S/PV.680 Security Council

If there are no objections to the adoption of the agenda, which is exactly the same as that adopted at the 679th meeting by 10 votes to 1, l will caU upon the representative of the United Kingdom to speak. 2. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (tramlated fl'mlt Russian): For the same reasons as l gave in my first statement objecting to the inclusion of this item in the agenda of the 679th meeting of the Security Council, l also object to its inclusion in the agenda of the 68ûth meeting of the Council. 3. The discussion of this item seems to me to be absolutel}' profitless and unjustified. 4. The PRESIDENT (translated from F1oench) : For the reasons l gave at the 679th meeting l call for the vote on the adoption of the agenda. A vote was ta.ken by show of hands. In favQ1.tr: Brazil, China, Colombia, Denmark, France, Lebanon, New Zealand, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ire1and, United States of America. Against: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The agen.da was adopt~d by 10 votes ta 1. Letter dated 8 September 1954 from the representative of the UnÏted States of America to the President of the Security Council (S/3287) ( continued)

l do not know whetherthe significance to be attached to the vote of the representative of the Soviet Union, which was a vote against discussing this question, is that we should 6. It \Vas with profound regret that we heard of the incident of 4 September 1954 in which a United States Navy plane was shot down by Soviet fighters. There have been a deplorable number of incidents of this kind. To shoot without provocation at foreign aircraft which have appeared anywhere near, or even remotely near, Soviet territory seems unforttinately to have becQme a Soviet practice. 7. Mention has been made during this debate of various similar incidents, including one in which a British aircraft was involved. 8. Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom fully supports the action of the United States Government in seizing the Security Council of this matter and thus alerting world opinion. It is, in our view, most desirable that there should be a strong and widespread international reaction against such unwarranted acts of force in times of peace wmch can only serve to increase international tension. 9. Let us examine for a moment the circumstances of tms particular incident. The United States representative has given us a calm and objective account of what occurred. The representative of the Soviet Union disputes these facts. His version was diametrically different. That is perhaps what could he expected. But, frankly, it did not seem to me to carry conviction. l am bound to say that in the view of my delegation there appears to be strong p"ùna facie evidence that the attack was not only unprovoked and made without warning, but occurred well outside Soviet air space. On the evidence the attack is indefensible. 10. My Government would think it deplorable if the practice came to be accepted of shooting down aircraft, whether military or civilian, in time of peace, without warning or provocation, merely on the ground that they were in the neighbourhood of the territorial air space of another State. This would be contrary to every precept of proper international behaviour. Moreover, we are, l think, bound to find this trigger-happy attitude on the part of the Soviet Union glaringly incompatible with professions of a desire to reduce international tension. 11. My delegation wishes to express its great distress at the particular incident to which the United States delegation has drawn atr-ention and its profound sympathy with the friends and relations of the unfortunate airman who must be presumed to have lost his life as a result of it. 12. Most delegations here, l am sure, share the~e sentiments, and l should hope that our discussion here would serve to make it plain that world opinion strongly disapproves of such acts of uncivilized behaviour. 13. The United Nations is now seized of this matter, and the views of the Council will be clearly on record. It is incumbent upon all Members of the United Nations, and indeed non-Members, to take heed of the views expressed in this Couneil and to conduct themselves in accordance with those principles of international be- 15. The United States representative's explanation of bis Government's position favourably impressed us aIl by its moderation and its studied objectivity. We were equally glad ta hear him affirm the United States Govemment's desire ta undertake the settlement of aIl the regrettable incidents which he enumerated, in a spirit consistent ",vith the precepts laid down in the Charter, by a process of peaceful negotiations and, should they fail, by recourse ta the International Court of Justice. That is a course from which peace-Ioving peoples should never allow themselves to be diverted, and the Soviet Union Government would great1y weaken the force of the assurances in favour of international peace and conciliation which it has so often given us here if it refused ta take it. 16. 1 listened with no less attention to Mr. Vyshinsky's statl'ment, and 1 \Vas glad to note that our coIleague ende2.voured, 50 far as the fire of his l'ver youthful temperaml'nt allowed him, ta adopt as moderate atone as Mr. Lodge. 1 hope that in the wl'eks and months ta come the exchange of views between our two l'minent colleagues will continue thus to combine firmness as regards substance with this relaxed moderation as regards form. 17. With great brilliance Mr. Vyskinsh.'J made the most of certain contradictions and certain divl'rgencies which he found in the official United States documents and Press reports on the incident of 4 September. We had before us an advocate interested not sa much in defend~ng a legal argument or in establishing the facts of hlS case as in endeavouring to embarrass the witnesses by an ingenious and insidious cross-examination. But h~ who tries ta prove tao much often proves nothing, and,.In my opinion, there are grounds for seeing in certaIn contradictions and certain fumblings and actions b~ the United States proof of that Government's good faIth rather than of its dishonesty. By acknowledging spontaneously that it had been wrang in stating on the first day that the United States aircraft had not replied to the fire of the Soviet fighters, it gave proof of honesty :ather than of duplicity. There was nothing ta campel It, other than a wish to be truthful, ta correct the assertion, which could have been contradi:ted only by an unsupported counter-assertion. As to the testimony of 3 18. About the incidents themselves 1 shaH merely say that this attitude on the part of the United States authorities, which Mr. Vyshinsky holds against them, seems to me to constitute a solid and even a convineing presumption of their good faith, and that while 1 am no more an airman than Mr. Lodge or Ml'. Vyshinsky himself, all the airmen 1 have been able to consult agree that it is almost ineonceivable that a bomber could deliberately expose itse1f ta the risk of a reply bound to be fatal to it by opening fire on fighters which are mueh faster, much lighter and much less vulnerable than itse1f. 19. But the question before us is a different one-or rather, it goes far beyond the incident of 4 September. What should be borne in mind, and the view the Security Council should express, is that it is inadmissible that the undoubtedly regrettable but often inevitable presence of an aireraft close to or even over the territory of a foreign country, in peace time, should be punished by its destruction and by loss of human life. Even if the aircrafthas committed an error, even if it is established at thè very moment of the incident - and that is strictly speaking impossible - that that error was voluntarily and deliberate1y committed, the use of force in driving it off, with the certain risk of destroying it, should not be aeeepted by civilized countries maintaini1lg peaceful reIations Witll each other. The varying limits of territorial waters were fixed in the time of Sai:~ll!; vesseIs, when it took ships several hours to caver a distance an airerait now covers in a few minutes. Besi~~es, any airman will tell you that it is as impossible ix: the great majority of cases for an observer on land or at sea as it is for the pilot of an aireraft to determine wiiliin a matter of kilometres the vertical position of an aireraft. This consideration, opening up as it does 50 many possibilities of errors committed in good faith, should be enough to render recourse to force and violence in eorrecting and rectifying them morally unacceptable. 1 must add that it should also indicate the desirability of prudence and wisdom to aircraft carrying out peaceful missions near foreign territory; and it is to he hoped that the pilots of such aircraft will always leave an ample margin of adequate safety between the international air space open to them and the national air spaces, the limits of which they cannot easily discern exactly from the air. 20. As Ml'. Lodge has reminded us, when an incident of iliis kind occurs, there is an international procedure which should make it possible for it to he settled in an honourahle and peaceful way, in the spirit and according to the prov'isions of the Charter. If aState is convinced 25. An atmosphere of mistrust and hostility cannot possibly constitute the climate in which the nations of ~he two hemispheres are to live. Peoples sometimes differ 111 their ideologies. That is of no importance. The peopIes gathered under the flag of the United Nations have pledged themselves to practise tolerance and live together 111 .l~eace with one another as good neighbours. This spmt should govern the conduct of nations on land and sea and in tht: air. It is understandable that in an atmosphere charged with intrigue and suspicion excesses may sometimes be committed. Such may be the conduct of certain persons, but it must in no circumstances be that of nations. Accordingly, an act of the kind which has been reported to the Council, if it is not the first, compels us to conc1ude that the requisite steps to prevent the recurrence of such incidents have not been taken. J

1 voted both at the 679th and at the present meeting in favour of the adoption of the agenda, after listening carefully to the objections of the Soviet Union representative. 28. The Soviet Union representative raised two ohjections. One was to the effect that, in his mind, the United States version of the incident of 4 September was entirely wrong and that, therefore, the incident was not worthy of attention. His second objection was based on his opinion that a discussion in the Security Council of the incident of 4 September 1954 would, as he stated, aggravate the situation in the Far East. 1 should like to take up the second objection first. 29. 1 do not believe that by itself any discussion in the Security Council aggravates any international situation, or, for that matter, improves any international situation. "Vhat effect a discussion in the Security Council cau have on the factual situation in the world depends ta a large e..xtent on the tone of the discussion. In this respect, 1 should like ta join with preceding speakers this afternoon in congratulating the United States representative on the moderation and sobriety of his statement and on the fact that he informed the Council that lùs Government was ready and willing ta accept any of the means of peaceful settlement prescribed by the Charter of the United Nations. If there should be any aggravation of the international situa':Ïon as a result of this discussion, the responsibility therefor would certainly not lie on the shoulders of the United States de1egation. 30. Suppose the Council had decided to accept the objection of the Soviet Union representative and had dismissed t1ùs cOll1plaint offhand. Would that have improved the international situation? Let us imagine the resulting situation in the world if we had accepted the advice of the Soviet Union representative. 1 do not be1ieve that it would have been improved at aIl. 1 believe that the effect of such action would, indeed, have aggravated the situation not onlv in the Far East but in the world as a whole, for by dismissing this complaint without a discussion we should have destroyed one of the important instruments of peace which the world has today. 31. 1 am finnly convinced that the Security Council did the right thing in adopting this agenda and in proceeding to consider the serious complaint that the delegation of the United States has placed before us. 1 would go a little further and say t1ùs: The United States, in brintillg this case to the Security Council, has acted not only in defence of the interests of the United States but also in loyal fulfiIment of its obligations as a Member of the United Nations. 32. Now we are faced with this situation. We have heard a version of the facts presented to us by the representative of the United States; we have heard also, a version of the facts presented to us by the representative of the Soviet Union; and the n"o versions are diametrically opposite. 1 am not a third party witness of the 34. A second consideration is that such incidents have occurred in the past. The representative of the United States this morning caUed our attention to a number of such incidents affecting United States aircraft. He also called the attention of this Ccuncil briefiy to some of the incidents affecting aircraft of other countries. 35. It so happens that yesterday morning l received the report of the Australian Royal Commission on Espionage. This publication is caUed Official Tra1tscript of Proceedings taken at Melbourne on Wednesday, 30 June 1954. It produces the testimony of a former Soviet civil servant. l have in mind Mr. Petrov, whose name figured so largely in the world Press a few months aga. Now, unexpectedly and in fact very surprisingly, this testimony supplies a test of the veracity of the Soviet Union Government in matters of a similar kind. 36. In the winter of 1937, Soviet Union armed forces sought to }ntrud<: into the Chinese province of Sinkiang. The SOVIet UUlon Government then, as the Soviet Union representative here, proclaimed itE own innocent::e. In this testimony, 1 was interested to find that Mr. Petrov said that he was a member of that unit which intruded into Chinese soil and that in fact Soviet sol- ~e.rs, tanks and aeroplanes did ca~ry on ~arlike acti- Vlhes on Chinese soil and then withdrew. That controversy lasted for severa! years without any final decision 37. This lllorning, we hearu a version of the facts which we may calI the Vyshinsky version of the incident of 4 September; and, in the course of time, we will also have a Petrov version of the incident of 4 September. 38. This in-:ident of 4 September stands condemned by the civilized opinion of the world. In the opinion of my delegation, the action of the Soviet Union aeroplanes \vhich shot down the United States aeroplane deserves ta be condemned. 39. Mr. SARPER (Turkey): 1 have listened carefully ta the statements made by the representatives of the United States of America and the Soviet Union. My delegation is gratified to note the calm and moderate tenor of the statement made by the representative of the United States. 1 understand fully the depth of indignation felt by public opinion in the host country to our Organization over this most regrettable incident. 40. The incident as reported by the news agencies and as explained in the letter dated 8 September 1954 from the representative of the United States of America addressed to the President of the Security Council [5/3287] is indeed very grave. "A United States Navy P2V aircraft, on a peaceful mission over [international] high seas," states this letter, "was attacked without warning by two MIG-type ail'craft with Soviet markings . .. on September 4 ... " This unprovoked attack caused the destruction of the United States Navy aireraft and the loss of one of the members of its crew. 41. Had this been the first inddent of its kind, one might not perhaps feel as alarmed as one feels now. Such incidents have, most unfortunately, been recurring for sorne time in conditions similar ta those now under consideration. 42. As ta the arguments that the United States Navy aircraft had violated Soviet Union territory or Soviet Union air space and ~hat it had fired fi;:st on the Soviet fighters, thi"se are not sound and convincing at all. Even if we were ta suppose that the P2V aircraft had flown over Soviet Union territor" as a result of human or mechanical error, or because of unfavourable atmospheric conditions, it should, according to well-established practice, have been warned and di, ected to its proper course. The ignoring of this practice and the shoot;ng down of the aircraft without warning cannot and should not be condoned. 43. The representative of the Soviet Union quoted abundantly in his statement from the United States Press, and he made grerrt capital of an error in the reports that immediately followed the incident under consideration. The United States Government, as the representative of the SovQet Union admits, subsequently corrected this error and gave an accurate account of the incident as it actually took place. This, in our opinion, should rather be appreciated than sharply criti- 45. Avoidance of such provocative acts in international relations is one of the first prerequisites for achieving an atmosphere of international co-operation that will be conducive ta the maintenance of international peace and security. What makes the incident under consideration ail the more deplorable is the fact that it has occurred at a time when appearances tend to indicate that sorne attempts are being made to lessen the existing tension in international relations. 46. In this brief statement l have tried to be as frank and as straightforward as 1 could he in order to show the apprehensions of my delegation over the recurrence of such lamentable incidents which might increase to dangerous proportions the already existing tension. It is in this spirit that we are prepared to support any decision or recommendation which may lead to a peacefuI solution and provide assurances for the prevention of the recurrence of such incidents.

An incident of the nature described in the United States representative's letter of 8 September is prima fada a matter of international concern, and when, as'in this case, the States involved are great Powers, such ail incident cannot be yiewed other than with gravity. That sense of gravity IS accentuated by a feeling of grief and sympathv over the loss of life involved. - 48. At this stage no specific action by the Council has been J2roposed. Ev~n if no action is contemplated, however, ~t IS appîOpnate that the Council should be fully acquamted wIth the facts and that its members should ~ave an opportunity to express their views. I, too, should hke to paya tribute ta the t:1oderation and candor displayed by the representative of the United States in his speech. this morning. The consensus of opinion in the ~ot1ncll - and that consensus is already clear enough - It may ~e hoped, will be taken into account by the parties responslble, whether or not it is embodied in a formaI resolution. 49. It cannot be disputed that this incident took place, and that, furthermore, in recent months other incidents of a similar nature have occurred in each of which Communist planes have attacked pl~nes of other natio- 50. In this conne.'don 1 should like to refer ta the speech delivered in the general debate at the seventh session of the General Assembly by the leader of the Swedish delegation. In his speech] Ml'. Unden referred ta a similar incident involving Swedish and Soviet planes, and his remarks, in my opinion, were a model of pertinence and moderation. 51. He drew attention to the fact that both the Swedish planes shot down had been flying over international waters, even outside the hvelve-mile limit cIaimed by the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union, he reported. refused to accept any responsibility in regard to the first daim. despite the fact that no aircraft belonging to a third Power were in the vicinity. In regard to the second incident, the Soviet Union claimed that the plane concerned had crossed the Soviet frontier and had opened nre. In fact, the Swedish plane \Vas unarmed and was engaged in rescue operations. The Soviet Union further refused to submit the matter either to the International Court of Justice or ta arbitratian.· 52. It was in connexion with this last refusaI that the representative of Sweden made his most cogent point and one that is equally relevant today. The Swedish representative dre\\' attention to the "tremendous peace offensive" which had been launched by the Communists. He emphasized, as so indeed did the representative of the United States today, the valuable contribution to peace which would derive from an extensive use of a judicial procedure in the settleme~t of international disputes. "The governments which range themselves behind the new peace propaganda", he concluded, "should at any rate show so much good wiII as not themselves to refuse acceptance of inquiry by international organs into the facts of a dispute", 53, Today there is much talk of the possibility of what is cal1ed "peaceful co-e.xistence". 1 should like to suggest two simple ,\-ays in which a state of peaceful co-e.xistence can be strengthened. In the first place, attacks of the kind we are discussing should not be made. Surely they cau be avoided. None, 1 believe, is unavoidable. In the second place. sucb disputes as do arise should be submitted to international judgment, and that judgment should be ac~em:ed, Ii these two principles were foI1owed by aIl, "peaceiul co-existence" would attain a less precarious reality than it has today. 54. ::\Ir. BORBERG (Denmark 1: A detailed account of the incident of 4 September and the reply of the Soviet L~mon representative having been given just l See Official Reco'l'ds of the General Assembly, Seventh Session, Plcllary Meetings, 379th meeting. 56. To that hope 1 add the expression of another hope, based on their stand here today, that the great Powers, in their endeavours to safeguard peace, will henceforth find it possible to make their military border relations less tense. The effect of shooting dO\vn one single aireraft in peace time is of no military importance worth speaking of, but its effect in making negotiations more difficult is long lasting. Add incident to incident, and the willingness of governments and people to sertIe down to negotiations, trading and living together will dwindle in proportion to the tensions created by the incidents. A poliey of avoiding incidents would be a great help to all peace endeavonrs.

Since aIl the members of the Council have expressed their views on this case, 1 should like to make same observations in my capacity as representative of COLO:VIBIA. 58. \Ve have all of us had to reply to general criticisms of the United Nations. Tt is accused of being a useless organization which could weIl be dispensed with. But the fact is not that the United Nations is useless or ineffective, but that our govemments do not knaw how to make use of it. The United States request gave us great satisfaction, because it proves not only the usefulness, but also the necessity, of the United Nations and the justification for its existence. 59. In the past, even incidents less serious than the one we are now discussing have started wars. It is to be hoped that the permanent members of the Council will in future bring such incidents before it, as the United States has done; for this discussion shows how important a part the Security Council can play in preventing them from bringing about consequences of more tragic seriousness. 60. l have to admit that l did not understand the arguments adduced by our eminent Soviet Union eo~l~~gue very weIl. l do not, for instance, see why he cntlclzed the United States delegation for approaching ~e la~t Monday and requesting the convening of the Seeunty Cauncil four days later. On the contrary, pI:'ôV('~ lll)t merely his entire gt)od faith but also his sinœrity. That is why r believe that what has happened duritlg' th~ p:\St four days - the haste with which the ~ase "'as rd~rred t\) the S~t\rity Coundl and the very frank \.~orre~tionof c~rtain error~ and certain reports- œ.'\rs witnt'ss ta a sinct.'ritv and a good faith for which an of us should he gritefui to the United States de1eg~tilm. 61. r ha\'e a180 becn impressed by the case argtted by our Frèndl colleagtte, ~1r. Hoppellot. Even without bein.g an airman, one:- must obviously Ilnd it hard to undel'stand why a mcre bŒllher would provoke an attack by nghtN' planes, which. as everyone kilOWSl have far gre~tN' ~triking fol'\.'é. It is just as though someone were h\ try to <\ttack \Vith his bare fists a soldier armed with a snlHl1athine g1.ll\. It is incomprehensible on the Îa\':e of it. Tt is hard ta Sée how the reconnaissance alr<:r,~ft ~onld. have attatked the fighter planes. 62. l have tlot-ed, too, Ml'. V:y~hinsky's argument that the map ~akulations were wrong. No very accurate maps are awtilab1e, hut r have referred to an atlas and have ü'und. tlmt Vladivostok is situated at the south of a penil1$ula less than fifty miles long. Following Mr. Yyshinsky's suggestion l drew a Hne eastward from \ 'ladivostok; and according to the scale. the distance of ~OO miles to which he referred gives a point on the high seas, not on an)' territory, either Soviet or non..s..wiN. l may quite well he wrong. but this does at least show dearlv that the matter needs to be e~mine(Î more dosëIy. l should he grateful to the Soviet re:pre~entati'Veii Ile would fumish us with a map :sn tlk'lt we i'.an clleck the distances he mentions. 63. Tha1' is why I, for my n'Wu part, would have been in fuvomoi ID! im'estigation in acœrdance 'wi1'h Article 34 oi the Charter~ Indeed, 11' was precisely for reasons of '1:.1Ù5 sort that the decision 'miS tal-en ta include this Article when the Charter "'"85 dmfted ai San Francisco: in order to give the Secrrrity Counci1 the power to ~u:ateanydb--pnte 50 .as to prevent obscure incidents irmn he..-.oming fr~""'aîs ta inteI'P..ational peace and securit\ .as .a resu1t of false infonnation or misinterprei:a:tiàn. Acrordingly. the Counci1's investigatory POWeI"5 WETe nniver5al:ty reco",o-nized, without reservation. :Still IDDïe: the permanent members of the Counci1 '\Vere :requiTed toabstam frnm -voting in the discussion of .any diEpnte +" v-bir:b they were parties, as was the case wifu :the U.,:.~~~ Kingdom when the Corlu qlle~i:ion r:ameup for consideration. In my opinion it WGu1d mUJ135riomilily he a grea! step iorwarc if the CCiunci1 ~a11owed to Jml1œ use of :the imre:."i:igatory powers crnlierr-edupnn Îî: ai San E=cisco; for that wiDu1d ~it iD '5ctt1e Bitnariom; -which might, if allnwed toiie:ttÙrn:i:tre, starta war, as tbey have done in the jpast. ~. As the representative of Denmark has very judi- ~IOusly observed, nothing is more dangerous than mternational tension in frontier areas. Anything that is done to obviate incidents in these areas wilI contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security. ~f~::gI ~~l ~:~~];;ot~ffo~e:uc;~a~nre~~~~~~ desIgned ta achieve the pllTposes laid down in Chapter VI of the Charter. ~ 70. Speaking now as PRESIDENT, l should like to say that l have no other speaker on my list. Does any ~ 1 :nember of the Council propose to speak after the mterpretation of my Etatement? 73. If l understood him correctly, Mr. Urrutia is now proposing not only that l should take a line directly opposed to my position, as l have just described it, but also that l should acquiesce in the desire that the Council should undertake a more detailed examination of the question. He is presumably counting on my great naiveté. He is probably assuming that l shall agree, ,vith a kinel smile, to absolut~ly everything. That woulel he a completely unfounded assumption. 74. l prove to you that it is not the business of the Secnrity Council to examine this question, and the reply l get is: "Come, let us appoint a commission to go more deeply into the question". But if l said: "1 elltirely agree with you, let us appoint such a 76. Accordingly l consider that Article 34, to which you have referred, can have no bearing on this question, simply because this question has no connexion with Chapter VI. Chapter VI is' concerned with cases in which a dispute arises the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. 77. l deeply regret the occurrence of such incidents as that of 4 September. Even so, however, we surely cannot seriously think that this incident is capable of causing international complications Iikely to endanger international peace and security? And what l have heard here from other members of the Security Council strengthens my conviction that, whatever attitude we may adopt in this case, whatever regrets we may express - and regret is ca11ed for because the incident, since it entailed loss of life, provoked needless tension in the relations of the countries directlv involved - we must not represent the case as one which, unless sorne sort of special measures are immediately adopted by the Security Council, will directly threaten international .peace. But articles in the United States Press say quite trankly that the case must by hook or by crook be hrought under Chapter VI in arder to make it impossible for the Soviet Union to cast a contrary vote, that is to use the veto, in arder to force it to abstain from yoting, as prescribed in such cases by Article 27, paragraph 3 of the Charter. But all these manoeuvres have ~bsolutely no bearing on the incident itself, despite aIl 1ts . ~egrettable aspects frDm the humanitarian and pohtlcal points of view - in which connexion, of course, l have no reason to raise any objections and sha11 raise none. 78. Of course, an incident is an incident. This is a regrettable incident. Firing is regrettable wherever it occurs. But, l venture to ask, what connexion is there hetweeJ.1 this incident and Chapter VI of the Charter? There IS absolutely no connexion. 79. The United States representative and l will doubtless continue to differ about how the incident came about, who was guilty, what were the consequences, 80. Of course, an increase in the frequency of border incidents could bring about a threat to peace; quantitative changes of any kind may he transformed into a qualitative change. But a dispute connected with an incident of this kind is not by itself sufficient to create such a threat; this will arise only if such incidents are repeated. Naturally we must take steps to see that they do not occur. l shaH fully support any proposaIs which, independently of this particulaI' case, are designed to prevent the occurrence of such incidents in the future; but the essential condition for that is ta put an end to this "prying" (as the United States Press calls it) into foreign territory by so-called patrol bombers, which are made out to be quite puny, indeed incqpable of attacking anyone and so slow that they can scarcely disengage if attacked by sorne other aireraft. 81. In my view, measures must he taken to put a stop ta this patrolling, or weather observation or, as Mr. Lodge called it, anti-submarine surveillance. It may be asked what submarines the aircraft were looking for. Whose submarines were they trying to track down and where? If the United States fleet were to cease performing such functions, if the whole practice and system of what is called peaceful patrolling were dropped ~ a policy in actual fact of endeavouring to penetrate frontiers with military aircraft, armed to the teeth and intended, with the help of their radar and other apparatu,,: to detect and observe one thing and another ~ then we should have grounds for hoping that such incidents would not be repeated in the future. No selfrespecting State can permit its State frontiers to be inadequately defended. 82. Mr. Munro has referred here to the incident involving a Swedish aircraft in 1952. l should like to point out, if we are to consider that incident, that it too involved the question whether or not it is permissible to open fire on an aircraft which does not comply with a request made by the frontier authority of aState. 83. The Swedish Government in its correspondence with the Soviet Government argued that Swedish legislation and Swedish regulations in general did not admit that thesis. However, l should like to recall that there is a Swedish Goverr.I1l1ent instruction which was appended to the Swedish Government's note to the Soviet Government in 1952, in which it is stated that individual aircraft which penetrate into Swedish territory without permission should be warned to withdraw. If the aircraft does not change its course and head away from Swedish territory, the instruction says, it should be fired on. 84. This is natural and right. Every State which has any respect for its sovereignty, its independence and its security in aU cases has the right of self-defence. Where there is no attack, there need he no self-defence: that is the import of this principle. Of course it does not mean that aState may take the offensive on the ~ow the case, the United States Navy should consider Itself the master of the situation in the Pacific, able ta do whatever it likes. It can sail into the Strait of Formosa. It can undertake the defence of that unfo!ttm.ate so-called Government of Chiang Kai,·shek, wIth Its equally unfortunate and not over-intelliO'ent representatives with whom we are unfortunately oblfged to have dealings here and who engage in aIl manner of slanderous nonsense which, 1 regret to say, runs unchecked in the Security Council, as was clearly demon- ?trate~ here today. We have heard many statements, mcl.udmg those of highly placed representatives of the pmted States, to the effect that the United States Navy IS the master in the Atlantic, the Mediterranean and the Pacific. It is the master everywhere. Efforts are being ~ade to make us believe that anything United States ~Irc:aft, submarines, or surface warships do will be ]ustIfied. 1 see proof of this here now. 88. 1 shaH revert to ~ir Pierson's statement in which he referred to "strong evidencc". vVhat "strong evidence" does he have in mind? On what is it based? On the statements which the airmen were able to make. But wc still do not even know what they said beyond the faet that one ainnun said he opened fixe and another said that he did not open fire. The Navy Department states in reply to inquiries that it is Ilot known who fired. But if it is not known who fired, when and why he fired are also unknown. And this is what is described as fwim.a fade evidence. But such a description is a lllockery of the course of justice. It is not prim.a fade evidence, but prime nonsense. The 1110st complete and utter nonsense. 89. The fact is that absolutely no evidence has been put forward in the case. Take Mr. Lodge's letter, for example. 1t contains no evidence to support the assertions made. Take his speech. In my view, he proved nothing ex:cept the opposite of what he set out to prave. 90. Sir Pierson Dixon's arguments therefore seem to me to be ill-considered and unwise. 91. l should like to say a few words about Mr. Hoppenot's ·statement. AIl of us have long been acquainted v.'ith Mr. Hoppenot and respect his stronger side - but he aIso has his weaker side, whic~ is connected with his \Vay of think;ng. Mr. Hoppenot said t11at contradictions are proof of good faith. For a man to ad-.'nowledge his own mistake is to strengthen the belief that he acted in good faith. NaturaIly, it is good when a man corrects his mistake. but it is not good if he does 50 and at once proceeds to commit a greater one. 92. Of course, if there are contradictions, if some say one thing and some say another, then, according to the maxim that the truth enlerges trom the clash of opinions, the truthemerges when contrary views are expressed. But how cau it be concluded that contradictions are proof of good faith? Does it mean that a man is not speaking in good faith if Ile speaks ",;thout involving himse1f in contradictions? .Are we to say that contradictions are proof of good faith and that therefore the more contradictions there are, the more good faith is demonstrated? A man who embroils hÙ11seIf in contradictions is a man of the greatest good faith because, had he not been, he would have been at pains 10 conceal and avoidcontradictions. 'VIllie if he does not avoid contradictions and if the contradictions pile up, one on top {lt another - a veritable mountain of contradictions - then he is a prodigy of good faith. That is MT. Hoppenot's reasonïng. This line of reasoning is inadvi::."'dhIe. This is p~-ncnlarlytrue in the present case, wiricb in'Volves not an abstract question of good faith, but the fact that there are contradictions in the state- 94. You say: let us verify the facts. Ml'. Urrutia even asked whether l would not produce a map. l could do 50 without difficulty, of course, though l have no cartographer's workshop or office here to prepare one. But l can go to a bookshop - assuredly in the United States there is a shop where maps are to be had and l have no doubt that they are to be had even in C0.1~mbiaand purchase the map. Then, after acqU1rlng a pair of dividers as well, aIl we have to do is to measure off on this map the appropriate distance to scale. You will then be able to fix the spot where th~se 100 miles end. Why then do you need a map of 1111l1e, a map signed by me? If l say "Certainly, here Y?U ar~", it will mean that l have been dragged into dlscuss1l1g this question: l will prod1'.œ a map, then 95. For the record, 1 should Iike to add with reference to one speaker, that 1 consider it beneath my dignity to react in any way to the sknderous statement by the so-called representative of Chin" who in reality is the representative of the Chiang Kai-shek clique and was thrown out of China by the freedom-Ioving Chinese people when they freeel themselves from their oppressors. 1 did not interrupt this gentleman when he made his provocative and slanderous statement. 1 did not l'aise a point of arder at the time because 1 relied on the loyalty of the President. 1 am now taking the opportunity of pointing this out. This too, very likely, is part of the plan for the consideration of this question; presumably it is considered undesirable to discuss it in a more tranquil manner than that whieh those gentlemen - who, 1 regret to note, are still seated near meallow themselves to use in discussing any question. 96. The Turkish representative said that this incident, in the fonu in whieh it was described in the American Press, gave rise to universal alarm. Of course, it gave Tise tu alarm; it alarmed us too, because we see in it evidence that certain States are persistently pursuing the objective of "feeling out", as sorne newspapers put it, what is going on in foreign territory. 97 This inoident provides further proof that such States are fo!lowing a course of action entailing consequences which do not contribute to an improvement in the international atmosphere; quite the reverse. The Berlin conference helped to ease the tension, despite the unfavourable conditions under whieh it was held; the Geneva conference resulted in the end of the war in Indo-China. That marked an enormous advance t6wards the strengthening of world peace and international security. As wc know, a number of other measures have been taken by sorne countries with a view to aggravating the international political situation; for example, the attemp~ ta compel France to vote for ratification of the so-called European Defence Community. That attempt failed, thanks to the resistance of the French people, for which they are only to be commended. AIl the facts 1 have mentioned have served ta ease international tension to sorne extent. This development was probably not weIcome in aH qnarters and it was perhaps thought that it might be useft.:.l, at this particubr moment, on the eve of the ninth session of the General Assembly, whieh will be called np ta consider and decide a large number of high!y important questions, to attempt to Taise a stir over this speciiic issue. The situation is quite simple: If a patrol aircraft attempts to cross our frontier, it will receive the appropriate treatm':nt from us. And such incidents are the germ, the initial cause from which a weakening of international confidence and cooperation develops. Every event, of course, bas a political explanation. ,~.=," ,','.''.'/ ,., >:::,".'.•..•.,.<•...,~ ,•.,<•.•__.•_..•':••. '....•..._._.,' __.',.,'.• ',_.'.",,"_";."._ •..•,•...•..,..•._.•.'.•.•.'_'-"_ ...,..,.._...•..•'.,f<••:: .•~..••••••,'.. ' ',,.;:.-"''''''.,'.,'.•''''f,·'-•.,·.•...,'...•.""'._..~.~-_ .-.-=.,-.,.c=--::'.;;;'ll;:~"""'••'•...,;.Jiii.;i,' ~._;o',;;;,''';;;0 ' < ...,;iJ, ;.;'J:;"'-::;'''.:.;:...;:,. ..::...:.::.:.~.:.....::.-..::.-....c::'._'..i.'"_·'·..:;,": 99. VVe do not suggest that the Neptune aircraft planned to attack the Soviet fighters. l presume that it had no such plan; but when it was told to leave it opened fire. 100. That is the situation; but the Turkish representative insists that no one taId the United States airmen ta withdraw, no one warned them that they were flying where they had no business to be. Where did he get this idea? 101. We decIare that that was what happened, and he replies that a warning should have been given, and that that was not done. AH this is hardly evidence of objectivity on his part in the present case. 102. He said: "We cannot believe that the American aircraft could have firec1 first, for that would have meant its destruction". He repeated what Mr. Lodge said about suicide. Of course, we can assume that the idea of committlng suicide did not enter into the Ameri.can airmen's plans. But it is a fact that the American aireraft was confronted with a specific situation; it was called upon to withdraw. But it answered the warniug of the Soviet aireraIt by opening nre. This has been proved by well-established facts. 103. But the question still remains: Who fired first? We advance one version and the United States advances another, contrary version. \iVhich should be given preference? Sorne speakers say the version containing contradictions. vVe, on the other hand, consider that preference shàuld be given to the version which is iree from contradictions. This is the crux of the matter. 104. The Turkish representative maintains that to have fired first would have meant certain destruction for the Neptune aircraft. This might be so were it not for t.he fact that the function of Soviet airerait protecting the mtegrity of the frontiers of the Soviet State is not ta shoot down an aircraft, even if it has commîtted a violation, but to prevent an aircraft from violating the Soviet frontiers and from persisting in such a violation. Ta that end, they caU on the offending aircraft and make a peaceful proposaI that it should discontinue the flight. 105. But the cases which Mr. Lodge has c:ompelled me ta describe here today go to show that what usuaJ1y happens is that the aircraft is requested to land but refuses ta do sa, is called upon to follow the Soviet planes, but declines to do so and opens fire. 101. répondez: on votre 102. tre que, répété ployé. n'envisageaient cet il reçu a 103. avons est répond qu'il faut dictions. celui là. 104. adoptant consommé oublie des non faute, et adressé qu'ils 105. à jourd'hui tude. drome donné; il refuse. soviétique; 106. ces buts sistent 106. Sorne of my colleagues ignore aIl this. Thev also evade the ~ues!i~n, of what purposes are purst~ed in these. patrOl actlvlU':S. What are these purposes? This questIOn was not answered. Are we ta believe that these 107. Ml'. Borberg expressed the hope that the two parties would find a solution satisfacto_y ta both of them. He spoke of his hopes that everything possible would be done ta ensure more normal border relations; he expressed the hope that these border relations would ~ecome less tense, and so forth. 1 agree with him entirely. The need, clearly, is that governments should live and \Vork together in frienciship. But this, of course, means that they must not intimidate one another with their armaments or, stillless, amass an infinite quantity and variety of such armaments and constantly try to create occasions for putting them to use by making up all manner of fables about dangers threatening now from the east, now through Alaska, now from the north and so on and so forth. In general, the peace endeavours of \vhich the Danish representative spoke here meet with a completely sympathetic response from me. But if they are to succeed, there must be not only desires but specifie actions, particularly on the part of those who glory in their strength. This will not do. We must not build everything on the premise that might is the universal deciding factor. Might is not right; right might. Right must he respected and, in particular, international law must be respected.

1 have only one member of the Council on my list of speakers for this evening - the representative of the United States. In view of the late hour, l have consulted the English-speaking and French-speaking representatives. By way of exception, and by way of exception only, they have agreed to dispense with interpretation in order ta aUow the representative of the United States to speak now, after which we shaIl adjourn the meeting. The United States representative informs me that his statement will take only a few minutes. Are there any objections to this procedure? 109. :Mr. HOPPENOT (France) (tra.nslated fram French): The right to interpretation belongs equally ta the speaker and the listener. In view of the special circumstances, and in arder not to delay the pleasure of the members of the Secretariat, who are certainly intending to take part in Staff Day, l am rea1y as listener to dispense with the interpretation into French, provided that Ml'. Vyshinsky, as a speaker, is prepared to do likewise. 110. The PRESIDENT (translated from French): Such is certainly my intention. That is why 1 have asked the Soviet Union delegation if it could by way of exception only and in view of the situation which has arisen today, dispense with the interpretation. 111. Ml'. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Repuhlics) : 1 agree. 112. The PRESIDENT (translated frorrt French): ln view of the fact that this procedure has been approved unanimously, 1 caU upon the representative of the United States. 113. :NIl'. LODGE (United States of America): Ml'. President, 1 shaH be true ta my word ta you that 1 wil! take less than three mir,,;es. 1 did think that 114. Then the representative of the Soviet Union began by expressing his unwillingness to. adopt the agenda, which will of cottrse inevitably - Ïet us face it-lead the world ta believe that he opposes discussion because his Government has something ta hide; otherwise, why would he oppose discussion? 115. Secondly, . his remarks were full of quotations from the United States Press as though the United States Press were the voice of the United States Government. It would be an understandable thing for a citi2:en of the Soviet Union who had never been here before to make such an assumption, because, of course, in his country the Press is a tool or arm of the Government and the people who work for the Press are in effect Govenunent employees, subject to the discipline of the Government. But it is passing strange that the repre!"entative of the Soviet Union, who has been here for so many years, should continue to make that error. 116. Now 1 myself was in the United States Press for a good many year::;, and 1 think it is a wondrous and excellent institution, but it does not speak for the United States Government. Quotations from it cannot he made as if they were matters of official fact here in the United States. 117. Then there was the discussion of the error in reporting the location of the downing of the plane. Of course, it is by now well-known all over the world that only the cammunists never admit making mistakes; only communists insist aIl the time that they are perfect, that they are the peerless anes who must be above the common ordinary run of mortals who sometimes get tired and who sometimes make errors. As. a matter of fact, the error was not a very large one; it consisted in reporting the incident in a clumsy way whereby a tine was drawn a hundred miles east, then dropped down south, and that is where the location was. The representative of the Soviet Union simply failed to mention the part about dropping down south and just stopped at the line going a hundred miles east. It is an old trick, and 1 have seen it worked in many courtrooms - but still it is a trick just the same. The fact is that this happened forty-three miles off the coast of Siberia, and there is no mystery at aIl about why United States planes should be in those waters: we have a peace treaty with Japan; we have the dt::~y and the right to exercise normal activities in that area. 116. pendant titue pas saurait la 117. parlé de l'erreur commise à propos de l'endroit où l'avion avait le naissent prétendent sans quels des rable; tion de jusqu'à l'URSS longement ligne n'est d'un lité, côte ricains se avec normalement 118. tant dit an posés 118. In regard to all the other cases mentioned bv the representative of the Soviet Union, 1 need but r~peat what.l previously said, that the United States is ready ta brmg them before the International Court of Justice. 121. What we are asking for today is not much; it is merely that the Soviet Union deal with these matters by peaceful processes. Surely, as Members of the United Nations, we should do no less.

As there bas been no interpretation of Mr. Vyshinsky's statement, may l ask Mr. Lodge whether he tao is prepared ta waive the interpretation of his last observations in arder ta enable Mr. Vyshinsky ta reply to one point.

l am glad to waive it.

1 do not wish to waste the Council's time but 1 should like to say a few words, ,at least, about one point which Mr. Lodge made in his last speech and which 1 cannot pass over in silence. 125. Mr. Lodge said that the USSR representative was apparently defending the right of the Soviet Union to shoot aircraft down over the high seas. If he had not made his speech in haste then 1 am sure Mr: Lodge would not have said that, for my whale argument on this question was concentrated on proving that the incident invohring the Suviet and United States aircraft occurred over Soviet territory and not over the high seas. It is therefore absurd to suggest that 1 could be defending the right of any State ta shoot aircraft down over the high seas. 126. It is others who wish to defend this right. We are opposed to it. The people who defend it are those who consider, for instance, that they have the right ta shoot aircraft down over Formosa, that is to say, not over their own territory and not over their own waters, but over the Straits of Formosa, to fly round other nations' ships and generally to misuse the armed forces they have in this region. We do not engage in such activities. 127. Such a conclusion is wholly absurd and 1 must correct Mr. Lodge's mistake. 1 hope he will concur. ..: : SALES AGEN'rS FOR UNITED DEPOSITAIRES DES PUBLICATIONS GREECE-GRECE "Elofthoroud.kl,," tion. Aihênes. GUATEMALA Gouboud & 28. Gu.tom.i HAITI Ubrairie liA III·B. Port·ou·Princ HONDURAS librerl. POMmoric.n•• HONG KONG-HONG-KONG Tho 'Swindon Kowloon. ICElAND-ISLANDE Bokovftrzlun Ausiurstraeti INDrA·INDE Oxlord Boo~ Hou,o. Now Coleullo. P. Vorodoch.,y ARGENTINA-ARGENTINE Editori~1 Sudamericana. Aisina 500. Buenos Aires. AUSTRALlA·AUSTRALlE H. A. Godd.rd. 255. Goorg. St~ Svdnov. Md 90 Qu••n St•• M.lbourn•• M.lbourn. Univ.rsitv Pr.... C.rlton N.3 Victoria. BElGIUM-BELGIQUE Agence et Messageries de la Presse S.A.• '14-22 ru. du Porsil. Brux.llo,. W. H. Smith & Sor.. 71.75. boul.v.rd Adolpho.M.x. Bruxollo,. BOLlVIA·BOLlVIE libr.rl. Soloccion.,. C.,iII. 972. l. P.~ BRAZIL·BRESIL • livraria AgÎr. Rio de Janeiro. Sao Paulo .nd B.lo Horizont•• CANADA Rv."on Pross. 299 Qu.on St. Wo,t. Toronto. FJeriodica. Inc.• 5112 Ave. Papineau. Mon- Ir.ol. 34. CEYl.ON.cEYLAN IIssoci.t.d New,p.p." of ,Coylon. l.lo Heuss. Colombo. CHILE.cHILI librerto Ivens. Menado 822. Santiago. Editoriol dol Podlico IIhumodo 57 50nllogo. CHINA,cHINE Th. W~rld Booi Co. ltd.. 99 Chung King Ro,d. 151 Section. Taipeh, Tlliwan. Commercial Press. 211 Henan Rd.• Shanghai. 'COLOMBIA.cOLOMBIE Librorta Améric", Medellin. librerfa Nac:ic'lOal Ltda.• Barranquilla. COSTA RICA.cCSTA·RICA Traies Hermones. Aportado 1313. San Jo,é. CUBA lo Co,o Belgo. O'Roilly 455. lo Hobono. CZECJ{OSLOVAKIA.TCHECOSLOVAQUIE Ceskoslovensky SpiSov4tel, N6rodnf Trfdl!!l 9. Proho 1 St~ Mod,~, INDONESIA·INDONESIE Pombongunon. Oiolo~o. IRAN K.tob·Kh.noh nue. leheron. IRAQ-IRAK Mocl.nzio', ISRAEL Blum,t.in·, Rood. Tol·Aviv ITALY·ITALIE Libreria Commissionorio Gino Capponi LEBANON·L1BAN libroirie Universelle, LIBERIA J Mamolu Albert Gomoyol. LUXEMBOURG Librllirie J MEXICo-MEXIQUE Editoriol Hermes 41. México. NETHERLAND5-PAYSoBAS N.V Mortinu, s.Grl!lvenhatje. NEW ZEALAN"Il-NOUVEU5-ZELAND! United Notions lond. C.P 0 NORWAY·NORVEGE Johon Grundt qu,"gt 711. DENMARK-DANEMARK Einar Munksqaard. ltd.. Norreg"de 6. Kobonhovn. K. DOMINICAN REPUBLlC· REPUBLIQUE DOMINICAINE librerfe Dominic:llna Mercedes 49 Ciu· dod Trujillo. ECUADO~·EQUA TEUR librorl. Cionlllico. Guoy.quil y Quito. EGVPT·EGYPTE librairie IOLa Renaissonce d'Egypte". 9 Sh. Adly Po,ho, Coiro. PAKISTiiN Thomo, & Thomo,. Rood. Ko,ochi. Publi,hors United, Th. P.li,ton Chill.gonq PANAMA Jo,6 M.n6ndez. PARAGUAY Moreno Hormono.; Asuncl6n, EL SALVADOR-5ALVADOR Manual Novas y Cfa•• la Avenido sur 37 Son Solvodor FINLANo.P1NLANDE III.t.eminon Kirjol.uppo. 2. K..lu.l.tu. H.f.inli. 'RANC! Edition. A. Pedon.. 13. ru. Soumot. P.rl. V. Orders and Inqulries from countrles where sol" agents have not yet been appolnted may be sent tOI Soles Circulation Section, United Nations, New York, U.S.A.; or Soles Section, United Notions OffIce, Palais Notions, Genevo, Switzerlond. Printed in Canada Priee: $U.S. 0.25; 1/9 (or equivalent in other