S/PV.682 Security Council

ln conformity with what has been the custom, 1 suppose representatives will expect me to invite the representatives of Israel and Egypt to come to the Council table. 2. Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): It is quite true, as the President has said, that it has been the custom of the Cüuncü to invite the two parties to any dispute to come to the Council table so that they might participate in our debate in aceordance with the rules of procedure, and 1 think that it is only right and fair that he should do so in the present instance. Since the agenda contains a complaint by Israel against Egypt, we should certainly have both the representative of Israel. and the representative of Egypt sitting at the table! With the Prèsident's permission, however, before he invites them to come to the table of the Council-although itmakes no ditrerence to me whether what 1have to say is said before or after he has invi~ed them-I should likci ifit is in order, to mak: sorne very brief remnrks. However, 1 sball be guided by thèPresident's decision. If he wishes me to say what

1 am sure that the representative of Lebanon will understand that it is a bit difficult for me to have any definite opinion since 1 do not know what is on bis mind. However, 1 think it would be quite in orqer for bim to s?eak now. 4. Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): 1 syrnpathize witQ the President's position, of course, and therefore 1 shàll accept bis kind permission to go ahead and say what 1 wish to say about this question. 1 take it that since we have adopted our agenda and are discussing item 2, we can now go into the substance of the matter. Oi am 1 wrong?

1 did not understand what was on the mind of the representative of Lebanon. The substance of the matter is something quite different from procedural questions, and therefore, since the representative of Lebanon has left it to me to decide, 1 tbink that the correct thing now would be to invite the representatives of Israel and Egypt to take their picices at the Council tablp.. 6. Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): 1 think that there is a misunderstanding. What 1 meant was that we are now talking about item 2 on our agenda, but l was not, as a matter of fact, planning to go into the substance of the matter. In fact, 1 was going to argue precisely that we should not go into the substance. 1 believe that the President misunderstood me when l mentioned our being able to talk about item 2. As 1said, it makes no difference to me whether he wishes me to speak now or after the representatives of Israel and Egypt come to the table. 1 am going to speak on procedure only, and not on the substance of the matter.

ln that case, if there is no objection, 1 shall invite the r~presentatives of Egypt and Israel ta come to the table of the Council. At the invitation of the President, Mr. Azmi, representative of Egypt, and Mr. E'ban, representative of Israel, took places at the Council table. 8. Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): This item, which was pJaced on the agenda of the Security Council in accordance with the letter of the representati,ve of Israel dated 4 October 1954 [S/3300], refers to bis letter of 28 January 1954 [S/3168] in which, as representatives will recall, he filed a similar complaint against Egypt. The complaint filed in that letter dealt with two issues, sub-paragraph (a) containing the exact wording of the item on our agenda of today, and sub-paragraph (h) concerning the Gulf of Aqaba. 9.When this item \Vas submitted to the Security Council in January, 1 happened to be President of the Council, and 1 remember that 1 asked the representative of New Zealand to rep!ace me in .the Chair [655th meeting]. w,:"Presentatives will remembe,. what..followed: the repre- 10. Then a lengthy debate, lasting a number of meetings, was held, and finally a draft resolution [S/3188 and Corr.l] was subnùtted on this point, namely, "enforcement by Egypt of restrictions on the passage of ships trading with Israel through the Suez Canal", which is exactly the same title as the one used by the representative of Israel. The Council debated that draft resolution; sorne were for it and some against, and finally, when it was put to the vote [664th meeting], the Council did not adopt it. And, if 1 remember correctly, that was the end ofour examination of tbis question when the Coun.cil rejected the draft resolution nn 29 March 1954. Il. Since then, this matter has been quiescent, and no one has asked for the Council to be convened in order to examine it until recently, when the representative of Israel submitted bis letter of 4 October 1954 [8/3300] to the President of the Council, and now, on 14 October, the Council is meeting to examine this matter. That is the history of this question up until this moment. 12. When we read the letter of the representative of Israel as to why he is reactivating this issue, we find that, after asking that the matter be taken up at an early meeting of the Council, and referring to his previous document and to the time when the Israel complaint was debated here, he goes on to say: " The representations which 1 have been instructed to make to the Security Council will refer to the general question of continued Egyptian interference with shipping in the Suez Canal, the most recent manifestation of wbich has been the illegal arrest and detention of the Israeli vessel SS Bat Galim on 28 September 1954. The detaHs of tbis incident were communicated to you "-that is, to the President ofthe Security Council- "in my letter of29 September 1954 (8/3296)." 13. We also have before us in connexion with the present item communications from the representative of Egypt in documents S/3297, S/3298 and S/3302 which, also for our information, place before rnembers of the Councîl a detailed account, seen from the point of view of Egypt, of this incident to which the representative of Israel refers in bis letter. 15. It is my. understanding-and 1 base this understanding on fairly good authority-that l'rom the time the Council failed to pass a resolution on this issue last Mareh, up uutil the incident involving this vessel, nothing whatsoever bappened in this whole question to warrant its being brought up again for debate by the Security Council-nothing, that is to say, except this last incident. Consequently, it would seem that this last incident of the ship was the occasion and the cause of the representative of Israel's wanting to have the Security Council debate this issue again. At least, 1understand-and 1have gone into this matter somewhat-that nothing whatsoever happened during the months between March and late September to warrant the bringing of this question before the Security Council again. 16. 1should like to put it another way. If we are going to debate this question now at sorne length it will, as far as 1know, be difficult for any representative to bring forward any new material on this issue that was not covered during the very lengthy debates we went through last February and March, other than the sbip incident. And, as 1bave said, this ship incident is now under investigation by the co~petent authorities in Egypt. Even the representative of Israel bimself says in his letter that l'rom certain point on ms Government lost contact with the ship, so that 1 do not know what new information he has in view of this lack of contact. The sbip is in the hands of the Egyptian authorities. The members of its crew are being interrogated there because the accusation is one of crime, and a very serious crime. 17. One wonders what the representative of Israel has in mind about this incident beyond what he has already written to the President of the Security COUDcil on the subject since, as 1 have pointed out, he says himself in bis letter that bis Government lost contact by radio with the vessel after a certain time. It follows that if we are to listen to a detailed debate on this issue we shall, unless 1 am entirely mistaken, hear a repetition ofthe arguments which we heard last February and March and at the end ofwbich an attempt to have a resolution adopted by the Security Council did not succeed. We shall either hear a repetition of those arguments-since nothing new has happened between then and now except the ship incident -or we shall hear a repetition of the information wbich has already been placed at our disposaI in the representative of Israel's letter. From the information at my disposai, 1 cannot conceive that any new materiaI-that is, materiaI from sources other than the two 1 have just mentioned-can possibly be placed before the Security Council. 19. j'ai ce simplement pour expliquer la suggestion de procédure que je que enquête 19. 1 am only talking about procedure, and 1 have brought up this question of the past and of what can possibly be communicated to us now, and so on, merely ta iUustrate this procedural suggestion 1 am making to the effect that, ifit meets with the approval ofthe Council, we should wait until the Mixed Armistice Commission finishes its investigation and submits its report to us. 20. 1 have said that there are one or two precedents that might to sorne extent guide us in connexion with this question. 20. pourraient, dans 21. du Conseil ce qui s'est passé de ont soumis une question à vues cet d'un l'incident de rités sur place, passé. sentants d'autres de Bennike, chargé et Bennike est arrivé en temps voulu, et c'est seulement alors que question. compris Jordanie. 22. sur Conseil tante. quelqu'un avis, et tement représentants l'Organisme présenté son rapport 23. je premier à voir sur quels points présent; mais il vaut 21. 1 should like first to remind the Security Council of what happened aImost exactIy a year ago with regarà ta the incident at Qibya. The three Western Powers submitted a point-I shall not calI it a complaint-for examination by the Security Council. After sorne preliminary consideration concerning the wording of the agenda, the Council adopted that agenda [627th meeting]. We then agreed among ourselves to restrain ourselves and not to enter into the substance of the Qibya incident until we had an objective report from the competent authorities of the United Nations on the scene as to what had actually happened. 1 could quote from statements made by the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom, and other representatives, to the effect that it would be wise not to enter into the substance ofthe matter until General Bennike, who was then Chief of Staff of the l'ruce Supervision Organization, had arrived and given us his report. In due time, General Bennike arrived, and discussion on the substance of the question was opened; all of us-including the representative of Israel and the representative of Jordan-participated fully in that discussion. 22. The Security Councilrs discussion of the Qibya incident constitutes a precedent in the following sense. The Council had a very important point before it.. An investigation of the matter was aIready under way, and there was a person who had the responsibility of telling us what he believed to be the facts of the case. We all restrained ourselves, and that was true of the two parties most directIy conct:rned-Israel and Jordan-whose representatives were heard from only after the chief of the Truce Supervision Organization had given his report [630tl1 meeting]. 23. ï quite understand that the above-mentioned precedent does not hold true in every respect, and 1 should be the first to realize where it is deficient as regards the present case, but it does hold true at least to the extent 24. The second precedent by which we might be guided -again with limitations-is that of the Guatemalan case, which was recently before the Security Council. It will be remembered that Guatemala presented a complaint [8/3232], wbich the Security Council voted to include its agenda and discuss [675tll meeting]. The representative of Guatemala presented his case; other representatives spoke; and, again, a draft resolution [8/3236/Rev.1] was submitted. The draft resolution was not adopted, but a subsLitute proposal made by the representative of France [8/3237] was adopted. A few days after that, the representative of Guatemala made another request [8/3241 and 8/3244] to present bis case to the Council. The Council met [676th meeting], and we aU remember-I shall not go into the details of what actuaUy happenedtbat it did not see fit even to include the item in its agenda, n-ot to speak of listening to what the representative of Guatemala had to say, because a regional organization was carrying on an investigation at the time and the Council felt that it should wait for a report on that investigation. 25. It seems to me that those two precedents are somewhat illuminating in tbis connexion. In both cases the questions were very serious and pregnant with tremendous possibilities from every point of view, and yet the Council considered that, since investigations were being carried on, it would be best, in the interests of peace, not to delve into the substance of the matters until it had obtained the results of the investigations. 26. 1 think that the most important consideration animating the Security Council's deliberations is that of international peace and security. It is always from the point of view of international peace and security that the Council takes up any issue and discusses it thoroughly. It is never exc1usively from the point of view of any particular country that the Council examines the problems before it. It is always from the point of view of international peace and security. 27. 1 do not believe that it would be conducive to the peace and quiet of the Near East to rake up tbis matter now and examine its substance before we have the results of the investigations now being undertaken by the competent organs. 1 doubt very much whether it will serve the purpose of international peace and security at the present moment ifwe take up the issue we have before us before we have more authoritative accounts of what actuaUy happened than we now have. 28. For aIl these reasons, it would seem to me that the wisest course would be to defer the further consideration of tbis item until we hear the facts of the case from the Mixed Armistice Commission. 1 am completely open to conviction on tbis matter, but that is my feeling at the present moment. After aU, it is the Mixed Armistice 29. 1 put this forward as a suggestion, without formulating any proposai, in the hope that it will meet with support from some of the representatives al this table. 1 put it forward as a suggestion because 1 think that, in view of the precedents 1 have mentioned, in view of the fact that this investigation is now being carried on, and in the interest of the promotion of international peace and security in the Near East, the wisest course for us would he to wait and not go into the substance of this matter before we have heard from the Mixed Armistice Commission. 1 will not present this formally, but only in an informai manner, and 1 hope that it will capture the thoughts of some of the representatives on this Council.

The representative of Lebanon has not made a formai proposai. He has suggested informally that we should defer the consideration of this question until we have heard from the Mix.ed Armistice Commission. If any member of the Council desires to express an opinion on that suggestion, 1 will be glad to cali upon him. If not, 1will call upon the representative of Israel to speak, since he asked to be the first speaker.

Before 1 express an opinion on the informai suggestion of the representative of Lebanon, 1 should like to ask the President or the Secretaiiat whether we can be given any information in regard to the work of investigation by the Mixed Armistice Commission orits agents or representatives. Are the representatives or agents of the Commission really on the spot? Have they begun their work? Approximately when can we expect a report, either interim or final, from that body? 1 request the President or the Secretariat to give us sorne information about the investigation being carried out by the Mixed Armistice Commission.

ln response to the request for information made by the representative of China, 1 am informed that the Mixed Armistice Commission has started its work on the matter. However, in the nature of things, it is hardly possible now to say when it will finish its work. We have no report to that effect.

Although we do not now know when we can get the report from the Mixed Armistice Commission, it appears to me that such a report could not be long delayed. As the matter stands, we have before us two versions of the incident connected with the Bat Galim,' from the officiaIletters from both si.des we get two versions which are completely contra~ dictory. If we should begin our discussions now, then 1 really do not know where we could begin. lt might be that much of the discussion at this present stage could be omitted if we had a report from a third party, a neutral party. It seems to me, therefore, that the informaI J_ 34. Mr. Charles MALIK (Lelbanon): It is quite possible for the members of the Council to pass over my informal suggestion without commentin,g on it and to proceed to the debate. At the same time, 1 think that 1 would be helped very much if 1 could hlear some members of the Council, or any member of the Council who would care to do so, express an opinion on this matter. 35. If we just pass from this stage of discussing the informal opinion 1 expressed to hearing immediately what the representative of Israel is going to say-and 1 have no doubt he will say important and interesting things-then 1 must take it that the (lther members of the Council, with the exception ofth(: representative ofChina, do not think much of my idea. It is quite possible that that is the case. However, 1 tl:ùnk there is some logic behind my ide&, and 1should be grateful ifsomeone would either underline that reasoning or refute it. Ofcourse, this is not a debating society where we present reasons and have them refuted by others; 1 am aware of this. But this is an important matter, and if the debate Is going to be opened at length on the substance, how do we know where we may end? The representative of Israel might make a speech and 1 am sure t11:at the representative of Egypt would answer. It is also quilte likely that others May want to speak on this question at this stage. 36. We do not have enough information on the matter. Would it serve the cause ofpeaceand security in the Near East ifwe discussed the matter betbre we had all thedetails on it? 37. 1 am not going to prejudg(: what any member is going to say; 1 do not know wh;at the members of the Council are going to say. 1 base my arguments so far ooly on the ground that, in the' absence of adequate authoritative information on this qaestion, and since such information is forthcoming and must be forthcoming, and since there have be.en the precedents 1 spoke of-and some members around this Council table at the time of the discussion of those precedents were eloquent in defending the point of view 1 have just put forward to the Council-it would be wise for us not to go into the substance until we bave more authoritative documents before us. 1would be very grateful to any member around this table if he would come forward and help us out a little in this matter. 1 cannot forj;:e anybody to speak. That being the case, after 1 bave .finished spea.king and the interpretation of my statement has been given, 1 takeit that the President is going to ask the representative of Israel to speak. However, 1 hope thnt sorne other inember L e of the Council will also tell us what he thinks about this matter. 39. 1 believe that, in cases such as this, the best comse is to consider the problem and express our views. Taken by itseli~ the incident ofthe SS Bat Galim might, it is true, be considered to have no more than local significance. But what is disturbing, in my view, is the constant recurrence ofincidents between the Arab States and Israel. This fact seems to indicate that a situation exists which, far from showing any improvement, deteriorates froni day to day. Statements made at meetings of the General Assembly have shown this to be the case. You have aIl heard the statements made, on the one hand, by the representative oflsrael, and, on the other, by the representative of Syria. 1 therefore wonder whether at the stage we have now reached the Security Council would not be making a mistake by burying its head in the sand in order not to face the problem. 1 wonder whether the time has not come for the Securîty Conncil to consider the problem fully. ~ 40. If we look back over the past few months, what do we find? We have been called upon to consider a series of border incidents, cases involving massacres which occmred near the border, a series of problems concerning Jordan and, lastly, a series of incidents relating to navigation, especially those affecting the Suez Canal. Plainly it would be absurd to believe that it was these inddents that were capable of creating inter~ational tension between the Arab States and Israel. 1 myself feel that tbis serious international tension exists already and that it is the cause ofaIl the many incidents submitted to us. 41. Would it not then be logical to consider the cause instead of continuing to consider the effects? 42. What can we do if we meet here to consider isolated incidents? We may be able to arrive at a solution for each incident as it occurs. What we can do, above aIl, is to defer every problem and wait for it to resolve itself. If we do that we shall be called upon two or three weeks later to consider a furtherincident. We hadjust concluded the consideration ofthe Jordan question when, a few days later, the question of the massacres was submitted to us, followed later by that of the Suez Canal and now, today, by that of the Bat Galim. 43. In the circumstances, 1 have a certain misgiving. 1 have not fully understood the statements made in the General Assembly by the representatives of Syria and Israel. For instance, it appears from the statement made by the Israel representative and also, incidentally, from those made by the Arab representatives, that the Arab countries are very dissatisfied; those countries would appear to consider the action taken by the United Nations as unsatisfactory. Ontheotherhand, whenever we attempt to consider the problem, efforts are made to avoid the debate for technical reasons. There may be some justification for this, but the fact reMains that on each occasion a technical question is raised in order to avoid a debate. =. =- 48. 1 have not made any formal proposaI. 1 have simply stated my opinion frankly, as requested by the representative of Lebanon. My Government is greatly concerned at the faet that every two or three weeks it is i11formed that a new question is before the Security Couneil, when previous questions have never really been solved.

As no other member of the Security Council desires to speak, and since 1 have no further proposal of any kind, 1 shall now call on the representative of Israel. 50. Mf. EBAN (Israel): 1 am grateful to the President for giving me this opportunity of addressing the Security Council on the item just inseribed on its agenda. We are here drawing the attention of the Security Council to a broad international question affecting the freedom of the seas, the definition of the legal position in the Suez Canal and the nature and the character of the Egyptian-Israel General Armistice Agreement. 1 Beyond these general considerations, there is a specifie episode which illustrates the importance of this question and its urgency. It is true, of course, that these individual incidents are merely symptoms of the general tension wbich prevails between 51. My delegation has deep sympathy with the view of the representative of Colombia that international attention should never be diverted for long from the general tension created by the lack ofany process ofnegotiation or settlement between these neighbouring States. However, there is probably no other specific problem within the context of Arab-Israef relations which more vividly than the problem before us illustrates the juridical and practical consequences of the state'of tension which now prevails. 52. The Israel delegation cornes before the Security Council to renew its complaint against the persistent violation by Egypt of internationallaw, of the Egyptian- Israel General Armistice Agreement and of a Security Council deeision [S/2322] concerning freedom of navigation for the ships of all nations passing to and from Israel. This is the third occasion on which we have seized the Security Council of this complaint. This very fact indicates in itself both the deplorable persistence of the Government of Egypt in maintaining a practice conrlemned by world opinion, and also the absolute determination of the Government of Israel, for the sake of its vital national interests and its international rigbts, to pursue this matter with the utmost tenacity until aIl discrimination against Israeli ships and cargoes is brought to an end. 53. In this respect, the policy of the Israel Government is that which 1 stated on its behalf at the 664th meeting of the Security Council, on 29 March 1954. My Government will not recognize, either in word or in deed, the rigbt of Egypt to exercise controls or restrictions over Israel's commerce or navigation, to apply belligerent rights, or to use visit, search or seizure against cargoes brought to Israel. It is our understanding that nothing prevents any maritime Power from exercising the freedom which international law-including the resolution of 1 September 1951 [Sf2322]-eonfers upon it, and celcainly one maritime country, namely, the State of Israel, intends to bring cargoes' freely into and out of its ports. 54. It is in the light of this policy that 1 would like briefly to review the origins of the question which now lies before the Security Couneil, and then to commentalso in brief and in general terms-upon the specific ineident which occurred a few weeks ago. 54. exposer Conseil brièveté, s'est 55. n'est laquelle par en Nations l'objet ment 55. 1 confess that 1 do not feel that the delegation of Israel is called upon to give a detailed substantiation of our daim to the free passage of shipping to and from Israel through the Suez Canal. The law and the policy of the United Nations on this question are clear. The issue of law has been settled. Our legitimate rights are firmly established. Every argument on which Egypt has ever sougbt to justify these restrictions and interferences has already been categorically rejected by the Security Council. The position, therefore, is not that we have to 1 riquement recourir 56. 1 would find it bard to accept the view, implied by the representative of Lebanon, that because a policy opposed by the Security Council has continued in force, therefore the Security Council should cease to be interested in that problem or that the aggrieved party should not be encouraged to invoke his rights under the policy which is being violated. The subject bel'ore us has been discussed on so many occasions, one of them recent, that 1 wish to refer only in very brier terms to the history of this discussion in the Security Council. 57. As the Councilis aware, the problem begins with the signature of the General Armistice Agreement in 1949 between the Governments of Egypt and Israel. That agreement brought hostilities to an end and deprived the parties of any right, whether or not they ever possessed it, to exercise blockade practices against each other. That this is the authentic interpretation ofthe meaning of the armistice agreement has been made clear by all the United Nations authûrities who have represented this Organization in the implementation of the armistice agreement. Thus General Riley, the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization, reported on 12 June 1951: cc ••• the action of the Egyptian authorities in this instance is, in my view, entirely contrary to the spirit of the General Arnlistice Agreement and does, in fact, jeopardizè its effective functioning. It was certainly nover contemplated at Rhodes that what is, in effect, an act of blockade or at least an 'uct undertaken in the spirit of a blockade and having the partial effect of one, would be continued by one of the parties to the General Armistice Agreement more than two years after it had been signed " [S/2194]. 58. In giving this as the authentic interpretation of the meaning of the General Armistice Agreement, General Riley was closely following the reasoning and argument of Ml'. Bunche, who had represented the United Nations in negotiating the Armistice Agreement at Rhodes, and who had said, on 4 August 1949, in the Security Council: "The armistice agreements are not the final peace settlement, but the only possible interpretation of their very specific provisions is that they signal the end ,..,r the military phase of the Palestine situation...There should be...free movement for legitimate shipping, and no vestiges of the wartime blockade should be allowed to remain, as they are inconsistent with both the letter and the spirit of the armistice agreements" [433rd meeting, p. 6]. 59. When the matter was fust referred to the Security Council, after having been through the preliminary m~ages in the Mixed Armistice Commission and the Special Committee, the ChiefofStaffofthe United Nations Truce 60. So much, then, for the General Armistice Agreement signed at Rhodes. The signature of that agreement should in itself have brought a complete end to aIl these regulations and practices involving interference with the freedom of passage ta and from Israel. 60. d'armistice cette toutes passage à 61. après conformer prétation des cette 61. As the Security Council weil knows, the signature of the armistice agreement was followed by no action on the part of Egypt to conform with these authoritative interpretations ofthe agreement by United Nations authorities, and, accordingly, the matter was brought to the Security Council for a full and comprehensive discussion on 11 July 1951 [S/2241]. p~ur 62. Again, it is not my intention to rehearse here aIl the arguments and counter-arguments which were brought before the Security Council in that debate. It is sufficient for our purposes that we recall and record the fact that the Security Council adopted a clear decision on 1 September 1951 [558th meeting, para. 5]. 62. à invoqués de 1 [558 63. The main elements of that decision, which is the central document for the Security Council's present consideration, consisted of two parts. The first was the formulation ofa legal principle. The Security Council expressed the consideradon that since the armistice régime was of a permanent character, " neither party can reasonably assert that it is actively a belligerent or requires to exercise the right of visit, search and seizure for any legitimate purpose of self-defence ". 63. comprend principe Conseil d'armistice parties trouve d'exercer fins 64. au point de des en 64. The Security Council then went on to define its position in respect of these blockade practices from the viewpoint ofgeneral internationallaw, from the viewpoint ')f the General Armistice Agreement and from the viewpoint of the obligations of Israel and Egypt under the Charter of the United Nations. 65. Under each and every one of these headings, the Security Council found these practices to be invalid and illicit, and, accordingly, in the operative paragraph of its r~solution, it called upon Egypt "to terminate the restrIctions on the passage of international commercial shipping and goods through the Suez Canal wherever bound and to cease aU interference with such shipping 65. et dans invite des par et UThe Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter." 67. Thus, legally, a decision of this kind posesses compelling force beyond that pertaining to any resolution of any other United Nations organ. This point was fully nuderstood by the Security Conncil in all its previous discussions. In the debate which took place in the Council earlier this year, the representative of Colombia stated correctly: UWe believe that we are bound by Article 25 of the Charter to support it "-the resolution of the Secnrity Council-u and that it should be respected and implemented, since the Council's function under the Charter is to maintain international peace and security, and we may assume that its actions are directed solely towards that end." [664tlz meeting, para. 22]. 68. Another reason which argues in favour of the compelling force of the 1951 resolution is the circumstance that it arises out of a contractual obligation which Egypt has undertaken towards Israel under the auspices of the United Nations in appending its signature to the General Armistice Agreement. These two facts, Article 25 of the Charter and the obligations of the parties to carry out the cOQtracts which they have signed, determine the obligatory charaeter of that decision, and also the duty of the United Nations to work steadfastly for its implementation. 69. Notwithstanding this clear decision of the Secnrity Council on 1 September 1951, the offending restrictions have continued in force. 70. It is highly important froI:"' the viewpoint of the discussion which has now been renewed that 1 reiterate with sorne emphasis the point which 1made last time, that these restrictions operate mainly through their deterrent effect. The offence consists in the existence of a decree by the Government of Egypt of 6 February 1950, entitled "Decree on the procedure of ship and airplane searches and of seizute of contraband goods in connexion with the Palestine war ".2 Under this decree, which was promulgated by the King of Egypt on 6 Fe~':"uary 1950, the Egyptian Government served notice to an maritime nations that it would prevent the passage to and from Israel of certain goods which it decided to describe as contraband. 71. Thus, in place of respecting the principle of the unconditional freedom of navigation for the ships of all nations to and from Israel, the Government of Egypt, as the territorial State adjacent to this international waterway, has ascribed to itself the authority to determinê which ships shan or shan not pass through the Canal, , See document 8/3179, dOC-ùl'ilent A. 72. Later, on 28 November 1953, the effect ofthis decree of 6 February 1950 was aggravated by an announcement by the Conncil of Ministers published in Cairo on that date. S This announcement gave further specification to the types of cargoes or ships which could be the subject of interference. It was clear, in other words, that instead of abolishing these restrictions in accordance with the resolution of the Security Council, the Government of Egypt proposed to maintain them in full effect and even to aggravate them still further. 73. It is by its deterrent effect that this policy of discrimination achieves its effects; by the very existence of these decrees and announcements at least 90 per cent of the traffic which would normally go to and from Israel is deterred from any attempt to use the right of innocent passage. The fact that amongst the small percentage of ships and cargoes which do attempt to use the right of innocent passage there are sorne instances in which interference is not applied, is a completely marginal and subsidiary circumstance. It is the existence of the regulations themselves which is the main source of our complaint. In addition, there is the circumstance that amongst those few ships which attempt to exercise innocent passage to or from Israel, there are, from time to time, acts of intervention and of discrimination. 74. Thus, if it is said that within a given period there have been few acts of substantive interference, far from proving an attitude of virtue on the part of the territorial State, this is an additional proof of transgression, for the fewer the acts of interference, the fewer are proved to be the attempts at innocent passage. In other words, the blockade is becoming increasingly effective in strangling this trade and in driving it off the maritime routes. 75. This was the position which faced my Government in February 1954. Owing to the existence of these restrictions, the stream of traffic to and from Israel had slowed down to a mere trickle and each attempt to exercise innocent passage was a venturesome episode. Ships' captains and maritime nations had no certainty or knowledge that they would be immune from discrimination or from interference, inc1uding force and confiscation. As a result, these restrictions had hardened and crystallized into something very close to a complete blockade of the Suez Canal against shipping bound to and from Israel, with incalculable effects upon Israel's economic position and with a persistent threat to peace and security arising out of the fact that one of the central points of the Armistice Agreement, upon which peace and security depend, was constantly being violated. • See document 8/3179, document B. 78 Indeed, it is difficult to think of any international illegality which has been maintained for so long against sucb unanimous international critici$m at a time when the correction of this anomaly would have required l'rom Egypt no effort, no injury, no sacrifice to its national interest or to its international repute. It was especially disappointing to my Government-and 1 have no doubt that it is disappointing to many governments-to observe that at a time when world opinion has rightly evinced such goodwill towards Egypt for the success of its national aspirations, Egypt has not yet responded with any sign ofdeference to the international interest involved in the principle offree navigation through the Suez Canal. 79. The Security Council, having received the complaint in February 1954, considered the matter again at several consecutive me-etings. It became abundantly clear, in the course ofthat discussion, that the decision of 1 September 1951 still commanded the majority support of the international community. Indeed, eight members of the Council were prepared to adopt a formal resolution on the motion of New Zealand [S/3188 and Corr.l], reiterating Egypt's duty ta comply with the decision of the Security Couneil of 1 September 1951. 80. The Security Council was prevented from giving formal effect to this majority opinion. Nevertheless, when the Security Council rose, the position was that the resolution of 1 September 1951 continued exclusively and completely to govern the legal situation in the Suez Canal, and that the support ofthe majority ofthe United Nations and the maritime world had again been demonstrated in favour of these principles. 81. The delegations of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Brazil, Colombin, Denmark and Turkey, as weIl as New Zealand-as the proponent of the draft resolution-made important statements in favour of terminating these illicit restrictions. These statements covered the same broad ground as that traversed in the debate of 1951. The argument ranged over principles of generaI internationallaw, over the meaning of the arrois- 82. Thus, while it would have been salutary for a formal resolution to have been adopted, it was still clear, after the suspension of that discussion, that the resolution of 1 September 1951 had emerged considerab1y strengthened and reinforced. It was clearly the will of the United Nations, ofthe maritime countries and ofthe international community that these practices should be laid aside and that the principle of non-discrimination in the Suez Canal waterway should be reinstated. The growing urgency of this matter was reilected in the observations of the representative of the United Kingdom, who stated, on 29 March 1954: "The question of compliance with resolutions ofthe Security Council is so important that my Government thinks that the Council should keep the question under review" [664th meeting, para. 60]. The United Kingdom representative went on to suggest, for the second time, .. that if, as 1sincerely hope will not be the case, Egypt has not within ninety days complied with the resolution, the Council should stand ready to take the matter up again .. [ibid., para. 61]. 83. This is the point the Security Counoil reached in its discussions in February and March 1954. 1 now address myself to the question of what has happened since March 1954. 84. The representative of Lebanon asserted that, with the exception of a single incident-to which 1 shall allude-nothing had happened since that date. 85. It is precisely because nothing has happened since March 1954 that the position is so grave. It is because the blockade regulations have continued in force, it is because the great bulk of the traffic which should normally flow to and from Israel has been prevented from ilowing, through the undiminished exercise of these restrictions, that we have felt entitled to draw the attention of the Security Council to this matter again. Ifthe representative of Lebanon says that nothing has happened, he means that this violation ofIsrael's rights and of internationallaw has continued persistently and without change or attenuation since that date. 86. Indeed, the insignificant proportion of the normal traffic which has been allowed through the Suez Canal does not constitute any departure from the position which existed before the adoption of the 1951 .resolution and before the discussion of 1954. It is the central crux of the Israeli complaint that the rights and obligations of the parties as denned in the 1951 resolution have continued • For an English translation, see Sir Edward Herslet, cd., A com· piete Collection of the Treaties and Conventions . .. betlVeen Great Britain and Foreign POlVers. .. , London, Butterworth, 1893, vol. XVIII, p. 369. 88. 1 come now to a few preliminary comments on the grave incident which took place on 28 September 1954, and which is certainly one of the motives which has animated my Government in renewing its complaint at this time. 89. On 28 September 1954, the delegation of Israel addressed to the Security Council the following detailed and factual account [8/3296] of that episode: " On 28 Septembe; 1954, the Bat Galim, a vessel of 500 tons flying the Israel flag, arrived at the southern entrance of the Suez Canal bound from Massawa in Eritrea to Haifa in Israel. The vessel was manned by a crew of 10, all Israelis, and carried a mixed cargo consisting of 93 tons of meat, 42 tons of plywood and 30 tons of hides.., In other wc.nIe, this was a c1assic example of theexercise of the n".!lt of innocent passage for the pursuit of legitimate tr&de between two sovereign States Members of the United Nations. "N:.:: fire-arms ofany description except the Captain's pistol were on the ship. "On reaching the Suez Canal without incident at 5.30 a.m., the Bat Galim identified herself to the Canal authorities. At 6 a.m., in accordance with the usual procedure, she anchored at Green Island, Port Tewfik, alongside the Empire Clyde, a British vessel under charter to the British Ministry of Transport, a Norwegian vessel and a tanker. "At 8 a.m., the Bat Galim was· boarded by the Egyptian port, health and immigration officiais. The routine inspections were carried out... " At 9 a.m., an Egyptian patrol vessel approached the ship, and witeless communication, which had been maintained up to then' between the vessel and the Company offices in Haifa, came to an end... " No contact between the ship and its owners, or between the ship and the Government whose flag it ffies, has since been made. 92. There is no justification whatever in internatior'Ù law for discrimination. against any vessel exercising the right of innocent passage, either on the grounds of the character ofits cargo, or on the grounds ofits destination, or on the grounds of the nationality under which the ship sails or of the flag which flies on its mast. This concept of non-discrimination is the very essence of the spirit both of the Constantinople Convention and of the Security Council resolution of 1951. The law does not say that ooly those countries to which· Egypt is pleased to grant this right shall be enabled to exercise it. It is not the position that any country against which Egypt deems itself to have some grievance or some cause of international tension at a particular time is thereby deprived of an international right which reposes universally in the shipping of all sovereign nations. 93. To seize the ship of a foreign country, to hold .it in confiscation, to exercise forcible restraints against its captain and its crew, is surely one ofthe most hostile and warlike acts which any government is capable of carrying out against any other government. IL is quite impossible for me to exaggerate the gravity with which my Government regards this act of hostility in its relations with Egypt. 94. 1 must reiterate in all solemnity our firm demand that this ship, its crew and its cargo be released forthwith in order that they may proceed directly to Haifa without further delay. It will be absolutely impossible for the Government ofIsrael to acquiesce in the further detention of this ship and its crew or in any attempt to block its exercise of legitimate passage northwards to Haifa. 93. mettre et l'équipage mesures gouvemement gouvernement. mon l'Égypte, 94. fermement que l'équipage, le bateau immédiatement relâchés de manière soient l'exercice Suez 95. Surely this act of detention and of confiscation, this persecution of an innocent vessel and its crew, must, by any precedents of internationallaw and history, appear to the Security Council as an act of the utmost gravity. If any Member nation will look back into its own history it will, 1 think, discover how easily such incidents lead to the most deplorable results, and it is, 1think, fortunate that we have the United Nations system as a point of recourse in order to secure peacefully the redress of such wrongful acts of seizure. 95. précédents Conseil cette équipage gravité dans incidents TI Unies pacifiquement iniques. 96. encore. par lui-même 96; 1 shall refer at this preliminary stage to one other matter alone. The maintenance of the restrictions introduced by the decree of 1950 and by the 1953 announcement would in itself have been a. sufficiently grave 97. The only reason adduced for the detention and confiscation of this vesscl and the incarceration of its crew lias been the extraordinary fiction that this crew and this vessel had e\lgaged in naval warfare south of the entrance to the SUf~Z canal. 1 therefore wish again to reassert with the utmost emphasis and conviction that this ship was completely unarmed except for the master's weapon, that it fired upon nobody anywhere, that it infticted no casu.alties either by land or by sea, and that this whole figment of an alleged incident involving the exchange of fixe is a product of the imagination and the invention of the Egyptian Ministry of Propaganda. My Government's chief consolation lies in the Ulliversal scepticism with which this Egyptian accusation has been reœived. Nowhere throughout the length and breadth of the world community do we find any disposition to attach credence to this accusation. 98. About the accusation itself, 1 would draw the Council's attention to certain relevant facts. First, the alleg;'Ltion that there had been firing was invented several hours after the firing was alleged to have taken place. EVf~n then, the first official Egyptian communiqué alleged tllat firing had taken place against a coastal post and that casualties had been intlicted on dry land. 'This was obviously an inconvenient story because it was capable of facile confirn1ation or refutation. When this inconvenience dawned upon those who had produced the allegation, the naval battle was obligingly transferred to the open seas, into whose depths this fiction has been plunged. Egypt could not adduce or even produce any evidence in support of this accusation. 99. If the matter were not so grave, it would be quite reasonable to <iraw some amusement from the very frivolity ofthe accusation. Readers of detective literature could ftnd in this the perfectcrime. The representatives of Egypt cau find no witnesses, no casualties, no weapons and no motives, and this is because the engagement did not take place at an, and because we are here faced with the pnst factum invention of an episode seeking to justify an aet of flagrant Sf'.2zure. 100. Ten days elapsed, and then-ten days after the assertion that aggression had been committed against Egypt-Egyptsuddenly thought ofpresenting a complaint io the .Mixeà Annist.ice Commission, even then not asking for urgent consideration. World opinion can draw 101. Now that this accusation, which the Government and people of Israel strongly refute and resent, has been submitted to the Mixoo Armistice Commission, we defi· nitely urge and advocate the utmost speed and despatch in investigating and refuting this fiction. It is an extremely serious matter in international relations when a govemment invents faise accusations against its neighbour as a justification for hûstile action. We think that it would be appropriate if the Government of Egypt would publish at least retraction ofand apology for this reflection upon the captain and crew ofthe Bat Galim, and withdraw its completely senseless and unfair accusation in order that we can discl~ss the political and juridica1 issues here involved, which are grave enough in themselves. 102. In conclusion, 1 should like to ouiline what, in the view of my delegation, the Security Council should appropriately do in order to eliminate this source of international tension and in order to vindicate the authority of its own law. 103. First, we believe that, on general grounds, and quite apart from the grave incident of 28 September 1954, the Security Council should again discuss the political and legal principles involved in the maintenance of these blockades and restrictions, and thus manifest the clear opinion of the international community on the question of whether Egypt is or is not entitled to practise discrimination and restriction against shipping in the Suez Canal. Surely no country anywhere in the world which invokes the principle of free navigation anywhere in the world will he unwilling to assert and defend this principle, which is involved in this important case. The issue is whether there is an unconditional right on the part of the shipping of all nations to navigate upon or between the high seas, or whether it is a matter for the grace and the condescension of the territorial State ta grant or to withhold that which until now has been regarded as a universal and unconditional right. Therefore, our first request is that the CouDcil should express its consensus upon this question in order once again to emphasize that the majority of the world community stands behind the demand for ~ abolition of these restrictions and the reassertion of freedom of passage for the siùps of aIl nations in this international waterway. 104. Secondly, we think that the Security Council should certainly condemn and criticize the hostile act involved in the seizure of the Bat Galim, and perhaps especially should the Couneil express its strong views on the faIse reports which have been adduced in favour of that action. In order that the Council should pronounee itself clearly and objectively on this question, wc advocate the utmost dispat.ch and speed in the investigation which is being carried out under the auspices of the United Nations by the Mixed Armistice Commission. "The Security Council should take into consideration any procedures for the settlement of the dispute which have aIready been adopted by the parties." 108. The Egyptian delegation to the Mixed .-<\rmisdce Commissiùn submitted its complaint against Israel to that commission on 6 October last. The permanent representative of Egypt to the United Nations brought this fact to the notice of the President of the Security Council on the morning of7 October [8/3302]. This is the text of the Egyptian complaint: "During the early hours of 28 September 1954, an Israeli merchant vessel namt;d Bat Galim, manned by a crew of ten Israelis, entered Egyptian territorial waters in the Gulfof Suez in the area a few miles south of Port Rock lighthouse. The crew attacked two Bgyptian fishing boats by automatic fire in the above-mentioned area, sinking one ofthem, thus causing the death oftwo Egyptian fishermen named Abd el Aziz Sabri and M 'lamed Hameed el Talatini. The other boat was damaged because of the fire, but its crew succeeded in returning to shore with the boat. "This hostile attack committed by armed Israelis inside Egyptian territorial waters constitutes a flagrant violation of the General Armistice Agreement. "An investigation is required." 109. On learning of tbis complaint, Israel asked the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice CommiJsion to calI an urgent meeting. While favouring .such an urgent meeting, the Chairman oi the Commission preferred, before setting a date, to send, at Egypt's request, three United Nations observers to make an investigat;un: one Swedish, one Danish and one United States national. The three observers arrived on Sunday, 10 October, at Suez, where they heard the witnesses of the incident and drew up a report on the damage to the second fisbing boat, which had escaped the me of the Israel vessel. On Monday, Il October, the three observers went to Cain" 110. gatoire - jusqu'à terminé du la 110. It would therefore be normal-it would even seem mandatory-for the Security COUDcil to postpone the discussion UDtil the Mixed Armistice Commission has completed its examination, Furthermore, the members of the Council who have dealt with this problem have expressed the same opinion. 111. de Gladwyn 111. At the 522nd meeting of the Security Council, on 13 November 1950, Sir Gladwyn Jebb, speaking on a similar matter, said the following: "The whole matter is therefore one which is, in a sense, subjudice, and my delegation feels that the proper course is to let the machinery provided for by the Armistice Agreement take its course before we enter into the substance of the question at length" [522nd meeting, p. 17]. 112. Jebb 112. The same opinion was expressed by Sir Gladwyti Jebb on 4 February 1954: "1 myself have a slight doubt, among other things, as to whether the matters to which he [the representative of Egypt] refers in his letter are not actually sub judice, so to speak, in the Special Committee provided for by the Armistice Agreement. That may or may not be so; 1 do not say that that is necessarily so. However, if ther~ is anything in the rumour to that effect which 1 have heard, then the matter of whether or not this is sub judice ought particular1y to be gone into and examined in anexplanatory memorandum, which should be circulated in the normal way to an members of the COUDcil. After having read this memorandum, we could then have another meeting... and determine . whether it should be put on the agenda, and if so, in what form " [657th meeting, para. 5]. 113. même 113. And the President himselfspoke to the same effect. At that same meeting, he said: "Furthermore, the question whether the case is sub judice-and 1 have not l.leen able to examine this because 1 have not had the time at my disposal-is one which, theoretically at least, might lead the COUDcil not to place the item upon its agenda" [ibid., para. 77]. 114. d'une résolutions sitions et 114. Like Sir Gladwyn Jebb, he based his view on a valid consideration, in conformity with two reso1utions of the Security CouDcil embodying the provisions of the armistice agreements concluded between Egypt and Israel. 115. tenue 115. The first, adopted by :he Council at its 437th meeting, on 11 August 1949, was worded as follows: " The Security Council "Notes that the armistice agreements providethatthe execution !)f those agreements shall be supervised by mixed armistice commissions whose Chairman in each case shall be the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization or a senior officer 117. However, the Security Council, which determines its own procedure, has just decided to deal withthe dispute and has requested both parties to express their views. As plaintiff, the representative of Israel has spoken first. What did he tell us? 118. The representative of Israel repeated what he had expounded at length at the last meeting of the Security Council, which dealt with a complaint concerning alleged infringements of freedom of navigation through the Suez Canal. He recapitulated the history of the question down to the last meeting. He mentioned the resolution of 1951. He spoke of "freedom of the seas", of the "legal situation", of" persistent violations ofinternationallaw " and of "ships of aIl nations". He also referred to what he called the ~'non-formulation " ofa resolution in March 1954 which really amounted to a rejection by the Security Council ofa draft resolution that had been submitted toit. 119. 1 have no intention of dwelling at length on these considerations, which were the subj~ct of protracted discussion at a number of meetings in February and March 1954. Nothing new has been introduced by the representative of Israel, and 1 have therefore no reply to make to any new element in the situation. 1shall merely make a few observations. 120. The representative of Israel spoke ofwhat he called " urgency" in submitting his complaint to the Secmity Council for its consideration. He told us that Egypt would occupy alone the Suez Canal. That is a fine argument which sheds some light on the rumours at present circulating in aIl the countries ofthe Middle East. There was speculation as to why Israel had chosen tbis precise moment to submit its complaint, and reasons for that choice were sought left and right. One reason was that Israel did not much like the idea ofa somewhat distressing situation in a part of Egyptian territory being brought to an end. Israel was opposed at aIl costs to the evacuation of British troops from the Canal area. And now the truth emerges; we are told: " Stop! Hurry, considerthe question immediateiy because tonight, or perhaps tomorrow, the agreement between Egypt and the United Kingdom may 122. The Israel representative told us that Egypt had waited for a long time before complaining. Yes, Egypt waited for some time before bringing the matter before the Mixed Armistice Commission. It is true that it was on 6 October that Egypt applied to that commission, although the incident had occurred on 78 September. Thus eight to ten days elapsed between the incident and the complaint. But Egypt had entered into communication with the President of the Security Council on 28 September. Israel's request to the President of the Security Council was dated 29 September, but Egypt had intervened on the 28th. 1 myself received a telephone call on the morning of 28 September giving me the news and asking me to inform the President of the Security Council immediately. That is what we did. We did not refer the complaint to the Mixed Armistice Commission because we wished to base it on specific data and so we awaited the conclusion of the investigation undertaken by the Public Prosecutor's office of the town of Suez. As soon as that office had completed its investïgation and we were sure of our position, since we were basing our case on specific data, we t:eferred our complaint to the Mixed Armistice Commission. That doesnot mean that we waited too long. On the contrary, Egypt informed the President of the Security Council of the incident on the very day it occurred. The documents are here, the proof is here. It was on 28 September 1954 that we communicated the information to the President of the Security Counci1. 123. The debate is continuing; matters are repeated which have aIready been conc1uded and which have already been considered by this Council. You have spoken, we have answered. If you want us to take the matter up again we shaH hear the same arguments and repeat the same things. You will present your charges and we our defence. 124. You have referred here to juridical considerations. But 1remember quite weIl that last March, when we spoke of international law and juridical considerations, the representative of Israel himself said that we should stop talking about internationallaw. He told us that neither we nor he had any competence in matters of high inter- 125. Reference was made to ships being unable to pass freely, and we wer€' told that the numbel' ofships passing throughthe Canal had decreased. Sincelast year, however, and at any rate since February and March 1954, we have fumished statistics showing that the number of ships passing through the Canal had increased in 1953 by comparison with 1952. We not only furnished evidence but quoted from the report of the Compagnie universelle du canal maritime de Suez. We informed you of statements made orally and in writing by Mr. Charles Roux, President ofthe Board ofDirectors ofthe company, who is not an Egyptian but a Frenchman, and who certified that thè company's revenues had increased. Where does that revenue come from? From fees paid by ships passing through the Canal. Here is proof, but we shall not dwell upon it in'order not to lose time. 126. An interesting question has perhaps been raised. To whom does the right of passage, freedom of passage through the Canal, belong? Does every nation have the right of free passage or can Egypt on its'own do what it likes, allow some ships to pass through and prevent others from doing so? 127. Here is a reply to that question. The Convention signed in Constantinople in 1888 gives a clear, unambiguous reply. There are two considerations. Articles IV and V provide for absolute freedom of passage, even for belligerents, and even if Egypt is one of the belligerents. According to those articles, that is an absolute principle which can in no way be restricted. But, as 1 said last February and March, do not forget article X of the same convention, wl,!.-:h states that the provisions of articles IV and V cannot be applied and will have no effect if it becomes necessary to defend the security of the Canal or. the security of Egypt. 128. 1 shall not go into details, and 1 shall merely say this: you raised the question by asking whether that was the fust or the second consideration, referring to them as two conflicting provisions. Those two considerations appear in the Convention of 1888. Inc1uded in that convention is the general provision allowing absolute freedom of plissage to all vessels, even those of belligerent States, and, on the other hand, the specific clause which applies when it becomes necessary to ensure the security of the Canal and of Egypt, and Egypt alone is competent to decide as to its own security. 129. Lastly, as 1 also pointed out last February and March, in case of complaints being lodged, a committee referred to in the Conventic,il is competent to deal with cases of alleged j'1W' ~erence with freedom of navigation and to decide on illeasures to be taken to safeguard the security of the Canal. 130. Before the representative of Israel made his statement, he transmitted two letters to the President of the Security Council, one dated 28 September 1954 and the other 4 October 1954. For the time being reference is made to " interference ". 1 shall refer 1ater to the word " continued ". 132. In what does this interference consist? ln the letter of 28 September 1954 [8/3296] we are told how the Bat Galim entered the Canal, how it was seized, and so forth. 1shall now read from the Israel representative's letter of 28 September 1954: "On reaching the Suez Canal without incident at 5.30 a.m., the Bat Galim identified herself to the authorities. At 6 a.m., in accordance with the usual procedure, she anchored at Green Island, Port Tewfik, alongside the Empire Clyde, a British vesse1 under charter to the British Ministry of Transport, a Norwegian vessel and a tanker. "At 8 a.m., the Bat Galim was boarded by the Egyptian port, health and immigration official,;. The routine inspections were carried out in a friendly atmosphere, so much so that some of the officiaIs concerned, this day being the first of the Jewish year, wished the crew a happy New Year." 133. Are those examples of interference? "Good morning, gentlemen, happy New Year." A routinevisit by the Port and Health authorities: "Come through, draw alongside two other ships which are passing through the Canal and, above all, a happy New Year t.o you." Are those examples of interference? But what does the letter of 28 September go on to say? 134. At 8 a.m., the Bat Galim was boarded by Egyptian officiaIs, an operation which took place in a friendly atmosphere, so much so that the officiaIs wished the crew a happy New Year. The Israel representative's letter goes on to say that "at 9 a.m., an Egyptian patrol vessel approached the ship, and wireless communication, which had been maintained up to then with the company offices in Haïfa, came to an end. No contact with the ship or its crew has since been made." 135. But what happened between 8 a.m. and 9 a.m.? At 8 a.m. everything was fine, a routine visit, friendly reception, cordial atmosphere, congratulations and wishes for the New Year. What happened in the next sixty minutes, seeing that a patrol vessel approached the ship and stopped wireless communication? Something must have happened for, after all, we are not in an insane asylu.m and there must be some explanation for this change of attitude. 136. Here is the explanation. 1 have. here a document describing the events that occurred. 1 ask the Council's indulgence because the document is in Arabic-it is an official note from the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs-and 1 shall have to translate it: "C On 27 September, at approximately 7 p.m., a boat resembling an oil tanker passed by, proceeding northwards at slow speed. Suddenly, it turned south, making two passes from south to north and from north to south. At dawn on 28 September, the tanker, lying due south of the three, opened :tire from a distance of 50 metres on the small boat manned by Mohamed Hameed el Talatini and Abd el Aziz Sabri. When the pilot, Helmi Sedeek el Daly, heard the sound of gunfire, . he quickly steered his vessel towards the south and caught up with Mohammed Barakat Achmud and Saber Khalil Mansour, whose boat was full of water. The two men held on to the boat and the pilot pulled the men out of the water. He then made for the Abu Darag lighthouse, arriving at 7 a.m. He describedthe incident to the lighthouse staff, who reported the news to the Government ofthe South Sinai zone. It was then 7.30 a.m. The Governor immediately got in touch with the police at Suez and learned that a vessel corresponding to the description given by the pilot and f1.ying the Israel'f1.ag had entered port that morning. These steps took about an hour or an hour and a half, and that was why the patrol vessel took action at approximately 9 a.m." 137. These facts explain the attitude taken towards the Israeli vessel. If we accept the account given in the letter of 28 September 1954, it will be seen that the Bat Galim was, as 1 said, given a friendly reception at Green Island. Later, however, came the news of the incident that had occurred at dawn, and steps were taken to find the boat. The public prosecutor's office at Suez was instructed to ope!l an inquiry, and on reference to the log (Chief Officer's log-book, Bat Galim) it was proved that at 2 a.m. on 28 September the vessel was 6 miles south of Abu Darag lighthouse and had slowed its engines to a speed ofnot more than 1knot per hour. 138. Investigations at the scene of the incident, in the presence of a naval expert, established the fact that the incident had occurred 15 nautica1 miles north of the Abu Darag lighthouse, 9 nautical miles Ifrom the west bank ofthe Gulfof Suez and 6 miles from the east bank. 139. The investigation conducted by the public prosecutor's office established that the vessel, bound from Massawa to Haïfa, was carrying a cargo ofcanned meat, hides and timber of a total weight of 171 tons. The logbook shows that the vessel, originally called the Brima, had been the property of the Compania Naviera Balboa, 140. Those were the facts revealed by the investigation conducted by the public prosecutor's office, which proved that the Israel vessel was in Egyptinn territorial waters at a distance of 6 nautical miles from the coast. Dnder Egyptian law, the limit of the territorial waters is fixed at 6 nautical miles. 141. In March 1954, 1 had the honour to draw the Security Council's attention to a shipping agreement dated 23 July 1953 between the Israel and Egyptian authorities. 1 shan recall its wording: "The following is herewith agreed by both parties: "In the event a non-military vessel of either party carrying non-military cargo is forced by engine trouble, storm or any other reason beyond the control of the vessel and its crew to seek refuge in the territorial waters of the other party, it shall be granted shelter therein and shall be allowed thereafter to proceed on its way freely and at the earliest possible time, together with its cargo, crewand passengers" [662nd meeting,para. 36]. 142. There was therefore an undertaking to allow Egyptian or Israel vessels which had entered the territorial waters of either State to proceed, provided that they had entered such waters for reasons beyond their control (storm, error of navigation). It is perfectly obvious that if there is no question of reasons beyond the vessel's control (storm, etc.), an Egyptian vessel must not trespass in Israel territorial waters, and an Israel vessel must not trespass in Egyptian territorial waters. If it does, it runs the risk of seizure. It is not permitted to proceed without hindrance, as it would be if it fell under the provisions of the agreement. r 143. Actually, Egyptian vessels have been seized by Israel. Israel ascertained-and correctly, as we admitthat. Egyptian vessels had trespassed in Israel territorial waters without there having been a storm or any reason beyond control. Israel seized the vessels. Egypt admitted the facts and did not protest. Sorne ofthe sallors from the vessels involved in one case are even imprisoned in Israel. So be it. That is fair play. Once there is an agreement, we are the fust to comply with it. Should sorne ofour people happen to trespass in your watérs, seize them. But expect to receive the same treatment, according as the case is or is not covered by the terms of the agreement. 144. We are told that the restrictions are being maintained though no example is given in support of that assertion.' No case of seizure or sequestration has been 146. 1 affirm that, since that statement was made, Egypt has not only disp1ayed tolerance but has also observed absolute silence and has refrained from any interference with vessels conveying goods to Israel or coming from Israel ports and passing through the Suez Canal. 147. Let me give you some statistics. During the period from Il February to 19 September 1954, the number of Haifa-bound vessels coming from the Red Sea with cargoes for Israel and passing through the Suez Canal was as follows: 14 Italian vessels, 2 Greek, 1 Swiss and 1 Danish. During that period, therefore, 18 vessels proceeded to Haifa from the Red Sea, passing through the Suez Canal. None of them was molested, seized or confiscated. No incident of the kind cûmplained about prior to the declaration 1 made to the Council has occurred up to this moment. 148. In the opposite direction, the number of southb&:lund vessels from Haifa passing through the Suez Canal during the period from Il February to 30 September 1954 was as follows: 14 Italian vessels, 24 British, 5 Norwegian, 4 Panamanian, 2 Greek, 1 Liberian, 1Romanian and 1Corsican. Since the declaration 1made before the Council, 52 vessels have proceeded south from Haifa towards the Red Sea, passing through the Suez Canal, without having in any way been touched. 149. In those circumstances, we may ask why this matter of freedom of navigation is being raised now. Freedom? The 1888 Convention? Free passage? But no one has molested you. No one has touched you. What are you shouting about? What is the matter? As 1 have said, we have tried to find the reasons. Perhaps it is for the sake of making propaganda during the session of the General Assembly. It has been noted that, in recent years, it has been Israel's habit to submit to each session of the General Assembly a specific complaint, a particular attack, in order to get Israel talked about, in order to attack other countries, in order to cast aspersions upon the truly peaceful sentiments of Egypt and the other Arab countries. 150. There has been some talk about the fact referred to by the Israel representative today-that Egypt is to be in exclusive occupation ofthe Canal zone. AIl that, however, is irrelevant. British troops were and still are in occupation of the Canal zone. That did not prevent Egypt from adopting an attitude which it firmly beIieved was completely in accordance with the requirements of its security. There have been complaints here. Appeals have been made to the Security Council and to the Joint 153. What is the position? Ten sailors are imprisoned. 1 assure you that we Egyptians pride ourselves upon the justice we administer. At all times, under aIl régimes, we have had complete confidence in ourjudicial system. That is a point of honour with us, a thing on which we pride ourselves. Do not worry. If nothing 1s proved against these sailors, 1 assure you that the court will acquit them, that it will even order the Egyptian Government to pay them compensation. Egyptian justice is like that. Be confident, and above all, allow your subsidiary organ to work and produce its results. 154. Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): 1 will take only three minutes of the time of the Council. 1 think four things are clear now. 155. First, nothing new has really been said by the representative of Israel at all. The only new thing in his narration is the fact that he did not distribute it amongst us in time for it to have been produced in a mimeographed 157. The third tbing that has emerged, 1 think, is the fact that we have listened to t\1/0 moderate statements, for which 1 think the Council can be grateful. 158. Since that is the case, it WOuld seem, in the fourth place, that it would be well for the Council to adjourn on this note of moderation, for wbich the two representatives concerned shOuld be congratulated, and leave it to the President of the Council, at any time he desires in, the future, in accordance with the dëvelopment of the situation, to caU the Council to meeting whenever he thinks necessary. 1 tbink that simple adjournment, leaving it to the President's own discretion to convene the Couneil, would b'e the appropriate step at the present moment. 159. There remains one thing for me to say only, since the representative of Colombia averted to this point, namely, the point of t.he general situation witb.in which all these incidents should be placed. 1 quite agree with the representative of Colombia that that should be kept in mind all the time. Also, 1 agree with the representative of Israel, w.hen he agreed with the representative of Colombia on this point. 160. 1 would like to make a very brief statement in response to that and to reassure the representative of Colombia about the Arabs so far as this thing is concerned. 161. The first noint is this: the Arabs will not attaek Israel. The secônd point is that the Arabs will defend themselves jointly and severally, if and when they are attacked. The third point is that if serious consideration is to be given to the general conditions for peace, for wbich the representative ofColombia seems to crave-and rightly so-then 1 suggest that the Arab representatives in the United Nations, during the last two or three years, have made themselves quite plain as to what they regard to be the starting point of any such undertaking: any serious consideration of genuine, honest, lasting condi· tions of peace for Palestine must start from the standing decisions ofthe several organs ofthe United Nations with respect to Palestine. When that condition is fulfilled, and if there is a disposition, a serious disposition, to fulfil that condition on the part of Israel and other Members of the United Nations, then the representative of Colombia, and other representatives around tbis table, will find that the Arabs are certainly ready to enter into a consideration of tbis matter, but it would be hopeless, as 1 have pointed out before to the COUDcil, and in other organs of the United Nations, to expect the Arabs to consider. these matters withollt that juridical starting point to wbich 1 have referred. 163. Having heard the respective statements of the representatives of Israel and Egypt, 1 feel that we need some time to study them and that we should await the information which the Mixed Armistice Commission is to send us. . 164. 1 therefore propose that we should adjourn, on the understanding that the Council will not be called upon to resume the conside':""1.tion of this question until the information from the iVIixed Armistice Commission is available. 165. Sir Pierson DIXON (United Kingdom): We now have before us a procedural question-a proposaI by the representative of Brazil for adjournment. 1 do not, therefore, intend to enter into questions of substance, but 1 should like briefly to explain why 1 shall vote in favour of the proposaI of the representative of Brazil. 166. The representative of Lebanon, in his first intervention during this meeting, suggested th!i.t it was better that the debate should be adjourned until the Mixed Armistice Commission had considered the incident in September involving the passage of an Israel ship through the Suez Canal, and until we had heard the results of the Commission's investigation. Mr. Malik made this suggestion immediately after the parties had been called to the table, and although he made no formaI proposaI at that time, 1 interpreted his suggestion as being, in effect, that the Council should at that moment adjourn. 1 thought that the speech by the representative of Lebanon on that occasion was very statesmanlike in its tone and ~haracter, and 1 am in general agreement with the ideaan idea which, at least as it seemed to me, underlay his speech-that there is no useful purpose in the Security Council having at this time a prolonged debate on the general question of freedom of navigation in th'·; liuez Canal. But 1 did not feel that it would be appropriate to adjourn before the parties had had an opportunity to make their statements. This they have now done, and 1 have listened with attention to the speeches by the representatives of Israel and Egypt. 167. Now that those statements have been made, 1 am, for my part, content that we should adjourn. Indeed, to put it positively, the view of my delegation is that a prolongcd debate at the moment would not lead us nearer to a fruitful solution of the wider problem; moreover, there is also the particular reason which, as 1 understand it, prompted the Israel Government to raise this matter again in the Council, that was·the occurrence of a particular incident, the incident of the ship. 168. We regret the circumstances which gave rise to this incident, but we do not feel competent to pass judgment on the merits of this particular casl~. We are pleased to note that both parties have had reCOUïse to the machinery 169. In these circumstances, it seems to me clearly desirable that we should await the report of the Mixed Armistice Commission on this question before deciding whether or not to give further cons:deration to the wider question. 170. Th..::se, then, are the reasons which willlead me to vote for the proposaI for adjournment just made by the representative of Brazil.

The French delegation fully supports the proposaI of the representative of Brazil; 1 have the impression that it expresses the general feeling in the Security Council and that perhaps there will even be no need to put it to the vote. 172. 1 feel that our judgment on the issue we are considering will have to be based on thr~e elements: the statements of the two parties iuvolved ~ j the report of the Mixed Armistice Commission. It was because 1 wished to hear the statements ofthe parties that 1 did not support the Lebanese representative's suggestion-a very wise suggestion from many pliJ,ints of view-that we should adjourn forthwith, and did not respond to 11Ïs courteous invitation to express our views at that stage of the discussion. 173. 'Ve have now heard the statements by Mr. Eban and Mr. Azmi. We have 110t yet received the report of the Mixed Armistice Commission, and 1 hope that we shall receive it soon. When we have the:;e three documents, we shall be able to resume the discussion at the calI of our Pr' ~dent. 174. In the meantime, we shall be able to examine more thoroughly the two statements made at tbis meeting. Several members of the Council have aIready paid a tribute, in wbich 1 gladly join, ta the moderate tone of those statements. However, 1 would tell Mr. Azmi that, hef.Jre the next meeting, 1 shall endeavour to clear up the question of the mysterious Corsican sbip he mentioned, since 1 sbould like to know whether it is not some new . ~:nit of an autonomous Corsican fleet 1 know nothing about 175. MF. WADSWORTH (United States of Am~rica): ln associating my delegation with the support for the motion made hy the representative of Brazil, l 5nd that there is virtually notbing w11Ïch l ca.n add to what has aIready been said by my colleagues. 1 wish to associate myself also with the expressions of gratification at the moderate tone used by both parties. to tbis dispute and by th~ representative of Lebanon in bis intervention. 1 feel that it is wholly appropriate that, now that we have heard the statements of the two parties. we should await the full report of the Mixed Armistic~ Commigsi~n in orderthat we may judge fully for ourrdves what the true state of affairs is. 177. First, we were glad to see the adoption without objection of the agenda. This is in accordance with what we believe to be the recognition of a principle of the Charter of first importance, namely, the principle of the supremacy of the Security Council. That recognition involved as weIl, in our judgment, the right of the parties to be heard initiaIly. Th.ey have been so heard. 178. Secondly, a body which may to some extent be described as subordinate to this Council will, we hope, shortly establish for us the facts whos~ consideration appears to be inseparable from the broader issues involved. 179. Finally, we wish to study the statements made today, characteri.'led as they were by a commendable moderation.

1 merely wish to support the Brazilian representative's proposai.

Tiule representative of Brazil has proposed that the discussion of the present question should be adjourned unill the information which is to be forwarded by the Mixed Armistice Commission has been received. 181. sentant question ayons d'armistice 182. proposition Il 183. de et 184. malentendu. de qu'il nome. m'ont convaincus de compétentes vous que 182. If1 hear no objection, 1 shall take it that that proposai is adopted unanimous1y. It was so decided.

1 congratulate the Security Council on the way it has dealt with this matter and on the unanimous decision it ha.s just taken.

1 wish to c1ear up a slight misunderstanding. 1 mentioned "Corsican " as being the nationality of one ofthe vessels that had passed through the Canal. 1 am well aware that there is no independen't or autonomous Corsican nationality. However, the information 1 have on the matter was sent to me by telegram and we are an convinced that there ha& been sorne nûstake. 1 have just consulted persons competent in the matter and it appears that it was really a Costa Rican vessel. 1 therefore apo10gize; 1 should have said " Costa Rican " and not "Corsican ". AUSTRALIA - AUSTRALIE : H. A. Goddard Pty., Md., 255a George Street, Sydney, N.S.W. Melbourne University Press, Carlton N. 3 (Victoria). FRANCE : Editions Paris V·. AUSTRIA - AUTRICHE : Gerold & Co., 1. Graben 31, Wien 1. B. Wü\lerstorff, Book Import and Subscription Agency, Markus Sittikusstrnsse 10, Salzburg. GERMANY - ALLEMAGNE: Elwert & Meurer, Schllneberg. W. E. Saarbach, hande!, Gereonstrasse, Alexander Hom, BELG[(iM - BELGIQUE: Agence et Messageries de la Presse S. A., 14-22 rue du Persil, Bruxelles. W. H. Smith & Son, 71·75 bd Adolphe-Max, Bruxelles. GREECE - GRÈCE Stadion Street, Athens. BOLIVIA - BOLIVIE: Librerla Selecciones, Empresa Editora .. La Razôn", Casilla 972, La Paz. HAITI : Max Bouchereau, velle ", Boite postale HONDURAS: Librerla Fuente, Tegucigalpa. BRAZIL - BRËSIL : Li'Jraria Agir, Rua Mexico 98-B, Caixa Postal 3291, Rio de Janeiro, D.F. HONG KONG : Swindon Road, Kowloon. CAMBODIA - CAMBODGE : !'apeterie-Librairie nouvelle, Albert Portail, 14 av. Boulloche, Pnom.Penh. ZCELAND - ISLANDE: Eymundsonnar, Austurstreti CANADA : The Ryerson Press, 299 Queen Street West, Toronto, Ontario. Periodica, 5112 av. Papineau, Montréal 34. INDIA - INDE: Company, Scindia P. Varadachary Madras 1. CEYLON- CEYLAN: The Associated Newspapers of Ceylon, Lld.. Lake House, Colombo, INDONESIA - INDONÉSŒ gunan, Gunung Saharï 84, Djakarta. CHILE - CHILI : Libreria Ivens, Calle Moneda 822, Santiago, Editorial dei Paeifico, Ahwoada 57, Santiago. IRAN: Ketab Khaneh Teheran. CHINA - CHINE: The World Book Co., Ltd., 99, Chung King Road, Ist Section, Taipeh, Taiwan. The Commercial Press, Lld., 170 Liu Li Chang, Peking, IRAQ - IRAK : sellers and Stationers. ISRAEL : Blumstein's Bookstores, Road. P.O.B. 4154, COLOMBIA - COLOMBŒ : Libreria Naciona!, Ltda., 20 de Julio. San Juan-Jesus, Baranquilla. Libreria Buchholz Galeria, Av. Jimenez de Quesada 8-40, Bogotâ, Librerla América, Sr. Jaime Navarro R., 49-58 CaIle 51, Medel1ln. ITALY - ITALŒ: Sansoni, Via Gino JAPAN - JAPON: Nichome, Nihonbashi, P.O.B. 605, Tokyo Central. LEBANON - LmAN: Beyronth. COSTA RICA: Trejos Hermanos, Apartado 1313, San José, LIBERIA: Mr. Jacob and Front Streets, CUBA : La Casa Belga, René de Smedt, O'Reilly 455, La Hab2llll. LUXEMBOURG: Guillaume, LuxemboUrg. CZECHOSLOVAKIA - TCHÉCOSLOVAQUŒ : Ceskoslovensky Spisovatel, Narodni Trida 9, Praha 1. MEXICO - MEXIQUE Ignacio Marlscal 41, DENMARK - DANEMARK: Messrs. Einar Munksgaard, Ltd., Norregade 6, Kiibenham. NE'I'HERLANDS - Nijhoff, Lange Voorhout DOMINICAN REPUBLIC - RÉPUBLIQUE DOMINICAINE: Libreria Dominicana, Calle Mercedes 49, Apartado 656, Ciuclad Trujillo. NEW ZEALAND The United Nations Association G.P.O. 1011, Wellington. ECUADOR - ~QUATEUR : Libr~ria Cientifica Bruno Moritz, CasiIla 362, Guayaquü. NICARAGUA: Dr. de Publicaciones, Menagna EGYPT - ~GYPTE : Librairie .. La Renaissance d'Egypte ", 9 Sharia Adty Pasha, Cairo. NORWAY - NORVÈGE: Forlag, Kr Augustsgt Sales Soction, European Office of the Unitad Nations, Palais des Nations, GENEVA (Switzerland) or Sales and Circnlation Ser.tion, UnitOO Nations, NEW YORK (U.S.A.) Printed in France l'lice: $U.S. 0.30; (o., equivalent