S/PV.670 Security Council

The Council will be grateful to the representative of the Soviet Union for making his position clear, and will note that, in the words which l quoted from the record of the 669th meeting, he was not making any independent proposaI or formaI proposaI or formaI motion. 23. The representative of Lebanon asked the representative of Brazil to make clear the status of his proposaI and to state whether he maintains it. The representative of the Soviet Union also asked whether the representative of Brazil would agree to a paragraph by paragraph vote on the Brazilian-Colombian proposaI. Perhaps the representative of Brazil, whose name is on my list of speakers, would agree to address himse1f to these tw.o points raised by the representative of Lebanon and the representative of the Soviet Union. 25. As for voting paragraph by paragraph on the delegation, of course, would not stand in the way. Braûlian-Colombian proposaI, as has been proposed by the representative of the Soviet Union, l, personaHy, have no objection. 26. Ml'. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): 1 take it that the Brazilian text is still before us, since there has not been any request by any other member, as Ml'. Gauthier has said, ta put it aside. Since this te..'Ct is still before us, 1 have sorne amen,iments ta propose, as 1 suggested l would have yesterday. 27. From what the representative of Brazil said, l am not quite c1ear in my mind whether he meant that there was a tendency by sorne m(;üîber or members ta put aside his plan in favour of sorne other. l -have not heard any such statement made formally ta the Couneil. Therefore, l can only address myself ta what is now before us, the Brazilié.n text, and, with pennission, 1 would beg to mave my amendments. 28. Before l do sa, 1 wish ta make a very brief statement about this matter. VVe were given ta understand, both by the Governments of Brazil and Colombia and by their representatives, that they wished ta remain strictly impartial in this dispute. However, the records of the Security Couneil contain the two objective demonstrations which 1 have given so far, showing that in this plocedural issue of the adoption of the agenda Brazil and Colombia have sided completely with one thesis against the other thesis. It would seem, therefore, that we were mistaken. If the rep:-esentatives of Brazil and Colombia wanted ta support the United Kingdom position, despite our opposition ta that position, they could have simply voted for the United Kingdom proposaI without having ta demonstrate their hiterest in this matter by defending the British thesis, which we have repeatedly stated was unacceptable ta us. ~9. Therefore, sirice the Brazi1ian-Colombian proposaI IS still before the Council despite what 1 have said, 1 should like formally to move the following amendments: (1) Insert after paragraph 1 the following paragraph, ta be numbered 2: "The Couneil proceeds ta take up and decide upon the items on the agenda in the arder in which they appear." .(2) Change the number of paragraph 2 ta 3, substltute th<- phrase "during the discussion of any item" for the phrase "a general discussion shaH be he1d in which", and add the following words at the end of the paragraph: "within reasonable limits". (3) Delete the present paragraph 3. age~da in the order in which they appear." 37. Secondly, change the number of paragraph 2 to 3, substitutf' the phrase "during the discussion of any item" for the phrase "a general discussion shaH be ·heJd in which", and add the foHowing words at the end of the paragraph: "within reasonable limits". In accordance with the two amendments proposed by the representative of Lebanon the whole of renumbered paragraph 3 would read as foHows: "During the discussion of any item reference may he made to any or all of the items of the agenda within reasonable limits." 38. The final amendment calls for the deletion of paragraph 3 of the Brazilian-Colombian proposaI which reads: "[The Security Council] does not commit itself at this stage as to the separatt> or joint character of its eventual resolution or resolutions."

Since the President is about ta put to the vote the amendments just moved by the representative of Lebanon as well as the original proposaI of the Brazilian and Colombian delegations, 40. Nevertheless, l ~m not in a position to pass any' final judgrnent on these amendrnents. My impressionand it is only an impression - is that the representative of Lebanon has taken back the concessio:ïs which he made in the course of the debate. He has taken up his original stand, namely, a separate consideration and a separate resolution. During the long debate on procedure, 1 thought he had met the Count:i1 part of the way by not insisting on a complete separate consideration of the two items. 1 know that he has insisted throughout on a separate resolution. However, with respect to this amendment, it appears to me that the represe!1tative of Lebanon is insisting upon a complete separate consideration and a separate resolution. i !, j 41. If my impression is correct, then 1 must say th~t this amendment is not acceptable ta my delegation, for our ba.c;ic stand is that the Council and its members should not be required to be committed to any particular mode of procedure or to any particular form or substance of a resolution which it may adopt at the end of the debate. 1 feel that any demand. at this moment ta commit the Couneil to any particular mode of procedure of debate or ta any form or substance of a resolution is unpreœdented, dangerous and should n ~t be accepted by the Connci1. ~ 1 1 1 1 1 42. That is what l wished t0 say in regard to the 2!.mendment moved by the representative of Lebanon. l have no dOllbt as to the outcome 0f the vote on that amendment. l will therefore devote most of my attention to the original proposal of Brazil and Colombia. 43. If the President should put the' B:;:'azilian- Colombian proposaI to the vote paragraph by paragraph, 1 will vote in favour of paragraph 1. That paragraph, which refers to the adoption of the agenda, is natural and we must have the agenda adopted. With respect to paragraph 3, to the effect that the Council does not c0mmit itself as ta separate or joint resolutions, 1 will :llso vote in !avour of that paragraph.· 1 think it is unnecessary; if we do not adopt that paragraph, the C01,lneil is not committed. Why should we have such a paragraph at aU? But there is nothing wrong· with the wording and for that reason l will vote in favour of the paragraph. 44. Vvith regard to paragraph 2, the members of the Counci! will recall that when the proposaI was -first 1':1t before us, 1 asked for a clarification. In order to make my meaning c1ear, 1 suggested a clarification in the form of an amendment. At that time l stated that after paragraph 1, we should have a new paragraph to the effect that the substance of the complaints should be presented to the Council in the arder of the agenda. That should be the fint business of this Conneil after the adoption of the agenda. 47. We aIl know very weIl that the prestige of the Security Council is not high. The prestige of the Council is in question, particularly in the Middle East. 1 do not see why members of this Council should gD out of their way to put before us a procedural proposaI which could be interpreted as a procedural manipulation with an ulterior motive. It would be most unfortunate if we were to create that impression. It would further lower the prestige of this Council. With such unfortunate beginnings, whatever resolution we might finally adopt would lose to that extent the moral value it might otherwise have had. 48. To sum up: if the Brazilian-Colombian proposaI is put to the vote paragraph by paragraph, l sha11 v('te in favour of paragraph 1, l sha11 vote in favour of p<t.ragraph 3 - not enthusiastically in that case, but still l sha11 vote for it - and l sha11 abstain on paragraph 2. When the resolution as a whole is put to the vate, 1 sha11 abstain. 49. l still feel as l felt yesterday: that the best course to follow is to start this debate, according to our agenda, with item 2 Ca), and determine our pïücedure as occasion may demand. Let us not cross the bridge before we come to it. Our attempt ta cross the bridge has involved us in 50 many meetings - and is it not possible that, when we actually get theTe, we may not find the problem so difficult to solve? 50. This procedural debate, which has now lasted through five meetings, r-..rninds me oi ::; famous saying by William James. James was one of those philosophers who can sometimes laugh at philosophers. He once said that a philosopher is a man who is looking in a dark cellar for a black cat that is not there. Trying to deter-

Before we proceed to a vote l should like to make a few explanatory comments, although l think l have made Them already. 53. The proposaI submitted by Colombia and B-azil is, in our view,. very different from that of the United Kingdom representative. We were trying to makean intermediate proposaI, one which would seek to recondIe the different points of view or to combine the different opinions maintained by the representatives of Lebanon and the United Kingdom. We were accordingly not in agreement with the United Kingdom proposaI, nor did we agree with the amendment proposed by Sir Pierson Dixon. 54. As for Mr. Malik's proposaI, we disagree with it entirely because it is a complete or fundamental change in our own proposaI. We do, however, agree to have the vote on our proposaI taken paragraph by paragraph. That is, if the Council adopts only paragraph 1, referring to the adoption of the agenda, the orJy thiüg t.hat we shall have adopted is the agenda. If neither paragraph 2 nor paragraph 3 is ad0J....ld, only th ~ agenda will have been adopted. 55. For myself, l am quite prepared to have the vote on our proposaI taken paragraph by paragraph. 56. Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): The representative of China saw in the text of my amendments what he called a complete withdrawal of my previous concessions. Now, it is true that l had suggesteJ sorne concessions. But l ask Mr. Tsiang: who accepted them? Who seized upon them? Who incorporated Them into texts t..~at are now before the Council? Nobody did. Therefore, my concessions were left hanging in the air. In fact, They were treated with what l might term an exalted silence. Consequently, it is not a question of withdrawing concessions when none was seized upon. It is simply a question of having a free hand once again after doing my utmost to move as far towards the middle as l possibly could. 1'1 cannot, therefore, be said thê?~ l have withdrawn suggestions which l made in the tirst place and which were not accepted by anybody. 57. l wish to comment briefly on the remarks of the representative of Colombia because They are important. l repeat that we were given to understand by the Governments of Colombia and Brazil, and also by the representatives of these two Latin-American States, that Colombia and Brazil were going to adopt an impartial attitude towards This dispute. The representative of Colombia said that they had suggested a middleof-the-way solution. l do not see it that way because the basic issue is between a general discussion and an 58. At this point, I do not know what the President desires to do next. However, I take il. that be wants to put my amendments to the vote. I would certainly be very grateful to him if he wauld do so. The Cauncil should vote on the amendments before it votes on the original text, and 1 should like to have them votOO upon according to that rule. Before that is done, however, I will make one last appeaI. Certain ideas suggested by the representatives of China, Turkey and the Soviet Union and concurred in by many other representatives have given me l'eason ta 'believe that it is stiil possible to find a formula with respect to which l, at least, would find it not impossible ta abstain; but it is up ta the powers that be to take that path. '·

Since no other representative wishéS ta speak, I shouid like to explain how I propose ta proceOO. 60. We 1:J.ave before us the Brazilian-Colombian proposaI, consisting of three paragraphs, and a series. of amendments bv the representative of Lebanon applymg ta two, but not the first of the paragraphs in the substantive proposaI. We also agreed ta proœed ta vote on the Brazilian-Colombian proposaI paragraph oy paragraph. 61. Ii therefore seems ta me that the 'best way of pro- œeding would be to vote on the Brazilian-Colombian proposaI paragraph by paragraph, starting with para- O'raph l, to which there is no amendment, then pro- ~eed to thefirst Lebanese amendment which calls for the insertion of a new paragraph, and vote on that amendment. Then the Couneil might proceed to paragraph 2 of the Brazilian-Colombian proposaI, ··oting first on the Lebanese amendment to it, and then on the paragraph itself, and so on. 62. If that procedure is agreeable to the Couneil, we shall proceed accordingly. 63. I shall now put to the vote paragraph 1 of the Brazilian-Colombian proposai. A vote was taken by a show of hands. In favour: Brazil, China, Colombia, Denmark, France, Lebanon, New Zealand, Turkey, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America. Paragraph 1 was adopted unanimously. ~ Abstaining: China, France, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America. The a1ltend1lte~t was rejected by 4 votes to 2, with Sabstentions. 65. The PRESIDENT: The Council will now vote on the Lebanese amendment to paragraph 2 of the Brazilian-Colombian proposaI, which is to renumber paragraph 2 to become paragraph 3, replace the phrase "a general discussion shall be held in which" by the following: "during the discussion of any item", and add at the end of the new paragraph 3 the fo110wing words "within reasonable limits". l propose to take this amendment as a whole. ~ iJ j ! A vote was ta-ke1t by show ,of hands. In favour: Lebanon, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Against: Brazil, Colombia, Denmark, New Zealand. Abstainin.q: China, France, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America. The amendment was rejected by 4 votes to 2, with 5 abstentions. 66. The PRESIDENT: The Council will now proceed to paragraph 3 of the Brazilian-Colombian proposaI and vote first on the Lebanese amendment to cldete the paragraph. Although l am by no means clear whether a deletion of a paragraph can, by any stretch of the imagination, he called an amendment, l think that, for purposes of convenience, we can caU it an amendment. 67. Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): l do not wish to press it. 68. The PREiSIDENT: The Lebanese representative has said that he does not want to press that amendment; l take it he withdraws it. We can therefore proceed to vote on paragraph 3 of the Brazilian-Colomhian proposaI. A vote was taken by show of hands. In fav.our: Brazil, China, Colombia, Denmark. France, New Zealand, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America. Abstaining: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The paragraph was adopted by 9 votes to n,one, with 1 abstention. 69. The PRESIDENT: The result of this voting is that none of the amendments proposed by the repre- 71. In fact, as we aU know, the representative of the Soviet Union voted against paragraph 2, as did the Lebanese representative. In the same \Vay, similar votes were cast on the other amendments. Consequently, there was no unanimity. 72. In any case, there were objections to paragraph 2 of the Brazilian-Colombian proposaI. I therefore ask for a vote on the draft resolution as a whole. If that is not done, I ask that it should be noted in the record that the Soviet Union voted against the resolution as a whole.

I think thre is force in what the rtpresentative of ·the Soviet Union has said, and 1 think we should do weIl to vote on the resolution as a whole. Unless, therefore, there is any objection, 1 now propose to proceed to a vote on the proposaI ,as a whole. A vote was taken by sh.ow of hands. In fa,vour: Brazil, Colombia, Denmark, France, New Zealand. Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northem Ireland, United States of America, Against: Lebanon, Union of ,Soviet Socialist Repu'blics. A bstaining: China. The Brazilian-Colonwian proposa! as a whole was adopted by 8 votes to 2, with 1 abstention. Th] agenda was adopted. The Palestine question (a) Cllmplaint by Lehanon on behalf of the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan of: . ''Flagrant breatlh of article m, paragraph 2 of the Gelllerai Armistice Agreement between Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan by the crossing of the demarcation line by a large group of miIitariIytrained Israelis who planned and carried out the attack on Nahbalin Village on March 28-29 1954, firing from autmnatic waapons, detonating explosives, throwmg hanà grenades and incendiary bombs, whicb resu1ted in: " (i) The killing of five national guards and one woman and the wonnding of 14 villagers, men and women; " (il) The kiIIing of three Arab legionnaires by thtJ blowing up of the truck which was proceeding to Nabhalin Village as reinforcement and the wounding of the officers in charge of reinforcement and four other legionnaires; and " (üi) Extensive damage to property including the bombing of the mosque of the village" (8/3195). (b) Complaints by Israel against Jordanconcerning the repudiation by Jordan of its obligations onder the General Armistice Agreement: "(üi) " (iv) RefusaI by Jordan to carry out ber obligations under article VIII of the General Armistice Agreement" (8/3196).

1 think it is our dutY now ta invite to this table the representative of Jordan, on whose behalf the representative of Lebanon has been acting, and the representative of Israel. Is there any objection ta that course? 75. MI'. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): 1 wish to ask the President whether it would be in arder for me to explain my vote now or whether he prefers that 1 make my br;ef statement after he invites the representatives of Israel and Jordan to the Security Council table.

Clearly, it seems to me that members of the Couneil should have an immediate opportunity ta e..'Cplain their vote. If that is what the representative of Lebanon wishes to do 1 should certainly ask him ta proceed accordingly b~fore we move on ta the next step of inviting the representatives of the two countries ta take part in our proceedinp's. Please proceed, MI'. Malik, if that is convenient. ." 77. MI'. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): 1 should like ta make a statement, which will take about -five minutes. This may be treated as an explanation of vote, but, on.the other hand, i~ the President wishes ta be very stnct he may tell me In the middle of my statement that 1 am out of order, because this statement is of a general nature. It is for the President ta decide whether he will allow me to make this statement DOW or whether 1 should maire it after the representatives of Jordan and Israel have been invited to come to the Security Cauncil ta·ble. Once these representatives have been invited the general debate will be opened, and if 1 am the first speaker. on the list and maire my statement then, 1 shall îlot he mterrupted by the President. Would the President al10w me ta make this brief statement now - and if he does so, 1 hope 1 shall not be interrupted - or would he prefer that 1 make it immediately after the two representatives have taken their places at the Council table?

If MI'. Malik's stat~ment were simply an explanation of vote, 1 think he should rnake it now, but 1 gather from what he has said that this statement ma.y stray a little beyond what is generally recognized to be an explanation of vote. In this, 1 find myself in sorne difficulty, because 1 am not sure wh~ther it is proper for me ta set a precedent under whlch, so to speak, the President ties his hands behind 80. Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): 1 fully agree with the analysis of the situation given by thePresident, provided that it is understood that this meeting will continue for a while longer so that 1 may make this statement this afternoon, and provided that 1 may be placed on the list of speakers for this afternoon. 81. 1 should like to be given at 1east that assurance. In that case, 1 would present my statement not as an explanation of vote, but as my first brief statement in the general discussion. 1 hope that the meeting will continue so that 1 may have an opportunity to make that statement today. If the meeting is not to continue, then 1 will take the risk of being interrttpted and make my statement as an exp1ana:tion of vote. Although 1 have no objection to either procedure, 1 wou1d prefer to wait until the general debate has been opened.

Before the representative of Lebanon.raised ·the question of his exp1anation of vote, 1 had proposed that we should now invite the representatives of Jordan and Israel to participate in our discussions. If, as 1 hope, the Council agrees to do that and the two representatives take their places, the position will then be that, as 1 have no names at the moment on my 1ist of speakers, the list will be spent. It is certain1y open to any member of the Counci1 to put his 'name down, shou1d he wish to do so. 1t seems to me, therefore, that it is open to Mr. Malik to put his name down as the first speaker in the genera1 debate. 1 assume that that is agreeab1e to Mr. Malik. At the 1:nvita.fÏon .of the President, Mr. Rifa'i, representative of the Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan, and Mr. Eban, representat-ive of Israel, took places at the Security Council table. 83. The PRESIDENT: The first name on the 1ist of speakers is that of the representative of Lebanon. 84. Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): It will he recalled that in the procedura1 debate which preceded the adoption of the agenda and which occupied six meetings, including the present one; of the Security Counci1, 1 raised eight important questions and begged my co1- leagues around this table to think about them. 1 a1so begged them to answer them, if possible. Tt will be recalled further that very 1itt1e heed was given to these points, which 1 raised at the second of the meetings [666tlz meeting] devoted to this question of procedure. Furthermore, we have devoted six meetings to a pure1y procedural discussion, and we ended by adopting a 88. For there is, in the Near East in general and in the Arab world in particular, a new will with which the world must reckon. It is a will ta independence, ta dignity and self-respect, and to an absolute refusaI ta be lorded over by anybody. This independent will requires, further, that we should be regarded as equals, politically and morally. If we are sa regc;.rded, we shall respond positively and sincerely. It follows from this that any expectation that the political c1imate of 1947 and 1948 may be re-established, a climate in which the Powers can manipulate governments and peoples as they please, will be dashed. New, youthful leaders have arisen, leaders worthy of great respect, who are anxious ta safeguard their rights and the rights of their people. If, occasionally, there is a reappea.<rance of a former leading figtire, that is only temporary and, in any event,'he lives literally in fear and trembling of his people's wrath, should he stray from carrying out their new will. 89. In the Arab world one is no longer dealing with a ki.ng here, or a pasha, a chieftain or a fe.udal lord there. In the Arab world there is a massive, general, fundamental awakening of the people, who are deterrnined to achieve four things: first, ta rule themselves; second, ta secur~ their economic and social rights; third, ta establish as close a natural unity among themselves as possible; and fourth, ta defend their rights in Palestine. 90. Now that the Security Council has adopted its agenda, we have decided not to withdraw from the engagement, but to fight the good fight ta the end. We reserve complete freedom of action, depending upon 92. Ml'. RIFA'I (Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan): May 1 thank the President for inviting me ta take a place at the Security Council table. 1 take this opportunity to express to the representative of Lebanon my sincere gratitude and that of my Government for having submitted our complaint ~aainst Israel, for having defended our common interests, and for having presented our real views. 93. My Government submitted its complaint against Israel for an open aggression and a warlike attack on Jordanian territory, an attack which resulted in death, bloodshed and destruction in the village of Nahhalin. Therefore, it is of vital importance to my Government to see that the Council gives our complaint full consideration and separate discussion in this general debate, tenninating in an independent resoiution en the incident of Nahhalin. 94. 1 thank the President for giving me the opportunity to present our complaint. In fact, 1 am not in a position at this stage to talk on anything except Nahhalin. Therefore, 1 shall confine my remarks ta the scope of that incident. 1 shall now present in brief the Nahhalin incident and 1 should he grateful if the President would permit me to distribute to the members, for the sake of illustration, sorne photographs of the tragedy of Na:hhalin. 2 At midnight of the day of 28-29 March 1954, an Israel force of approximately two infantry companies, one company consisting of 120 men, made a strong attack on the Arab village of Nahhalin which lies 4 kilometres inside Jordan territory in the district of Bethlehem. They entered the village of more than 1,000 persons, in a sudden weHplanned attack while the inhabitants were asleep. 95. Before the attack was carried out, the aggressors mined the road leading to th~ village in order ta prevent the arrivaI of help and reinforcements. One Israeli company carried out the attack :five minutes hefore midnight, while the other company encirc1ed the area and remained on the surrounding slopes. Bren guns, automatic weapons, mines, grenades and incendiary bombs were used. The attacking company, which was covered by the second company watching the road leading to Nahhalin, entered the village carrying large quantities of explosives. They sacked the village mosque and bomhed other buildings. Fortunately, they were u'11able to accomplish their full purpose due to the 2 Yembers of delegations may see the photographs on application to the archives of the United Nations. graphies ganisation. 97. The destruction in the village was extensive, and its innocent people suffered greatly. Old men, women and children were killed and wounded. The 70 year old mukhtar of the village was one of those who died after accomplishing his duty in defending his native land and family. 98. Here is a written report - and a factual onepresented by the writer J. W. Barwick, who describes the tragedy as he saw it. He says : "The case of the national guardsman, Husni Ahmed Salameh, who held the éastern post in the village, tells the story in all its glory and horror. He fired until his fifty rounds were gone, then started to crawl across 130 feet of open ground to the nearest house. There was no connecting trench or stone wall to protect this post. We traced his' path by the large drops of blood. When his aged father tried to get the 'body, he was shot and killed. Then his sister came out of the house, crying to them: 'Do not fight us women.' But she was shot, too, as she stooped over the body. "The village mayor, a man of over 70, lived in the bouse nearest the entrance. Aroused, 1. ' ran out, shouting: 'Better die àefending our ho.nes than contilme in this misery.' His example had much to do with the resolute defence by all. He was shot and bayoneted as his body lay across a stone fence. His grandson and the boy's mother were seriously wounded when the house was blown up. "Another national guardsman, Mohammed Yussuf Abdul Hady, was wakened from sleep by Israeli soldiers in the h.ouse, who killed him, his wife beside him, and wounded their daughter. The women put the small children into chests to protect them." 99. The Israelis' tactks in that attack were similar to their tactics in previous incidents, such as the cordoning off of the objective, the attacking of the objective and the laying of mines where reinforcements were Iike1y to approach. 100. The Israelis remained in the village for thirtyfive minutes. Were it not for the arrivaI of the Arab ~on, they would have gone through the whole vl1lage, murdering as many of its inhabitants as they could. It is estimated that a minimum of 100 raiders, armed with automatic weapons and various kinds ot 103. However, the Mixed Armistice Commission held a meeting on 30 March 1954 and passed the fol1owing resolution : "The crossing of the demarcation line by a large group of militarily trained Israelis who planned and carri~d out the attack on Nahhalin Village on 28-29 March 1954, firing automatic weapons, detona:ting explosives, throwing hand grenades and incendiary bombs, which resulted in: "(1) The killing of five national guards and one woman· and the wounding of 14 vil1agers, men and women; "(2) The killing of three Arab legionnaires by blowing up the truck which was proceeding to Nahhalin Village with reinforcements and the wounding of the officer in charge and four other legionnaires; "Constitutes a most flagrant breach of article III, paragraph 2, of the General Armistice Agreement. "The Mixed Armistice Commission condemns Israel in the strongest terms for this latest aggression and cal1s on Israeli authorities to take the most effective measures to prevent such and other aggressions against Jordan in the future and to apprehend and punish those responsible. "The Mixed Armistice Commission deeply deplores the loss of innocent lives incurred as a result of the attack on Nahhalin Village." 104. The paragraph referred to by the resolution of the Mixed Armistice Commission reads as follows: "No element of the land, sea or air military or para-military forces of either party, inc1uding nonregular forces, shal1 commit any warlike or hostile act against the military or para-military forces of the other party, or against civilians in territory under the control of that party; or shal1 advance beyond or pass over for any purpose whatsoever the armistice demarcation lines ..." 106. This distinct and specific incident should, in our view, be treated independently and deait with on its own merits. Certain distinguished members of this Council, howevèr, have chosen to think otherwise. They think that acts of violence on the Israel-Jordan frontiers are symptoms, and not causes, of the tension which worries them. 107. But, in fact, were it not for these grave incidents there would be no problem of tension. It is the incidents that are creating the tension and not the tension which is causing the incidents. Let me make it clear, the tension to which sorne members of the Councii referred is a result of those grav~ incidents. Therefore, when we deal with these incidents, we are not treating symptoms but we are actually treating the causes of the disease. When this Council takes positive action and effective measures to end such aggressive attacks, theu there will he nothing to inflame the feelings of the public or disturb the situation on the borders. 108. l am not entering into a general debate on the problem. l will simply put before the members our assessment of this aggression, its causes and the fadors that enter into it. 109. Why Israel initiated that aggression and carried out that attack is the subject with which l should like to examine and discuss in brief. First, Jordan has come here to complain about what it rightfully considers to be an act of aggressibn and a violation of an arrangement in which the United Nations is deeply involved. The United Nations and we have heen attempting to maintain security in our area, relying on an arrangement that worked more or less satisfactorily for the last five years. There is a United Nations Truce Super-.rision Organization with observers on the spot. There are United Nations resolutions governing the Palestine issue, and there is our national policy in Jordan which aims at securing our national interests and, at the sitme time,coping with the tremendous social,' political and economic problems brought about by the emergence of Israel and the repercussions it created among the Arabs. How this specific complaint affects the United Nations and its organs as weIl as our national interest is a point l intend to put before the CounciL jr1 ~ 't Il ;r i 1 :1 ~ 110. l have said that there is a workable arrangement wbich has more or less satisfactoriiy governed the frontier disputes between us and Israel. It worked as long as we and our adversary abided by it. When Israel came out with new intentions and introduced newaims, this arrangement became subject to severe 111. Israel considers the frontier as the last aspect of the Palestine dispute which still has to he froz'en, not on the basis of the United Nations resolutions or with a sense of equity to the legitimate rights of the Arab but on the basis of the status quo. Israel does not disguise this intention. It has been repeated on several occasions by a numher of Israeli officials and responsible persons. So what is the use of keeping the armistice arrangement workable? Why let the United Nations have any finger in the pie? The 800,000 refugees, in Israel's opinion, are more or less forgotten; the political personality of Israel is supported by many influential friends. Israel declared Jerusalem the seat of its Government. The Palestine Conciliation Commission is paralysed. Contributions, compensations and financial aid are continuously pouring into Israel. Water projects to satisfy Israel's need are being plan- "ned. \Vhat was left as a sore point as far as this Israeli diplomatic venture is concerned is the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization. vVhy not get rid of it once and for all, even if it means many condemnations from the Security Couneil? Israel actually "started executing this plan. On 31 March 1954, Israel announced its boycott of the Jordanian-Israeli Mixed Armistice Commission, when it failed earlier in its attempt to have the Commission condemn Jordan for an unidentified attack on an Israeli bus within Israel. 112. The New York Times, in its issue of 24 March 1954 under the headline "Israel quits armistice unit", says: "The threat to paralyse the armistice machinery is regarded as less serions than a warning by the senior IsraeH delegate that bis Government might not he able to prevent 'retaliatory' action. An Israeli spDkesman ... warned hefore the vote by the Mixed Armistice Commission that an unfavourable decision would mean the 'end' of Commander Elmo lIS. In the issue of 23 February 1954 of the Israeli new!paper H eruf, the editor wrote the following: "The situàtion made Ben-Gurion, Israeli Prime Minister at that time, formulate a plan to stifle Jordanian intentions. We do not know the nature of Ben-Gurion's plans, but it is generally known that they were not peaceful lDethods, nor were they steps towards peace. On the contrary, they were distinctly otherwise. It was said that Ben-Gurion presented to the Council of Ministers a proposal which the majority of the Council, and Mr. 'Sharett in particular, opposed. We do not know the nature of that decisive proposaI; all we know is that the churning of the mountain did not produce a mouse; it actually produced the Qibya incident." 116. The Nahhalin incident, coming after Qibya, bas the same explanation. 117. An objective analysis of border problems between Jordan and Is~ael will cl,early reveal that Israel tends ta justify its own armistic~ violations, or to ignore them and exaggerate the militkry nature of the Arab infiltrations. How could a single, meagre act of a borderland Palestinian refugee who crossed the Hne to bis own farm or house, be compared to an organized violation of an official or semi-official nature? These so-called intntders are harmless· 'and hungry borderland Palestinian refugees. Daily they see their rich fields beyond the line being exploited by Zionist immigrants who flocked into Palestine from eveq corner of the world. These hungry and homeless Palestinian Arabs cross the border to get food from lands that are theirs legitimately. If an Arab should chance to wander into Israel after his stray cow and gt:t himself shot, the Israe1i Press and Government spokesmen announce it as a "r~pulsed raid". That poor, helpless refugee believes that it is his full right to go to his homeland and that such a right was admitted by the United Nations resolutions. 118. Nevertheless, the Jordan Government did not fail to take effective measures to prevent those cros- 5ings. General Bennike, Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organizatior. in Palestine, states in his report of 24 February 1954 [S/3183 and Corr.1] that the Government of Jordan has taken the following measures: " (d) Removal from the border area of suspected infi!trators and. imposing of heavy sentences on known infiltrators; " (e) Effective measures, bath preventive and punitive, in order ta put a stop to in~iden~s resultin~ from ploughing across the de~arcatlOn lm~. In thlS. c~n­ nexion, the Israel delegatlOn to the Mlxed Anmstlce Commission has been requested to co-operate by notifyinO' the Mixed Armistice Commission or the Jordan iocal commander immediately on upon observing any illegal cultivation." terres et territoire errants, ne nisées. lorsque Nahhalin saisi. pas et de s'assurer voisins territoire appliquer Arabes loin ses par maisons plus nant miya, voisinage - d'Israël? 121. autres aspects manœuvre doxal lin nouvelle et au le une les 119. \\That more does Israel want from Jordan? 1 expect that it wa~ts the J?rdanian forces t? take ove~ the task of the hlghly skilled and mcchamzed Israeh army in protecting Israeli frontiers. On our side of the border there are hungry, destitute inhabit21nts of villages cut off from their land by Is:taeli occupation. On the opposite side of the border there is a cordon of Israeli military and strategic settlements. Intruders from ?ur side are invariably homeless peasants and wandermg shepherds, while Israeli excursions can he only organ- . ized miHtary operations. This is an important f~ct to bear in mind in viewing this wanton act of aggressl0n at Nahhalin and similar incidents of which the Council is seîzed. 120. Secondly, it seems that it was not enough that Israel had expelled the native Arab population of Palestine from their own homes and land. Having accomplished this, the Israelis are persisting in a policy calculated further to push these same Palestinian Arabs inside Jordan, a long distance beyond the borderline, in order to secure for themselves what they may believe to be a pacified strip of territory alongside their State, at the expense of the ~nhabitants. of the n~ig?bou~ing Arab villages. Israel beheves that It can att~m.It~ obJectives by compelling, thmugh murder and mtu!udatlon, the inhabitants of these villages to evacuate thelr homes and land, thereby causing them to retreat to the i?ner parts of Jordan. Is it any surprise, there~ore, that Qlbya, Wadi Fukin, Kharas, Battir, Targumlya, Idna, Nahhalin Husan - aIl '1leighbouring villages - shou1d have been 'the target of the Israeli agression? 121. Thirdly, this case of Nahhalin, .and othe~ p~st and future Nahhalins, apart from thelr humamtanan aspects, are shaping into a venture of higher political magnitude. Whatever the paradox in the use of force, the attack on Nahhalin was meant to drive the Arabs towards the acceptance of a new formula for a joint solution between the Arab countries and Israel, or for a joint meeting, starti~g at leas~ with Jordan, ~f not with aIl the Arab countnes bordenng Israel. The dIspute between the Arabs and the Jews in the Near East is frustratingall possibility of any wider plan - political, military or economic - which might include the Middle East ~~d the western Powers in one framework. Thereftldir~ct agreements with Israel at the expense of legitimate Arab rights and Arab national interests. 122. I must state clearly and firmly in this respect that we in Jordan are not alone and will not be alone in facing these attèmpts. The Israeli menace reaches beyond us and beyond the Arab world. In a statement released to the Press in Karachi on 9 April, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan said: "Recent incidents of Israeli aggression with regard to the Arab States, and particularly Jordan, have revived acute fear with regard to Israeli designs. The Israeli menace threatens not only the surrounding Arab States but constitutes a threat to the centre of the whole Islamic world". 123. Fourthly, Israel feels the psychological pressure of time. Thought and reflection on the part of the people of the wodd are uncovering the fact that the Arabs have been s'ubjeeted to conditions imposed without regard to moral or humanitarian principles. When world opinion was indifferent or distantly sympathetic, Israel was able to play its role undisturbed. Now that the Arab cause is beginning ta gain supporters and moral indignation is rising against Israeli tactics, Israel wants an early settlement of the whole problem to stabilize its position and guarantee its future. The Arabs, on the other hand, havè borne their disaster calmly and patient1y, hoping that human conscience wiII one day awaken. 124. Fifthly, and last, is the traditional Israeli conduct. Were l to review the tehaviour of Israel since its inception or to cover the aets and deeds of the Zionists in Palestine befcre Israel was established, it would require a very long speech and a repetition of faets which have been thoroughly assimilated by every man who has an interest in the Palestine question. 1 wish only to say that terrorism one day and aggression the next have become a habit' among the Israelis. Why should that habit not develop and flourish? It served to gain them a foothold in Palestine, ta establish the State of Israel, ta occupy the territory now under their control, to drive out the Arab inhabitants of Palestine, to continue attacking the Jordanian borders, and it is serving them now in calling for peace and in compelling Jordan ta make a settlement with them when and as they want it. Israel wants peace wholly at our expense and wholly to its advantage. It will keep it as long as it likes, and we wiII have ta keep it as long as it likes. 124. tionnelle d'Israël. tade commis d'Israël, de à me de Pourquoi ne de créer trouve Palestine les nant procéder les paix tage. et qu'il 126. In its resolution of 24 November 1953 [S/3139/ Rev.2] on the incident of Qibya, this Council called upon Israel "to take effective measures to prevent aIl such actions in the future". We have witnessed the "future" referred to in that resolution, and have seen Israel carrying out a new strong attack. What will this Council do now to assert its authority and stop Israel's continuous aggression? 127. It seems that the attitude of the majority of this Council is ta cûnsider the incident of Nahhalin within a general decision deaHng with the whole situation on the Armistice lines. They formed this opinion before we discussed or explained our complaint. Why was this prejudgment made? Why should anyone hesitate to tell the aggressor that he is an aggressor and that his acts of aggression are causing disturbance and unrest? If no separate and independent resolution is to be taken concernïng this particular attack, then Israel will take advantage of this development by creating future incidents and planning further attacks in arder to ensure a general discussion and to secure general resolutions on any subject it wishes to see considered. Such tactics will set a serious precedent in other world disputes and will diminish the power ta subdue aggression.

The representative ol Israel has intimated to the Chair tL1.t he desires to make a brief statement this evening, and 1 therefore call upon him. 129. MI'. EBAN (Israel): It is, of course, not possible at this stage of the meeting for me to deal comprehensively with any of the aspects of the question which lies before the Security Couneil. 1 should, however, like, with the permission of the President, ta make a brief statement on the atmosphere and circumstances of this debate and also, at the end, to draw the attention of the Security Council to the political and juridical conditions under which the disputes between Israel and Jordan are to be discussed. 130. 1 cannot, however, embark upon that statement without referring briefly to the speech to which we have just listened, a strident and extremist speech which illustrates, 1 am afqtid, the comprehensive and intense hostility within which the State of Israel struggles for security and for peace. It was a description of events upon our frontier conceived in the.most unilateral spirit, without the slightest tone of self-criti- 132. Nobody who listened to that description would have imagined that since the signing by Israel of the Armistice Agreement with Jordan, the people of Israel had suffered the following casualties: 218 killed and 300 wounded, making a total of 518. Nobody who listened to the account given by the Jordan representative of the events on the frontier within the past four months, since the Security Couneil was last seized of this problem, would have imagined that within that period since we last confronted each other across this table, Jordan has inflicted upon the people of Israel the following casualties, 25 killed and 17 wounded, and that in the brief period between December 1953 and the end of March 1954. 133. Nobody would have seen reflect~d in that speech the slightest hint or semblance of the 917 armed clashes which have been organized by Jordan against Israeli territory in the duration of the armistice, 118 of them in the period of four months which has e1apsed since the discussion was suspended in the Security Council. 134. Nor would anybody have understood the local relevance of the Nahhalin area in aIl this sombre ton of violence and bloodshed. Nobody would have got the slightest impression of a long and uninterrupted series of violent assaults which reached their culminating point this year, but of which the origins go back to the very beginnings of our State. Out of the area of Nahhalin in Februàry 1948 there came the first attack upon one of our convoys, resulting in 35 of our people being massacred. In May 1948, out of the village and area of Nahhalin there was conducted the successful assault upon the Etzion villages, in which 160 of our settlers were killed and the villages entirely destroyed. Out of the same area of Nahhalin and its vicinity, in the year 1953, there came 58 armed attacks, two robberies, and four people were killed. In the year 1954, so far, Ottt of that area there have erupted against the people of Israel in the frontier villages Il armed attacks, one of them, which had fatal results, now stands upon the agenda of the Security Couneil as the case of Kissalon. 138. Nobody, of course, would have seen behind the background of armistice violations the evet'-pressing memories and echoes of the war of aggression which the Government of Jordan launched against the State of Israel for the purpose of its forceful e.xtinction five or six years ago. 139. The problem of this frontier, as we shaH suggest in the continuing course of this discussion, is primarily a problem of a purposeful hostility waged against a smal1 State by a powerful coalition which is thirty times the s~ze of Israel in population and 300 times its size in area. The spearhead of this attack is the constant murderous harrassment of the Jordan frontier, which has had the sombre consequence in terms of loss of life to which l have referred. 140. The problem, then, is one of constant military attack to which the frontier population on our side is increasingly unwilling to submit peacefully. It is, as l judge it, the temper of our people that this holocaust of Israel bloodshed must be halted. We can give an assurance that if Israeli villages and areas are left in peace, then the Jordanian villages and areas which confront them need certainly have no fear. A theory, however, appeared to emerge from the address which we just heard that hundreds of our people can be killed by the sword of Jordan, while those who attack them can enjoy unilateral impunity. This seems to me a most unacceptable theory, not merely for the sake of Israel, which thoroughly rejects it, but even for the Security Couneil, charged as it is with primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. 141. We shall bring to the notice of the Security Council these trends and tendencies of armed attack which have made the State of Israel the chief casualty of the violence which has taken place in the past four months; for we come here not to defend ourseIves against accusations, but to accuse those who have caused us this overwheiming and preponderant loss of life, tragedy and bereavement which has brought the peace of the Middle East to its present state of tension. l should like, in my later submission, to refer in more 143. We come to this table in an effort to improve the relations between Israel and Tordan under the Armistice Agreement, and we seek 'to improve Israel-Jordan relations within the Armistice Agreement both ,as something of value in itself and also as a means of advancing towards the high vision which the Armistice Agreement embodies, namely, the transition to permanent peace. Accordingly, my delegation will make specific proposaIs for eliminating tension on the Israel-Jordan frontier by restoring the integrity of the Armistice Agreement which was concluded by the parties five years ago as a provisional measure designed as a transition to permanent peace. We shaIl seek the restoration of the integrity of the Armistice Agreement especiaIly through the irnplementation of those provisions which the Armistice Agreement contains for negotiations, review and modification. 144. These, then, are the problems on which 1 hope to make a more detailed submission at an early date. 145. At this point, 1 would only, in concluding, invite the Security Council's attention to a preliminary matter of great political and juridical importance which 1 think should be clarified at an early stage. l refer to the status and obligations of Israel and Jordan in this discussion, with special reference to Article 35, paragraph 2 of the United Nations Charter. 146. The position is that the Govermnent of Jordan has brought to the Security Council's attention a dispute with the Government of Israel. The letter from the representative of Lebanon, dated 1 April 1954 [5/3195], makes it clear that the first item on the agenda has been submitted on hehalf of the Government of Jordan as a complaint against the Government of Israel. My delegation, too, has presen~ed a series of complaints which constitute a dispute between Israel 147. The Charter lays down precise conditions, which l hereby invoke, for the discussion of disputes in the Security Council between Member and non-Member States. These :onditions seek to create equality of obligation between those who are bound by the Charter and those who are not. l shall first quote Article 32 of the Charter: " .. , any State which is not a Member of the United Nations, if it is a party to a dispute under consideration by the Security Council, shall be invited to participate, without vote, in the discussion relating to the dispute. The Security Council shall lay down such conditions as it deems just for the participation of aState which is not a :Member of the United Nations." 148. Certain statutory conditions for such participation are prescribed in Article 35, paragraph 2 of the Charter, which reads: "A State which is not a Member of the United Nations may bring to the attention of the Security Council . .. any dispute to which it is a party if it accepts in advance, for the purposes of the dispute, the obligations of pacifie settlement provided in the present Charter." 149. l wish forrpally and officially to enquire whether, in inviting a Jordan repi-esentative to the Security Council for the purpose of presenting a complaint against Israel, the Council has satisfied itself that Article 35, paragraph 2 has been complied with; that is, whether the Government of Jordan has given notice, or will give notice, tha:' it accepts in advance the obligations of pacific seb'l~n:ênt provided in the Charter. If this indispensable legai condition is not complied with, we should surely be following an abnormal and unprecedented courSf. - abnormal because the Charter's injunctions would i10<: have been met; unprecedented because in all similar cases the Security Council has required and received an indication of readiness bya non-Member State to accept the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the Charter. Thus, in 1950, the Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan brought a complaint against Israel to the Security Council, alleging that Israel's occupation of Naharayim did not conform with the Annistice Agreement. In admitting this complaint to the agenda and inviting a Jordan representative to present the complaint against Israel, the President of the Security COtmcil, Mr. 'Warren R. Austin, the United States representative, made the following statement at the 511th meeting of the Security Council: "An appropriate document has been filed by the representative of the Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan, in conformity with Article 32 and Article 35, paragraph 2, of the Charter, wherein this State has undertaken the obligations for pacific settlement provided in the Charter." 152. In view of the proposaIs for pacific settlement which may arise during the course of this discussion, it is especially important that the acceptance by ~oth parties of the obligations of pacific s.ettlement proYIded in the Charter should be duly enunc1ated. Accordingly, l wish to seek an assurance, through the President, that Article 35, paragraph 2 of the Charter has been or will he c(i)mplieà with.

We have now reached the cu~tomary hour for terminating our meetings. The name of only one representative is inscribed on the list of speakers: that of MI'. Malik. MI'. Malik has been ~ood enough to intimate to me that he has placed a t1melimit of five minutes on his statement. l am sure that, in those circumstances, it will be agreeable to the Council if l now calI on him. 154. MI'. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): l am not going ta speak for a very long time, but l cannot be sure that l am going ta speak for only five minutes. ~ do not think l shall need more than ten or twe1ve mmutes. If that is agreeable to the Council, l shall procee~. At. the rime when l asked that my name should be mscnbed on the list of speakers, l had not had the benefit of hearing the entire statement of the Israel representative. l have a few very brief comments ta make on that statement. As l have said, my entire statement will probably take about twe1ve minutes. l therefore leave it ta the President ta decide whether to calI upon me or deny me the right ta speak. 155. The PRESIDENT: In saying what l did, l was trying ta interpret the sense of the Security Coun~il. l think that we do try ta keep ta the rule of endmg our meetings at 6 p.m. If it were equ~lly conveni~nt for MI'. Malik ta speak on a later occaSlOn, my feehng is that that would meet the general sense of the Security Council. 156. MI'. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): Ida not know whether the President is calling upon me ta speak. 157. The PRESIDENT: If after my remarks the representative of Lebanon still wishes to speak, l of course ca11 upon him ta do so. 158. MI'. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): The proceduraI debate was quite exciting, but, of course, the real excitement has just begun. It is this substantive debate which is rea11y most interesting to a11 of us, and l am sure that, from now on, members of the Council will 160. Therefore, when such numbers as 977 and 118 and others are quoted by the representatïve of Israel, l do not think that we, knowing the facts and having read the documents, especially the report by General Bennike and others, ought to take them very seriously. l only wish to call the attention of the Council to the facts concerning these figur.es. From June 1949 to 15 October 1953 -;- four years and several months - Israel alleged, in this game of figures, that as a result of Jordanian attacks, 89 Israelis and 68 Jordanians were killed inside Israel, and that 110 Israelis and 18 Jordanians were wounded inside Israel. All these figures were round in General Bennike's report. 161. But as a matter of fact, of these allegations, the Mixed Armistice Commission has verified only 24 Israelis and two Jordanians killed inside Israel, and only 30 Israelis and one Jordanian wounded inside Israel. In other words, the daims of Israel were, in the iirst case, 27 per cent reliable and, in the second case, 2.9 per cent reliable. In the third case, they were 29.7 per cent reliable, and in the fourth case, 5.6 per cent reliable. These figures, which were verified by the Mixed Armistice Commission, reveal this degree of reliability about these extravagant - the representative of Israel used the term "fantastic", but l would only use the word "extravagent" - figures which Mr. Eban quoted concerning events which preceded Nahhalin and which therefore, in his view, might have justified Nahhalin. 162. l could go on speaking about these figures, but l will have more occasi.on to speak about them later on. l welcomed what Mr. Eban said concerning the moderate tone which he was intending to adopt. l welcome it, and l hope that an of us will use moderation in our tone and in our .approach to the problem. l fully agree with him that unless we aU abide by this rule, things' will certainly go from bad to worse. He did make e~ployés: réellement des ciation, 164. est événements recoure 165. tion, gements parfaitement rédigée libellé, écrit faire la offense décider séances. aucunetpent sent continuerais l'intérêt moment de 166. cela; notamment donner ressources invoquons tous Jordanie, à donner ployer Mais sentant de la l'avenir, projet de résolution dont immédiatement, très de à de en au d'examiner 164. The whole point of our argument is that it is useless and hopeless ta expect, in the shadow of NahhaHn and Qibya, any such invocation of any such peaceful attempts. . 165. FinaIly, when Mr. Eban spoke about this obligation, this accep'.mce by Israel of its obligations under the Charter, he was quite right ta say that. Our complaint was a carefully worded complaint. We adhere ta that wording, and he quoted it. Of course, when l composed that particular letter, l had known that he would be the first ta note these things and l was right. If, however, the presence of the Jordanian representative here offends Mr. Eban, then it is for the Council ta decide whether it wants Mr. Rifa'i here or not. l am sure that Mr. Rifa'i will not take it amiss if the Council does not want him here. He will leave me in charge and l wiII carry on his case. Therefore, for the purposes of our own practical activity, let us, at 1east for the present, not talk much about that point. 166. Of course, there is much more ta be said concerning aIl of these points. But it is important for us aIl - and l say this ta Mr. Eban - not ta give the impression that we are at this moment exhausting and manipulating aIl international machinery and invoking every conceivable article and paragraph of everything everywhere, in arder, in the shadow of Nahhalin, ta force Jordan tci come and sit at the same table with Israel, and ta conclude peace with it. 16ï. If you really want to be moderate, do not give this impression. There ls plenty of time for you ta employ your ingenuity and ta dig out aU these articles, and so forth. But do not do it from the start. 168. In view of what we heard from the representative of Jordan, and ta avoid future misunderstandings about it, l am going ta seize the Council of a draft resolution, which· l will read because it seems ta me that the issue i5 very clear; the decision of the Mixed Armistice Commission Is before us aIl. l am not asking anybody here ta make a decision concerning this draft immediately, but certainly the members of the Council should have it before them ta refiect upon. This is the draft resolution which we are putting before the Council in connexion with the item which it is considering: 3 "The Security Council, "RecaUing its previous resolutions on the Palestine question, concerning methods for maintaining the 3 This draft was later distributed as document 8/3209. cease~fire provisions of the Security Couneil resolution of 15 July 1948 [S/902], expressing the strongest censure of that action and calling upon Israel to take effective measures to prF.:vent all such actions in the future, "Noti'ng the reports of 27 October 1953 [630th meeting], 9 November 1953 [635th meeting, a.nnex] and patticularly that of 24 February 1954 [S/3183 and Corr.l] , to the Security Couneil by the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization and the statements to the Security Couneil by the representatives of Jordan and Israel, [After we hear the full story from the orepresentative of Israel, if there are any modifications ta be introduced into this text, 1 assure Mr. Eban that 1 will issue revision and include all important modifications.] UTaking note of the resolution adopted on 30 March 1954 by the Jordan-Israel Mixed Armistice Commis- 5ion, "Noting further that Jordan has abided by the provisions of the Security Council resolution of 24 November 1953, and has taken adequate measures to implement them, [This is the preamble and we now come ta the operative part, and here 1 am quoting only from what our own agency has found:] UFinds that the military action taken by the armed forces of Israel on 28-29 March 1954 constitutes a fl';'t>rant breach of the cease-fire provisions of the Security Couneil resolution of 15 July 1948; of article III, paragraph 2, of the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan; of Israel's obligations under the Charter; and of the Security Couneil resolution of 24 November 1953; "Expresses the strongest censure and r.ondemnation of that action; "CaUs upon Israel ta take effective measures to apprehend and punish the perpetrators of that action and to prevent such actions in the future; "Requests Israel ta p.l.y compensation for the loss of Hfe and damage to property sustained in Nahhalin as a result of that action; "CaUs upon the Members of the "Cniteà Natiù_.s to apply, in accordance with Article 41 of the Charter, such measures against Israel as they deem necessary to prevent the repetition of such actions and the aggravation of the situation." 169. 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