S/PV.675 Security Council

Sunday, June 20, 1954 — Session 9, Meeting 675 — New York — UN Document ↗

NINTH YEAR
ème SEANCE: 20 JUIN 1954
NEUVIEME ANNEE
NEW YORK
Les cotes des ducuments de l'Organisation des NatiotlS Unies sc composent de
The agenda was adopted.
The President believes that he should inform the Council that there is also before it a draft resolution sponsored by the Governments of Brazil and Colombia [S/3236] concerning the referral of this proposition to the O!rganization of Amerîcan States and a letter from the representative of Cuba [S/3235jRev.l] to the same effect. As these go to the fundamental question of venue, l feel that l should mention this fact now for the inforrnjation of the Council. 2. Under the provisions of Article 32 of the Charter, l invite the. representatives of Guatemala, Honduras and NicaragUa to come ta the table. At the invitation of the President, Mr. Castü!o Arriola, rep1'escntative of GU(/Jtemala; Mr. Carias, repre- sentative of.Hondums, and Mr. Mena Sol6rzano, repre- sentative of Nicaragua, took places at the Council table. 3. Mr. CASTILLO ARRIOLA (Guatemala) (trans- lated from Spœnish): It is my dutY- one in which l take pleasure - to begin by expressing the unshakeable faith which l personally, as a result of working w'ith the United Nations for three years, and my Government have in this Organization, one of the greatest advances the States of the world have m'ade in their search for effective means to ensure peacefuL coexistence alTIiOng nations. This faith was strengthened today when the United Nations met, in' all justice, at the earliest moment in order to consider the tragic situation whiçh is arising in my country, Guatemala. Président: M. H. C. LODGE (Etats-Unis d'Amé- rique). Présents: Les représentants des pays suivants: Brésil, Chine, Colombie, Danemark, France, Liban, Nouvelle- Zéla Ide, Turquie, Union des Républiques socialistes soviétiques, Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande d..: Nord, Etats-Unis d'Amérique. 1. Adc.ption de l'ordre du jour. 2. Câblogramme, en date du 19 juin 1954, adressé au Président du Conseil de sécurité par le Ministre des relations extérieures du Guatemala. Adoption de l'ordre du jour Câblogramme, en date du 19 juin 1954, adressé au Président du Conseil de Sécurité par le Ministre des relatiolls extérieures du Guate- mala (8/3232) -- 1. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Le Con- seil est également saisi d'un projet de résolution [S/3236], présenté par les Gouvernements du Brésil et de la Colombie et tendant à renvoyer la proposition du Guatemala à l'Organisation des Etats américains, ainsi que d'une lettre dans le même sens au représentant de Cuba [S/3235/Rev.l]. Etant donné que ces texte" intéressent. le fond même de la question en discussion, je crois Gevoir les signaler au Conseil. 2. En application de l'Article 32 de la Charte, j'invite les représentants du Guatemala, du Honduras et du Nicara,gua à prendre place à la table du Conseil. Sv,r l'invitation du Président, M. Castillo Arriola, représentant du Guatemala, M. Carias, représentant du Honduras, et M. Mena SO'!6rzan,o, représentant du Nicaragua, prennent place à la table du Conseil. 3. M. CASTILLü ARRIOLA (Guatemala) (tradttit de l'espagnol) : J'ai le devoir et aussi le désir d'expri- mer pour commencer la foi inébranlable de mon gouvernement et la mienne dans l'Organisation des Nations Unies aux travaux de laquelle j'ai l'honneur de participer depuis trois ans. Nous la considérons en effet comme l'un des plus grands triomphes des Etats dans leur recherche de moyens efficaces pour assurer une coexistence pacifique entre les nati.ons, Cette foi a été renforcée auj()Urd'hui par la hâte qu'a mise le Conseil, épris de justice, à se réunir pour.connaître de la situation tragique qui est sur le pomt de se produire dans mon pays, le Guatemala. S. Not one of the representatives with whorn l was able to get in touch yesterday to ask them to agree to an immediate meeting of the Security Council refused to co-operate. l would particularly thank the repre- sentatives of the sister republics of Brazil and Colombia and those of the United IG'1gdom, Turkey and the Soviet Uilion - the five cou' cries l was able to reach. l feel that the other countrit , also deserve my gratitude, for had l been able to communicate with them they too would have agreed. 6. On behalf of my country l wish to dec1are cate- gorically and pubîicly that the Republic of Guatemala has been inva.ded by expeditionary forces forming part of an unlawful international aggression. This inter- national aggression i the outcome of a vast inter- national conspiracy which has been directed against my country for some time and which, let me say for the record, Guatemala reported officially to the United Na.tions on two occasions. And now, to add_ to tbis intensive campaign of defamation intended to convince world public opinion of the justice of these devious plans, Wf' are confronted with an act of crimfinal aggressior. against Guatemala, one which has 50 far gone unpunished. Fortunately, public opinion has not been deceived in a single country; and even though only one side of the picture has been given, people- even people ignorant of the true state of affairs in Gua- temala - have fe1t, have indeed been confident. thanks to the sense of honesty innate in all human beings, that there is another side to the picture, namely jitstice, independence and democracy, the very features which disting:.tish my country. 7. Those who have today conspired ta stifle democracy in the name of a false freedom already stand condemned by public opinion and will undoubtedly be condemned by history. They did not try to, nor couId they, hide their great joy at hearing that there was war in Guate- mala and that Guatemala had been invaded sinee they were sure that to overcome a small country which had intentionally beel1 left defenceless, they had taken the best measures to achieve their end, which was the destruction of a true democracy in America. 8. The battle for Guatemala has begun. The battle which has threatened us for so long has started. The people of. Gu~temala are now undergoing an in~er­ national mvaSlon masked as a movement of extles, of whom onîy a small number in the expeditionary forces which have violated Guatemala's soil. The expe- ditionaries are foreign forces. Nevertheless, as-one more demonstration by my country of its love for peace and ~ k " 9. l have had no hesitation in beginning to give you this account of the present situation in iny country and in re1ating before the Security Cauneil on this occasion, albeit briefly, the background, past and prevent, and basis of the Guatemala problem. l regret that l learned offieially orny this morning that the rDleeting would take place. My statement may prove lengthy; but l hope representatives will bear with me in view of the urgency of the prob1em and the distress of my people. Many uf the facts are weIl known; hence l shaIl state only those which l believe ta be significant. expo~é sera peut-être long, mais le problème lui-même, l'urgence qu'il présente et les souffrances de mon peuple m'autorisent à faire appel à la patience des - membres du Conseil. Beaucoup de faits sont bien connus, et je me bornerai donc à évoquer ceux qui me paraissent d'une importance capitale. 10. Depuis un certain temps, le Guatemala est l'objet de la campagne la plus active et la plus intense qui ait jamais été déclenchée contre un pays comme le mien. Cette campagne a pris pour point de départ des ren- seignements entièrement faux et tendancieux. Son unique objet était de préparer le climat en vue d'une intervention non déguisée dans les affaires intérieures de notre patrie. Cette campagne, lancée par la United Fruit Com?any et les autres monopoles qui opèrent dans le pays, et favorisée par le Département d"Etat des Etats-Unis, tendait à faire apparaître le Guatemala comme un poste avancé du communisme soviétique sur le continent américain, comme un instrument de Moscou, comme une sorte de fer de lance de l'Union soviétique dirigé contre les Etats-Unis; le Guatemala a aussi été injustement accusé de troubler la paix sur le continent américain et de menacer la sécurité des pays de l'hémisphère occidental. En présence de cette situation et pour.prévenir une action quelconque dirigée contre lui, le Guatemala a informé l'Organisation des Nations Unies et le Conseil de sécurité, le 1er avril 1953, à toutes fins utiles, et pour en prendre acte devant l'histoire, que sa souveraineté et son indépendance étaient très gravement menacées. Je prie les membres du Conseil de sécurité de bien vouloir se souvenir de ce document, qui a été distribué en tant que docmnent officiel du Conseil de sécurité, le 15 avril 1953 [SI 2988]. Je ne vais pas leur en imposer la lecture, mais je tiens à rappeler quelques-uns des faits principaux que mon.gouvernement a dès lors dénoncés au Conseil de sécurité. 3 10. For some time past the most active and intensive campaign ever conducted against a country like mine has been waged against Guate~la. This campaign has been based on utterly, false and tendentiuus reports. Its sole purpose has been to prepare the way for open intervention in the domestic afIairs of our country. This campaign, set on foot by the United Fruit Company and other monopolies operat.:ng in the country and encouraged by the United States State Department, has sought to represent Guatemala as an outpost of sovietjl communism on the American continent, a tool of Moscow and a spearhead of the Soviet Union agdnst the United States. Guatemala h:as also been unjustly accused of being a disturblOr of !che peace in the Ame- rican continent and a threat ta the security of the countries of the Western Hemisphere. In view of this, and to prevent any action being taken against it, Guatemala subm;.tted ta the United Nations and the Security Couneil on 1 April 1953 a statement, for information and for historical reco1"d, that its sovereignty and independence were faced with a most serious menace. 1 would ask members of the Security Council to bear in mind and to look up this document, which was distributed as an official Security Council document dated 15 April 1953 [S/2988]. l will not weary you by reading the text but should like to emphasize some of the chief facts which my Government reported ta the Security Couneil as early as that time. ~J Richard~'Patterson, engaged during his tenure of that post. Mr. Patterson announced openly that the Govern- ment then headed by Mr. Juan José Arévalo would be overthrown as the result of international pressure. He incited various groups of conspirators to engage in subversive activities against the constitutional regime and expressed ta high officiaIs of the Guatemalan Government the opinion that the Guatemalan problem was a matter which cûuld easily be settled, as it repre- sented a just daim and involved only a few million dollars. But he said that if the U,uted States were to give way in the case of Guatemala, it would be obliged to do sa elsewhere, which would mean a loss of many thousand million dollars. 13. This was the background in 1953. 1 shall not weary representatives by reading the whole or other parts of the document, but would ask them to bear it in mind for their better understanding of the problem. 14. In February 1954 my country public1y announced that it had obtained convincing proof of the complicity and assistance LI certain international groups and large interests in destroying the threatened Guatemalan demo- cracy. In February 1954 my Governrnent leamed of a vast conspiracy \vith funds from outside Guatemala, in which the complicity of a certain Central American country was clearly proved. 1 have that convincing proùf here, and it is in the archives of Guatemala; it has been attested not only by non-nationals of Guate- mala, but also by members of the diplomatie corps. My country has given the widest circulation ta these proofs - documents in which the present leader of the expedi- tionary forces, who is certainly a Guatemalan, has obtained such assistance. 1 which also to stress that when my country and my Government published these documents this year and publicly denounced this conspiracy ~oainst my country it made absolutely no accusation ~crainst any government - not even against governments that are unfriendly ta Guatemala, and much less against the Government of the U :ted States, a country with which we have at ail tirr maintained sincere friendship. But the assistance is recounted in these documents. Colonel Castillo Armas stated in • a letter, of which there is a photostat copy in this . document - but which l regret 1 cannat circulate as 1 have only OIlle copy of it--- that the movement for the ÏIivasion of Guatemala has the open approval of the Government of the north. We make no accusations against the United States Government. We merely publish the correspondence wmch Castillo Armas him- self- and 1 state the source: another Guatemalan in exile - had with Mt..Anastasio Somoza of Nicaragua. :- 15. Castillo Armas wrote ta Colonel Anastasio Somoza de Baile on 7 November 1953 that he was informed- and l quote the sources - that he would go ta Nica- ragua as 'Saon as the President of Nicaragua returned from a tour of several South-American countries. The activities of Castillo Armlas, who norma!1y resides in the city of Tegucigalpa, are supported by his relations with Gener~l Anastasio Somoza, President of Nica- ragua, an:' his son, Colonel Anastasio Somoza de Baile. who does business through the firm of "A. Samoza y Ciao Ltda.", with headquarters at Managua. The liaison agent between Ml'. Castillo Armas and Messrs. Somoza is Ml'. José Isaac Delgado, Commercial Attaché to the Panamanian Embassy in Nicaragua. From the photostat copies of the documents in question, w'hich will be exhibited if necessary. the people realized that Castillo Armas had placed in the hands of foreign officiaIs the fate of the müvement which, according to the future invaders of Gnd.temala, was called upon to save the country. . 16. Ml'. Castillo Armas wrote them on 20 September. and the Somozas replied on a number of occas. '1s in accordance with documents which are inc1uded here. My country denounced this 1954 conspiracy, of which it has authentic evidence in Guatemala. Ml'. Shuck, for~r chief of the United States military aviation mission ta :tIl(Y country, who asked for his discharge, his release from the United States Army in 1952 and who then came ta work and live in Guatemala, was in. cha:':~ of the operations. 17. The Guatemalan Army loves peace, but it is capable of repelling any armed aggression against the republïc. The Guatemalan Army has been practically disarm:ed. For many years it has felt the need to secure arms for the defence of the national territory. It is a proven fact that Guatemala. made repeated requests to the United States Government for arms, but those requests were refused, notwithstanding the fact that the imminent danger of invasion in which my country stood had been revealed. 18. Peu avant l'invasion de mon pays. non seulement la campagne de dénigrement contre le Guatemala. s'est poursuivie avec la même intensité~ mais encore certains faits nous ont convaincus qu'une action armée se pré- parait à brève échéance contre·notre pays. Les efforts du Secrétaire d'Etat des Etats-Unis pour intervenir au Guatemala, avec d'autres gouvernements. ont atteint leur point culminant à la dixième Conférence interanlé- ricaine qui s'est tenue à Caracas et au cours de laquelle mon pays a été dénoncé comme une menace contre la paix du continent. Or. un pays qui était désarmé ne pouvait constituer une· mena.ce contre personne. 18. Shortly before the invasion of my country, not only did the defamatory campaign against Guatemala continue with unabated intensity, but events occurred whichconvinced us that an armed action against our country was being plotted for an early date. The efforts of the United States Secretary of State ta participate with other govcrnments in interference in my country's affairs ctllminated at the Tenth Inter-American Confe- rence held at Caracas, at which the attempt was made to brand my country a threat to the peace of the con- tinent. A disarmed country could not be a menace to anyone. 19. Je ne .compte pas exposer les divers incidents qui se sont produits à la Conférence de Caracas. car j'estime que la presse leur a donné une publicité suffi- sante et que les membres du Conseil savent parfaite- ment ce qui s'est passé. 1Ç,. l do not propose to recount the incidents of the conference at Caracas- because l think the Press has dealt with them sufficiently and that the members of the Security Cauncil know what happened there. 17. L'armée du Guatemala est éprise de paix. mais elle est capable de repousser toute agression armée dirigée contre la République. L'armée du Guatemala a été virtuellement désarmée. Pendant de nombreuses années, l'armée guatémaltèque a cherché à se procurer des armes pour la défense du territoire national. Il est démontré que le Guatemala a adressé des demandes réitérées au Gouvernement des Etats-Unis en· vue d'obtenir des armes, maioS ces demandes ont été rejetées; bien que le Guatemala ait dénoncé l'imminent danger d'invasion qui le menaçait. 21. Such WdS the atmosphere at, Carac,as.· But today, even if the Guatemalan representative appears in the guise of the vanquished, he has none the less turned his sufiering to good account; and in the applause with wlrlch sorne of his rernarks have been received the real feelings of a large proportion of the Latin-American representatives have been revealed. 22. Bohemia, the great organ of Cuban opinion, referred to the conference of Foreign Ministers at Cara- cas in the following terms: "There are Guatemalans who profess this or that viewpoint just as there are people in the United States who profess them, but the îact that such people exist is no basis for an asserti.on that Guatemala is communist or is a comlmunist danger: Furthermore, it is contradictory to caU Guatemala Communist and try to expel if from the community of American peoples while the United States is rendering mi.litary, economic and technical assistance to a regime in Yugoslavia which does not deny its communism. Where does this leave us? 1s the West opposed to communism or is it not? Guatemala considers that only peace, only the peaceful coexistence of peoples, can overcome backwardness and establish a human race ïree of fcars and difficulties." 23. Certain cOlllj1!lents were lWlde at that time in American newspapers, of which l shall quote only a ,few. For instance, Mr. Walter Lippman said that it li appeared plain enough that the resolution could not achieve what was called a unanimous vote and that, if it was adopted, it would he adopted reluctantly and under pressure. This was the atmosphere in which effcrts were made at Caracas to represent my country as· a danger to the peace of the continent. 24. Even such conservative newspapers as the few 1 am going to quote already had a clear view of the Guatemalan situation. Le Monde of Paris referred to the anti-communist resolution in an editorial as follows : "Those who supported it most enthusiastically were just those dictatorial governments whose power rests on a military junta and on the official representatives of the great United States companies. These govern- ments owe their existence solely to the protection of the United States. If free elections could be organized in their countries it would nût be communism that would come to power, but left-wing anti-communist political movements which, 111(Oreover, would be firmly resolved to reopen negotiations over the advantages obtained by foreign monopolies. It is quite understood 25. This is the case in my country. In my country free elections were held in 1944. After haH a century of oppression and tyranny there was established a democratic g. vernment which sought to give my coun- try a standard of living which we have approved and applauded here. It sought to secure for the people of Guatemala the enjoyment of human nghts, respect for the most essential human rights. It is exactly ~':lis endeavour which an attem!pt is now being made to stiBe. 26. "What is needed," said Kr. Hallet, interpreting the viewpoints he hear:d expressed, "is sorne sort of encouragement of the kind given to the peoples of Eastern Europe by the Secretary of State, Mr. John Foste. Dulles, and other high officiaIs of the United States: future.. freedom and a share in government." And that is what nw Government has done; it has brought about participation in govemment by our people. Mr. Hallett went on ta say, "In contrast, the United States had repeatedly given economic assista.'1.ce to the dictators and had also made military concessions to them to strengthen their armled forces, which, as the majority of Latin Americans believed, would never be used otherwise than against their own peoples." 27. The opinion expressed by the noble people of Uruguay through its representative hecame very widely known in those days. The Uruguayan representative said; In the opinion of the Uruguayan mat. in-the-street - he was referring to that country's people, a great people - the United States was entirely on the side of the hèmisphere's dictators and did not see'i'!l to be much concerned with the democratic aspiraions of the peoples of the continent." l am still quoting Mr. Hallett, the well-known North-American conunentator. 28. Later on the U ruguayan representative said: "We should very much like to secure the support of our people for the United States. But we cannot say much about its policy towards authoritarian govern- ments, nor can we say with complete conviction that the United States is in favour of freedom for aIl men." 29. l could not ignore the authoritative opinion of Mr. Velasco Ibarra; President of Ecuador, who, com- menting on the Caracas meeting, said: "For us the right way to fight communism is not through declara- tions which more or less conceal direct or veiled threats of intervention. In Latin America, which is loyal to the Monroe Doctrine, we shall always resist any inter- vention. Every South Amerkan and Latin American country has the right, within representative and demo-, cratic limits, to organize its government as it pleases and to adopt economic reforms on the scale and of the type it chooses." 30. Mr. Fabela of Mexico wrote in the important Mexican newspaper E~celsior: "You can he sure that no American country will fail to combat communism or will fold its hands and ignore overt or surreptitious ' th~ lines of economic rather than political interests of United States individuals and undertakings, agalnst certain Latin-American countries and peoples, they do not usually aim to serve the ends of morality or justice, but to support specifie and strong economic interests. Mexico has on various occasions been the victim of this propaganda policy, which is the negation of t1'uth." That is an opinion of an effort made by Mor. Dulles which eJ,..-plains in part the background of the situation which my country faces today. 31. Two great groups inside my country can never consent to Guatemala having a democrntic regime. 1 From the e.nQ of the last century until1944 my country suffered the lash of the most violent and terrible tyrannies, great in longevity and in the hatred they caused among mankind. One lasted twenty-two years; the other lasted fourteen years but was expected to last much longer. It was these two tyrannical governments which gave a United States company, in exchange for maintaining them in power, the most exaggerated privi- leges, which it has e.xploited in my country for haH a century. The difficulties of this company and of those which formerly flourished in the shade of those govern- ments began when, for the first time in this century, a demlocratic government started to take an interest in the people of Guatemala, to l'aise the standard of living of my country and to recover our national wealth and increase our general well-being. These two groups, both interested in Guatemala for different reasons, can have no interest in maintaining a democratic regime in my country. The sad thing is that the United States State Department should support these interests by stifling principles which have received our support here and which operate in the United States, forgetting that we Guatemalans have a right ta the enjoym~nt of these principles. For, while we are a small country, we are also a sovereign State. This is our claim. 32. Before the Caracas conference took place, the United States State Department had prepared the ground for it. MI'. Toriello Garrido, Guatemalan Ambassador in Washington, had a farewell interview with President Eisenhower. It is interesting to note that at that time President Eisenhower knew nothing about, or had entirely different information on, the state of the United Fruit Company's business in my country. The former Guatemalan Ambassador informed him! fully of the manner in which the United Fruit Company and other United States monopolies had been operating in Guatemala, with full control over aIl our 11· 33. After the conference at Caracas there occurred events which are lmown to all the representatives here, but whid. ~t is interesting to recall in this brief state- ment. Guatemala was without arms and our army was unable to obtain them from the country that had them. We have proof of this, and we can produce evidence of the repeated requests made for the arms necessary to our defence. "The basic purpose of the Guatemalan revolutionary army is to train citizens of military age for the defence of the homelan_ - the traèitional purpose of all the world's armies", said Colonel Pari- nello, Chief of Staff of the Army. 34. My country has never committed aggression against any other country, nor has it been a threat to any other country, inc1uding, in particular, its sister countries in Central America. The United States State Department asserted that the purchase of arms which my country effected after its attempts to proœre them from other sources had repeatedly proved unsuccessful was of Soviet origin or came from Poland. My country categorieally denies this allegation. Moreover, my country had no need ta consult or ta ask permission of anybody. Guatemala has stated - too often for it ta be necessary to repeat it here - that it is not a satellite of either Russia or the United States; we are a sover- eign country, and ~ Government has acquired armi> through the exercise of a sovereign which is Inherent in all countries, and that right cannat he denied to any sovereign State. The pressure of certain foreign govem- ments which put into effect a policy of hostility towards my country followed the conference at Caracas and the shipment of arms which my country received, and was among the heaviest ever brought to bear on the foreign ministries of our countries. Thus the sister Republic of Niearagua, to our great regret, inexplicably lXoke off diplomatie relations with my country in a mannel' without justification in iI).ternational law. Even if the alleged grounds had been true, they would have justified only the withdrawal of an ambassador, and not on any account the breaking off of diplotmtiç relations. There 33. Après la conférence de Caracas, on a assisté à une succession d'événements que connaissent tous les membres du Conseil de sécurité, mais que je crois intéressant de rappeler dans mon exposé. Le Guate- mala n'avait pas d'armes; notre armée était dans l'im- possibilité de s'en procurer dans le pays qui en possède. Cela, nous en avons la preuve certaine; nous sommes à même de prouver qu'à différentes reprises nous avons :fait des démarches afin d'obtenir l'armement nécessaire à notre 1éfense. "L'armée de la r~YQlution du Guate- mala - a dit le colonel Parinello, chef <\e l'état-major de l'armée - a pour mission première de préparer les citoyens en âge de porter les armes à la défense du sol national, objectif traditionnel de toutes les armées du monde." 34. Mon pays n'a jamais attaqué aucun autre pays, n'a jamais menacé aucun autre pays, et à plus forte raison aucun des pays frères de l'Amérique centrale. Le Département d'Etat des Etats-Unis en est arrivé à affirmer que les armes achetées par mon pays- après les refus successifs essuyés lorsqu'il a essayé d'en obtenir ailleurs - étaient d'origine soviétique, ou venaient de Pologne. Mon pays s'inscrit en faux contre cette allégation; au surplus, il n'avait à c003ùlter personne, et n'avait à solliciter l'autorisation de per- sonne. Le Guatemala a proclamé assez souvent pour n'avoir pas à le répéter ici qu'il n'est le satellite ni de la Russie ni des Etat-Unis: nous sommes un Etat 'Souverain, et mon gouvernement a usé, en achetant des armes, d'un droit souverain qui appartient à tous les peuples et que l'on ne peut refuser à aucun Etat souve- rain.. Après la Conférence de Caracas et la livraison d'armes que mon pays a reçue, les pres5ions exercées par certains gouvernements étrangers, qui pratiquent envers le Guatemala une politique d'hostilité, sont deve- nues encore plus violentes et ont atteint une intensité jamais connue jusqu'ici par nos chancelleries. C'est ainsi que la République-sœur du Nicaragua, à notre grand regret, a rompu les relations diplomatiques avec mon pays d'une m~iè~e in~xplicable ~t s.ans qu~ l'on puisse trouver de JustificatlOn en drOIt mternatlOnal. Les motifs invoqués, s'ils étaient fondés, auraient pu entraîner le rappel d'lm ambg,;?§Çl,q~1Jrl tll{.tis non la aUl:f~S pays de l'Amérique latine, ces pays signaient un pacte Oe non-agression avec les Etats américains, mais le pacte de non-agression avec le Guatemala a été repoussé sous prétexte qi1'il existe déjà des règles de droit international suffisantes et qu'il était inutile de signer un nouveau pacte. Je suis donc amepé à poser une question: le pacte de non-agression avec les Etats- Unis était donc, lui aussi, inutile? Ou était-ce un moyen de fournir des armes, une manière d'équiper des pays pour porter ainsi à son maximum une campagne d'assistance ou, tout au moins, de tolérance à l'égard d'activités préparatoires d'une agression - actuellement en cours - contre un peuple sans défense - laissé vo- lontairement sans défense et sans armes? 36. Je dois m'excuser de cette digression. 37. Pour nous, toutes ces difficultés découlent du fait qu'un monopole bénéficiant de \Soutiens officiels ne veut pas perdre des privilèges qu'aucun Etat souverain ne saurait lui conserver. Je veux parler de la United Fruit Company. 38. La vérité a été déformée et travestie. On a pré- tendu avec insistance que les raisons qui ont motivé cette campagne dirigée contre mon pays sont toutes différentes. M. John Foster Dulles, dans un récent discours, a déclaré - excusez-moi si ma citation n'est pas strictement exacte, mais ma mémoire ne me trahit pas pour l'essentiel: "Je suis certain que le problème du Guatemala est tel que, si demain le problème de la United Fruit Company était réglé, le problème du communisme guatémaltèque subsisterait." Mais M. Dulles ne se rendait pas compte qu'il y a un autre aspect des choses et qu'il existe une autre raison - que l'on pourrait tout aussi bien dire (et c'est tout à fait exact) que, si demain le Gouvernement du Guatemala expul- sait du pays les membres du Parti communiste - parti qui au Guatemala a le même statut que les autres groupements politiques, parce qu'il s'agit d'un pays libre où la liberté de pensée existe - on chercherait à cette campagne un nouveau prétexte. En effet, cette campagne a pour objet de venir en aide aux monopoles, profondément ancrés dans mon pays et qui ont perdu Ïeurs privilèges lorsque le Guatemala a fait usage de ses droit souverains et a promulgué des lois justes. La 'réforme agraire, par exemple, est une loi qui a été édictée dans mon pays de manière entièrement légitime et en conformité des principes des Nations Unies. 39. Voilà, dans ses grandes lignes, l'historique de la situation. La République du Guatemala a été envahie. 40. Par une information que publie aujourd'hui le New York Times, mon gouvernement a appris que l'Ambassadeur au Guatemala aurait nié qu'il y ait eu des bombardements au Guatemala. Il a affirmé, au con- traire, qu'il s'agissait d'un mouvement intérieur; que les habitants des villes s'étaient soulevés; que c'était le peuple guatemaltèque qui avait entrepris une lutte pour sa libération. machine~gunned irom P~47's, the most up-to-date fighter aircraft, whereas my country has been denied even training aircraft for its miHtary schoo1. This can- not be denied. Accredited diplomats in Guatemala agreed ta go up in planes and were able to determine the origin of the aircraft that are hombing my country and the fact that the!r bases are at Toncontin and Copan, in Honduras; that they are unidentified air- craft, possibly \Vith altered identification marks; and that we know more or less what their nationality is. 42. It has been asserted here that this is a movement of e."dled Guatemalans. At 9.30 a.m. today an airerait which had bombed and machine~gunned the capital and other Guatemalan towns ·ran out of fuel and fell at Tapachula, Mexico, with an injured airman. My Gov- ermnent requested that these airm~H should be appre- hended, anù it is surprising that this movement, these gentlemen who are bombing my country should be deseribed by Ambassador Peurifoy as Guatemalans. 1\!e.xico will say whether these two airmen who came down at Tapachnla and crashed their aircraft were or were not two airmen of North American nationality. These men are members of the expeditiona:ry forces. And l am not inventing this; Mexico will be able to say tomorrow whether my assertion is correct. 43. My country did not repel the invading forces, but we arc prepared to repel them and not to acquiesce in the invasion. In obedience to a principle which i5 innate in us Guatemalans - the observance of our under- takings and obligations - we should like the Security Coundl to send an observation nùssion to Guatemala as quickly as possible. This is the first ·request which l officially make here on behalf of my Government: that an observation commission should be sent to Gua- temala to ask questions, to investigate, and to listen ta the diplomatic corps. 43. Mon pays n'a pas voulu repousser les forces d'in- vasion, mais nous sommes tout disposés à les repousser et à n'admettre aucune invasion. Fidèles à un principe que respectent profondément les Guatémaltèques, c'est- à-dire le principe du respect des engagements et des obligations, nous voudrions que le Conseil de sécurité envoie au Guatemala, le plus tôt possible, une mission d'observation. Voilà la première demande que je for- mule ici officiellement, au nom de mon gouvernement: qu'on constitue une commission d'observation chargée de se rendre au Guatemala, pour procéder à des con- sultations et à des enquêtes, et pour entendre le corps diplomatique. 44. Au Guatemala, il y a des journalistes des Etats- Unis qui ont envoyé à leurs journaux respectifs des comptes rendus des bombardements et des incidents qui se sont produits à l'occasion de ces bombardements. Néanmoins, je le répète, mon pays n'a pas voulu re- pousser les envahisseurs dans le nord, bien que ceux-ci aient déjà occupé trois villes importantes, à proximité de la frontière du Honduras. Nous souhaitons que le Conseil de sécurité, après avoir recueilli tous les ren- seignements possibles, demande aux Gouvernements du Honduras et du Nicaragua qu'ils internent les exilés et les mercenaires"qui envahissent le territoire du Guate- mala et qui ont leurs bases d'opération et leurs points d'appui au Nicaragua et au Honduras. Ils ont proba- blement fermé les yeux sur ces activités ou peut-être les ont~ils aidées. 45. L'Ambassadeur du Guatemala au Honduras a fait une démarche auprès du Ministère des affaires étran- gères de ce pays pour protester contre les mouvements de troupes aéroportées des mercenaires en uniforme vers la frontière hondurienne. Nous avons des preuves 44. There are North American journalists in Guate- mala who have sent reports on the bombing, on the incidents of the bombing, ta their respective periodicals. Nevertheless, l repeat, my country has not chosen ta repel the invaders in the north, although they have already taken three large towns near the Honduran frontier. It is our desire that the Security Council should in the first place, and with a knowledge of re~ ports which ean be obtained, send a warning to the Governments of Honduras and Nicaragua, calling upon them to apprehend the exiles and the mercenaries who, forpay, are invading the territory of Guatemala, and who have operatin,g bases, support bases, in Nicara- gua and Honduras, possibly with assistance, or through people dosing their eyes to these actions. 45. The Ambassador of Guatemala in Honduras lodged a complaint with the Honduran Ministry of Foreign Affairs in whieh he denounced the move ènts of uniformed mercena'ry troops by air towards the frontier of Honduras. We have clear proofs. An ob- 46. My Government's second request is that an ob- servation -commission of the Security Council should be constituted in Guatemala, and in other 'COuntries if necessary, tn verify through an examination of the documentary evidence, the fact that the countrles which my Government accuses have connived at the invasion. 47. The invasion of Guatemala began on 18 June. The first attac1..s and acts of sabotage occurred as follows: 48. In the night of 18 June, a passenger train pro- ceeding from Puerto Barrios to the capital was machine- gunned, and stopped. The attackers fiew over the Gualân Bridge, and the train reached the township of Entre Rios. They destroyed national property and propeny of the International Railways of Central America, and removed the railway Hnes. 49. At 10.50 a.m. on that day, P-47 aircraft of North American manufacture attacked public and private buildings in the -capital of Guatenlala and dropped large quantities of arms at Nuevo Vinas, ~alencia and Villa Cané' l~s. This fifth-column method - there is no doubt that they had a fifth column in the country - was con- stantly repeated. 1 must state that the people of Guate- mala, who are united, delivered up, in the presence of reliable witnesses, aIl the arms that fell into their possession. 50. During the night they fiew over various town- ships and bombed sorne of them, although without causing great .a.amage. 51. At 8 a.m. on 19 June an unidentified P-47 aireraft fiew over the capital and others dropped arms in vari- ous villages which 1 will not name here. 52. At 11 a.m. another unidentified aircraft dropped bombs, without success, on petroleum depots at Puerto Bar·rios and Puerto de San José. 53. At 12 o'c1ock mercenary forces occupied Es- quipulas and Jocotan, two towns a short distance from the Honduran frontier. The mereenary forces crossed the Honduran frontier. 54. At 5.45 p.m. on that same day two aireraft attacked the military areas of Jutiapa. They withdrew, and returned with two more aireraft for a further at- tack at 11.30 p.m., and two aireraft equipped with searchlights fiew over the military area of Petén. 55. At 11.40 p.m. mercenary forces oceupied the towns of Morales and Bananera, whieh are also very near the southern frontier in the north-east of the country. The fate of the civilian population is unknown, for the bridge was blown up and no information has been received. 56. Various aireraft dropped arms in different parts of .the Republie at different times but, as 1 said, the people collected them and handed them over to the army, 57. On 20 June, today, at 8.35 a.m., aircraft bombed and damaged the bridgeat Quirigua, a town in the 49. A 10 h. 50 du matin, des avions du type P-47 construits aux Etats~Unis ont attaqué des édifices pu- blics et des maisons particulières dans la capitale guaté- maltèque et ont parachuté de grandes quantités d'armes à Nuevo Vinas, Palencia et Villa Canales. Ces para- chutages destinés aux cinquièmes colonnes existant sans doute dans le pays se sont poursuivis sans interrup- tion. Je dois déclarer que le peuple guatémaltèque, qui est parfaitement uni, a remis toutes les armes qui sont tombées entre ses mains en présence de témoins dignes de foi. 50. Les agresseurs ont survolé de nombreuses loca- lités pendant la nuit et en ont bombardé plusieurs, sans toutefois causer de dégâts importants. 51. Le 19 juin, à 8 heures, un avion P-47 non identifié a survolé la capitale, tandis que d'autres avions ont parachuté des armes sur divers villages dont je ne vais pas citer le nom. 52. A Il heures, un autre avion non identifié a lancé sans succès des bombes sur les dépôts de pétrole de Puerto Barrios et -de Puerto de San José. 53. A midi, des forces mercenaires ont occupé Esqui- pulas et Jocotan, deux localités situées à une faible dis- tance de la frontière hondurienne. Les forces merce- nairesavaient franchi cette frontière. 54. A 17 h. 45, toujours le 19 juin, deux avions ont attaqué les zones militaires de Jutiaca. Ils se sont ensuite retirés et sont revenus, accompagnés de deux autres avions, pour se livrer à une nouvelle attaque à 23 h. 30, tandis que clenx avions munis de projecteurs ont survolé la zone militaire de Petén. 55. A 23 h. 40, des forces mercenaires ont occupé les localités de Morales et de Bananera, elles aussi proches ,de la frontière méridionale, dans la par·tie nord-est cl'.! pays. On ignore le sort de la population civile, car ces forces ont fait sauter le pont, et on n'a pu obtenir aucun renseignement. 56. Divers avions, à des heures différentes, ont para- chuté des armes en divers endroits de la République, mais, ainsi que je l'ai indiqué, la population a ramassé ces armes et les a remises à l'armée. 57. Aujourd'hui, 20 juin, à 8 h. 55, des avions ont bombardé et endommagé le pont de Quirigual localité 59. This is an account of the situation with which my country is faced. 60. To conc1ude, my country c1early and concretely requests the Security Council's intervention in this matter. The Peace Committee of the Organization of American States met yesterday. My Govemment, e.'"ercising the option whkh is open to the Organiza- tion's members, this moming officiaUy declined to allow the Organization of American States and the Peace Committee to concern themselves with this situation. That is a right embodied in the rules of the Organization of American States, and 1 therefore believe that there would be no purpose in discussing here any proposaI by which any attempt might he made to evade the responsibilities of the Security Council, which are laid down with the utmost darity in the United Nations Charter and which 1 think it unneces- sary to repeat here. 61. 1 am at the disposaI of the representatives for any information they may consider desirable.
L'ordre du jour est adopté.
Of ail the situations 1 have had to cape with in my long years of service in the United Nations, this, perhaps, is the one most involved in cruel ironies. To- day we have heal'd drastic and far-reaching charges made against Honduras by the representative of a country with which Honduras is linked by historieal ties and by the deepest feelings of fraternity. In addi- tion, we have once again the great pamdox that in an organization whose supreme object is to work for the establishment of an honourable peace, sa many words have been spoken whkh are distorted by anger and in which good judgment is blinded by passion and fear. This solemn forum is being misused for the preaching of hatred, for inflaming emotions in international affairs and for sowing confusion. Yet the question be- fore us is a c1assic case of the jurisdiction of an organi- zation designed for the maintenance of peace and security. The whole world knows that the American countries possess organizations which are the pride of the continent. The whole world is accustomed ta hea1'"- ing the representatives of Latin America 'boasting of the great achievements of international law in the American continent. It is because of that that 1 vent- 'e to speak the following quite unprepared words. 63. The charges made by the Guatemalan Govern- ment have the initial advantage of surprise. However, 1 believe that there will be occasion enough for our position to be c1early explained to the Council and for responsibilities to be c1early demarcated. It is precisely .~i~ns Unies, et sur lesquelles je crois ·superflu de revenir ICI. 61. Je reste à la disposition des membres du Conseil pour leur fournir tous renseignements qu'ils jugeraient utiles. 62. M. CARIAS (Honduras) (traduit de l'e~pagnol) : De toutes les situations en présence desquelles je me suis trouvé au cours des longues années passées à l'Or- ganisation des Nations Unies, celle dont nous sommes saisis actuellement est peut-être la plus lourde d'uuf ironie cnt'elle. En effet, des accusations tragiques et extrêmement graves sont portées contre le Honduras par le représentant d'un pays auquel nous sommes liés par toute notre histoire et par une amitié fraternelle. Nous nous trouvons une fois de plus dans cette situa- tion paradoxale où l'on prononce des paroles empreintes de colère devant cet organisme dont la préoccupation principale est l'établissement d'une paix digne, dans une situation où les passions et la peur l'emportent sur le ·bon sens. On abuse de cette noble tribune pour prê- cher la haine, pour exacerber les passions internatio- nales et semer la confusion. Cependant, la question dont nous sommes saisis est un exemple type d'affaire rele- vant de la compétence d'un organisme chargé de main- tenir la paix et la sécurité. Tout le monde sait en effet que les pays américains disposent d'organismes qui font l'orgueil de leur continent. Le monde entier est habitué ft entendre les représentants des pays de l'Amérique latine se flatter des progrès du droit international sur leur cont!~!ent. C'est précisément pour cette raison que je me permets de prendre la parole sans avoir préparé mon intervention à l'avance. 63. En formulant ses accusations, le Gouvernement guatémaltèque a eu l'avantage de la surprise initiale. J'espère toutefois avoir l'occasion d'exposer nettement notre attitude au Conseil de sécurité de manière que les responsabilités puissent être fixées. C'est précisé- 64. Before concluding, 1 wish to repeat that my Government reserves the right to make another state- ment if matters take a different turn. 1 should alsa like, before concluding, to express my gratitude for the in- vitation which has been extended ta me in this question, which is one of the most painful 1 have had ta face. 65. Ml'. Mena SOLORZANO (Nicaragua) (trans- lated from Spanish): My delegation was surprised at the Security Council being cal1ed, especial1y to hear \the charges made against my country by the Guate- >malan delegation. 1 believe that these matters should .be settled in the Organization of American States, which was set up precisely in arder ta hear our differences. 1 therefore request that this matter should be referred to the appropriate organization, where it can be hearcl and where we can defend ourselves. 66. Ml'. GOUTHIER (Brazil): The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Guatemala has addressed a cable- gram to the Security ·Council [S/3232] informing the 1 latter of events that are now taking place in that coun- : try. The Guatemalan Government has requested the i Security Council to take appropriate measures, in 1 accordance with Articles 34, 35 and 39 of the United Nations Charter, "to prevent the disruption of pe.ace and international security in this part of Central America and also to put a stop to the aggression in progress against Guatemala". \ 67. It has long been a tradition among the American States that aIl disputes and situations which could threaten or endanger the friendly relations among American republics should be dealt with by the organi- zation which those republics themselves have set up for that purpose. According to its charter, the Organiza- tion of American States is empowered to deal with and to solve any problems relating to such disputes or situations. Furthermore, Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter acknowledges this principle in Article 52, and l wish to draw the attention of the Council to paragraph 3 of that Article, which reads as follows: "The Security CouBcil shall encourage the development of pacifie settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Coun- cil." 68. l think that the Council shou1d act today according to that very clear provision of our Charter and, with- 64. Avant de conclure, je tiens à répéter que mon Gouvernement se réserve le droit de faire une nouvelle déclaration si l'affaire prend une autre ·direction. Je voudrais aussi, avant de conclure, exprimer ma grati- tude pour l'invitation qui m'a été adressée dans la pré- sente affaire, qui est une des plus pénibles en présence desquelles je me sois jamais trouvé. 65. M. Mena SOLORZANO (Nicaragua) (tradttit de l'espagnol) : Ma délégation a été prise au dépourvu par la convocation du Conseil de sécurité; elle a été surprise surtout d'entendre la délégation du Guaœmala formuler des accusations contre le Nicaragua. J'estime que ces questions doivent être réglées par l'Organisa- tion des Etats américains, qui a été créée précisément pour régler nos différends. Je demande donc que cette affaire soit renvoyée à l'instance compétente afin que nous puissions y présenter notre défense. 66. M. GOUTHIER (Brésil) (traduit de l'anglais) : Le Ministre des relations extérieures du Guatemala a adressé au Conseil de sécurité un télégramme [S/3232] l'informant des événements dont son pays est actuelle- ment le théâtre. Le Gouvernement du Guatemala a demandé au Conseil de sécurité d'adopter, conformé- mentaux Articles 34, 35 et 39 de la Charte des Nations Unies, les mesures propres "à empêcher qu'il ne soit porté atteinte à la paix et à la securité internationales dans cette région de l'Amérique centrale, ainsi qu'à mettre fin à l'agression dirigée contre le Guatemala". 67. Il est depuis longtemps de tradition, chez les Etats américains, de laisser à l'organisation que les républiques américaines ont créée à cette fin le soin d'examiner tous les différends et toutes les situations qui pourraient menacer ou mettre en danger les rela- tions amicales qui existent entre ces républiques. La charte de l'Organisation des Etats américains autorise cette organisation à examiner et à résoudre tous les problèmes relatifs à ces différends et à ces situations. En outre, le Chapitre VIII ·de la Charte des Nations Unies reconnaît ce principe dans son Article 52, et je voudrais attirer l'attention du Conseil sur le paragra- phe 3 de cet article, qui est ainsi conçu: ~ i; il P "Le Conseil de sécurité encourage le ·développe- ment du règlement pacifique des différends d'ordre local par le moyen de ces aœ{)l'ds ou de ces orga- nismes régionaux, soit sur l'initiative des Etats inté- ressés, soit sur renvoi du Conseil de sécurité." 68. J'estime que le Conseil devrait s'inspirer aujour- d'hui de cette disposition très claire de la Charte et, "The 5ecurity Council, "Having considered on an urgent basis the com- munication of the Government of Guatemala to the President of the Security Council (S/3232), "Noting that the Government of Guatemala has dispatched a sim'ilar communication to the Inter- American Peace Committee, an agency of the 01'- ganization of American States, "Having in mind the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, "C.onscious of the availability of Inter-American machinery which can deal effectively with problems concerning the maintenance of peace and security in' the Americas, "Refers the complaint of the· Government of Guatemala to the Organization of American States for urgent consideration; "Requests the Organization of American States ta inform the Security Council as saon as possible, as appropriate, on the measures it has been able to take on the matter." 70. Ml'. ECHEVERRI CORTES (CoIombia) (translated from 5panish): It has been a cariie of anxiety for my delegation to hear of the violent events in Guatemala re1ated by Ml'. Castillo Arriola, the Guatemalan representative, and we hope that there will be an end to any action which might cause shedding of blood. However, my delegation has some comments of a strictly legal nature to make. 71. Since the San Francisco Conference it has been a concern of the Colombian delegation to av01d any direct appeal to the Security Council without going first to the regional organization, because, in that case, any action taken on this continent ta prevent aggression would be at the mercy of the veto. This view was shared by aU the American de1egations and was ex- pressed in Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter. 72. According to Article 33 of the United Nations Charter, the parties to any dispute, the continuation of which is like1y to endanger the maintenance of inter- national peace and security, must seek a solution ta it and in that connexion mention is made of resort to regional agencies or arrangements. This Article must be taken in conjunction with Article 52, paragraph 2 of which says that every effort must be made to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or agencies before referring them to the Security Council. 73. 1 should like to make it quite clear that the pro- visions of Article 52, paragraph 2, of the United Na- tions Charter impose on all Members the dutY to apply région~ux. Cet article doit être considéré en même temps que l'Article 52, qui est encore plus formel, car son paragraphe 2 stipule qu'il convient de faire tous les efforts pour régler d'une manière pacifique, par le moyen desdits accords ou organismes, les différends d'ordre .Jocal avant de les soumettre au Conseil de sécurité. 73. Je tiens à souligner maintenant que les dispositions du paragraphe 2 de l'Article 52 de la Charte des Nations Unies imposent aux Membres de l'Organisation l'obli-
At the last meeting of the Security Couneil, the day before yesterday, the President said [674th meeting] : "The United States was a small country for a long time and still looks at many things from the stand- point of a small country. 1 hope that 1 will never live to see the day when a small country cornes to the United Nations and asks for protection against war and is simply greeted with the question: What is the hurry?" When we listened to him then we did not think we should so soon be confronted with the a1most academic problem he set. 1 should like to express, on my own behalf and, 1 think, on behalf of all the members of the Couneil, our great appreeiation of the trDuble the President has taken to convene the Security Couneil today, despite considerable physical difficulties, in order to enable the Guatemalan representative to lay his request before us as quickly as possible. 75. As to the substance of the problem before us, it appears a difficult matter for the Council to take a de- eision at once and without longer consideration. 1 have examined the draft resolution just submitted by the Brazilian delegation with the support of the Colombian delegation. The French delegation has no objection in prineiple to voting for this draft resolution. It is right that the Couneii should have a picture of the whole of the situation referred to it. It can be justly claimed that the Inter-American Peace Committee is qualified to report ta us on this subject, comprising as it does a group of countries which have long been accustomed to working together, which are bound one to another by historical and geographical ties, and between which it may prove possible for understanding ta he achieved more readily than before an international body of wider scope. 1 consider that in referring Guatema:la's request ta the Inter-American Peace Committee as a matter of urgency the Security Couneil will not heunloading its responsibilities on that committee ; for it is requesting the committee to report on the conclusions it reaches after carrying out its enquiry. On those conclusions, in my opinion, it will rest with the Security Couneil ta take its final deeision. ,76. There is, however, one immediate responsibility 1which the Security Couneil cannot evade without failing ,in its essential mission: to deeide this very day in .'favour of the immediate cessation of any action in- (; volving the loss of human lives, and of aIl externat aid ~ ta such action. 77. It is in this spirit that my delegation proposes to the Council that the fqllowing final paragraph should be added ta the draft resolution submitted by the Brazilian delegation: "Without prejudice to such measures as the Or- ganization of American States may take, the Council calls for the immediate termination of any action likely ta cause further bloodshed and requests aIl "Les Etats-Unis ont été longtemps un petit pays et voient encore bien des choses du point de vue d'un petit pays. J'espère ne jamais voir le jour où un petit pays demandant aux Nations Unies de le protéger de la guerre sera aœueilli par Ia question: Pourquoi se hâter?" Nous ne pensions pas, en écoutant alors le Président, que le problème presque théorique qu'il posait allait se présenter à nous aussi vite. Je tiens à dire, en mon nom et au nom - je le pense - de tous les membres du Con- seil, à quel point nous avons apprécié le soin que le Président a apporté, malgré des difficultés matérielles considérables, à réunir immédiatement, aujourd'hui même, le Conseil de sécurité, afin de permettre au représentant du Guatemala de nous saisir, de toute urgence, de sa demande. 75. Sur le fond même du problème qui nous est posé, il paraît difficile que le Conseil se prononce immédiate- ment et sans plus ample réflexion. J'ai pris connaissance du projet de résolution que la délégation du Brésil vient de déposer avec l'appui de la délégation de la Colombie. En principe, la délégation française n'a pas d'objection à voter en faveur de ce projet de résolution. Il convient que le Conseil soit éclairé sur l'ensemhle de la situation évoquée devant lui; on peut prétendre à juste titre que la Commission intenunéricaine de la paix est qualifiée pour nous faire rapport à ce sujet, dans la mesure où cette commission réunit un ensemble de pays habitués depuis longtemps à travaiHer en commun, rapprochés par l'histoire et par la géographie, et entre lesquels l'entente pourra peut-être se faire plus facilement que devant une instance internationale plus vaste. Je consi- dère que le ConseH de sécurité, en référant d'extrême urgence la requête du Guatemala à la Commission inter- américaine de la paix, ne se décharge pas de ses respon- sabilités sur ladite commission; car il demande à la -Commission de faire rapport sur les conclusions aux- quelles elle aboutira à la Sttite de l'enquête qu'elle effec- tuera; c'est sur ces conclusions, me semble-t-il, qu'il appartiendra au Conseil de sécurité, le cas échéant, de se prononcer en dernière instance. 76. Il est cependant une responsabilité immédiate à laquelle le Conseil de sécurité ne peut se dérober sans manquer à sa mission essentielle: c'est de se prononcer, aujourd'hui même, pour qu'il soit mis fin immédiate- ment à toute action entrainant perte de vies humaines et à toute aide extérieure apportée à cette action. 77. C'est dans cet esprit que ma délégation propose au Conseil que soit ajouté au projet de résolution présenté par la délégation du Brésil le paragraphe final suivant: "Sans préjudice des mesures qui pourraient être prises par l'Organisation des Etats américains, [le Conseil] fait appel pour qu'il soit mis fin immédiate- ment à toute action susceptible de provoquer l'efru- 80. 1 trust that our Brazilian colleague will be good enough to accept this amendment and join with me in recommending its adoption by the SeGurity Council. 81. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with the usual procedure, the President will call upon the representa- tive of Brazil sa that he may comment on the proposed amendment offered by the representative of France.
l gladly accept the ideas expressed by the representative of France. My d~legation shares the views of Mr. Hoppenot, and we smcerely hope that further bloodshed will be avoided. In presentinJ our proposaI we dealt only with the best way of proceeding with the case, taking into account the machinery of the Organization of American States and the principles of the Charter. Keeping within this Ene of impartiality, we did not prejudge the matter. For my part, 1 have no objections to the amendment proposed by the representative of France.
In the same spirit in which 1 recognized the representative of 'Brazil, 1 now call on the representative of Colombia. 84. Ml'. ECHEVERRI CORTES (Colombia) (translated from Spanish) : 1 should like to congratu- late Ml'. Hoppenot, the French representative, on the excellent amendment he has made to the draft resolution submitted by Brazil and supported by Colombia. In my ?elegation's opinion this ame!ldment expresses the feel- m~s ?f us all perfectly. We have made clear the legal pru;C1ples on which is based the need to apply to regIOnal organizations, but at the same time we are glad to see them completed in this way. 79. Ce que ma délégation demande - et se croit en droit de demander - au Conseil de sécurité, c'est sim- plement d'adresser un appel pour que cette effusion de sang cesse, pour que des victimes innocentes ne tombent plus, aujourd'hui, ·dans les rues des villes et dans les CatlIlpagnes du Guatemala, et pour qu'il 'soit mis fin immédiatement aux plus douloureuses conséquences de cette situation. 80. J'espère que notre collègue brésilien voudra bien accueillir cet amendement et se joindre à moi pour le recommander à l'adoption du Conseil de sécurité. 81. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais) : Confor- mément à la procédure établie, je vais donner la parole au représentant du Brésil, qui veut présenter des obser- vations sur l'amendement que le représentant de la France vient de proposer. 82. M. GOUTHIER (Brésil) (traduit dtz l'anglais) : J'accepte très volontiers les idées que le représentant de la France a exprimées. Ma délégation partage <l'opinion de M. Hoppenot, et nous espérons sincèrement qu'il sera possible d'éviter toute nouvelle effusion de sang. En soumettant notre proposition, nous ne nous sommes préoccupés que de la manière la plus utile d'agir, compte tenu du système de l'Organisation des Etats américains et des principes de la Charte. Soucieux d'impartialité, nous n'avons pas p:;éjugé la question. Pour ma part, je n'ai pas d'objections à formuler contre l'amendement du représentapt de la France. ~ .' 83. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais) : Je donne la parole au représentant de l&. Colombie pour les mêmes raisons qui m'ont fait la donner au représentant du Brésil. 84. M. ECHEVERRI CORTES (Colombie) (tra- duit de l'espagnol) : Je tiens à féliciter M. Hoppenot, représentant de la France, de l'excellent amendement qu'il a proposé d'apporter au projet de résolution pré- senté par le Brésil et appuyé par la Colombie. Ma délé- gation a le sentiment que cette modification·traduit par- faitement les sentiments qui nous animent tous. Les principes juridiques relatifs à la nécessité de s'adresser aux organismes régionaux demeurent tels que je les ai exposés, mais ils sont en même temps complétés pour faire un tout parfait. 85. Je tiens donc à déclarer que ma délégation accepte l'amendement proposé par le représentant de la France et votera en sa faveur. 86. Sir Pierson DIXON (Royaume-Uni) (traduit de l'anglais): Nous avons entendu le représentant du Guatemala, ainsi que les représentants du Honduras et du Nicaragua. Il -s'agit maintenant de savoir quelles mesures il convient de prendre. Nous avons dû nous réunir d'urgence, mais il ressort déjà clairement des 88. It is clear that under this draft resolution the Security Council's interest in peace and security is made plain. It is made plain in the last paragraph, which 1"(~ads : ~r "Requests the Organization of American States to ,inform the Security Council as soon as possible, as (appropriate, on the measures it has been able to take on the matter." 89. The amendment introduced by the representative of France appears to me to be desirable in itself. It makes aIl the clearer the interest of the Security Coun- cil in this question, and 1 am happy to support it. 90. It seems to me that the course proposed in the draft resolution submitted by Brazil and Colombia is the most constructive that the Cauneil could aJdopt and the course most conducive to the interests of peace and security. There is a long standing, historical tradition of co-operation between the States of Latin America. This is fortunate fer world peace, and that tradition 1S part of our strength in the free world. The machinery exists in the Organization of American States for dealing with inter-American disputes. In the light of this historical tradition to which 1 have referred, it seems to me that the proposaI to use this machinery is both reasonable and constructive. 91. My delegation, therefore, sees no objection to the draft resolution and to the amendment proposed by the French delegation. 92. Ml'. MUNRO (New Zealand): My delegation fully supported the adoption of this item and approved the action of the President in calling the Couneil to- gether as quickly as possible. During the debate on the previous item, 1 took occasion to emphasize my Gov- ernment's views on the importance of the right of any State, particularly any small State, to seek the support and the assistance of the international community when it believes its security to be threatened. It follows that, without prejudging the merits of this case, my .delega- tion considers that Guatemala was fully entitled to have immeciiate recourse to this Council in the situation which has given rise to this application. 93. 1 listened to the speech of the representative of Guatemala with the closest attention. My delegation does not feel it is in a position, at this short notice, to pass judgment on the facts of this case. 1 also heard 89. L'amendement présenté par le représentant de la France paraît opportun, car il souligne encore plus nettement le souci que le Conseil de sécurité a de cette question, et je suis heureux de l'appuyer. 90. Il me semble que la méthode proposée dans le projet de résolution présenté par le Brésil et la Colom- bie est la plus utile de celles que le Conseil pouvait adopter, celle qui sert le mieux les intérêts de la paix et de la sécurité. Les Etats de l'Amérique latine ont une tradition déjà ancienne de 'COopération-fort heureuse- ment pour la paix mondiale - et cette tradition est un des éléments qui font la force du monde libre. L'Orga- nisation des Etats américains constitue un système qui permet de traiter des différends qui surgissent sur le continent américain. En raison de la tradition historique à laquelle j'ai fait allusion, il me semble que la proposi- tion d'av.oir recours à ce système est aussi raisonnable que riche de promesses. 91. Aussi ma délégation ne voit-elle aucune objèction ni -au projet de -résolution ni à l'amendement de la .France. 92. M. MUNRO (Nouvelle-Zélande) (traduit de l'anglais) : Ma"délégation a ·donné son appui entier à la demande d'inscription à l'ordre du jour, et elle a approuvél-a ·décision prise par le Président de réunir le Conseil au'ssi .rapidement que possible. Pendant les débats relatifs à la dernière question que nous avons discutée, j'a.i dit combien mon güuvernement attachait d'importance au droit qu'a tout Etat - en particulier, tout petit Etat - de demander l'aide et le soutien de la communauté internationale lorsqu'il estime sa sécurité menacée. II suit que, sans se prononcer sur le fond, ma délégation estime que, vu -la situation qui a provoqué sa demande, le Guatemala était entièrement justifié à saisir immédiatement le Conseil. 93. J'ai écouté le discours du représentant du Guate- mala avec la plus grande attention. Faute de temps, ma délégation ne s'estime pas en mesure de porter un juge- ment sur les faits en question. J'ai écouté également avec 94. The desirability of achieving peaceful settlement of local disputes is, moreover, enjoined upon the mem- bers of such an organization by paragraph 2 of Article 52 of the Charter. Article 53 authorizes measures by regional organizations under the direction or with the authority of the Security Council. 95. In a case such as this, a regional organization may weIl be in the best position to ascertain the facts and ta recommend appropriate measures. 1t may proper1y be considered, therefore, fully consistent with its own overriding concern for the maintenance of international peace and security for the Council ta refer the problem first ta the Organization of American States and ta ask it ta report ta the Council at an early date. My delega- tian is, therefore, ready in principle to support the draft resolution proposed by the delegations of Brazil and Colombia, together wi~~ the amendment proposed by the representative of F!'::"uce. 96. It is our view that the amended resolution does not constif:ute a judgment on the part of the Council and cannat, therefore, reflect in any way on any of the States mentioned in the complaint of Guatemala. My delegation, therefore, will support the draft resolution as amended by the representative of France and accepted by the representatives of Brazil and Colombia.
l have listened with the greatest attention to the statements which have been made by aIl the speakers at this meeting. l feel it necessary to make certain remarks and shaH begin by telling Ambas- sador Carias, the Honduran representative, that my country and l recognize, feel strongly and have c1,lltivated the strong bonds of brotherhood which unite our peoples. Partic1.11arly in the case of Honduras neither 1, in my speech, nor my Government has had the intention of accusing that counrry of connivance in the attacks on my country or in the invasion of my country. My only intention was ta point out that the competent body should fix the responsibility for Honduras having consented to become a centre of operations from which aircraft and ships have set out un the invasion of my country. 98. l should like to explain to the representative al France that neither my Government nor l, in the course of my remarks, have sought to impute connivance either to the people or ta the Government of the United States. l have referred ta the United Fruit Company and, ta certain official groups interested in supporting that company's interests. 99. After that explanation l must express my thanks 99. Après ces quelques explications, je tiens à expri- to the French representative for his amendment to the mer ma reconnaissance au représentant de la Forance BraziIian draft ref'Jlution, which close1y refieds the pour l'amendement qu'il a présenté au projet de résolu- anxious feelings of the Guatemalan people and contains tian du Brésil; il a interpréré avec exactitude les senti- one of the twospecifie requests l have mad~ thh~ after- ment13 {1'~p.goi5se qu'éprouve le peuple guatémaltèque; )l ï1 100. In the third place 1 wish to refer to the remarks made by the Colombian representative. My country is small but has a legal tradition - and l, by fate or by chance, am also a lawyer and have a great respect for legal principles - but a country cannot lose itse1f in legal minutiae. With all respect and with no intention of giving offence, 1 would ask the Colombian ·represen- tative to understand the feelings of my people who are being machine-gunned; and 1 thank him on behalf of my Government for the joint Brazilian and Colombian proposaI. But their proposaI is rot in strict conformity with the Charter. 1 am going briefly to analyse the Art- icles of the United Nations Charter. 101. From remarks 1 have heard 1 undtrstand that the draft resolution submitted by Brazil and Colombia is based on Articles 33 and 52. Article 33 says: "The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is like1y to endanger the maintenance of inter- national peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, concilia- tion, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their ownchoice." This article is. completely inapplicable to Guatemala's case. The Republic of Guatemala, as can easily be appreciated, has no dispute either with the brother country of Honduras, or with Nicaragua, or with any other State. Guatemala has no dispute. We have not even any boundary difficulties. We are in no disagree- ment about boundaries. Nor is there any question under discussion, of a political, territorial, economic or any other nature. To this day we have enjoyed excellent diplomatie relations with Honduras. Nicaragua, at its own wish and for no essential reason, has broken off diplomatie relations with Guatemala. This Article would be operative in any kind of dispute, but not in the case of an aggression or an invasion; not when open towns are being machine-gunned, when we have victims among the innocent civilian population, and when children have been machine-gunned to {:reate paulc. 1 would ask you ta take Article 33 into consideration from this point of view. The Security Council cannot compel the parties to settle their disputes by this means, for in this case there are no parties and there is no dispute. 102. 'In connexion ~ith regional arrangements, Ai' :cle 52, paragraph 2, states: "The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacifie settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or "Les Membres des Nations Unies qui concluent ces accoMs ou constituent ces organismes doivent faire tous leurs efforts pour régler d'une manière pacifique, par le moyen desdits accords ou organismes, les diffé- 103. On the other hand, if my country's appeal is to be considered from a legal standpoint, if juridical argu- ments are to our taste in this hour of anxiety and aggression, what more weighty juridical argument could there be than Articles 34, 35 and 39, on which my Government has based its appeal? My Government considers Article 33 and 52, which are perfectly c1ear, to be irrelevant. We cannot go to a regional organiza- tion to discuss a dispute which does not exist. In view of this fact l stated that the Guatemalan Embassy in Washington this mo'rning officially renounced on behalf of the Guatemalan Government any intervention by the Organization of American States or the Inter-American Peace Committee in this matter. We are faced with an outright act of aggression. Perhaps at this very moment when it is being proposed to refer the matter te the Inter-American Peace Committee for a subsequent report, aircraft are machine-gunning my country. Under the terms of Article 34 my Government has an unchal- lengeable right to appeal to the Security Counci1. That Article reads. "The Security Council ma~r investigate any dispute..." Here again, there is reference to a dis- pute; but we have no dispute. That does not apply to this case. However, the Artide goes on as follows: H... or any situation which might lead to international friction or givë rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security". 104. Article 35 reads: "Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation of the nature referred to in Article 34, ta the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly. AState which is not a Member..." and the Article goes on to analyse the otI;ter cases. My country is one of the sixty States which originally formed this Organization. Under the Articles l have quoted, the Security Council cannot deny it its right of direct intervention by the Council, not intervention through a regional organiza- tion. We recognize the effecti,reness of that organiza- tion; we have the greatest respect for it and are mem- bers of it, but we consider that under Articles 33 and 52, precisely, that organization ceases to be effective when an invasion is already in progress, when aggres- sion has been committed against my country. 105. l should like to ask you to give your attention ta these facts, no aspect of which is such as ta allow the Council ta avoid direct intervention. l have already expressed my thanks to the Council for taking the initial precaution which we have just requested on behalf of the Guatemalan Government. 106. We are greatly afraid that there may be a very cruel conflict in Guatemala and that it may spread. This is not our opinion alone. Observers whom the whole world may well regard as impartial have said the same, observers who have gone directly to Guatemala. Mr. Max Lerner, a columnist of the New York Post, says 107. l expressed on behalf of the Guatemalan Govern- ment my disagreement with the first part of the draft resolution before the Council. That is aIl l wish to say at this time. 108. Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated front Russian): The Security Council has before it the protest of the Guatemalan Government against the armed aggression committed by neighbouring States. 109. As can be seen from the telegram from the Guatemalan Minister for External Relations, which was distributed to the members of the Council as a Security Council document, Guatemala has been the subject of an armed attack by land, sea and air. We are confronted \Vith an absolutely clear and obvious case of aggression - an attack on one of the Central AmerÎcan States, Guatemala, which is a Member of the United Nations. 110. In these circumstances it is the Council's dutY and responsibility to take urgent steps to end the aggression. In. the present circumstances and at the present time when the forces of aggression have already been unleashed on the country, the Council cannot refuse to accept this responsibility, and no other body can take its place in this respect at this moment. 111. A draft resolution on the question has been introduced by Brazil and Colombia. Tt propQses that the question of the aggression against Guatemala raised in the telegram from the Guatemalan Minister for External Relations should be referred to the Organization of American States. In this case, however, when the forces of aggression are already on Guatemalan territory, a smalI country which can be crossed in one day's march, we know that Guatemala will he overcome while we refer the question to that organization and allow it time to discuss and decide upon it. Moreover, such a powerful world Power as the United States lIas already done everything to ensure that this plan will be put into effect. 112. l have before me the text of aState Department declaration on Guatemala, which says that the most recent outbreak of disorder in Guatemala bears out the point of view previously expressed by the United States concerning possible action. against Guatemala by the Organization of American States. Nevertheless, we are now confronted with a draft resolution asking that Guatemala's complaint should be referred to the very Organization of American States which the United States State Department is planning to use to settle its accounts with Guatemala. parti~ du projet de résolution dont le Conseil est saisi. C'est tout ce que j'avais à dire à ce propos. 108. M. TSARAPKINE (Union des Républiques socialistes soviétiques) (tradttit du russe) : Le Conseil de sécurité est saisi de la protestation du Gouvernement guatémaltèque, concernant l'agression armée dont il est victime de la part d'Etats limitrophes. 109. Il ressort du télégramme du Ministre des rela- tions CÀ"térieures du Guatemala, télégramme qui a été communiqué aux membres du Conseil, que le Guate- mala a fait l'objet d'une agression armée snr terre, sur mer et dans les airs. Il s'agit là d'une agression flagrante, commise contre un pays de l'Amérique centrale, le Guatemala, qui fait partie de l'Organisation des Nations Unies. 110. Le Conseil de sécurité est tenu de prendre sans délai les mesures nécessaires pour mettre fin à cette agression. Dans les circonstances présentes, alors que le Guatemala a déjà été envahi, le Conseil de sécurité ne peut pas se dérober à sa responsabilité. Il n'y a pas d'organe qui puisse le remplacer et assumer ses fonc- tions dans le cas présent. 111. Le Brésil et la Colombie ont saisi le ('onseil de sécurité d'un projet de .résolution commun tendant à renvoyer à l'Organisation des Etats américains la ques- tion qui fait l'objet du télégramme du Ministre des rela- tions C},.."térieures du Guatemala, à savoir l'agression commise contre ce pays. Nous savons tous qu'à l'heure actuelle où les forces d'agression ont déjà pénétré sur le territoire du Guatemala, petit pays qu'un déta<:hement militaire peut traverser en une seule journée, le Guate- mala sera écrasé si nous renvoyons la question à l'Orga- nisation des Etats américains en lui laissant tout le loisir de l'examiner et de prendre une décision. En attendant, les Etats-Unis, qui sont une Puissance mon- diale, ont déjà pris des mesures pour exécuter ce plan d'action. 112. J'ai devant moi le texte de la déclaration du Département d'Etat sur la question du Guatemala. Il y est dit que les désordres qui se sont produits récemment él:U Guatemala confirment le bien-fondé de la thèse que les Etats-Unis ont déjà eu l'occasion d'exposer, thèse selon laquelle l'Organisation des Etats américains pour- r·ait avoir à intervenir dans ce pays. Et void que nous sommes saisis d'un projet de résolution qui tend à -renvoyer la plainte du Guatemala à cette même Organi- sation des Etats américains dont le Département d'Etat des Etats-Unis espère se servk pour régler le compte du Guatemala. 114. L'affai're dont nous sommes aujourd'hui saisIs constitue un e..'<emple typique de la politique des Etats- Unis à l'égard des petits Etats. Il y a deux jours à peine, comme l'a déjà rappelé le représentant de la France, le représentant des Etats-Unis décla'rait avec émotion que les Etats-Unis étaient eux-mêmes, il n'y a pas si longtemps, un petit pays, et qu'en conséquence ils considèrent encore bien des choses avec l'optique d'un petit pays. C'est probablement en considérant le Guate- mala sous cet angle que les Etats-Unis ont prépa'ré une intervention armée contre ce minuscule territoire d'Amérique centrale, dont la population ne compte que trois millions d'habitants. 115. On n'ignore pas, en effet, que le Département d'Etat et certains sénateurs américains ont accueilli la nouvelle de l'invasion du Guatemala avec un enthou- siasme qu'ils n'ont pas su dissimuler. Tout lecteur du journal World-Telegram and Sun, publié par Scripps- Howard, a pu remarquer l'article spécial '!"elatant avec quelle joie, quel enthousiasme débordant le Département d'Etat et le Sénat américains ont appris l'invasion du Guatemala. Il n'y a rien là qui puisse nous surprendre, car de nombreux sénateurs américains et de nombreux hauts fonctionnaires du Département d'Etat sont per- sonnellement et directement intéressés aux activités de la United Fruit Company au Guatemala. Voilà l'origine de l'enthousiasme qu'a suscité l'agression dirigée contre ce pays. 116. The case before us takes on even greater signifi- 116. La question dont le Conseil est saisi est d'autant can.:e because it exemplifies the clear1y defined political plus importante que les Etats-Unis d'Amérique, qui principles followed by one of the major world Powers sont l'une des plus grandes Puissances du monde, s'ins- - the United States of America - in its policy towards pirent de certains principes bien déterminés dans la smal1 States, particular1y in its policy towaros the politique qu'ils suivent à l'égard des petits pays et Latin American Stat s. notamment des Etats de l'Amérique latine. 117. We must not lose sight of the factthat if the 117. Il ne faut pas oublier que, si le Conseil de sécurité Security Council fails to take steps to ensure that the s'abstient de prendre des mesures pour mettre un terme aggression against the little country of Guatemala, a à l'agression dont est victime le Guatemala, Etat Mem- Member of the United Nations, is stopped, the United bre des Nations Unies, l'Organisation aura encouragé, Nations will thereby have offered encouragement to the par là même, la. politique des Etats-Unis ou n'aura en United States, and every instance of that country's tout cas opposé à cette politique d'agression qu'une aggressive policy will in future be met with passive or résistance entièrement passive et muette. Quelles en silent resistance. There will be no active resistance to seront les conséquences? Eh bien, demain le Costa- that policy. What will this mean? It will mean that like Rica, après-demain un autre pays de l'Amérique latine Guatemala today, Costa Rica tomorrow and some other et ainsi de suite, auront à subir le so'rt qui est réservé Latin American country the day alter tomorrow will aujourd'hui au Guatemala. On aura porté atteinte à la suffer this fate, and that the cause of peace and security paix et à la sécurité internationales sur le continent on the American continent, and not only on the Ameri- américain et même dans le monde entier. Cette évolu- can continent but throughout the world, will be struck tion peut avoir des conséquences irréparables, ca'!" on another serious blow - perhaps a mortal blow, because aura sapé ainsi la foi en les principes de l'Organisation it will be a blow at the very roots of the faith and prin- des Nations Unies. Alors la Charte et ses principes ciples of the United Nations. In that event the Charter, exemplaires deviendront la cible ·de railleries et de 23 115. It 1S a matter of common knowledge that the State Department and certain United States senators have greeted the news of the invasion of Guatemala \Vith unconcealed triumph. Anyone who has read the Scripps-Howard World-Telegram and SIm will have seen the special dispatch on the joy and open triumph \Vith which the State Department and certain American senators greeted the invasion of Guatemala. The expla- nation is quite simple: many United States senators and responsible officiaIs in the State Department have a material and personal interest in the United Fruit Company and its activities in Guatemala. Such is the reason for the rejoicing at the aggression unleashed on Guatemala. 119. We are thus confronted with an open act of aggression against Guatemala, a Member of the United Nations; and we consider that the Security Council should take immediate steps to end this aggression. The Council cannot refer this matter to another body, parti- cularly since, as 1 have already said, it must be c1ear, when we remember the State Department announce- ment to which. 1 have already referred, that Guatemala cau expectnothing good from that body. 120. In these circumstances the Soviet delegation considers, 1 must again emphasize, that the Security Couneil shou1d take an immediate decision to end the aggression in Guatemala. 121. Ml'. Charles MALL.( (Lebanon): We cau react to a situation like this only according to the light that has been cast upon it, and it has been remarked by a number of speakers this afternoon that the light so far ' as this issue is concerned is not very effulgent. This question has been sprung upon us suddenly, and sorne of us did not even expect that we should meet tOOay. However, the urgency of the matter is such tha:t undoubtedly tOOay's meeting is fully justified. 122. vVe are deeply interested in this matter, partIy because it affects the question of international peace and security, and my country is a Me~ber of t.he Unite.d Nations and a member of the Secunty CounCll. In addi- tion, as some membe.rs have indicated, there is the ques- tion of the fate of small countries who may be overrun by aggression or in sorne other way and, therefore, the United Nations has to maintain a strict vigilance over such countries. 1 do not know how big or how small Guatemala is, but 1 am certain that my country is smaller. Therefore, simply for that reason, my interest in this problem is deep. 1 124. One of the suggestions was made by the repre- sentative of Guatemala who could not make a formaI proposaI since his country is not a member of the Stcurity Counci1. He suggested that ap. observation commission be sent to his country to keep watch over the situation. 125. Another suggestion is contained in the draft reso- lution submitted by the representatives of Brazil and Colombia. To this draft resolution, which has been supported by a number of repres:entatives, there is a French amendment, which has been accepted by the authors. 126. The representatives of Guatemala and of the Soviet Union have critieized the text of the joint draft resolution especially that paragraph which would refer this matter to the Organization of American States. 127. l have no idea how the various members of the Council will vote. l have no inkling of their instructions, beyond what l have heard this afternoon. From the point of view of the United Nations ànd the Security Council- particularly with regard ta the authority and dignity of the latter - as weIl as from the point of view of the small States, it would be regrettable if, in a serious situation like this, this meeting ended without taking any decision whatsoever. Such à possibility exists, and we are threatened with seeing our efforts amount to nothing. Such a possibility ought to be con- sidered by us in all seriousness and with a full sense of our responsibility. Would it be a good thing for the Security Council, for the United Nations, and for the small States if nothing whatsoever emerged from our deliberations on such a serious matter? 128. Of course, the blame would 'be placed on the veto and aIl sorts of other excuses, but that would not a:lter the fact that the Security Council, in such a case, would have proved itself completely impotent. Considerations of this nature were in my mind as l heard the various speakers expressing their views. Therefore, my posi- tion is that it would be very regrettable if nothing emerged from our deliberations. 129. It follows from this that every effort should he made to accomplish something. Subject to any further information that may cause me to change my mind, l think we ought to seek a text which would at least pr~vent the casting of a vote that would destroy every- thmg. 130. As l have said, l have absolutely no idea how the members of the Council will vote, but, for fear lest we should end with nothing, l shall make a suggestion: the French amendment which, l think, is acceptable has been received with some favour - at least it has been accepted by the authors of the draft resolution, by the representative of Guatemala and, l think, by the representative of New Zealand and others. This may be something, not just zero. It is better, in a situation like this, to end up with something rather than with nothing. Therefore, l suggest that the authors should alter their draft resolution as follows: leave unimpaired the fad 126. Les représentants du Guatemala et de l'Union soviétique ont critiqué le texte du projet commun, notamment l'alinéa qui a trait au renvoi de la question à l'Organisation des Etats américains. 127. J'ignore absolument comment voteront les mem- bres du Conseil, je n'ai pas la moindre idée des ins- tructions qu'ils ont reçues, en dehors de ce que j'ai entendu cet après-midi. Mais, pour les Nations Unies comme pour le Conseil de sécurité - notamment en ce qui concerne l'autorité et la dignité de celui-ci - il serait désolant que, la situation étant aussi grave, nous levions la séance sans avoir pris. aucune décision; ainsi que je l'ai déjà dit, 'Ce serait tout aussi regrettable pour les petits Etats. Pareille éventualité n'est pas exclue, et nous sommes menacés de voir nos efforts n'aboutir à rien. J'ignore s'il en sera ainsi, mais nous devrions prendre très sérieusement cette éventualité en considé- ration et avoir pleinement conscience de notre 'respoI).- sabilité. Serait-il bon pour le Conseil de sécurité, pour l'Organisation des Nations Unies, pour les petits Etats, que nos délibérations sur une question aussi grave n'aboutissent pas au moindre résultat? 128. Naturellement, on en 'rejetterait le blâme sur le veto, sans parler de toutes sortes d'autres excuses, mais cela ne changerait rien au fait qu'en pareil cas le Con- seil de sécurité se serait révélé absolument impuiz'·· '!1t. J'ai pensé à tout cela en écoutant ies divers orateurs exposer leurs idées, et j'estime qu'il serait déplorable que nos discussions restent stériles. 129. Il faut donc ne négliger aucun effort; sous ré- serve de tout élément nouveau qui m'amènerait à modifier mon opinion, j'estime donc que nous devrions nous efforcer d'élaborer un texte grâce auquel, au moins, le vote qui détruirait tout serait évité. 130. Ainsi que je l'ai indiqué, j'ignore absolument dans quel sens sè prononceront les membFes du Conseil, mais, de peur que nous n'aboutissions à rien, je ferai une suggestion: l'amendement de la France, que je con- sidère comme acceptable, a été accueilli avec une cer- taine faveur, du moins il a été accepté tant par les auteurs du projet de résolution que par le représentant du Guatemala, et, je crois, par le représentant de la Nouvelle-Zélande, notamment. Il se peut que le prin- cipe de cet amendement soit à retenir. Dans une situa- tion comme celle-ci, mieux vaut un résultat qu'un échec total. Je propose donc que les auteurs du projet de 131. This could be done in one of two ways, and whichever is more agreeable to the representatives of Brazil and Colombia and to the other members of the Council will be quite agreeable ta me. 132. One method would be to omit altogether the referral phrase, since l understand that the Organiza- tion of American States is going to be seized of this matter in any event. It could then go on with its own deliberations quite independent1y of us, but the Security Council would maintain its authority in this matter. If that were done, the last paragraph but one would be omitted and th~ French text would be added. Then, it seems to me, we would have a text that would stand a good chance of being adopted. 133. Another way would be to vote on this text para- graph by paragraph so that, if one paragraph should be unacceptable ta the Council, it would be dropped, while the draft resolution itself would be retained; in that way, we should have something a little more than zero. 134. These are suggestions that have come to my mind. They are quite tentative and subject ta further discussion because, as l said, what l know about this matter is limited strictly to what l have heard at this meeting; therefore, l cannot talk about it with any great authority. But if we aim at taking a decision this after- noon, and if there is a real danger that we may take none, then my suggestion might help us at least to adopt the French representative's text, which seems to meet with some approval; then we might add to it everything else in the text to which the other delega- tions do not strongly object. 135. That is my present position. If l receive any encouragement from any quarter regarding my sugges- tion, l shall present it immediately as a formaI proposaI. J
The question before the i;.' ! Security Council is the draft resolution sponsored by Brazil and Colombia, as modified by the amendment Il offered by the representative of France; the amendment i has been accepted by the representatives of Brazil and ii Colombia and, consequently, becomes an integral part .;:. of the draft resolution now before us. 137. l have consulted with the representative of Brazil, who tells me that he is opposed to a ';rote para- graph by paragraph; and, of course, it is his privilege ta oppose it. Therefore, we face the prospect of voting on the draft resolution as a whole. 138. Mr. SARPER (Turkey): l have listened very carefully to the statements made by the representative of Guatemala and by other representatives on the Council. The draft resolution of the representatives of Brazil and Colombia, particularly after the acceptance of the amendment proposed by the representative of 140. It has also been stated that we may possibly reach no decision at all after this long debate, which has lasted for the whole afternoon, and the representative of Lebanon has said that we should find a way if possi- ble to avoid so unhappy a conclusion to our debate today. l do not think that we should constantly try to change our attitudes in or.der to find a way of avoiding a veto. The Security Council really cannot bend all its efforts ta reaching sorne sort of agreement which will not come up against a veto. We should try to do our best to produce the best possible solution, and, if the veto makes this Council a complete1y use1ess and sterile debating society, the responsibility for that should be placed squarely on the shoulders of those whose behaviour brings about that situation. It is no fault of ours if our actions are obstructed by a veto. 141. Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): l thought the representative of France had raised his hand before me, but, since the President has given me the floor, l want to ask a question, through him, of the representative of France. In the event that the text before the Council is not adopted, would the representative of France be willing to present his own text as an independent proposaI? 142. Mr. HOPPENOT (France) (translated from French) : Yes. 143. Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): l should like to say a few more words in opposition to the draft resolution submitted by Brazil and Colorn,bia. 144. In submitting this drait resolution the represen- tatives of Brazil and of Colombia. and the members of the Cauneil who supported them; referred particularly to Article 52 of the Charter. Article 52, paragraph 2, reads as follows: "The Members of the United Nations emtering into such arrangments [that is, regional arrangements] or constituting snch agencies shaH make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through sucb regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them ta the Security Counci1." This paragraph envisages a situation in which no aggression has taken place; a dispute or quarrel exists; the parties are threatening each other, and 50 forth, but there has been no aggression. We are here con- fronted with an entirely different situation; the position is quite clear. An act of aggression has been com- mitted against Guatemala. The Security Council, acting under Article 24 of the Charter, is bound to take steps to end this aggression. Article 24 says: "In order to ensure prompt" - and l would stress the word "prompt""""':' "and effective action by the United Nations, itsMembers confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in 27 143. M. TSARAPKINE (Union des Républiques socialistes soviétiques) (traduit du russe) : Je voudrais faire encore valoir quelques arguments contre le projet de résolution présenté par le Brésil et la Colombie. 144. En présentant ce projet de résolution, le Brésil, la Colombie et les membres du Conseil qui les ont appuyés, ont invoqué notamment l'Article 52 de la Charte. Or, le paragraphe 2 de l'Article 52 stipule: "Les Membres des Nations Unies qui concluent ces accords" - il s'agit des accords régionaux - "ou constituent ces organismes doivent faire tous leurs efforts pour régler d'une manière pacifique, p~r le moyen desdits accords ou organisllli:s, les différends d'ordre local, avant de les soumettre au Conseil de sécurité." Ce paragraphe vise une situation où il n'y a pas d'agres- sion: un conflit a éclaté, il existe un différend, les deux parties se menacent mutuellement, etc., mais il n'y a pas agression. La situation qui nous occupe en ce mo- ment est entièrement différente, et elle est parfaitement claire. Un acte d'agression a été coll1\miÏs contre le Guatemala. Aux termes de l'Article 24 de la Charte, le Conseil de sécurité est tenu de prendre des mesures pour mettre fin à l'agression. En effet, l'Article 24 dit ce qui suit: "Afin d'assurer l'action rapide" - je souligne le terme "rapide" - "et efficace de l'Organisation, ses Membres confèrent au Conseil de sécurité la respon- sabilité principale du maintien de la paix. et de la sécurité internationales et reconnaissent qu'en s'ac- 146. Secondly, 1 must draw the attention of the members of the Council to the fact that in referring this dispute to the Organization of American States the attempt lS being made to settle the question in a procedural way, to oblige one of the parties to comply with a procedure which it is not willing to accept. 147. If 1 understood the interpretation rightly, the Guatemalan representative said that his Government was opposed to Guatemala's complaint of aggression being referred to the û ..ganization of American States. That, I believe,' was what he said. But an attempt is now being made to take the opposite decision, a decision which one of the parties does not consider acceptable. 148. What does Article 36 of the Charter say? Article 36 oi' the Charter prohibits the adoption of such a decision. Paragraph 2 of that Article states: "The Security Council should take into consi- deration any procedures for the settlement of the dispute which have already been adopted by the parties." J.4S-, But one of the parties has rejected tbis procedure. That means that adoption of the Brazilian-Colombian <.iraft resolution would be a violation of Article 36, paragraph 2. The Soviet delegation therefore considers that the draft resolution is inadmissible and should not even be put to the vote. . 150. In view of the fact that a situation has arisen which requires that the Security Council should take a decision and do so promptly, we cannot afford to lose time. The Secûrity Council is confronted with an act of aggression against Guatemala, and in view of the fact that the forces of aggression have already invaded Guatemala, it must take immediate action. What action should it take? In the first place, it should decide that aU hostilities should cease, that the bloodshed should be ended and that the aggression should stop. 151. It would be difficult to adopt any complex reso- lution today, for a certain interval of time has to be maintained between the submission of a draft resolution and the voting on it. We therefore feel that it would be advisable for the Council to timit itself to a text along the following tines: 151. Puisqu'il peut être difficile d'adopter dès aujour- d'hui une résolution tant soit peu compliquée, car il faut qu'il s'écoule un certain temps entre le dépôt d'un projet de résolution et s~ ~ise aux voix, nous po?rrio~s nous borner aujourd'hUi a adopter un texte qUl serait ainsi conçu: 28 149. Puisque l'une des parties rejette la procédure proposée, le Conseil de sécurité agirait à l'encontre des dispositions du paragraphe 2 de l'Article 36 s'il adoptait le projet de résolution du Brésil et de la Colombie. La délégation de l'URSS estime donc que, dans les circonstances présentes, ce projet de résolution est inacceptable et qu'il n'y a même pas lieu de le mettre aux voix. 150. Etant donné qu'il s'est créé une situation qui appelle une décision urgente du Conseil de sécurité, nous ne pouvons pas perdre de temps. Une agression a été commise contre le Guatemala, sur le territoire duquel les troupes de l'agresseur ont déjà ,pénétré; aussi le Conseil est-il tenu d'agir sans délai. De quelles mesures s'agit-il? Tout d'abord, il faut adopter une résolution tendant à mettre fin aux opérations militaires, à faire cesser l'effusion de sang et à arrêter l'agression. 152. 1 believe the Guatemala:n representative agïeed ta til~ "french ~roposaL Of course, it could be improved; a more specIfie reference could be made in it ta termi- nation of the act of aggression; 1 should have no objection ta that. Today, however, the Council should limit itself ta such a decision; it should not enter into de~ai1s. which !Uig~t.bring forth quite legitimate legal objections, objectIons based on the Charter; details which, instead of aiding the victims of aggression, would risk bringing about a situation even worse than their present one, as would happen if the Council adopted the Brazilian draft resolution. 153. The PRESIDENT: The President will recognize himself for a few minutes in ms capacity as repre- sentative of the UNITED STATES OfF AMERICA. 154. Let me say ta the representative of Guatemala that 1 appreciate ms polite reference ta me; he has always been equa11y courteous. 155. The United States believes in the basic propo- sition that any Member, large or sma11, has the right to have an urgent meeting of the Security Council called whenever it feels itself to be in danger. This is so even when, as is sometimes the case, the Security Council may not itself be in the best position to deal directly with the situation. 156. Guatemala charges that other Governments are pursuing a policy of hostility and aggressiveness against it. These specific Guatemalan allegations involve two of its immediate neighbours, Honduras and Nicaragua, who are charged with disturbing the peace in a parti- cular part of Central America. These charges are indeed serious and certainly warrant urgent examination. But the question arises as to where the situation can be dealt with most expeditiously and most effectively. 157. The situation appears to the United States Government to be precisely the kind of problem which, in the first instance, should be dealt with on an urgent basis by an appropriate agency of the Organization of American States. The very fact that the Government of Guatemala, as a member of the inter-American system, has already requested that the Organization of American States take action strengthens this view. 158. It would perhaps be in order for me to inform the Council that while the reports that we receive on the situation in Guatemala are incomplete and frag- mentary, the information available ta the United States thus far strongly suggests that the situation does not involve aggression but is a revoIt of Guatemalans against Guatemalans. The situation in Guatemala, out of which this problem arises, has caused grave concern to the United States Government and to the other members of the Organization of American States. Consequently, the members of the Organization of American States have for some time been conferring intensively among themselves on the GuatemaIan situa- d~ s~ng et dem~nde à t?US les Membres de l'Orga- msation des NatIons Umes de s'abstenir, dans l'esprit de la Charte, de prêter aide à une telle action." 152. Si je ne m'abuse, le représentant du Guatemala a acce~~é la proposition de la France. On peut certes, en ame~lOrer le t~te; on peut la rendre plus concrète, en y st1pulant qu Il faut mettre fin à l'agression. Je ne m'y oppose pas. Mais c'est à une décision de ce genre qu'il faut nous borner aujourd'hui, sans entrer dans ~es ~étails qui provoquent des objections juridiques fort J~s.tifiées et ~o~dées s1fr la Cha;te, détails qui, au lieu d aIder la VIctIme, rIsquent d aggraver la situation, comme il arriverait si le Conseil adoptait le projet de résolution brésilien. 153. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais) : Je vais prendre la parole pendant quelques instants, en qualité de représentant des ETATS-UNIS D'AMERIQUE. 154. Permettez-moi de dire au représentant du Gua- temala que j'apprécie les égards qu'il a eus pour moi et la courtoisie dont il ne s'est jamais départi. 155. Les Etats-Unis reconnaissent strictement le prin- cipe fondamental selon lequel tout Etat Membre, qu'il soit grand ou petit, a le droit de demander au Conseil de sécurité de se réunir d'urgence, toutes les fois qu'il s'estime en danger. Cela est vrai même lorsque, comme c'est parfois le cas, le Conseil de sécurité peut très bien ne pas être l'organisme le mieux placé pour s'occuper directement de la situation. 156. Le Guatemala accuse d'autres gouvernements de poursuivre une politique d'hostilité et d'agression à son égard. Ces allégations précises du Guatemala concernent deux de ses voisins les plus proches, le Honduras et le Nicaragua, qui sont accusés de troubler la paix dans une certaine partie de l'Amérique centrale. Ces accu- sations sont très graves et exigent sans aucun doute qu'il soit procédé d'urgence à un examen de la situation. Mais il reste à savoir quel organisme peut régler cette question de la manière la plus rapide et la plus efficace. 157. Le Gouvernement des Etats-U!nis estime qu'il s'agit là d'un problème urgent qui doit être traité en premier lieu par un organe approprié de l'Organisation des Etats américains. Le fait même que le Gouverne- ment du Guatemala, membre de l'Organisation des Etats américains, ait déjà demandé à cette organisation de prendre des mesures, confirme ce point de vue. 158. Peut-être conviendrait-il que je signale au Con- seil que, si les rapports que nous avons reçus sur la situation au Guatemala sont incomplets et fragnlentaires, les lenseignements dont les Etats-Unis disposent jus- qu'à présent indiquent nettement qu'il ne s'agit pas d'une agression, mais d'une révolte de Guatémaltèques contre des Guatémaltèques. La situation au Guatemala, qui est à l'origine de ce problème, a vivement inquiété le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis et les autres membres de l'Organisation des Etats américains. C'est pourquoi les membres de l'Organisation des Etats américains ont, depuis quelque temps, procédé à maintes reprises à des échanges de vue sur la situation an Guatemala afin 161. Ta anyone who knows President Eisenhower, and many of you in this room know him, it must be crystal clear that he is a man who is utterly devoted ta the principles of democracy, ta the rights of man, who abhors all forms of imperialism. He is a man who led a great a,rmy in World War II against Nazi imperialism and who has shown by every word and deed of his life, since the day when he was a small boy in Kansas, that his heart is always on the side of the little man who is trying ta get by in life. 162. The Secretary of State did nothing at Caracas that was not in accordance with the facts. As a matter of fact, the only authorities which the Guatemalan representative cites are the United States Press, and the United States Press, estimable though it is and deeply as 1 respect it, does not speak for the United States Government; and 1 am sure the United States' Press would agree with me in that respect. You can find as many different opinions in the United States Press as you care to look for. Mr. Castillo Arriola then cited certain United States companies, which of course do not speak with authority. Finally, he referred ta Mr. Patterson. Mr. Patterson does not hold office under this administration; he has never held affice under this administration. Whatever he says is entirely on his own authority as an individual, and just as 1 will not judge the opinion of the Guatemalan Government about the United States on the basis of what sorne individual Guatemalan may say, so 1 urge the Guatemalan representat;.ve not· ta judge United States opinion about Guatemala on the basis of what sorne individual citizen of the United States may say. 163. 1 should like ta point out that the Guatemalan representative has never produced any names or dates or other specifications showing that the State Depart- ment has ever acted in an improper m~.nner. 163. J'aimerais souligner que le représentant du Guatemala n'a jamais fourni aucun nom, aucune date ni aucune autre précision qui prouve que le Départe- ment d'Etat ait jamais agi de façon incorrecte. 165. Le représentant de l'Union soviétique a dit que les Etats-Unis étaient les maîtres de l'Organisation des Etats américains. Il déclare ne pas vouloir désobliger les Etats-Unis, mais il se désoblige lui-même parce qu'il montre qu'il ne peut concevoir d'autre rapport humain que les rapports de maître à valet; il ne peut concevoir de relations régies par le principe du "vivre et laisser vivre", d'après lequel les hommes sont égaux et peuvent vivre' ensemble grâce à des concessions mutuelles et en se respectant mutuellement. Il ne peut qu'imaginer le sort de quiconque élèverait la voix contre l'Union soviétique en Pologne ou en Tchécoslovaquie, en Lettonie, en Esthonie, ou dans un autre de ces pays. Comparez cela avec la façon dont les représentants des petits pays aux Nations Unies expriment constamment une opinion contraire à celle des Etats-Unis; et les Etats-Unis eux-mêmes s'en félicitent. Nous n'avons pas de satellites, et nous n'en voulons pas. Nous ne désirons pas établir une structure monolithique dans le monde libre. 165. The representative of the Soviet Union said that the United States is the master of the Organization of American States.' When he says that he is not reflecting on the United States, he is reflecting on him- self because it shows that he cannot conceive of any human relationship that is not the relationship of master and servant; he cannot conceive of a re1ation- ship in which there is a rule of "live and let live", in which people are equals, h', which people can get along by accommodation and by respecting each other. He can only imagine what would happen to somebody who raised his voice against the Soviet Union in Poland or Czechoslovakia, Latvia, Esthonia or one of those c'Juntries. Compare that with the way in which representatives of small countries in the United Nations constantly disagree with the United States; and they are welcome to do it. We have no satellites and we do not want any. We do not desire. to set up a mono- Iithic structure in the free world. 166. Le représentant de l'Union soviétique a dit éga- lement que les Etats-Unis avaient préparé cette inter- vention armée. C'est parfaitement faux; je le mets au défi de le prouver. Il est dans l'impossibilité de le faire. 166. The Soviet Union representative also said that the United States had prepared this armed intervention. That is flatly untrue; 1 challenge him to prove it. He cannot do so. 167. Il est très intéressant pour moi, qui ai passé treize années au Sénat des Etats-Unis, de venir ici et de découvrir que nous avons, en la personne du représen- tant de l'Union soviétique, une autorité aussi éminente pour tout ce qui touche au Sénat des Etats-Unis; bien que, selon toute vraisemblance, il ne soit j::J.mais allé au Sénat des Etats-Unis, il semble en savoir davantage sur ce Sénat que les hommes qui en ont fait partie pendant de nombreuses années. Lorsqu'il laisse entendre que les actes offidels des sénateurs am-éricains sont dictés par leurs intérêts financiers privés, il formule une accusation qui, non seulement ne lui fait pas honneur, mais qui, encore, permet de douter sérieuse- ment de la sagesse, des intentions et de la sincérité de la politique que son gouvernement préconise ici aujourd'hui. 167. It is interesting to me who spent thirteen years of my life in the United States Senate to come here and find that we have, in the person of the represen- tative of the Soviet Union, such an outstanding authority on the United States Senate. Although he probably never set foot inside the place, he apparently knows more about the United States Senate than men who have been members of it for many years. When he infers that senators of the United States allow their official actions to be determined in accordance with their private financial interests, he is making an accu- sation wh:ch not only reflects no credit upon himself but which refiects a grave doubt on the wisdom and the good intent and the sincerity of every policy which his Government advCJcates here today. 168. J'appelle l'attention du représentant de l'Union soviétique sur le tait que j'étais membre du Sénat des Etats-Unis au début de la deuxième guerre mondiale, à l'époque où le Sénat a voté la loi sur le prêt-bail, par quoi les Etats-Unis ont aidé l'Union soviétiquê à re- pousser l'impérialisme nazi. A cette époque, nous n'avons entendu de la part de l'Union soviétique aucune critique des motifs qui ont inspiré les sénateurs américain~ lorsqu'ils ont décidé d'aider l'URSS. Les hommes qui font aujourd'hui partie du Sénat des Etats-Unis sont exactement semblables à ceux qui avaient décidé alors d'aider l'Union soviétique. Si, à cette époque, ils 168. 1 calI the attention of the representative of the Soviet Union to the fact that 1 was in the United States Senate at the beginning of World War II, when the Senate voted the lend-lease bill, whereby the United States aided the Soviet Union in its fight to repel Nazi imperialism. At that time we did not hear from the Soviet Union any criticisms of the motives of the United States Senators who were then voting to he1p the Soviet Union. The men who are now in the United States Senate are precise1y the same kind of men as those who voted to help the Soviet Union. If they were good enough thL1 ta he1p the Soviet Union, they 170. The Soviet Union representative told us that he intends ta veto the draft resolution. That will make the second Soviet veto in three days. We had veto No. 59 on Friday, and now we are ta have veto No. 60 on Sunday. And what is the Soviet Union vetoing? It is vetoing a move to ask the Organization of American States to try to solve this problem, to try to bind up this wound in the world, and then report back to the Security Council. This draft resolution does not seek to relieve the Security Council of responsibility; it just asks the Organization of American States to see what it can do to be he1pful. Par~OTaph 2 of Article 52 of the Charter states: "The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements" - that is, regional arrangements - "or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlemeut of lncal disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council." 171. At the very least, that is a harmless provision. It is actua1ly an intelligent provision and it is a cons- tructive provision. Why does the representative of the Soviet Union, a country thousands of miles away from here, undertake to veto a move 1ike that? What is his interest in it? How can this action of his possibly fail to make unbiàsed observers throughout the world come to the conclusion that the Soviet Urhn has designs on the American hemisphere? 172. There is no other explanation, and the articles which have appeared in Pravd(j; and IsvestÜJ; during the last twQ or three days give colour to that ass~rtion. l say to the representative of the Soviet Union, stayout of this hemisphere and do not try to start your plans and your conspiracies over here. 173. Ml'. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (tran~lated from Russian): l feel obliged to reply to the statement which the President has made as representative of the United States of America. Let me point out that no one has quoteû the laEt paragraph of Article 52, wherein it is stated that "This Article in no way impai>s the application ai Articles 34 and 35" - which Articles impose on tre Security Council a definite obligation to act. l leave aside Article 24, which l have dready quoted, and which giV{;S the Security Council primary responsibility for the main- tenance of international peace and security. 174. l should now like to reply to another point. The Uniter! States representative asked with emotion what was the reason for the Soviet Union's present attitude in the Security Council; why it was interesting itself in the Western Hemisphere. He even voiced the suggestion that the Soviet Union had certain intentions in the Western Hemisphere. That is the usual method : 176. l must once again stress that the Soviet Union considers that whether aggression ocurs in the Northern or the Southe>rn Hemisphere, the Eastern or the Western Hemisphere, it must be stopped. The Charter binds each Member of the United Nations, and parti- cularly the permanent members of the Security Couneil, to take aIl steps in the Couneil to end aggression even if it occttrs in the Western Hemisphere, even if it occurs in Central America against the minute Republic of Guatemala. Tomorrow aggression may be committed against Honduras; the day after tomorrow Nicaragua may be the victim - who knows, the marines may again be sent to that country to lord it there as they once did in the past. Mr. Lodge appears to have forgotten that incident. l could remind him of United States policy towards a number of small States, including Nicaragua itself. Thus, aggression is indi- visible, whether it takes place in the Western, the Eastern, the Southern or the Northern Hemisphere. \Vherever aggression occurs, Mr. Lodge, it must be stopped; territorial and geographical boundaries have no meaning in this connexion; if aggression occurs in the Western Hemisphere then no one is entitIed to discuss the question; it must be referred to the Orga- nization of American States. Mr. Lodge failed to men- tion that yesterday that a spokesman for State Depart- ment said the United States would settle its accounts with Guatemala in the Organization of American States. 177. l should like in addition to reply to the charge that while the Soviet Union representative alleged that the aggression had been carried out by the United States he did not prove his allegation. That is not so: l shall prove it. l can cite additional facts later; in the meantime let me draw attention to the following. 178. The documents which l studied in preparation for this meeting show that when the United States of America had decided on its plan to settle its accounts with Guatemala for the measures taken by that country in connexion with the vacant and unused lands owned by the United Fruit Company, it conc1uded a special military alliance with Honduras and another with Nicaragua. The facts show, for example, that on 23 April 1954 the Governlilents of the United States of America and Nicaragua signed a treaty of military assistance and that on 19 May, tImt is ta say three weeks or a month later, Nicaragua broke off diplomatic relations with Guatemala, and was already making political and military preparations ta settle its score with Guatemala. The same thing happened in the'case of Honduras. On 21 May, almost the same date, the United States signed a treaty of military assistance with Honduras. And when on 27 May Guatemala asked Honduras ta sign a treaty of friendship and 182. 1 could eite still further facts, but 1 feel that the case is quite clear. The identity of the parties guilty of aggression is an open secret; the United States cannot distort the issue. We shall adduce additional facts at a later stage. At this juncture, and to conclude my reply to the United States representp-.tive, 1 must state that the Soviet Union is taking part in the dis- cussion of this question - and this should he quite clear even to Mr. Lodge - because wherever aggres- sion occurs - in the Western, the Eastern, the Northern or the Southern Hemisphere - it is still aggression; it must be stopped, and the Security Council must come to a deeision.. 183. Mr. Lodge remarked that he would prefer that the .Security Couneil should refrain from considering aggression when it occurred in the Western Hemis- phere, that is, that he wanted the United States to he left alone with aIl the backward countries in Latin America. But if aU those countries are to ignore the Security Couneil, if they are to be left :>.1one face to face with the United States, the danger to them will be immense. We believe that this should be clear to every- one,. and that the introduction of a draft resolution in which it is proposed that the Security Council should not consider a case of aggression in Central America against a Member of the United Nations is an attempt to prevent the Security Couneil from considering the qqestion. .184. At this juncture, when an aet of aggression has already been committed, when foreign troops have already invaded Guatemala and aircraft. are bombing the country, 1 feel that to refer the question ta an 179. Selon ce que dit M. Wagner, un des correspon- dants du journal H erald Tribune, on sait qUI; le Gou- vernement des Etats-Unis préférerait que ce soit un des pays de l'Amérique latine qui prenne l'initiative d'une telle mesure - il s'agit de l'agression contre le Guate- mala. D'après certains indiœs, dit encore Wagner, ce sera peut-être le Honduras ou le Nicaragua qui soulè- vera la question. 180. Le 23 avril, après la signature des traités relatifs à l'aide militaire entre les Etats-Unis, d'une part, et le Nicaragua et le lIonduras, d'autre part, tout a été mis au point et l'agression a été déclenchée. 181. Je puis y ajouter encore ce qui suit. Au moment de l'arrestation de cinq soldats (le 25 m::>i, le Daily News annonçait que la guerre entre le Honduras et le régime de gauche du Guatemala semblait proche ce soir-là, lorsqu'un détachement de gardes-frontières s'est emparé de einq Guaté~altèques armés), les Etats-Unis ont expédié en toute hâte, tant au Honduras qu'au Nicaragua, des avions chargés de canons, de munitions, d'automobiles et d'armes. Voilà les préparatifs aux- quels les Etats-Unis se sont livrés. Cela ne vous suffit- il pas? Vous dites: donnez-nous des preuves. Or, ces preuves, il y en a tant et plus; elles sont publiées chaque jour, en toute franchise, par la presse américaine. 182. Je pourrais eiter d'autres faits encore. Toutefois, la question me paraît parfaitement claire. En effet, l'identité de l'agresseur est un secret de polichinelle, et les Etats-Unis ne parviendront pas à déformer la réalité. Plus tard, je vous fournirai des renseignements plus détaillés. Pour le moment, en en terminant avec ma réponse au représentant des Etats-Unis, je me bornerai à dire que même M. Lodge ne peut ignorer pourquoi l'Union soviétique prend part à l'examen du problème dont le Conseil est saisi: c'est parce qu'il faut mettre fin à l'agression où qu'elle se produise, que ce soit dans l'hémisphère oriental ou occidental, dans le Nord ou dans le Sud; il le faut, et le Conseil est tenu de prendre une décision. 183. L'allusion que M. Lodge a faite en déclarant qu'il voudrait que le Conseil s'abstînt de s'occuper d'une agression qui se produit dans l'hémisphère occi- dental- il souhaiterait que les Etats-Unis restasseiJt face à face avec tous les pays arriérés de l'Amérique latine - constitue avant tout un terrible danger pour les pays sud-américains. En effet, ces pays se trouve- raient menacés s'ils venaient à ne plus s'adresser au Conseil de sécurité et demeuraient seuls en présence des Etats-Unis. Il me ~emb1e que cela doit être clair pour tout le monde. Les auteurs d'un projet de réso- lution tendant à ce que le Conseil de sécurité s'abs- tienne d'examiner la question de l'agression qui a été commise en Amérique centrale contre un Membre de l'Organisation des Nations Unies cherchent en réalité à empêcher le Conseil d'agir. 184. Il me semble que, maintenant que l'agression à été commise, que des troupes étrangères ont pénétré sur le territoire de ce pays et que des avions en bom- bardent les villes, il n'y a pas à renvoyer la question
The question befOl-e the Security Council is the draft resolution submitted by Brazil and Colombia [S/3236/Rev.1] dated 20 June 1954, which is ta be 'voted on a's a whole.
l should Iike to refer very briefly to an explanation of the stage reached in the Organization of American States in dealing with the notification of the invasion handed in by Guatemala. First of all, however, l wish to make a few comments on what Mr. Lodge said in his speech. He said that l had not made conclusive accusations; .I should like to tell him that l did not, indeed, come here to make accu- sations or to present any official view of rny Govern- ment to that effect. One of my Government's requests, its most important request, is tbat the Council should take steps. Besides, l should like to speak of what Mr. Lodge himse1f gave as his Government's or his own point of view - that there was no invasion in Guate- mala. We, a people who are nndergoing bombardment and machine-gunning by civil aircraft, consider that there is an invasion. What could be a better solution than to send a United Nations observation commission to Guatemala and find out which assertion is true? 188. Secondly, when l referred ta Mr. Patterson l was not referring to his present status as a private citizen no longer holding an official position. l was reÎerring to activities in which he was engaged in my country when he was the Ambassador of the United States. l think that, when a person is entrusted with the performance of public functions, particularly in case of a long assignnlent, it is permissible to form an opinion of the policy of the State that person represents. Nor did l wish to take it upon myself to make accusations on my own behalf or on that of my Government, in order to avoid making a violent or inappropriate accusation. l gave indications and quoted from a few sources for the information of the Security Council. What l have given is not our opinion, though of course we could very weIl form an opinion, but the opinion of observers who cau be considered impartial- and who are connected neither with my country nor with my Government. 189. After this explanation l should like briefly to explain that my Government has not reÎerred the essential feature of the matter to the Organization of American States. It has merely notified the Peace Committee of the Organiz~tion of American States of the invasion, but has asked it to adopt no position until the Security Couneil has taken action. Thus my country and my Government have renounced the possibility of intervention by that Organization but article 20 of the charter of the Organization of American States binds 3S nais~f'~ce à un conflit entre les obligations contractées par les Etats Membres des Nations Unies aux termes de la Charte, et il convient d'appliquer l'Article 103, que je vous demande de prendre en considération; "En cas de conflit entre les obligations des Mem- bres des Nations Unies en vertu de la présente Charte et leurs obligations en vertu de tout autre accord international, les premières prévaudront." 190. Il est évident que, dans ce conflit - si l'on peut employer ce terme, alors que mon pays ne s'est adressé à l'Organisation des Etats américains que pour l'aviser de la situation - il convient d'appliquer les Articles 34, 35 et 39 de la Charte des Nations Unies. Je tiens à indi- quer, dans le même esprit, que le paragraphe 4 de l'Ar- ticle 52 précise: "Le présent Article n'affecte en rien l'application des Articles 34 et 35." 191. Ainsi, aux termes des dispositions de la Charte, le Conseil de sécurité a l'obl;gation absolue d'enquêter lui-même sur la situation que mon pays, ainsi que l'y autorise la Charte, a signalée à son attention. Je demande au Conseil de bien vouloir réfléchir à cet im- portant aspect de la situation. 192. M. CARIAS (Honduras) (traduit de l'espa- gnol) ; J'estime qu'il est de mon devoir d'appeler l'atten- tion du Conseil sur la méthode qu'il va suivre pour voter sur le projet de résolution dont il est saisi. Il a été proposé de procéder au vote par division. Il me semble que, si le Conseil approuvait le dernier alinéa de ce texte, il laisserait subsister une certaine équivoque tou- chant la 'Culpabilité de mon pays, culpabilité que je nie dès maintenant d'une manière courtoise, mais vigou- reuse et catégorique. On affirme qu'il n'y a pas de con- troverse. S'il en est ainsi, c'est précisément parce que nous nous heurtons maintenant à un fait que j'ai signalé dès le début, et qui est que le Conseil de sécurité n'est pas qualifié pour connaître des difficultés qui surgissent en Amérique centrale. Il existe des organismes panamé- ricains qu'on a qualifiés de parfaits et dont on a affirmé qu'ils avaient permis aux pays de l'Amérique latine d'employer leurs grands talents en matière de droit international. Pourquoi nous, les représentants de l'Amérique latine, n'essayons-nous pas d'insister davan- tage sur ces talents et d'attribuer plus de valeur à une œuvre latino-américaine? Pourquoi nous obstinons- nous à porter une affaire qui est du ressort de l'Améri- que latine devant un organisme où, comme nous venons de le voir, on a prononcé des paroles irritées, des paroles qui vont absolument à l'encontre des idéaux de l'Orga- nisation des Nations Unies? A vote was taken by show of hLZnds. I1J favottr: Brazil, China, Colombia, Denmark, France, Lebanon, New Zealand, Turkey, United King- dom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America. Against: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The res'llit of the -vote wa'S 10 in fœvour and one agOlinst. 195. The PRESIDENT: Anticipating that this issue would come up, l have studied the principles involved and have concluded that, while it is rather a close question in my mind, on balance this is not a procedural question and is, l regret to say, subject to the veto. The draft resolution was not adopted, the negative vote being that of a pernzanent member of the SecuriOy Council. 196. Mr. HOPPENOT (France) ('translated trom French) : The French delegation deeply regrets that the Soviet Union delegation has vetoed the Brazilian draft resolution. This veto effectively prevents the Security Coundl from adopting practical measures which the United Kingdom representative has called reasonable and constructive, and which were worked out by the Brazilian and Colombian 'representatives to facilitate the peaceful settlement of the situation brought ta our notice by the representative of Guatemala. 197. Once again the veto has paralysed the Council and prevented it from discharging its dutY under the Charter. Once again the delegation of the Soviet Union takes on itself a heavy responsibility with regard ta the maintenance of peace and international security. 196. M. HOPPENOT ('France) : La délégation fran- çaise regrette profondément le veto opposé par la délé- gation de l'Union soviétique au projet de résolution du Brésil; ce veto prive effectivement le Conseil de sécurité des moyens pratiques, qualifiés par le représentant du Royaume-Uni de raisonnables et constructifs, conçus par les représentants du Brésil et de la Colombie pour faciliter un règlement pacifique de la 'situation sur laquelle le représentant du Guatemala avait attiré notre attention. 197. Une fois de plus, par l'effet du veto, le Conseil se trouve paralysé dans l'accomplissement de la mission que la Charte lui a confiée. La délégation de l'Union soviétique assume une fois de plus une lourde responsa- bilité au regard du maintien de la paix et de la sécurité internationales. 198. Je suis d'accord avec M. Malik - et il pronon- çait ces paroles il y a quelques instants - pour estimer très désirable que le Conseil de sécurité ne demeure pas dans cette position d'impuissance totale où l'a placé le veto de I~URSS, pour que, sur le plan moral au moins, l'autorité du Conseil s'exprime afin qu'il soit mis un terme à l'effusion de sang et pour que le Conseil réponde aux sentiments de tous les hommes libres et pacifiques qui ont mis en nous leur confiance, en adressant à tous un appel à cet effet. Cet appel n'aurait-il pour résultat que d'épargner une seule vie humaine ou d'empêcher qu'une seule victime innocente s'ajoute à toutes celles qui sont déjà tombées sur les champs de bataille des guerres civiles et· internationales depuis tant d'années, qu'il serait de notre devoir de le lancer. En conséquence, je me propose de reprendre, en projet de résolution séparé, le texte de l'amendement auquel tous les mem- bres du Conseil et le représentant du Guatemala ont bbn voulu donner leur accord. 199. Je tiens à dire de la manière la plus nette que, dans cette démarche de la délégation française, rien ne peut itre interprété comme mettant en doute ou comme tenàant à affaiblir, soit la compétence de la Commission interaméricaine de la paix, soit la légitimité de son 31 198. l agree with Mr. Malik, who spoke a few mo- ments ago, that it is highly desirable that the Security Council should not remain in the situation of utter impotence in which it has been placed by the Soviet veto; that, at Ieast on the moral plane, the Council should give expression to its authority and bring the blood-Ietting to an end; and that the Council, by making a general appeal to that effect, should respond to the feelings of aIl those free and peace-loving men who have reposed their confidence in us. If the only result of this appeal is that a single human Hie is spared, that a single innocent victim is saved from join- ing aIl those who have already fallen on the battlefields of civil and international wars in the course of so many years, it is still our dutYta launch it. Hence l propose to re-introduce as a separate draIt resolution the text of the amendment to which aIl the members of the Council and the representative of Guatemala kindly gave their support. 199. l wish to make it as clear as possible that there is nothing in this step by 'the French de1egation which can be construed as casting doubt on, or weakening, the competence of the Inter-American Peace Committee or the legitimacy of its action in this matter. On the 195. Le PRESIDENT (fra.duit de l'anglais): Pré- voyant le résultat du vote, j'avais étudié la question, qui me paraît délicate, et suis arrivé à la conclusion qu'en définitive il ne s'agit pas d'une question de procédure et que, je le regrette, ,le veto joue. La voix contre étant celle d'un membre permanent du Conseil, le projet de résolution n'est pas adopté. J 200. The new draft resolution which 1 propose to submit will accordingly read as follows: "The Security Coltncil, '''Ha'VÏng consùlered on an urgent basis the com- munication of the Government of Guatemala to the President of the Security Council (S/3232), "CaUs for the immediate termination of any action likely to cause bloodshed and requests all Members of the United Nations to abstain, in the spirit of the Charter, from rendering assistance to any such action." 201. It is hardly necessary for me to ~epeat to the Honduran representative that there is absolt,tely nothing in these general terms, takenfrorn the lttter and the spirit of the Charter, which can he construed by anyone to mean that the Government of Honduras, Nicaragua or any other country may have any direct or indirect responsibility for the 'regrettable events now taking place on Guatemalan territory. 202. Unless members of the Council ask for this text to he distributedheforehand 1 would ask the President to be good enough to put it to the vote immediately.
We shaH now vote on the draft resolution which has just been proposed by the representative of France. A vote was ·taken by show of hands. The draft resolution was ad.opted unanimously. 204. Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): 1 cannot agree with the way in which the French representative has interpreted the Soviet representative's vote on the Brazilian 'resolution. He expressed the view that that vote had paralysed the Council, and so forth. But if we c1ear our minds of cant, it is plain that it is precisely the Brazilian resolution which would have prec1uded the Security Council from any participation whatsoever in the settlement of the question. That was the trtie state of affairs. The fad that the Soviet Union was in favour of the Security Council's dealing with the case is proved by the voting on the 'last resolution, which has just been adopted unanimuusly. 205. Mr. GOUTHIER (Brazil): 1 voted for the French text on the assumption that any action taken by this Council would not prevent the Organization of American States from taking wl:i:ltever steps it deemed appropriate in the matter before us. This was very c1early stated by the French representative when he introduced his <kaft resolution. 206. Mr. ECHEVERRI CORTES (Colombia) (translated from Spanish) : My delegation is gratified at the vote cast in favour of the draft resolution it had the honour to submit in conjunction with the Brazilian representative. This implies a vote of confidence in the American regional system, against which invidious cha~ges were made by a representative who is foreign to that system and ignorant of its nobiepurposes of 38 205. M. GOUTHIER (Brésil) (traduit de l'anglais): J'ai voté pour le texte de -la France en comprenant que la décision du Conseil de sécurité n'empêcherait pas l'Organisation des Etats américains de prendre, à pro- pos de la question qui nous occupe, toute mesure qu'elle jugera opportune. Le représentant de la France l'a bien précisé en présentant son projet de réso-lution. 206. M. ECHEVERRI CORTES (Colombie) (tra- duit de l'espagnol): Ma délégation remercie tous ceux qui ont voté pour le projet de rés01ution qu'elle avait soumise au Conseil, de concert avec -la délégation brési- lienne. Par leur vote, ils ont, en réalité, exprimé leur confiance dans le système régional américain, système contre lequel un représentant qui lui est étranger et qui en méconnaît le noble but - maintenir la paix et la L 208. 1 voted for the French text because, as 1 said, it seemed to me that, in matters of such moment, some kind of result, no matter how modest, was better than none. 209. The whole significance of the rule of unanimity among the five permanent members of the Se('urity Council is to seek the least common denominator a.mong them. It is, therefore, the dutY of the Security Couneil to seek that least common denominator. And now that the representative of France seems to have found it, we appear to be ending on a happy note, having adopted a text which, in aIl modesty, is far more in keeping with the dignity and the prestige of the Security Council than no text at aIl. 210. Mr. TSIANG (China) : 1 should like to explain briefly my two votes. 1 voted for the French proposaI on the theory that something is better than nothing. 1 voted for the joint proposaI of Brazil and Colombia for a number of reasons. 211. In the first place, 1 have a great deal of admira- tion for the history and development of that organiza- tion which is now called the Organization of American States. 1 feel that the Security Council should have ütilized the services of that organization, that it should have given that organization an opportunity to acquire such prestige in its own region as to render its member States greater services in the future. 212. In the course of the discussion this afternoon we heard from five Latin-American States, and we have before us a letter from another; 1 refer to the letter from the representative of Cuba. li 213. Now, from these indications, 1 gather that, among the Latin-American States, opinion'is very, very strong - almost unanimous - that this question should be handled, in thefirst instance, by the Organization of American States. Therefore, that almost unanimous opinion of the Latin-American States seemed to me to be very impressive. 1 fe1t, therefore, that the Security Couneil should defer to that strong opinion. 214. Mr. MUNRO (New Zealand) : 1 have no need to explain my vote on thé fi'rst draft resolution, but 1 do desire briefly to explain my affirmative vote on the second resolution. In the first place, 1 want to make it c1ear that, as far as we ar.e concerned, there is no 215. Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): l want to make a simple correction in my statement. It has been pointed out to me that l used the phrase "the least com- mon denominator". l should certainly have said "the highest common factor" - the highest common factor of agreement among the five permanent members of the Security CounciI. If there is still any ambiguity about that, l would even use the phrase "the maximum pos- sible area of agreement". That should be the aim of every member of the Security CounciI. 216. There is another correction l should like to make. l used the word "modest" in regard to the French proposaI. l used it in a modest sense, but l should like to dispel any impression that may be aroused abroad that what we have passed today is modest. It is not at aIl modest, in a strictly objective sense. It at least calls for the stopping of the shedding of blood and therefore, objectively speaking, it is not modest; it is a very important text. When one says that something is better than nothing, one gives the impres- sion that it is a question of the least common denomina- tor that l was talking about. Actually, we have adopted a rather significant text, far more important than the phrase "something better than nothing" would indicate. 217. Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) -(translated from Russian) : As many mem- bers of the Security Council have said in their explana- tions of vote on the resolution which we have just adopted unanimously that they attach little importance to the resolution but that something is better than nothing, let me point out that the resolution calls for the cessation of bloodshed and the adoption of aIl steps necessary to end it and to ensure that it does not con- tinue. l t also urges the States concerned to abstain from taking any action likely to cause further blood- shed. 218. l consider that the adoption of this resolution-i5 a very important decision by the Security Council and that if the resolution is properly implemented it should play an important part in restoring peace among the Central American Republics - and our primary respon- sibility is to restore peace and put an end to aggression. The fact that we have adopted this resolution, brief though it may be, gives it greater significance than the lengthy resolution which we previously rejected.
If no other member of the Council wishes to speak, l should like to say a few words as representative of the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 220. The United States delegation voted in favour of the text proposed by the representative of France he- cause it agreed wholeheartedly with his express assurance that nothing in his resolution inany way inhibited the Organization of American States and he- 224. Mr. .cASTILLO ARRIOLA (Guatemala) (translated trom Spanish) : l wish to state that, solely on account of the seriousness of the situation, my Gov- ernment would have preferred this Council to assume fully each and every one of the obligations laid down in the Charter. l have just communicated the result of this meeting to my Government, which expresses satis- faction and reaffirms its faith in the Organization of American States. It considers that the resolution adopted by the Security Omncil carries with it the force and the moral dignity of this Organization and will thus prevent - and this will be a binding prohibi- tion - the despatch of airerait ta bomb and machine- gun the people of Guatemala. My Government believes that the resolution will also have sufficient force to ensure that States will close their frontiers with Guate- mala, ta avoid incursions and useless bloodshed. Such is the scope which, my Government considers, is given to this resolution by the force and the strength of the dignity with which the United Nations and the Security Council are endowed by worId public opinion. The meeting rose at 8.5 p.m. ARGENTINA - ARGENTINE Editorial .Sudamoricono S.À.. AI~in. 500, Buenos Aires. FRANCE Editions A. Pedone, 13, rue soumot, Peris V\ GREECE - GREeE "Eleftheroudakis," Place de le Constitu. tion, Athènes. AUSTRALIA - AUSTRALIE H. A. Goddord. 255. Goorgo St., Sydney, ond 90 Oueon St., Melbourne. Melbo", ,e UniVllrsity Press, Carlton N.3, ~UATEMALA Gou!>oud & Cio. Ltd..:, 50. Avenida sur 28, Guotemala. HAITI Libroirie' "A la Carovelle," Boite postele III·B, Port·au·Prince. Victori~. IELGIUM -IELGIQijE Agence et Mossogeries de la Presse S.A" 14-22 ruo du Persil, Bruxelles. W. H. Smith & Son. 7"1.75, boulevard Adolphe.Max. Bruxelles. IOlIVIA -JOLIVIE Librerfa Selecciones, Cosilla 972. Lo Poz. IRAZIl-BRESIL Livrorio Agir. RiQ de Joneiro. Sao Poulo ond Bolo Horizonte. HONDURAS Librerra Panomericona, Calle de la Fuente, Tegucigalpa. HONG·KONG The Swindon Book Co" 25 Nath.n Roed, Kowloon. ICELAND-: ISLAHiiE Bokav.nlun Siç,fusor Eymondssonor H. F., Austyrstroeti 18, Reykjovik. INDIA-INDE Oxford Béok & Stationery Co" Scindi.e House, New Delhi, end 17 Pork Street, Calcutte. P. Varadochery & Co., 8 Ling!]i .Chetty St" Mo, ras 1. CANADA Ryerson Press. 299 Queen St. West, Toronto. Periodico, Inc.. 4234 de 10 Roche; Mon. trool. 34. CEYLON - CEYLAN The Associoted Newspopers of Ceylon Ltd., Loke House. Colombo CHILE- CHILI Librerro Ivens. Monedo 82.2, S.ntiogo. Editoriol dei Poclfico. Ahumodo 57, Sontiogo INDDNESIA -INDONESIE Joia..'; fembangunon, Gunung Soheri 84, Djokorto. IUN Ketab-Khaneh Danesh, 293 Soodi Ave. nue, Tehron. IRAQ-IRAK Modenzie's Bookshop, Beghdod. ISRAEL Biùmstein's Bookstores Ltd., 35 Allenby Road, Tel~Aviv. CHINA - CHINE The World Book Co. Ltd.. 99 Chung King Rood. Ist Sectidn. Toipeh, Toiwon. Commercial Press. 211 Honon Rd., Shong. hoi COLOMBIA - COLOMIIE Librerfo Lotino. Correro 60.. 13·05, Bogot6. Librerro Américo, Medellfn. Librerfa Nocional Ltdo., Barronquillo. ITALY -ITALIE Colibri S.A., Wo MercoJ:i 36, Milano. COSlA RICA - COSTA.RICt Treios Hermenos, Aportodo 1313, Son Jo,é. CUlA la Coso Bolgo, O'Roilly 455, lo Hobono. LEBANON - LIBAN Libroirie Universel/e, Beyrouth. LIBERIA J. Momolu Kamaro, Monrovie. LUXEMBOURG Librairie J. Schummer, Luxemboul'g, CZECHOSLOVAKIA - TCHECOSLOVAQUIE Coskoslovensky Spisovatel, N6rodnl Trldo 9. P,aho 1. MEXICO - MEXIQUE Editoriol Hermes S.A., Ignocio Moriscel 'II, México, D.F. DENMARK·· DANEMARK Eino; Munksgoerd, Ltd.. N~rregodo 6, HETHERLANIS - PAYS-BAS N.V. Mortinus Nijhoff, Lange Voorhout 9, 's-Gravenhage. K~bonhovn. K. DOMINICAN REPUlLlC - REPUBLIQUE DDMINICAINE Librerlo Dominiceno. Mercedes -49, Ciu. dod Trujillo. HEW ZEAUHD - NOUVElLE·ZELANDE United Nations AS90ciation of New Zee. land. C.P.O. 101 J, Wellingtcn. ECUADOR - EQUATEUR Librorlo Cienllfica. Guoyoquil and Quito. NORWAY - NOVEGE Johan Grundt Tonum Farrag, Kr. Au. gustsgt. 7A, Oslo.. EI»'PT - EGYPTE Libroirie "Lo Renoissonce d'Egypte." 9 Sh. Adly Posha, Cairo. El SALVADOR-SALVADOR Manuel Novos y Cio., 10. Avenida sur 37. Son Salvador. PAKISTAN Thomas & Th.omas, Fort Monsion, Frere Rood, Karochi, 3. Publishers United Ltd.. 176 Anerkeli, Lahore. The Pakiston Cooperetive Book Society, ChittlJgong ond Dacca (Eost Pokiston.) ETNIOPIA -$HIOPIE Agence Ethiopienne de Publicité, Box 128, Addis.Abebo. ~NAMA José Menéndez, Plozo de Arango, Ponem6. PARAGUAY Moreno He(menos, Asunci6n. FINLARD - FINLAI!.DE Akoteeminon Kirjokauppo, 2, Keskusketu, Helsinki. Orders and inquiries from countries where sales agenls have not yet been appointed may be sent to: Sales and Circulation Section, United Nations, New York, U.S.A.; or Sales Section, United Nations Office, Palais des !:lation"" Geneva, Switzerland. Priee: $U.S. DAO; 3/- stg.; Sw. fr. 1.50 (or equivalent in other currencies) Printed in Canada mu - PERDU Librerlo IrlteN.eionol dei Per6, S.A" Limo ond Arequipo. PHILIPPINES Alemer', Book Store, 749 Rizol Avenue, Monilo. PORTUGAL Livrerio Rodrigues, 186 Ruo Auroo. Lisboe. SINGAPORE - SIHGAPOUR The City Book Store. Ltd. Winchester House, Col/yer Quey. SWEDEH -SUËDE C. E. Fritze', Kungl. Hovbokhondel A·B, Fredsgaten 2, Stockholm. SWITZERLAND _ SUISSE Libroirie P!lyot S.A., Lausonne, Genève. Hens Rounhordt, Kirehgosse 17. Zurich l, SYRIA -SYRIE Libreirie Universelle, Demes. THAILAND - THAI!ANDE Prûmuan Mit Ltd.. 5E Chokrawot Roed, Wof Tuk, Bong~ok. •,RKEY - TURQUIE ~ibr"irie Hochette, 469 Istiklal Coddes;, Beyoglu, Istanbul. UNION OF SOUTH MRICA - UNION SUD·AFRICAINE Ven Schoik's Bookstore (Pty.I, ~td., Box 724. Pretoria. UNITED XINGDOM - ROYAUME-UNI H.M. Stetionery Office, P.O. Box 569, London, S.E. 1 (ond at H.M.S.O. Shops). UHITED STATES OF AMERICA - ETATS·UHIS D'AIIER, Inl'I Documents Service, Columbio Univ. Press, 2960 Broodwoy, New York 27, N.Y. URUGUAY Representaciôn de Editoriales, Prof. H. D'Elr., Av. 18 de Julio 1333. Montevideo. VENEZUELA Distribuidora Escolor S.A., ond Distribui. doro Contineptol, Ferrenquln 0 Cruz de Condelerie 178, Coracos. VIET·NAM Papeterie·Libroirie Nouvelle Albert Por. tail, BoIte postole 283, Sorgon. YUGOSLAVIA - YOUGOSLAVIE Dnovno Preduzece, Jugoslovensko Knjigo, Teraziie 27 ! l, Beogrod. United Nations publi<ations can also b. obtainod from the fol/owing finn.. Lo. pu!>Iications do. Notion. UnI.. peuvent également être obtenues aux adresses ci.. dossous: AUSTRIA - AUTRICHE B. Wiljlerstorff, Woegplotz, 'l, Solzburg. Gerold & Co.. 1. Groben 31. INien. GERMANY - AlLEMAGNE Elwert & Meurer. Hauptstrasse 101. Berlin -Schoneberg. W. E. Soorboch, Gereonstrosse 25·29, Kain (22e). Alex. Horn, Spiegelgesse 9, Wiesbeden. JAPAN-JAPON Moruzen Compony, Ltd., 6 Tori·Nichome. Nihonbashi, Tokyo. SPAIN·ESPAGNE Librerra Bosch. Il Ronde Universided, Borcelono. Les commandes et demandes de renseignements émanant de pays où il n'existe pas encore de dépositair.es peuvent être adressées il la Section des ventes et d.a la distribu- tion, Organisation des Nations Unies, New·York (Etats. Unis d'Amérique) ou il la Section des ventes, Organis.a- tion des Nations Unies, Palais des Nations, Genève (Suisse). (5382) 20065-August 1954-1,600