m. We normally suspend our meetings at this time. However, more than one member of the Council has expressed the wish that we should make an attempt to complete the adoption of our agenda this afternoon, and 1 shall take it that it is the pleasure of the Council that we continue for a little longer at any rate to see how far we can go. Then, if it is agreeable to m)' colleagues, 1 will again intervene in the proceedings if it appears - as 1 hope will not be the case - that we are not ciss~ment plutôt qu'amendement. La déclaration qu'a faite cet après-midi le représentant du Brésil m'a con· firmé que mon amendement était un éclaircissement. Le représentant du Brésil nous a dit que nous devrions examiner les plaintes quant au fond dans l'ordre dans lequel elles figurent à notre ordre du jour; c'est-à-dire que nous devrions commencer par le point 2, a. Le représentant de la Jordanie présenterait sa plainte, et le représentant d'Israël lui répondrait. Les autres membres du Conseil formuleraient leurs observations. Ensuite, nous examinerions le point 2, b, de la même façon. 125. Je ne vois pas la nécessité de prendre un engage- ment quelconque au sujet de la procédure que nous suivrons par la suite ou de la ou des résolutions que nous adopterons. Par conséquent, à mon avis, il faut que nous commencions cette discussion sans adopter une résolution touchant la procédure, sans voter sur la proposition du Brésil. Commençons nos travaux. Com- mençons par le point 2, a, puis passons Cl.U point 2, b. Si, au cours de cet examen, l'un ou l'autre des membres du Conseil soulève une question de procédure, le Prési- dent a le pouvoir de la trancher. Nous avons pour nous guider notre règlement intérieur. Nous devons prendre une décision à la majorité, conformément à ce règlement. 126. Si nous soulevons des questions de procédure après avoir discuté pendant un certain temps le fond des problèmes, nous serons les uns et les autres mieux à même de nous prononcer sur ces questions de procé- dure. Un débat de procédure prolongé semble absolu- ment vain. Lorsqu'on a discuté pendant un certain temps le fond d'une question, un débat de procédure peut se justifier et donner des résultats. En conséquence, à mon humble avis, la meilleure méthode à suivre con- siste à adopter l'ordre du jour, à commencer l'examen du point 2, a, et à attendre la suite des événements. Je n'insisterais pas pour que la proposition du Brésil soit mise aux voix. 127. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Je dois maintenant rappeler au Conseil qu'il sera bientôt 18 heures, c'est-à-dire l'heure à laquelle, habituellement, nous levons la séance. Normalement, FOUS arrêtons nos travaux à cette heure. Cependant, plusieurs membres du Conseil ont exprimé le désir que nous nous ef'for- cions d'adopter notre ordre du jour cet après-midi, et je considérerai que le Conseil tient à ce que nous pour- suivions nos débats pendant quelque temps encore, au moins jusqu'à voir jusqu'où nous pouvons aller. En- suite, si mes collègues veulent bien, j'interviendrai à nouveau s'il apparaît - et j'espère qu'il n'en sera pas 129. Accordingly, as a question requiring further clarification has been raised, 1 believe that it would be premature to consider the question of a vote today. For my part, at any rate, 1 would like to hear the views of the Brazilian and Colombian representatives and possibly of other representatives on the new proposaI before us : not to vote on the Brazilian resolution because it serves no useful. purpose. The remarks which have been made here to that effect seem to me correct. 130. Ml'. HOPPENOT (France) (translated from French): 1 do not know exactly to what appeal Ml'. Vyshinsky is referring, since for sorne reason equally unknown to me he did not mention the author of it. 1 only know that a few minutes ago Ml'. Malik quite clearly asked the representative of Brazil whether he intended to maintain his proposaI; and that repre- sentative, in no less clear and unequivocal terms, replied that he was maintaining it. In those circumstances 1 cannot see how there can be any doubt that the repre- sentatives of Brazil and Colombia wish to maintain their proposaI. 131. The statement just made by Ml'. Tsiang refers purely and simply - and a single occasion does not constitute a custom - to the proposition which Ml'. Vyshinsky was upholding just now that any draft resolution on the procedure for adoption of the agenda should be discarded and that we should embark at once on an entirely unregulated discussion in which each speaker wouId have the right, speaking on point 2 (a), ~o refer to point 2 (b) and so on; and the Council could 111 Ml'. Tsiang's view, deal with any procedural incident~ as they arose in the course of the debate and the President could settle them or not as best he could. 1adm!t freely that t.hat proposaI from the representative of Chma was weIl mtended, but 1 cannot see anything new in it. It is, in fact, the original proposaI with which we started and the majority of the members of the Council, by their very attempts to find another formula, have c1early shown that they do not favour it. 132. Ii! conclusion 1 should like to express my agree- ment wlth the extreme1y sensible comments just made by the United States representative when he suggested 134. Secondly, l am altogether unable to understand Ml'. Hoppenot's remark. He says that to adopt the provisional agenda means to embark upon a discussion of which the result is uncertain, in which anyone may speak of wh3.t he pleases and as he pleases, while the President will regulate the debate. l should like to ask Ml'. Hoppenot what usually happens when we begin the discussion of a question, any question - say the Moroccan or the Tunisian question? \-Vhat has happened until now? Did we ever decide what we would say and how and within what limits we would say it, whether we would or would not touch upon general questions and to what extent we would do so? Nothing of the sort occurred. We adopted the agenda, we said what was called for, and if we strayed beyond the limits of the question the President - it is true that Ml'. Hoppenot has not taken part in the discussion in this particular case, but he has done so in other cases - would bring down his gave! and say: "Please confine yourself to such and such a question." That is what happened. 135. l therefore cannot understand this line of argu- ment. The only possible explanation for it is a desire to vote today at aIl costs on this proposaI which i5 not even of a formaI nature. In that case may l first request that the proposaI be properly introduced? 136. What have we before us? We have this bit of paper in English, which was circulated to us, and we do not even have the proposaI that Ml'. Hoppenot wants us to vote on today. We also have document S/ Agenda/ 669. He wishes to substitute sorne other draft for it. He says that this is a procedural proposaI. In that case l must ask that that proposaI be circulated in the Security Council as a draft motion or a draft resolution. It is true that the "procedurali!:>~.:;" among us maintain that procederaI proposaIs have never before been cir- culated as formaI resolutions. But have we ever before been unable to adopt our agenda for a month and a haH? For nearly a month and a haH we have been unable to adopt this agenda and now we are asked to vote on this proposaI. 137. What is this? A sheet of paper. It is neither a draft nor a proposaI, because it is cOlPpletely informaI. What is a vote? A vote is a formaI act. You are asking us to take a formaI decision on an informaI act, an informaI paper. Do you calI that order? l hope that the l'occurren~e, ce qui m'intéresse, ce n'est pas de savoir qui a parlé, mais ce qu'on a dit. S'il y a une logique, j'ap- prouve cette logique. A cet égard, il semblE: que M. Hop- penot soit également disposé à applaudir la logique des autres, mais qu'aujourd'hui il ait changé d'attitude. 134. Deuxièmement, l'observation de M. Hoppenot est absolument incompréhensible. Si l'on adopte, dit-il, l'ordre du jour provisoire, on se lance dans une discus- sion dont le résultat est incertain: on dira ce qu'on aura envie de dire et comme on aura envie de le dire, et le Président dirigera les débats. Que M. Hoppenot me permette de lui demander ce qui se passe lorsque l'on aborde l'examen d'une question, de n'importe queile question, par exemple de la question marocaine Otl de la question tunisienne? Comment a-t-on procédé jusqu'à présent? Avait-on décidé à l'avance ce qu'on dirait, comment on le dirait et jusqu'où on irait? Avait-on décidé si l'on aborderait ou non les questions générales et jusqu'où irait l'examen de ces questions? Rien de semblable ne s'est produit. Nous adoptions l'ordre du jour, nous disions ce que nous avions à dire et, si nous allions trop loin, le Président frappait la table de son marteau et disait: "S'il vous plaît, ne vous écartez pas du sujet." Il est vrai que M. Hoppenot n'a pas assisté à la discussion de ce sujet particulier, mais il a assisté aux autres séances. Vùilà comment on procédait. 135. Pour cette raison, je ne puis comprendre une telle argumentation. Celle-ci ne s'explique que par le désir de voter à toute force sur une proposition qui n'est même pas présentée de façon formelle. Dans ce cas, permettez-moi avant tout de demander que nous soyons officiellement saisis du texte en question. 136. Qu'avons-nous? Nous avons devant nous un morceau de papier écrit en anglais qui nous a été distri- bué, mais nous n'avons pas cette proposition sur la- quelle M. Hoppenot voudrait que l'on vote aujourd'hui. Nous avons le document S/Agenda/669, et M. Hop- penot veut que l'on vote sur un autre projet. Il dit que c'est une proposition concernant la procédure; dans ce cas, je demande que cette proposition soit présentée sous forme de motion ou de projet de résolution. Il est vrai que les "partisans de la procédure" disent qu'il n'est jamais arrivé que des propositions relatives à la procé- dure soient distribuées sous la forme d'un projet de résolution formel. Mais est-il arrivé que, pendant un mois et demi, on ne parvienne pas à adopter un ordre du jour? Il y a presque un mois et demi que nous n'ar- rivons pas à adopter l'ordre du jour, et maintenant on no'1S demande de voter sur cette proposition. 137. Qu'est-ce que c'est? C'est une feuille de papier. Ce n'est pas un projet. Ce n'est pas une proposition. C'est une feuille qui n'a rien d'officiel. Et qu'est-ce qu'un vote? Un vote est un acte officiel. Vous voulez par con- séquent que nous prenions une décision officielle au 139. When we discuss any question, any one of us here - any member of the Security Council- may speak of what he pleases as he pleases and for as long as he pleases, and the President must keep order. That is the normal procedure. You are proposing some other procedure which, to my regret, l am quite unable to accept. 140. l therefore make a formaI request that, if any draft resolution is to be put to the vote, l may be allowed to see it first. It exists only in English and has not even been eirculated in Russian. Otherwise we cannot take a serious decision on this question. 141. Mr. GaUTHIER (Brazil): l shall be very brief. l have already stated here that the Brazilian- Colombian proposaI stands as it was submitted to this Couneil. Of course, our proposaI is now in the hands of the Couneil which should deeide when to vote on it. 142. Regarding the remarks made by the represen- tative of the Soviet Union, l should like to state .that my proposaI is a procedural motion and, in accordance with our rules, does not need to be presented formally. l c~l1 the attention of the representative of the Soviet Umon to rule 31 of our rules of procedure, which states: "Proposed resolutions, amendments and substan- tive motions shall normally be placed before the representatives in writing." Our proposaI is not a substantive proposaI, and for that reason it was submitted in the normal way. 143. Mr. Vyshinsky also mentioned the fact that this document was not translated into Russian. Does he not ~ow its meaning in Russian? l wish to calI the atten- tIon of the representative of the Soviet Union to the ~ecord of the 667~h meeting which has been translated 1l1to Russian. l said in that meeting: "Therefore, the Brazilian and the Colombian de1egations formally introduce their proposaI, reading as follows: ..." For that reason, the representative of the Soviet Union knows the exact terms of our proposaI because the document was also translatd iuto Russian. 146. The question of time and a question of procedure have just been raised. 1 would ask the President to put to the Couneil the preliminary question whether it agrees to an immediate vote on the Brazilian proposaI. 1 would ask him to put that question to the Council and request it to answer yes or no.

I have three more names on my list of speakers. At the same time, we have before us the suggestion made by the representative of France that we should consult the Couneil as to whether the Brazilian proposaI should be put to the vote forth- with. In this 1 am very much in the hands of the Council, but I would like to make one point from the Chair, and that is that in my view the Brazilian proposaI is a procedurai motion in a proper form, as has been explained hy the representative of BraziI. Furthermore, it i5 the only proposaI of its kind which is formally before the CouneiI. If there is no objection, I propose to take the pleasure of the Council in the manner suggested by the representative of France. That is to say, 1 will ask the Couneil whether it agrees that the Brazilian proposaI should be put to the vote forthwith?

1 want to ask the President whether he considers that the French pro- posaI has precedence and is not subject to debate. If the President rules that it does not have precedence and that we can debate it, then I ask to be allowed to speak on the French proposaI.

It seems to me quite c1ear that the Chair must allow a debate on the proposaI made by the representative of France, if only because there are three members who have put their names on the list of speakers on this question of procedure. Therefore, the answer to the representative of China is that certainly this is a matter on which debate can and, indeed, should take place. 150. I should perhaps make it clear to my colleague that the order of speakers on my list is Lebanon, the Soviet Union, Colombia, and China. 151. Je donne la parole au représentant de la France pour une motion d'ordre. . 20 151. 1 call upon the representative of France on a point of order. 145. Le représentant du Brésil a bien fait d'ajouter que le texte russe de la proposition du Brésil est à la disposition de M. Vychinsky, de même que le texte français est à la mienne, puisqu'il figure dans le compte rendu sténographique des débats du Conseil de sécu- rité. Par conséquent, nous ne pouvons pas prétendre- pas plus M. Vychinsky que moi-même - que nous ne connaissons pas le texte sur lequel nous discutons. D'ail- leurs, l'affirmer serait dire que nous discutons depuis deux séances sur un texte que nous ne connaissons pas, ce qui n'est certainement le cas ni de M. Vychinsky ni de moi-même. 146. On a soulevé tout à l'heure une question d'heure et une question de procédure. Je demanderai au Pré- !3ident de bien vouloir poser au Conseilla question préa- lable de savoir s'il est d'accord pour que soit mise aux voix immédiatement la motion du Brésil. Je le prie de poser cette question au Conseil en l'invitant à répon- dre par oui ou par non. 147. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Il y a encore trois orateurs inscrits. En même temps, nous sommes saisis de la proposition du représentant de la France tendant à demander au Conseil s'il faut mettre immédiatement au.x: voix la proposition du Brésil. Il appartient au Conseil de prendre une déeision à ce sujet, mais je voudrais formuler une observation en ma qualité de Président: à mon avis, la proposition du Brésil est une motion de procédure en bonne et due forme, comme l'a expliqué le représentant du Brésil. En outre, elle est la seule proposition de ce genre dont le Conseil soit saisi formellement. S'il n'y a pas d'objec- tions, je me propose de demander l'avis du Conseil comme l'a suggéré le représentant de la France. En d'autres termes, je vais demander au Conseil s'il désire que l'on mette immédiatement aux voix la proposition du Brésil. 148. M. TSIANG (Chine) (traduit de l'anglais): Je voudrais demander au Président s'il considère que la proposition de la France a priorité et ne doit pas être débattue. Si le Président répond par la négative et dit que nous pouvons l'examiner, je demanderai à pre~dre la parole à son sujet. 149. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Il est parfaitement clair, me semble-t-il, que le Président doit autoriser les membres du Conseil à instituer un débat sur la proposition du représentant de la France, ne serait-ce que parce qu'il y a sur ma liste trois repré- sentants qui veulent prendre la parole sur ce point de procédure. Par conséquent, en réponse au représen- tant de la Chine, je dirai qu'il s'agit là certainement d'une question dont nous pouvons et devons même dé- battre. 150. Je devrais peut-être indiquer à mon collègue que les orateurs qui figurent sur ma liste sont dans l'ordre suivant: le représentant du Liban, le représentant de l'Union soviétique, le représentant de la Colombie et le représentant de la Chine.

Under rule 33, l am obliged immediately to put to the vote the proposaI for the adjournment of the meeting which has just been made by the representative of Turkey. As l understand it, that leaves in the hands of the President the question of when the Council will next meet to discuss this question. Therefore, l now put to the vote the proposaI that this meeting be adjourned. A vote was taken by show of hands. In favour: China, Turkey, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Against: Brazil, Colombia, Denmark, France. Absta,ining: Lebanon, New Zealand, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America. The proposaI was 1'ejecied by 4 votes ta 3, with 4 abstentions. 155. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): l propose that the meeting be adjourned - not under rule 33, but on account of the lateness of the hour. It is 6.30 p.m., and unfortunately my personal affairs are such that l cannot remain at the meeting any longer.

Would the Soviet Union representative care to propose a date for the Council's next meeting? l have just put to the vote, as l was requested to do, a formaI motion under rule 33. That is rather different from the question of deferring to the personal convenience of one of the members of the Council. l feel that my attitude, and, indeed, the attitude of the Council, might be affected if the Soviet Union representative cared to let us know the date on which he believes the Council should resume its work. 157. Mr. Vyshinsky (Union of Soviet Socialist Repub- lies) (translated from Russian): l could name tomorrow, at 3 p.m. AlI the rest of course depends on the Council.

In that case, l think that l am bound under rule 33 to put that proposaI to the vote. As members are aware, one of the cases included in rule 33 is a proposaI that discussion of a question should be postponed to a certain day. l am perfectly prepared to put to the vote the Soviet Union represen- tative's proposaI, which seems to me, as President, ta be a sensible proposaI. l should add that l am, of course, quite aware that in this case the question is open ta debate. 159. For some time, Mr. Malik has been asking to sl?eak on a point of order. l therefore call upon hlm now. 160. Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): l do not know 160. M. Charles MALIK (Liban) (traduit de l'an- what the Council witt Wiêh t9 do about the matter of glais) : Je ne sais pas quelle décision le Conseil prendra 27 Il est procédé ml, vote à main levée. Votent pour: Chine, Turquie, Union des Républiques socialistes soviétiques. Votint contre: Brésil, Colombie, Danemark, France. S'abstiennent: Liban, Nouvelle-Zélande, Royaume- Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord, Etats- Unis d'Amérique. Par 4 voix contre 3, avec 4 abstentions, la proposi- tion est rejetée. 155. M. VYCHINSKY (Union des Républiques so- cialistes soviétiques) (traduit du russe): En raison de l'heure tardive, je propose de lever la séance. Ce n'est pas en vertu de l'article 33, mais bien parce qu'il est tard que je fais cette proposition. Pour des raisuils per- sonnelles, je regrette de ne pas pouvoir siéger au-delà de 18 h. 30. 156. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais) : Le re- présentant de l'Union soviétique souhaite-il proposer une date pour la prochaine séance du Conseil? Comme on me l'a demandé, je viens de mettre aux voix une motion formelle présentée conformément à l'article 33. S'il s'agit de tenir compte de convenances personnelles d'un des membres du Conseil, la question est différente. Je pense que mon attitude et même l'attitude du Conseil pourraient être modifiées si le représentant de l'URSS voulait bien nous faire connaître la date à laquelle il pense que le Conseil devrait reprendre ses travaux. 157. M. VYCHINSKY (Union des Républiques so- cialistes soviétiques) (tradttit du russe) : J'estime quant à moi que nous pourrions nous réunir demain à 15 heures. Mais c'est bien entendu au Conseil qu'il appar- tient de prendre la décision à ce sujet. 158. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Dans ces conditions, je crois qu'aux termes de l'article 33, je suis tenu de mettre cette proposition aux voix. Comme les membres du Conseille savent, l'article 33 prévoit le cas d'une proposition tendant à remettre la discussion d'une question à un jour déterminé. Je suis tout dis- posé à mettre aux voix la proposition du représentant de l'Union soviétique, qui, me semble-t-il en qualité de Président, est raisonnable. Je dois ajouter que je sais fort bien, évidemment, que cette question peut donner lieu à controverse. 159. M. Malik demande depuis quelque temps à pré- senter une motion d'ordre. Je lui donne donc la parole. 1 1 163. l beg every member of the Security Council to bear wiî:h us in aIl these delays and ta view them in their proper perspective; l ask members ta do that while they are making every effort ta maintain the dignity and authority of the Couneil, which is our last re50;t in these cases. A: this point, the representative of Lebanon was called to order by the President. .i54. Ml'. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): 1 was going ta say that item 2 (a) may no longer be before the Couneil tomorrow. l may withdraw that item. In that case, there would be no purpose for this debate. 1 have said aIl that 1 have said because l wanted ta show the Couneil ... 165. The PRESIDENT: l have not yet been able to draw the attention of the representative of Lebanon ta the fact that l called him ta arder. The reason 1 did sa was that he had requested permission ta speak on a point of arder - and l was going ta point out to him - and 1 point out ta him now, that he was straying far from a point of arder. The question to which the Couneil is now addressiag itself is whether we shall proceed, under rule 33, to a motion for adjournment until tomorrow. 166. 1 call upon the representative of the Soviet Union. 167. Ml'. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): Did not the President ask me a question? 168. The PRESIDENT: 1 am sorry, had not the representative of Lebanon completed his remarks?

As my proposaI for the adjournment obviously gives rise to sorne hesitation, 1 shall not press it, but 1 should like to ask the President till what hour we shall work today. 1 should like to know this, in view of my dep2.rture from New York on leave the day after tomorrow. Perhaps this request could be satisfied, at any rate.

Before 1 answer that ques- tion 1 believe that the representative of Turkey wishes ta raise a point of order.

It is up to the President to deeide whether it is a point of order, but what 1 should like to say is as follows: when 1 proposed the adjournment it was not because 1 was tired. Indeed, 1am not tired and 1 can continue. 1 made my proposaI because 1 feh and knew that the whole atmosphere of the Security Couneil tonight was not suitable for reaching a deeision and an agreement. 1 urge the Coun- cil and beg the President to adjourn now and to let us meet tomorrow or at any other time that is desired. 1can, as 1 have said, continue if the Couneil so desires.

We are c1early in a position where it is becoming a matter of extreme inconvenience for some members of the Couneil, who might normally expect that meetings would end about 6 p.m., to find their engagements interfered with. Taking into account the questions 1 have been asked, 1 should like to propose that we cease working now and resume work tomorrow at 3 p.m.

1 said just now that, because my request has given rise to some hesitation, 1 withdraw it. So far as 1 am concerned, therefore, the objection which sorne members of the Security Council have advanced against continuing today's meeting on the ground that it would involve personal inconvenience has no validity. 1 should not be personally inconvenienced, and 1 am prepared to sacrifice my other interests and continue the meeting today. 173. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Il est manifeste que certains membres du Conseil, qui peu- vent s'attendre normalement à ce que la séance soit levée aux environs de 18 heures, éprouvent de la gêne à continuer à siéger parce que cela va à l'encontre de leurs engagements antérieurs. Compte tenu des ques- tions qu'on vient de me poser, je me demande si les membres du Conseil accepteraient que nous arrêtions nos travaux maintenant et les reprenions demain après- midi, 15 heures. 174. M. VYCHINSKY (Union des Républiques so- eialistes soviétiques) (traduit du russe) : J'ai dit tout à l'heure que je retirais ma demande parce qu'elle avait suseité certaines hésitations. Je pense donc qu~ dispa- rait l'objection de certains membres du Conseil de sécu- rité suivant lesquels il y aurait des inconvénients d'ordre personnel à prolonger cette séance. Il n'est plus question d'inconvénients personnels; je suis prêt à sacrifier mes autres intérêts ét à poursuivre la séance. 177. MI'. MUNRO (New Zealand): 1 am going to make a motion which has precedence over any others. 1 am going to move what was moved by the represen- tative of Turkey not long ago, name1y the adjournment of the meeting. That means that the date of the next meeting is in your hands, MI'. President, and 1 think you have a clear guidance from members - or what 1 think is a clear guidance from members - as to what should be the date of that meeting. 178. We are dealing with an urgent matter and we cannot afford to waste the time, but 1 am convinced that we have reached such a stage in our debate that it would be profitless ta continue it this evening. 1 there- fore mave that the meeting he adjourned.

1 hav~ had another indication that some members wish to speak. 1 shall be interpreting the rules correctly if 1 permit interventions on points of order in connexion with the proposaI ta adjourn. Otherwise, the proposaI has ta be voted without debate. 180. MI'. HOPPENOT (France) (translated from French): It seems to me that the Counci! took a decision on the Turkish representative's proposaI a quarter of an hour ago, by rejecting it. 1 wond.er whether a similar proposaI is admissible a quarter of an hour later, and whether we can be asked to vote on the identical point on which we have just voted. For myself 1 should think not. 181. The PRESIDENT: 1 would have thought, MI'. Hoppenot, that this is a case where we should bring out the old principle that the Council is the master of its own procedure. In other words, we might find it highly inconvenient for ail of us to take a very decided view that we could not revive this proposaI at some later hour. It seems ta me that the lapse of time may make a difference. 182. 1 call upon the representative of Lebanon on a point of order. 183. MI'. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): 1 do not know the status of my complaint and 1 do not know when 1 will know that status. 1 have information that 1 may not know the status of my complaint for a number of days. 1 therefore beg you to take that into account. 184. MI'. HOPPENOT (France) (translated from French): 1 should like to reITÙnd MI'. Malik that his 182. Je donne la parole au représentant du Liban pour une motion d'ordre. 183. M. Charles MALIK (Liban) (traduit de l'an- glais) : J'ignore ce qu'il en est de ma plainte. J'ignore à quel moment je serai fixé. Les renseignements que je possède me donnent à penser que je risque de ne pas être fixé avant plusieurs jours. Je demande au Prési- dent cl'en tenir compte. 1 184. M. HOPPENOT (France): Je ferai remarquer à M. Malik que sa plainte n'est pas la seule dont le Il est procédé au vote à main levée. Votent POU'1": Brésil, Chine, Danemark, Nouvelle- Zélande, Turquie, Union des Républiques socialistes soviétiques, Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Ir- lande du Nord, Etats-Unis d'Amérique. S'abstiennent: Colombie, France, Liban. Par 8 voix contre zéro, avec 3 abstentions, la motion d'ajournement est adoptée. La séance est levée à 18 h. 55. fUNŒ Edifion. A. P,IIdon.. 13. fUll 6ouiIIot. Peris V. IllEU-IllCE ·e.ftheroudokï.... PI.c. de "" Comtifa. fion, AfhAn.... .....1!II1lA- AHENIlIll Editori.1 Sud.m.tic.n. SA. Ahin. 500. Bu.no. AiM.. • AlIS1IAUA-11lS1UllE H. A. Godd.rd. 2551> GlIOrge Sf. Sydney. IE'IIIIII-InllQUE Ag.nceet M....g.ri•• de II> Presse S.A. 14-22 rue du P.rsil. Bru18U.... W. H. Smilh llc Son. 71·75, boulev.rd Adolph..Mox, Brwc.Uos. lUA1EIW.A Gouboud & CIe. LM•• 50. Av••idl> SUI 28, Guatem.l.. '# HAIn Libr.irie "A 1. CoravaUe,· llofIe pOJtele III.B. Port...u.Prince. IIOUVIA-IOUVlE librerl. S.lecciono•• Co.ma 972., "" pO%. IIOIL-Imll livr..i. Agir. Rue MlllÙco 98-&. Rio de J.n.iro; S!o P.ulo, B.lo Horizon~ IIONDURAS librerf. P.n.meric.n., C.lle de Il> Fu.nte, T~gucig.lp•• ClIWIA Ryorson Pr.... 299 Qu.o/) St. Wost. Toronto. INDIA-INDE Oxford Book & Sf.tionory Co.. Seindil> Hou,e. New D.lhi••nd 17 P.rk SI..et, Colculf•• P. V...d.ch.ry & Co.. 8 lingbi Chetty St. M.elr., 1. P~ioelic•• 4234 de II> Roche. Monm.l anON-CEYllIf The As.oci.t.d N.wsp.p.rs of 'Ceylon LM.. L.ke Houso. Colombo. INDONESIA -INDONESJE J.j.,.n Pemb.ngull.n. Gunung S.hori 84, Dj.k.rt•• CHIlE-CHILI Libr.rr. 'Iv.ns., Monoel. B22. S.nti.go. Editori.1 dol P.ctfico, Ahum.el. 57. S.ntiego. IlWf Ket.b-Kh.neh D.nos!l, 293 Sa.di A_ :'lU';', Te~rl!.l~ IIAQ-llAl M.ckenzie', Boouhop. B.ghded. CHINA':"anNE Tho World Book Co. Ltd.. 99 Chung King Ro.d. ht S.ction. T.ipoh. T.iw.n. Commorci.1 Press. 211 Henon Rd. Sh.ng- h.i. C010.IA-C0108IE lib'.,r. ""tin.. Cl>rr.rl> 6.. 13-05, 1l0gotA. Lili,.rll> AmSrice. Modellln. lillrerfl> N.cion.1 l~d•• Ilorr.nquill.. ISWl Blumsfein's BooWores Ltd. 3S AII.nby Ro.d. Tel Aviv. ITA1Y_ITAUE Colibri S.A, Vie Merc.1Il 36, MiI.no. lWIION-11LU1 libr.irie UniverseUe. Beyroulh. COSTA IlCA- COUA·lICA Tr.jes H.rm.nos, Ap.rt.do 1313. S.n JœL CId , le Cos. Il.'g•• O'Roilly 455. "" H.b.n•• UlnlA J. Momolu K.m.... Monrovia. 1UXEMIOUllll libr.irie J. 5chummer. luxe.mbourg. mOlOSlOVmA-IC!lrCOSlOYlQUlE ConoslovonskY Spisov.toJ. N'rodnl TIld. 9.Pr.hl> 1. r/iEIICO-lUIIGUE Edilori.1 Hermes S...... Ignecio MarisceJ 41. MSxico, D.F. 8ElllWJ[- DANDIÙI Ein.r Munhg••rd. ltd~ tUrro~.de 6, K.b.nh.vn. K. IlEmEllANDS- 'AYS..AS N.V. M.rtinus Nijholi. L.nge Voorhout 9. 's-Gravenhllge. IOMINICIII, IEMUC-IEPtlI. DOMINICilINE Libr.rr. Dominicen.. M.rc.el.s 49, Ciu- d.d Trujillo. NEW JEAL'ND-IIOUVEUE.ZEUIIlIt United N.tions Associ.lion of New Ze.. I.nd. C.P.O. 1011, Wellington. ICOADOI-EQUAmnt •• Librerlà Cientmc., Gu.y.qu,i1 ".cl Quito. Il'''_ ElmE , Libr.irie "le Ren.iss.n,ce. d'Egypfa," 9 Sh. Adly P.,h•• C.iro. Il SA1VADOI-U1VADOI , M.nu.l N.ves y Cl... 1•• Avenid. sur 37, $.n S.lv.dor. IIOIWAY-IIOIVEIE Joh.n Grundt Tonum Forlog, Kr ,.", 9usts9t. 7A. Oslo. PAIISTAN Thom.s & Thom... Fort M.nsion, Frete Re.d. K.rachi. 3. Publi,hers United ltd. 176 An..lon. l.hore.' 0HI0PlA-mdOPIE .,\goncs ::tbiopienne de Publiclt6. Box 128, t\ddi. AÎl.b... 'AIIAMA JosS MenSndez, Pl.us delullngo. Panam&. IlttUllD- nNlANDE Al.fe.minon Kirj.buPI''' 2. Koskuùolv, HaI.inU. PAUIUAY Moreno He.rmeno;, Asu.ci6n. Orders and inql.ii7Ïes from cquniT jes wherê saTes ageh" kave not yet boe!! i:I~pointed may he sent fa: SaTes and Circ.uTatlon Section, Uilited Nations, New Yorle, U.S.A.; or Sai. Section, United Nations Office. PaTois des ~btrons, ~nèY;:SwItzerland. Priee: $U.S. 0.30; 2/-stg.; Sw. fr. 1.20 (or equivalent in other currencies) Printed in Canada 'DU-PElOU libr.rr. Inf.r••clon.1 de! pèr6. S.A. Lima and Arequip•• PHIUHINES Alem.r·s Ilook Slore, 749 RIuI "'venue. M.nil•• POIt1IUl livr..ia Rodrlgues. 1116 Rue Aul'llll, llobaa. SINIAPOIlE 'Th.. City Book Store. ltd.. Wi.cbosht House. Colly.r Qu.y. SWEDEH-SUED~ C. E. Fritz..'s Kungl. HevboUlandot A·1l. Fredsg.l.n 2. Sfodholm. SWiTZElLAND-SU'5.SE libr.iri.. P.yot ~.A.. lous.nne. Genève. Hens R.unh.rdt. Kirchg.sse 17. Zurich 1. SY!lIA-STlIE libr.irie UniverseUe, D.m... 1lIAlLAND-1HAllANDE Pr.mu.n Mit Ltd.. 55 Ch.kraw.t Roecl. W.t Tuk. B.ngkok. lI!UEY-TUIQUIE librairie H.chette, 469 blikl.1 C.ddesi. Beyoglu. bl.nbul. UNION OF SOUTH AOIU-II. ~UD.AOICAINE V.n Sch.ik's Boeksfore (Ply.). Ltd.. Il.. 724. Prelori•• UNitED IIMODOM-IOYAUJlE.UN1 H.M. St.tionery Office. P. O. Ilox 569. london. S.E. 1 (end.t H.M.S.O. Shop.). U. S. OF AMEIICA - ETATS-III:IS D'AllEllQUE Int'I Documents Service. Columbie Univ. Press. 2960 Bro.dw.y. New York 27••• Y. IlIUIUAY Represenl.ci6n de Edilori.l... Prof. H. D'E11•• Av. 18 de Julio !333, MC!ltevideo. VENUUElA Di,fricuido.. Escol.r S.A.. Ferrenqulft a Cruz d.. Cendel.rk 178.Coree... YUllOSLAVlA - YOIlQOSlAVIE Drzovno Preduzece. Jugo,loven.m K.jig.. Mers.l. Tit. 23·11, Oeogracl. UnI/oc! NoIi.... pubncatio... "'" "ho 110 obroinoc! 'rom Ihe followinll fi..... Lu publication. <1•• Hal/o... Uni.. flOuyonl egolom.nl 'Ire oblonu.. aux 0<1,,_ d- de.ssous: AunRIA-·AUTllaIë 8. WüUerslerlf. W.~gpl.tz. 4, 5.lzburg. Gerold & Co.. 1. Gr.ben 3/. Wien. GEJlMANY- A1lEMAlNE Elwert & Meurer, H.upts!r.sso 101. B.rlin -Schëneb.rg. W. E. S...b.c~. Fr.nkensft.sse 14, Koln -Junkersdorf. Alex. Horn, Spiegelg.SSIl 9, Wiesb.den. JAPAN-~APON M.ruzen Comp.ny. Ud. 6 Tor;.Nicllom• Nihonb.sh~ Tokyo. SPAIN- ESPAGNE librerl.. Bosch. .1 Rondo Unlversid.cl. ,B.rcelon.. (5381) Les commandes et demandes de renseignements émanant de pays où il n'existe pas encore de dépositaires peuvent Afre adressées à la Section des vemes et de la distribu· tion, Organisation des Nations Unies, New-Yorle (Etats. Unis d'Amérique) ou à la SectIon des ventes, Organisa- ,ln des Nations Unias, Palais des Nations, Genive \,juisse), 16415-·July 1954-1600