S/PV.683 Security Council

It is my pleasant duty-and 1 am sure that 1 voice the feelings of all the members of the Council-to express to Mr. Borberg, the retiring President, our sincere appreciation of the manner in which he performed the duties of his offiee last month. 2. Mr. Borberg presided over our work with bis charàcteristic wisdom,. good judgment and unfailing sense of humour, with a firmness matched only by his graciousnes~ and impartiality. 3. This is the second and, unfortunately, the last tîmesinee Mr. Borberg will be leaving us at the end of the year-that the order of the alphabet gives me the privilege of paying him this tribute. AIl of us who have worked \mder him will retain a vivid recollection of his terms as President and he will long serve as an example to those who succeed him in the Chair.

M~y 1 express my thanks to the President for the words he has just spoken? They are not deserved, because 1 am sure that if nothing untoward occurred during the month of October it was not due to the President ; any success our work may have hau is attributable not to the ; President but to the excellent co-operation of aIl the ' members of the Council and to the assistance which '",J,i,. the President can always count on receiVing from the Secretariat. l;c·, ..~. l '1. Three weeks have since clapsed. and on 25 October 1954 a telegram [8/3309] relating to the Bat Galim incident was received by the Secretary-Gen~ralfrom the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supe'"Vision Organization for transmission to the Security Council. It appeared from that communication that a decision by the Egyptian delegation to considei' illegal the emergency meeting of the Mixed Armistice Commission held on 21 October 1954 had prevented that commission from discharging its duties and had thus given rise to a situation which the Chairman of ~e C011lIlÙssion felt compelled to report to the Security Coun~il. 8. Following that communicatior" and as a result of the sitaation which had arlsen, the representative of Israel requested a· meeting of the Security Council, and bis request [8/3310] has been complied with. Hence the purpose of our meeting, as 1 see it, a.t least, is not to consider the substance of the question at this point but to examine the situation resulting from the facts 1 have just related. 9. 1 would urge speakers to confine their statements to this particular point and not to feel compelled to review the whoh: matter from its inception and through all its developments. The representatives of Israel and Egypt expressed their views on this item very fully and with great relevance at the last meeting ofthe Security Council. They will no doubt find it unnecessary to repeat what has aIready been said.

1 wish to thank the President for convening the Security Council in response to my delegation's request to renew the discussion on the item inc1uded in the agenda relating to Egyptian restrictions jn the Suez Canal, with special reference to the Bat Galim incident. 1 should like very briefly to summarize the circumstances in wbich the Security Council concluded its last meeting, on 14 October 1954. 12. The seven months which have passed since the Security Council's last discussion, in March 1954, have brought no improvement whatever in the Egyptian practice. The Offe'llding regulations have remained in full effllet, and no compliance with the Security Council's resolution has been secured. 1.3. The figures quoted by the representative of Egypt Jn 14 October [682nd meeting] concerning ships reaehkg Haifa through the Suez Can.al were a confession of guilt and not a daim of virtue. They revealed that Egypt had secured the effect of an abnost totaI blockade. For if it was Mr. Azmi's object to ereate in us a sense of Ieassurance by proving that sorne eighteen ships haà reaehed Israel during that period, then bis assertion 1eads to the opposite conclusion. Such a patheticilly meagre trickle would be but a tiny fraction of the total volume of traffie which would normally reach Israel through the Canal if Egypt obeyed international law in the waterway. le qui constituent indiquent que l'Égypte a imposé dans le canal de Suez blocus rassurer d'Israël période, Le infime rendraient l'Égypte régissent 1~. Against this background of a continuing maintenance of illicit restrictions, with the effect of an aImost total blockade, !here came the incident on 28 September. The situation which faced us was now clear. First, Egypt continued to maintain the restrictions which the Security Council had required it to terminate. Secondly,Israelbound commerce was being effectively throttled and reduced to an insignificant tric1de. Thirdly, any serious attempt to·exercise the right of innocent passage was liable to forcible obstruction, even to the point of a hostile assault on the freedom of an unarmed ship and its crew. 14. aux illégales imposées Suez, et qui équivalent à est navigation Conseil de sécurité lui avait demandé de lever. transport de marchandises à destination d'Israël est réduit à exercer rencontre une bateau 15. différend international. traité la maintenant obligation à l'égard des navires àciestination nance normes time. reprendre conséquences l'Égypte 16. cette nouvel incident. égyptien 15. Now these facts tlwmselves created a grave international ~ispute. In addition, Egypt had signed an international tleaty which appeared in its wording to respect freedom ofnavigation in the Suez Canal. It was now clear that Egypt recognized no such obligation in respect of shipping passing to or from Israel, and refused any deference to the international law. affecting the waterway in this regard. There was every reason, then, for the Security Council to renew its general efforts to free the Suez Canal from the effects of these unlawful and dangerous practices. i 16. But before the Security Council could discuss this l question in its broad perspective, a new and specific issue 1 arose. The.Government ofEgypt alleged on 28 September j 1954 that the merchant ship Bat Galim had fired on an ~_"" ""'''''' 3 17. World oplIDon, 1 think, seized on the inherent absurdity of a charge such as thîs. What kind of folly would tempt a ship's captain engaged in a historic mission to secure a legal right of free passage in an international waterway to risk the life of himself and his crew, and the integrity of bis cause, by a useless assault in conditions where he and his ship were physically helpless? 18. ït was no wonder that nine days elapsed before Egypt tOQk this fiction to the Mixed Armistice Commission. It was quite obvious to us !hat Egypt's purpose in that commission was to avoid or delay a discussion in the Security Council which Israel had naturally requested. A government which places the slightest credence in its own story of aggressive attack and loss of life would not have waited nine days before offering an opportunity of investigation. i9. While we hz.d a clear view ofthe Egyptian motive for belatecUy submitting this complaint to the Mixed Armistice Commission, we did not regret that the case was to be heard. The story of an attack by the Bat Galim upon Egyptian fishermen is, in our view, a monstrous international perjury deserving public rebuke. It aroused our deepest resentment and indignation. Once the charge had been made, it became an elementary condition of justice tliat it be swiftly investigated and discussed. 20. Accordingly, 1 joined with the representative of Egypt, on 14 October [682nd meeting], in expressing the reasonable hope that the Mixed Armistice Commission would complete its action on this case. The Security Council unanimously agreed that its further discussion should await a report from the Mixed Armistice Commission. The Egyptian representative addressed the Security Council as follows: "There is already a committee, a competent subsidiary organ ofthe Security Council, to which the matter has been referred. That committee is functioning. It has sent observers. The observers are making their inquiries. How do you wish to continue the discussion at this point? Are you not afraid that the continuation of the discussion will embarrass the observers on the spot? Tbose observers wish to arrive at the truth. 21. It was on bis note of reason and moderation that the Security Council concluded its meeting on 14 October this year. 22. 1 no'v come, with deep regret, to outline the events which hue taken place slnce the Security CouDeil last met. 23. When the Egyptian complaint was subr.ùtted to the Mixed Armistice Commission. the Government of Israel addressed a letter to the Chairman of the Commission. This communicatioll, which is quoted in General Burns' report [8/3309], stated, first, that the èh,arge was basele>s, since the Bat Galim had not fired a single shot upon anybody on land or sea, but, secondly,. that, once the charge had been made, the Israel Government felt entitled to claim an early investigation and decision by the Mixed Armistice Commission. :'- ~', 24. My Government's attitude as expressed in this letter is. 1 hope, too simple to require any long explanation. It is surely an axiom ofjudicial decency that those who make a grave ôarge should afford the earliest opportunity to have it investigated and judged. Any government making an accusation with sincerity and conviction should be interested in a swift process of decision. Moreover, under the armistice procedures, it has been universally accepted, aImost as an unwritten tradition, that any charge invo:ving alleged bloodshed shall be discussed at an emergency meeting, not at an ordinary meeting. Obviously, ifthere is loss oflife, or an accusation of 108s of life, it would be irreverent for such charge to be investigated ai the eJ;ld of a long list of relatively insignificant cases, minor incidents with no bloodshed, the theft of a sheep or a camel or a piece of waterpipe; so that everything about the Israel request for expedited discussion was normal and orderly. 25. The Egyptian Government had submitted a complaint against an alleged assault by an Israel merchant vesse!. Israel had denied the assault but had accepted the challenge of the accusation, requesting the Chairman of t}1-; M5.xed Armistice Commission to bring the matter to an emergency meeting, in accordance with article 4, paragraph 3, of the rules of procedure of the Mixed Armistice Commission. It was now, then, a matter for the Chairman's decision, and he decided rhat an emergency 26. The Commission convened at its usual place of meeting on 21 October 1954. The participants had before them a report of the investigation conducted by the United Nations observers throughout the previous two weeks, after receipt of the Egyptian complaint on 6 October. This, again, is normal practice; on receiving a complaiut from either party, the United Nations observers embark on an investigation of the charge and then formulate their findings, which become, naturally, the cemral evidence upon V/bich the Mixed Armistice CommiRsion deliberates and votes. 27. The Unit~d Nations observers' report is divided into two parts. The first part deals with the investigation of the representatives of the Dolphin Shipping Company, as the owners of the Bat Goiim and the source of its captain's instructions. The second part of the observers' report sets out the results of their investigations in the Suez region at the scene of the alleged conflict. 28. The observers' report is a most instructive document. Hs contents may help to reveal why the Egyptian delegation has still evaded the judgment of the Mixed Armistice Commission, for the report of the United Nations observers on their investigations contains the following findings: first, a search of the ship revealed that it carried no arms or ammunition of any kind except the revolver of the captain, secondly, the United Nations observers found that the Egyptian officiaIs who had gone aboard on 28 September had found no arms and no ammunition; thirdly, the bodies of the alleged victims of the assault were not to be found; fourthly, none of the fishermen who were allcgedly involved in the incident could say what was the number of the fishing boat which had allegedly disappeared, nor could they identify the Bat Goiim as the origin of any shooting; fifthly, the two fishermen who had aUegedly disappeared as a resclt of the so-called shots from the Bat Ga[üll were completely unknown to aU the other members of the fishing group who were questioned; sixthly, the Egyptian authorities were unable to give the United Nations observers any information about the domicile or the origin of the two alleged victims, and Colon.el Gohar explained that it was very difficult ta find their relatives. In short, there was no evidence that any two existent people had lost their liv~N at aU, and none whatever to 1ink the Bat Goiim \Vith any untoward incident of any kind or sort. 30. The report fully confirms, in our view, that the Egyptian assertion of firing from the Bat Galim is a libel unsupported by the smallest shred of evidence. It is an unusual ~pisode in the history of the United Nations that a charge sa frivolous, and yet so grave, as this, could bave been proclaimed from the rostrum of the C'TCneral Assembly and at the table of the Security Couneil-in other words, from the two highest platforms of international security and law. It must have becn obvious to both delegations that this charge faeed ignominious collapse and, one would hope, the indignant retribution of world opinion, of representatives in the General Assembly, of members of th~ Security Cauneil, and of representatives of the Press throughout the world on whom the Egyptian Ministry of Propaganda had foisted this charge. It is at this point, with the receipt of the report of the United Nations observers, that there begins the purposeful obstruction which has brought the matter back to tbe table of the Security Couneil. 31. Unwilling to confront the evidence, patently reluctant to discuss or to act upon the observers' report, the Egyptian representative in the Mixed Armistice COll.m1ÏSsion, on instructions from his Government, began a long and obstructive procedural wrangle. 32. The Mst point which Colonel GobaI' l'aised in the meeting of 21 October 1954 was that the meeting should not be in session at all. Egypt, he asserted, had brought a complaint against Israel but had not asked for an emergency meeting; therefore the Chairman had acted wrongly in convening the meeting. There was, in bis view, no hurry. Egypt had complained that its nationals had been killed by tire from an Israel ship, but there was notbing urgent about investigating the charge. It could wait. Thete was a long list of other matters: there were Bedouin who had crossed the lines without identification cards; here a camel had been stolen, there a sheep; here a piece of irrigation pipe had been uprooted, there a soldier on patrol had put bis foot innocuously beyond the demarcation line. Tbere are 130 snch ordinary cases upon the agenda of the Mixed Armistice Commission. Egypt solemnly suggested that the Bat GaIim episode, a major international confiict, should be postponed u:1til the end of that list. 33. 1 should point out that the Mixed Armistice Commission usually deals with four or five such ordinary cases at each of its meetings, which are generally held at monthly intervals. In making this argument that the ,~~.· ... ":"~-i.;'"~·'':~'''·''';'''··~'''·'''''''·~·''''';'ë''''''~.n.;i':';~;'~:"'···.tt' ~ .•:..:.:;~:;::: ..;•. :.~:~~a~.,,".,,~ J.t 1 understand that the Egyptian assertion is-and General Burns so states-that only the party which 5ubmits a complaint to the Mixed Armistice Commission lIlay cali for its emergency discussion. Yet one can read Ule Egyptian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement 1 from beginnîng to end and find not a single word in support of such an interpretation. The plaintiff has no speciul privileges not possessed by the defendant. Whether on matters of procedure or on matters of substance, a majorit.y shaH decide. A majority had so decided and, in df:ference to its decision, the emergency meeting was calied. 35. The Council will be interested to hear that there have been sixteen emergency meetings called at Egypt's request in the past two years, since October 1952, in nine of which there was an allegation of the use of armed force and the creation of casualties. Similarly, there have been a large number of emergency meetings called at the request of the Israel delegation, nearly always in the event of an exchange of :lire and the creation of casualties. Therefore there was nothing at aIl abnormal in the' Chairman convening an emergency meeting for a discussion of tbis case in which bloodshed had been alleged, quite apart 'from the wider international complications which the issue evoked. 36. Another plea by the Egyptian representative at the meeting on 21 October 1954 was that the meeting was illegal since the Chairman should have convened it immediately after the investigation at Haifa and not after the investigation at Suez. Accordingly, he pleaded that the results ofthe investigation at Suez should not be discussed af tl-..1S meeting of the Mixed Armistice Commission, wrich should deliberate, ifat aIl, only on the interrogation ~)f the Dolphin Shipping Company at Raifa. Is it really possible for the human mind to conceive anytbing more far-fetched than tbis argument adduced by the Egyptian delegation in an effort to avoid discussion and judgment on this grave dispute? At any rate, the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission, representing the United Nations, rejected tbis Egyptian complaint and patiently pointed out that both inquiries, that at Haifa and that at Suez, were essentially parts of any discussion of the Bat Galim incident. 37. This was the Chairman's ruling, and, having failed to advance his cause against logic or justice, the Egyptian representative unfortunately proceeded on a struggle 38. Itwas agreed that the discussion would be postponed unill Saturday, 23 October, at 9 a.m., at the same place. This second meeting was du1y appointed, with Colonel Bartholdy of the Danish Army in the Chair, Colonel Shalev representing Israel, Colonel Gohar representing Egypt, and Mr. Vigier, of the United Nations staff, and Mr. Tekoa, legal adviser to the Israel reprL_.mtative, in attendance. 1 should add that the meeting was convened Ol: 23 October only ~.fter intenslve attempts by the Egyptians in the inter, 'Ding two days to prevent this meeting from taking place at aIl. 39. When the meeting opened, Colonel Shalev, representing Israel, expressed his Government's indignation at the presentation of this complaint, and especially at the purposeful attempt to prevent the Mixed Armistice Commission from reaching its conclusions. He pointed out cogently that the Egyptian conduct in this matter could not be reconciled with any belief that Egypt had a valid case or grievance, for in that case it would surely be anxious to press the matter to an immediate conclusion. 1 était indigné, à une tude de plainte étaitjustifiée: elle qu'une 40. adressé aux parties et a avait questions et déreraient cette la été tirés du dè d'énergie? 41. cet empêcher la tendant à prouver que, conseiller 40. The Chairman, Colonel Bartholdy, then addressed the parties, saying that the previous meeting had been consumed in a discussion of procedural matters, on which he had ruled, and that he therefore now hoped that the parties would regard the procedural discussion as ended and would discuss the substance of the question itself. Had there been shooting from the Bat Galim or not, and what evidence was there in support of the Egyptian charge which Israel so vehemently denied? 41. The Egyptian representative ignored this appeal from the Chairman and embarked upon a new effort to prevent the Mixed Armistice Commission from discussing the question. He began by a long dissertation seeking to prove that the presence of ~1r. Tekoa, legal adviser of the Israel Foreign Office, rendered the meeting of the Mixed 42. Then, for five whale hours, the EgyptilU1 representntive pursued an argument with Colonel Bnrtholdy, the Chnirmnn of the Mixed Armistice Commission, on titis Illdicrous point thnt Mr. Tekoa's presence made the meeting illegal, and having gained as much time ~\s the matter was worth, he consumed the remninder of the time of the meeting in returning to the assertion tlmt the meeting was illegal because it was summoned only t\t'er the complction of the investigation nt Suez and not after the earlier completion of the inquiry at Haïfa. Aguin, the Security Council will hardly wish to give serious weight to an assertion that the Mixed Armistice Commission should have convened to discuss an alleged incident involving bloodshed before having received the report of the investigation at the scene of the alleged offence. 43. Here, again, the Chairman overruled this Egyptian objection, stnted emphatically that the mccting wns legt\l, appealed again to the parties to put an end to this proceduraI discussion, which had gone on for two days, {Uld urged that they should begin to discuss the substance of the matter at the third meeting, which he then fixed for 26 October 1954. 44. It was obvious to the Chairman of the Mixcd Armistice Commission, m:cl indeed to the Chief of Staff, General Burns, that there would be no point in repeating the fareical filibuster of21 and 23 October. General Burns therefore attcmpted to ascertain what the Egyptian demeanour would be if the meetinlZ were called. He has now reported to the Security Council [S/3309] that, if a meeting of the Mixed Armistice Commission were called, the Egyptian position would be unchanged-in other words, the Egyptian representative would continue to prevenî a discussion of the substance of the grave aecusations which Egypt made three weeks ago, concerning an incident alleged to have taken place five weeks ago. Presumably, the robust Colonel Gohar would either spend six hours objecting to the presence of Mr. Yigier or would again return to one of these judiciaI points, namely, that the meeting had been called too earlv and too late-too early because Egypt had not asked .or an emergency meeting, and too late because the emergency meeting, which should not have taken place at ail, should have taken place on receipt of a report following the completion of the inquiry at Haïfa, and before receipt of the data on the investigations at Suez. 45. The Security Council might find it hard to believe, but this is an account summarizing the report of the United Nations investigation and the proceedings of two meetings of the Mixed Armistice Commission, lasting twelve hours. There can hardly exist in the jurisprudence of the United Nations such a distortion of the judicial process, su(;h an evasion of judgment, and such an attempt to reduce the Mixed Armistice Commission to mockery. It is, 1 am afraid, a lamentable refiection on the character of this conflict between Israel and its neigh- 47. What, then, has become ofthese declarations? We have instead a letter before us asserting that the Security Council should repudiate the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission, who had ruled in favour of immediate discussion, and should acquiesce in a manoeuvre to have tbis dispute postponed until a host of insignificant matters have fust been discussed. Does anyone doubt that, on any or each of these 130 routine cases, a determined Egyptian representative could put up an indefinite barrage, for six hours each, of arguments and counter-arguments, so that a discussion of the Bat Galim incident would never be reached? 48. Therefore 1 regret to conclude that the enect of Mr. Azmi's letter cau only be defined in these terms: that the Bat Galim incident would never be discussed in the S~curity Council because of allegedly prior jurisdiction in the Mixed Armistice Commission, and would never be discussed in the Mixed Armistice Commission because of the allegedly prior jurisdiction of 130 other complaints not involving the allegation of bloodshed. 49. Moreover, the who1e point wbich Mr. Azmi brings in bis letter to the Security Council is really not before the Security Council at all. Whether the Bat GaIim case should have been broüght to an emergency meeting on 21 October 195'-1-, or only after other matters on the agenda, is not an open question. It is a closed question; it has been decided. The Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission, supported by a majority ofits members, decided upon the emergency procedure. If Mr. Azmi's letter were seriously considered, it would mean that the Security Council-for the fust time, 1 think, in its history-would be repudiating the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission for applying normal judicial principlesand would be overruling a majority of the Mixed Armistice Commission on a matter strictly within that Commission's sole discretion, namely, the arrangement of its procedure. 52. My delegation therefore considers that the Egyptian complaint of an alleged assault by the Bat Galim could quite properly now be regarded as nuU and void. In the fust place, there is no evidence and there has never been any evidence for the assertion, and there is not even a prima fade case for regarding the case as existent. 1 do not believe that there is a single coun1:ry anywhere under whose judicial traditions a complaint such as this, without a single shred of evidence in its support, would have qualified for formaI investigation. Secondly, the Egyptian Government does not seem to believe its 0\\..1 assertion any more than do other Governments. This is manifest in the very fact that the delegatiC'u of Egypt, so far from seeking remedy, is actually postponing and evading a discussion and is desperately 100king for a retreat from its charge of 28 September 1954. 53. The Security Council would be acting wisely if it were to regard the Egyptian accusation as non-existent and were to pass on, as soon as possible, to consider the real question, name1y, the steps which should be taken in respect of Egypt's unlawful seizure of the Bat Galim on 28 September 1954 and of its violation of the Security Council's decision of 1 September 1951 [8/2322]. 54. My Government cannot acquiesce in the idea of leaving the Bat Galim and its crew in the unlawful custody of the Egyptian authorities in order that such unseemly proceedings should be repeated at forther meetings of the Mixed Armistice Commission. Surely the Government of Egypt would be weIl advised, on all grounds ofjustice and expediency, to release this ship and its innocent crew, on whom the injury of arrest and deprivation of liberty has already been wantonly inflicted. 55. We would therefore ask the Security Couneil, with aU respect, to bring about the immediate release of the Bat Galim and its crew and to reïterate its opinion in favour of terminating the Egyptian restrictions on all traffic passing to or from Israel through the Suez Canal.

1 must begin with an expression of regret. 1 should have been the first to agree to keep to the rule the President laid down, to confine myself strictly to the study of the question or to the matter of postponing that study until ~ Massawa, the vessel was given a new name, the Bat Galim, L____ 13 61. On 28 September, the very day of the Bat Galim incident, Egypt reported the matter to the President ofthe Security Council. It did so, 1must point out, for purposes of information. The next day, 29 September, reference was made to a "complaint ", a formal complaint by Israel against Egypt. Very well. Egypt was awaiting the results of the investigation carried out by the Egyptian office of the public prosecutor before taking a final position: it wished to be on solid ground. But Israel filled the air with public accusations and referred to Egypt in derogatory terms. 62. Egypt submitted its complaint on 6 October 1954, or nine days after the incident, nine days which were required to conclude the investigation by the public prosecutor's office. Egypt, then, submitted its complaint to the competent commission, namely, the Mixed Armistice Commission. The very next day, Israel submitted an urgent request. What was the nature of that request or complaint? It merely alleged that the Egyptian complaint was based on completely false data and that the "Israel daim ", as it was called. should be urgently cousidered by the Commission. 63. The Israel complaint is thus a reply to the Egyptian complaint. But should the Commission consider the Egyptian complaint, Israel will inevitably object. The consideration of the Egyptian complaint, however, would result in t1}e immediate and simultaneous consideration of the Israel complaint. Why complicate matters? Why do two things at once? Why ask for a reply, as a matter of priority, to a question, a charge, which must be considered fust if logic and the normal order of things are to be observed? 64. Ml'. Eban went to great lengths to describe the position taken up by the Egyptian representative in the Mixed Armistice Commission. As 1 pointed out in my letter [S/3311] to the President of the Security Council, that position was based simply on a desire to observe the rules, and Egypt cannot be held responsible for a statement which lasted six or twelve hours. 1 may even say that Colonel Gohar has my utmost sympathy for having had to go to such lengths. But he must have felt that it was his duty to do so. Being on the spot, he certainly noticed things which escape our notice here. He therefore took that position because he wished to observe the rules, and Egypt cannot be held responsible for the length ofhis speech. 65. 1 heard Ml'. Eban refer just now to an "emergency meeting". 1am Sl1re that if he had used the word " early " or " special" in bis request, the results would have been just as speedy. But no, things have to be complicated, if not by Mr. Eban, who is among us, then by those who submitted Israel's request to the Mixed Armistice Commission. The word "urgent" was used. Ml'. Eban, too, used the word in his letter of 27 October 1954 [S/3310] to the President of the Security Council. He requested an urgent meeting of the Council. This is part of the 66. Very well, then, we must apply the rules ofprocedure with ail urgency. That is exactly what Colonel Gohar did when he spoke for six or twelve hours. He was compelled to do so because of that ill-chosen and inapposite word "urgent". Anyone who uses a word like that should at least be patient enough to hear any arguments which might be advanced to correct the procedure which its use imposes. 67. Accordingly, it was in order to observe the ru1es of procedure that the Egyptian representative took that position in the Mixed Armistice Commission. Had that position been disputable, the Chairman of the Commission would have taken a decision. Mr. Eban tries to describe Colonel Gohar as a man who-I am not quite sure of the exact term he used-has about ten tongues instead of just one. He wants us to admit that Colonel Gohar prevented everyone else from speaking. What are we to think of this? Was there not a glass of water at the Mixed Armistice Commission? Did the Egyptian representative speak for six or twelve hours without stopping even once to swallow his saliva, which wou1d have given the Chairman, not to mention the others, an opportunity to intervene? 68. 1 believe, however, that Mr. Eban omitted one small detail. He omitted to say that Colonel Gohar asked Mr. Vigier, legal adviser to the Chairman ofthe Commission: " Am 1 right? ", meaning, was he right to adduce all these arguments for twelve hours? And the reply was: " Yes, you are right." The legal adviser thus approved the Egyptian representative's position, and, consequently, there was no obstruction to the proceedings. When he spoke for twelve hours, the representative of Egypt might have expected the Chairman to intervene. 1 am sorry to say, however, that the Chainnan of the Mixed Armistice Commission did absolutely nothing. He did not make a ru1ing. 69. Mr. Eban has just told us that the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission did in fact make a statement. He said he regarded the two complaints as constituting a single question. That is logic. Of course there is only one question, since Egypt is making the complaint and Israel is replying to it. Those are the two elements in the discussion. So the Chairman of the Joint Armistice Commission stated that there was only a single question. But he should have gone a little further, he should have announced his decision as Chairman, he should have said that the two questions would be studied simultaneously. But the Chairman of the Commission did not do that. 70. So what happened? The Chief of Staff sent a telegram [8/3309] to the Secretary-General informing him of the facts. He informed him of everything that happened there: the six hours, the twelve hours, the arguments advocating respect for the rules relating to matters of urgency, etc. 72. That is how Mr. Eban has dramatized the situation; that is the background of the picture which 1 wished to show you. 73. 1 return to the contrast 1 have drawn: on the one hand, tolerance and legality; on the other, provocation and illegality. We are accused of being obstructive. But, as 1 said in my letter, the Egyptian Government has instructed its representative to communicate with the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission and ask him to convene the Commission immediately and arrange for it to hold a number of meetings at very short intervals. À decision by the Chairman was expected, and it is to his failure to act that the present situation is due. It is because of the Chairman's failure to act that the Commission has wasted time and that the prestige of the Security Council has perhaps been somewhat impaired. Is it the function of the Chairman of the Commission to study such questions as whether a speech may last for six hours, or twelve hours? 1personally think he has other things to do than waste time on such futilities. 74. Thus, as the letter from the permanent representative of Egypt shows, the Egyptian Government asked the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission to take a decision, saying that for its part it desired frequent, and even daily, meetings. 75. It is true that, still dramatizing the situation, Mr. Eban spoke of 140 cases-cases concerning camels, crippled feet and 1know not what else. For its part, the Egyptian Government asks the Chairman ofthe Armistice Commission to concern himself with important matters. 76. How are decisions taken? The Mixed Armistice Commission consists of three persons-the Chairman, an Israel representative and an Egyptian representative. Decisions are taken by a majority, that is to say, by a majority vote of two. The Chairman may have his opinion as to what the important questions are. The Israel representative may agree with the Chairman on that point. In any case there will be discussion. The representative of Egypt will state his reasons, the representative of Israel will state his and the Chairman will express his views. That is precisely what we are asking the Chairman to do. If he agrees with the representative of Israel, they will constitute the majority and their opinion will become a decision by the Commission. But what we want is that the Chairman should state bis views. Poor Colonel Gohar is now accused of having 78. I shall read you some ~xtracts from the annex to the official record of the meeting of the Security Council held on 9 November 1953. They are the replies of the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization to the questions which had been put to him. One of the replies is as follows: "In the course of their duties, United Nations military observers have met with some obstruction on the part of Israeli civilians and some over-zealous Israeli officiaIs in the two demilitarized zones created by the Israel-Egyptian and Israel-Syrian Armistice Agreements and in the Mount Scopus demilitarized zone... "At approximately 6.30 a.m., I arrived at the area with several United Nations obse.rvers. The senior Israeli police inspector in charge informed me that he hp.d received specifie orders not to allow anyone to enter the buildings in the Jewish sector. I inquired as to who had issued this order and was told that his superiors in Jerusalem were responsible. He refused to divulge the name of the superior who had issued the order. At about Il.20 a.m., after many difficulties and after an Israeli police inspector had been brought to the spot from the Israeli section of Jerusalem, we were allowed to start the inspection, but the observers met with minimum co-operation. Keys to locked doors could not be found, and the operation of mine detectors was not allowed. At approximate1y 12.40, the Israeli police inspector announced that be had received orders to stop the inspection. 1 then withdrew from the area " [635th me.eting, annex, p. 26]. That, of course, is obstruction by Egypt; it is not obstruction by Israel at aIl! "Here the investigating party was stopped by an Israeli police inspector. Even though the United Nations observer was satisfied that the tracks he saw at thepoint near the Scopus fence were'the same as those seen at the site of the explosion, the Israeli inspector refused to let the tracker or the United Nations observer come nearer the fence" [ibid., p. 27]. That, too, is obstruction by Egypt! "In paragraph 58 of bis report, General Bennike speaks of 'Israel opposition to the fulfilment by the Chairman and United Nations observers of their responsibility for ensuring the implementation of article V of the General Armistice Agreement'. This opposition is further hinted at in paragraph 66. Since this is not an unimportant matter, especially in view of the text of the present item with which the Security Council is seized, a detailed report on this question seems necessary" [ibid., p. 31]. " The assurance thus given to my predecessor has not always been fully observed " [ibid., p. 31]. AlI that is obstruction by Egypt! 79. In the report by the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization to the Secretary-General concerning the incident in the Beit Liqya area (document 8/3290, dated 14 September 1954, or approximately one and a half months ago) 1 read the following: "In view of the non-co-operation of Israel in the Mixed Armistice Commission,... if United Nations observers went to the area, they would go unofficially, since their carrying out an investigation on the Israel side would mean that Israel was participating in the Mixed Armistice Commission" [8/3290, para. 3]. More obstruction by Egypt! "On the basis of the United Nations observers' reports, the Mixed Armistice Commission, in its meeting of 3 September, adopted, in the absence of the Israel delegation, a resolution proposed by... " [ibid., para 6]. Absence, sabotage, for seven consecutive months; aIl that is obstruction by Egypt! " ...Israel was in its absence condemned for the following incidents: (a) ...(b) ... (c) ...(d) " [ibid., para. 8]. In other words, four incidents; and aIl that is obstruction by Egyptl "The non-co-operation of Israel in the work of the Mixed Armistice Commission has prever.ted an investigation on the Israel side" [ibid., rara. 9]. Obstruction by Egypt! " ...The non-co-operation of Israel in the work of the Mixed Armistice Commission precludes any investigation by United Nations observers that could either prove or disprove these Israeli allegations of thefts and murder" [ibid., para. 10]. 80. Obstruction by Egypt! The choice of words is really unfortunate. Urgency, obstruction? If 1 have any right-and perhaps 1 have-to give the opposite side, with which we are in a state of war, a word of advice, it is the following: let us choose our words, and let us not use expressions which themselves may really be the cause of obstruction in the normal work of the Security Council. 83. Another example. On 26 August 1953, Israel refused to discuss any of the complaints on the agenda of the Mixed Armistice Commission. There were seventeen Egyptian complaints. Because they dealt with really important and urgent questions, Israel "efused to discuss them. This time the questions were urgent: attacks by Israeli soldiers resulting in the death of seventeen civilians and one Egyptian soldier, the wounding of thirty other Arabs, and serious damage to property belonging to Arabs, inc1uding an ice plant destroyed by dynamhe. All that, of course, is more obstruction by Egypt! 84. And there are so many other examples! 1 would not like to read to the Council all the documents in my possession, showing unmistakably that, ifthere is obstruc~ tion, its source is well known. 85. But let us come back to the specific issue defined by the President. With regard to the matter of urgency, 1 have explained the Egyptian representative's attitude, which was prompted by the use of that ill-chosen term. The Chairman should have acted, he should have taken a decision, especially as he nad stated that the two questions were one and the same. But he did not do so. Yet his decision would have closed the incident. It is for the Chairman-aftertakingthe matter up withtheCommission, of course-to decide which of the agenda items are the most important. The items should then be dealt with rapidly, at daily meetings if necessary. Mter five or six important incidents have been selected from among the 144 cases mentioned, the incident ofthe Bat Galim might, for instance, be taken up as the fourth or Mth item. But '.1 is for the Chairman, after an exchange of views among the members of the Commission, to take a decision. l~ r- 87. Furthermore, Mr. Eban took issue with the Egyptian Governmenl for having waited eight days before submitting its complaint. As 1 have already explained, we waited eight or nine days simply in order to allow the public proseclltor's office to carry out an investigation. The incident was one which we considered to involve criminal offence and the public prosecmor's office had to carry out an investigation, for which at Jeast eight or nine days were needed. While the investigation was proceeding, the findings were periodically communicated, and the Egyptian Government, once it felt that it was on solid ground, took the matter up with the Mixed Armistice Commission. There is nothing at aIl unusual in this, and issue cannot be taken \Vith Egypt for having walted eight days before submitting its complaint, nor can ulterior motives be imputed to it of which Mr. Eban may be aware but of which we know nothing. 88. Referriûg to the results of the investigation, Mr. Eban categorically denied the Egyptian charges: there were no arms, there were no shots, there was nothing. The incident was a complete fabrication. Mr. Eban used the \Vorà "filibuster ", which 1 have not yet been able to look up in an English-French dictionary for its exact meaning, but 1 gather that he was continuing to accuse us of inventing incidents. 89. Moreover, Mr. Eban refers to the results of the investigation as if they were final conclusions, although, in point of fact, the Commission has not yet stated its views on the investigators' reports. We are still at the investigation stage, and the report has yet to be submitted to the Commission for consideration and debate. Only after that has taken place can reference be made to the official results of the investigation. However that may be, 1 can give my word-and 1 mean, of course, my word of honour-that 1 know nothing of aU these reports. 1 know that the investigators went to Tel Aviv to speak with the owners of the vessel, that others went to Egypt, to Suez and to Cairo, that they inspected the vessel and the fishing boats and prepared a report; in otrer words, they questioned sorne of the seamen and inspected the vessel. Yes, 1 am aware of those investïgations, but 1 can honestly say that 1 have absolutely no information on their result. That is why 1 was amazed to hear Mr. Eban say that the results ofthe investigation had proved that the Egyptian allegations were false. 90: 1 reserve the right, of course, to reply to those statements, but 1 wish to point out her-e and now that no official document on the results of the investigation has yet been submitted to the Council, nor can it be until the Mixed Ar-.uïislice Commission has considered the reports based on the investigations which were carried out. The results of those exchanges of views, held in the presence of the Chairman, and the resolution which will subse- 94. Mter the shipping agreement, there were other seizures. On 15 June 1954, vessel No. 273, with six sailors on board, was seized because it had alleged1y entered territorial waters and there was no storm. On 24 March and 25 July 1954 respectively, vessels Nos. 467 and 577 were also seized because they were in territorial waters. The shipping agreement was applied. The Israel authorities decided that there had been no storm and no circumstances beyond human control, and accordingly seized those vessels. The Egyptian Govemment did not protest, it did not bring a complaint. As 1 have already said, it is a case offair play, but there must be fair playon both sides. The Israel vessel was in our territorial waters. If an Israel vessel is found in our territorial waters, whether on the east or on the west coast of the Gulf of Suez, whether at Port Tewfik or even in the Suez Canal, we apply the shipping agreement and we seize it, as you do our vessels. Let us admit that. 95. 1 say an this without prejudice to anything 1 may have to say if the question arises of free navigation through the Suez Canal, which 1 do not wish to discuss at present. 96. 1 do not know why it should be so, but we must admit that Israel has a complex, an extraordinary fear. In Israel it is l>elieved that Egypt and the other Arab countries are going to make waT. On 14 October 1954, the 95. je navigation veux 96. reconnaître ordinaire, autres 97. 1 was very glad to read in the New York Times this morning the summary of yesterday's House of Commons debate on the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement. The speakers in the House ofCommons were not of course Israeli, but there was-I do not imply that there was anything intentional about this-a banquet the same evening, and the same feeling of fear was displayed. It was perhaps reflected in the speech by Mr. Morrison in the House of Commons. But! shall quote: "Mr. Nutting (Minister of State) said he had no evidence of aggressive intent on the part of any Arab State." So l simply say: at least believe a mutual friend when he tells you that. Thanks to the agreement, we are already on a footing of friendship; you are still seeking such friendship. But believe what Mr. Nutting tells you. As for us, we shall never cease to - repeat: "We shall not make war upon you"; but at the same time we say: "No peace for the time being." 98. Those are the facts. 1 have perhaps strayed somewhat beyond the limits the President laid down for me, but 1 was forced to reply to Mr. Eban's speech. In accordance with the decision it adopted two weeks ago, the Security Council will have to decide whether Qr not it has before it the report containing the Commission's decision. l myself do not think it has. 99. What has actually happened out there is that, after the use of an unfortunate word to which attention was directed out of respect for the rules of procedure, claims that "you have the right ", "you have not the right ", and so on, were made, time was lost and the Chairman did not give his ruling. That is the present situation, and it is really tlJ.e same situation as that in which the Cou.ncil found itself two weeks ago. We wait and hope. If Egypt has committed an act of provocation-which l admit-it did so by its last letter addressed to the Chairman of the Commission on 30 October 1954, in which we asked him to act as soon as possible. We do not say that he should take emergency action, but we use the expression which Mr. Eban has now repeated: the word "soon ". We also ask him to deal with important matters and not with 130 cases involving carnels. 100. Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): At the beginning, the President made an appeal to all representatives to stick to the point under examination as indicated in the 101. nous nous des débats que la Commission mixte d'armistice a A ne réellement quent, ce s'est arrogé le droit le mixte nom à entendu - n'est s'est le de et passé 101. 1 should like to make a few observations about what we have heard this morning. We were told by the representative of Israel that he had put befoîe us "the story of whàt transpired in the Mixed Armistice Commission". To my knowledge, we have received no report from the Mixed Armistice Commission as to what actually transpired within it, and therefore the report which the representative of Israel put before us this morning was a purely one-sided and tendentious report which he assumed the right to put before us. 1 am not aware of the fact that the representative of Israel represents here the Mixed Armistice Commission and can, therefore, speak in its name and seize the Council of what he alleges took place in that Commission. Therefore, what we have heard-whether it is true or false is entirely another matter-is, formally speaking, not at aIl a presentation of what happened in the Mixed Armistice Commission, since the representative of Israel has no right to speak for that body. It is a purely one-sided and, therefore, possibly tendentious report of what happened in the Mixed Armistice Commission. 102. Then, at one point, the representative of Israel was very sorry-" sorry " was not th,:: word, but he said that such and such behaviour on the part of Egypt would " reduce the Mixed Armistice Commission to mockery ". Again, 1 am quoting his words. In view of this, he would seem to be very jealous of the proper activity of the Mixed Armistice Commission. It is a recorded fact in the annals of the United Nations that no one has slighted the activities of the Mixed Armistice Commission concerned with Israel more than Israel itself. It was Israel that boycotted the Israel-Jordanian Mixed Armistice Commission, for instance. There are innumerable records of our own activities here in the Security Council to prove that facto 1 need hardly refer to them. 102. qu'il dérision plus, représentant bonne mistice. nisation travaux Israël. mission mixte de est inutile 103. Then the representative of Israel spoke of the urgency of the matter with which the Mixed Armistice Commission was seized. He was wondering why that urgency was not acted upon by the Mixed Armistice Commission. 1 agree that when there are questions of urgency they should be acted upon urgently, but there are innumerable decisions of the United Nations where a question such as that of the Palestine refugees, for example-and there are a million of them-is described as of the highest urgency but where hardly any really urgent action is taken. Now we are told that in this case, where ooly ten persons are involved and where a regular judicial inves- 103. de était mixte urgente. sont dant sation des des million sans On 104. Again, in some of his language, the representative of Israel uses phrases such as-and 1 shall quote only two-" The Security Council would be acting wisely if. .... -after which he added his prescription of what the Council's action should be-and, on another point, "The Security Council would hardly wish to give serious consideration to... ", whereupon he described the point he had in mind. This is, of course, really an indirect way of telling the Security Council what it ought to do. 1 do not think that that is the proper way to address the Security Council-to say, " The Security Council would be acting wisely if. .. " and "The Security Council would hardly wish to give serious consideration to... ". 1 do not think that it is in keeping with the dignity of the CouDcil at all that it should be addressed in this manner. 105. Moreover, 1 caught about half a dozen or more phrases of extreme dramatization and exaggeration uttered by the representative of Israel. For instance, he referred to the Bat Galim incident as "a major international confiict". Then he spoke of the "indignant retribution of world opinion ", and of the " distortion of thejudicialprocess ". He spoke also of manœuvres being resorted to by Egypt, of mendacious c1aims, of world opinion having been roused by this incident, of "a monstrons international perjury " and of something or other being " an axiomofjudicialdecency ". He said that if a certain accusatiûn were made with sincerity and conviction, something would follow. He spoke of "an unusual episode in the history of the United Nations", of charges being "frivolous ", and so on. 106. This is extreme language: certainly it is not the language which will help us in the Near East at the present moment. And 1 might a~ld, in passing, that it is not the language which is in keeping with the very proper and timely appeal made to aU of us by the President of the Security Council to control ourselves in this debate. 107. But the most striking thing, to my ears, in what the representative of Israel said, was his question, which 1 took down verbatim: "Is it really possible for the human mind to conceive anything more far-fetched than this argument. .. ?"-whatever the argument was. It may weIl be that the particular argument ta which tbe representative of Israel was referring was far-fetched-I am not raising that issue-but it is quite another thing to talk about it in such extreme language. 108. It would be a very interesting exercise for a student of rhetoric and debate to take the very interesting text of the representative of Israel, which we heard this morning, and ta examine it from the point of view of its extremism. 1 suggest very respectfully and very modestly that such language does not help the situation in the Near East at the present moment, no matter what the provocation. 110. Of course, there are wiser men than 1 around tbis table. But 1 seriously doubt whether this phenomenon, which repeats itself indefinitely-namely, the pheno~ menon of Israel's appearing, through its representatives, to get away with almost anything-conduces to peace in the Near East. 1say cc withal most anything " because it is obvious that there is one thing which, in the nature of the case, Israel cannot get away with by these methods-and that is the development, the honest development, of positive relations of trust with its immediate world. In my opinion, it would be far better if the representative of Israel applied his talents to this problem rather than to an indiscriminate attack upon that world. 110. sages phénomène, d'Israël, sentants, nature dis une peut de médiats. beaucoup problème contre ces voisins. 111. et représentant de l'Égypte vient de dire, de dire depuis deux d'hommes ont Unies raisons chacun intention défendront de ceux que à rables entre le normale, faudrait de dans C'est pourquoi j'affirme respectueusement, conviction absolue, que c'est l'initiative Orient, radical Ill. FinaIly, one word about peace and about war in the Near East. 1 repeat what the representative of Egypt has just said, and what 1 have been saying aIl along for two or three years, and what any number of Arab leaders have sp;<Î, but which never receives adequate attention in the councils of the United Nations, for reasons that 1will not go into but that are obvious to everybody-that is, that the Arabs have absolutely no intention ofattacking Israel but that. of course. they will defend themselves if attacked. The passage from this situation to more positive relations of peace between Israel and its immediate world can hardly be helped by these phenomena to which 1 have pointed and wbich keep repeating themselves before us here in the United Nations. 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