S/PV.679 Security Council

In the General Assembly and its Committees representatives are able to speak in any of the five official languages without lengthening of the debate, since only simu1taneous interpretation is used in these United Nations organs. In the Security Council, however, the use of a language other than EngEsh or French necessitates two consecutive interpretations - into English and into French. As l, as representative of Colombia, am at the moment the only Spanish-speaking member of the Council and as, in any case, representatives will be able ta listen to my remarks in the five official languages, 1 shaH not unnecessarily lengthen the discussion and shall confine myself to using one of the two working languages. Expression of thanks to the retiring Preiii~ent

Before we adopt the agenda 1 should like, on my own hehalf and on behalf of aU my coUeagues, to thank my predecessor, Mr. Tsiang, the representative of China. We are aU familiar with his wisdom, prudence and ability, qualities which he has always displayed in the United Nations and which he showed once again last month when he presided over the Security Council. 3. Mr. TSIANG (China): 1 am only too well aware of the faet that my services to the Council as President during the last month were of a strictlyroutine nature. 1 appreciate aIl the more the kind and appreciative words acldressed ta me by the President. i Adoption of the agenda

The present meeting of the Security Council has been convened at the request of the United States of America to consider the question set forth in the letter circulated [S/ 3287], 6. The Soviet Union abjects ta the inclusion of this question in the Security Couneil's agenda, since the letter from the United States representative of 8 September 1954 gives a completely distorted account of the entire incident - which took place on 4 September in the area of Cape OstroVll-:i, to the east of the pori: of Nakhodka - and is ('. viously intended for provocative purposes. 7. It may readily be observed on ca'1"eful study of the United States documents relating to this questionand l venture to state here and now that these no not hold water - ·that the particulars set forth in this letter and in the two notes on the subject from tr..e United States Government bear no relation to reality. 8. Although l very natttrally do not intend at this stage ta deal with the question in substance, l nevertheless feel compel1ed, in the interests of truth and objectivity, ta r-ecall atthis juncture, since it will serve as the basis of my objection ta the inclusion of this question in the Security Council's agenda - the actual circumstances of this incident, which show that no attack by Soviet fighters on a United States aircraft took place. ':[" 'e actual facts of the matter are quite different. , 9. According to the facts as carefully determined by the Soviet Government, a United States twin-engined military aircrait of the Neptune type violated the State !rontier of the Soviet Union on 4 September 1954 at 7.12 p.m., Vladivostok time. On the approach Qf two Soviet fighter aircraft, whose intention was to inform the United States aircraft that it had penetrated Soviet territory and advise it to \vithdraw immediately from Soviet air space, the United States aircraft immediate1y opened fire on the Soviet fighters. This hO!5tile and utterly unwarranted action by the United States aircraft which had violated the frontier of the Soviet Union compelled the SO\'et ai,rerait to return fire, whereupon the United Sto.i":3 aircraft was forced to make for the open sea. No report has been received by the Soviet Government about the subsequent fate of the offending aircraft, a:J.d it has no information on that subject. 10. Such Was the incident as it actually occuned. 11. But how does the United States Government present the affair? It presents the incident in a completely false light; without the slightest justification it reiects the statements contained in the Soviet Governmént's note and unwa:rrantedly puts forward its own story, in an attempt to oppose ta the true racts of the actual incident, its owu hurriedly concocted version, which bears literallv no relation ta the events which really took place. - These are the exact words used in note No. 203 of 6 September 1954 from the United States Government to the Govemment of the Soviet Union. 13. But what are the facts? 14. l do not wish to express my views on this qaestion at the present stage, since, as l have aIready said, we are at present discussing the procedural question of the inclusion of this item in the agenda; but l cannot refrain from pointing out that according to a report in The New York Times, it was announced in Washington as early as 7 Septemrn:r that this so-called patrol aireraft opened fir~ on the Soviet fighters - a fact admitted by the crew members of the United States aireraft who were responsible for the fking. 15. It should he sufficiently clear from' the foregoin2' that in claiming that an attack was made by Soviet aireraft on a United States plane, the State Department is d'storting the facts, for the truth of the matter is quite the contrary. Its purpose is to justify the illegal activities of the United States airerait alld to divert the blame for the incident from the guilty to the innocent. 16. But the matter does not end there. In its first note, dated 6 September, the United States Embassy stated that a United States aireraft - a Neptune bomber - had encountered the Soviet fighters over the high seas 100 miles east of Vladivostok and 44 miles off the Siberian coast. But if you look aï. the map you will see that a point 100 miles east of Vladivostok is I.':Ot over the high seas but over the telTitory of the Soviet Union. ' 17. This fact shows that t:Ie United States authorities' attempt to place the meeting-point between the United States aircraft with the Soviet fighters outside the borders of Soviet territory is utterly unwarranted. 1t proves quite conclusively that the United States aircraft, that so-ca1led patrol plane, had crossed the Soviet frontier. 18. There is no doubt that this violation of the frontiers of the Soviet Union by United States military aireraft, like others which have taken place, \Vas carried out in execution of specifie tasks set by the United States Military Commando At the same time it constitutes a gross infringement of the most elementary rules of international law, respect for whieh is ineumbent upon aU States, including the United States of America. 22. Hence, l repeat, the Soviet Union considers that it wou.ld he wrong to place this question on the Secu- 'rity Council's agenda. 23. Mr. LODGE (United States of AmeriC3.): The United States of iunerica h~~s already made a prima fade case for the adoption of the agenda in its letter of 8 September 1954 addressed to the President of the Security Council [S/3287]. l do not, therefore, intend ta make the United States presentation until the agenda has been adopted; l shall ask to speak a.iter that.

Approval of the agenda does not imply acceptance of the arguments put forward by either pa:rty. Indecd, if we are to examine those arguments and learn the facts of the case, we must first adopt the agenda. The representative of the Soviet Union and of the United States will then he able to explain to us in detail the eircumstances of the incident referred to the Security Cauneil. 25. l accordingly put to the vote the provisional agenda. In favour: Brazil, China, Colombia, Denmark, France, Lebanon, New Zealand, Turkey, United King- dom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America. Against: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. 0'0 unchallenged, might endanger international peace 1> • and secunty. 27. Contrary to what the Soviet Union representative has just told you, here are the facts. On 4 September 1954, at about 6.18 p.m. local time, a United States Navy aircraft type P2V was attacked without warn- ing and destlJyed by two Soviet aircraft of the MIG type. Early infonnation as to the exact location of the attack which was communicated to the Soviet Govern- ment by the United States Government in its note of 5 Sepl ~mber was in error. This error was corrected upon receipt of later and, more complete information. This new information showed that the att"".::k took place over the high seas at a point 42 degrees 15 minutes north latitude and 134 degrees 24 minutes east longi- tude - and you can look it up on your map. The point to be emphas~zed is that at no time did the American aireraft come doser than within 43 miles of the Siberian coast. This point was never in di3pute in any of the reports or the communications of the United States Government. There ean be nD dm' t about the position at which this attack took place. 27. soviétique passées 18 Etats-Unis, ment MIG. sée au sujet a plets montraient haute latitude Ce compte ment 4·3 communications catégoriques proddte 28. caractère s'est l'aérodrome accomplir du Etats-Unis logique tions, en le seignements pour l'Extrême-Orient et de reconnaître les mouvements des aux 29. l'attaque véritable reil qu'il soleil et se diriger vers lui. MIG comme l'avion atteint mis livré tiles en l'avion l'altitude. officiers l'appareil penser, 30. indiquaient 5 28. A second point to be stressed is the peaceful na- t::Ire of the mission of the aircraft. This aircraft took off from Atsugi Airfield near Tokyo, Japan, on a rou- tine daylight flight over the Sea of Japan at 1.54 p.m. local time on 4 September. This flight is made daily for weather reports and anti-submarine surveillance by aircraft of the United States Navy. Such operations, involving the defence of Japan, are conducted pursuant ta the security Lreaty with that country dated 28 April 1952. These flights provide necessary data for weather forecasting in the Far East and are concerned with the movements of surface ships, submarines and aircraft into the western approaches of Japan. 29. The circumstances of the attack by the Soviet aircraIt give good indication of the real nature of the attack. The first indication which the crew of the United States aircraft received that an attack ".'as in progress was the sighting of a plane diving out of the sun at the Unii:ed States aireraft. The first MIG scored no hits. The second MIG likewise dived out of the sun at the United States aircraft. It scored approximately five hits in the left wing, as a result of which gasoline began to leak from the United States aircraft. The first MIG then made a third ron but scored no hits. At that time the MIG's departed in the direction of the Siberian coast. After their departure the United States a~rcraft began to lose altituderapidly. It caught fire and fell into the sea. One of the officers of the aircraft ..as trapped in the sinking fuselage and now can orny he presumed to have lost his lif~. 30. The first reports'of this attack iridicated that the United States aircraft had at no time fired at the 31. The central point is that this attack in the .inter- national air SpRce over the high seas took pla~e WI~h~ut waming' no attempt was made by the attackmg SOVIet aircraft to determine the mission or the identification the United States aircrait before firing. No chaUenging signaIs were made visually or by radio. 32. The United States Gûvernment considers this un- provokeù attack in the air spaœ over the high seas be a clear violation of the obligations undertaken by the Soviet Union when it adhered to the Charter of the United Nations. In its adherence to that Charter, the Soviet Union promised not to resort to the use of force in any manner incompatible with the purposes of t~e United Nations. We aU know and understand this ,cardinal principle of the United Nations Charter and yet today the United States has the duty of calling your attention to this violation, which has lcd not only to the destructi01i of American lives and property, but has also created more tension in a world which wants peace, a world trying to check the very forces of aggr~ssion that threaten ~o destroy us aU. The seriousness of this incident is c1ear. 33. T11e gravity of the situation caused by this attack is compounded by the fact that this is not the first time such attacks have been made by Soviet aircraft. A whole series of incidents can be recounted wherein lives and property have been 105t as a result of such wanton attacks bv Soviet aircraft. Let me recount sorne of these incidents": On 8 April 1950, an unarmed United States aircrait was shot down by Soviet aircraft in the Baltic Sea. In this attack the lives of ten Americans were 10st. On 6 November 1951, an American weather aircraft was shot down by Soviet aircraft in the Sea of Japan with a loss of ten lives. On 19 November 1951, a Soviet fighter forced an unarmed United States plane clown on to a Hungarian airfield. The four-man crew of this aircraft was held for ransom. On 7 October 1952, a United States B-29 was shot down near Hokkaido, the northernmost island of Japan. Eight lives were lost. On 15 Mareh 1953, an American aircrait was attacked without warning while en route from Alaska to Japan, These details are not presented merely to emphasize the need1ess anà tragic loss of American lives or of United States property which resulted from these attackr.; what is of the greatest importance is the pattern of ünprovoked attacks. These Soviet actions show a continuing disregard for the generally accepted standards of international conduct. This is very dis- turbing to the United States Government and to the American people. 34. Let me sav here that the United States is not the only nation to be vidimized by such hostile action. In rceent times Soviet aircraft have attacked aircraft oi Sweden, th~ United Kingdom, France and Belgium. These cases add emphé'.sis to the evidence already presented. A common danger faces aH of us if these attacks by Soviet aircrait are to be allowed to go unehallcnged. 35. The United States Government has not remained inactive in the face of the threat presented to its own security and to the peace of the world through con- tinuation of this long series of attacks on peaceful aireraft by the Soviet Union. But the United Staî:es of America, in meeting tbis situation, has been faithful to the principles of the Charter, which rec,,'lires aIl Members to seek a peaceful settlement of controversies. This principle is consistent with the Jeep-seated cor,- viction of the United States that international differ- ences, including differences that involve OTlr own national interests, must be disposed of through proce- ~ur~s of pacific settlement for the sake of peace and JustIce. 36. The United States has consistently foIlowed the procedures set forth so wisely by the founders of this Organization for the solution of disputes. In each case of an unprovoked attack by Soviet aircraft the United States has 50ught to bring about a peaceful settlement through diplomatic negotiation. In each case an energetic protest has been made to the Soviet Government. In each case assurances·have been sought that there would he no rep~tition of these aggressive acts. In each case, therefore, the United States Government has pUt the highest value on the need to preserve the peace. - M 36. procédures nisation des a Etats-Unis du une ment Unis d'agression par attaché la 37. s'est inexactes coopérer 38. pas aux Charte des ont depuis des 37. On the other side, in each case, the course of the Soviet,ut;ion has been to use highly inaccurate ve~sions of the lllCldents and to refuse co-operation in anv efforts for settlement. • ~. Th~ United States Government wiU not be goaded tnto a. dIsrega;r? for its obligations. In conformity with the.wIse prOVlSlOns of Chapter VI of the Charter of the Umted Nations, it has sougbt peaceful remedies for the wrongs done to it by the Soviet Union. We have long felt that the correct forum for the solution of such problems is the International Court of Justice, where such cases can be considered on their merits. The 40. In the light, therefore, of the failure of the Soviet Govermnent to respond to this reasonable proposaI, we believe that the recent attack on a United States aircraft l.ll the Far East makes it essential to lay this problem before the Security Council, v,ihich .ve are now doing. 41. 'Ne have not proposed an unreasonable course these cases of Soviet attacks on our aircraft. What we have asked, and continue to ask, is that the Soviet Govermnent should negotiate in good faith on a bilateral basis for a settlement of the daims presented. Vif have asked further that, if a settlement cannot be reached, the Soviet Government should consent impartial adjudication of the issues by the International Court of Justice. This is exactly what the United States itself is prepared to do in the case of similar claims which the Soviet Union might present. This we are prepared to do even though we may consider the daims put forwarèl to be completely without foundation. For example, the Soviet Government has pressed daims with regard to the loss of a Soviet transport in Korea during the recent hostilities there. Although Soviet daims in this matter have been refuted by a careful investigation of the facts, we are likewise prepared to see this issue subjected to international adjudication. 42. In conclusion, the United States Government will not falter in its search for peaceful means of soiving such prablems as the one presented here today to this Council. The United States of America will continue to consult with aIl peace-loving members of the family of nations in seeking methods for the preservation of peace. The United States Government attaches great importance to the raIe of this body in the solution of disputes which might lead to the further disruption of international peace and security. 43. The United States considers that discussion of this issue in this organ of the United Nations should lead to a. speedier and more equitable solution of the case at hand. It should be a powerful factor in focusing world opinion on the problem. The United States is confident that the discussion here may contribute materially to prevent repetition of these incidems. 44. These are the purposes of this appeal by the United States ta the Security Council. .:f.G. 1 am very grateful to Mr. Lodge for the explnnations he h:ts given for they greatly lighten the ta5k of the Security Council, in the examination of this qUèstion. However, they by no means help the case submitted hy Mr. Lodge as representative of the United States o~ America. -J.ï. \Vhat did Mr. Lodge say? In the first p~ace he . stressed that there had been earlier clashes of this kind between Soviet and United States aircraft. He gave a number of examples, and recaIled a series of similar incidents. Unfortunately, however, he did not mention aIl the nece5sary facts; for if we are to go into the past, then of course we must do so not hy making an arti;icial selection of a few of the faets; but by surveying aIl the facts that will serve to provide a true and objective picture of the case under review. 1 have no doubt that that is what Mr. Lodge tried to do but he did not succeed. He did not succeed because he put the wrong Iight on the facts he took up, in an attempt to reduce the \vhole question to om. of aIleged Soviet responsi- bility for aIl these past incidents. 48. The reasoning is rather strange; since there has been not merely one of these incidents - the recent affair at Cape Ostrovnoi - bl.:t several, then the Soviet Union must be to blame. If there have been five or six such incidents, then the Soviet Union is to hlame. But what sort of incidents have there been? 1 maintain that these incidents have been cases of various kinds of violation of Soviet territory by United States aircraft. And if we foIlow Mr. Lodge's reasoning, that in fact strengthens our case: if there have been sevc:ral such incidents in the past, then the United States of America is to blame. That is logica1. Nevertheless 1 shaU reject this mode of reasoning, and sha11 try to make a logical case of another kind. 49. First of aU we must marshal our facts properly. Mr. Lodge mentioned a first occurrence which took place on 8 April 1950. Please believe that it has been no wish of mine to rake up the past and go back ta 1950, 1951, 1952 or even 1953. Moreovei", you will recall that when 1 objected. in my first statement, to the inclusion of this question in the agenda 1 did not even alJude to these occurrences. 1 refrained from going into them and, a fortiori, from drawing any conclusions in the nature of charges or an indictment. Mr. Lodge did that. That \Vas the position he took. But if the Security Council's attention is drawn to these past events, it must be done not by way of an indictment but above aIl to bring out the truth, to bring to light, objectively an~ factuaIly, what reaUy took place in every instance whlch we are now being asked to recaU. 50. Mr. Lodge would like us to recall these facts. Very weIl, 1 am ready to do so. 52. The second incident - though it is not second in the order given by Ml'. Lodge, for if the notes l took are correct he placed second the incident of 6 November 1951 over the Sea of Japan - occurred in that same year, on 4 September 1950. Ml'. Lodge for sorne reason did not mention this incident. What happened on that occasion? A USSR twin-engined military aircraft which had just completed a training flight from Port Arthur to the area of the island of Hai-Yang-Tao, which is within the zone of the Port Arthur naval base and 140 kilometres from the Korean coast, was attaeked and shot up without any cause or justification by eleven fighter planes of the United States Navy. As a result of this attack, the Soviet aircraft was hit and fell in flames into the sea 8 kilometres south of the island of Hél.Î-Yang-Tao. Naturally, the crew of the aircraft perished. 53. When the Soviet Government protested against this incident to the Government of the United States 55. 1 cannot but observe that to my mind that argu- ment too is utterly artificial because the fact was, of course, that the United States of America, through its Command in that theatre, was directly implicated in such incidents. The settlement of this issue, the holding of an investigation and the adoption of measures to prevent any repetition of such incidents are not matters for the United Nations or for the Security Council, which has no authority over the command of the anned forces operating in the Pacifie area even when they do sa under cover of the United Nations flag or, in certain cases perhaps, even in the name of the United Nations, as was the case during the Rorean War. In any event, of course, this was a matter for the United States authorities; but the latter, presumably fearing the ttndesirable consequences which consideration of the matter might have, then took the view that a discussion would be inadvisable. 56. Mr. Lodge mentioned a second incident, that of 6 November 1951. 1 should like to point out first of aIl that this incident bears a close resemblance to the one which .took place on 4 September 1954. In the first place, 1t alsa occurred in the area of Cape Ostrovnoi ; in the second place, it involved an aircraft of the Neptu71e type as did the incident of 4 September 1954. And .lt r:sulted from a similar cause, a Neptune aircraft having Vlolated the, Soviet frontier in 1951 in the same area 57. The 1951 incident followed the same course as that of 4 September 1954. The Soviet aireraft called upon the offending aircraft to return to its own territory, to refrain from penetrating Jnto our territory, to stop trying, so to speak, to get a bird's-eye view of what \Vas going on on the ground or thereabouts. Again the United States aireraft replied to this request by opening fire, after which, as in the present instance, it was itself fired on and withdrew. In that case also we said that the appropriate action should he taken, as the facts were perfectly clear. 58. l.'Ir. Austin, the then United States representative to the United Nations, made a statement at that time to the effect that one of the United States military aircraft under General Ridgway's command had not returned to its base, and alleged that the pircraft had been attacked without warning by Soviet fighters, again over international waters. In every single case it happens that the attacks take place over international water$, but there is never any mention of why these aircraft appear over international waters in this particular area so close to our coasts. This is completely passe": over in silence. 60. Is Ml'. Lodge aware of these faets? We shl)Uld talk about this too if we are to recaoitulate all these incidents involving aircraft. In fact it \vas proposed that the matter should be laid before the International Court of Justice. But the International Court refused to deal with it because the other party's consent \-vas lacking. What other party was this? The Hungarian Republic. Did Hungary aet correctly in refusing to allow the International Court ta examine this case? Certainly, since after the offenders were taken red- handed, with documents and articles which, I would assure Ml'. Lodge, do not constitute evidence of any peaceful aims pursued by this other special Neptune aircraft, there was nothing for the International Court to do. 61. Ml'. Lodge mentioned the incident which occurred off the island of Hokkaido on 7 October 1952, when the same thing happened. We protested to the United States of America at the time through the intermediary of Ml'. Shaughnessy, but without result. 62. Ml'. Lodge forgot to mention the incident of 27 .Tuly 1953 - an incident of great interest. Four United States fighter aircraft crossed the frontier of the People's Republic of China and attacked and shot down one of our passenger aircraft carrying fifteen passengers and a crew of six near the town of H wadyan, 110 kilo- metres from the Sino-Korean frontier. Everyone in the éùrcraft perished. 63. Why do I mention this incident? Not of course merely because the representative of the Chinese People's Republic is not here to tell you himself; but because it directly involved a Soviet passenger aircraft which \Vas making its regular, genuinely peaceful flight from Port Arthur to the Soviet Union over the estab- lished route. Four United States aircrait attacked this Soviet passenger plane, destroyed it and killed fifteen passengers and the six members of the crew. 67. r could cite several further instances, but r prefer not to go into this subject for l feel it wouId be out of place to. deal with the question of alleged incidents involving other countries. That is a matter between our- selves and those other countries; if they have any cause for dissatisfaction, they can address themselves to us and we will discuss the matter with them. In any event. such incidents have no bearing whatsoever on the incident of 4 September 1954. But the incidents l have just mentioned, which directly involve the operations of United States military aircraft either over Soviet territory, or near our frontiers, or' in violation of our frontiers, have, in my view. a direct bearing on the question - which the Security Council today took up at the request of the United States representative. 68. This is how things stand with the first group of arguments .connected with the events of the pasto Mr. Lodge tried to prove that the Soviet Union \Vas the guilty party in those cases. He said that the incirlent of 4 Septemher ,vas not the first. That is quite true. It was not the first; but this merely confirms our asser- tion that aIl these incidents are the result of one and the same line of policy on the part of the United States authorities. And if we are to draw the attention of the Security Council to anything, it should be to this aspect of the affàir. 69. Did ail these incidents, in faet, take place on the frontiers of other States? Did they occur off the co~st of San Diego, let us say? AlI these incidents in fact occurred near the coast of the Soviet Union or, as in the case of Hungary, right over the territory of the Hungarian Republic and, in the case of the Moldavian SSR, over that Republic's territory. 70. How is it possible to reach the conclusion that the other incidents strengthen the argument that the incident of 4 September 1954 indicates that the Soviet Union is to blame for everything and should bear the responsi- bility? Everything l have said - and 1 should like to hear Mr. Lodge refute it - indicates that this is aIl part of the policy pursued by the United States military authorities and the State Department - a policy which bas nothing in common with the peaceful assurances which are being made in this ch:unber and which we are at all times prepared to support, provided thev are sincer~ . 71. The second group of arguments advallced by Mr. Lodge \Vas in truth nothing but a repetition of the oontents of the notes of 6 September 1954 addressed to the Government of the USSR by the United States Government. 73. There has been a strange haste about this affair, a Iack of thought in it aU, a sort of precipitancy; reports have been dragged out which are whoIly without veri- fication. It was enongh for someone at a radio station in Japan to he told thar something or other had occurred, and in no time reports were being drculated throughout the world that Soviet aircraft had "attacked", "fired", etc. But we, they said, are angels, we fired on no one. But faets are facts, Ml'. Lodge. 74. It was stated in your note No. 203 that never in Imy circumstances had United States aircraft opened lire. That was in your report. But now it is said there was a slight error, a misul1derstanding. They opened fire from their aircraft - that is correct. But, they say, their statement that they did not open fire is also correct. A pretty misunderstanding! Did they or did they not open fire? They did; but they say they did not. So, \Vere you telling the truth or not? Answer that question. If you were telling the truth you must have known that they fired. But you said at l'andom that they did not tire. This is aIl very dubious, you know. You will say: "Yes, but that was the information we had". In th..t case, who were your informants? Your informants must have deliberately misinformed you, for the Command knew what happened on board your aircraft whel1 it was the victim of the so-called attack. 'YVhat happened? Please tell us, what happened? You do not know, or, if you do know, you won't say. That is why you get into difficulties; that is why you say things which are not true. 75. In yesterday's N C'W Y m'k Post it was stated in this connexion that the Uaited States of America had insisted that the United States aircraft was in a place where it actually was not, and that its aircraft did not shoot when in fact, of course, it did. Ml'. Lodge, l do not know whether you have read the New York Post but 1 advise you ta do so, albeit belatedly. It is interesting. 76. Now the whole matter is presented to us here as what a school-teacher might calI a chance mistake by a pupil in the first grade. Tt was just a slip. Quite by accident the negative "not" was used when it should not have been. In fact the aircraft did fire. This mistake, of course, is either intentional, ta obscure or falsifv the facts - which 1 should not like ta impute ta the highest authorities, at any rate - or it is due to ignorance of 78. Accordingly, l say that this entire fairy-tale about a poor Neptune aircraft being shot down on 4 Sept~mber by Soviet fighters which approached it without warning - and over the high seas, into the bargain - attacked it and destroyed it, will certainly not hold water, if the case is handled by objective examination of the evidence, the factual data - without which appraisal no correct conclusion can be reached. 79. The objective facts are as follows. In its official notes the State Department declares that no fire was opened from the Neptune aircraft. This was contra- dicted on almost the very same day by the Department of the Navy. That is to say, the airerait did open fire, and nobody now denies it. 81. The discrepancy between the second United States note and these reports drew an e.xplanation today from the Department of the Navy. This is the document, Mr. President. 1 would refer you to the New York Herald-Tribune of 7 September 1954, or The New York Times of the same date, and you will find this matter written up in detail in reports from Washington. l do not know which to believe and which the Secnrity Council should believe 'in this case, because this i5 not the first example ar d because the United States Govern- ment has avoided dealing with these cases and on sorne occasions has not even replied to our notes or has referred us to the United Nations or to the United Nations Command instead of dealing with the matter itself. Every time they have been driven into a corner by proofs they have said that their fire was answering fire. But there is no reason why we should believe their versions. ~ i 82. That is why l say that there is no justification for bringing this question before the Security Council. 83. The second argument concerns the statement that the incident took place over the high seas. But may l point out that you said that the place was 100 miles east of Vladivostok and 44 miles te the south-east or east - here again the facts are confused.- of Nakhodka. This is more non-commital, of course; this is vaguer: "44 miles from the coast of Siberia". But the coast of Siberia, we know, is here, there and everywhere. This is shrouded in mist, too, Mr. Lodge. 84. If you will take the trouble, as 1 ask every member of the Security Council to do after the meeting (in view of the urgency of the matter 1 have not had time to prepare a suitable map), please take any American or British map - and incidentally these maps are excellent- ly produced - and look at Vladivostok, Cape Ostrovnoi and the port of Nakhodka. Take your dividers. look at the sca1e and calculate the number of miles to that point 85. Thus our version is correct. It is complete1y faultless. We have no corrections to make and no reason ta make them, because it was established from carefully verified facts, as shown by appropriate and technically perfect radiolocation sets, that the incident took place at that point, which lies within the territory of the Soviet Union and not, as the United States note sought to assert, on the high seas. This fact confirms that the violation of the State frontier of the Soviet Union by a United States aircraft of the Neptune type took place in the area of Cape Ostrovnoi to the east of the port of Nakhodka, as the Soviet note of 5 September 1954 stated. 86. 1 should point out to you that, when there was such confusion about where this happened, The New York Times published a map with the spot marked with a cross. But on this map the spot was shawn as being sorne 125-145 miles to the east of Vladivostok, while this note speaks of 100 miles from Vladivostok. Hence the map published in The New York Times is fa1se one. . 87. But 1 must point out that when this confusion arose, it was perfect'y obvious to anyone prepared to abandon for a moment the attitude necessi~ted by defending the indefensible at aIl costs, that serious efforts were then being made to prove the accuracy of the United States story that the incident took place over the high seas. But, as frequent1y occurs, the Press biurted out confidential matters which should have remained a secret of diplomacy - at least, of United States diplomacy. 88. On 7 September 1954, the newspaper the New York Herald-T1'ibttne published a report by Ml'. Kerr, its Washington correspondent, according to which the United States had taken steps on 6 September to establish that the attack on the United States land-based patrol bomber, which had been fired upon by Soviet jet fighters on the morning of 4 September, had been carried out above international, not Soviet, waters. 89. In other words, steps were not taken to establish objective1y the point where the incident occurred; but measures were taken to establish that this point was over the high seas. But this amounts to falsification. We find that special steps were taken to prave that the incident occ,urred outside Soviet territorial waters and in air space not over Soviet territory. But now, instead of 100 miles, they say 125 miles, 14.5 miles... They might just as well say 300 miles. 91. There is a Russian proverb which says: "You'll never wash a black dog white". So, here, you will never he able to whitewash this affair. It will give itself away. 92. vVe have been discussing two basic issues: first, the attack. But attack by whom? There is sorne con- fusion about this, confounded by the fact that the urst version put out was a complete corruption of the facts, with the obvious intention of whitewashing those who were guilty of the attack. The second issue is the location of the attack. Here too there is sorne confusion. But, ta be more precise, confusion is not the correct ward. for the original reports failed to bear out the United States story that the incident had taken place at a distance of 100 miles. and refuted the assertion that the Neptune aircraft \~as not above Soviet terri- tory, since a distance of 100 miles does in fact fall within our territory. You may measure, remeasure, calculate and reca1culate and you will find that this is the case. The original story is therefore replaced by a new one for which a new distance has been invented -125 ta 145 miles - in the effort, as the N e'lV York Hemld-T1'ibune admits in the report of 7 September by Mr. Kerr, at aIl costs ta prove that the alleged attack on the United States land-based patrol bomber was committed over international waters. In order ta prove that, the original figure of 100 miles had ta be dropped. A new story had to he invented and the number of versts, miles or kilometres had to be altered. The 100 miles became 125 to 145 miles. And this is the sort of evidence the Council is being asked to consider. 93. l therefore contend that this evidence deserves neither attention nor credence. 94. 1 venture to draw attention .to the following fur- ther fact. Both in the United States notes Nos. 202 and 203 of 6 September 1954 and in the United States representative's statement today, aIl reference is omitted to an important question, to which an answer is parti- ~ularly essentiaI in view of the fact that a threat to mternational peace and security is being alleged. The question is what patrol functions the United States military aircraft was supposed to be carrying out and what patroI functions Ut:ited States aircraft are in general carrying out when in the air space over the Soviet territory or, as the_, United States note says, 96. This is, of course, an important question. If you. are anxious ta avoid difficulties anù to ensure that there are no misunderstandings like1y to result in interna- tional complications, would it not be necessary to give sorne attention to this aspect of the question? Might it not be 'advisable for aState to limit or prohibit sG-CaUed patrol aircraft, which occasionaUy become involved in situations in which they open fire, from approaching foreign coasts, at least within a distance of 40 miles. This point has been completely overlooked. \Ve consider it extremely important. 97. A partial answer ta it is ta be found in one of the United States newspapers l read yesterday. The issue of 8 September of this paper, the Christian Science Monitor, contained an article which is worthy of at- tention and from which 1 shaH quote verbatim, refrain- ing from aIl comment. 1 shall mere1y read what the article in question in the Christian Science 111onitor 8 September states, namely: " ... air patrolling now is not merely a business of flying high and seeing whar the htillmn eye can pick out on a nearby coast. It is a business of using e1ectronic aids - radar for short - to see what's cooking further than the eyt can see. It is a business of flying a plane chockful of eIectronic equipment and testing out the opponent's radar installations, sen- sing their effectiveness and ability." The article goes on to say: "A plane which is 30 or 40 miles off the coast and using its radar may be deemed ta be offensively "No Pentagon official is going to say how steadily or how frequentIy the United States sends its planes around Hokkaido or close to Siberia, but an alert Navy and Air Force isgoing tG carry through with the kind of patrolling that keeps intruders at a dis- tance and finds out what can be reasonably ascer- tained about hostile installations and reactions." 98. veut comme affectés à constate que ces missions la par ressent 98. This is an outspoken statement of the aims of these patrol flights by patrol aircraft, which, according to the United States representative, no"rmally under- take routine flights. The United States representative, however, said that the flight in question was for "wea- ther reports". It appears, however, that this means practice in testing the radar strength and the radar installations of those countries which, for one reason or another, are of particular interest to the United States Commando 99. This, we learn, is the purpose of the so-called "peaceful" flights of patrol aircraft. 100. There is lio doubt that the Neptune bOMber which, aceording to the Navy Department, was en~îaged in a routine patrol flight from its base in Japan and, according to the same source, was flying parallel to the coast of the Soviet mainland, had similar reconnaissance objectives. 99. fiques" 100. sance "Neptune" ment naissance Département parallèlement 101. M. précisément à Il duquel bombardier l'a naissance lations parler n Toutefois, tances Il On d'armements vols littoral précisément moyen c'est 102. la ne autour d'avance duire, 101. In connexion \Vith the newspaper article 1 quoted, a reference to an incident described (or at least recalled) by Mr. Lodge is apposite. This incident, which took place in the Baltic, involvecl the shooting down of a United States military patrol bomber by Soviet fighters. It was reported at the time that this Baltic military patroi aireraft was testing out Soviet radar installations. The newspaper, from which 1 have just quoted, con- tains the following statement: "There is no official admission that the Navy pa- troi bomber shot down 44 miles off Siberia \. as simi- larly engaged in radar patrolling ..." There is no official statement to tlut effect, but the newspaper goes on to say: " ... The circumstances are simiIar". Nor can they be otherwise. Neptune aircraft were involved in both cases. As we know, the Neptune aircraft is fitted out with arms and radar equipment of e~ery sort. It makes routine flights, approaching to wlthin 30 or 40 miles of the Soviet coast, at which very distance it is in a position to observe what is going on ~here and by means of its radar equipment to obtain the mforrnation it is interested in - the object being to test the strength of Soviet installations. 102. That is, in fact, why certain naval authorities assert that these incidents are a normal risk in con- nexion with such operations, and recommend that no fuss should be made about them, pointing out that the possibility of such incidents must be anticipated and that they cannot he avoided except by renouncing the 104. Renee, the whole responsibility for the incident of 4 September, and for the further attempts te e..'Cploit these incidents with the object of creating international tension rests squarely on the United States Government.

It is 12.45 p.m. and 1 have several speakers on my list who wish to speak today. 1 therefore propose that now hear the French interpretation of the Soviet Union representative's statement, then adjourn the meeting and meet again at 3 p.Ul. We will then hear the English interpretation of Mr. Vyshinsky's statement followed by the statements of the other speakers on my list. 106. However, before the interpretation begins, must infonn the Council that the Soviet Union representative has just transmitted to me a letter 1 in Russian, which has not yet been officially translated, requesting, as 1 understand, that copies of the notes of 5 and 8 September should be circulated. They will' be circulated in accordance with this request as soon as they have been translated. Rep~tblics was given. 107. The PRESIDENT (translated from French): The next meeting will be held this afternoon at o'dock. It will begin with the interpretation into Eng- lish of the statement by the representatîve of the Soviet Union. The mceting t'ose at 1.30 p.m. 1 The letter was subsequently circulated as document 5/3288.